“I can’t predict the future, but I would bet the non-kinetic effects will reign supreme…What if we did not have to produce sorties to achieve the same effect? What if a future small diameter bomb looks like ones and zeros?”
– Gen CQ Brown, 22nd chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force.
Old battlespace notions of soldiers, tanks, artillery, cruise missiles, and airstrikes on a traditional battlefield are becoming less relevant in a growing era of conflict and competition. Even in the early phases of the war in Ukraine, as Russian forces assaulted Ukrainian military units and cities with only mixed success, their military actions largely failed to overcome Ukrainian hybrid defense actions–ambushes, resistance forces, and robust information operations. Speaking at the Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference on 13 November, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General CQ Brown told the audience that kinetic warfare was going the way of Blockbuster. General Brown further added “I can’t predict the future, but I would bet the non-kinetic effects will reign supreme…What if we did not have to produce sorties to achieve the same effect? What if a future small diameter bomb looks like ones and zeros?”
The industrial way of fighting is antiquated and has given way to the informational way. The safety and security that the U.S. felt with two major oceans separating it from Europe and Asia – and friendly neighbors like Canada and Mexico – is no longer a given. The digital age, its associated technologies, and the 4.9 billion internet users worldwide are transforming governments, societies, and militaries in one important way – they are under constant attack. To what extent is the U.S. responding?
Not enough, and the attacks are growing in frequency, intensity, and sophistication. “Thought Bombs” are already being used by the Chinese and Russians (and other adversaries) to kill Americans in a way that was not possible in a pre-internet era.
President Biden’s claim that some online discourse on social media platforms were “killing people” has merit. A 2020 journal article estimated that at least 800 people had died due to ingesting dangerous COVID-19 treatments spread online through misinformation. With over 900,000 Americans having died due to COVID-19, tens of thousands of Americans could arguably have been killed by social media warriors working on behalf of Beijing and Moscow spreading mis- and disinformation. Other adversarial operations in the cyber domain are influencing Americans into thinking that: COVID-19 is not real, masks don’t work, herd immunity will save us, utilizing unproven treatments, vaccines are dangerous, and other anti-science viewpoints.
While U.S. leaders debate how many more F-35s are needed and if the Navy needs to build more ships to keep pace with China, adversaries pursue cheaper alternatives that damage the U.S. without having to fire a shot. Lithuanian defense officials briefed me in September 2021 on how the Russians were spending approximately $4 billion a year (comparable value) on cyber-influence operations against the West. While it is unknown how much the Chinese are spending on cyber and information warfare, analysts believe that Beijing has “redirected as much as 20 to 30 percent more funding” to these endeavors. Moreover, since 2019, China has increasingly adopted Russian influence tactics, with one prominent researcher noting that “significant human and financial resources are being devoted to the disinformation effort.”
Such information campaigns have contributed to hyper-polarization and schismogenesis (i.e. creation of divisions) in civil society in the U.S., Europe, and other democratic nations – and many militaries have not adapted. Instead, military leaders are more concerned about developing war-fighting concepts, such as Joint All Domain Operations (JADO), for some sort of conventionally styled hyperwar (e.g. artificial intelligence, network-centric, etc.,) against China or Russia. However, China and Russia do not want to give the U.S. the war that it wants, namely major combat operations. This translates into poor American and allied preparation for expected conflict in the South China Sea and against a NATO ally in Eastern Europe. Even with Russia’s “conventional, bloody warfare” in Ukraine, concerted efforts by pro-Russian social media influencers – like “the Texan trolling for Putin” – seem bent on undermining European and American resolve and political willpower to support Ukraine.
China, Russia, and other adversaries have figured out the lessons of what happens when the U.S. military is directly confronted, as seen in Iraq in 1991 – and again in 2003. America’s enemies understand that the nature of American political willpower is directly linked to the likelihood of the U.S. mobilizing and projecting great amounts of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Hence, there is every incentive to cause damage against the U.S. on par with another Pearl Harbor or 9/11 but without provoking a major American response. This is why China and Russia increasingly pursue sociopolitical-information warfare strategies against the U.S. and other Western democratic nations. Inflicting damage against civil society “by amplifying racial, cultural, political and religious cleavages” weakens democratic institutions, norms, and values – not to mention preventing the creation of coherent policies to confront China and Russia. Adversaries exploit this new battlespace blind spot and prevent a robust Western response.
From creating conspiracy theories and generating disinformation about COVID-19 and fueling misinformation about various contentious issues throughout the U.S., adversaries are proving they can achieve damaging effects on the American homeland without spending billions of dollars on advanced munitions and expensive weapon systems. Adversaries get away with such influence operations that damage the U.S. because of the attribution problem. Being unable to clearly identify whether an information operation against the U.S. is intentional, through a state-funded proxy, or just normal civil society discourse (that is sometimes amplified by foreign social media warriors), stymies attempts at a response. By virtue of creating enough information chaos and uncertainty, it can be difficult for the U.S. and allies to respond with any instrument of national power.
This weakness in the mental paradigm of Western thinking about non-kinetic threats and intangible damage will continue being exploited by anti-Western actors unless major reforms are undertaken across government and military institutions.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an easier example of directly attributing aggression. For instance, one U.S. Senator suggested that a cyberattack against Ukrainian energy infrastructure could lead to invoking NATO Article 5 (Collective Defense), because it would cause power outages in neighboring NATO member states “that in turn could affect U.S. troops based in Eastern Europe, for example, if suddenly hospitals are shut down.” However, no one has suggested that Article 5 could be invoked in response to Chinese and Russian influence operations against the U.S. and NATO allies – even though they are causing tremendous damage against civil society and political institutions in the U.S. and across Europe. This weakness in the mental paradigm of Western thinking about non-kinetic threats and intangible damage will continue being exploited by anti-Western actors unless major reforms are undertaken across government and military institutions.
There are four major steps needed for the U.S. to better defend the American Homeland, which are crucial for adapting to growing dependencies on the internet and social media for the functioning of governments, economies, and societies.
First, elected leaders at the local, state, and federal levels must recognize – regardless of party affiliation – the substantial damage being inflicted by foreign actors through social media to kill Americans, weaken the economy, and undermine the U.S. military. This means U.S. politicians must understand the new battlespace in which foreign actors weaponize reality to turn Americans against one another. It means that any sort of partisan rhetoric will be utilized by foreign actors to amplify divisions and to further polarize Americans, hoping to weaken the U.S. Thus, while some partisanship and divisive rhetoric is top-down, there can be similarly corrosive behaviors from the bottom-up, like the trucker protest rallies in Canada and Washington DC meant to protest vaccine requirements. The bipartisan Cyberspace Solarium Commission is a step in the right direction for better defending cyberspace in the Homeland, with policy proposals meant to “diminish the prevalence of disinformation in the information ecosystem and build greater individual and societal resilience to disinformation and malign foreign influence.” However, policy proposals do not work if toxic political rhetoric continues, which has contributed to a plurality of Americans thinking a future civil war is likely. Elected leaders must be more judicious in their tweets, media appearances, and rallies, because foreign adversaries will weaponize statements.
Second, much like the First Amendment does not allow someone to yell “Fire!” in a crowded movie theater, the equivalent is happening every minute on social media causing chaos and violence. For example the 2020 Nashville Christmas suicide bomber was motivated by social media conspiracies about 5G technology, as well as the Pizza Gate conspiracy. Now with almost 2 years of COVID-19 dis- and misinformation causing disorder in America as some citizens are influenced into anti-science ideas. Legal reforms are needed, such as Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, to bring enforcement against social media platforms that are allowing extremist rhetoric, propaganda, and dangerous information to be spread, potentially hurting Americans. Additionally, it means investigating social media behavior of individuals espousing extremist views, to confirm whether these are genuine Americans – and whether they are being funded (possibly cryptocurrency) and communicating with foreign agents. Resolving many of these legal issues and potential loopholes might require external coordination between U.S. cyber defense agencies and ally and partner institutions dedicated to removing damaging social media information emanating from adversarial states. For instance, Latvian and Lithuanian StratCom (Strategic Communication) personnel – inside government and military organizations – work towards identifying influence operations meant to weaken their societies.
Third, each U.S. government agency and Department of Defense will need to integrate inter-agency capabilities and joint responses to mobilize strategic communication capabilities against adversaries trying to create a chaotic information environment to degrade and disrupt the power of the U.S. government to respond domestically, and to project strength globally. As noted by top U.S. intelligence officials, there is also great concern that strategic competitors might target critical U.S. infrastructure in the next crisis as a way of delaying, disrupting, and degrading an American response. Given that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prevents the U.S. Armed Forces from operating on American soil, more U.S. agencies should be given more capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities to ensure that the American public and infrastructure are defended from foreign actors and domestic extremists.
Finally, the average American must be a part of the solution and contribute to the resilience of civil society. Critical thinking skills and resisting foreign attempts to polarize and divide Americans along various societal cleavages, also means not sharing divisive meme created by an adversary. Culture wars of words have been monetized in media, and as long as such hyperbolic, extremist debates drive ratings, the public will be polarized – as will be elected leaders – undermining any viable long-term strategies that promote U.S. national interests domestically and abroad. Changing the business model will be difficult, but this might require Congress to provide clearer FCC rules that compel cable news channels to be more explicit and transparent about shows that are opinion-driven, instead of news-fact driven. It may sound like a radical idea, but any channel with “news” in it, should show a disclaimer during all biased opinion shows, reminding viewers it is not news and for entertainment purposes only. Finally, it would also mean getting adversarial foreign money out of U.S. based news organizations, because of slanted reporting that may be of real strategic importance to the U.S. The next crisis America faces – domestically or internationally – will be defined by how well agencies and the military adapts to and responds in a highly contested information environment. Thus far, Western society has managed to overwhelmingly respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine across the informational spectrum, but this means a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan will hinge on the ability of Beijing to create uncertainty about their actions – and to undermine domestic support among Western citizens for an intervention.
Lt Col Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, Ph.D., (@JaharaMatisek) is a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute (HDI) and recently led HDI research teams to Eastern Europe. He is an active duty U.S. Air Force pilot serving as associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and is the director of fellows for the Irregular Warfare Initiative. His forthcoming book, Old and New Battlespaces, describes how adversaries use strategic schismogenesis and employ sociopolitical-information warfare to weaponize everything in society, as every citizen becomes a combatant.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force Academy, U.S. Air Force or the Department of Defense. (PA#: USAFA-DF-2021-410)
Photo Description: Photo Taken of the 2014 Euromaidan ‘War Pokémon’ at the NGO “Come Back Alive” in Kyiv, Ukraine, August 2021, by Jahara Matisek. There is dual meaning to this art: Pokémon are popular anime characters and Ukrainian military slang refers to an upgraded Kalashnikov machine-gun as a Pokémon.
Photo Credit: Jahara Matisek