Russian innovations with short/medium-range hypersonic weapons present the main challenge to the United States.
As the conflict in Ukraine continues into its fourth full year of full-scale war and with the entrance of a new U.S. presidential administration, the security environment for the United States vis-à-vis Russia has changed rapidly. Russian lessons learned, strategic innovations, and battlefield successes and failures have generated new challenges that will threaten U.S. national security in the near term. Within this article, a strategic threat is defined as a factor that denies or mitigates the United States’ ability to employ its current warfighting doctrine, conduct combat operations, or effectively protect its allies. Despite the recent focus on Russian ground operations, in the next 3-5 years, the most prominent Russian strategic threats to the United States will be advancements in hypersonic technology, Russia’s use of its regional and global partnerships to bolster munitions production, and Russia’s leveraging of partnerships to expand its geographic advantage. Also, Russia’s massed offensive maneuver capability will remain a challenge but likely will decrease over the next 2-3 years as the Russians seek to reconstitute their losses.
Emerging Threat #1-Advanced Weapons Development: Hypersonic Missiles
Russian innovations with short/medium-range hypersonic weapons present the main challenge to the United States. These weapons can destabilize the current offense-defense balance that informs the military strategy for both the United States and Russia. The new Russian Khinzal and Zircon hypersonic missiles can defeat U.S. and European air defenses not only through the massing of effects, supported by Russia’s increased production rates, but also due to the weapons ability to maintain its radar defeating plasma layer through the terminal phase when striking static targets. This capability would tilt the offensive advantage in favor of Russia, which could conduct strikes on strategic infrastructure across Europe that hinders the U.S. ability to respond to adversary aggression or come to the aid of NATO allies with resources both inside and outside the theater of operations.
The urgency to address this threat grows more pressing for several reasons. First, due to the relative success of the Patriot air defense system in Ukraine against Iskander, Kalibr, and Geran-2 drones, NATO and the United States have doubled down on investments in these systems. Several countries, including Germany and Romania, are actively pursuing the procurement of additional batteries, while the United States is investing in expanding interceptor and platform production. Expanded focus on the Patriot system as a European shield consumes large amounts of precious capital with little tangible alternative if a superior weapon renders that investment obsolete. Second, Russia’s hypersonic weapons are increasing their effectiveness against the Patriots. In early 2024, Russian and Ukrainian sources reported the employment of Zircon hypersonic missiles in Ukraine. Officials claimed Patriots intercepted only one Zircon, which departs from this system’s typically high intercept rate. Finally, with its mass serial production announced in February 2024 and the development of a ground-based launcher, the Zircons’ initial effectiveness over the Patriot system threatens to negate the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO air defense in the region. Furthermore, considering the similar $3 million cost of Patriot interceptors and Zircon missiles, Russia will seek to harness its increased industrial production base over the next several years to outproduce the West. These factors will support Russia’s drive to gain an asymmetric advantage over Western air defenses. If achieved, this advantage will enable Russia to target infrastructure critical to U.S. warfighting and ally support at its chosen time.
Emerging Threat #2-Russia’s Alliances: Munitions and Manpower
In the immediate future, Russia’s strengthening of alliances with regional and global partners will increasingly challenge the United States. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) echoes this sentiment, indicating that due to deteriorating Western relations, Russia will continue to expand ties with countries in its Near- and Far-East.
Russia’s partnerships open avenues for increased munition sourcing and combat power replacement. Russia has already demonstrated the impact of this threat in Ukraine by procuring thousands of conventional munitions from North Korea and acquiring drones from Iran. The initial augmentation of ammunition supply now appears to be transitioning into a permanent arrangement as North Korean facilities operate at max capacity to sustain Russian demand. Similarly, Russia and Iran have deepened their material cooperation, including the transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles and the establishment of domestic Shahed/Geran drone production. These relationships dubbed the “Arsenal of Autocracy” by the Atlantic Council, allow Russia to receive critical conventional ammunition, thereby allowing their domestic production lines to focus on missile and rocket production that directly facilitates the first threat outlined above.
This Arsenal of Autocracy has also become a conduit through which Russia seeks to replenish manpower in recent months. In October 2024, news outlets first reported that North Korea had dispatched 1,500 special forces soldiers to Russia for potential use in combat operations in Ukraine. This estimate swelled to nearly 12,000 at the end of 2024, and despite reported heavy losses, North Korea continues preparing to deploy further troops to the region. The provision of not only weapons but also manpower further underscores how the deepening of ties between Russia and its Arsenal of Autocracy partners will complicate the security environment in the coming years, not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific.
Emerging Threat #3-Russia’s Alliances: Geographic Advantages
The third emerging threat, Russia’s gaining of geographic advantage and positioning, also derives from its increased relations with regional partners. This threat primarily stems from Russia’s increasing control of Belarus but can also benefit Russia in areas where it seeks to project power to counter U.S. moves. With the Russian army suffering devastating losses in Ukraine, some argue that Russia would be incapable of affecting NATO countries after only taking 18% of Ukrainian territory. However, the United States must not discount the advantage that geographical placement would provide to Russian ground forces. As seen in 2008, 2014, and even in the limited gains of 2022, geographical proximity played a pivotal role in the rapid seizure of land by Russian troops. This threat will grow as Russia seeks to increase its ties and influence with regional partners that may be willing to host Russian forces.
The Russian-Belarus exercises in early 2022, which became the northern invasion axis, clearly demonstrated that Russia can utilize its allies’ territory to devastating effect.
Russia has already used cooperation with Belarus to improve its military posture. The Russia-Belarus exercises in early 2022, which became the northern invasion axis, clearly demonstrated that Russia can utilize its allies’ territory to devastating effect. In two to three years, strengthening of regional partnerships can likely allow Russia to place reconstituted forces permanently or via “joint exercises” in nearby territories, threatening the Baltics or Ukraine once again. This type of posturing will directly threaten the U.S. strategic interests as a Russian presence outside its borders will decrease transparency of pending operations, as was the case with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. Additionally, it would increase the reaction time of a NATO/U.S. response if Russia conducted a swift, limited action, likely resulting in their ability to achieve fait accompli objectives. Each of these outcomes would be unacceptable to the United States, reinforcing that Russia’s renewed efforts to seek a geographic advantage through its allies will only increase as a threat in the coming years.
Diminished Threat- Massed Maneuver Potential
Though Russia poses several growing strategic threats to the United States, its ability to conduct large-scale operations will likely decrease over the next 2-3 years. In the initial phases of the Ukrainian invasion, Russia committed many of its most cohesive, well-trained and -equipped ground units, which suffered severe losses and withdrew for reconstitution. Most recent Russian offensive operations have occurred only at the company level or below. Until the war concludes, this scale of operations will likely continue for the next two years as units continue to reconstitute. There are conflicting reports on the time it will take for Russia to reconstitute its forces, with Lithuanian officials estimating 2-3 years. At the same time, former Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell asserts that Russia has already reconstituted its forces. Even if Russia fills its manning charts and delivers new equipment, its capability to operate at echelon and scale in a manner that poses an offensive threat to the United States is likely several years in the future. The ATA underscores this assessment, stating that Russia will face a multi-year recovery and must rely on other strategic capabilities and avenues such as those discussed above.
Way Forward
The war in Ukraine ravaged Russia and its military; however, after three years of warfare, some threats that the United States faces grow while others have weakened. While the Russian threat of massed maneuver operations and offensive potential has receded, the development of hypersonic weapons and the strengthening of strategic partnerships to sustain operations and gain geographic advantage represent growing challenges to the United States’ ability to operate in the region. With increasingly effective Russian missiles posing to overwhelm Western air defense and Russian-aligned partners willing to ease the munition burden for Russia and provide geographic advantage for future operations, the United States must reorient its strategy to meet these challenges. By identifying emerging threats early on, the United States can focus on and reprioritize its defense spending, innovation, and diplomatic power in areas to counter them. For example, U.S. investments in weapons innovation on technology such as next-generation full-band Patriot radar and its own hypersonic capability can aid in restoring the regional offense-defense balance. Economically, the Institute for the Study of War proposes that the West could sanction Belarus in kind with Russia. This action could not only stifle munition provision and sanction evasion but also discourage Belarus from fully integrating with Russia, thereby decreasing the likelihood of unrestricted troop access inside the country. Finally, U.S. and allied national decisionmakers can pursue more unconventional means to disrupt the flow of munitions into Russia from its allies. The United States, NATO allies, or partners like Ukraine could employ, or support, covert action to target production facilities or logistical sites that transfer munitions to Russia. Doing so may provide a way for the United States to disrupt the threat presented by Russia’s Arsenal of Autocracy. A renewed strategic emphasis by the U.S. interagency and our NATO allies on the threats outlined above remains critical to meeting, countering, and overcoming the challenges the Russian military poses in the coming years.
Eric J. Uribe is a major in the U.S. Army and a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), with an area concentration in Europe. He holds a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service with a concentration in International Security. Prior to service as a FAO he served in a variety of armor assignments, including command at the company level and has previously deployed to Afghanistan and Eastern Europe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: The 3M22 Zircon is a Russian scramjet-powered, nuclear-capable hypersonic cruise missile. Produced by NPO Mashinostroyeniya for the Russian Navy, the missile utilizes the 3S-14 launch platforms on frigates and submarines. The missile has a reported top speed of Mach 9. The weapon was first used during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Photo Credit: Courtesy of Минобороны РФ via Wikimedia Commons