While most Americans would be hard pressed to locate Moldova or Georgia on a map, these elections serve as a lesson in how Russia employs hybrid warfare to undermine U.S. security and advance Russia’s interests globally.
In the fall of 2024, both the Republic of Moldova and the country of Georgia held major and contentious national elections, the results of which sent shockwaves through their respective societies, as well as the international community more broadly. While Moldova managed to remain on its pro-European path, Georgia’s “Georgian Dream” Party, a pro-Russian party in power since 2012, won again despite mass outrage and accusations of election interference. While most Americans would be hard pressed to locate Moldova or Georgia on a map, these elections serve as a lesson in how Russia employs hybrid warfare (an effort to shape the global environment primarily through information manipulation) to undermine U.S. security and advance Russia’s interests globally.
Moldovan Election
On October 20, 2024, the people of Moldova took a stand against Russian interference in their country, voting to permanently embed European integration in the constitution. Additionally, President Maya Sandu, Moldova’s pro-EU leader, was re-elected to a second term in a run-off election held on November 3. The votes for both European integration and for a Sandu second term were hardly won by a wide margin. Despite early polling indicating a roughly four to five percent advantage for the pro-EU vote, the final tally was a mere 50.46 percent in favor. In the first round, Sandu fell short of the 50 percent needed to win outright, receiving only 42.45 percent of the vote, as her rival, Alexandr Stoianoglo, backed by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists, received approximately 25 percent of the vote. In the second round, Sandu received approximately 55 percent of the vote, ultimately beating out Stoianoglo. A large part of the pro-EU victory in both the referendum and the presidential election was thanks to the Moldovan diaspora, living largely in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. In each election, before the Moldovan diaspora vote was fully counted, it briefly seemed that the country would swing away from the West.
Moldovan officials have highlighted the alarming and heavy-handed role that Russia played in this election through vote buying and an aggressive disinformation campaign, pointing to this involvement as the cause of the near failure of the European integration project. These reports are backed by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) election observations and Freedom House preelection assessments. This is not the first time the country has faced such pressures from Moscow.
On November 12, 2024, the U.S. Helsinki Commission hosted a briefing on “Moldova’s European Future” in which the panelists discussed how Russia leverages vulnerabilities in Moldovan society to undermine its democracy and development. The vulnerabilities identified included internal divisions along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines; energy dependence; financial weaknesses; and the frozen conflict in the Russian-separatist region of Transnistria. Weaknesses in Moldovan media were also highlighted, including ownership of major media sources by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan oligarch living in exile in Russia, and Russian covert influence over media narratives through disinformation campaigns. Moldova also struggles with wide-reaching corruption. These vulnerabilities make Moldova a critical front for Russia’s war against the United States, NATO, and the West. If Russia can undermine the development of Moldovan democracy and interrupt its European integration, it can maintain a presence on the border with Romania, a NATO ally and EU member.
Georgian Election
In the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections, Georgians had the option between the incumbent, pro-Russia Georgian Dream party or the pro-EU and -Western opposition. When the results rolled in, Georgian Dream claimed victory, taking 54 percent of the vote and retaining control over the parliament. Still, opposition parties and international election observers, including the OSCE, have accused the ruling party of rigging the ballot, buying votes, and intimidating voters and the media of promoting political propaganda and disinformation.
Additionally, Salome Zourabichvili, Georgia’s president (a role that is largely ceremonial and holds little power), rejected the results, calling on Georgians to protest against Georgian Dream. She stated, “This election cannot be recognized, because it is the recognition of Russia’s intrusion here, Georgia’s subordination to Russia.” This election comes on the tail of the June “foreign influence law,” which critics see as a copycat of a similar Russian law and which seeks to curtail media freedom in Georgia.
Like Moldova, Georgia’s internal weaknesses are being exploited by the Kremlin. Though 79 percent of the Georgian population holds pro-European sentiments, the increasingly autocratic government driven by the parliament has made it difficult for the population to enact its EU aspirations. Further, Zourabichvili and nearly all opposition parties have refused to accept the results reported by the election authorities alleging Russian disinformation was widespread in the leadup to the election. In Georgia, though, it takes a different shape than in Moldova, where the disinformation is traced directly back to Russia. With Georgia, the Kremlin relies mainly on the Georgian Dream party to promote its message and execute its goals, to great effect.
Beyond potential interference in this election, Russia has long exerted influence over Georgia directly and indirectly.
The election results sparked outrage and widespread protests, such as on November 11, when thousands rallied in Tbilisi waving Georgian and EU flags and demanding a new election with increased international monitoring. Later in November, protestors clashed violently with police, who responded with tear gas and water cannons. Recently, journalists and opposition leaders have been under attack, and a new president, Mikheil Kavelashvili, has been sworn in despite President Zourabichvili’s denial of her successor’s legitimacy, claiming he was appointed by an illegitimate parliament elected in a fraudulent election.
Beyond potential interference in this election, Russia has long exerted influence over Georgia directly and indirectly. Directly—like in Moldova’s Transnistria region—Russia has deployed troops into Georgia, supporting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2008, and in 2024 satellite imagery revealed the construction of a new Russian naval base in Ochamchire. Indirectly, the Kremlin backs pro-Russia actors, engages in disinformation campaigns, and exerts substantial economic influence over Georgia. As a result, Georgia, once viewed as a beacon of democratic hope in the Caucuses, appears to be caught in a cycle of democratic backsliding that has given Western leaders pause and interrupted integration with the EU, thus allowing the Kremlin to gradually strengthen its influence over Georgia and therefore maintain a presence in the Caucasus.
So What?
Vladimir Putin is explicitly concerned with the futures of Moldova and Georgia. As former Soviet republics, the Kremlin considers these countries as within its “sphere of influence” and seeks to maintain control over them. Because of the overt and easily documented nature of Russia’s interference in Moldova and Georgia, these elections provide important insight into how the Kremlin operates as it seeks to exert influence globally and compete with the United States by disrupting fragile democracies and destabilizing key regions. Ultimately, these case studies demonstrate the very real security threat posed by Russian hybrid warfare and the integration of multiple elements of power to shape the environment below the level of actual conflict.
By studying the patterns of interference observed in Moldova and Georgia, U.S. decision makers can better understand how Russia seeks to disrupt the United States from within—something particularly important in an age of strategic competition. During the 2024 U.S. presidential election, reports of Russian interference were extensive. On September 4, the U.S. Justice Department announced the seizure of thirty-two internet domains linked with Russian foreign malign influence campaigns aimed at affecting the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. In the days leading up to the election, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials warned of an increase in alarmist fake articles and videos undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process. On election day, polling locations in Georgia, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania received hoax bomb threats linked to Russian e-mail domains. These efforts are illustrative of how Russia seeks to utilize disinformation and hybrid warfare to erode trust in institutions and promote partisan divides, thereby weakening the United States and undermining its role as a global leader.
Recommendations
The United States needs to make a concerted effort to strengthen its anti-disinformation campaign, both within the United States and globally, focusing on providing counter-narratives to Kremlin talking points and educating populations on identifying disinformation. Historically U.S. funding for publications such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America have provided multi-lingual, reliable information to groups vulnerable to Russian propaganda, the importance of which cannot be overstated for U.S. security. The United States must also support partner countries, like Moldova, in their efforts to strengthen media freedom, diversify journalism, block Russian ownership over media outlets, and translate state and independent news into minority languages.
Domestically, the U.S. government must protect its citizenry from Russian disinformation and hybrid warfare. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, disinformation campaigns require first the construction of a false narrative, then the broad amplification of the narrative, and finally, concealment or obfuscation of the origins of the narrative. The best way to protect a community from falling victim to a narrative is to “pre-bunk” it, that is, to identify it before its amplification and construct an early and aggressive counter-narrative. The counter-narrative should highlight and repeat the false narrative and educate people on their own vulnerability to disinformation. There will undoubtedly be challenges to implementing these steps in the United States, primarily related to an increasingly fragmented media environment, accusations of partisanship, and disagreement over what is considered disinformation. However, Russian election interference in Moldova and Georgia is only the latest example of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare to promote its interests, and given Russia’s history and worldview, this behavior will continue in an age of strategic competition. As such, U.S. decision makers and Western leaders must understand Russia’s efforts and take action to inoculate their populations against these tactics in the future. Failure to do so puts American unity and leadership at risk.
Anna Harvey is a Research Intern at the American Foreign Policy Council, working for their Russia-Ukraine Program and Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. She holds a master’s degree from Stanford University’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies. In 2022 to 2023, she was awarded a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant position to Cahul State University “B. P. Hasdeu” in Moldova, where she directed a project educating local teachers on countering Russian disinformation in the classroom. Previously, she has interned at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies in Tartu, Estonia, and at War Room.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Maia Sandu, President of the Republic of Moldova speaking in the War in Europe: Year 2 session at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2023 in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, 17 January.
Photo Credit: Courtesy of World Economic Forum/Sikarin Fon Thanachaiary