The central premise of the book is that time pervades all aspects of warfare, and that it is the “dominant dimension in warfare.”
It has been thirty years since the first edition of Robert Leonhard’s Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War hit shelves—and subsequently the reading lists of professional military education programs—for the first time. Revised in 2017, this treatise on the role of time in war has retained its relevance thanks to both Leonhard’s novel insights, and the unchanging nature of war. An infantryman and educator, Leonhard’s seminal work notably makes use of scientific terms such as frequency and amplitude, vertices, and dimensions. A veteran of Operation DESERT STORM, Leonhard’s career spanned assignments ranging from leading an infantry platoon to commanding a mechanized infantry task force, but also time as a planner, strategist, and concept developer. These wide experiences provided his bona fides, and put him in good standing to critique maneuver warfare as he did in his first book, 1991’s The Art of Maneuver. His study of the centrality of time in war has proven to be an enduring work for planners and futurists, and is worth review given the shift towards large-scale combat operations.
The central premise of the book is that time pervades all aspects of warfare, and that it is the “dominant dimension in warfare.” Leonhard, using a multitude of historical examples, argues that military conflict of all types, when it is “reduced to its fundamentals,” is a “contest for time.” His assertion is simple, and easily demonstrated when viewing operations through the framework of tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, how fast a unit can seize key terrain, the arrival of local reinforcements, the servicing of a target—all are heavily influenced by temporal factors, and each can determine the outcome of an engagement. At the operational level, the days of supply for an armored force will influence operational reach and culmination. Even at the strategic level, time plays a role; will public support wane during a long conflict? Does a protracted war favor either combatant? Time—and the struggle for the mastery of time—certainly pervades the levels of war using this lens.
Leonhard maintains that “the most important strategic military problem for the United States is time.” Invoking the Cold War, Leonhard highlights soldier and author Chris Bellamy’s observation that “If the Warsaw Pact were to punch through to the Rhine by day five of a war, it would not be because the American Army was not big enough. It would be because they were not there in time.” A 2016 RAND wargame seems to have affirmed this theory, when it found that it would only take sixty hours—at the longest—for Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn or Riga. It does not take a strategist to see the time-distance problems that currently exist in multiple theaters, and the associated advantage for a local actor as opposed to one that must deploy across vast distances.
Some of Leonhard’s points seem to already be unconsciously accepted as fact, which is a credit to his reasoning. A survey of quotes from the great captains and theorists of history points to the obvious point that time is a key variable in war. Sun Tzu wrote that speed is the “essence of war,” and Napoleon once told one of his subordinates, “ask me for anything you like, except time.” Leonhard, then, has not stumbled upon something new when he articulates the importance of time in war, but he elevates traditional considerations to the strategic level. Posture conversations, for example, are informed in part by time—if there is a decrease in forward stationing, there is an increased importance on forces arriving “in time” to deter aggression, or respond and make a difference. The author makes the point that in a time of decreased forward presence, strategic lift becomes “unquestionably our most important asset in fighting by minutes.” In this way, it is clear why Leonhard calls time the “common denominator in all American strategic formulation.”
Leonhard urges the reader to consider what he calls the temporal aspects of war: duration, frequency, sequence, and opportunity at every level of war.
The ideas and passages highlighted here are only a fraction of the topics the author covers. Leonhard urges the reader to consider what he calls the temporal aspects of war: duration, frequency, sequence, and opportunity at every level of war. Of these characteristics, Leonhard writes that duration is the most difficult one for the commander to control; he associates duration more with the purview of policymakers than operational commanders. He describes frequency in war as the pace of events, by unit, in war—what can a unit do, or not do to an adversary in a given period of time. Sequencing ties to what Leonhard calls the “most important” question in war— “what follows?” While current concepts propound simultaneity, Leonhard emphasizes the “power of sequential operation” (and the “reality of actual conflict”) and the importance of considering branches and sequels. Lastly, Leonhard stresses the role of time in opportunity— “an opportunity is a decision point,” he writes, but it cannot be left at that—opportunity is a “time-sensitive decision point,” the impact of which cannot be overstated.
Additionally, Leonhard builds on some of the foundational thinking done by famed military theorist J.F.C. Fuller, and outlines the idea of like-system fighting (versus unlike-system fighting), wherein tankers train to kill tanks, artillerymen “glory in the counter-fire fight,” and infantrymen “train primarily to kill other infantrymen.” While this might be a minor exaggeration, there are serious implications for an army that abides by doctrine biased towards like-system warfare.
The general feeling of Fighting by Minutes is that it is a book written by a practitioner, for practitioners. Thirty years after its initial publication, Fighting by Minutes clearly remains a worthwhile read as the joint force grapples with how to counter peer and near-peer competitors. While Leonhard’s classic work is best suited for planners, it may also appeal to those simply seeking to do some deep thinking about the conduct of modern war. No one can predict the exact character of the United States’ next war, but it is a valid assumption that time will remain a critical, if not the critical, determinant. As Leonhard notes in the introduction to the 2017 second edition, when it comes to future conflicts, “at the center of it all will be a contest for time.”
Rick Chersicla is an Army Strategist currently serving in a joint headquarters in Europe. Rick is a 2025 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: U.S. military personnel arrive aboard a C-5A Galaxy aircraft during Operation Desert Shield, January 23, 1991.
Photo Credit: Courtesy of the National Archives Catalog, Combined Military Service Digital Photographic Files