Disclaimer: The systems, processes and views described in this book reflect the judgments and interpretations of authors and editors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or positions of the Department of the Army (DA), the Department of Defense (DOD), or the U.S. Government. The text is a synthesis and interpretation of existing and developing Army and Joint systems, processes and procedures as currently practiced and is intended only for instructional purposes within the U.S. Army War College and as an informal desk reference for its graduates and other interested organizations and project officers.
The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) is proud to present the 27th Edition of *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2009-2010*. Publication of this text at this time, when the Army is simultaneously in the midst of a long war, fundamentally reorganizing its formations, and executing formidable base closure and restationing actions, gives credence to the enduring truth that in order to be successful the Army must sustain and improve itself while it is fully committed to the Nation's bidding. The systems and processes documented and explained in this work are designed to do just that.

This edition is being released electronically on both fixed media (CD) and on the USAWC Internet site at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/htar2009.htm. It will also be published in hard copy. The CD includes the ability to link to our Internet site where changes will be posted between complete updates.

This text was prepared under the direction of the faculty of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. It is intended to be used in an academic environment during the study of the systems and processes used to develop and sustain trained and ready combat forces to be used by the Combatant Commanders. It has also found great utility as a reference for those who actually use and “run” the organizations, systems, and processes described.

Every effort has been made to ensure that the text accurately describes the systems and processes as they are. While there is no intent to advocate either the reform of the described systems or their continuance, the text does provide a foundation of knowledge for those who are charged with developing potential reforms.

We look forward to your comments regarding the value of the text to you and to your organization.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Williams
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

Enclosure
This text is designed to explain and synthesize the functioning and relationships of numerous Defense, Joint, and Army organization, systems, and processes involved in the development and sustainment of trained and ready forces for the Combatant Commanders.

It is intended to be used by the faculty and students at the U.S. Army War College (as well as other training and educational institutions) as they improve their knowledge and understanding of "How the Army Runs." We are proud of the value that senior commanders and staffs have placed in this text over the years and are pleased to continue to provide this reference.

The text is revised every two years as we strive to capture the most up-to-date information available. This involves the synthesis of a wide array of published and unpublished references from a variety of sources. Necessarily, there is a point in time at which updates must stop.

This volume contains our best description of the systems, processes, and organizations as of March 2009; however, we caution the reader that there may be some inaccuracies as the system or process may have evolved from the description in the text.

We encourage all readers to contribute to its continued development and improvement. Please send your recommendations for changes, improvements, and additions to the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-5240, ATTN: Editor, "How the Army Runs."

To the maximum extent possible these changes will be posted to our Internet site pending the next complete update. The text can also be accessed over the Internet at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/decl/htar2009.htm.

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The U.S. Army War College also extends its appreciation to the staff and faculty of the Army Force Management School and other contributing organizations for their efforts in the publication of this text.

[Signature]

Harold W. Lord
Colonel, U.S. Army Retired
Editor, "How the Army Runs"
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Chapter 1

Introduction

“It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States,... supporting the national policies,... implementing national objectives and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. [The Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.’Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062 a and b.

Section I
Fulfilling the Intent of the Congress

1–1. Changing How We Manage Change

a. Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of Section 3062 of Title 10 United States Code are formidable tasks. The Army is a dynamic organization that must constantly change to adapt to changing threats and challenges to the Nation’s security and the assignment of new missions to fully execute the range of responsibilities identified in the National Security and Defense Strategies. The Army must be capable of accomplishing the full range of missions ranging from domestic disaster relief and homeland security (HLS) through major combat operations and stability and reconstruction operations across the full spectrum of conflict. This requires the continual adaptation and development across the Army’s Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Training, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains.

b. Today, the Nation remains engaged in an era of persistent conflict, a period of protracted confrontation against adversaries willing to use any and all means at their disposal to achieve their political and ideological ends. The wars that we are fighting in this new era are unlike any other in American history; wars in which military forces operating among the people will decide the outcome. The United States Army, with its singular ability to achieve decisive effects on land, is at the forefront of this struggle, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but throughout the world. In addition to meeting the demands of persistent conflict, the Army is undergoing its largest, most comprehensive transformation since World War II. We are midway through our transition to a modular force, capable of deploying, fighting and winning anywhere in the world. At the same time, we are continuously developing breakthrough technologies and capabilities that will help us win current and future conflicts.

c. Changing large organizations with well-developed cultures embedded in established bureaucracies can be incredibly difficult. Functioning complex organizational systems and embedded processes can tend to resist change or cause change to become more evolutionary in nature. The Army’s systems and processes outlined in this text are no exception. The Army has the internal challenge to ensure these processes are both flexible and adaptable to facilitate and not impede change as the Army incorporates flexible and adaptive processes to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, inspire creativity and rapidly incorporate technological, cognitive, and organizational innovations. By describing these systems with this text, the authors do not intend to advocate their continued use nor indirectly resist their modification or wholesale reform. Instead, this text is intended to be a reference for educating our leaders so that they may make informed decisions on how these organizations, systems, and processes work to provide a basis of knowledge. This knowledge allows leaders to determine how systems and processes can be used or changed to better serve our Soldiers and our nation. This text should provide a basis of understanding that empowers continued change and the eventual transformation in How the Army Runs.

1–2. Managing The Army

“The U.S. Army today is a battle-hardened force whose volunteer Soldiers have performed with courage, resourcefulness, and resilience in the most grueling conditions. They’ve done so under the unforgiving glare of the 24-hour news cycle that leaves little room for error, serving in an institution largely organized, trained, and equipped in a different era for a different kind of conflict. And they’ve done all this with a country, a government-and in some cases a defense department-that has not been placed on a war footing.” - Secretary of Defense, Honorable Robert M. Gates, October 10, 2007, AUSA Meeting

a. The Army as an organization performs a myriad of functions within the framework of well-defined systems and processes to effect the changes that enable it to accomplish the full range of missions. Some of the many complex functions that the Army must address when managing change include the following: recruiting and accessing military and civilian manpower; providing individual and unit training and education; developing war fighting doctrine and requirements; designing and organizing units and activities; equipping and sustaining fielded units; mobilizing and demobilizing Reserve Component units; stationing and supporting units; and deploying and redeploying forces.

b. The Army’s institutionalized systems and processes address those just described and many other functions.
Section II
Army Focus

1–3. Background

a. In response to the strategic environment briefly discussed above, the Army has tremendous challenges. The clarity of these challenges is evident in the first paragraph of the 2008 Army Posture Statement: "Our Nation has been at war for over six years. Our Army-Active, Guard and Reserve-has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. We also have provided support, most notably by the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, to civil authorities during domestic emergencies. Today, of the Nation’s nearly one million Soldiers, almost 600,000 are serving on active duty and over 250,000 are deployed to nearly 80 countries worldwide."

b. The challenge of providing the right forces with the right capabilities is as stated in the 2008 Army Posture Statement: “The Army recruits, organizes, trains, and equips Soldiers who operate as members of Joint, interagency, and multi-national teams. The Army also provides logistics and other support to enable our Joint and interagency partners to accomplish their missions, as well as support civil authorities in times of national emergencies. Responding to the strategic environment and the national security strategy that flows from it, we are building an expeditionary and campaign quality Army. Our expeditionary Army is capable of deploying rapidly into any operational environment, conducting operations with modular forces anywhere in the world, and sustaining operations as long as necessary to accomplish the mission. To fulfill the requirements of today’s missions, including the defense of the homeland and support to civil authorities, approximately 591,000 Soldiers are on active duty (currently 518,000 Active Component, 52,000 Army National Guard, and 21,000 Army Reserve). Forty-two percent (251,000) of our Soldiers are deployed or forward-stationed in 80 countries around the world. Additionally, more than 237,000 Army Civilians are performing a variety of missions vital to America’s national defense. Of these, more than 4,500 are forward deployed in support of our Soldiers.”


a. The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff submit an annual Posture Statement of the United States Army to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives. This is done in preparation for subsequent hearings on the Army budget. This strategic communication document broadly describes the characteristics of the strategic environment the Army operates within. To respond to that environment, it then identifies the critical challenges facing the Army, which in 2008 were explained under the framework of what needs to be achieved to restore balance and the associated funding challenges. It then provides examples of the Army’s stewardship, innovation and accomplishments to preserve the strength of the nation. There are various subjects covered in this document’s Addenda that are related to specific issues such as Reserve Component Readiness, a topic required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, or other subjects that need more detail such as reset, modularity and business transformation to name a few. As such, this Posture Statement must be read by Army Soldiers and civilians to appreciate both the current challenges and future direction that the systems and processes described in this text must respond to.

b. Vision: A vision identifies what an organization must achieve or strive for and inspires the members of the organization toward that future end state. It is a leader’s responsibility to provide that vision for the organization. The Army Vision has been succinctly articulated in the Army’s 2009 Strategic Communication Guide as follows: “The
Army Vision focuses on remaining the pre-eminent landpower force on Earth - one that continues to be ready and relevant to meet the challenges of an ever-evolving security environment. Through its current and future efforts, the Army continues to transform to a versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable and interoperable land force to face the challenges of the 21st Century.”

c. Mission: A mission broadly identifies the main tasks and responsibilities of what an organization must execute. It provides overall direction for the leaders and members of the organization. The Army has a noble mission, as it serves the American people in many different ways both at home and around the globe in defending the nation, protecting vital national interests, and fulfilling the many national military responsibilities. The Army’s mission is clearly defined in the Army’s 2009 Strategic Communication Guide as: “Our enduring mission is to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.” It further amplifies that when stating: “The Army also provides logistics and support to enable other Services to accomplish their mission, and to provide support to civil authorities in times of emergency.” To execute that mission requires the systems and processes discussed in this text. Because of the actions of our Soldiers and our record of accomplishment, the American people regard the Army as one of the Nation’s most respected institutions. By fully executing this mission, the Army maintains this trust.

d. Strategy: A strategy identifies the ends, ways and means that an organization sets out to accomplish its mission and achieve its vision over time. The Army identifies the various ends, ways and means to do this through the Army Plan (TAP), which is updated annually or adjusted more often when needed. Section one of the TAP is called The Army Strategy, which provides the strategic context that informs the Army’s choices and specifies the institutional rational behind the decisions. As a consequence of the current stress on the force and the challenges in an era of persistent conflict, the Army is committed to restoring balance to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restore necessary depth and breadth to Army capabilities, and build essential capacity for the future. To restore balance by 2011 the Army is focused on the following four imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, RESET, and Transform. These four imperatives to restore balance are further explained in the 2008 Army Strategy and Army Posture Statement. A way to envision this is in Figure 1 that is used in both of these documents.
e. Risk: One of a leader’s most important responsibilities is to identify and mitigate risk. There will never be enough resources or predictability to eliminate risk, hence the challenge is for the leaders to properly scan the strategic environment to identify risks and make the proper decisions to mitigate those risks. The current challenge facing our leaders as the Army continues to operate within a persistent conflict environment with high levels of force deployment is to maintain the proper balance between current and future demands. To assist in this effort, the 2008 National Defense Strategy categorized risk within the following four dimensions: Operational, Future Challenges, Force Management and Institutional. The Army has and will continue to identify and mitigate risk to the organization and its people to accomplish its mission. The restoring balance framework just described in Figure 1–1 along with the details articulated in the 2008 Army Strategy and Army Posture Statement address various ways to mitigate risk.

1–5. The Army Campaign Plan 2009

a. The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) directs those actions necessary to execute Army transformation, restore balance to the Army and perform Service Title 10 functions by providing guidance for development of the Army program and budget while integrating continuous evolution of capabilities over time with the Army’s current strategic posture. The ACP manages this transformation in order to better balance current versus future requirements. It also provides guidance for other functions required to restore balance to the Army. The ACP remains Section IV of The Army Plan (TAP) and applies to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), and supporting agencies and activities.

b. This plan, because it is synchronized with other Defense and Army resource guidance and processes, looks out six years or more. It also includes various annexes to provide comprehensive direction to Army organizations, identify focus areas along with the lead organization and proponent, as well provide strategic guidance in such areas as aviation, lifecycle management, modernization, and force generation. Its comprehensive nature ensures that the Army synergistically and systematically plans and executes change.

1–6. Accelerate Change and Future Needs

a. One of the responsibilities of senior leaders is to identify the strategic issues facing the organization and the questions that must be answered to deal with these issues. This is illustrated in the 2008 Army Strategy’s Strategic Choices section. This section identifies six key questions to address the four strategic imperatives of Sustain, Prepare, RESET, and Transform identified by The Army Secretary and Chief in their Posture Statement. These six questions that the Army must examine and answer are as follows: “How does the Army address the imbalance between the Operating Force, Generating Force, Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS), and End Strength? What does the Army need to do to adapt structurally given an environment of persistent conflict? To what extent do we operationalize the Reserve Component; what is the appropriate glide path; how do we resource? What are the Army’s transformation strategy and priorities to include modernization? How will the Army train units and develop leaders for Full Spectrum Operations in an era of persistent conflict? To what level do we set standards to support Soldier and Family Quality of Life, installation readiness, and infrastructure to sustain, grow and transform the Army?”

b. Responding to each one of these six questions provides the Army leadership with many strategic choices that will have resource, readiness and capability implications. A summary of twelve strategic choices the Army has made to restore balance by 2011 as specified in this strategy is as follows: “ Build the best possible force within the programmed end strength; Accept risk in the Generating Force; Use TAA 10–15 as an enterprise approach to inform future force structure decisions; Set conditions to operationalize the Reserve Components; (Accelerate modernization where feasible; Prioritize the spinout of dimension of the FCS program; Calibrate network fielding to FCS fielding; Focus on organizational readiness (future/current); Reconstitute Army Prepositioned Stocks; Transform LandWarNet to a Network Service Center Based Global Construct; Preserve the training base for full spectrum operations; and Maintain installation programs and services at today’s standards.”

c. A key value of this text is that the systems and processes identified within will help enable Army leaders and managers to implement these strategic choices. Future budgets and internal and external challenges will impact the pace of implementing these choices as well as making proper adjustments in how these choices are fully executed.

1–7. Transformation

a. The subject of transformation had been embedded in the first sections of this chapter in various ways. That is because transformation in some manner impacts or influences almost everything the Army does from personal, unit and joint perspectives. We are entering a critical phase of our transformation from a Cold War Army to a 21st Century Army; one that is an expeditionary, campaign capable, disciplined Warrior Team dominant across the spectrum of conflict. The past decade has seen the Army transform in many ways. Secretary White and General Shinseki provided an intellectual framework for our transformation. Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker led the Operating Force transformation. Now, both Secretary Geren and General Casey have clearly articulated our need to adapt our institutions in order to cement the transformation of the Army of the 21st Century
b. As specified in the 2009 Army Campaign Plan: The Army continues to transform to improve the capabilities of Soldiers and the Joint Force to meet the challenges of the new security environment characterized by continuous full spectrum operations (Offense, Defense and Stability or Civil Support) in persistent conflict against complex, adaptive enemies at home or abroad. This, however, is not the end-state. Trends toward the future that are clearly visible today, though fraught with multiple unknowns, require that transformation must not merely continue; it must accelerate in the coming years. Army transformation improves the capabilities of Soldiers engaged in an era of persistent conflict against global terrorism and the conditions that give it life and sustenance, while preserving the All-Volunteer Force. Transformation, as established in Army concepts and capabilities, improves Army capabilities to meet Joint Force requirements to defend the Homeland, deter conflict in critical regions, respond promptly to small-scale contingencies, conduct stability operations and swiftly defeat any enemy in major combat operations. This, in turn, improves the Nation’s military capability to deal with traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic challenges on the horizon.

c. Army transformation integrates a broad range of concept-based initiatives and institutional processes across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities, (DOTMLPF) domains to achieve the Army vision and execute its mission. This transformation is framed in terms of the broader defense transformation effort and addresses the needs of the Joint Force, as well as the needs of the Army.

Section III
Purpose, Scope, and Objectives of this Text

1–8. Purpose

a. The purpose of this text is to provide a primer and ready reference to officers preparing to assume command and management positions at the senior and strategic levels of leadership. It explains the relationships of the systems and processes that produce both future change and contribute to daily mission accomplishment. It is these systems and processes that will be taxed to their fullest capabilities and capacities during the execution of the Army Campaign Plan.

b. While a principal use of this reference text is to support the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management’s (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum, there are additional objectives that serve broader purposes. These other objectives include its use by the following ways: by nonresident students in fulfilling the requirements of the Army War College’s Distance Education Program; as a general reference for branch and service schools in the military education system; and as a primer for all who seek to better understand the Army’s organization and functions, along with its systems and processes.

c. The major focus of the text is on the United States Army as specified by its title. However, this text also addresses how the Army interfaces with the Office of the Department of Defense, other Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Combatant Commanders to better achieve joint interdependence. Hence, it describes other systems and processes such as the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process.
Section IV
Text Organization and Relevance

1–10. Text Organization

a. This text is organized into 22 different chapters which cover Army structure, systems and processes from broad as well as specific perspectives. For example, the Army structure is described from an organizational life cycle perspective before describing the various structural components. A separate chapter is devoted to the Reserve components.

b. Broad systems and processes that impact the Army overall are first described. When appropriate, these systems and processes are covered from Defense, Joint and Army perspectives to understand their interaction and synergy. This includes chapters that involve subjects such as: strategic planning, force development, mobilization and deployment, readiness, resources, and materiel system research, development and acquisition.

c. This text’s later chapters focus more on Army functional organizations, systems or processes. This includes chapters devoted to the following: logistics, military human resources, civilian personnel management, training, knowledge management, installations, health services, legal, civil functions and public affairs. Finally, the last chapter deals with the complex Defense and Army’s contributions to the subject of defense support of civil authorities.

1–11. Relevance

a. This text helps one understand how to operate within strategic context and meet the critical challenges as addressed in the Army Posture Statement and other strategic documents. This text is about the systems and processes that will enable the Army to remain as effective in service to the Nation in the future as it has been in the past. The Army has an historic legacy from which to build upon and as stated in the 2008 Posture Statement: “And, while our Nation has many strengths, in time of war, America’s Army is the Strength of the Nation.”

b. It is hoped that students and practitioners of the military art who use this text will more fully appreciate the truth in the words of General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff Army 1964–1948 who said: “The Army is like a funnel. At the top you pour in doctrine, resources concepts, equipment, and facilities. And out at the bottom comes one lone soldier walking point.”

c. In the current Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey’s arrival message to the Soldiers, Civilians, and Families of the United States Army he stated in the first sentence: “I am extremely proud to be taking charge of an organization that is rightly regarded as the best in the world.” He goes on to say: “Seldom in our history have Soldiers faced greater challenges. We serve as a time when the stakes for our Nation and way of life are high, and the demands on our force significant. We will continue to reflect the very best of our Nation by defeating the enemies of freedom and the proponents of terror, by defending our homeland, and by assisting our Nation to build a better future for coming generations.” Understanding and applying the organizations, systems, and processes described in this text are part of the way leaders will continue the legacy of those who have come before us to keep the Army as the best in the world. It is in support of the Army’s Soldiers around the world who are living the Warrior Ethos that this reference text is written.
Chapter 2

The Army Organizational Life Cycle

In his Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the period July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, General George C. Marshall described the stark situation in which he found the Army as the war in Europe erupted and threatened to involve a neutral United States. President Roosevelt’s emergency proclamation of September 8, 1939 had given the authority for the Active Army to expand from 210,000 to 227,000 men and to reorganize from the World War I square divisions to the new triangular divisions. However, General Marshall’s problems could not be solved by a manpower increase of less than 10% and division reorganization. He also had major training deficiencies to correct. There was such a shortage in motor transportation that divisional training was impracticable. A lack of corps headquarters and experienced commanders and obsolete doctrine and organizations further degraded capabilities. Over half the undermanned Active Army divisions were horse-mounted and the horse was still the primary means of mounted movement. At the same time Congress had reduced the Army Air Corps request for replacements to World War I aircraft to only 57 planes. It was even worse in the National Guard organizations. General Marshall’s solution to these massive problems was to reconstruct the Army systemically, by resourcing, structuring and integrating new equipment, personnel, and organizations while training. Ultimately, he improved the youth and vitality of the Army by discharging elderly and substandard soldiers. The U.S. Army’s success in creating, deploying, and sustaining 89 divisions for the European Theater during World War II was largely due to General Marshall’s genius for leadership and his skill at what, today, is known as force management and force integration.

Section I

Introduction

2–1. Chapter content

a. This chapter provides an overview of the systems and processes employed by the Army to manage change on a continuing basis. It reflects the fact, as General George C. Marshall understood all too well, that, in complex organizations, every action or problem affects every other function of the organization. Army management systems and processes dictate the entire life cycle of the Army, from the earliest stages of conceptual development to the final disposition of people, equipment, and facilities.

b. The Army manages change by utilizing a myriad of institutional processes as it performs its legal function as specified in, Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062, to prepare forces “…organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.”

c. This chapter looks holistically at the interconnected systems and processes used to develop and manage the Army. The chapter is an overview of ‘How the Army Runs’ and addresses systems that are necessary to the overall leadership and management of the Army, and that are integral to the force management processes. Subsequent chapters will expand upon the sub-elements presented here.

2–2. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM)

a. Managing change in any large, complex organization requires management of many interrelated processes. In the context of developing operational organizations with highly trained personnel, led by confident leaders, using technologically advanced equipment, and providing that capability when needed by the unified combatant commander (CCDR), the Army manages from an organizational lifecycle view. The Army Organizational Life-Cycle Model graphically captures the continuous cycle of developing, employing, maintaining, and eliminating organizations. The Army management approach recognizes the need to understand modernization and change as a complex adaptive system. The Army Plan, and The Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) mandate the Army transformation and modernization efforts such as the Future Combat Systems (FCS), modularity, and AC/RC rebalancing to produce relevant and ready landpower that is strategically agile and expeditionary. The AOLCM provides a conceptual framework to both analyze and assess Army change efforts.

b. The AOLCM shown at Figure 2–1 reflects the stages that organizations and their personnel and equipment will experience at one time or another (and oftentimes concurrently) during their service in the Army. The functions performed in these stages develop, field, sustain, and modernize operational units and their supporting organizations; maintain their viability and effectiveness; and remove them or their assets (personnel and materiel) from the force as requirements change. Each individual asset (a soldier or civilian or materiel) required by a unit or activity will be found at some stage of the model beginning with the establishment of the need and entry into the Army to ultimate separation or disposal. The model details the critical stages through which an organizational resource will move, at some point, during its life span. Generally, the model depicts the life cycle of Army organizations from their development and their
progression (clockwise around Figure 2–1) to separation. The dynamic of the model, displayed by the interconnecting lines, illustrates that the Army leadership must resource and manage all of the functions simultaneously, since Army assets will be in each functional stage at any one time. Any change to a resource in a functional stage will affect resources in most of not all of the other functional stages. In other words, if you influence or change something in one functional node the response will impact the entire model affecting other nodes to some degree.

Figure 2–1. The Army Organization Life Cycle Model

c. Life cycle functions are listed below.

1. **Force Management.** As the first phase of the organizational life cycle model, force management becomes the key activity underlying all other functions. The process involves decision-making, and execution of activities encompassing conceptual development, capabilities requirements generation, force development, organizational development, force integration functions and resourcing. Force management results in the development of a capable operational force within constrained resources.

2. **Acquisition.** After the Congress authorizes, and the DOD provides, the budget and the force structure allowance (FSA) (see para 13–7b) guidance, the Army must then acquire the people and materiel specified in the requirements and authorizations documents necessary to accomplish specified missions. From a materiel acquisition perspective, the acquisition function extends beyond the principal item being fielded and must consider other essential requirements such as the availability of associated support items of equipment and personnel (ASIOEP), technical publications, repair parts, trained personnel, and facilities. From a human resource (HR) (see Chapter 13 and 14) acquisition perspective, the acquisition function must consider recruiting and accession missions in concert with the overall manpower management program and the influences of personnel life cycle functions.

3. **Training.** The training function encompasses the processes for accomplishing the transition from civilian status to military life. In this context, the training function is somewhat different from what most Army leaders think of when discussing training. At this point in the life cycle, consider training from the aspect of initial entry training or the requirement to provide soldiers with initial new equipment training or familiarization training on new or displaced equipment. In other words, this aspect of the training cycle imparts new skills to the soldier or converts the civilian into a soldier. It most often results in award of a military occupational specialty (MOS) or additional skill identifier (ASI). The training function also includes the transition of U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates into officers through the Basic Officer Leadership Courses (BOLC). Traditional collective training and professional educational and leader development fall under the “development” phase of the Organizational Life Cycle Model.
(4) **Distribution.** Having produced or procured the resources necessary to form and sustain units they must be distributed according to established requirements, authorizations, and priorities. The distribution function includes the assignment of people from entry-level training to their initial unit and the delivery of new materiel from the wholesale level to the user. This activity is primarily managed and synchronized through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process that focuses equipment and personnel distribution during the reset phase. See paragraph 2–7b (3) below.

(5) **Deployment.** Once trained or prepared units, individuals, packages, or materiel become available to support worldwide operations. An individual soldier, civilian, unit, or item of equipment may be subject to some, if not all, of the mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconfiguration processes of this function. Deployment represents both a planning and operational function involving agencies on the ARSTAF, other levels of DOD, and the civilian transportation structure. Like many of other AOLCM activities, unit deployments are managed on a cyclical basis with the ARFORGEN model.

(6) **Sustainment.** In peace or war the presence of people and materiel in units establishes a requirement for sustainment. People, skills, capability, and equipment must be maintained to the standard set for mission accomplishment by replacement, rotation, repair, and training operations. From a personnel perspective this function covers soldier reassignments throughout a career or obligation period, quality of life and well-being programs, as well as other aspects of the personnel systems influencing retention. Repair parts and maintenance provide the sustainment process for materiel. Training in units covering the process of sustaining common soldier skills that maintain unit or individual proficiency falls under this function as well. The Manning priority level, the Dynamic Distribution System (DDS) (see para 13–19b), Dynamic Army Resource Priority List (DARPL), Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), ten classes of supply, the Authorized stockage lists (ASL), and prescribed load lists (PLL) illustrate some of the systems or techniques used to apply authorization and priority to the sustainment function.

(7) **Development.** The Army must constantly develop and improve. We develop individuals through civilian, enlisted, and officer education programs that include character and leader development modules. Education and training programs range from individual self-development, including graduate-level degree programs to the entire range of branch and skill related institutional training culminating at either the senior service college for officers and civilians or Sergeants Major Academy for enlisted soldiers. Units develop through collective training processes that include individual training in units, home station training, and deployments for training. Examples are collective training tasks (CTT), leader training, live fire and maneuver training, external evaluations such as those under the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), deployment exercises, and training rotations to the combat training centers (CTC).

(8) **Separation.** Finally, there comes a time when people and equipment separate from military control. People may separate voluntarily by not extending following completion of an obligated service period or by retiring. Involuntary separation may occur due to reduction in force (RIF) actions or qualitative reasons. The Army normally separates materiel through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) process or through foreign military sales (FMS) actions.

d. External influences affecting the functioning of the model. There are two categories of external influences that affect the model:

(1) The first category is the availability of resources. Resources include tangible objects in the form of funds, materiel, or personnel as well as intangible resources such as time, information, and technology.

(2) The second category is the influence of command, management, and leadership in planning, organizing, directing, controlling, and monitoring the multitude of inputs, decisions, and actions to ensure that functions at each stage of the model execute effectively and at the appropriate time. These command and management activities are synchronized within the ARFORGEN process to ensure the timely allocation of scarce resources and to maximize the availability of trained and ready Army forces to meet CCDR Army force requirements.

**Section II**

**Force management**

**2–3. The Army War College Model**

To aid in examining specific force management systems (FMS) (see Chapter 5) and their interactions, the U.S. Army War College has adopted the force management model shown in Figure 2–2 (insert at the end of this book). This model reflects a System-of-Systems approach (see para 11–9d), each of which provides an essential force management function and, more important, how these functions relate to each other.

a. In this network, strategic and senior leadership guidance, the processes for determining warfighting capabilities requirements, conducting research and development (R&D), and providing resources all provide input to the force development process. The resulting products of force development, in turn, provide the basis for the force integrating functions of acquiring and distributing materiel, as well as acquiring, training, and distributing personnel in the Army. This widely used model highlights key aspects and relationships of force management. The model shows the relationships of Army processes to each other and to the major DOD management processes. These processes drive and interact with Army processes. Each process displayed in the figure is examined in detail in other chapters of this text. These major DOD management processes are the:
The underlying basis for this model is that force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change using many interrelated and complex processes. Although the model depicts the flow of processes in a somewhat linear, sequential manner, the complexities of managing change mandate that at any one time an initiative may be simultaneously in several of these processes at some level of maturity. As organizations develop, these processes may run sequentially, be compressed, run in parallel, or even run in reverse depending on the urgency, risk and senior leader guidance on the issue. History has shown, however, that eventually all of the steps must take place to produce a fully trained and equipped operational force at the right time and at the right place for the geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDR).


This section will explore the terms commonly used when describing the force management process. Force management has two major sub-components, Force Development and Force Integration:

a. Force development. Force development determines Army doctrinal, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities requirements and translates them into plans and programs, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions. A capability provides the means to accomplish a mission or task decisively. Capability comes from organizations comprised of well-trained people with superior equipment, led by competent leaders employing sound doctrine. The following paragraphs offer a condensed explanation of the force development process. (For more detail see Chapter 5).

   (1) Generate capabilities requirements.

   a) The force development process has its roots in the process of developing operational concepts to meet the future functional needs of the Joint force. The capabilities requirement generation process identifies the desired operational capability in terms of personnel, equipment, and unit structure. This process begins with national-level guidance such as Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); the National Security Strategy; the National Military Strategy; Guidance for the Development of the Force; guidance from the Army’s senior leadership (The Army Plan [TAP] see para 1–4d), which includes the Army Strategy, the Army Planning Priorities Guidance, the Army Programming Guidance Memorandum, the Army the Army Campaign Plan [ACP]); operational requirements of geographic Combatant Commanders. With this guidance, the military examines trends, patterns and projections to forecast the future joint operational environment (JOE). The military and the Army then develops a family operational concepts expected to accomplish the strategic guidance and related operational objectives and prevail in that environment. These include development of the family of Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) (such as the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO); Joint Operating Concepts (JOC); Joint Functional Concepts (JFC) and Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC), and the family of concepts in the Army Concept Strategy (ACS) including the Army Capstone Concept, Army Operating Concepts, and Army Functional Concepts. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assesses the future concepts through a series of analyses, tests, experiments, and studies to gain insights for solutions across DOTMLPF domains for emerging functional needs. Through this analysis key capabilities are refined and included in Concept Capability Plans (CCPs) and documented as Force Operating Capabilities (FOCs).

   b) Using the Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT) management technique, TRADOC pursues timely involvement of appropriate agencies/expertise to aggressively analyze and assess future operating capabilities requirements. The Director of TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) establishes an ICDT to conduct Capability-based Assessments (CBA) that includes functional area analysis (FAA), functional needs analysis (FNA), functional solution analysis (FSA), and the preparation of capability documents. This assessment process leads to the identification by the Commanding General (CG) TRADOC to HQDA of DOTMLPF change recommendations (non-materiel solutions) or a materiel capability need. If the capability requires a change in doctrine, training, or leadership and education TRADOC begins action to meet the requirement upon approval of HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–3/5/7. For doctrinal changes, TRADOC prepares a program directive (PD) (normally approved by the CG, CAC) to define and document in detail the doctrinal requirement. If the analysis results in a need for change in soldier occupational specialty structure, then the recommendation goes forward to U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) for Army wide coordination and approval (See Chapter 13). If the required capability needs a materiel solution, TRADOC conducts a more detailed Analysis of Materiel/non-materiel Approaches (AMA) and, if appropriate, prepares an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and forwards it to HQDA DCS, G–3/5/7 for approval of the capability requirement through the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation/approval process. HQDA DCS, G–8 has responsibility for materiel solutions and DOTMLPF integration throughout the program life cycle. (For more detail on fulfilling materiel capabilities requirements see Chapter 11). If the solutions analysis determines a need for change in facilities, then the recommendation goes forward to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) (see para 9–8i) for action (also see Chapter 17). If TRADOC determines the required capability needs an organizational solution, TRADOC prepares a Unit Reference Sheet (URS). TRADOC forwards the URS to HQDA for approval. The approved organizational solutions move to the next phase of force development.
(2) Design organizations. As the conceptual change in organizational structure becomes recognized and codified, the
organizational design process begins by capturing the organizational personnel and equipment requirements. The
combat development community develops the proposed organization, as well as its mission and functions, to meet the
required mission capabilities. Organizational solutions to capabilities requirements are captured in a URS in sufficient
detail to support Army force design initiatives, and related studies and analyses. After the design has been developed,
launched and analyzed by TRADOC, it moves forward to HQDA in the force design update (FDU) process (see para
5–8). The FDU process is used to gain consensus within the Army on new organizations and changes to existing
organizations. Once approved, this design will be further refined into an organizational model known as a table of
organization and equipment (TOE) in the next phase (see para 5–9).

(3) Develop organizational models. Following approval of the URS during the FDU process, the U.S. Army Force
Management Assistance Support Agency (USAFMSA) applies rules, standards, and guidance to the doctrinally correct design to
produce the organizational model (TOE). The TOE is a requirements document, and defines a fully resourced and
mission-capable organization (i.e.; assuming all personnel and equipment are available and resourced).

(4) Determine organizational authorizations. The HQDA approved TOE competes in the Total Army Analysis
(TAA) process for resources. TAA develops requirements and authorizations defining the force structure the Army
must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource. Through TAA, the Army provides the geographic
CCDRs with the proper force structure to execute assigned tasks. In the first phase, the TAA determines the
requirements (number and type) for all approved TOEs. In the second phase, the TAA process resources the
requirements based upon Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analyses, and the priorities of the Combat-
Commanders. The resourcing phase of TAA also accounts for the materiel requirements. TAA takes into account
force guidance and resource availability to produce a balanced and affordable force structure. It determines and/or
verifies the affordability, supportability, and executability of the proposed organizational models. (see Chapter 5,
Section V)

(5) Document organizational authorizations.
(a) After approval of the resourced force structure by the Army leadership, USAFMSA manages the process of documenting the decision(s). This process results in organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA) (see Chapter 5, Section VI). The force development process culminates with the HQDA approval and documentation of personnel and equipment authorizations as Army organizations in the force structure. The resource-constrained decisions on the allocation of authorizations are recorded in The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) (see para 5–24) and the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) (see para 5–23).
(b) The marriage of these two systems occurs in the Structure and Composition System (SACS). SACS produces the
Army’s time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the current, budget and program years and is extended
for a total of a ten-year period. Additionally, SACS builds a fully modernized Objective TOE (OTOE) position for all
units. In this way, SACS shows current levels of modernization, levels achieved at the end of the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) (see para 5–26a and 9–54) period and a fully modernized Army (for planning purposes). SACS
outputs combine information from Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), TOE, SAMAS, TAADS and known force structure
constraints not included in the previous files. Key outputs are the Personnel SACS (PERSACS) and the Logistics
SACS (LOGSACS) (see Chapter 5).
(c) SACS provides the data that drives the force integration processes to acquire, train, and distribute personnel and
acquire and distribute materiel to the right place at the right time. Upon completion of force development the
management processes become integrating functions. These force integration functions take an approved force develop-
ment program and incorporate it into the force.

b. Force Integration.
(1) Effective force integration is a difficult and demanding process that involves coordinating many complex and
unique procedures and data systems. Force integration is the synchronized, resource-constrained execution of approved
force development plans and programs to achieve systematic management of change, including—
(a) The introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army;
(b) Coordination and integration of operational and managerial systems collectively designed to improve the
effectiveness and capability of the Army, and;
(c) Knowledge and consideration of the potential implications of decisions and actions taken within the execution
process.
(2) The scope of force integration includes the functions of structuring organizations, manning, equipping, training,
sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding the force during the introduction and incorporation of approved organiza-
tional or force structure changes. It also includes the function of minimizing adverse impacts on force readiness during
the introduction and incorporation of change. Force integration synchronizes these functional activities to produce
combat ready organizations. Force integration is the enabling process of force management. Force integration focuses
Army management actions towards organizations to ensure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure,
equipment, and doctrine in the Army. The objective of the effort is to assess the combined impact of Army functional
Section III
Coordination of force integration actions

2–5. Information exchange as a key element of force integration
Coordination of all aspects of force integration requires the constant exchange of information. In the Army’s battle to achieve effective force integration, there have been and continue to be initiatives that focus on improving the information flow within and between the multiple systems and processes of force integration. Throughout this text, readers will find detailed descriptions of systems and processes that exchange information and help coordinate force integration actions.

2–6. The team approach to force integration

a. Execution of the organization integration process was the responsibility of the organization integration team prior to the 1 December 2000 reorganization of the G–8 and the G–3/5/7. While the materiel management responsibilities of the G–3/5/7 and the G–8 are known in general terms to be as described above and in Chapters 9 and 11, the functions and responsibilities of these staff elements and their individual force management action officers with respect to the force integration function are still evolving. HQDA has learned from the force management experiences of the formation of the Stryker brigades, the modular conversions, and AC/RC rebalancing the value of utilizing the working team approach to problem solving. Correspondingly, teams of stakeholders meet to discuss and seek solutions to implementation challenges of force management initiatives. These cross-functional working groups have been able to work the complex issues faced by the accelerating pace of change in a manner superior to the linear and sequential methods used in the past. HQDA continues to use the team approach for force management. The three key staff officers that chair the major integrating working groups are the requirements staff officer (RSO) assigned to the G–3/5/7, the synchronization staff officer (SSO) assigned to the G–8 and the DA system coordinator (DASC) assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASAALT). They work with other team members including the G–3/5/7 force integrator (FI) (see para 2–6c), the G–3/5/7 organization integrator (OI), the G–8 PA&E action officer, the document integrators (DI) (see para 2–6c), the personnel system staff officer (PERSSO) (see para 11–17f(1), command managers and resource integrators (RI). As required, representatives from Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Direct Reporting Units (DRU), Reserve Components and other functional area and special interest representatives are included in this function and in staffing force management issues.

b. The integrating team approach helps to ensure that every action is properly coordinated with representatives who have knowledge of the doctrine, design, structure, personnel, acquisition, equipping, resources, facilities, information management, and training activities that impact a unit. The G–3/5/7 RSO serves as the HQDA single point of contact and represents the HQDA position for DOTLMPF capabilities requirements. RSOs convene capabilities requirements teams to analyze, coordinate, refine, resolve critical comments, non-concurrences and develop recommendations for the capability. The SSO is the counterpart to the RSO for the G–8 and serves as the HQDA single point of contact for the integration and synchronization of approved capabilities requirements in order to achieve the Army Strategy, Army Campaign Plan (ACP) priorities and modernization strategy. The DASC is the primary acquisition staff officer at DA. The DASC is responsible for the day-to-day support of his/her assigned program and serves as the PM’s representative and primary point of contact within the Pentagon. Each staff action officer is responsible for preparing, handling, and coordinating actions in his or her area of expertise. For more detail on the duties and responsibilities of these staff members see Chapter 11.

c. Roles of other ARSTAF team members.

(1) Force integrator. The FI assigned to G–3/5/7 represent the interests of functionally dissimilar force-level organizations (e.g., the entire force structure from Modular Brigade through Theater Army). They are horizontal force-level integrators and work with brigades, regiments, divisions, and corps and Theater Armies. The FI:

(a) Assesses ability of functional systems to support major organizations.
(b) Recommends prioritization of resources.
(c) Assesses impacts of organizational change, at appropriate force level, on readiness.
(d) Facilitates integration of units into major organizations.
(e) Evaluates and analyzes impact of incorporating personnel, facilities, equipment, doctrine, structure, and capability changes into major organizations.
(f) Ensures major units are represented in force integration and force planning processes (e.g., TAA, FDU, etc.).
(g) Assesses impacts of mid-range and long-range planning on major units including new doctrine, structure, manning, equipment, technology, facilities, stationing, strategic policy, and resource strategies.
(h) Links organization requirements to resource allocation.
Organization integrator. The OI are assigned to the G–3/5/7 Force Management Directorate represent organizational interests of functionally similar organizations, e.g. Infantry, Armor, etc. These individuals are organized into teams for Maneuver, Maneuver Support, and Maneuver Sustainment. The OI serves as the vertical integrator, in their area of specialization. Additionally, they provide subject matter expertise to the RSO regarding requirements documentation that deal with these functionally similar organizations. The duties of the OI include, but are not limited to:

(a) Analyze, coordinate, refine and develop recommendations on requirements.
(b) Ensures doctrinal linkage exists between organizational and current and emerging capabilities.
(c) Coordinate approval of TOE, BOIP and Concept Capabilities Plans.
(d) Participate in force management analysis reviews of all force management documentation.
(e) Develops and coordinates the HQDA position on proposed TAA process.

Command manager (CM). Command managers (force structure) (CM [FS]) assigned to the G–3/5/7 represent the organizational interests of an ACOM/ASCC/DRU by managing its TDA units, and serves as the FI for the command’s MTOE. The second focus of the CM is managing program budget guidance by ensuring that the manpower allocation for each ACOM/ASCC/DRU is accurately reflected in the SAMAS in compliance with Army leadership decisions and within manpower controls established by OSD. Duties, include:

(a) Point of contact for command plans and concept plans (CONPLAN).
(b) Maintaining the documentation audit trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to unit MTOEs and TDAs.
(c) Producing manpower resource guidance for ACOM/ASCC/DRU program budget guidance (PBG).
(d) Managing command FSAs.
(e) Providing analysis and assessment of resource alternatives for organizational actions under consideration.
(f) Documenting current and programmed personnel strength, applicable Joint RDA programs, and organization force structure.
(g) “Cross-walking” analysis of Army programming decisions with those of the DOD, OMB, and Congress.

Document integrator. The DI, are assigned to the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA), a DCS, G–3/5/7 field operating agency (FOA). The DI produces organizational requirement and authorization documents that implement approved Army force programs. Their duties include:

(a) Document the unit mission and required capabilities by applying equipment utilization policies, manpower requirements criteria (MARC), standards of grade (SG), and BOIP to develop the proper mix of equipment and personnel for an efficient organizational structure.
(b) Develop MARC that serves as HQDA approved standards for determining the minimum mission essential wartime requirement (MMEWR) for staffing to accomplish maneuver support and maneuver sustainment functions in TOE and MTOE documents.
(c) Review proponent proposed or approved authorization documents to ensure compliance with manpower, personnel, and equipment policies and directives.
(d) Centrally build ACOM/ASCC/DRU authorization documents based on HQDA guidance, Command Plan, and input from the ACOM/ASCC/DRU. This process is called centralized documentation or CENDOC (see para 5–24a (1)).

ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs. Force management staffs at these echelons manage the planning and execution of the force integration mission through—

(a) Document integration, including authorization document (MTOE and TDA) review, and database management.
(b) Systems integration, including, requirements and authorization document review, the Materiel Fielding Plan (MFP) process, New Equipment Training Plan (NETP) review, and facilities support annex review.
(c) Organization integration, including the organizational assessment process, review of requirement and authorization documents, and doctrine review.
(d) Force structure management, including TDA manpower management and end strength management.
(e) Force planning, including the TAA process, command plan process, force reduction planning and monitoring, and CONPLAN development.

Corps, division, regiment, separate brigade, and installation. Force management staffs at these levels continue to manage force integration through—

(a) Force structure management, including authorization document management, Unit Status Report (USR) (see para 8–17) monitoring, and force structure review and analysis.
(b) Systems integration, including action plan development, distribution plans reviews, and facilities review.
(c) Organization integration, including organizational assessments, force structure review and analysis, and authorization document review process.
Section IV
Changing how we manage change

2–7. Alterations to force management
   a. The elements for managing change are themselves changing and this fundamentally alters force management. The processes that develop operational units often frustrate those who need the capabilities in the near term. Several factors contribute to this frustration. The pace of technological advances challenges our ability to envision future force capabilities and to properly plan for their development. The time required to change the primary long lead elements of the institution: such as doctrine, materiel, and organizations can appear excessive. Materiel changes may require up to 15 years for developing and fielding, organizational change may require 2–8 years, doctrine may require 2–4 years, and leader development and training follow changes in the other “drivers” by several years. For the future Army to benefit from the synergism of integrated doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities, it must continue to work to shorten development and fielding times, and increase the ability to envision and conceive future warfighting capabilities. Because of these, current operational exigencies and many more factors, the Army senior leadership continues to implement policies and procedures to streamline existing force management processes and improve their effectiveness. Today, the ARSTAF continues to evolve to meet the demands requirements of force management. Initiatives for improving the ARSTAF enable HQDA to streamline the requirements approval process, replace and combine several legacy automated force management support systems, and fielding equipment to brigades as sets.
   b. Force management changes at HQDA.

(1) Support to current operations: Interim Policy on Capabilities Requests. In response to exigent capability requirements generated by current operations, HQDA instituted streamlined processes and staffing procedures to rapidly procure and distribute materiel solutions to identified operational deficiencies. Operational Needs Statements (ONS) and Authorized/Pre-validated request procedures were developed and implemented in order to support deployed or deploying units’ accomplishment of their assigned missions. The Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process was developed for presenting critical operational needs to the Army’s senior leadership for rapid decision making (accelerated fielding solutions). The response to an ONS is based on an ARSTAF validation supported by TRADOC, AMC, and MATDEV reviews. The AR2B determines validity of the need, availability of technology, and source of resources to fill the requirement. If the need is determined to be critical, and can be resourced (at least for the present situation) a directed requirement may result. Additionally, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) has developed a process and supporting structure to accelerate capabilities development, such as those resulting from ONSs. Support to on-going and emerging operational urgent requirements will likely continue to drive changes in force management organizations, systems and processes.

(2) The Modular Conversion of Army Force Structure. To maximize force effectiveness, the Army is reorganizing to a modular, brigade-based force to achieve three primary goals: (1) Increase the number of available BCTs to meet operational commitments while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal or better than that of previous divisional BCTs; (2) Create combat and support formations of common organizational designs that can be tailored to meet the varied demands of the regional Combatant Commanders- reducing joint planning and execution complexities; (3) Redesign organizations to perform as integral parts of the Joint Force-making them more effective across the range of military operations and enhancing their ability to contribute to joint, interagency, and multinational efforts. This modular conversion is a total Army effort affecting nearly every combat and support organization in the inventory. Most combat formations and headquarters have been completed; the current effort is mainly ton converting theater Army headquarters and Support Brigades. The restructuring of the force from Division-based to Brigade-based will likely impact many of the Army Force Generation-specific organizations, systems and processes, and proponent and management relationships.

(3) Implementation of the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN). The Army is currently faced with on-going, continuous force deployments while simultaneously preparing for the full spectrum of other possible contingencies. As a response the Army is adapting from tiered readiness to cyclic readiness to meet both rotational and contingency operational requirements. Fundamentally, ARFORGEN is a cyclic training and readiness strategy that synchronizes strategic planning, prioritization and resourcing to generate trained and ready modular expeditionary forces tailored to Joint mission requirements. The RESET, TRAIN/READY, AND AVAILABLE force pools provide the framework for the structured progression of increased readiness in ARFORGEN. The Army will use these force pools in addition to mission requirements to prioritize resources over time and synchronize unit manning, equipping, resourcing, and training (See figure 2–3). Units transition through the force pools based on the unit commander’s assessment of designated criteria, validated by the next-higher commander, and monitored by FORSCOM. The Army focuses units against future missions as early as possible in the ARFORGEN process and task organizes units in expeditionary force packages tailored to joint mission requirements. ARFORGEN structures all Operating Force units into three force pools, in ascending order of readiness: RESET, TRAIN/READY, AND AVAILABLE. In RESET, units conduct recovery, reconstitution, equipment reset and recapitalization, receive and stabilize new personnel, reconnect with families, and conduct individual and institutional training. After RESET, all forces designated for a known
operational deployment will be designated as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF), be placed under the operational control of the corresponding higher deploying headquarters, and will train on specified Deployment Mission Essential Task List (DMETL). All other units will be placed in the Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF), train on their Core METL (CMETL) (See figure 2–4), and prepare for full spectrum operations. When units in the DEF and CEF reach their peak state of readiness, they will move into the AVAILABLE pool. Forces in the DEF will deploy in accordance with their programmed rotation and those in the CEF will be prepared for immediate deployment on any emerging contingency. Once a unit’s deployment is over or after a unit spends a year in the CEF’s AVAILABLE pool without deploying, it returns to the RESET pool and the cycle is repeated. When CCDRs require more forces than the Army has in the AVAILABLE Pool, the Army can surge forces from the TRAIN/READY Pool at lower levels of preparedness. The expeditionary forces (Deployment - DEF and Contingency - CEF) consist of modular AC and RC brigade combat teams, multi-functional and functional support brigades, Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) CS/CSS units, and the appropriate operational headquarters necessary to provide the required capabilities to the Joint force. The implementation of the ARFORGEN model will impact nearly every institutional function as they are modified to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency and accommodate the cyclic nature of the ARFORGEN process.

Cyclic Readiness

Predictably provides modular forces in a logical, systemic process

- **Reset**
  - Reset Soldiers/Families
  - Manning Units
  - New Equipment Training (By Exception)
  - Individual Training & Institutional Training

- **Train/Ready**
  - Continued fill of unit
  - Individual Training
  - Collective Training
  - Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)

- **Available**
  - Fully Trained, Equipped, Manned, & Ready Deploy

![Figure 2–3. Cyclic Readiness](image)

✓ Every unit is focused on future missions as early as possible
✓ Every unit deploys fully ready for combat
2–8. Basic Force Management Tools

Force integration carries a significant manpower bill across the HQDA staff. The required activities for detailed and interactive coordination contribute to and drive manpower requirements. Across the staff, it takes people to participate in the management, synchronization and coordination activities and their collective knowledge to make force integration a viable function. These staff officers need access to the many different databases and models that provide information in order to efficiently accomplish their functions and responsibilities. Correspondingly, steps are underway to apply technology to help reduce the manpower costs of this process. These automation and information technology improvements are continuous and on-going.

a. The Army Flow Model (AFM), The Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S) developed by the Army Strategic and Advanced Computing Center, is a decision support system designed to provide the ARSTAF with an integrated, quick turnaround planning tool to assess actual or notional force structures and/or policies across the Army’s major functional areas (force structure, personnel, logistics, installations, and budget). Part of AE2S is the Army Flow Model (AFM), which supplements the current functional models. These legacy functional models remain “stovepipe” systems and cannot easily conduct “What If” analyses in a timely manner. The AFM provides the capability to readily assess force structure or policy changes and examine the effects of these changes on unit fill levels and readiness both within and across functional areas. Users can access AFM through Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (see para 16–8).

b. USAFMSA has developed the Force Management System (FMS). This system replaces the four existing stovepipe automated support systems, Requirements Documentation System (RDS), TAADS, SAMAS and Force Builder. These legacy automated systems can only exchange data through manual file exchange. FMS is based upon a single integrated database providing access through an integrated set of user applications. The first phase of FMS (requirements documentation) is now operating with full implementation to take several years. No implementation timelines have been published. (For more detail see Chapter 5).
2–9. Summary
   a. In modern, complex organizations there is a cause and effect relationship involving almost every process and system. An appreciation of these interrelationships and knowledge of the individual systems that contribute to force management will in turn lead to an understanding of how the Army runs.
   b. Changes within the Army and the processes used to implement those changes require a holistic application of cross-functional factors. To be successful, future senior Army leaders and managers must understand the nature of the interrelations of the systems and subsystems, as well as the key players and functions. Senior leaders who understand how these processes work and where leadership can influence these processes will be more effective. Experience shows us that successful senior leaders understand how the Army develops and sustains its part of our nation’s military capability and use this knowledge to make informed decision on how to use or change the processes to improve that capability. The overviews of the Army Functional Life Cycle Model and the Army War College Model introduced in this chapter provide a basis for subsequent and more detailed examinations of the Army management systems and processes in subsequent chapters. Additional information can be found at the following web sites:
   (1) 1 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/
   (2) http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil.
   (3) http://usafmsa-add.belvoir.army.mil/usafmsa

2–10. References
   c. Title 10, United States Code.
   e. General Orders Number 3 (GO 3), Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army.
RESERVED
Chapter 3

Army Organizational Structure

The resolution of Congress on 2 June 1782 clearly illustrates the concepts of civil control of military forces and the primacy of the Congress in the determination of the Army’s structure. That resolution resolved to discharge all remaining Continental Army troops from Federal service except 80 men. It further assigned the remaining men to “guard stores.” It established the Army’s force structure as:

Section I
Introduction

3–1. Chapter content

a. The United States Army is a strategic instrument of national policy that has served our country in peace and war for over two centuries. The Department of the Army is separately organized under the SECARMY (10 USC 3011). This chapter provides a discussion on how the Army is organized to perform its doctrinal tasks and how it responds to changes in its environment. AR 10–5, Headquarters, Department of the Army as supplemented by General Orders Number 3, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army, and AR 10–87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States, provide the official description of Army organizations, as well as their roles, missions and functions. The Army web site at: http://www.army.mil/info/organization/ provides links to the home pages of the Army Headquarters staff elements and the Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), and Direct Reporting Units (DRU).

b. The understanding of how the Army operates as a system to carry out its Title 10 functions within the context of its organizational, operational and strategic environment provides the insights into how the Army efficiently allocates resources and effectively manages change to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.” What follows is a discussion of the framework that describes the Army as an organization of headquarters, staffs, commands, and functional units. Additionally, this and other chapters will discuss major realignments within Army organizations, which have taken place over the past 18 months.

3–2. The Army organizational system

a. The Army as an open organizational system.

(1) In terms of management theory, the Army can be considered an open organizational system with three distinct components: the production, combat, and integrating subsystems. Each of these components has tasks to accomplish, each operates in a given environment, and each requires and acquires resources. Because of the size and complexity of the Army and its tasks, its corresponding organizational structure must provide as much flexibility as possible (given resources and mission requirements) while also maintaining the command and control necessary to develop forces and marshal, deploy, employ those forces and sustain operations in support of our national strategy.

(2) The Army’s organizational design has evolved over time and is continuously being adapted to ensure a “goodness of fit” between its overall structure and the conditions of the external environment. In essence, the Army exists as an “open system” and thus must be structured and re-structured in such a way as to allow the system to adapt to external factors in an appropriate manner. To facilitate adaptation, the Army organizational system is composed of a combination of decentralized functionally-focused subordinate organizations empowered to adapt and make decisions to effectively and efficiently support or execute mission requirements and a centralized hierarchy designed to establish policies to effect coordination and cooperation between the sub-organizations and ensure cross-functional integration and differentiation.

b. Differentiation and integration. Every complex and open organization that is functionally organized to allow for decentralized sub-optimization is also challenged with ensuring both the integration of its sub-organizational outputs and continued differentiation of those organizations as they in-turn adapt to the external environment. To manage integration and differentiation organizations need to continuously scan their environment, both internally and externally, in order to best determine—

(1) The overall tasks and corresponding functional sub-tasks to be accomplished.

(2) The resource constraints placed on the organization.

(3) The extent of coordination that is needed within the organization in order to make effective and efficient decisions across all tasks and functional sub-tasks.

(4) Whether accomplishment of new tasks or sub-tasks requires sufficiently unique skills, equipment, activities or management (requires creation of a new sub-organization) or should or could be subsumed under an existing functional sub-organization.

(5) The most effective and efficient overall organizational design needed to accomplish those tasks and, most important, assure that the organization can rapidly adapt to future changes within and across the identified functional areas.
(6) Differentiation. Organizations should be tailored in design to meet specific mission requirements and avoid unnecessary redundancy. For example, to demonstrate a forward presence in an area of vital interest to U.S. security, such as Europe, and to enhance relations with our allies, the Army has organized U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Conversely, the U. S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), which is now part of Accessions Command under TRADOC, was established to deal with the soldier acquisition task. To accommodate these different demands, the Army’s systemic organizational response must be different. USAREUR would be as ineffective recruiting in the continental United States (CONUS) as USAREC would be in dealing with the Army’s mission in Europe.

(a) Task or functional specialization is both a dimension and a requirement of the structure of Army organizations. Such functions as personnel management, resource (funds and manpower) management, operations, intelligence and security, logistics, and research and development are found separately identified in both the management staffs and subordinate commands.

(b) A major result of task specialization is that organizations tend to be designed and structured to fit the requirements of their sub-environments. Depending on the demands of the environment, organizations in one functional specialty tend to be differentiated from organizations in other specialties in the following manner:

(c) Unique functionally-related mission focus.

(d) Orientation on time, i.e., a focus on short-term, mid-term, long-term results.

(e) Degree of formality of the structure of organizations, i.e., rules, job descriptions, chain of command, process or procedural adherence, etc.

(f) Interpersonal orientation-ways of dealing with people, i.e., very mission-oriented vs. a concern for relationships with others.

(7) Integration. The environments within which the Army competes require one primary output: mission-ready forces with a full range of operational capabilities. The Army is successful only to the extent that it produces such forces. The widely diverse operational environments also require a high degree of differentiation if the Army is to meet its full spectrum requirements. These two environmental demands-output and high differentiation-must be reconciled and the Army must integrate many elements to produce mission-ready forces. One should expect that the greater the degree of differentiation in an organization, the more difficult it is to get the necessary coordination and integration. There are three levels of complexity of the approaches to integrating diverse organizational activities ranging from the simple to the highly complex. The use of each depends on a wide range of situational factors.

(a) The simplest devices, which can be used to deal with more certain environments, are standard rules and procedures. Integration is achieved through adherence by the sub-organizations to specified procedures and active management is normally not necessarily required.

(b) Somewhat more complex is a plan, directive or order. Integration is achieved through formulated guidance that specifies for the overall mission each organization’s roles, responsibilities and sub-tasks in time, space and purpose. Coordination and integration is achieved through the coherency of the planning concept and the sub-organization’s compliance to both the letter and intent of the plan.

(c) Third, and the most complex, is the process of active management and directed integration leading to mutual adjustment in which iterative communication is required within the management hierarchy (or chain of command) and which could also entail the formation and use of cross-functional teams or individual integrators. A good example of the last process is the battalion task-force approach to integrating and maneuvering the combined arms team after contact with the enemy. A project management organization also exemplifies integration by mutual adjustment.

(d) Each of these devices is operating in any Army organization to some extent. Effective and complex organizations facing dynamic and diverse environments will use all of these integrative processes.

(8) The Army is organized into a managing headquarters with a permanent and enduring management construct constituting 8-levels of headquarters managing activity (see General Orders No. 00, Managing the Headquarters, Department of the Army) and four types of subordinate organizational headquarters and supporting activities: Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Direct Reporting Units (DRU), and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs).

(9) Army Command (ACOM): an Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, performing multiple Army Service Title 10 functions (3013b) across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary. There are three ACOMs: TRADOC, AMC and FORSCOM (FORSCOM also serves as an Army Service Component Command).

(10) Army Service Component Command (ASCC): an Army Force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, comprised primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component for a combatant commander. If designated by the combatant command, serves as a Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) or a Joint Task Force (JTF). Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary. Examples include U.S. Army Central (USARCENT), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), and U.S. Army North (USARNORTH).

(11) Direct Reporting Unit (DRU): an Army organization comprised of one or more units with institutional or operational functions, designated by the Secretary of the Army, providing broad general support to the Army in a normally, single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. Direct Reporting Units report directly to a Headquarters, Department of the Army principal and/or Army Command and operate under the authorities
established by the Secretary of the Army. Examples include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).

(12) Field Operating Agency (FOA): an agency under the supervision of Headquarters, Department of the Army, but not an Army Command, ASCC or DRU, which has the primary mission of executing policy. Examples include: the Center for Army Analysis is a FOA for the Army DCS, G–8; the Army Human Resources Command (HRC) is a FOA of the DCS, G–1; and, the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) is a FOA reporting to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)).

Section II
The production subsystem

3–3. Statutory requirements
The Army’s fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation’s wars by establishing conditions for lasting peace through land force dominance. Laws further direct the Army to be organized and trained for prompt and sustained combat. Many other specific requirements are assigned by statute to the SECARMY and the ARSTAF. They include requirements to form organizations of men and women and machines “for the effective prosecution of war.”

3–4. Production of needed resources
The production subsystem is the cornerstone of the process. Its job is to secure from its resource environments the “raw materials” for its many production efforts: recruiting untrained people, searching for useable technology, and dealing with producers of outside goods and services. Its task, accomplished through its people and structure, is to convert the “raw materials” into the “intermediate goods” required by the combat system. To do this, the Army integrates doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) to produce the desired end state (see Chapter 5 for more details). Training centers and schools transform untrained people into tank crewmen, infantrymen, and mechanics. Schools convert ideas and knowledge into doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training methods for the use of the combat subsystem. Laboratories, arsenals, and procurement and test organizations convert technology and contractor effort into weapons systems and equipment for the combat subsystem. Other parts of the production subsystem provide such sustaining support to the whole organizational system as health care, commissary support, and other services. The production subsystem serves primarily to meet the needs of the combat subsystem.

a. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

(1) TRADOC is first of two major components of the production subsystem. TRADOC develops the Army’s Soldier and Civilian leaders and designs, develops and integrates capabilities, concepts and doctrine in order to build a campaign-capable expeditionary Army in support of joint warfighting commanders through Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). TRADOC recruits, trains and educates the Army’s soldiers; develops leaders; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future Army. It is an Army Command (ACOM) consisting of HQ TRADOC, three Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), and eight special activities. All TRADOC centers and schools are aligned under an MSC, except the US Army War College and TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). The MSCs have direct authority over the centers and schools aligned under them and are the linkage with non-TRADOC schools. (See Chapter 15 for a more detailed description of TRADOC’s training-oriented organizations.)

(2) The HQ TRADOC staff consists of a command group, personal staff, coordinating staff, and special staff, with the Army Capabilities and Integration Center (ARCIC) as a FOA in support of the TRADOC coordinating staff. Although established as a FOA, the ARCIC is an integral part of, and functions as an element of, the HQ TRADOC staff.

(3) The HQ TRADOC staff provides staff management, facilitates external coordination, and assists the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff (DCG/CofS) in the prioritization of resources. It ensures the coordination and integration of DOTMLPF initiatives and functions between external commands and organizations, and the TRADOC MSCs and special activities. The HQ TRADOC staff is the primary interface with external agencies (DoD, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), joint organizations, other Services, and other external agencies and organizations) to provide TRADOC positions and receive taskings and requests for support.

(4) TRADOC’s MSCs are also functionally aligned:

(a) U.S. Army Accessions Command: provides integrated command and control of the recruiting and initial military training for the Army’s officer, warrant officer, and enlisted forces. Designed to meet the human resource needs of the Army from first handshake to first unit of assignment, the command transforms volunteers into soldiers and leaders for the Army.

(b) U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: provides leadership and supervision for leader development and professional military and civilian education; institutional and collective training; functional training; training support; battle command; doctrine; lessons learned; and activities in specified directed areas that serve as a catalyst for change and that support developing relevant and ready expeditionary land formations with campaign qualities in support of the joint force commander.
b. Army Materiel Command (AMC). The second major component of the production subsystem is AMC. AMC is the
Army’s premier provider of materiel readiness-technology, acquisition support, materiel development, logistics
power projection, and sustainment-to the total force, across the spectrum of joint military operations. The command’s
complex missions range from development of sophisticated weapon systems and cutting-edge research, to maintenance
and distribution of spare parts.

(1) AMC operates the research, development and engineering centers; Army Research Laboratory; depots; arsenals;
ammunition plants; and other facilities; and maintains the Army’s prepositioned stocks, both on land and afloat. The
command is also the Department of Defense Executive Agent for the chemical weapons stockpile and for conventional
ammunition.

(2) To develop, buy and maintain materiel for the Army, AMC works closely with Program Executive Officers, the
Army Acquisition Executive, industry and academia, the other services, and other government agencies.

(3) The command’s main effort is to achieve the development, support, and sustainment of the future force in this
decade. At the same time, AMC is key to supporting, sustaining and resetting the current force. Its maintenance depots
and arsenals restore weapon systems needed as the Army makes its way to full transformation. The command’s
overhaul and modernization efforts are enhancing and upgrading major weapon systems—not just making them like new,
but inserting technology to make them better and more reliable.

(4) AMC handles diverse missions that reach far beyond the Army. For example, AMC manages the multi-billion
dollar business of selling Army equipment and services to friends and allies of the United States and negotiates and
implements agreement for co-production of U.S. weapons systems by foreign nations. AMC also provides numerous
acquisition and logistics services to the other components of the DOD and many other government agencies.

(5) Continuing support across the spectrum of operations plays a large role in maintaining combat readiness. Perhaps
no other organization is faced with such a diversity and cross-functional panoply of activities. Consequently, AMC is
almost continuously adjusting its organizations to adapt to the changing operational and strategic environments while
ensuring both differentiation and integration of its subordinate organizations roles, responsibilities and functions.

(6) The MSCs include the Research Development and Engineering Command, concerned with R&D missions; the
Army Sustainment Command (ASC) that functions to manage Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), administers the
Logistics Civil Augmentation and Logistics Assistance Programs, oversees the timely retrograde and of war materiel
from the theater to Army Depots for reset, and supports through seven assigned deployable Army Field Support
Brigades army operations in strategic locations around the world; Joint Munitions Command that provides the
conventional ammunition life-cycle functions of logistics sustainment, readiness and acquisition support for all U.S.
military services, other government agencies, and allied nations as directed; the U.S. Army Security Assistance
Command (USASAC) which is concerned with security assistance programs to include foreign military sales (FMS);
the Army’s Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) which safely stores and destroys the nation’s aging chemical weapons
and effectively recovers the nation’s chemical warfare materiel; and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC), concerned with ground transportation and port operations. The SDDC is also under the combatant
command (COCOM) of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and serves as its ASC.

(7) The four Life Cycle Management Commands LCMCs are commodity oriented and perform life-cycle manage-
ment over the initial and follow-on procurement and materiel readiness functions for items and weapon systems in
support of the Army in the field. As part of an effort to more closely integrate the Army’s procurement priorities with
maintenance and support needs, AMC realigned the service’s far-flung acquisition, technology and logistics organiza-
tions into “life cycle management commands.” The LCMC concept is designed to break up the traditional fiefdoms in
the Army’s bureaucracy and ensure that weapon systems get the appropriate funding from “cradle to grave.” Previous-
ly, the Program Executive Officers (PEOs) had development and procurement responsibilities for weapon systems,
while the AMC subordinate commanders were in charge of maintaining those systems. The new LCMC Now integrate
both functions under one command headquarters by commodity. See Chapter 12 for a more detailed description of
AMC. AMC’s log site is www.amc.army.mil and it is informative and current.

(c) Installation operations. Key to the production subsystem is the growing central role of Army installations. The
subparagraphs below provide a general discussion and background for installations operations with the detail of this
function discussed in Chapter 17.

(1) The integration of installation organization and operations into the Army’s overall organizational structure in the
1980’s, both as a home station and training base, has proven to have a significant and positive effect on readiness.
Installations are organized for and capable of training, mobilizing, deploying, sustaining, supporting, recovering, and
reconstituting assigned and mobilized operating forces. Additionally, activities on the installation receive installation
support in accomplishing their missions. Examples of these are schools, hospitals, reserve component elements, and
tactical headquarters and their subordinate units. However, the traditional boundary between tactical and sustaining
base activities are disappearing as the installation power projection platforms assume an increasing role in the
sustainment, support and the welfare of deploying operating forces as information technology (IT), rapid transportation
and improved management techniques enables more consolidated installation activities and “reach-back” to the installations for deployed forces.

(2) In October, 2006 the Army reorganized its structure for managing installations with the activation of the Installation Management Command (IMCOM). The Army established IMCOM to improve its ability to provide critical support programs to Soldiers and their families while ensuring its installations are “flagships of readiness.” The IMCOM’s mission is to provide the Army the installation capabilities and services to support expeditionary operations in a time of persistent conflict, and to provide a quality of life for Soldiers and Families commensurate with their service.

(3) IMCOM transformed the Army’s current installation management structure into an integrated command structure. This consolidation of the installation management structures of ACSIM and IMA under IMCOM continues the organizational initiatives begun in the 1980s to optimize resources protect the environment and enhance well-being of the Army community. The IMCOM mission requires fast, efficient and agile support to commanders in the performance of their tactical, operational, and strategic missions. This initiative is part of the Army’s efforts to reorganize its commands and specified headquarters to obtain the most effective, efficient command and control structure for supporting the operational force.

(4) As a Direct Reporting Unit, IMCOM is accountable to the Chief of Staff of the Army for effective garrison support of mission activities, and serves as the Army’s single authority and primary provider of base support services. The previous installation management structure, part of Army Chief of Staff, Installation Management, included as separate entities ACSIM directorates, the Installation Management Agency (IMA), and the former U.S. Army Environmental Center and U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC). Under IMCOM, CFSC is renamed the Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command, and becomes a subordinate command of IMCOM. The Army Environmental Center is now the Army Environmental Command and is also a subordinate command of IMCOM.

(5) Installations are power projection platforms. They provide a home to the force and are resourced as a productive work and training site. This evolution of the installation’s role in the army structure and its placement in the Army’s organization has established it as a critical production subsystem of the Army.

\textit{d. Functional commands.}

\begin{itemize}
\item (1) Not only is the installation operations task common to both the combat and production subsystems, but parts of the installation operations function have become recognizable “specialty” commands - and therefore part of the production subsystem - providing their goods and services usually to both the combat and production subsystems. For example, U. S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) (see Chapter 18) operates most Army medical activities in CONUS; and the U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) directs all criminal investigators.

\item (2) The principal reason for the establishment and continuation of functional commands is that the required degree of integration for their specialty activities differs substantially from those functions that are the responsibility of the installation commander. Each of the specialty functions is a goods or service provider that performs very different missions than those of the installation, whether it is force readiness or training. Mission performance does not require that telephone service, or commissary operations, or medical care delivery is totally integrated with facilities or maintenance so that unit readiness or training objectives can be met. The same is not true of functions like maintenance or personnel support, which more directly affect installation goal achievement.

\item (3) Further, the conceptual model would suggest that achieving greater performance on the delivery or performance of these functions could best be accomplished by improving the degree of corresponding organizational differentiation. The “functional” organizational model appears to do just that. The central control reinforces the commitment by the local agency to: high quality, efficient telephone service, and medical care, good commissary support, meeting recruiting objectives, carrying out engineer construction projects, by emphasizing the uniqueness of the function and providing associated specialty career paths for employees.

\item (e) HQDA support specialty commands. Another secondary category of organizations within the producer subsystem is the group of service producing, special-purpose organizations reporting to HQDA. This category includes, among others, the U.S. Human Resources Command (USAHRC) (see Chapters 13 and 15). It has tasks that do not require field units to produce the service; therefore it does not fall into the functional command category. USAHRC’s services are used by the producer and combat subsystems, as well as HQDA. Because of its specialty tasks, such agencies are directly linked to the HQDA staff, yet they are not classified as extensions to the staff because their functions are operational, rather than policy. Most organizations operating in such manner are categorized as field operating agencies (FOAs) or Direct Reporting Units (DRUs).

\item (1) Listed below are the current HQDA FOAs under the staff principal they support:

\begin{itemize}
\item (a) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA (FM&C)) - U.S. Army Finance Command (USAFINCOM)
\item (b) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower & Reserve Affairs (ASAM&RA):
\begin{itemize}
\item 1. U.S. Army EEO and Civil Rights Office
\item 2. U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency
\item 3. Department of the Army Review Boards Agency
\item 4. U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Section III

The combat subsystem

3–5. Products of the combat subsystem

The combat subsystem’s major task is to convert the Army’s intermediate products, obtained from the production subsystem, into mission-ready forces, that is, into units and organizations. Each element of its structure welds together individual soldiers, equipment, and procedures and produces combat readiness. The combat subsystem engages in a process of continued interaction with its resource environment, primarily the production and the integrating subsystems.
Its task environment includes the enemy threat(s), the unified combatant commands, allied forces with whom it must deal, and, especially in peacetime, the OSD and the Congress.

3–6. The Army in the field

a. This category of the Army’s organizational structure consists of three ACOMs including two of the commands previously addressed under the production subsystem and installation operations and nine ASCCs. The Army’s designated ACOMs/ASCCs are the following:

(1) Army Commands (ACOM):
   (a) U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
   (b) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
   (c) U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)

(2) Army Service Component Commands (ASCC):
   (a) U.S. Army Central (USARCENT)
   (b) U.S. Army North (USARNORTH)
   (c) U.S. Army South (USARSO)
   (d) U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)
   (e) U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)
   (f) Eighth Army (EUSA)
   (g) U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)
   (h) Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)
   (i) U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT)

b. In some respects each command faces similar environments although they differ from each other in many ways. Several (FORSCOM, USAREUR, USARPAC, EUSA, USASOC, and USARSO) have the principal task of providing mission-ready land forces—the primary output of the Army. As a result, each has developed an organizational structure reflecting its environment.

Section IV
The integrating subsystem

3–7. Tasks of the integrating subsystem

a. The integrating subsystem ties all of the subordinate subsystems together for the Army as a whole. Its tasks are to decide what is to be “produced” or accomplished by the whole system and to see to it that the system performs as expected. It also acts as the source of funds for the subsystems, obtaining them from DOD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (see chapter 10, sections II and III), and the Congress.

b. In any large organization, the headquarters has the major function to see to it that the overall mission and major tasks of the organization are accomplished. It is the most prominent integrating device in the organization. The challenge for the integrating subsystem is one of structuring the organization to accomplish the following tasks effectively:

- Determining the nature of current and future demands and requirements from the strategic and operational environments (e.g., from OSD, Congress, the public, other Services, the nature of the threat, etc.).
- Charting a course for the Army that can and will meet the projected demands/requirements.
- Securing the necessary resources (appropriations authority) for the Army.
- Allocating resources, responsibilities, objectives and performance requirements to the combat and production subsystems.
- Evaluating the performance of the subsystems’ organizations against the requirements.
- Bringing about change, whether evolutionary or revolutionary, in cases where performance does not meet present requirements, or the projected security needs of the nation.
- Transforming the Army to future force structure organizations in order to meet the National Security and National Military Strategies.

3–8. Differentiation and integration

The exercise of these functions calls for both a high degree of differentiation within the headquarters and cross-functional integration. Each function must relate to a similar functional group in OSD, to some extent to interested committees in Congress, and to members of the same specialist community in the combat and production subsystems. Figure 3–1 reflects the current HQDA structure.
Achieving differentiation.

(1) Differentiation is achieved through the assignment of functional responsibilities to the HQDA directorates and the HQDA special and personal staff sections. It is within the directorates that assigned tasks such as recruiting, planning, or budgeting are managed; goals are formulated; timing coordinated; and sub-organizational hierarchy and protocols established. The directorates possess knowledge and experience sufficient for most decisions that concern their task environments.

(2) It is important at HQDA that the requirements of the associated functional environments are communicated and analyzed. This includes both upward relationships—with OSD, OMB, and congressional committee staffers—and downward relationships with the subordinate organizations. The senior leadership of the Army has a large influence on goal-setting and performance evaluation for the whole functional or specialty community within the Army and a similar influence on getting the needed resources from OSD, OMB, and Congress.

Horizontal Differentiation in HQDA.

(1) Part of the past debate on HQDA reorganization was the belief that the structure of HQDA actually complicates the achievement of the required differentiation and performance. The criticism focused on the functional parts of the Army Secretariat and the ARSTAF directorates which seemed to perform duplicating activities or have overlapping responsibilities. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 required the integration of the two staffs into a single HQDA comprised of a Secretariat focused on managing the business of the Army and the Chief of Staff and deputy chiefs of staff responsible for planning, developing, executing, reviewing, and analyzing Army programs. The policy/business management vice program development and execution differentiation does provide for a unified headquarters approach that limits sub-optimization while concurrently producing subordinate organizations with required differentiation, capable of being integrated into the roles, missions, and functions of the Army. Notwithstanding, the Army has continued to increase the integration of HQDA with the creation of the “Executive Office of the HQDA” and subsequently re-designated as “Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army” that increased administrative oversight by the Director of the Army Staff of both the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff and required closer staff relationships.

(2) The acquisition process provides a good HQDA example of the differentiation sought by Congress. The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) has now incorporated into the office, by law, the acquisition function assigned by Congress. The Assistant SECARMY (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) has been appointed by the Secretary of Army to perform this function. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 13, the Army has also transformed the
way it conducts its contracting business. As an example, the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) now centralizes the Army’s previously decentralized installation and information technology (IT) (see Chapter 16) contracting processes into one system. It is responsible for all contracts over $500K and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts, and leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA supports Army Transformation efforts by aligning all base support contracting into a single organization that best supports installation management transformation. All of these initiatives use IT to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities. Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting and operational support to the war fighting commands. The Army Contracting Agency and other contracting activities will also continue to support small business awards.

(3) Correspondingly, the Army differentiates functions and tasks vertically. Efficiency and effectiveness demands that organizations eliminate any level that does not perform essential and unique tasks or perform critical integrating functions. The Army executes unique Title 10 functions and tasks and produces value-added outputs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. These levels are further divided into eight levels. Figure 3–2 depicts the eight hierarchical levels of differentiated functions and critical tasks.
## How The Army Runs

### Figure 3–2. Differentiation of Army Hierarchical Functions and Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Critical Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGIC</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE ENTERPRISE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VIII (SA &amp; CSA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Sets the Direction of the whole Enterprise, and</td>
<td>&gt; Set Vision: Structure, Systems and Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Assigns Major Areas of Accountability to Each Direct Subordinate</td>
<td>&gt; Define Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VII (USA; VCSA; ASA; GEN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; External Affairs</td>
<td>&gt; Create Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Policy Application</td>
<td>&gt; Formulate Enterprise Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>&gt; Initiate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Alignment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VI (PDASS; SES-4; LTG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Policy Formulation</td>
<td>&gt; Maintain Global Awareness (Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Strategy Development</td>
<td>Environmental, Social, Technical, Informational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Program Analysis &amp; Integration</td>
<td>&gt; Manage Portfolios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Best Business Practices (Networking)</td>
<td>&gt; Allocate Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; (Command Direct Reporting Units)</td>
<td>&gt; Design: Structure, Systems, and Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level V (SES-5; MG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Strategy Implementation</td>
<td>&gt; Manage Operational Unit(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Identify Customer Needs</td>
<td>&gt; Manage Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Business Plan &amp; Program Development</td>
<td>&gt; Integrate Cross-functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Implement Continuous Improvement</td>
<td>&gt; Create Supportive Climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; (Command Direct Reporting Units)</td>
<td>&gt; Formulate Operational Unit Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level IV (SES-6; GS-15; BG(Colonels))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Program Execution</td>
<td>&gt; Manage people, processes, activities, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Meets Customer Needs</td>
<td>resources achieve goals &amp; objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Implements Continuous Improvement</td>
<td>&gt; Integrate Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Manage Resources</td>
<td>&gt; Measure Customer Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III, II, and I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Produce Direct Outputs</td>
<td>&gt; Increase Productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Interact with Customers</td>
<td>&gt; Measure Customer Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Manage to Budget</td>
<td>&gt; Eliminate waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Implement Continuous Improvements</td>
<td>&gt; Apply Lean Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; (Command Direct Reporting Units)</td>
<td>&gt; Ensure Quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) The top level (Level VIII) sets the direction for the total enterprise and assigns major areas of accountability to each of the Army’s subordinate organizations. The other most senior levels (Levels VII and VI) set the vision and mission of the major components of the Army and, therefore, involve work with long time horizons (15 years or more). These are the strategic levels in an organization. Fulfilling the Army vision of “relevant and ready Landpower in service to the Nation” and the mission “to provide necessary forces and capabilities ...” requires outputs (e.g., resource decisions, program development, change management, organizational alignment, etc.) by Level VII and Level VI leaders that impact the Nation’s defense for the next 15 years and beyond.

(5) The operational levels (Level V and IV) have traditionally provided the leadership of Divisions and Brigades. The outputs of Level V and Level IV equal those of strategic business units found in large scale enterprises. These two levels transform the strategic vision of Level VII leaders into a 3 to 6 year framework within which organizations implement programs and devise and implement training plans to create the conditions for successful activities at the tactical levels.

(6) The lower levels (Levels III, II, I) produce the direct outputs (products and services) of the organization. Time horizons at these levels are much shorter - 1 year or less. Several product/service examples: the output of a depot is a recapped piece of equipment (product); the output of an Army Training and Document Command training center is a Soldier ready for warfighting; the output for the operational army are trained and ready combined-arms units; and the output of an Army installation daycare center is childcare (service).

(7) The left side of Figure 3–2 shows the nature of value adding functions undertaken at higher levels in a properly designed organization. The right column shows the critical tasks performed at each level in the organization. Finally, the right side of Figure 3–2 emphasizes the importance of an enterprise perspective. The tactical level produces direct outputs, i.e., the products and services consumed by the customer. The output of a service school is a trained and educated Soldier. The output of a small unit combat team is occupied and controlled territory. In a command situation, the direction of work flow and its outputs at operating commands are directed down to lower levels because this is where the organization’s “production” of the direct outputs occurs.

(8) By contrast, in HQDA at Levels VI and VII the work fundamentally changes. Individuals doing their work at these levels produce outputs (services or products), but their outputs, and therefore their work, is directed to supporting a more senior Principal. The work at Level VI supports the outputs of Level VII. For example, the work of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 supports the resourcing mission of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology at Level VII. The outputs might be data analyses (services) or reports (products). The G–4 at Level VI may also prescribe tasks to Level V directorates that have been established to assist the Level VI Principal in carrying-out his or her work. The Level V output in this case might be drafts of specifications, directives, or programs.

   c. Achieving integration.

(1) Integration is achieved in a formal series of meetings at the senior staff level within the Secretariat and ARSTAF. The heads of the staff agencies, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff themselves, have a principal integrating role, serving more as a corporate management committee, than as simply representatives of their own staff agencies. And there are also many task forces, working groups, and committees with membership drawn from throughout the ARSEC and ARSTAF, which also serve as important knowledge-based integrators.

(2) Integration is also the primary function of the Army’s senior leadership: the SECARMY, Under Secretary, Chief of Staff, and VCSA. This group decides on management strategies: stability, modernization of equipment, allocation of scarce resources, and force structure issues. These strategies, enunciated in the yearly Posture Statement, are unifying, integrating statements of objectives that relate directly to the dominant overall issue...maintaining mission-ready forces.

Section V
Summary and references

3–9. Summary

a. The United States Army Posture Statement, available through the U.S. Army home page (http://www.army.mil), articulates the strategic role of the Army and the integration necessary to produce combat ready units. The document acknowledges that while fighting the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, the Army is concurrently transforming its organizational structure and doctrine.

b. This chapter presents a theoretical construct for the organizational design and structure of the Army and examines the two defining characteristics of functional differentiation and integration. The start point is our current National Security and Joint Military Strategies. Currently, the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family (www.dtic.mil/futurejoi warfare) provides the direction for change and The Army Strategy focuses that direction for the Army. The Army Campaign Plan maps the lines of operations the Army will pursue to manage the change effort as it continues its journey towards achieving required future capabilities. The remainder of this text will address the systems that actually plan and execute this continuous process of change and growth.
3–10. References
   b. Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
   c. Army Regulation 10–5, Headquarters, Department of the Army.
   d. Army Regulation 10–87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States.
   e. Army Regulation 10–88, Field Operating Agencies, Office of the Chief of Staff.
   f. General Orders Number 3 (GO 3), Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army.
   g. General Orders Number 00 (GO 00), Managing the Headquarters, Department of the Army.
   h. Amendment to GO 2002–03, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army.
Chapter 4

The Relationship of Joint and Army Planning

Joint matters, as identified in Title IV, Public Law 99–433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, are defined as “... matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to:”

Section I
Introduction

4–1. Chapter Content
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act profoundly changed the relationships among the Services and with the organizations of the OSD, the Combatant Commands, and the JCS. The Chairman and JCS were given additional responsibilities, the Combatant Commands were given greater authority and responsibilities to execute their missions, and Services and OSD realigned specific responsibilities and made organizational changes to include some that involved greater civilian oversight and control. This chapter addresses the processes used within the DOD, the JCS, the Combatant Commands and the Army to determine the joint capabilities and associated force levels required to meet the U.S. national security and military strategies and to fulfill Combatant Command requirements. These processes also determine the capabilities that need to be resourced by Services’ programs within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process (PPBE) and provide the basis for the DOD’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). While the emphasis of this entire text is on the Army management systems, it is first necessary to understand the relationship of DOD, the JCS, and the Combatant Commands to the Army. Hence this chapter provides more of a joint perspective to then better appreciate and apply information in other chapters in this text, and because the Army has significant input to the joint processes that support the development of requirements, programs and budgets, as well as, strategic planning.

4–2. Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense provides both formal and informal guidance to the services, Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies. His formal guidance is provided in the document called the National Defense Strategy. This document, while not required under Title 10 USC, has become a means for the Secretary to transmit his formal guidance. Signed by the Secretary, the document is designed to take the national goals and objectives of the Nation delineated in the National Security Strategy signed by the President and turn them into Defense objectives and goals. The document has been used to guide the formulation of Quadrennial Defense Review required by the Congress and various other Department of Defense strategy documents.

4–3. Other DOD Strategic Guidance
The Department of Defense changed the format for its guiding documents by merging twelve (12) strategic-level planning documents into two (2) documents. The two (2) new documents are the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF). The GEF provides guidance that impacts current operations and the current planning process; the GDF provides guidance for requirements development and programming and budgeting processes. Unique to the GEF is the inclusion of Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance.

4–4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman by Title 10 USC is the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC). The Chairman is required under the law to: assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction; conduct strategic planning; advise on preparedness of the Armed Forces; advise on requirements, programs and budgets; develop joint doctrine. The Chairman was required by the Congress in 2004 to produce every even year a detailed report that reviewed the current national military strategy to include the strategic and military risks to execute that strategy, and during every odd year the Chairman was to produce an assessment of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the current National Military Strategy (NMS) (discussed below).

4–5. Joint Strategic Planning System
The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) was revised in December 2008 to provide an integrated assessment, advice, and direction system to better enable the Chairman to assess the strategic environment, provide comprehensive military advice and provide unified direction to the Armed Forces. JSPS is the means by which the Chairman can, in the larger cycle of strategic planning by the Department of Defense, provide the assessments, advice, and direction he is required to provide under Title 10 USC. Through JSPS, the Chairman can conduct the comprehensive assessments to provide the statutory advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the Congress. JSPS provides the Chairman the means to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense with unified direction to the Armed Forces.
4–6. JSPS Overview

The three major components of JSPS address the Chairman’s statutory responsibilities: Chairman’s Assessment, Chairman’s Advice, and the Chairman’s Direction. While these three major components are more fully discussed later, a brief summary of them provides broad context to appreciate this strategic planning system.

a. The Chairman conducts both deliberate and continuous assessments. These assessments focus on such topics as readiness, risk, sufficiency, and joint military requirements. The two formal products as a result of this are the Comprehensive Assessment (CJA) and the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process.

b. The Chairman’s Advice is a principal statutory requirement of the Chairman and is designed to provide independent military advice to the senior leadership to assist in their development of strategy, guidance, and policy. The formal roles and areas associated with this advice include: Combatant Commander Spokesman, strategic direction, strategic planning, contingency planning, programming, budget, strategic environment and validate military requirements. In addition to the National Military Strategy, this advice includes formal documents such as the Chairman’s Risk Assessment, Chairman Program Recommendation, Chairman’s Program Assessment and Joint Strategy Review Report.

c. The Chairman’s Direction provides strategic direction on behalf of the President and Secretary of Defense to implement their guidance associated with the roles of strategic direction, strategic planning and developing doctrine. The two formal products associated with these roles are the National Military Strategy (NMS), which provides guidance to Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, Combat Support Agency directors, Defense Agencies, DOD Field Activity directors, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau to accomplish task and missions based on near term capabilities. The JSCP implements planning guidance reflected in the GEF.

4–7. Army Participation in joint planning and resourcing processes

The Army participates fully in the strategic planning and resource processes. The ARSTAF supports the SECARMY and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) by participating in various ways in working groups associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review, which is a comprehensive defense review required by Congress with the beginning of each new administration. The ARSTAF supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), in his role as a member of the JCS, by performing analyses and providing inputs to the JSPS. The ARSTAF supports the VCVA, in the role as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Deputies Advisory Working Group (DAWG), by...
direct participation in the capabilities assessment process. The ARSTAF supports the SECARMY, as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and DAWG by participating in JSPS, QDR and JROC, and by performing additional analyses as required in support of the development of the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and Joint Programming Guidance (JPG). In essence, the Army Staff has developed parallel processes to provide the Army’s perspective to these joint systems and processes both at the working and general officer levels. Most of the outcomes of these efforts that affect the Army are then codified in The Army Plan and The Army’s Campaign Plan.

a. GFM is designed to align force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements. It provides the comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military forces and provides the senior decision makers a process to assess quickly and accurately the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces/capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation. GFM is designed to transform the previous reactive force management process into a more near real-time, proactive process.

b. As specified in Title 10 U.S. Code and as identified in the Unified Command Plan and the “Forces For” memorandum, forces are assigned to Combatant Commands. Forces are generally apportioned by the CJCS based on Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provided by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Allocation of forces is the authority that resides with the Secretary of Defense and President. GFM integrates these two main responsibilities into a single overarching process. A major element of this new process is the Global Force Management Board, which is Chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff with advice from the other Joint Staff Directors and Services Operations Deputies. The Army G–3 represents the Army in making recommendations for final outcomes of this process that result in decisions by the SECDEF and the President as to force assignment, allocation, and apportionment. The final outcome is the production of deployment orders and executive orders.

Section II
Joint Strategic Planning System

4–8. JSPS

a. The CJCS is charged with preparing strategic plans and with assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces. The JSPS and the Global Force Management Process, as prescribed by CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01B and the Secretary of Defense’s Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, provide the framework for strategic planning and formulating strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Joint strategic planning begins the process to create the forces and associated capabilities that are then allocated to Combatant Commands for their planning. Since the capabilities integration and development process is essential to many of the formal strategic planning products and processes, CJCSI 3170.01E, which covers this Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), helps to validate and prioritize joint warfighting requirements. JCIDS is also a key supporting process for DOD acquisition and PPBE processes. A primary objective of the JCIDS and associated processes is to ensure the joint warfighter receives the capabilities required to successfully execute the missions assigned to them. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 describes how the Joint Force will operate in an uncertain, complex, and changing future environment characterized by persistent conflict.

b. Within the Joint Staff, strategic planning is primarily the responsibility of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J–5, and capabilities and resources are primarily the focus of the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J–8. They use input from the Joint Staff, OSD, other DOD and Defense Agencies, Combatant Commands, and the Services to assist in formulating policy, developing strategy, and providing force planning guidance. The Adaptive Planning Roadmap II and the review and approval of operations plans, which resides with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J–7, and Operations Directorate, J–3. All of the above mentioned Joint Staff Directors are members of the Global Force Management Board. Furthermore, the J–1, J–4 and J–6 Directorates have responsibilities for providing direction to specific Functional Capability Boards. Hence, all elements of the Joint Staff work together to fully execute these processes.

c. The JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which formal products on a specific cycle such as the National Military Strategy or Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other focused assessments or studies are produced as required to provide this formal direction. Some of these products provide direction while others provide formal advice or shape the personal advice from the Chairman. The CJCS uses this planning system to give him the formal ability to execute his Title 10 US Code responsibilities to conduct continuous strategic assessments, assess risk, provide statutory and personal advice to the President and Secretary of Defense, develop strategic plans, and provide strategic direction to the Armed Forces.
4–9. Chairman’s Assessments

The Chairman’s Assessments are a major component of the JSPS process. These assessments consist of obtaining and analyzing data concerning: the nature of the strategic environment; U.S. and allies ability to operate and influence that environment; adversaries and potential enemies’ ability to operate and influence that environment; the risk to the national strategies over the near, mid and far term. The requirement for the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA) is contained in Title 10, USC in those sections requiring the Chairman to assess the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risk to missions called for under the NMS, and to confer with the Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs to provide advice to the President and Secretary of Defense.

a. The Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) is a deliberate process intended to reduce redundancy and facilitate integrated comprehensive Combatant Command, Service and Joint Staff analysis. CJA survey requests assessments from the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders relating to statutory and Unified Command Plan responsibilities in support of the NMS. CJA focuses on qualitative not quantitative inputs. Further the CJA draws on other assessment such as the Joint Combat Capability Assessment (JCCA), Defense Readiness Reporting System, and Service and Combatant Commander assessments. The Chairman uses these assessment to formulate: military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on strategic direction for the Armed Forces; identify pressing and most pressing military issues; reconcile issues and requirements across Service and Combatant Commands; provide input to DOD processes; and Congressional reports.

b. As Combatant Command Campaign Plans are developed and approved as directed by the JSCP and the GEF, assessments of those plans will become a part of the CJA. Until the plans are fully developed Campaign Assessments will be incorporated in the CJA survey.

c. The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process provides an analytical framework that looks in depth at a variety of CJCS products to include: strategic documents; directives; instructions and memorandums. The JSR provides the synthesis of the CJA and the Joint Staff’s functional estimates and processes. The components of the JSR process include; Joint Intelligence Estimate; Joint Strategic Assessment; Joint Strategy Review Report; Capability Gap Assessment; Joint Concept Development and Experimentation; Joint Logistics Estimate; Joint Personnel Estimate/Health
Force Metrics; Chairman’s Risk Assessment; Operational Availability Studies; Joint Combat Capability Assessment; Chairman’s Readiness System; and Global Force Management.

4–10. Chairman’s Advice

A major statutory responsibility of the Chairman is to provide military and strategic advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, NSC and HSC. By providing formal advice the Chairman enhances his ability to assist the nation’s leadership in developing Nation Security and Defense Strategies, and programs and budgets.

a. The Chairman’s advice is developed using the information provided through the CJA and the analysis of the JSR process.

b. The Chairman’s formal advice provides National Security, Defense and Agency staffs with a framework and military baseline for strategic policy and guidance as well as direction for developing Joint Staff assessments and recommendations. The Chairman’s advice assists the President, the Secretary of Defense, and their staffs in the formulation of the NSS, NDS, Program Budget Review, GEF, GDF, QDR and Service strategies.

c. The Chairman’s formal advice includes: Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR); Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA); National Military Strategy (NMS); Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA); Chairman’s briefs; Council Membership; Chairman’s Formal Correspondence and Guidance Statements.

(1) CPR is developed under the leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) using the Joint Capabilities Assessment to provide the Chairman’s person programmatic advice to the Secretary of Defense.

(2) CPA is developed under the leadership of the JROC using the Joint Capabilities Assessment to shape the Chairman’s personal advice and assessment on Service and Defense Agency POMS and Budget Estimate Submissions to the Secretary of Defense to influence the Program and Budget Review (PBR).

(3) NMS is primarily to transmit direction to the Armed Forces, and it and its annexes provide the Chairman’s formal military advice on the global strategic environment, and military’s best approach to accomplishing goals of the NSS and NDS given resources and means.

(4) CRA is the method of transmitting formal military advice to the Congress.

(5) Chairman’s Briefs provide formal advice to President via briefs and discussions.

(6) Through the Chairman’s Council Membership, he provides advice to the NSC and HSC.

(7) Chairman uses personal correspondence and formal guidance statements to advise the President, Secretary of Defense, NSC and HSC.

4–11. Chairman’s Direction

The Chairman assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. He assists them with their command functions, and performs directive functions which the law specifies, and includes: planning, joint doctrine, education, and training. The Chairman’s formal direction is executed in the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP).

a. Formal strategic direction is executed biennially. The components of JSPS are sequenced to best support the formulation of key strategic documents. The development of strategic direction begins with the issuance of Chairman’s advice. The Chairman’s advice informs the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy developers each year and provides the military baseline for staff interaction and the development of critical work such as the NSS and QDR.

b. The production of the strategic direction by the Chairman is a collaborative effort requiring extensive coordination. The Chairman provides advice and recommendations to influence the NSS, NDS, GDF, GEF, UCP, Quadrennial Role and Missions Reviews (QRM), and the QDR.

c. The NMS and the JSCP are the major direction documents signed by the Chairman, produced under the JSPS.

(1) The NMS sets priorities and focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces while providing the Chairman’s advice on the security environment and necessary military missions to protect the Nation’s interests. Based on the NSS and NDS, the NMS provides the guidance that Combatant Commanders use to employ the Joint Force to protect the Nation’s interest, and the Service Chiefs use to develop capabilities that support the Joint Force.

(2) The NMS provides military objectives to Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs, derived from the NSS and the NDS. The NMS provides military ways and means to achieve national objectives.

(3) The NMS provides the Chairman’s advice on the strategic environment, the Implications of that environment, and the best way to accomplish the goals of the NSS and NDS.

(4) The NMS state the Joint Force’s resolve to defend the American people and the nation’s vital interests, while achieving the national and defense objectives.

(5) The NMS forms the basis for the advice in the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (odd years) and Bi-annual Review (even years) provided to the congress.

(6) The JSCP provides guidance to accomplish tasks and missions based on near term military capabilities to Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, Combat Support Agencies (CSA) directors, applicable Defense agency and DOD Field Activities directors, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau.
(7) The JSCP implements campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture planning guidance from the GEF.
(8) The JSCP implements the objectives in the NSS and NDS through the resulting combatant command campaign and contingency plans.
(9) The JSCP provides a coherent framework for military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense and follows, implements, and augments presidential and SecDef guidance provided in the GEF, UCP, and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.
(10) The JSCP provides: strategic planning direction; detail planning guidance, force apportionment guidance, assumptions and tasks; tasks the Combatant Commanders to prepare campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans; establishes the synchronizing, supported and supporting relationships.

4–12. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

By statute the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible to chair the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the functions of the JROC chairman may only be delegated to the Vice CJCS (VCJCS). Other members of the JROC are selected by the CJCS after consultation with the SecDef, who are in the grade of General and Admiral that are recommended by their military Departments. In addition, Combatant Commanders now have a standing invitation to attend JROC sessions as desired. Historically, the JROC has consisted of the VCJCS, the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Since 1994, the CJCS expanded the authority of the JROC to assist in building senior military consensus across a range of issues across four broad functional areas. These functional areas are capabilities, assessments, joint integration, and resources (Figure 4–3). Furthermore, some Under Secretaries of Defense, Defense Agencies, or Inter-agency activities also attend JROC meetings depending on the subject. The CJCSI that covers this organization’s functions and membership is 5123.01D.

a. The JROC has continued to broaden its strategic focus to include providing top down guidance in defining military capabilities from a joint perspective and integrating this advice within the planning, programming and budgeting process. The JROC oversees the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and provides advice on acquisition programs as specified in CJCSI 3170.01E and DOD 5000.1. Additionally, JROC activity has continued to focus on dialogue with Combatant Commanders on the full range of warfighting requirements and capabilities. Assessment teams perform the assessment of those requirements and capabilities or working groups are organized within the established Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs). The domains of each of these Functional Capabilities Boards include the following nine critical functional areas: Battlespace Awareness; Force Application; Building Partnerships; Command and Control; Logistics; Protection; Net-Centric; Force Support; and Corporate Management and Support (See Figure 4–4). Finally, the JROC continues to maintain its direct integration in the PPBE process. Significant effort is involved in the production of two JSPS documents: the Chairman’s Program Recommendations (CPR) and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) that were discussed earlier in this chapter. By providing functional assessments in the domains listed above, the JROC provides significant input into the development of the full range of Chairman’s programmatic advice required by statute.

b. The JROC chartered the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) to serve as an executive level advisory board to assist the JROC in fulfilling its many responsibilities. The JCB consists of the Director, J–8, and the appropriate Service-designated general/flag officer representatives. The JCB assists the JROC in overseeing the capabilities integration and development process and the capabilities assessment process. The JCB reviews capabilities assessment insights, findings, recommendations, and provides both guidance and direction.

c. Functional Capabilities Boards (FCBs) serve as the points of entry for the JROC’s actions related to capabilities. Additionally, the FCBs, under the leadership of a Joint Staff or Joint Forces Command flag officer or senior executive service civilian, serve as integrators of functional capability development and ensure that major programs are fully integrated into joint architectures from the outset. The JROC and its associated sub organizations continue to evolve in order to remain focused on strategic issues and concepts. As an example of this strategic focus and desire to directly influence future systems and capabilities, each of the organizations within the JROC process has become deeply involved in developing Operational Concepts and Operational Architectures, as well as developing strategic guidance to influence transformation. The overall intent is to provide more upfront guidance to ensure capabilities and systems are “born joint” and the focus in on joint interdependency.

d. Along with the changes to the structures and establishment of these boards discussed above, advisory support to the JROC has also increased. For example, there are organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (e.g. Comptroller, Policy, Intelligence, etc.) that now come to the capabilities meetings as part of the Functional Control Boards. Further, certain interagency organizations have a standing invitation to attend and provide senior level advisory participation at JROC related meetings on specific subjects, such as the NSC, CIA, OMB, DHS and others. This evolution allows for a broader vetting and input of issues and capabilities before they get to the most senior level for decision.
Figure 4–3. JROC Functional Areas

- **Joint Functional Capabilities Assessments**
  - Strategic Study Topics
  - Operational Architectures
  - Operational Concepts
  - Mission Area Analysis

- **Joint Capabilities**
  - Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)
  - Capabilities Development Document (CDD)
  - Capabilities Production Document (CPD)
  - JCIDS Overview / Prioritization

- **ASSESSMENTS**
- **CAPABILITIES**
- **RESOURCES**
- **JOINT INTEGRATION**

- **Services & COCOMs**
  - Integrated Priority Lists (IPL)
  - Hub Trips
  - Service/COCOM Issues
  - Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) Review
  - GWOT Assessments

- **Defense Programming**
  - Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA)
  - Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR)
  - Title 10 Responsibilities

Figure 4–4. Functional Capabilities Board (FCB)

- **Gatekeeper**
  - DIRECTOR, FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT
  - VICE DIRECTOR, FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT

- **Battlespace Awareness**
  - VDJ2

- **Command and Control**
  - JFCOM J8

- **Logistics**
  - VDG4

- **Force Support**
  - DDFM, J8

- **Corp. Mngt & Spt**
  - TBD

- **Force Application**
  - DDFA, J8

- **Protection**
  - JTAMDO

- **Net – Centric**
  - VDJ6

- **Building Partnerships**
  - J5

- **FCB Membership (0-6 Level)**
  - USA, USN, USAF, USMC, Combatant Commands, OUSD(AT&L), OSD PAE, OSD NII, DIA, USD(I), MRB, Others (as required)
  - FCB Advisors
  - Assessment Team Leads, J-6 Rep, DoD Labs, Industry/Corporate, J8 WCAID, CJCS Legal
4–13. Capabilities Assessments

Capabilities Assessment teams, under the supervision of a Functional Capability Board, examine key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness. The teams consist of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services, OSD, DOD agencies, and others as deemed necessary. Assessment issues are presented to the FCB for initial issue review, to the JCB for further issue development, and then to the JROC for final recommendation to the CJCS. Through this process the JROC then is instrumental in helping the CJCS forge consensus and examine alternatives.

a. There are a series of documents that provide guidance for the defense capabilities development process. Within this capabilities process the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the overarching concept that guides the development of the family of joint concepts and future capabilities. It broadly describes how the future joint forces are expected to operate across the range of military operations for an approximate period of time of 2016 to 2028. This document then provides guidance for the family of concepts called Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), Joint Functional Concepts (JFCs) and Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs). The JOCs of which there are currently a total of six describe broad joint operations. The Joint Functional Concepts, of which there are currently eight, describe enduring joint force functions. Finally, there are currently sixteen Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs), of which there are sixteen, describe more narrowly focused operations or functions. The number and type of concepts is being evaluated as this is being written, so there may be future changes in this family of concepts framework.

b. Guidance in the above documents is used by the capabilities assessments that are part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) briefly described earlier. The CJCSI that describes this detailed process and the documents produced this process is 3170.01E. The documents produced by the JCIDS process that support the materiel and non-materiel solutions are as follows: Joint Capabilities Document (JCD), Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capabilities Development Document (CDD), Capabilities Production Document, and Joint DOTMLPF Change Recommendations (DCR).

Section III
Planning and Resourcing

4–14. DOD planning, programming, budgeting system, and execution process (PPBE)

a. PPBE is a cyclic process containing four interrelated phases: planning, programming, budgeting and execution. The process provides for decision-making on future programs and permits prior decisions to be examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the strategic environment and for the time period being addressed.

b. Through the JSPS, the Chairman performs his statutory requirement to provide advice on requirements, programs and budgets. Formal advice is provided in NMS, CPR and CPA. These documents are designed to impact the planning, programming and budgeting phases of PPBE.

c. Through JSPS, the Services and Combatant Command by their input to the Comprehensive Joint Assessment, and their input to the process for developing formal advice provided by the Chairman provide an integrating perspective.

4–15. The Army Planning System

The Army planning system is designed to meet the demands of JSPS, JROC/CA, GFM, JOPES, and PPBE. Through its interfacing with the JSPS and the JROC/CA processes and its input as a member on the various councils and boards, the Army provides its input to joint assessments and strategic planning documents, which present the advice and direction of the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the Combatant Command Commanders, to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

a. The Army PPBE initiates Army planning system. This planning system addresses the direction provided by defense policies and the military strategy for attainment of national security objectives and policies. It determines force requirements and objectives, and establishes guidance for the allocation of resources for the execution of Army roles and functions in support of national objectives. It provides the forum within which the Army conducts all planning, except operational (contingency) planning which is performed by the Combatant Commands, to integrate CJCS guidance and provide Service assistance. The Army’s PPBE planning phase supports the DOD PPBE process and the JSPS. It also provides guidance for the subsequent phases of the Army PPBE. Planning is defined as the continuing process by which the Army establishes and revises its goals or requirements and attainable objectives, chooses from among alternative courses of action, and determines and allocates its resources (manpower and dollars) to achieve the chosen course of action. The value of comprehensive planning comes from providing an integrated decision structure for an organization as a whole.

b. Adequate planning requires a ways and means of making events happen to shape the future of an organization instead of adapting to a future that just unfolds. Planning is considering and assessing ideas that represent the resources
of an organization without risking those resources. It is designed to reduce risk by simplifying and integrating as much information as possible upon which to make a decision. It includes the development of options.

c. The Army planning system includes strategic planning and force planning for both requirements and objectives. Strategic planning includes the development of national defense policy along with the ends, ways and means associated with the various parts of the NMS. Strategic planning provides direct support to the DOD PPBE and JSPS, while concurrently supporting the Army PPBE. These planning activities serve to guide the subsequent development of programs and budgets. Army planning includes the identification of the integrated and balanced military forces necessary to accomplish that strategy, and provision of a framework for effective management of DOD resources towards successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource limitations.

Section IV
The Joint Operations Planning

4–16. Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

The joint operation planning process is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by commanders to determine the best methods of accomplishing tasks and to direct the actions necessary to accomplish those tasks. Joint Operations, Planning, and Execution System (JOPES) is used to conduct joint planning. JOPES facilitates the building and maintenance of operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans. It aids in the development of effective options and operations orders through adaptation of OPLANs or create plans in a no-plan scenario. JOPES provides policies and procedures to ensure effective management of planning operations across the spectrum of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. As part of the Global Command and Control System, JOPES supports the deployment and transportation aspects of joint operation planning and execution. JOPES contains five basic planning functions: threat identification and assessment; strategy determination; course of action development; detailed planning; and implementation.

4–17. Combatant Commands

Combatant Commands provide for the integrated effectiveness of U.S. military forces in combat operations and for the projection of U.S. military power in support of U.S. national policies. They are established by the President through the SecDef with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.

a. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the document signed by the President that establishes the roles, functions and mission for the Combatant Commands, and it specifies their day to day responsibilities.

b. The chain of command extends from the President to the SecDef to the commanders of the Combatant Commands. Forces are assigned under the authority of the SecDef. A Combatant Command is assigned a broad continuing mission under a single commander and are composed of assigned components of two or more Services. Combatant Commands have full command of all forces assigned.

c. There are two types of Combatant Commands: geographic, which have responsibility for specific areas, and functional, which have responsibility for executing certain functions. There

d. are six geographic and four functional Combatant Commands.

![Figure 4–5. Combatant Commands](image-url)
How The Army Runs

(1) U.S. Joint Forces Command is the primary joint force provider and will develop recommended global joint sourcing solutions for conventional forces and capabilities worldwide in coordination with the Services and Combatants. USJFCOM does not provide forces from SOCOM, TRANSCOM, or STRATCOM. USJFCOM is responsible for experimentation, joint training, interoperability and force provisioning. USJFCOM is the “transformation laboratory” of the United States military that serves to enhance the Unified Commanders’ capabilities to implement that strategy. USJFCOM develops future concepts, tests these concepts through rigorous experimentation, educates joint leaders, trains joint forces, and makes recommendations on how the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines can better integrate their warfighting capabilities.

(2) U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility includes 25 culturally and economically diverse nations located throughout the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, and Northern Red Sea regions, as well as the Arabian Peninsula. It includes the countries of Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan.

(3) U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is responsible for the U.S. contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and for commanding U.S. forces assigned to Europe. Its area of responsibility includes six countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union as well as portions of the Middle East. The Command USEUCOM is also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a major NATO commander, and as such is responsible for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

(4) U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is responsible for defense of the United States from attacks through the Pacific Ocean, and for U.S. defense interests in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.

(5) U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is responsible to lead, plan, synchronize and as directed execute global operations against terrorist networks. USSSOM trains, organizes, equips and deploys combat ready special operations forces to combatant commands. It executes and exercises COCOM of all CONUS-based special operations forces (SOF). Major units include: Army Special Forces, Rangers, special operations aviation, PSYOP, and CA units; Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) and special boat units; and Air Force special operations squadrons. USSOCOM is unique in that it is responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for Major Force Program 11, Special Operations Forces.

(6) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for providing global air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives in peace and war. Its component commands are the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(7) U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is responsible to provide global deterrence capabilities and synchronize regional combating weapons of mass destruction plans. It enables decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects to include nuclear and information operations in support of US Joint Force Commander operations and provides: integrated surveillance and reconnaissance; space and global strike operations; integrated missile defense and robust command and control.

(8) U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) is responsible to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States; its territories and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or SecDef, provide defense support to civil authorities including consequence management operations. USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President and SecDef.

(9) U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): The guidance to establish AFRICOM was provided in February 2007 and the general area of operation will be African continent that was under the three Combatant Commands of EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM. Their mission, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense in May 2008, was defined as “in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”

4–18. Relationship of the CJCS to Combatant Commands
The US Code Title 10 specifies that the SecDef may assign to the CJCS responsibility for assisting him with his command responsibilities. It further identifies that subject to the SecDef, the CJCS can also serve as the spokesman for the Combatant Commands. In addition the President may direct that communications between the Combatant Command Commanders and the President or SecDef be transmitted through the CJCS. This places the CJCS in a unique
and pivotal position. However, this does not confer command authority on the CJCS, and does not alter the responsibilities of the Combatant Command Commanders. Subject to the direction of the President, a Combatant Command Commanders: performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the President and SecDef; and responds directly to the President and SecDef for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command. These broad responsibilities of the Combatant Commands are also specified in US Code Title 10.

**Section V**

**Summary and References**

**4–19. Summary**

Joint strategic planning is conducted under the direction of the CJCS in consultation with the Services, Combatant Commands, and Office of Secretary of Defense.

a. The JSPS is oriented toward identifying and evaluating the threats facing the nation and looking at the ever changing strategic environment. It provides the basis for formulating the nation’s military strategy and defining resource needs in terms of capabilities, forces, and materiel.

b. The PPBE focuses resource allocation, making it dollar and manpower oriented. The PPBE is concerned with the amount and direction of those resources necessary to provide the capabilities required to execute the planning guidance identified by the GDF and programming guidance in JPG, as well as the strategy outlined in the National Defense Strategy and guidance articulated in the QDR. Cost is balanced against risk.

c. The JSPS, JROC, and Capabilities Assessments process impact the PPBS starting with the planning phase by providing broad strategy advice contained the NMS more specific advice in the CPR and through the programming phase by assessing the Service’s, and certain Defense Agency’s programs and budgets with the CPA.

d. The JSPS, based on the GEF, directs strategic planning through the NMS and JSCP. JSCP requires that plans be completed to accomplish tasked missions within available resources. The Combatant Commands are the organizations that develop the various JSCP directed plans. The JSCP is the JSPS document that starts the deliberate planning process. The JSCP is the formal link between JSPS and JOPES.

e. The details of planning change constantly. However, the overall process included the following: identifying the capabilities required; assessing various threats to include asymmetric threats; developing a military strategy; structuring forces and determining capabilities to support the strategy; providing resources for priority requirements; and planning for the deployment of those forces to meet contingencies. These responsibilities are essentially a requirement from year to year, with both a near term and long term focus depending on the operational and strategic challenges.

f. Capabilities’ planning is not a precise activity, even though the resulting force levels to execute some of these capabilities are stated precisely in terms of divisions, air wings, carrier battle groups, and the like. There are many challenges involved in capabilities planning, and the resultant analyses to determine force structure, as well as the risks inherent with a particular force level, are judgmental in nature. Throughout all of these processes, the Army has developed internal processes and organizational structures, which will be covered in later chapters, to ensure it fully contributes to all these processes and the subsequent products.

**4–20. References**

e. Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, February 2006
f. Joint Publication 0–2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
g. Joint Publication 5–0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.
h. CJCS Instruction 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System, Dec 2008.
i. CJCS Instruction 3137.01C, The Functional Capabilities Board Process
 j. CJCS Instruction 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
k. CJCS Instruction 5123.01D, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
l. Army Regulation 1–1, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.
o. Adaptive Planning Road Map II 2008, December 2005
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Chapter 5

Army Force Development

“As the decisive ground component of the Joint and interagency teams, the Army operates across the full spectrum of conflict to protect our national interests and affirm our Nation’s commitment to friends, allies, and partners worldwide. Our goal is a more agile, responsive, campaign quality and expeditionary Army with modern networks, surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are lighter, less logistics dependent and less manpower intensive.” 2008 Army Posture Statement, Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army and General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, Army

Section I

Introduction

5–1. Force development overview

Force development starts with the operational capabilities desired of the Army as specified in national strategies and guidance such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Defense Strategy (NDS), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Army Strategy as well as the needs of the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs). Strategic guidance identifies the range of military operations that the U.S. expects its military forces to perform, the effects they must achieve, the attributes those forces must possess, where they must operate, and generally what kind and what size of force is expected to execute those operations. Strategic guidance informs the development of the contemporary operational environment (COE) and future joint operational environments (JOE). These visualizations of the operational environment (OE) describe the composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect commanders’ decisions on the employment of military capabilities. The JOE provides the framework for the development of more specific concepts that are intended to accomplish the strategic objectives and decisively prevail within the JOE. These concepts, in turn, provide a visualization of how joint and Army forces will operate 10–20 years in the future, describe the capabilities required to carry out the range of military operations against adversaries in the expected OE, and how a commander, using military art and science, might employ these capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. Concepts consist of future capability descriptions within a proposed projection of future military operations. Each concept describes the operational challenges, the components of potential solutions, and how those components work together to solve those challenges. The force development process then determines Army doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) capabilities-based requirements and produces plans and programs that, when executed through force integration activities, brings together people and equipment and forms them into operational organizations with the desired capabilities for the combatant commanders. Force development uses a phased process to develop operational and organizational plans, and then combines them with technologies, materiel, manpower, and limited resources to eventually produce combat capability. The force development process interfaces and interacts with the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the materiel systems acquisition management process, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (see para 6–3) and the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

5–2. Force development process summary

a. This chapter explains the Army force development process (Figure 5–1). Force development initiates the organizational life cycle of the Army, and is the underlying basis for all other functions. It is a process that defines military capabilities, designs force structures to provide these capabilities, and produces plans and programs that, when executed through force integration activities, translate organizational concepts based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. The five-phased process includes:

   1) Develop capabilities.
   2) Design organizations.
   3) Develop organizational models.
   4) Determine organizational authorizations.
   5) Document organizational authorizations.

b. The Army force management chart (Figure 2–2 in Chapter 2) displays a schematic framework of the force development sub-processes as part of the force management process. The Army force management chart depicts how each process or system relates to others and contributes to the accomplishment of the overall process. The following sections will explain the phases of force development in detail.
Section II
Phase I–Develop capability requirements

5–3. Joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS)
   a. The JCIDS, the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process are the DOD’s three principal decision support processes for transforming the military forces. The procedures established in JCIDS support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs.
   b. JCIDS is a need driven joint capabilities-based requirements generation process. The objective is to develop a balanced and effective doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solution that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable by outside agencies, and based on mature technology. JCIDS implements an integrated, collaborative process, based on top-level strategic direction, to guide development of new capabilities through changes in DOTMLPF. Change recommendations are developed and evaluated that optimize the joint force’s ability to operate as an integrated force in the future operational environment. The JCIDS is an integrated, collaborative approach that uses joint/services concepts and integrated architectures to identify and prioritize high risk capability gaps and integrated joint DOTMLPF and policy approaches (materiel and non-materiel) to resolve those gaps.
   c. Joint and Army concepts collectively provide the context for determining capability requirements, capability gaps and redundancies, and potential materiel and non-materiel solutions to solutions to those gaps. See para 5–6b below.

5–4. Army implementation of JCIDS Overview.
   a. Capabilities-based requirements generation begins the Army force development process. Army CIDS develops an integrated set of Army DOTMLPF requirements that support national strategic guidance, The Army Plan (TAP), and
the operational needs of the combatant commands. This process assesses future Army warfighting concepts in the context of the future joint operational environment (JOE) and within the corresponding joint concepts to identify functional needs and solutions. The JOE describes the physical, demographic, political, economic, technological and military conditions in which the Army will operate during the next two decades.

b. Transformation to the future modular force. The Army Strategy (Section 1 of the TAP) and Army Field Manual 1–The Army, provide the broad direction for the transformation of the Army in order to meet the challenges of our changing national security environment. FM 1 provides a broad abstract description of the future Army and its desired role within the overall national security apparatus. It establishes both the desired organizational goals to be achieved and provides purpose, direction, energy and identity to its Soldiers in order to accomplish those goals. By its nature and scope, FM 1 integrates the challenges associated with the NSS and NMS and outlines the Army requirements to accomplish its role within those strategies. Similarly, the Army Strategy seeks to develop future capabilities to achieve an Army that effectively operates across the full spectrum of military operations. The Army Campaign Plan (Section 4 of the TAP), captures the details of how the Army intends to achieve the Army transformation objectives and directs planning, preparation, and execution of Service Title 10 activities toward those ends.

c. The Army begins the CIDS process through the Army Concept Strategy (ACS). The ACS family of concepts consists of the capstone concept (TP 525–3–0), operational concepts (AOCs), Army functional concepts (AFCs), concept capability plans (CCPs), and other concepts directed by CG, TRADOC. The use of these concepts allows front-loaded analysis to capabilities development and refinement through the CBA to identify gaps in capability and propose solutions to resolve or mitigate those gaps. Properly applied, Army CIDS produces an integrated set of DOTMLPF and policy solution approaches that collectively provide the RCs. As it is grounded in joint/Army concepts, the Army CIDS process provides a traceable path of all Army system and non-system solutions back to overarching national strategic guidance.

d. Bridging the conceptual gap between the governing concepts and CBA are Future Operations Capabilities (FOC). These critical, force-level, measurable statements of operational RC frame how the Army will realize future force operations visualized in the capstone, operating and functional warfighting concepts. All warfighting capabilities-based requirements emerging from the CBA must have direct linkage through an FOC to an approved Army concept.

e. The CBA identifies and documents capability gaps; determines the attributes of a capability or combination of capabilities that would resolve the gaps; and identifies non-materiel and/or materiel approaches for possible implementation. As a result, the concepts-centric Army CIDS process is a robust analysis of warfighting capabilities projected to be essential for mission success within the JOE. This process helps ensure the Army considers the most effective joint force capabilities and the integration of those capabilities early in the process. Appropriate component, cross-component, and interagency expertise; S&T community initiatives; and war gaming and experimentation results must be considered in the development of DOTMLPF and policy solutions. Due to the wide array of issues considered in the Army CIDS process, the breadth and depth of the analysis must be tailored to suit the specific candidate capability gap. Ultimately, the CBA will produce ‘solution sets’ that are based upon fully integrated Army, joint and interagency architectures within an overall systems-of-systems (SoS) framework. In the interim, the CBA will apply existing analytical approaches for discrete DOTMLPF and policy capability solutions using joint and Army concepts as the primary integrating mechanism. See para 5–7.

f. Joint/Army CIDS documentation (initial capabilities document (ICD), capability development document (CDD), capability production document (CPD), DOTMLPF integrated capabilities recommendation (DICR), and DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCR)) provides the formal communication of DOTMLPF and policy solutions between the user and the acquisition, test and evaluation, and resource management communities. Capability documents are discussed in detail in chapter 11.

5–5. Integrated capabilities development teams (ICDTs).

a. ICDTs are teams integrated teams made up of people from multiple disciplines formed to develop a CCP, perform the CBA to identify capability gaps, identify non-materiel and/or materiel approaches to resolve those gaps, and develop an ICD and/or a DICR (for Army-only integrated capabilities recommendations) or DCR (for joint change recommendations), when directed.

b. The ICDT membership and participants vary, depending on the specific product; however, core membership always includes representation across the DOTMLPF domains. The ICDT charter identifies the membership, the participating organizations, and the expected deliverables. While industry and academia are usually not formal members of the ICDT, their input is a key to identifying risks the Army may face and what it might cost.

5–6. Concept development and experimentation (CD&E).

a. Concepts. Concepts are the centerpiece of the CD&E process. An operational concept is a generalized visualization of operations. It describes a problem to be solved, the components of the solution to that problem, and the interaction of those components in solving the problem.

(1) Concepts serve as the foundation for architecture development and for generating capabilities-based DOTMLPF solutions. These solutions usually include a combination of: doctrine (fundamental warfighting principles and tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs)) development; organizational design changes; training initiatives; materiel solutions;
leadership and education requirements; personnel solutions; and facilities renovation/design. The DOTMLPF solution sets are developed and refined through an evolutionary development process that results in enhanced capabilities at the unit level.

2. Components of an operational concept include a description of the JOE and its associated range of challenges, a set of concepts that address the “how to” of countering and overcoming the challenges posed, and a corresponding set of RCs and initial force design principles needed to implement the concept.

b. Concept and concept capability plan (CCP) development. The Army publishes its fundamental ideas about future concepts of military operations and their associated capabilities in operational concepts and CCPs. The translation of concepts into capabilities is an iterative process. While concepts may be bounded by the feasibility of technological solutions, their scope is not limited to near term maturity of the technology. To maximize their future utility, concepts must be broadly based and encompass both the art and science of forecasting future warfighting environments, and be continually refined through war gaming, experimentation, assessment, and analysis. Since the Army will fight as part of the joint force, Army concepts are nested within and/or synchronized with joint concepts. Consequently, the Army actively participates in the development of the family of Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) and leverages them in the development of Army concepts.

(1) The JOpsC consists of a capstone concept for joint operations (CCJO), joint operating concepts (JOCs), joint functional concepts (JFCs) and joint integrating concepts (JICs). These concepts address the period from just beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) out to 20 years. The NSS, NMS, Unified Command Plan (UCP), Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provide top-level strategic guidance for the JOpsC development and are the impetus for deriving capabilities needed to shape the joint force.

(a) Capstone concept for joint operations (CCJO). The CCJO is the overarching concept of the JOpsC that guides the development of future joint capabilities. The purpose of the CCJO is to lead force development and employment primarily by providing a broad description of how the future joint force will operate. Service concepts and subordinate JOCs, JFCs, and JICs expand on the CCJO solution. The CCJO broadly describes how future joint forces are expected to operate across the range of military operations 8–20 years in the future in support of strategic objectives. The CCJO briefly describes the environment and military problem expected to exist in 8–20 years. It proposes a solution to meet challenges across the range of military operations and describes key characteristics of the future joint force. The CCJO concludes by presenting risks and implications associated with this concept. The CCJO is approved by the SECDEF and CJCS.

(b) Joint operating concepts (JOCs). A JOC applies the CCJO solution to describe how a future joint force commander, 8–20 years in the future, is expected to conduct operations within a military campaign, linking end states, objectives and effects. It identifies the broad capabilities considered essential for implementing the concept. JOCs provide the operational context for JFC and JIC development. There are currently six approved JOCs: Major Combat Operations, Homeland Defense, Strategic Deterrence, Stability Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Shaping Operations. The JOCs are approved by the SECDEF and CJCS.

(c) Joint functional concepts (JFCs). A JFC applies elements of the CCJO solution to describe how the future joint force, 8–20 years in the future, will perform a broad military function across the full range of military operations. The JFC identifies the capabilities required to support joint force operations as described in the JOCs. It also identifies the attributes to compare capability alternatives and measure achievement. JFCs provide functional context for JOC and JIC development. There are currently eight approved JFCs: Force Application, Force Protection, Focused Logistics, Force Management, Battlespace Awareness, Command and Control, Joint Training, and Net Centric. The JFCs are approved by the JROC.

(d) Joint integrating concepts (JICs). A JIC is an operational-level description of how a joint force commander, 8–20 years in the future, will perform a specific operation or function derived from a JOC or JFC. JICs are narrowly scoped to identify, describe, and apply specific capabilities, decomposing them into the fundamental tasks, conditions, and standards required to conduct a JCIDS CBA. Additionally, a JIC contains an illustrative vignette to facilitate understanding of the concept. To date, sixteen (16) JICs have been developed and approved by the JROC (i.e., Global Strike; Joint Logistics Distribution; Joint Command and Control; Seabasing; Integrated Air and Missile Defense; Joint Undersea Superiority; Joint Forcible Entry Operations, etc).

(2) Likewise, Army operational concepts (AOCs) are visualizations of future operations that describe how a land force commander, using military art and science, might employ army-centric capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. Concepts are the foundation of Army CIDS.

(3) Army concept strategy (ACS) Army concepts documented in TRADOC 525-series pamphlets, illustrate how future forces will operate and the capabilities that they will require to carry out a range of military operations against adversaries in the expected JOE. They describe future capabilities within a proposed structure of future military operations for a period of 8–20 years. These concepts are the basis for assessment that may include studies, experimentation, war gaming, analyses, testing and simulations leading to determination of DOTMLPF solution sets to gain the specific capabilities required in approved concepts. The ACS consists of a capstone concept and a set of subordinate operating and functional concepts. For further detail or to describe a specific mission, function, or unique perspective, a concept capability plan (CCP) may be developed. Concepts are structured to facilitate visualization and communication of key ideas on future operations; CCPs are structured to facilitate the development of RCs. The
capstone and subordinate operating and functional concepts are written by the TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) assisted by the TRADOC staff, Combined Arms Center (CAC), Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), and selected TRADOC Centers of Excellence (CoEs). The ACS is at figure 5–2.

(a) The Army capstone concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3–0 The Army in Joint Operations, provides an overarching description of how the future Army, as part of the joint force, will operate across the range of military operations. It is the unifying framework for developing subordinate concepts, CCPs, and integrated RCs.

(b) Army operating concepts (AOCs) provide a generalized visualization of operations across the range of military operations. There are two AOCs: Operational Maneuver and Tactical Maneuver. Together, they describe how an Army force commander 8–20 years in the future will accomplish operational or tactical level missions and identify RCs to achieve objectives in land operations in support of a joint force commander’s military campaign or operation. AOCs do not include the details required to initiate the JCIDS CBA.

(c) Army functional concepts (AFCs) describe how the Army force will perform a particular military function across the full range of military operations 8–20 years in the future. AFCs support the capstone concept and the AOCs, as well as joint concepts, and draw operational context from them. Organized along the lines of the classic functions of a military force, the six AFCs are Command, See, Move, Strike, Protect, and Sustain. As an integrated suite of concepts, they describe the full range of land combat functions across the range of military operations. The AFCs contain an initial, broad description of RCs necessary to implement the concepts. AFCs may include the details required to initiate the JCIDS CBA.

(d) Concept capability plan (CCP). A CCP describes the application of elements of joint and Army concepts to selected mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT–TC) conditions. A CCP is typically more illustrative and descriptive than a concept, and more focused in its purpose. It includes one or more illustrative vignette(s) for a specific scenario and a set of distinguishing principles applicable to a particular operation. A CCP may include multiple illustrative vignettes for specific mission, function, or operation from the range of military operations. CCPs provide architecture data to support experimentation and the continuous refinement of the concept and architecture. CCPs have the narrowest focus of all concepts in order to derive detailed required capabilities and operational architectures. CCPs include the required details to initiate the CBA within JCIDS.
c. Force operating capabilities (FOCs).

(1) The TRADOC ARCIC. The TRADOC ARCIC establishes required FOCs as the foundation upon which to base the JCIDS CBA process. These critical, force-level, measurable statements of operational RC frame how the Army will realize future force operations as stated in the approved capstone, operating and functional warfighting concepts. The FOCs help focus the Army’s Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP) and warfighting concepts development and experimentation (CD&E) efforts. All warfighting capabilities-based requirements must have direct linkage through an FOC to an approved Army concept (capstone, operating, and functional). FOCs are listed biannually in TRADOC Pamphlet 525–66.

(2) TRADOC Pamphlet 525–66, guides independent research & development (IR&D) efforts. By providing the private sector an unclassified descriptive list of desired FOCs, the Army is able to tap into a wealth of information and new ideas on different means to achieve those capabilities. The Army encourages industry to share these ideas with appropriate combat developer (CBTDEV) and training developer (TNGDEV) organizations.

d. Experimentation. Experimentation is the heart of joint/Army’s capabilities integration and development system (CIDS). Experimentation explores warfighting concepts to identify joint and Army DOTMLPF change recommendations and capabilities needs. It provides insight and understanding of the concepts and capabilities that are possible given the maturity of specific technologies and capabilities that need additional research and development emphasis. The results of joint/Army experimentation help define the ‘art of the possible’ and support the identification of DOTMLPF solutions to provide new capabilities. Additionally, progressive and iterative mixes of high fidelity synthetic environments with live, virtual and constructive (LVC) activities using simulated units and environments, real Soldiers, units, and other designated players all participating in relevant, tactically competitive scenarios provide Army leaders with FOC insights. Warfighting experiments are conducted to gain understanding about some aspect of future warfighting. Capability insights from warfighting experiments are “waypoints” used by the Army to plot its future course leading towards the transformed future modular force.

(1) The U.S. Army Experimentation Plan (AEP), Annex B of the 2009 TRADOC ARCIC Campaign Plan (ArCP), is
the Army’s directed plan supporting future force development. It integrates Army concept development and experimentation (CD&E) in a coherent service/joint context to ensure the Army provides combatant commanders with sustained land combat capabilities that are an indispensable, decisive component of the joint force. Ultimately, the goal of CD&E is to reduce risk through learning, through innovation, and through pushing the limits of the possible. The AEP program is a holistic effort that inductively and deductively examines the future operational and strategic environments, supporting both current and future modular force development through a two-path approach that nests within the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan. Simply put, the AEP is about what the Army must learn, when, and how. Army experimentation is hypothesis based - the overarching hypothesis is that the future force capabilities will provide the joint force commander a means to attain a rapid decision by providing a much broader range of decisive capabilities. The AEP provides a means for validating that hypothesis.

(2) The Army CD&E strategy spans two mutually supporting, yet distinct paths - prototyping and concept development

(a) The prototype path satisfies critical operational needs and tests compelling technologies that promise to shape the future and produce feasible future force capabilities. Prototype experiments address current force semi-annually defined capability gap areas. At any point in time, the Army will be a hybrid of new and existing capabilities. One example of this is the ongoing reorganization of Army units into modular brigade combat teams (BCTs). Prototyping also informs the future modular force and supports the Future Combat Systems (FCS) acceleration strategy by prototyping FCS spin-out capabilities. The prototyping supports development and validation of DOTMLPF products, assesses FCS spin-out systems, and assists with integrating each spin-out into the overall systems-of-systems. “Spin-out” is a term developed by OSD to describe the unique approach of fielding FCS program mature capabilities and technologies to the current modular force while simultaneously continuing development of the full system-of-systems to achieve threshold and objective capabilities for the Army’s future modular force. This term is used to avoid confusion with the term spiral that refers to technologies inserted into an acquisition program over time as described in DOD 5000 acquisition series documents.

(b) The concept development path develops a concepts-based, coherently joint future force, using live, virtual and constructive (LVC) experimentation to provide actionable recommendations to reduce future force development risk. The concept development path is focused by approved foundational operational themes which contain the key ideas of Army warfighting concepts. The concept development pathway must address attaining fundamentally new capabilities such as an FCS-equipped BCT as well as the seamless integration of select FCS capabilities into the total force.

(3) Though CD&E is a continuous process, there are two basic components - concept development and capability development (which occur along both paths, with differing levels of maturity and resolution). Generally, concept development should drive capability development but the reverse is historically commonplace. Both components are supported by experimentation. For campaign level planning, it is essential to address all three efforts (concept development, capability development, and experimentation) to ensure synchronization to achieve the Army’s vision. At a more detailed level it is necessary to specifically address experimentation (due to planning requirements). For an individual experiment, questions of “what, when and how well” an issue must be investigated drives the experiment, whether concept development, capability development or a mix of the above. However, in all cases, an experiment is still an exploration of uncertainties in an experiential manner. An experimentation campaign must address all issues requiring such investigation, which creates the duality of purpose for an experimentation campaign - supporting both concept development and capability development.

e. In summary, a robust CD&E program is designed to optimize return on investment while acknowledging that there are many aspects of future operations that cannot be feasibly predicted. Conducting a planned, coordinated CD&E program enables transformation; however, allocating some resources for prototyping compelling or promising concepts and capabilities enables adaptation to emerging issues.

5–7. Capabilities-based assessment (CBA) process.

The Army CIDS CBA is a structured, three-phased JCIDS process that includes functional area, needs, and solution analyses that are used to develop capability documents. The three major phases of the JCIDS directed CBA are the functional area analysis (FAA), the functional needs analysis (FNA), and the functional solution analysis (FSA) of non-material and materiel approaches. The product of CBA is a materiel or non-materiel required capability approach, with DOTMLPF implications, that provides an assessment of satisfying the need, technical maturity, technical risk, supportability, affordability (best available data), timeliness of delivery, and potential for meeting full capability. In the Army the materiel approach product is articulated in a functional area strategic framework, currently under development by TRADOC’s ARCIC, delineating a modernization roadmap that satisfies the identified needs over the desired time frame. Once developed, these strategic frameworks produce timely input to the materiel acquisition and resourcing (PPBE) processes. The results of the CBA become the basis for the ICD and/or joint DCR and/or Army DICR. In this context the CBA results are merely a tool. As of this chapter update, the Joint Staff (JS) has streamlined the CBA process and has eliminated the terms FAA, FNA, and FSA while retaining the CBA methodology. The Army is retaining these terms.
Figure 5–3. Concepts based capability development

a. Joint operating environment (JOE). The CBA process begins with an analysis of the JOE. This analysis describes the physical, demographic, political, economic, technological and military conditions in which the joint/Army force will operate during the next two decades. The JOE results from an analysis of military and civilian documents, classified and unclassified, that describes future world conditions. Analyzed through the lens of professional military judgment (PMJ), the JOE serves as a basis for shaping future modular force operating capabilities (FOCs) previously discussed.

1. The JOE is described in The 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE), written by U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) J–2. This living document serves as the frame of reference for developing the concepts that provide a macro-level description of the future force’s operational tasks and specific functional areas required in the JOE. The JOE also supports joint/service concept development and experimentation (CD&E) processes.

2. The JOE reflects the analysis and assimilation of dozens of futures studies conducted by DOD, other government agencies, academia and industry, considered in relation to the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF). Joint experimentation and exercise wargames and the Army transformation process further supplement the development and definition of the JOE. Ultimately, these studies provide the basis for detailing the Army’s future modular force, and for its subsequent preparation for combat.

b. Functional Area Analysis (FAA). The FAA is the first analytical phase of the JCIDS-directed CBA. Strictly a capabilities-based task analysis, the FAA provides the framework to assess required capabilities (RCs) in the follow-on FNA.

1. The input to the FAA is an approved joint integrating concept (JIC), Army functional concept (AFC) or concept capability plan (CCP) that describes how the force will operate, the timeframe and environment in which it must operate, its RCs (in terms of missions and effects), and its defining physical and operational characteristics. Any analysis begins with a problem statement, and the FAA must start with the military problem to be examined. From the examination of the problem statement, the FAA isolates the RCs documented in the concept/CCP, identifies those tasks that the force must perform, the conditions of task performance, and the required performance standards. Its output is a list of RCs and associated tasks and attributes. Mapped to each RC, the tasks, conditions, and standards are developed to the level required for analysis against which current and programmed capabilities will be evaluated in the follow-on FNA. Not all warfighting concepts will necessarily generate a FAA.

2. The FAA is based on professional military knowledge of established doctrine and standards that are modified to account for the projected concept/CCP for future operations and organizations. The FAA employs operational analysis that is primarily qualitative in nature. The analysis must identify the tasks that must be performed to accomplish the mission or achieve effects, and the specific conditions (e.g., weather, terrain, threat) in which the tasks must be
performed. Many of these conditions are described in the universal joint task list (UJTL), but they must be adapted based upon PMJ of related operational experiences and the forecasted influence of the future environmental factors. The performance standards developed for required tasks are found in the Army Universal Task list (AUTL) or UJTL, approved concepts, or may also be based on operational experience.

c. Functional Needs Analysis (FNA). The FNA is the second analytic phase in the CBA. It assesses the ability of current and programmed Army capabilities to accomplish the tasks identified in the FAA, in the manner prescribed by the concept, under the full range of operating conditions, and to the prescribed standards. The FNA will identify any gaps and overlaps in capabilities and the risk posed by those gaps. The FNA determines which tasks identified in the FAA cannot be performed, performed to standard, performed in some conditions, or performed in the manner that the concept requires using the current or programmed force; and which of these gaps in capability pose sufficient operational risk to constitute needs that require a solution. Capability needs are defined as those capability gaps determined to present unacceptable risk. Following the FNA, the Dir, ARCIC will direct the JCDT chair or proponent to proceed with an FSA for those needs considered critical to executing operations IAW the concept.

(1) The tasks, conditions, and standards identified in the FAA and a list of current and programmed capabilities are the inputs to the FNA. The initial output of the FNA is a list of all gaps in the capabilities required to execute a concept to standard. When these gaps are subjected to risk analysis, the final output is a list of needs - capabilities for which solutions must be found or developed. Not all capability gaps will be identified as needs. Only those of high risk will be put on the capability needs list.

(2) In its simplest form, the FNA is a comparison of RCs to existing and programmed capabilities and the identification of the corresponding gaps. It must accurately and fairly assess current and programmed solutions' ability to provide RCs when employed in the manner and conditions called for by the concept/CCP. The FNA includes supportability as an inherent part of defining the capability needs. Emphasis will be placed on defining capabilities by functional domain, describing common attributes desired of subordinate systems, family-of-systems (FoS), or system-of-systems (SoS) and non-materiel solutions. Required capabilities must address joint and coalition warfare applications. The issue of determining whether the risk posed by specific capability gaps rises to the level of need, and to decide the relative priority of competing needs is a leadership decision. The FNA must provide the Army’s leadership with an understanding of the operational effect of each identified capability gap at levels ranging from the simplest functional or tactical task to tasks of potentially operational or strategic impact.

d. Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). The FSA is the third analytic phase in the CBA. It is an operationally based assessment of potential non-materiel doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTmLPF) and policy, and/or materiel approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or more of the capability needs determined from the FNA. The FSA describes the ability of each identified approach to satisfy the need. The FNA high-risk capability gaps are inputs to the FSA. The outputs of the FSA are the potential materiel and/or non-materiel approaches to resolve the capability needs. The FSA is composed of two substeps: ideas for non-materiel approaches (DOTMLPF analysis) and ideas for materiel approaches.

(1) Ideas for non-materiel approaches. The first substep in the FSA identifies whether a non-materiel (DOTmLPF) or integrated DOTMLPF and/or policy approach can address the capability gaps (needs) identified in the FNA. It first determines how the needed capability might be met by changes in DOTLPF or existing materiel short of developing new systems. These include changes in quantity of existing materiel, improving existing materiel, adopting other services’ materiel, or purchasing materiel from non U.S. sources. If the analysis determines that the capability can be partially or completely addressed by a purely DOTmLPF approach, a DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCR) is prepared and appropriate action is taken IAW the JCIDS Manual. If it is determined that DOTLPF changes alone are inadequate and that product improvements to existing materiel, adoption of other service or interagency materiel, acquisition of foreign materiel, or a new materiel approach is required the FSA process continues to substep 2 below. Some capability proposals will involve combinations of DOTLPF and policy changes and materiel changes. These proposals also continue through the FSA process at substep 2.

(2) Ideas for materiel approaches (IMA). In substep 2, materiel approaches (courses of action) are identified to provide the required capabilities. The collaborative nature of this effort is meant to develop potential solutions that are truly “born joint”. The process brainstorms possible materiel approaches and always includes existing and future materiel programs that can be modified to meet the capability need. The DOTLPF and policy implications of a materiel solution must always be considered throughout the process.

e. CBA recommendations. A CBA offers actionable recommendations for both non-materiel and materiel solution approaches.

(1) Potential non-materiel solution approach recommendations (sometimes called DOTmLPF or DOT_LP):

(a) change policy;
(b) change doctrine;
(c) reorganize;
(d) train and educate DOD personnel differently;
(e) acquire commercial or non-developmental items;
acquire more quantities of existing items or commodities to include increases in manpower, operational tempo, spare parts, and fuel supplies;

add or reassign personnel to mission areas;

move or realign facilities to support new mission areas.

2. Materiel initiatives tend to fall into three broad types (listed in terms of fielding uncertainty from low to high):

(a) development and fielding of information systems (or similar technologies with high obsolescence rates) or evolution of the capabilities of existing information systems;

(b) evolution of existing systems with significant capability improvement (this may include replacing an existing system with a newer more capable system, or simple recapitalization);

(c) breakout systems that differ significantly in form, function, operation, and capabilities from existing systems and offer significant improvement over current capabilities or transform how we accomplish the mission.

f. TRADOC ARCIC tasks an ICDT or proponent to develop the initial DOTMLPF capabilities document(s) - initial capabilities document (ICD) and/or joint DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCR) and/or DOTMLPF integrated capabilities recommendation (DICR). When documented, TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) submits DOTMLPF solution sets to HQDA for ARSTAF validation and VCSA approval via the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation and approval process (discussed later in chapter 11). Figure 5–4 illustrates some documents that might initiate resourcing for DOTMLPF domains. This collection of possible solution approaches forms the strategic framework plan to reach the desired capability.

g. Processes that may substitute for the CBA. DOD has several processes in place that can substitute for a formal CBA. They are listed below.

1. Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). The military utility assessment (MUA), which is completed at the end of the JCTD, may be a suitable replacement for the required analysis used as the basis for ICD preparation. MUs that do not contain the critical elements of information presented in the ICD (description of the capability gap(s); associated tasks, conditions and operational performance standards/metrics; and how the materiel and non-materiel approaches and analyses from the JCTD addressed these factors) will be augmented with a final demonstration report to qualify the results as equivalent to an ICD. The MUA/final demonstration report will be used to support the development and subsequent AROC and/or JROC approval of the CDD or CPD. A CDD or CPD, as appropriate, will be developed for the JCTD to transition into a program of record.

2. Prototypes. Results of prototype projects (i.e., USJFCOM prototypes) and operationally validated quick reaction technology projects intended for direct transition to fielded capabilities may also be eligible for consideration as potential solution approaches. This consideration will be based on mission need validation and MUA processes as applied to JCTDs.

3. Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Initiative Transition. The Joint IED Defeat Transition Packet,
which is complete after the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) validates an initiative, may be the appropriate replacement for the required analysis used as the basis for ICD preparation. The Transition Packet will be used as the CDD/CPD equivalent document for subsequent AROC and/or JROC approval and transition to a program of record.

(4) Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) or Services’ urgent needs processes. Capabilities developed and fielded to support the resolution of an operational commander’s urgent need can be transitioned into the JCIDS process. An urgent need validated by the Joint Staff J–8, or the Service as appropriate, may be used to enter the JCIDS process without an ICD. The sponsor can enter the JCIDS and acquisition processes at milestone B or C by initiating development of a CDD or CPD as appropriate. Capabilities fielded to resolve an urgent need which will continue to be required and sustained for the duration of an on-going operation do not require additional JCIDS documentation.

h. Overall, the concept-based Army CIDS process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost. The Army learned many lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and accelerated processes used to develop the Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs). These lessons have helped to shape informed changes to how we generate current and future modular force structure requirements. Inserting an up-front and robust integrated analysis based on guidance from overarching joint and Army concepts allows informed decisions earlier in the process, producing optimal DOTMLPF solution proposals, and making it easier to synchronize development and fielding. In addition, this process allows requirements to be traced back to national strategies, concepts and policies thus helping to eliminate redundant capabilities within the Army and DOD.

Section III
Phase II–Design organizations

5–8. Organization design
Organizational requirements flowing from the functional solution analysis determine whether a new or modified organization is required on tomorrow’s battlefield. Once identified, organizational requirements are documented through a series of connected and related organizational development processes: Unit Reference Sheet (URS) development; Force Design Update (FDU) process; Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) development; basis-of-issue plan (BOIP) development, and Total Army Analysis (TAA). Every process may not always be required before organizational changes are made to the force structure. For instance, phase III, Development of Organizational Models, starts before the end of Phase II, Designing Organizations.

5–9. The organization design process

a. Organizations have their beginnings in warfighting concepts and concept capability plans. They provide the conceptual basis for the proposed organization and address a unit’s mission, functions, and required capabilities. The combat developers (CBTDEV) at TRADOC proponent schools, the Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S) (see Chapter 18), the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) develop new organizational designs or correct deficiencies in existing organizations. The Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Director integrates and validates concepts developed for future force capabilities. These concepts normally address:

(1) Missions, functions, capabilities, and limitations.
(2) Command and control linkages.
(3) Individual, collective, and leader training requirements.
(4) Sustainment in field and garrison.
(5) Doctrinal impacts.
(6) Impacts on materiel programs.

b. The FDU is used to develop consensus within the Army on new organizations and changes to existing organizations and to obtain approval and implementation decisions (Figure 5–5). On a semi-annual basis, the FDU process addresses organizational solutions to desired capabilities and improvements to existing designs in which other doctrine, training, materiel, leader development, personnel or facilities solutions were insufficient. The FDU serves as the link between the development of the URS and the development of the TOE. During the FDU, the URS is staffed throughout the Army to include the Combatant Commanders and the Army’s commands. HQDA then makes approval and implementation decisions. Force design issues will then go through a HQDA force integration functional analysis (FIFA). The FIFA reviews force structure issues and the impacts of force structure decisions.

c. During the FIFA, the ARSTAF analyzes the force to assess affordability, supportability, and sustainability. At the macro level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FIFA determines the ability for the force to be manned, trained, equipped, sustained, and stationed. The FIFA may provide alternatives based on prior initiatives, unalterable decisions from the Army leadership or program budget decisions (PBD). The FIFA can result in one of three recommendations.

(1) HQDA can decide to implement the change and find resources.
(2) Or HQDA can return it to the ARCIC for further analysis,
(3) Or prioritize the issue for resourcing in the next TAA.
Section IV
Phase III–Develop organizational models

5–10. TOE and BOIP development

a. Organizations in the process of being designed in the preceding phase become the start point for the next phase. Following the first level of approval of the URS during the FDU process, the design goes to U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) for documentation as a TOE. The USAFMSA and USASOC develop TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the URS basic design.

b. TOEs and BOIPs are developed using an Army-wide development system and database called the Force Management System (FMS). A successor system to the Requirements Documentation System client server, the Force Management System (FMS) is currently being implemented and should reach full operational capability in the next few years. FMS will eventually feature a relational database for both requirement and authorization documentation and other information management systems as well.

c. Although the organization design phase and organizational model development phase are depicted as separate processes, they are closely related and conducted very nearly concurrently. The proponent organization designers and the USAFMSA TOE developers work closely to ensure that the designs reflect requirements consistent with doctrine and policy and include all the elements necessary to provide an organization fully capable of accomplishing its doctrinal mission. The approved organization design should capture personnel and equipment requirements as accurately and completely as possible.

5–11. TOE description

a. TOEs provide a standard method for documenting the organizational structure of the Army. A TOE prescribes the doctrinal mission, required structure, and mission essential wartime manpower and equipment requirements for several levels of organizational options for a particular type unit. These organizational options provide models for fielding a unit at full or reduced manpower authorizations if resource constraints so mandate. A TOE also specifies the capabilities (and limitations or dependencies) for the unit.

b. TOEs provide the basis for developing authorization documents and provide input for determining Army resource requirements for use by force managers. In addition, these unit models establish increments of capability for the Army to develop an effective, efficient, and combat-ready force structure.

c. The TOE is a collection of related records in the database. There are a variety of records to include narrative information, personnel requirements, equipment requirements, paragraph numbers and titles, and changes in the form of BOIP records to name a few. A TOE consists of base TOE (BTOE) records and related BOIP records,
d. Document developers construct a TOE in three levels of organization based on the manpower requirements necessary to achieve the following percentage levels: 100 percent (level 1) minimum mission essential wartime requirement (MMEWR), organization partially manned by personnel other than soldiers (level B) and cadre (level C). As TOE level 1 is the wartime requirement, it is what is reflected in the “required” column of the authorization document (MTOE) unless adjusted on the MTOE only to reflect available resources.

e. FDU decisions, branch proponent input, and Army commands’ issues, along with force design guidance developed during capabilities analyses, provide TOE developers with recommended TOE additions/modifications. Policy and doctrine provide the missions and probable areas of employment of a unit. Policy includes guidance, procedures, and standards, in the form of regulations, on how to develop TOEs. Policy published in Human Resources Command’s MOS Smartbook contains standards of grade (SG), duty titles, guidance for occupational identifiers (area of concentration [AOC], MOS, skill identifier, special qualification identifier [SQI]), and ASIs used in the development of requirement documents and concept capability plans. Doctrine describes how each type of unit will perform its functions and details the mission and required capabilities.

f. TOE developers consider the unit mission and required capabilities when applying equipment utilization policies, Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC), SG, and BOIPs to develop the proper mix of equipment and personnel for an efficient organizational structure. Resource guidance limits the development of draft TOEs, as they must use resources available in the inventory.

5–12. The TOE system

The Army uses a TOE system with personnel and equipment modernization over time that reflects how the Army actually conducts it’s organizational and force modernization business. The TOE system illustrates capability enhancements or increases to the productivity of an organizational model through the application of related doctrinally sound personnel and equipment changes in separately identifiable BOIPs. See Figure 5–6. TOE begins with a doctrinally sound BTOE and through the application of BOIPs building up to a fully modernized Objective TOE (OTOE). The TOE is the basis for force programming and becomes an authorization document (MTOE) upon HQDA approval of resources, specific unit designations, and Effective Date (EDATE) for the activation or reorganization. The TOE system consists of the following components.

a. Base TOE. The BTOE is an organizational model design based on doctrine and equipment currently available. It is the least modernized version of a type of organization and identifies mission-essential wartime requirements for personnel and equipment.

b. Basis of issue plan. A BOIP is a doctrinally sound grouping of related personnel and equipment changes that is applied to a BTOE to provide an enhanced capability, increased productivity, or modernization.

c. Objective TOE. The OTOE is a fully modernized; doctrinally sound organizational model design achieved by applying all DA-approved BOIPs. The OTOE sets the goal for planning and programming of the Army’s force structure and supporting acquisition systems.
5–13. **TOE review and approval**

a. URSs form the basis for developing TOEs.

b. A TOE in the revision, development, or staffing process and not yet DA approved is called a draft TOE (DTOE). DTOEs are reviewed by USAFMSA and coordinated with appropriate commands, agencies, and activities during an area-of-interest (AOI) review. After AOI review, USAFMSA makes final changes before the responsible G–37 (FMO) OI staffs the TOE HQDA-wide and presents the DTOE to Director, Force Management for approval. Following approval, the DTOE status is changed to “DA approved” in the FMS.

c. A TOE becomes eligible for cyclic review every three years.

5–14. **Basis-of-issue plan (BOIP)**

a. A BOIP specifies the planned placement of new or improved items of equipment and personnel in TOEs at 100 percent of wartime requirements. It reflects quantities of new equipment and Associated Support Items of Equipment and Personnel (ASIOEP), as well as equipment and personnel requirements that are being replaced or reduced. In addition to its use for TOE development/revision, HQDA uses it for logistics support and distribution planning for new and improved items entering the Army supply system. Materiel developers (MATDEV), Program Executive Officers (PEOs)/Program Managers (PMs), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and USASOC communities use it as input for concept studies, life cycle cost estimates, and trade-off analyses during the system development and demonstration phase of the system acquisition management process.

b. A BOIP provides personnel and equipment changes required to introduce a new or modified item into Army organizations. The development of a BOIP can play an integral part in TOE development. A BOIP provides the data to place a new or substantially changed materiel item into organizations along with associated equipment and personnel to maintain and operate it as specified in the materiel capability document and the basis-of-issue feeder data (BOIPFD).

c. BOIPFD, prepared by the MATDEV, contains a compilation of organizational, doctrinal, training, duty position, and personnel information that is incorporated into the BOIP. The information is used to determine the need to develop or revise military occupational specialties and to prepare plans for the personnel and training needed to operate and maintain the new or improved item. Human Resources Command (HRC) provides input to the BOIP through development of the Operator and Maintainer decision. The BOIP process begins when the MATDEV receives an approved and resourced CDD. The project manager and/or MATDEV develop BOIPFD, and then obtain a developmental line item number (ZLIN) and Standard Study Number (SSN) from AMC.
d. The BOIPFD goes to USAFMSA via the Logistic Integrated Warehouse where the information is reviewed for accuracy, continuity, and completeness before the formal development of the BOIP. During staffing, the training impacts associated with the BOIP and the associated personnel requirements are developed. If the O/M decision includes an occupational identifier, the personnel proponent must prepare a proposal per AR 611–1 for submission to HRC to revise the military occupational classification and structure. USAFMSA requests TDA requirements for new or modified items from the Army’s commands and TDA requirements are entered into the BOIP at unit level. Note that BOIPs are not developed for TDA-only equipment. When the BOIP is complete, it goes to DA for approval. The G–37 (FMO) organizational integration officer, in coordination with the G–8 synchronization staff officer is responsible for HQDA staffing and for presenting the BOIP to the Director, Force Management in the G–37 (FM) for approval.

e. There may be several iterations of the BOIP: an initial BOIP, developed during system development and demonstration, and amended BOIPs, which are based on updated information provided by the MATDEV as required. A BOIP may be amended at any time during system development and fielding, upon approval of HQDA, or when new or changed information becomes available.

Section V
Phase IV–Determine organizational authorizations

5–15. Determining organizational authorizations

a. The fourth force development phase, determining organizational authorizations, provides the mix of organizations, resulting in a balanced, and affordable, force structure. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD management systems, PPBE and the JSPS. It is the resource-sensitive process portrayed in the “Determine Authorizations” section of the Army Force Management Chart at Figure 2–2. It develops force structure in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming, and budgeting. Force structure development draws upon an understanding of the objectives, desired capabilities, and externally imposed constraints (e.g., dollars, end strength, roles, and missions). The Army has transitioned from a Division-based design to a modular design; TAA supported the transition, providing the correct number and types of units over the POM period.

b. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process, not all of which is exclusively within the purview of the Army. The national security strategies, NDS, NMS, QDR and GDF/JPG constitute the major JCS/DOD directives and constraints imposed upon Army force structure. Overall, The Army Plan (TAP) captures Army-specific strategic and programmatic guidance.

c. TAP, the principal Army guidance for development of the Army POM submission, articulates the SECARMY and CSA translation of the JCS/DOD guidance to all Services into specific direction to the ARSTAF and commands for the development of the Army POM, and the initiation of the TAA process. Phase I of the TAA process captures the Army’s combat requirements (MTOE), generates the Army’s support requirements (MTOE); and develops the Army’s generating force requirements (TDA). TAA develops the echelons above brigade (EAB) support force warfighting requirements of the “operating forces” (i.e.; combat [CBT]), combat support [CS], and combat service support [CSS] or maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment, respectively), and TDA force structure, referred to as the “generating force,” required to support both portions (combat and support) of the “operating” force structure. Phase II of the TAA process resources the requirements based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, the Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) and input from the Combatant Commander’s daily operational requirements (CCDOR). The resulting force structure is the POM force, forwarded to the OSD with a recommendation for approval. When Congress approves the budget, all approved units are entered into the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS).

5–16. Total Army Analysis (TAA) Overview

a. TAA is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for explaining and defending Army force structure. It takes us from the Army of today to the Army of the future. It requires a doctrinal basis and analysis, flowing from strategic guidance and joint force capability requirements. TAA has been compressed from a biennial process initiated during even-numbered years to an annual process. The purpose of TAA is to determine the EAB support force structure of the “operating force” and define the required “generating” forces necessary to support and sustain the “operating” forces directed in strategic guidance. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. The POM force, the force recommended and supported by resource requests in the Army POM, as part of the FYDP, derives from the TAA process. TAA determines the force for each program year. It has Army wide participation and culminates in a Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) decision and approval. Prior to General Order #03, dated March 2009, the SLDA was known as Executive Office of the Headquarters or EOH...

b. The TAA principal products are the:
   (1) Army’s total warfighting requirements.
   (2) Required support forces (EAB CS/CSS)
   (3) Force resourced against requirements and budgetary constraints.
(4) ARSTRUC Memorandum.
(5) Initial POM force.

\textit{c. TAA objectives are to:}

1. Develop, analyze, determine and justify a POM force, aligned with the strategic guidance and TAP. The POM force is that force projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during the FYDP.

2. Provide analytical underpinnings for the POM force for use in dialogue among Congress, OSD, Joint Staff, CCDRs, and the Army.

3. Assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production base, and equipment distribution programs for the projected force structure.

4. Assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBE process.

5. Provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations.

\textbf{5–17. The TAA process}

TAA supports the fourth force development phase by determining the mix of organizations that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure. The TAA process is evolving based on CSA guidance. There are two phases: Requirements Determination and Resource Determination.

\textit{a. TAA is the resource sensitive process that executes the decisions of the OSD, directives and initiatives of the Joint Staff, and the Army PPBE process. TAA serves as the bridge between OSD/JS guidance and the Army’s forced structure planning and program building processes; balancing the Army’s force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources. Decisions, as a result of the TAA process, will shape the future size and composition of the Army, are senior leadership-sensitive and made in the best interest of the Army. The Army’s resourced force structure must support strategic guidance. Therefore, TAA develops a force that meets guidance, within the defined scenarios, under the established resource constraints, and fulfills all the roles and missions within the parameters of congressional oversight and guidance.}

\textit{b. Additionally, the TAA process is the means to transition force structure from the planning phase to the programming phase within the Army’s PPBE process, assisting in determining, verifying and justifying Army requirements, while assessing force capabilities. The TAA process is flexible and responsive to dynamic changes. The process flows from internal Army actions, decisions and guidance (e.g., allocation rules, resource assumptions, warfighting capabilities, and infrastructure priorities), and from external inputs from the President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, JS, OSD, and CCDR priorities (e.g., anticipated threats, scenarios, and assumptions). The Army develops the POM force to achieve an affordable and competent force capable of best supporting national objectsives and CCDR warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the JS, CCDRs and the Services at the transition between planning and programming. The mix of unit models (TOEs) that make up a balanced and affordable force structure must support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.}

\textit{c. Figure 5–7 depicts the sequence of activities in the TAA process. TAA is a two-phased analytical and subjective process consisting of Requirement Determination (force guidance and quantitative analysis) and Resource Determination (qualitative analysis and leadership review).}
5–18. TAA Phase I–Requirements determination

Requirements determination, the more critical of the two phases, is made up of two separate events: force guidance and quantitative analysis. Accurate planning, consumption and workload factors, threat data, and allocation rules ensure accurate computer developed requirements.

a. Force guidance. Force guidance consists of data inputs and guidance from various sources.

1. Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF). The GDF provides unified, resource informed strategic objectives, key assumptions, priorities, fiscal projections, and acceptable risks. The GDF focuses on “what” needs to be done, not the “how.”

2. Joint Planning Guidance (JPG). The JPG provides fiscally constrained programming guidance, directing the services to program towards the strategic objectives. The JPG focuses on the “how” and the “how well to do it.”

3. The Army Plan (TAP). The TAP is the principal Army guidance for development of the Army POM submission. The SECARMY and CSA translate the DOD guidance into specific direction to the ARSTAF and commands for the development of the Army POM. The TAP provides the senior leadership’s strategic vision and intent, translates vision into prioritized capabilities, links vision with capabilities and resources, and provides the synchronized road map of “how” to implement the TAP through the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). The TAP provides the base level of “operating” forces which is the start point for force structuring activities. DAMO–SSW and DAMO–FMF determine the specific identification, size, and composition of the “operating” forces in accordance with TAP force structure guidance.

b. Data and guidance inputs.

1. Homeland Defense (HD). NORTHCOM and USARPAC have the responsibility to develop and identify the missions, threats, areas of responsibility and Army force structure needs to accomplish HD/defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).

2. Analytic Agenda. OSD provides the directed scenarios within the Analytic Agenda.
Scenarios are developed for Joint/Combined warfighting at the theater level.

Future force structure requirements will be generated through the QDR 2010 influenced strategy.

OSD has executed several Operational Availability (OA) studies to determine mid-term warfighting scenarios or vignettes. Each OA study leverages previous efforts against the large pool of capability.

Current scenarios and vignettes are referred to as Baseline Security Posture (BSP), Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) and Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). OSD provides scenarios and vignettes through the “Operational Availability (OA) Studies” within the OSD Analytic Agenda process.

The OA studies provide the approved scenarios for DAMO–SSW and DAMO–FMF to select from for the TAA modeling. These force structure requirements from BSP and SSSP scenarios are added to the TAA MCO scenario modeling requirements.

Force structure requirements are also generated from DOD directives (i.e., Army is responsible for all DOD Veterinary Services, locomotive services and mail delivery services); from requirements generated from Combatant Commander’s Operational Plans (CCDR OPLANS); Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA) and other operational requirements (i.e., Combatant Commander’s Daily Operational Requirements). These force structure requirements are added to the TAA MCO scenario modeling requirements.

Deter - Postures of Engagement (POE).

Postures of engagement include force deployments for small scale contingencies or existing non-MCO security operations such as Kosovo, Bosnia and MFO.

Deter - POE includes all of the rotational force structure currently deployed and projected missions. These force structure requirements are added to the TAA MCO scenario modeling requirements.

Parameters, planning and consumption factors and assumptions.

HQDA DCS G–4, TRADOC, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the theater commands and other elements of the HQDA staff (G–1, G–3/5/7, G–4, G–6 and G–8) provide specific guidance, accurate and detailed consumption factors, planning factors, doctrinal requirements, unit allocation rules, network requirements, weapons and munitions data and deployment assumptions. The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) uses the parameters, factors, and assumptions to conduct the series of modeling and simulations (M&S) iterations that develops and defines the total logistical support requirements necessary to sustain the combat force(s) in Homeland Defense, ASOS, Deter-POE, each Major Combat Operation (MCO), and the generating force.

The parameters, factors, and assumptions contain theater-specific information concerning logistics and personnel planning, consumption and workload factors, host-nation support (HNS) offsets and other planning factors crucial to theater force development. A critical step in force guidance development is the update and revision of the planning and consumption factors and assumptions.

Allocation rules.

Another critical step during the force guidance development is the review and updating of support-force allocation rules used by the CAA during the modeling process (quantitative analysis).

These allocation rules, developed by TRADOC and the functional area proponents, represent a quantitative statement of each type of unit (CBT/CS/CSS). An allocation rule is a machine-readable statement of a unit’s capability, mission and/or doctrinal employment. Allocation rules are normally an arithmetic statement that incorporates the appropriate planning factors. They are adjusted as necessary to incorporate theater-specific planning factors. There are three basic types of rules:

- Direct input (manual) rules are stand-alone requirements for a unit in a theater. The requirement maybe designated as an operating force structure (combat, combat support, combat service support) or generating force. The Area Support Groups in Europe are an example. These organizations are not doctrinally required in the warfight. They are required to support the warfighter and the military community. Area Support Groups require people, equipment, facilities and money.
- Existence rules tie a requirement from one unit to another. Allocation of units based on the existence of other units, or a function of a theater’s physical or organizational structure. An example is the force required to operate one large general purpose port, which is 1 ea Harborcraft Company. The existence of the Harborcraft Company requires 1ea Military Police Company in support.
- Workload rules tie unit requirements to a measurable logistical workload or administrative services in proportion to the volume of those services. Each unit’s allocation is affected by a set of data items (i.e., 1ea DS Maintenance Company per 375 daily man-hours of automotive maintenance or 1ea POL Supply Company per 2200 tons of bulk POL consumed per day).

The allocation rules need modification whenever unit TOEs, scenario assumptions, logistical support plans, or doctrinal employment concepts change.

Council of Colonel (CoC) and General Officer (GO)-level reviews ensure all allocation rules are appropriate and approved for use in the current scenarios.
CoC and GO-level reviews are decision. Forums where all the parameters, constraints, data inputs and guidance are identified and approved for inclusion in the current TAA cycle and CAA models.

(a) The term “GO-level” includes assigned Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel.
(b) The CoC reviews and recommends approval of all data inputs and required forces developed by CAA modeling.
(c) The GO-level review ensures all data input and guidance is appropriate and approved for use in the current scenario(s). It specifically addresses those issues that were unresolved at the CoC review.

c. Quantitative analysis. The total warfighting requirements are determined in this phase. CAA, through computer modeling, generates the total requirements (operating and generating forces) for types of units needed to ensure success of the BCTs, support brigades and headquarters commands directed in the different scenarios. CAA accomplishes the modeling through a series of analytical efforts and associated computer simulations. CAA uses the apportioned force provided in the OSD and Army guidance for employment in the Major Combat Operations (MCO) scenarios.

1. Operating Force. The operating force has two parts: BCTs and support brigades.
(a) The TAP provides the number and type of BCTs.
(b) Support Brigades are comprised of combat, CS, and CSS organizations supporting the BCTs. CAA determines the quantity and type of “support forces” (predominately MTOE CS/CSS force structure) comprising the required support brigades. The computer models also generate resources (units or classes of supply) needed in each scenario. Based on the allocation rules and the requirements generated for units or classes of supply, CAA modeling develops the “support forces” and Support brigades required to ensure success of the deployed BCTs in the scenarios. Force Generator (FORGE) is the current model used to determine CS/CSS units.
(c) Modeling develops support requirements for division, corps, and Army headquarters as well. The TAA process then integrates the “generating force” requirements into the total force requirements.

2. Generating Force.
(a) The “generating force” is predominately TDA organizations.
(b) It is comprised of the force structure required (CONUS/OCONUS) to provide support to the operating force (BCTs and EAB CS/CSS).

3. The Force Sizing Construct. The total force requirements include the force requirements identified to successfully defend the United States, conduct the War on Terror and Irregular Warfare, and conduct conventional campaigns. Force sizing guidance is based on persistent conflict demands and Army force rotational requirements. (Figure 5–8).

d. Review and approval. Phase I (Requirements Determination) is complete after the CoC/GO-level reviews of the CAA computer generated output (total warfighting MTOE and TDA requirements).

1. The CoC/GO-level forums “review and approve” the total warfighting requirements portrayed by Force Generator (FORGE) as a fully structured and resourced force.
(2) Additionally, the CoC/GO-level forums review and reach agreement on the force structure requirements supporting HD, Army Support to Other Services, Deter-POE, and the number of units conducting transformation. The GO-level review recommends approval of the force to the VCSA.
(3) The VCSA reviews and approves the “total force requirements” generated through the computer models and recognized within the force sizing construct. The VSCA review and approval is the transition to Phase II of TAA (Resource Determination).
(4) After the VCSA reviews and approves the total force requirements, DAMO–FMF makes a comparison of data files (MATCH report) between the VCSA approved total force requirements (CAA developed) and the current program force (Master Force (MFORCE)) (see para 5–22f).
(a) The MATCH (not an acronym) report identifies the difference between the new requirements and the programmed force. The MATCH is accomplished through a computer comparison program. CAA produces the “required MTOE/TDA” force file by combining the troop lists of required forces for the various scenarios (force sizing construct), in accordance with guidance provided from HQDA DCS, G–3/5/7.
(b) A computer program compares the VCSA approved, doctrinally required, force file provided from CAA with a current list of on-hand and programmed units (MFORCE from SAMAS) to determine the projected whole unit deficits (COMPO 5) for future programming discussions and issue formulation. The MATCH report and required force files are provided to the G–3/5/7 for dissemination to the commands for review and issue formulation in preparation for the Resource Determination phase. Figure 5–8 depicts the refined force sizing construct.
5–19. TAA Phase II–Resource determination

Resource determination consists of two separate activities: qualitative analysis and leadership review. The qualitative analysis is the most emotional facet of the TAA process because the analysis results in the distribution of scarce resources, impacting every aspect of the Army. Therefore, this phase requires extensive preparation by participants to ensure all force structure tradeoffs are accurately assessed and the best warfighting force structure is developed.

a. Qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within end strength guidance, for use in the development of the POM. A series of resourcing forums, analyses, panel reviews, and conferences consider and validate the FORGE model requirements and the analysis of those requirements. The qualitative analysis is conducted during the resourcing conference.

b. The resourcing conference is held in two separate sessions: CoC and General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC).

1. Resourcing conference CoC.
   a. The resourcing conference CoC provides the initial qualitative analysis and review of the CAA developed force. The resourcing conference CoC provides the opportunity for the ARSTAF, commands, proponent representatives and staff support agencies to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues. The issues focus on COMPO and center on resolving claimant versus bill payer resourcing issues, while balancing priorities and risks. The active/reserve component (AC/RC) mix and end-strength concerns are key recommendation outputs of this conference. It allows CCDR representatives (Army service component commanders) to verify that theater specific requirements are satisfied by Army force structure assigned/apportioned to their commands to meet current CCDR OPLAN/CONPLAN warfighting requirements and CCDOR.

b. HQDA action officers and their counterparts enter an intense round of preparations for the resourcing conference. Since the quantitative analysis only determined requirements for doctrinally correct, fully resourced CBT/CS/CSS units deployed into the theater(s) of operations, the determination of a need for additional non-deploying units and the allocation of resourced units to components (Active Army, Army Reserve (AR), Army National Guard (ARNG) must all be accomplished during the resourcing conferences. HQDA bases force structuring options on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, the desired capabilities and the constraints. The primary differences among various options are the extent to which risk, constraints and time are addressed.
(c) The resourcing conference focuses on identifying and developing potential solutions for the wide range of issues brought to TAA. The Organizational Integrators (OI) and Force Integrators (FI) are key individuals in this forum. The OIs and FIs have the responsibility to pull together the sometimes diverse guidance and opinions developed during the conference, add insight from a branch perspective, and establish whether the changes in the building blocks for the design case were in fact the best course of action. The OIs pull all the relevant information together for presentation to the CoC. During these presentations, the OI reviews each standard requirements code (SRC) that falls under his/her area of responsibility, and presents recommendations on how to solve the various issues.

(d) The resourcing conference CoC integrates TDA issues and requirements, and reviews and resolves issues based upon sound military judgment and experience. The CoC forwards their recommendations and any unresolved issues to the resourcing conference GOSC.

(2) Resourcing conference General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). The GOSC has evolved into a series of GO resourcing forums at the two- and three-star levels. The GO forums review and approve the decisions of the resourcing conference CoC and address remaining unresolved issues. The GO forums submit their product to the Force Feasibility review prior to forwarding their recommendations to the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army.

(3) Force Feasibility Review (FFR). The ARSTAF further analyzes the force, initially approved by the GO resourcing conferences, via the FFR. The FFR process uses the results of the TAA resourcing conference as input, conducting a review and adjusting the POM force to assure it is affordable and supportable. At the macro level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FFR determines if the POM force can be manned, trained, equipped, sustained and stationed. The FFR process identifies problems with the POM force and provides alternatives, based on prior TAA initiatives, unalterable decisions from the Army leadership, or Program Budget Decisions (PBD), to the GOSC for determining the most capable force within existing or projected constraints. The FFR process is the vehicle to analyze force structure options developed during the TAA process.

(4) Leadership review. After the resourcing conference sequential GO Resourcing reviews meet to resolve any contentious or outstanding issues; the leadership review is initiated through the force program review (FPR) process. The Secretary of the Army, the Undersecretary of the Army, the CSA and the VCSA attend the SLDA review of the POM Force. The CSA approves the force structure recommended for inclusion in the Army’s POM submission to OSD in this forum.

5–20. Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum
The ARSTRUC Memorandum provides a historical record of Army’s Senior Leadership final decisions made during the TAA process. The ARSTRUC memorandum, produced by Army G–37 (Force Management), is directive in nature, providing the commands results at the SRC level of detail. The ARSTRUC Memorandum directs the commands to make appropriate adjustments to their force structure at the unit identification code (UIC) level of detail during the next command plan. Commands record changes during the Command Plan process in SAMAS, the official database of record for the Army. SAMAS, along with the BOIP and TOE files, provides the basis for Army authorization documentations (MTOE and TDA).

5–21. The product of TAA
a. The resourced TAA force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, Host Nation [HN]) and type (MTOE, TDA) requirements through the end of the POM years. The POM force meets the projected mission requirements with appropriate risk within anticipated end strength and equipment level. The final output should result in an executable POM Force. The Army forwards the POM force to OSD with a recommendation for approval.

b. The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved force structure for the Army, which has been divided for resource management purposes into components: the Active Component (AC) (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO 2), and the AR (COMPO 3). Three other components - direct host-nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host-nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9) - comprise force structure offsets. Host-nation support agreements guarantee the COMPO 7 and 8 resources. COMPO 9 is an augmentation, not an offset and represents the contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms augmenting existing force structure (Figure 5–9).
Section VI
Phase V–Document organizational authorizations

5–22. Documentation components overview

a. The fifth and final phase of force development, the documenting of unit authorizations, can be viewed as the integration of organizational model development and organizational authorization determination. Battlefield requirements for specific military capabilities drive the development of organizational models. The results of this process are TOEs for organizations staffed and equipped to provide increments of the required capabilities. TOEs specify Army requirements. Determining organizational authorizations, on the other hand, is a force structure process that documents resources (people, equipment, dollars and facilities) for each unit in the Army.

b. Because the Army is a complex array of people, each with one or more of a variety of skills, and many millions of items of equipment, there must be an organized system for documenting what is required and how much is authorized. More importantly, as the Army moves forward with transformation, modularity, equipment modernization, application of new doctrines, and the development of resulting organizations, the Army must have a way of keeping track of changes that are made so that they may be managed efficiently and with a minimum of turbulence. The following paragraphs will discuss the systems the Army utilizes to perform this function.

c. Each unit in the Army has a The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) document identifying its mission, structure, personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations. These documents are essential at each level of command for the Army to function. A unit uses its authorization document as authority to requisition personnel and equipment and as a basis for readiness evaluation. Authorization documents are used to manage personnel and materiel procurement, force planning, programming, budgeting, training, and distribution. Additionally, authorization documents are used at various levels of command for inspections, surveys, special projects, and studies.

5–23. Structure and manpower allocation system (SAMAS)

a. SAMAS is the force development automated database that records, maintains and distributes force structure information for all 7500+ units in the Army. SAMAS is the Army’s “database of record” for all force structure actions. It maintains information for all COMPOS.

b. The primary inputs to SAMAS are the “operating” forces (BCTs, divisions, corps, ASCCs, ACRs and Special Forces groups) directed by the Army Leadership. “Operating” forces are developed during TAA to support the combat force structure; “generating” forces are derived during TAA and refined through the Force Management Review (FMR) and Command Plan processes.

c. SAMAS has two primary views. One is the Force Structure (FS) File (commonly referred to as the “force file”), which reflects the approved (programmed and documented) force structure position for each unit in the Army. The force file produces the Army’s MFORCE. The second file is the Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) File (commonly referred to as the “budget file”). The budget file produces the manpower addendum to the PBG.
d. The force file is updated and maintained by the Force Structure Command Managers and Organizational Integrators at HQDA G–37/FM (DAMO–FM). The force file displays the force structure position for every unit in the Army at UIC level of detail. There are approximately 46 total data items for each unit, displayed over time (previous, current and future programmed and approved actions). These data items include UIC, Troop Program Sequence Number (TPSN), unit number and regimental designation, unit description, SRC, EDATE, Army Management Structure Code (AMSCMO), MDEP, required and authorized strength levels (manpower spaces), MTOE and TDA number, location code, station name, phase and action codes, and Dynamic Army Resource Priority List (DARPL) number. SAMAS drives the development of authorization documents (captured in TAAADS), which contains the MTOEs and TDAs at paragraph, line, MOS and grade, line item number (LIN), Equipment Readiness Code (ERC) and quantity level of detail.

e. The budget file is maintained by the PBG Command Managers. The budget file contains military and civilian manpower data and represents the manpower for which budget authority is available. The budget file also feeds other HQDA data systems, most notably the HQDA Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Program Optimization and Budget Evaluation (PROBE) database, which captures the Army’s POM and Budget submissions. It also feeds civilian data to the Assistant SECARMY (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA [FM&C]) Civilian Manpower Integrated Costing System (CMICS) where civilian costing is performed for all PPBE process events. Primary inputs to the budget file come from the annual command plan submissions of the Army commands, concept plans, PBD, Budget Change Proposals, Program Change Proposals, and POM decisions. The primary output of the budget file is the manpower addendum to the PBG.

f. SAMAS is updated and “locked” annually, usually in the June timeframe, at the end of the documentation cycle. This locked position is called the Army’s Master Force (MFORCE) and reflects the CSA-approved current, budgeted and programmed force structure of the Army. As such, it is the authoritative record of the total force over time.

5–24. The Army authorization documents system (TAADS)

a. Authorization documents. Every Army unit and Army components of other agencies must have an authorization document to reflect an organizational structure that can be supported in terms of manpower and equipment. Authorization documents detail a unit’s approved structure and resources, and serve as the basis and authority for requisitioning of personnel and equipment. There are two types of authorization documents in the Army:

1. Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The MTOE is a modified version of a HQDA approved TOE prescribing the unit organization, personnel, and equipment necessary to perform a mission in a specific geographical or operational environment. It reflects the organizational option selected from the TOE as directed by the Army command and HQDA. It also reflects the level of modernization directed by the Army command and HQDA. At unit level, the MTOE is the base document for:

(a) Requesting personnel and equipment.
(b) Distributing personnel and equipment resources.
(c) Unit status reporting.
(d) Reporting supply and maintenance status.

2. TDA. The TDA prescribes the organizational structure for a unit having a mission for which a TOE does not exist. TDAs are unique in that they are typically developed based on the type and level of workloads associated with the unit’s mission. Units with similar missions, like U.S. Army garrisons, may be organized similarly but may have a substantially different mix and number of personnel and equipment authorizations due to differences in the population and composition of the post they support. Beginning in 1999, the development of TDAs fell under TDA Centralized Documentation (CENDOC). The goal of this initiative is that all TDA documents will be designed and built at HQDA (USAFAFMSA). This will allow for standardization of unit design for units with like-type missions provide the ability to conduct supportability analyses and compliance reviews, and enhance the capability to plan and evaluate changes. There are four specialized types of TDAs:

(a) Mobilization TDA (MOBTDA). The MOBTDA records the mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations for an Army unit to perform assigned missions upon mobilization. It reflects the unit’s mobilization plan by identifying functions to be increased, decreased, established, or discontinued.

(b) Augmentation TDA (AUGTDA). The AUGTDA provides the functional support required for the MTOE unit to execute functions beyond the capabilities for which the MTOE was designed and are unique to that particular unit. AUGTDA may include military and/or civilian personnel and/or military or commercial equipment allowances required and authorized to augment or supplement an MTOE unit. An example is the augmentation of the 11th ACR at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA with equipment authorizations for their “visually modified” (VIS-MOD) opposing forces (OPFOR) equipment.

(c) Full Time Support TDA (FTSTDA). The FTSTDA documents military (AC and AGR) and Federal Civil Service positions required and authorized to provide full-time support to RC MTOE and TDA units.

(d) Joint Table of Authorization/Joint Table of Distribution (JTA/JTD). JTAAs and JTDS are documents that authorize equipment and personnel for joint activities supported by two or more services. Examples of this would be the Army component for the CCDR’s staff or for the Joint Staff.
b. The development and documentation of authorization documents is supported by TAADS. TAADS is a HQDA automated system that contains all unit authorization documents, maintains personnel and equipment data for individual units and the entire Army force structure, standardizes authorization documents for similar parent units, and interfaces with other DA automated systems, e.g. SAMAS, LOGSACS, and PERSACS. TAADS documents can now be accessed on line at: http://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/usafmsa/. This web site instructs users on how to obtain access to the FMSWeb tools.

c. The authorization document data maintained in TAADS are organizational structure, personnel, and equipment requirements and authorizations. The basic procedures for documentation are the same for MTOE and TDA units; that is, all unit personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations are written in the same detail. However, the basis for developing the two documents differs.

(1) MTOEs are derived by adjusting/modifying TOEs to meet specific operational requirements at affordable modernization and manning levels. A unit will be organized under the proper level of its TOE to the greatest extent consistent with the mission and the availability of manpower spaces and equipment.

   (a) Personnel authorizations are derived from SAMAS, FDUs, TOE design and leadership decisions.

   (b) Equipment authorizations are derived from the Army Modernization Strategy (AMS), fielding time lines and distribution plans.

(2) TDAs are developed to attain essential manning, the most efficient use of personnel, and the most effective operational capability within the manpower spaces prescribed in the command force structure. Manpower standard applications, manpower surveys, manpower requirements models, FMR generating force directives and change requests through concept plans, are used to structure TDA manpower.

d. The HQDA annual Command Plan process reviews and approves all authorization documents (MTOEs and TDAs) to ensure compatibility among the unit’s mission, capabilities, organization, authorized level of organization (ALO), and the allocation of resources. Approved MTOEs and TDAs are documented in TAADS and the SAMAS MFORCE.

5–25. The force documentation process.

   a. The MTOE force structure authorization documentation process begins with documentation guidance released by HQDA G–37/FM at the start of the documentation window. The HQDA guidance establishes the focus (“target”) of the documentation window and directs documentation of specific units and actions. Under CENDOC, USAFMSA builds draft MTOEs based on the documentation guidance and forwards these documents to HQDA and the Army commands for subject matter expert (SME) and command review before being incorporated into the Command Plan process.

   b. Under CENDOC, the TDA force structure authorization documentation process closely resembles the MTOE documentation process. USAFMSA initiates the process with the receipt of HQDA guidance and builds the appropriate draft TDAs to reflect current guidance. The TDAs will be staffed with the Army commands and appropriate ARSTAF office/agency SMEs before being incorporated into the Command Plan process.

   c. Detailed integration and documentation of the force centers on the “Command Plan process,” a yearlong process running from the approved June MFORCE until the next June’s approved MFORCE. The Army uses this process to update and create MTOE and TDA documents up to two years out. These documents officially record decisions on missions, organizational structure, and requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment. The command plan process also updates programmed decisions for the outyears in SAMAS. The command plan is used to make adjustments between spaces programmed in SAMAS and the proposed draft authorization documents for that cycle. The command plan is also used by HQDA and the Army commands to comply with FMR directed force structure actions and to document approved concept plans and other HQDA directed actions.

   d. The Reconciliation Process. At the close of each documentation window, the “SAMAS–TAADS compare” is run. The “SAMAS–TAADS compare” or Automated Update Transaction System (AUTS) reconciles the forces programmed in SAMAS with the authorization documents submitted for approval in TAADS at the UIC level of detail. Those TAADS documents that match SAMAS programming at UIC, SRC, EDATE, MDEP, AMSCO, and requirements and authorizations strength level of detail (officer/warrant officer, enlisted, civilian), are approved and forwarded to the Army commands for distribution to the appropriate units. The approved SAMAS database and the approved TAADS documents provide the basis for updating a number of other data bases and systems, including:


   (2) The Structure and Composition System (SACS)-personnel and logistics.

   (3) HQDA DCS, G–37/TR-(Training) (DAMO–TR) Battalion Level Training Model (BLTM) and the Training Resource Model (TRM) for developing operating tempo (OPTEMPO) funding.

   (4) ASA (FM&C) Army Budget Office (ABO) for civilian costing through the CMICS model and budget estimate submission (BES) preparation.

   (5) HQDA G–8 PA&E for POM preparation.

   e. Organization Change Concept Plans.

   (1) A Concept Plan is a detailed proposal by an Army command/Agency to create or change one or more units
when the level of change reaches a specified threshold. The purpose of a Concept Plan is to ensure that appropriate resources are used to support Army objectives, priorities, and missions. AR 71–32 addresses Concept Plans, provides guidance, and formats for submission.

2 To warrant creating a new organization or changing an existing one, Concept Plans must demonstrate a valid need for change, or demonstrate significant improvement to be realized, in order to warrant creating a new, or reorganizing an existing, organization.

3 The HQDA approval process for Concept Plans includes an evaluation of the missions, functions, organization, workload data, and required operational capability of the organization affected and the proposed manpower and equipment requirements. The outcome of a successful submission and approval of a proposed concept plan is the establishment of the organizational/unit personnel and equipment requirements and positioning the organization/unit to compete for resourcing against the Army’s priorities.

5–26. Structure and composition system (SACS)

a. The SACS produces the Army’s time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the current, budget and program years. These demands are then extended for a total of a ten-year period. Additionally, SACS defaults to FY 2050 and builds a fully modernized OTOE position for all units. In this way, SACS shows current levels of modernization, levels achieved at the end of the POM, and a fully modernized Army (for planning purposes).

b. Operated and maintained by USAFMSA, SACS is produced by merging data from a number of management information systems and databases addressing force structure, personnel, manpower, and dollar resource constraints. Specifically, SACS combines information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, TAADS and Equipping the Force (EQ4). SACS products are the Personnel SACS (PERSACS) and the Logistical SACS (LOGSACS). Both PERSACS and LOGSACS are at the UIC/EDATE and MOS/grade (GRD)/ LIN/ ERC/quantity (QTY) level of detail for requirements and authorization for MTOE and TDA units. The SACS process is shown in figure 5–10.

1) PERSACS combines data from the SAMAS, TAADS, and TOE systems to state military personnel requirements and authorizations by grade, branch, and MOS/AOC for each unit in the force for the 10 years of the SACS. This data supports planning for personnel recruiting, training, promoting, validating requisitions, and distribution. LOGSACS combines data from the SAMAS, TAADS, TOE, BOIP, and EQ4 to state equipment requirements and authorizations by LIN and ERC for each unit in the force for the current, budget, and POM years extended for a total of ten years. Authorized/required quantities of currently documented equipment are determined for each unit from its authorization document in TAADS for the first two years of the SACS run. Data for the POM period and beyond is derived from the unit TOE model and data on unit equipment for new developmental items that are undocumented, but planned for inclusion at a later date, are applied through application of the applicable BOIP file. A summary of all unit requirements for a particular LIN, as computed by LOGSACS, is the initial issue quantity (IIQ) of that LIN. The Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) is computed by taking the IIQ input and adding requirements for Army war reserves, operational projects, war reserve stocks for allies and operational readiness float (ORF)/ repair cycle float (RCF).

2) LOGSACS and PERSACS, while products of SACS, are themselves inputs to other processes. The Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), for example, uses equipment requirements and authorizations from LOGSACS to plan equipment distribution. The PMAD, used by DCS, G–1 and AHRC provides personnel requirements and authorizations, and is updated by TAADS.

c. USAFMSA typically produces SACS twice a year, once when the force locks (the MFORCE) or at a Force Review Point.

d. SACS output products (PERSACS and LOGSACS) are published after the AUTS process at the end of the command plan cycle. The reconciled MFORCE is the key force structure input to initiate the SACS cycle. See Figure 5–10.
5–27. Force management system (FMS).

a. The increased complexity of the Army, together with the frequency and scope of changes, has made the task of coordinating the various systems and databases that direct, control or document the force increasingly difficult. To meet these challenges, HQDA G–37/FM, is developing the FMS under the management/oversight of PEO–Enterprise Information Systems (EIS). FMS will be an overarching automation system that will ultimately replace the existing systems for developing, documenting, accounting, and managing organizational requirements and authorizations. FMS will become the Army’s single database for requirements and authorizations information. FMS will provide capability to plan tactical unit conversions to new concepts and doctrine. It will also support other Army databases such as HQDA DCS G–1, G–4, G–8, and ASA–MRA with baseline and out-year force structure modernization authorization data. This integrated system will replace the four legacy systems, which evolved in the 1970s-80s. The FMS is critical to Force Management mission support including total Army force structure management and manpower allocation; development of organizational models (both operating and generating forces); providing analytical support in determining organization authorizations; and documenting organization authorizations across the Army both now and in support of future personnel and logistics planning efforts.

b. FMS is designed to effectively manage manpower, personnel, equipment, readiness, and force structure decisions and databases. Specifically, FMS will integrate the capabilities of, and then replace, the following systems:

(1) Requirements Documentation System (RDS)
(2) TAADS
(3) SAMAS
(4) PMAD

c. The principal advantages that FMS will bring to the Army’s force management process include:

(1) A single, integrated, hierarchical unit structure across all Force Management processes with a single, common, integrated database system.
(2) An automated change management system utilizing integrated product dependencies enabling automatic pushing of approved changes to higher order products (NOFC, BOIP, Requirements, Authorizations, Structure).
(3) A single, integrated unit document combining TOE, MTOE, AUGTDA and other currently disparate document components.
(4) The ability to create TDA organizational templates, e.g. requirement documents, to enable the development of doctrinal standards for the Army Generating Force.
(5) A rule engine capable of storing and applying force management rules against new data condition sets in order to provide more consistent and efficient force management documentation processes.
(6) An Army Organizational Server to provide tailorable web services for FMS data consumers consistent with the Global Force Management directives utilizing Enterprise Identifiers.

d. FMS brings to the Force Management community interactive tools, use of direct database access, web access technologies, supporting on-line transactions and on-line analysis. These capabilities will be available for daily use by all portions of the Force Management community. Initial operating capability of FMS was achieved in August 2006. Target full operating capability is scheduled for FY09.


a. Synopsis: Global Force Management (GFM) establishes a transparent and universal process to manage, assess, and display the worldwide disposition of US Forces. This includes the availability, readiness, and capability information required to assess risks associated with proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment options. The Army Organization Server (AOS) will be the authoritative data source (ADS) for Army implementation of the Global Force Management Data Initiative. The Force Management System (FMS) is the system of record the Army will use to maintain the AOS data.

b. Strategic Vision: The basic premise of GFM is that force structure is the common element between all systems within the Department of Defense (DOD). Force structure acts as a common reference point that will allow computers to integrate and manipulate data. GFM is the foundation upon which force structure information will be captured, and used, to associate and aggregate information from the warfighter and business domains in order to form a coherent, integrated global picture.

1. A key enabler for GFM is the GFM Data Initiative (GFM DI), which organizes force structure data in a hierarchical way for integration across DOD. The GFM DI defines how the Services electronically document organizational structures across the DOD enterprise and establishes a standard structure for the organization information needed. The GFM Organization Servers provide the means of implementing that plan through identification of force structure data sources by Component, creation and maintenance of that information in a standard format and, most important, a single authoritative data source (ADS) for the dissemination of that information across the DOD enterprise.

2. The Army Organization Server will be the Army’s ADS for Global Force Management data. This data will be constructed and maintained in the Army’s Force Management System (FMS). Army G3 will have oversight, with G3–FM–USAFMSA managing the completion of loading the Organizational Server with the Force Structure data, G3–FMP overseeing the Hierarchical interconnections and G3 SS managing the connectivity to downstream readiness, personnel and equipment systems. The Army IT Portfolio Management initiative, FMS, is integral to the Army’s Force Management Domain and is currently shared by the Warfighter and Business Mission Areas. The Force Management System will consume legacy force management systems and link to applicable funding, personnel, and equipment systems to ensure its validity as the Army’s authoritative data source.

c. Mission: In support of the Department of Defense Global Force Management initiative, the Army will develop net-centric web-based classified and unclassified organizational servers that are interoperable with the DOD organizational servers and that fulfill the requirements of the DOD Global Force Management Data Initiative. The Army has demonstrated GFM–DI capability and anticipates full operational capability in the next year.

Section VII
Summary and references

5–29. Summary

a. Capability requirements drive what the Army needs to execute its roles, functions and missions to deter or conduct operations across the full spectrum of military environments to achieve national security objectives. Resources determine the capabilities the Army can afford.

b. Force development begins with capabilities generation for doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities derived from a concept of how-to-fight/operate (required capabilities) within the future operational environment. These approved capabilities initiate the five force development phases: develop capabilities, design organizations, develop organizational models, determine organizational authorizations, and document those authorizations. The BOIP and TOE systems provide the organizational models that are the building blocks of force structure. The capabilities based force-structuring process determines the mix of units for a balanced force and how many units the Army can afford in our resource-constrained environment.

c. Finally, the authorization documentation process captures the decisions of the organizational unit modeling and force structuring activities providing the detailed forecast of authorizations that forms the basis for acquiring, distributing, and sustaining personnel, materiel, and facilities in the Army.

d. The past several years have seen significant changes to the force development process. The process of force development and how the Army manages is dramatically changing. This chapter provides an overview of a process that is itself transforming as it responds to the dynamic operational and strategic management environments.
5–30. References

b. CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, 9 July 2007.
g. Department of the Army, Amendment to GO 2002–03: Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army, 18 Mar 2009.
h. General Orders #4, Redesignation of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Futures Center as the Army Capabilities Integration Center, 10 February 2006.
i. TRADOC Regulation 71–20), Concept Development, Experimentation, and Requirements Determination, 5 March 2009.
j. HQ TRADOC, TRADOC Campaign Plan, 31 March 2006.
m. HQ TRADOC, TRADOC Campaign Plan, 31 March 2006.
n. HQ TRADOC, 2009 Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Campaign Plan (ArCP), 1 October 2008.
o. TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Capabilities-Based Assessment Guide, 28 January 2008.

\[\text{Note: FM 3-0, Operations, dated February 2008 rescinded the terms combat arms.}\]
Chapter 6

Planning For Mobilization And Deployment

The Reserve components provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet the nation’s defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. While these roles are not new, the degree to which the military services have relied upon the National Guard and Reserve to support operational missions has changed. ... the Reserve components have been used in different ways and at unprecedented levels, most significantly after September 11, 2001, and the onset of the global war on terrorism. The demands of the persistent conflicts of the past seven years have been high-beyond the ability of the Active component to meet alone. The Reserve components have been relied on heavily to fill operational requirements—comprising close to 40 percent of forces in theater at the height of the mobilization. The role of the Reserves in the total force changed fundamentally. Today, the Department of Defense is asking much more of its Guard and Reserve members. Being in the Reserves is no longer about deploying once in a career, or maybe not at all. Today’s reservist might deploy three or four times over the course of a career. This is a different type of commitment, based on different expectations—members, their families, and employers. The military services are asking for more time from their reserve members—for more training and more frequent deployments. Department of Defense White Paper “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force”, October 2008, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Section I
Introduction

6–1. Chapter content
As of October 28, 2008 the more than 450,000 Army Reserve Component soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001 [Contingency Tracking System (CTS)) Daily Processing Files data ASD (RA) information briefing fourth quarter FY2008] dramatically expresses today’s Army mobilization and deployment requirements. Our Army is evaluating its ability to rapidly deploy decisive force throughout the world. In view of today’s complex global environment, the Army must remain prepared, trained and ready to deploy operationally. It must have the capability to expand rapidly through mobilization to meet its regional and territorial responsibilities. The Army force structure must be designed to allow force projection with maximum combat power and support units to sustain that power. The AC and RC must provide both capabilities without the lengthy preparation periods that have been characteristic of the past. The need for deploying a substantial number of RC units overseas in the initial stages of a conflict underscores the importance placed on the Army force structure. The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the AC and RC, but also in the preparedness to convert civilian manpower and industrial production rapidly into military power, individual replacements, and supplies. The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is essential to deter potential enemies. Such a capability assures our allies of U.S. resolve. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments for war that require mobilization.

6–2. Chapter organization
This chapter covers mobilization and deployment planning systems. Although the focus is on joint planning systems, the participation of the Army in these systems is explained in some detail. Also discussed are the DOD objectives for improving industrial preparedness in the United States and the Army industrial preparedness program. The discussion of mobilization and deployment is presented in five sections:
• Planning System Description, Deliberate Planning, and Crisis Action Planning.
• Single-Crisis and Multiple-Crisis Procedures.
• Army Mobilization.
• Industrial Preparedness.
• Summary and References.

Section II
Planning system description, deliberate planning, and crisis action planning

6–3. The planning system
Joint operational planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations and includes mobilization, deployment, and employment planning. Joint operational planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) (discussed in chapter 4) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). These systems are related to each other and to the DOD PPBE process (discussed in chapter 9). Army operational planning to implement joint operational planning tasks is conducted within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). Other service systems, similar
to AMOPES, include the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP) and Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), the Coast Guard Capabilities Plan (CG CAP) and Coast Guard Logistic Support and Capabilities Plan (CG LSCP).

a. JSPS. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive process, and is the primary formal means by which the CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the JCS and Combatant Commanders, carries out statutory responsibilities and discharges strategic planning responsibilities. The JSPS is the mechanism for translating national security policy, resource planning guidance, and Combatant Commanders requirements into strategic guidance, force structure objectives, and operations planning guidance (Figure 6–1). The link with JOPES is through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provides short-term operational planning guidance to the military Services and Combatant Commands.

b. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP, as the link to JOPES, provides guidance to the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions utilizing the current capabilities. It also apportions resources to Combatant Commanders based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. Additionally, the JSCP provides a solid framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and the SecDef.

c. JOPES. JOPES provides a single, interoperable planning and execution process, using similar policies and procedures needed during Major Combat Operations (MCO) and in Small Scale Contingencies (SSC). It also provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision-making supported by modern command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems. Thus, it is the joint command and control system for operation planning and execution covering the full spectrum of potential threats identified through the national security planning process. JOPES provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated planning and execution. It also addresses mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment mission areas. JOPES is designed to support commanders and planners at national, theater, and supporting levels. The goals of JOPES are to—

1. Support the development of OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans, campaign plans, and the development of operation orders (OPORD) within time-constrained crisis situations.
2. Permit theater commanders to start, stop, or redirect military operations effectively and rapidly.
4. Integrate mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
5. Standardize policies and procedures that will be similar, in peacetime (including exercises) and crisis situations.
(6) Support the rapid evaluation of military options and develop courses of action in single or multi-theater scenarios for example two major combat operations (MCO).

(7) Exploit information technology (IT) and communications technology advances. Specifically, utilization of the capabilities of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and communications assets such as the Defense Data Network (DDN).

(8) Expedite the development of military estimates of situations.

(9) Ensure the dissemination and presentation of timely, accurate, and properly aggregated information.

(10) Allow planners to identify resource shortfalls (personnel, transportation, materiel, forces, medical, and civil engineering services).

(11) Secure information from unauthorized access, data manipulation, and data retrieval. System hardware must be tempest (an unclassified term referring to technical investigations for compromising emanations from electrically operated information processing equipment) qualified and must be security certifiable for top secret sensitive compartmented information (SCI).

d. Systems relationship. JOPES is the principal system for translating and implementing policy decisions of the National Security Council (NSC) System (NSCS) and the JSPS into plans and orders for operations in support of national security policy. It also provides a means of identifying risks in executing currently assigned missions employing currently available resources. AMOPES is the Army’s mobilization interface with JOPES. It is applicable to Army components of combatant commands, the ACOMs, and other supporting commands and agencies.

e. JOPES overview. JOPES is the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support all military operation monitoring, planning, and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with IT systems, reporting systems, and the underlying GCCS. JOPES provides IT support to senior-level decision makers and their staffs with enhanced capabilities to plan and conduct joint / combined military operations. JOPES procedures and IT systems are the mechanisms for submitting movement requirements to USTRANSCOM.

f. Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JOPES provides support to and is used by decision makers and their staffs at all levels of the national structure for joint planning and execution. This structure is defined as the President, the SecDef, and the JPEC. Membership includes, but is not limited to the following:

(1) National level. CJCS; Service Chiefs; Joint Staff; Services.

(2) Theater level. Supported commands (including Service component commands, sub-combatant commands, and joint task forces (JTF)).

(3) Supporting organizational level. Supporting commands (including Service component commands and supporting Combatant Commands); Defense agencies; Non-DOD departments and agencies; Allied commands and agencies.

g. JOPES planning and execution methodology. JOPES supports the joint planning and execution process used during peacetime operations, exercises, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and war. JOPES procedures provide for various levels of decision-making in deliberate and crisis action planning environments. The five operational functions of JOPES (Figure 6–2) govern both deliberate and crisis action planning processes. Together with the two JOPES supporting functions (simulation and analysis; and monitoring), they form the JOPES methodology.

Figure 6–2. Joint operation planning and execution system (JOPES).
h. JOPES procedural principles.

(1) Single set of IT procedures. JOPES embodies a single set of IT procedures that, combined with administrative policies and procedures, govern all aspects of conventional military operation planning and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans). This single networked system ensures that all users of joint military planning and execution use the same vocabulary, procedures, and joint IT support, thus facilitating the transition from training to planning, then to effective military operations.

(2) Use of existing or programmed capabilities and resources. JOPES planning is capabilities based. Military planners use the forces and resources specified for regional or global planning in the JSCP and CJCS orders. Service capabilities documents, and approved OPLANs or orders. Using the forces and resources apportioned for planning, the Combatant Commanders select those forces they intend to employ within their plans to complete the assigned tasks.

(3) Shortfall identification and risk analysis. JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported command to identify shortfalls between the planned requirement and the identified capability at various points in the planning process. The supported command then attempts to resolve shortfalls, conducts risk analysis if the shortfalls are not resolved, and redefines the Combatant Command’s Strategic Concept if the resultant risk is too great.

(4) Plans maintenance. Completed and approved plans will be maintained and updated as changes occur. A new plan is required only when the threat, tasks, forces assigned, resources available, or concept of operations change to the extent the supported Combatant Commander and the CJCS deem it necessary to develop a new plan. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs concentrate on keeping existing plans and orders up to date and executable. Currently, the SecDef requires Combatant Commanders to brief their major OPLANs and CONPLANs every six months during the planning revision process.

i. JOPES policies, procedures, and guidance. Procedures, guidance, and descriptions of IT system support and reporting structure necessary to conduct joint operation planning and execution are contained in four Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandums (CJCSM):

(1) CJCSM 3122. 01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), provides policy, guidance, and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, approval, and implementation of joint OPLANs and OPORDs.

(2) CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance, prescribes standard formats and minimum content for OPLANs, concept summaries, annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits. It is functionally oriented and provides directional, procedural, and planning guidance keyed to certain plan annexes.

(3) CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume III, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution, prescribes standard formats and minimum content for crisis action planning (CAP) procedures, orders, letters, reports, and the CAP checklists.

(4) CJCSM 3150.16D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP), prescribes reporting procedures, reporting channels, and timelines necessary to conduct joint operation planning.

j. JOPES functions. JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework for joint military planning and execution. Figure 6–2 depicts the five operational functions and two supporting functions. The five operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order from identification of a threat, to determination of strategy that counters the threat, to course of action development, to detailed planning, and finally, to actual implementation of military operations. The supporting functions, on the other hand, relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each JOPES operational function. Figure 6–3 displays the operational functions and identifies the major inputs and outputs of each operational function.

(1) Threat identification and assessment. This function addresses procedures for continuous monitoring of the international political and military environment so threats to national security can be detected and analyzed, alerting decision makers, and determining and defining threat capabilities and intentions. Through detailed planning and the development of courses of action at the operational level and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution, this function provides information for strategic planning and resource allocation at the national level. All organizational levels are supported by this function during crisis action planning and execution.

(2) Strategy determination. Using this function, the President, SecDef, CJCS, and JS formulate suitable and feasible military direction to counter the threats and to develop courses of action. It involves formulating political-military assessments, developing and evaluating military strategy and clearly defining political and military objectives or end state, apportioning forces and other resources, formulating concepts and military options, and developing planning guidance leading to the preparation of courses of action, OPLANs, and OPORDs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategy guidance in light of the intelligence estimate and ends with issuance of either the JSCP in peacetime or a CJCS warning or planning order during crisis action planning situations.

(3) Course of action development. In course of action development during peacetime, the supported command develops the Combatant Commander’s Strategic Concept based on JS and Service planning guidance and resource
apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In crisis situations, the supported command develops courses of action based on CJCS planning guidance and resource allocation from approved OPLANs and CJCS warning or alert orders. Using this JOPES function coupled with the simulation and analysis JOPES support function, force sustainment and transportation feasibility are analyzed. The Services, through Service component commands and supporting commands provide supportability estimates of the Combatant Commanders Strategic Concept or courses of action to the supported command. Products from course of action development include the Combatant Commanders Strategic Concept; CJCS-approved Concept of Operations; the Commander’s Estimate, including courses of action; supportability estimates; and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of notional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) force requirements with an estimate of required sustainment.

(4) **Detailed planning.** This function is used in developing a CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD with supporting annexes and in determining preliminary movement feasibility. This function provides detailed force lists and required sustainment. This includes a fully integrated schedule of deployment, employment and mobilization activities, determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host nation support and transportation needs, all based on the CJCS-approved concept of operations or course of action. Detailed planning begins with CJCS guidance in the form of an approval for further planning in a peacetime environment and a CJCS Alert or Planning Order in a crisis action-planning situation and ends with a CJCS-approved OPLAN or President/SecDef-approved OPORD.

(5) **Implementation.** This function provides decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during the conduct of military operations. It encompasses the execution of military operations and provides procedures to issue OPORDs; conduct mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities; and adjust operations where required. The ability to monitor and compare actual events with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment; controlling, directing, re-planning, redirecting, or terminating operations; and conducting redeployment. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Implementation begins with the CJCS execute order and usually ends with some type of re-planning effort such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

(6) **Supporting functions.** Two supporting functions identified in Figure 6–2, monitoring and simulation and analysis, complement the operational functions to complete the conceptual framework of JOPES.

(a) **Monitoring.** This supporting function supports each of the other JOPES functions by obtaining current, accurate information concerning the status of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources to accomplish mission tasks. Examples of information processed are objective accomplishment; consumption data; and the status of deployment, procurement, mobilization, forces, and facilities.

(b) **Simulation and analysis.** This supporting function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications, when feasible, are force-on-force assessments (suitability); generation of force requirements; comparison of requirements to capabilities, such as consumption data; closure profiles (feasibility); and generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on need.

(k) **JOPES planning process.** Joint operation planning and execution is a continuous, iterative process. It begins in response to perceived and identified threats to U.S. security interests; continues through military flexible deterrent option (FDO) and course of action selection, OPLAN, and operation order development and implementation; and ends when the requirement for the plan is canceled, the operation is terminated, or the crisis is satisfactorily resolved. Figure 6–4 shows the JOPES operational functions aligned with the deliberate and crisis action planning process.
6–4. Deliberate planning

a. Applicability of JOPES. This section describes the applicability of JOPES to deliberate planning, describes the deliberate planning process for OPLANs, outlines responsibilities and recommended time requirements for the planning cycle, and provides guidance for resolving conflicts. JOPES applies to all OPLANs except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) that is prepared with inputs from the Combatant Commanders in response to CJCS requirements. OPLANs are prepared in complete format or in CONPLAN format. Theater engagement plans and campaign plans are also a vital portion of the deliberate planning process. All are described below:

(1) Operation plans (OPLAN). An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan for the conduct of joint military operations. Prepared by the Combatant Commander, it includes a full description of the concept of operations and all
annexes applicable to the plan. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be quickly developed into an OPORD. OPLANS are normally prepared when the contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning or when detailed planning will contribute to deterring by demonstrating readiness through planning. In some cases detailed planning is required to support alliance or combined planning. OPLANS also facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan’s concept of operations. OPLANS usually discuss the Combatant Commanders desired end state and include as a phase or sequel the transition to post-hostility operations.

(2) Concept plans (CONPLANS). A CONPLAN is an OPLAN with or without TPFDD in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the Combatant Commanders strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the Combatant Commander to complete planning. CONPLANS with TPFDD require more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces. Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported Combatant Commander in support of their deliberate plans. As a rule, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

(3) Functional plans. The Combatant Commanders develop plans involving the conduct of MOOTW or operations in non-hostile environments. Examples include plans for disaster relief, peacekeeping, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, and protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations. Requirements for these plans should be satisfied by command publications. An example is the United States USAREUR Reconstitution Plan. Unless specifically directed, no requirement exists to submit these plans to the JS for review and CJCS approval, but information copies will be submitted to the JS, J–7, for internal JS distribution. Although the planning procedures and formats prescribed in JOPES, Volume II, are not mandatory for such plans, they may be useful.

b. Campaign planning. Campaign planning is the process whereby Combatant Commanders and subordinate JTF commanders translate national and theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin prior to or during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance and resources become evident, but is not completed until the Combatant Commander and CJCS provide recommended courses of action to the President and SecDef and they select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is normally conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

c. Deliberate planning process for OPLANS.

(1) Conducted primarily during peacetime, deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process that involves the entire JPEC in a coordinated effort to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. In its basic form, deliberate planning has five formal phases (Figure 6–5). These phases produce a family of plans (the supported commander’s plan, supporting plans, and plans designed for concurrent execution).

(2) Forces and sustainment requirements are developed by the supported commander, tasked by OSD and resourced by the Services, supporting commanders, and Defense agencies. The resourced forces and sustainment requirements requiring common-user lift are time-phased by the supported Combatant Command and scheduled for movement by USTRANSCOM. The supported commander prepares the various annexes that provide detailed guidance to supported command components and subordinate commanders. The supported commander is authorized to task supporting commands and DOD agencies to participate in the planning process to include submitting supporting plans, as required. The supported command may also request JS assistance in gaining planning support from agencies outside the DOD. Supporting commands and agencies should be informed of support requirements as early as possible in the planning process. OPLANS must be thoroughly coordinated. The format and content for an OPLAN are prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03C, JOPES, Volume II.

d. Deliberate planning process for CONPLANS. The planning process for CONPLANs is the same as for OPLANS, except that the CONPLAN process normally omits the resource detail developed in the Plan Development Phase. The format and content for a CONPLAN are prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03C, JOPES, Volume II.

e. Planning cycle responsibilities and time requirements. JOPES uses a planning cycle that begins when the JS, in the name of the CICS, publishes the JSCP and planning schedules and terminates at the end of the period to which the JSCP applies. The JS also reviews OPLANS, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs prepared by the Combatant Commands in accordance with provisions of Enclosures C and D, CJCSM 3122.03C. The JSCP provides guidance, assigns tasks, apportions major combat forces, and specifies items of materiel and lift assets available for planning. Following publication of the JSCP, the JS, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, will produce an initial planning schedule for the development of the OPLANS and concept summaries tasked in the JSCP. The initial planning schedule will be disseminated by message and will set forth established OPLAN submission and, if required, plan refinement conference dates. All Combatant Commanders’ plans will be forwarded to the JS for CICS and SecDef review / approval which includes all Tier 1 Homeland Defense and Tier 2 Swiftly Defeat the Enemy (SDTE) plans. CICS and SecDef review and approval is also required for selected Tier 3 CONPLANs, Consequence Mgt, and War on Terrorism (WOT) plans. Tier 4 FUNCPLANs Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), etc are reviewed and approved at the Combatant Command level. Upon receipt and after analysis of JSCP tasking and planning guidance, supported commanders develop new OPLANS, request permission to cancel approved plans no
longer meeting JSCP requirements, or revise existing plans to conform to current JSCP and CJCS tasking. Canceled plans must be retained on file for a two-year period. Upon expiration of the two-year period, the record copy of the OPLAN (less TPFDD file) or CONPLAN specified as the permanent record will be retired to the applicable Federal records center. Records so retired will be marked with appropriate instructions to ensure their protection against improper release in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01C, Policy for the Release of Joint Information. If the requirement for an existing OPLAN is not changed by the JSCP taskings, the supported commander should review the plan to determine whether it is still sufficient and can still pass the tests of acceptability, feasibility, adequacy, and consistency with joint doctrine. If the plan still sufficiently passes these tests, the taskings may be satisfied by a message to the CJCS stating that the plan has been reviewed, analyzed, and can still meet the JSCP taskings. If the CJCS review results in concurrence, a CICS message or memorandum will approve the plan for the appropriate JSCP period.

f. Conflicting guidance. Combatant Commanders who are also commanders of combined commands or who conduct coordinated planning on a bilateral or combined basis will report to the CJCS any conflicts between the guidance contained in JOPEs and directives received from international authorities or provisions of any plan established by international agreement. The Chairman, U.S. Section, Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, will report to the CJCS any conflicts between plans developed by the committee and the guidance in JOPEs. In all cases, the provisions in JOPEs will have precedence pending resolution of the conflict.

g. Deliberate planning procedures. Procedures for deliberate planning are designed to assist the planning community in the timely, efficient development of OPLANs and to provide a consistent framework for the planning process. The deliberate planning process phases and procedures are as shown in Figure 6-5 and 6-6. A detailed discussion of the requirements of each phase follows:

1) Phase I–Initiation. Initiation is the phase in which planning tasks are assigned, resources available for planning are identified, and the groundwork is laid for planning.

a) Task assignment. In the JSCP, the CJCS tasks the Combatant Commanders to develop OPLANs and concept summaries. When a message or other directive issues such taskings, they will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP. The extent of Combatant Commanders’ planning is not limited by JSCP taskings. Each Combatant Commander has broad responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0–2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) July 10, 2001 and may prepare whatever plans are necessary to discharge those responsibilities. The Combatant Commander may decide to prepare an OPLAN not required by the JSCP that would task forces not apportioned to the affected theater. However, the Combatant Commander will submit the requirements for the plan to the CJCS for approval before preparing the plan.

b) Resources. The JS and the Services identify resources and provide guidance to the supported commander. The JSCP, other JSPS documents, joint doctrine, and Service planning documents provide the following:

- Strategic intelligence and guidance.
- Service doctrine and guidance.
- Resources available for planning.
- Priorities for accomplishing tasks.

(c) Review of previous operations. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), as well as the Joint Utilization Lessons Learned System (JULLS) database, should be queried early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise occurrences. A regular review of this information during plan development can alert planners to known pitfalls and highlight successful and innovative ideas.

2) Phase II–Concept development. Concept development is the phase in which all factors that can significantly affect mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, the mission statement is deduced, subordinate tasks are derived, courses of action are developed and analyzed, the best course of action determined, and the Combatant Commander’s Strategic Concept developed and documented.

3) Phase III–Plan development.

a) Plan development is the phase in which the basic OPLAN, CONPLAN and supporting annexes are prepared. Upon receipt of the approved concept of operations, the supported commander prepares the OPLAN or CONPLAN in the format prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03C, JOPEs Volume II, and submits it to the CJCS for formal review and approval.

b) During this phase, the supported commander publishes guidance in a memorandum of instruction (MOI); the force list is structured; non-unit-related materiel, non-unit-related personnel, noncombatant evacuation order and medical evacuees, enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retrograde cargo, and transportation requirements are determined; the nuclear, civil engineering, and medical support planning is conducted; the TPFDD file is developed; shortages are identified; transportation feasibility is determined; and all the elements of the plan are documented for TPFDD refinement and preparation of the plan for submission to the CJCS for review and approval.

c) At the beginning of the Plan Development Phase, the supported commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI). The purpose of the LOI is to provide specific guidance to the Combatant Commander’s service component commanders and supporting commands and agencies on how to develop the plan. The LOI should be coordinated with
affected organizations (e.g. USTRANSCOM or Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (see para 12–10)) prior to publication to ensure that the planning guidance is current. The LOI should contain the supported commander’s classification and Operational Security (OPSEC) (see para 21–10) planning guidance.

(4) **Phase IV—Plan review.** In this phase, all elements of the OPLAN, CONPLAN, and Concept Summary are assessed and validated. The JS, in coordination with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries in accordance with the procedures in CJCSM 3122.01A JOPES Volume 1.

(5) **Phase V–Supporting plans.** In this final phase, all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, will be submitted by the supporting command or agency to the supported commander within 60 days after CJCS approval. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless it is so directed by the supported commander. In the absence of JS instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans.
6–5. Crisis action (time sensitive) planning (CAP)

a. This paragraph and paragraphs 6–6 and 6–7 describe how the basic planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. Crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

b. An adequate and feasible military response to a crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. In time-sensitive situations, the JPEC follows formally established CAP procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans or to develop and execute OPORDs where no useful contingency plan exists for the evolving crisis. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military courses of action for consideration by the President and SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to supported commanders (Figure 6–7). The CICS or Combatant Commander may adjust the CAP cycle based on the urgency of the situation for issuing the Warning Order or Planning Order. Only the President and SecDef may issue the Alert Order and the Execute Order based on their approval of course(s) of action.

6–6. Relationship to deliberate planning

CAP procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to MOOTW or war. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning (CAP) by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans, which facilitates the rapid development and selection of a course of action and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for a hypothetical crisis based on the best available intelligence and using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be in effect. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it improbable that any contingency plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds. Every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decision-making and execution planning as assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. CAP procedures provide the means to respond to any crisis within a constrained time frame. CAP routinely includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate contingency planning.

6–7. Crisis action planning phases

a. Planning sequence. Because crises are fluid and involve dynamic events, planning procedures must be flexible. The activities of the JPEC are keyed to the time available and the significance of the crisis. Planning procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of a crisis and progressing through the employment of U.S. military forces. Several points are identified in this sequence where key activities (or decisions) are required:

(1) Phase I–Situation development. An event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and reported.

(2) Phase II–Crisis assessment. The diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are...
weighed and FDOs are developed. A decision is made on the possible requirement for a military force. Current strategy and applicable operations plans are reviewed.

(3) Phase III–Course of action development. Combatant Commands are tasked, or a Combatant Commander is tasked to develop and recommend courses of action, or the President and SecDef may develop their own course of action. The CJCS is the principle advisor to the President and SecDef for recommending a particular course of action.

(4) Phase IV–Course of action selection. The President and SecDef select the course of action.

(5) Phase V–Execution planning. A detailed operation order is prepared to support the selected course of action. The level of detail is proportional to the time available for planning. Combatant Commanders also develop branches or sequels to their OPORD as a result of the CAP process.

(6) Phase VI–Execution. The decision of the President and SecDef to deploy or employ U.S. Forces is implemented. CAP phases are further defined in the remaining paragraphs of this section. Through the inherent flexibility of CAP, the time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis.

b. Post-execution activities. Post-execution requirements (including preparing detailed after-action reports, assessing results, developing lessons learned, declassifying material, releasing information, and preparing follow-on plan reviews) will be as directed by the CJCS.

c. Operation plans. In a crisis, existing OPLANs or CONPLANs are reviewed for applicability to the situation at hand. Using CAP procedures, applicable existing plans are expanded or modified to fit the situation. If no existing plan applies, CAP procedures are followed to build an OPORD.

d. Joint planning and execution community responsibilities. Many organizations are involved in planning during a crisis. The composition of the JPEC and roles of members are described below.

e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the SecDef. The CJCS manages the planning process; provides advice, options, and recommendations to the President and SecDef; and conveys President and SecDef decisions to the Combatant Commanders. More specifically, the CJCS receives and analyzes reports, tasks commanders to prepare estimates and courses of action, reviews those estimates and courses of action, resolves conflicts and shortfalls or seeks resolution from the President and SecDef, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces. The CJCS and Combatant Commanders have the flexibility to modify particular portions of the process depending on the situation. The President and SecDef have the final responsibility and authority in a crisis. The President and SecDef approve a course of action and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces. Authority to conduct military operations against a potential enemy, as delineated in the JSCP, rests solely with the President and SecDef, except as authorized under the applicable rules of engagement.

f. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other members of the JCS are military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef. A member of the JCS (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the NSC, or the SecDef. Additionally, the members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers provide advice to the President, the NSC, or the SecDef on a particular matter when requested. The VCJCS plays a critical role during the CAP process and frequently acts on behalf of the CJCS at key interagency Policy Coordinating Committee meetings. These meetings take place in a parallel manner to the Military CAP.

g. Supported commander and service component commanders. The supported commander, designated by the CJCS, has the primary responsibility for responding to a crisis. The supported commander is usually the commander of the unified command of the geographic area in which the crisis occurs. As soon as the supported commander becomes aware that a military response may be needed, course of action development begins and the supported commander provides an estimate of the situation to the CJCS. In developing courses of action, the supported commander will consult with and task the commanders of subordinate components, sub combatant commands, or JTFs. If time permits, the Service component commands will develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and build TPFDD files to implement appropriate concepts. The Service component commands will also work within Service channels to identify CS and CSS forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, filler and replacement personnel, and RC asset availability. Throughout the crisis, the supported commander will ensure that continuous communications are maintained with the supporting commanders concerning present requirements and anticipated future actions that might affect or necessitate additional support. The supported or supporting Combatant Commander may request additional ADP support (e.g. GCCS terminals) through the JS during the CAP.

h. Supporting commanders. Supporting commanders are designated by the CJCS. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0–2 (UNAAF). Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military courses of action and identify the actual units and associated movement data. Additionally, when supporting commanders provide lift assets in support of a course of action, they will provide deployment estimates and schedules for non-USTRANSCOM assets.

i. Services. The Services are responsible for mobilizing and calling up RC forces when authorized; providing units, individual fillers, and replacement personnel; and sustaining deployed forces.

j. Commander, USTRANSCOM and components. As a supporting commander, the Commander, USTRANSCOM is
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responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning (deliberate and crisis) and central-
ized wartime traffic management, including developing and operating the deployment elements of the crisis action
planning and execution system; receiving, evaluating, and coordinating global strategic mobility requirements in
support of the other Combatant Commands; optimizing the use of transportation capability; and validating service
component TPFDD.

k. Other supporting agencies. Combat support agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA), DLA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security
Agency (NSA); and other U.S. Government agencies, such as the Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) play important roles as part of the planning community in developing, evaluating, selecting, and
executing military courses of action. These agencies provide information vital to decisions made by the President and
SecDef and should be considered early in the planning process. Other agencies supply materiel, personnel, or other
resources to support the military forces.

l. The interagency process. Concurrent to the military CAP process discussed in this section, there is an informal
Interagency Process that takes place to ensure the other components of national power (Political, Economic and
Informational) are integrated into a national crisis. The interagency group may contain many functional capabilities
from throughout the executive branch. The purpose of the interagency process is to provide recommended courses of
action to the President and lead agency Director (e.g. Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security).

(1) The interagency planning group conducts Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) that develop policy options
and positions for the President to use during a crisis. This group is non-standard in composition but usually consist of
DOS, NSC, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Treasury (DOT), the
FEMA and the DOD.

(2) Other agencies may be invited to PCC as directed by the lead agency.

(3) The President through the NSC normally directs the lead agency.

(4) The DOD usually sends a representative from OSD. OSD may also require that a representative from the JS be
present at the PCC. An example of a proposed interagency crisis action planning process is shown in Figure 6–8. There
is no formal doctrine developed for the Interagency CAP by the NSC; however, this figure closely resembles models
used during previous national crises.

Section III
Single-crisis and multiple-crisis procedures

6–8. Initiation of single-crisis procedures
As previously discussed, a response to a crisis is normally carried out in six sequential phases. The time spent in each
phase depends on the nature of the crisis. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the time spent in each phase can be
compressed so that all decisions are reached in conference and orders are combined or are initially issued orally. A
crisis could be so time-critical, or a single course of action so obvious, that the first written directive might be a
deployment or execute order. The time sensitivity of some situations may require so rapid a response that the normal
CAP sequence cannot be followed. Accordingly, the commander’s assessment may also serve to indicate a recom-
pended course of action, normally developed in Phase III. In this situation no formal warning order is issued and the
next communication received by the supported commander from the CJCS is the planning order or alert order
containing the course of action to be used for execution planning. A commander’s assessment and proposals should be
submitted at the earliest possible time to preclude an execution decision that may not consider the commander’s
position. Meanwhile other members of the JPEC are gathering information and developing an accurate picture of the
crisis event. The following subparagraphs describe key activities during each phase of a crisis, and Figure 6–8 presents
a general flow of the CAP procedures:

a. Phase I—Situation development. Phase I begins with an event having possible national security implications and
ends when the Combatant Commander submits an assessment of the situation to the President, SecDef, and the CJCS.
When a significant event is recognized, an initial report is submitted to higher headquarters. If the National Military
Command Center (NMCC) receives the report from a source other than the commander of the combatant command in
whose area the event occurred, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communication with the Combatant
Command and request a report. In an assessment report, the Combatant Commander provides as much information as
possible about the nature of the crisis, the forces readily available, major constraints to possible force employment, and
actions being taken, if any, within existing rules of engagement. As appropriate, the Combatant Commander’s report
also contains a succinct discussion of various courses of action under consideration or recommended by the command-
er. A report that initiates CAP may be received by message or voice. Two formal reports that could initiate action are—

(1) Critical Intelligence Communication (CRITIC).

(2) Operational Report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE Command Assessment (OPREP–3PCA). This is an event or incident
report of possible national interest.
Phase II—Crisis assessment. Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the President and SecDef to return to the pre-crisis situation, or to have military options developed for possible consideration and possible use.

1. Phase II is characterized by increased awareness and reporting and intense information-gathering activities. The CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the JCS, provides the President and SecDef with an assessment of the situation from the military point of view and provides advice on possible military action. The CJCS reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in the JOPES and evaluates reports from the Combatant Commander and other sources. The CJCS establishes, or directs the establishment of a crisis teleconference if the supported commander has not already done so. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) provides the required assets.

2. The Combatant Commander continues to issue status reports as required and to report the significant actions taken within the existing rules of engagement. The Combatant Commander continues to evaluate the crisis event and the disposition of assigned and available forces. The Combatant Commander will assess the employment status and availability of theater transportation assets and the transportation infrastructure.

3. The Services participate in the Combatant Commander’s review of available military forces, when time permits. The Services review will include, as appropriate, actions within Service purview to improve force readiness and sustainability and to identify potential RC requirements.

4. Commander, USTRANSCOM reviews the status of strategic lift assets and takes action as authorized and appropriate to improve the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets and common-user port facilities. The Commander, USTRANSCOM also identifies potential conflicts and competing demand decisions to be made by CJCS.

Phase III—Course of action development.

1. Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military courses of action, normally transmitted by a CJCS warning order, and ends when courses of action are presented to the President and SecDef.

2. The warning order is a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC which establishes command relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders) states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The warning order usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the
supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using JOPES. A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the warning order, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour.

3. Finally, the warning order directs the supported commander to develop courses of action. If time permits, the supported command should use JOPES IT and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific course of action is already being considered, the warning order transmits the course of action and requests the supported commander’s assessment. It also establishes a deadline for USTRANSCOM’s preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile as well as the supported commander’s response commonly called the commander’s estimate. Time permitting, the CJCS may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a Deployment Estimate for analytical purposes. During the preparation of the warning order, the CJCS will use the GCCS to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission support requirements are adequately detailed.

4. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the warning order may be issued orally or omitted. When it is omitted, a planning order or alert order may be issued which will contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information. In response to the warning order, the supported commander works with supported command components, sub combatant commands and JTFs and develops possible courses of action using JOPES.

5. The amount of time available for planning governs the level of activity. The supported commander manages the use of JOPES to construct courses of action and tasks Service component commanders and supporting commanders to evaluate the proposed courses of action by releasing an evaluation request message. The supported commander directs a review of existing OPLANs for applicability. Even if not applicable in full, deployment data extracted from existing plans may be useful.

6. Finally, the supported commander prepares and submits a commander’s estimate to the CJCS. It contains one or more possible courses of action and the supported commander’s recommendation. If time permits, courses of action will include deployment estimates. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the commander’s estimate may be provided orally.

7. The supporting commanders and Service components take action as directed by the supported commander’s evaluation request message. Activities will normally include the creation of combat, CS, and CSS lists and generation of a movement requirement estimate. Normally, they are directed to provide the required information in an evaluation response message or in JOPES (by developing a deployment database).

8. Sustainment planning (non-unit related cargo and non-unit related personnel data) will be coordinated with the Services as directed by the supported commander. USTRANSCOM reviews the supported commander’s proposed courses of action and prepares and forwards deployment estimates to the supported commander, normally 24 to 36 hours prior to the commander’s estimate, for each proposed course of action. As time permits (as directed by the supported commander), the JOPES data will be used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and a force closure profile.

9. The Services monitor course of action development using JOPES and begin preliminary plans for providing support forces and sustainment. In addition, the Services continue to monitor force readiness and requirements for the RC, taking action or making recommendations to the CJCS, as appropriate.

d. Phase IV–Course of action selection.

1. This Phase begins when courses of action are presented to the President and SecDef and ends when a course of action is selected. The primary activity in this phase of crisis planning rests with the CJCS and the President and SecDef. All other members of the JPEC continue their activities as described in Phases II and III.

2. The CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS, reviews and evaluates the commander’s estimate. Based on the supported commander’s assessment, the CJCS prepares to advise the President and SecDef. The CJCS may concur with the supported commander’s recommended course of action in whole or in part, direct the supported commander’s development of an additional course of action, or may develop and recommend a different course of action.

3. The CJCS presents possible military courses of action to the President and SecDef and, following their decision, normally issues the alert order. The alert order is approved by the SecDef and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the course of action selected by the President and SecDef. The alert order will describe the selections in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to begin the detailed planning required to deploy forces. The alert order will also contain guidance, as needed, to change or amplify the guidance provided in the warning order.

4. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the alert order may be omitted or issued in lieu of the warning order. When issued in lieu of a warning order, the alert order will contain the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in the warning order.

5. The planning order is a message from the CJCS to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC. The primary purpose of the planning order is to direct that execution-planning activities begin before formal selection of a course of action by the President and SecDef. Used in this manner, the planning order saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V to begin pending a decision by the President and SecDef. The planning order is designed to allow the CJCS additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis.

6. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the planning order may be used in lieu of a warning order. When used in
this manner, the planning order will describe a specific course of action; direct execution planning activities; and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a warning order. The planning order will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the planning order will require the approval of the SecDef.

e. Phase V–Execution planning.

(1) Phase V begins when a planning or alert order is received and ends when an executable OPORD is developed and approved for execution on order. Execution planning activities begin with the CJCS-issued planning or alert order. If (in the case of a planning order) a decision by the President and SecDef on a course of action is still pending, then the CJCS will notify the supported commander by message, GCCS, or orally (in extremely time-sensitive situations) when the decision is made.

(2) The CJCS monitors the execution planning activities using JOPES and reviews the supported commander’s OPORD for adequacy and feasibility. Time permitting, the CJCS may direct the Commander USTRANSCOM to develop a deployment estimate for analytical purposes. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into execution, the CJCS will evaluate the situation and provide the Combatant Commander guidance on either continuing under CAP or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures.

(3) During the execution-planning phase, the supported commander publishes a TPFDD LOI that provides procedures for the deployment, replacement, and redeployment of the operation’s forces. The LOI provides instructions and direction to the Combatant Command’s components, supporting Combatant Commands, and other members of the JPEC.

(4) Also, the supported commander converts an approved course of action into an OPORD. The purpose of the supported commander’s OPORD is to provide the components, supporting commands, and agencies a detailed OPLAN and to task those involved to prepare for the operation. The supported commander also submits the OPORD to the CJCS for review. The amount of time available will govern the level of activity.

(5) A primary deployment concern of the supported commander during execution planning is to ensure that early deploying force requirements are adjusted as required in response to the alert or planning order and to the current situation. When firm force requirements and priorities are established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for sourcing.

(6) This signals force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts the Service logistics and personnel offices to adjust sustainment requirements based on the most accurate assessments available.

(7) When the above actions have been completed, the supported commander will review the TPFDD and notify USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. The supported commander also requests that the JS and supporting commands and agencies assist in resolving any critical resource shortfalls or limitations.

(8) Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for the first increment of deployment. Supporting commanders will develop OPORDs to support the approved course of action effectively.

(9) The Service component commanders work with the Services and their major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements in JOPES. Service components and supporting commands also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves).

(10) Commander, USTRANSCOM takes action to provide effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved course of action or OPORD. USTRANSCOM will apply available transportation assets against the transportation requirement identified by the supported commander and will develop feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules. USTRANSCOM also establishes air and sea channels for movement of non-unit sustainment and non-unit personnel. The Commander, USTRANSCOM also recommends to the CJCS when the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Ready Reserve Force (RRF) are required to be federalized to meet mission requirements based on President/SecDef decisions. The CJCS then in turn provides the President and SecDef a recommendation for decision.

(11) The level of detail will be commensurate with the availability of detailed movement requirements and the time available for planning. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM will focus its planning effort on the first increment of the movement requirement.

(12) During Phase V, the Services determine mobilization requirements and take action to request the authority to mobilize. The Services also provide non-unit sustainment and recommend the necessary actions to improve manpower and industrial readiness. The Services work with the supported commander’s components in establishing or updating sustainment requirements. The Service subordinate commands that provide augmentation forces as supporting commands also schedule organic (self-deploying) movements in JOPES.

f. Phase VI–Execution.

(1) Phase VI begins with the decision to execute an OPORD, transmitted by a CJCS Execute Order, and continues until the crisis is resolved satisfactorily. The CJCS, reflecting the decision of the President and the SecDef, publishes
the Execute Order, issued by authority and direction of the SecDef, and orders the supported commander to execute the
OPORD.

(2) The Execute Order is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of
forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the execute order may be the only message provided. In such
situations, the CJCS ensures that the Execute Order contains the information normally provided in the warning and
alert orders.

(3) Throughout the operation, the CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions
needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not
progress into execution, the CJCS will evaluate the situation and provide the Combatant Commander guidance on
either continuing under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the
deliberate planning procedures.

(4) Should the President and SecDef desire to increase the deployability posture, position forces, or take other
preparatory action that might signal a U.S. intent to respond militarily to a situation, a deployment preparation or
deployment order will be published by the CJCS. These orders are issued by authority and direction of the SecDef and
may be issued at any time throughout the crisis.

(5) Deployments or preparations for deployment may also be included as part of the warning, planning, or alert
orders and will always require President and SecDef approval. The supported commander executes the OPORD and
uses JOPES to monitor the force deployments.

(6) Incremental force sourcing and lift scheduling continue, with USTRANSCOM managing the deployment process
in accordance with the supported commander’s force and sustainment priorities.

(7) The supported commander reports force or resource shortfalls to the CJCS for resolution. The supported
commander employs assigned forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

(8) The Service component commanders work with the Services and their subordinate commands to continue to
provide forces and to report movement requirements within JOPES. Supporting commanders execute their supporting
OPORDs.

(9) Management of common-user transportation assets needed for movement of forces and sustainment is a function
of USTRANSCOM, who will report the progress of the deployment to the CJCS and the supported commander.
USTRANSCOM will support the JS in developing lift allocations and report shortfalls to the Chairman and the
supported commander. USTRANSCOM will support the Joint Transportation Board (JTB), as required, during resource
deliberations. The Services continue to provide for the sustainment of forces.

6–9. Initiation of multiple-crisis procedures

a. When to use multiple-crisis procedures. Multiple-crisis procedures are used by the JPEC to respond to situations
in which more than one crisis is occurring simultaneously. The following procedures define only those procedures
unique to multiple-crisis situations. These procedures supplement, but do not replace, those found in the preceding
section. Multiple-crisis procedures apply when all of the following conditions are met:

• CAP procedures are in progress for two or more crises.
• Competing demands for combat forces or resources exceed availability.
• The supported commanders are unable to resolve the conflict over combat forces or resources.

b. Multiple-crisis events may occur in a single theater. The supported commander facing two or more crises may
apply multiple-crisis procedures when the available forces or resources are insufficient to carry out assigned missions
simultaneously. The procedures unique to multiple crises are provided in the following subparagraphs. The procedures
are organized by phases, as are single-crisis procedures. Within each phase, activities are described for applicable
members of the JPEC.

(1) Phase I—Situation development. No procedures unique to multiple crises are established in this phase.

(2) Phase II—Crisis assessment. The key activity in this phase is the exchange of information. When crises occur in
two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be provided to all the supported commanders
involved.

(3) Phase III—Course of action development. When publishing warning orders for multiple crises, the CJCS will
allocate forces and resources as necessary. Combat forces will be allocated to supported commanders within each
warning order. If forces or resources are insufficient, the CJCS will establish planning priorities. The JTB or the Joint
Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) may be convened, if needed, to allocate the available resources and
strategic lift or recommend allocations to the CJCS.

(a) Activities of the supported commanders. The supported commanders will develop a course of action using those
forces and resources allocated for planning. The effect on mission accomplishment of force, materiel, strategic lift, or
other resource shortfalls will be defined briefly in the commander’s estimate.

(b) Activities of the supporting commanders and service components. The supporting commanders and Service
components allocate CS and CSS forces to the tasked supported commanders. This allocation will be in rough
proportion to the CJCS-allocated combat force. If CS and CSS forces are insufficient to meet all tasks, the supporting commanders and Service components will allocate such forces in accordance with priorities established by the CJCS.

(c) Activities of USTRANSCOM. The command coordinates the preparation of movement requirements and deployment estimates with the supported commanders to resolve potential conflicts in the use of transportation assets, to remain within port workload constraints, and to identify firm movement requirements. Issues that cannot be resolved will be referred to the CJCS.

(d) Activities of the Services. The Services will take action to identify and alleviate anticipated shortages in supplies and forces. The Services will identify and take action to activate needed Reserve units and personnel.

(4) Phase IV–Course of action selection. The primary activity in this phase rests with the CJCS and the President and the SecDef. In recommending courses of action to the President and Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the JCS, will consider, and brief to the President and SecDef, the impact of each course of action on other courses of action approved or contemplated. The briefing will include the impact of multiple deployments on strategic lift and other resources. If resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all supported commanders, the CJCS will brief plans in priority order and recommend that allocation of the available resources be based upon these priorities. The CJCS also recommends which forces can be extracted from ongoing SSCs to meet course of action decision requirements for the multiple crises. The President and SecDef have the ultimate decision authority to move forces from an ongoing SSC to an MCO.

(5) Phase V–Execution planning. The primary activity of the CJCS during this phase is the adjudication of conflicting demands for forces, resources, and strategic lift. The CJCS may convene the JMPAB and the JTB to resolve resource or strategic lift shortfalls.

(a) Activities of the supported commanders. The supported commanders monitor the process as forces and resources are identified (“sourced”) in all the OPLANs being considered. The supported commanders react to conflicts, dual tasking of units, and resource shortfalls by modifying the concept of operations or by seeking resolution by the CJCS.

(b) Activities of the supporting commanders and service components. The supporting commanders and Service components seek to allocate forces and resources without conflict (e.g., dual-tasking units) or shortfalls (e.g., unfilled force or resource requirement). The supported commander will be advised of all known unresolved conflicts or shortfalls.

(c) Activities of USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM will examine port workloads and other factors that may be affected by the execution of multiple plans. USTRANSCOM will develop and integrate movement schedules.

(d) Activities of the Services. The Services will attempt to resolve dual-tasked units and shortfalls by advising the supported commander and Service component commanders of unassigned or substitute units. The Services will participate in the JMPAB, assisting the CJCS in resolving resource shortfalls.

(6) Phase VI–Execution. If a force deployment is in progress and a second, more threatening, crisis erupts, the President and SecDef, through the CJCS, may halt existing deployments or order the redeployment of forces. The procedures in Phases I through V of this section apply.

Section IV
Army mobilization

6–10. Framework for mobilization planning

a. The DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG) provides the framework for mobilization planning within the DOD. The MMG provides a conceptual overview of the DOD mobilization planning process and its relationship to the development of military operations plans. It also provides a basis for making mobilization decisions within the DOD and managing the mobilization process to support military operations.

b. Army participation in joint operations planning and Army planning for mobilization must be integrated processes. Joint Pub 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning, facilitates integration of these processes by identifying the responsibilities of the JS, Services, Combatant Commands, transportation component commands, and other agencies engaged in mobilization planning. The mobilization annex of the JSCP guides the Army and Combatant Commands in preparing mobilization plans.

c. AR 500–5, Army Mobilization, incorporates DOD and CJCS mobilization planning guidance in a single Army publication. It recognizes the close relationship between operations planning and mobilization planning. It provides the means, within the Army, to accomplish both in a coordinated manner.

d. The mobilization plans of ACOMs and agencies, together with those of HQDA, constitute the Army Mobilization Plan (Figure 6–9). AMOPES is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of combatant commands. AMOPES serves as the Army supplement to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. It provides the interface between the Army’s plans to provide forces and resources and the combatant commander’s plans to deploy and use them. It also provides a standard set of guidelines for developing these plans and an integrated structure for the planning products.
Figure 6–9. Army mobilization planning

6–11. AMOPES overview

a. AMOPES. AMOPES ensures that the Army plans and executes actions necessary to provide the forces and resources to meet requirements of the Combatant Commander. It covers a wide range of general functions covering the full course of a military action, conflict, or war. These functions include training, exercises, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, expansion of forces beyond the approved force structure, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstruction of Army forces. The goal of AMOPES is to ensure that the Army can adequately support all future combat operations of the Combatant Command, as opposed to concentrating only on getting forces into the theater of operations. AMOPES is also adaptable for planning MOOTW. The system is not just a planning system but also an execution system. The use of OPLAN format, with functional annexes and appendices, emphasizes the operational nature of the system.

b. Required mobilization plans. Each of the following commands/activities will prepare mobilization plans, to include deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution actions when appropriate. Mobilization plans of ACOMs, Army components of combatant commands and other Army elements as indicated by the DCS G–3/5/7 HQDA are forwarded to HQDA for review prior to publication. Plans will be prepared in accordance with guidance contained in the AMOPES basic plan and the following annexes:

- ACOMs
- Army components of combatant commands
- Mobilization stations (Power Projection Platforms/Power Support Platforms) (PPP/PSP)
- Support installations (AR 5–9, Area Support Responsibilities)
- Staff support agencies and field operating agencies

c. Mobilization files. Mobilization files in place of plans will be maintained as directed by Commander, FORSCOM or the Commanders of EUSA, USAREUR, USASOC, or USARPAC. The latter commands will use FORSCOM guidance to develop mobilization files.

d. The Army mobilization plan. The Army mobilization plan is a collection of individually published mobilization plans of the ACOMs, Army components of combatant commands, and other designated Army elements. The Army mobilization plan currently consists of Volume I through Volume XIX. AR 500–5 further amplifies responsibility for each volume.

6–12. Mobilization planning responsibilities

a. Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7. Army Staff organization responsible for developing Army mobilization and operations policy and guidance; developing priorities for mobilization of RC units; directing the call-up of RC units and preparing them for deployment; and establishing, publishing, and maintaining AMOPES. The AMOPES responsibilities include coordinating the structure and content of AMOPES with ARSTAF, ACOM, and other Army activities; tasking agencies and commands to prepare appropriate portions of AMOPES; reviewing agency and command mobilization plans; and ensuring AMOPES guidance, policies, and products satisfy applicable OSD and CJCS guidance and are updated biennially, as a minimum, but not later than 45 days after publication of the JSCP.

b. Principal DA officials and Army Staff agencies. Each agency is responsible for assisting the DCS G–3/5/7, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of AMOPES pertaining to their respective areas of interest and for mobilization and operational planning activities within their respective functional areas. They disseminate additional
guidance to staff support agencies and field operating agencies (FOA) on related matters in development of mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, reconstitution plans and other matters. They review and approve mobilization plans of their respective staff support agencies and FOA.

c. **ACOMs.** Each ACOM is responsible for assisting the DCS G–3/5/7, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of the AMOPES pertaining to their respective mission areas. ACOMs are also responsible for mobilization and operations planning within their respective mission areas and for publishing a command mobilization plan as a volume of the Army Mobilization Plan. Such plans will be submitted to HQDA for review and approval prior to publication. ACOMs are also responsible for compliance with the guidance and procedures published in the AMOPES.

d. **Specific responsibilities.**

(1) **FORSCOM** is the DA executing agent for CONUS unit mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution planning and execution. FORSCOM also develops the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) that standardizes policies and procedures for all Army mobilization efforts for CONUS based Army forces in support of approved military operations.

(2) **USASOC** and **USARC** are responsible for the alert notification of all RC special operations forces (RCSOF) units to include mobilization, validation, deployment, redeployment and demobilization for wartime or other assigned missions. USASOC provides follow-on personnel and equipment to sustain RCSOF units and individual replacements provided to the Combatant Commands.

(3) **TRADOC** acts as HQDA executive agent for CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) operations. TRADOC establishes and operates CRCs that receive and prepare individuals and replacement personnel for onward movement. TRADOC establishes procedures and ensures the training base infrastructure can be rapidly expanded to support contingency operations and that individual ready reserve (IRR) soldiers are properly assessed, trained and processed for onward movement in time of crisis. As part of the AMOPES, TRADOC develops and maintains the TRADOC Mobilization Operation Planning and Execution System (TMOPES).

(4) **ACOMs** and Army components of combatant commands support HQDA in developing and maintaining AMOPES, and assist FORSCOM units to ensure plans to mobilize, deploy, redeploy, demobilize, and reconstitute are sound and workable. Memorandums of Understanding will be initiated with FORSCOM, where appropriate, for execution of Army Mobilization functions.

e. **Mobilization planning.** Mobilization, under the concept of graduated mobilization response, is a tool provided to the President and SecDef to respond in varying degrees to crises as they occur. It is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. It is also the process by which the armed forces are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It can include ordering the RC to active duty, extension of terms of service, and other actions necessary to transition to a wartime posture. This section provides an overview of the mobilization process within the framework of the AMOPES, the types of mobilization, and the interface with non-DOD agencies.

(1) **AMOPES major and functional subsystems.** The primary objective of the Army mobilization process is to mobilize, deploy, and sustain the theater force. The major subsystems involved are theater force units, military manpower, and materiel. Supporting these subsystems are a number of interrelated CONUS-based functionally oriented subsystems; principally PPP/PSP, the training base, the logistics structure, the medical structure, and transportation support. These subsystems are interrelated as shown in Figure 6–10 and described in more detail below.

(2) **Theater force.** The theater force consists of theater force units, military manpower (individuals), and materiel apportioned for deployment to the theater of operations. The objective of the theater force units subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of Army units at ports of embarkation (air and sea) for deployment as prescribed in war plans or as directed by the JS. It also may include new, or un-resourced, units that would be activated on order.

(a) Deployed or designated to support one or more OPLANs by the JSCP and Annex A of the AMOPES. When an emergency arises, the JS alerts CONUS-based active units through FORSCOM channels (through the PACOM Combatant Commander channels for Hawaii and Alaska-based units). Active Army units do not require mobilization; they are either forward positioned or pre-position (PREPO) units which deploy by air to link up with pre-positioned equipment. Units with organic equipment load their equipment and move either to an air or sea port of embarkation. PREPO units turn in equipment that will remain behind, load equipment to accompany troops, load equipment not authorized pre-positioning (NAP) and items that may be short in PREPO, and move to a designated airport of embarkation. PREPO shortages may be shipped by air and/or sea as required by the TPFDD. Units may be deployed from an ongoing SSC location to a higher priority MCO at the direction of the President or SecDef.

(b) **Army National Guard.** During peacetime, the preparation of Army National Guard units for mobilization is the responsibility of the State Governor. Guidance is issued to the Governor by HQDA through the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) (see Para 9–8l), and by FORSCOM and USARPAC to the adjutants general of the States within their area of operation. The State Governor commands ARNG units until they are federalized. Once federalized, ARNG units become AC units under the appropriate ACOM.

(c) **Army Reserve.** During peacetime, the preparation of Army Reserve units for mobilization is the responsibility of the CG, FORSCOM through the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC); the Commander, USARPAC; and Commander, USAREUR for assigned Army Reserve units. Army Reserve units are usually apportioned to one or more
OPLANs or designated to support the CONUS sustaining base. Selected later-deploying units may receive interim assignments to augment a particular element in the CONUS base. Human Resources Command, St. Louis (HRC St. Louis) is responsible for the management and continued training of the IRR and Retired Reserve. These groups provide the largest resource of pre-trained soldiers. HRC St. Louis executes its peacetime mission through direction of the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) and, on order of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, orders selected numbers of individuals to active duty.

(d) Unresourced and new units. FORSCOM prepares, in coordination with each supported Combatant Command, a proposed unit activation schedule for each major planning scenario identified in the JSCP. Changes emanating from the Combatant Commander’s response to biennial JSCP guidance (TPFDD shortfall), TAA determinations of which units in the required force structure will be un-resourced, and structure changes reflected in Program Objective memorandum (POM) development will all be considered in the development of the proposed unit activation schedule (UAS). The prioritized activations include additional support units required to sustain the current force. In preparing this activation schedule, close attention is given to recognized equipment availability constraints, particularly major weapon systems. The composition of the proposed UAS and the recommended priorities will be reviewed and approved by HQDA.

(e) Military manpower. The objective of the military manpower subsystem is to ensure full and timely use of all available sources of individual military manpower to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment, sustain the deployed force with trained replacements and provide mobilization augmentation for the CONUS sustaining base.

1. Prior service personnel are grouped generally by their training status. Pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) is a generic term for the following manpower categories: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Individual Mobilization Augentee (IMA), Standby Reserve (SBR), and the Retired Reserve. Qualified individuals in these categories are the primary source of manpower to reinforce AC and RC units during the early phases of mobilization. Unskilled individuals, principally IRR members whose skills have eroded, or who were transferred to the IRR in lieu of discharge prior to the completion of initial entry training, will be ordered to an appropriate training center to complete training. Each of these PIM categories is explained further in Chapter 7.

2. Non-prior service personnel include Selective Service inductees, delayed entry enlistees, and volunteer enlistees who, by law, require a minimum of 12 weeks training prior to deployment.

3. Selective Service inductees constitute the largest single source of post-mobilization manpower. Delayed entry personnel are active and reserve enlistees who are high school graduates or students awaiting graduation, and reserve unit members who have completed basic training and are awaiting advanced training.

4. Replacement centers, which process and equip non-unit-related individual replacements will be established by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at sites normally collocated with Army Training Centers. These CONUS replacement centers (CRC) are close to Air Force Air Mobility Command (AFAMC) designated airfields with strategic lift capability. In addition to final preparation of replacements for overseas movement, Preparation for Overseas Replacement (POR) CRCs will issue individual clothing, equipment, and weapons.

(f) Materiel. The objective of the materiel subsystem is to ensure the full and timely availability of adequate military
materiel to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment and to sustain the deployed force in accordance with requirements and priorities.

1. Sources of supplies and equipment include the organic equipment of deploying and non-deploying units, PREPO Unit Residual (left behind) Equipment (PURE), and that equipment scheduled for delivery through procurement and maintenance channels.

2. War reserve materiel stocks (WRMS) consist of military materiel acquired in peacetime to meet military requirements at the outbreak of war until the sustaining production base can be established. WRMS are acquired to meet the war reserve materiel requirement (WRMR) established in the Army guidance.

(g) Mobilization stations or Power Projection Platforms/Power Support Platforms (PPP/PSP). The objective of the mobilization stations subsystem, now called (PPP/PSP), is to ensure the orderly expansion of Army posts, camps, and stations and their ability to receive, house, supply, train, and deploy theater force units in a timely manner.

1. There are 15 designated PPP, and 12 PSP. Mobilization stations develop mobilization TDAs (MOBTDAs) based on guidance provided by their parent ACOM to enable mobilization stations to meet surge population and operational requirements. Deleting non-mission-essential services; extending the workweek; executing option clauses in existing contracts; and contracting for personnel and services accomplish expansion of mobilization services.

2. When mobilized units arrive at their designated mobilization stations command passes to the mobilization station commander. The commander is then responsible for correcting readiness deficiencies that restrict the deployment readiness of the units. The mobilization station commander cross-levels personnel and equipment in accordance with established HQDA policies and priorities and FORSCOM/USARPAC instructions. The commander is responsible for unit training and deployment validation in accordance with HQDA policy as implemented by FORSCOM/USARPAC.

(h) Training base. The objective of the training base subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of trained manpower to mobilize for CONUS base support and theater force requirements.

1. TRADOC and HQDA are responsible for operating the component organizations that comprise the post-mobilization training base, induction centers, reception stations, training centers, and Service schools. HQDA (G–1) is the agent for DOD on all matters pertaining to the operation of the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) and the military entrance processing stations (MEPS) (see para 13–13b(4)), also known as induction centers. MEPCOM, through the MEPS, is responsible for providing facilities for conducting physical and mental examinations and inducting qualified registrants into the armed forces.

2. The Army’s capability to receive and process enlistees, inductees, and other accessions will be increased in the event of mobilization. The existing reception stations (all collocated with existing TRADOC training centers) will be expanded. Army Reserve training divisions/brigades will be mobilized to increase the capacity of TRADOC training centers and establish new training centers at selected FORSCOM installations. This is important, especially during any MCO, however it seldom happens or is very limited during SSCs.

3. The capacity and capability of the Army Service Schools will also be expanded. The existing TRADOC Service School structure will be expanded. Selected United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools will be mobilized to expand the capability of designated TRADOC Service Schools and to augment the U.S. Army Training Centers.

4. AMC provides extensive refresher and skill sustainment training for both ARNG and Army Reserve units and individuals during peacetime and specialized post-mobilization training in accordance with existing agreements.

(i) Logistics support system. The objective of the logistics support system is to provide logistical support to meet mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the Army.

1. Supply, maintenance, services, and facilities capabilities must be expanded to deploy and sustain the force. Storage policies will be relaxed to permit open storage on improved and unimproved sites, public warehouses, and contractor facilities. The waiving of formal advertising and competitive bidding will expedite the ability to procure goods and services. Suppliers will accelerate deliveries by going to multi-shift production operations. A major objective of the supply system will be to expedite the availability of needed materiel for entry into the transportation subsystem and responsive delivery to the recipient. The Army will call on the existing (wartime) authority to utilize the national industrial base for preplanned production and buy, lease, or contract for goods and services from any available commercial source.

2. Upon mobilization, the Army maintenance structure has several immediate goals. It absorbs RC combat service support units, executes emergency civilian hiring procedures in accordance with mobilization TDAs, and implements already negotiated maintenance contracts and inter-service and Federal agency support agreements. Mission-essential items receive the highest priority of maintenance effort. First priority is for equipment items for deployed and/or deploying theater force units. Second priority is for equipment in excess of mobilization needs left behind by deploying units. Third priority is specific items identified and managed by HQDA.

3. It will be necessary to expand troop service support (food services, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, and mortuary) to accommodate the expanded mobilization station population. Service facilities at newly activated mobilization stations will be renovated utilizing available materiel, funds, and manpower. As required, support units will be tasked to provide mobilization stations with unit facilities and equipment until general support force units can assume these functions.

4. The Army production base is comprised of Army-controlled industrial activities and contractor facilities. The
Army will coordinate expanded production requirements with the DLA on common use items. Included in these industrial activities are active and inactive ammunition plants, arsenals and proving grounds, missile plants, and other miscellaneous plants. These facilities are to be activated or expanded to provide maximum wartime production levels of materiel.

5. Expansion of the CONUS training and sustaining base facilities will be required at initial Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) and will increase incrementally through partial and full mobilization as the mobilization surge passes through the mobilization stations and ports. Initially, expansion of capacity will be achieved from immediate cessation of nonessential activities; relaxation of space, environmental, and other constraining criteria; and the rehabilitation of facilities using available labor and the self-help effort of using units. New facilities construction will feature modern prefabrication technology to provide increased living, storage, and workspace needed early in the post-mobilization buildup period.

(j) Medical support. As dictated by crisis action, U.S. Army hospitals may initiate conversion to their planned mobilization configuration to accommodate the vastly increased military population and expected theater force casualties.

1. Health care services (inpatient and outpatient) may be limited to active duty military personnel, with the exception that outpatient occupational health services will continue for civilian service employees. If so, all nonmilitary inpatients will be discharged or transferred to civilian or other Federal hospitals as expeditiously as possible. TRICARE service centers and the local military medical treatment facility will assist eligible beneficiaries in completing administrative requirements for procuring health care from civilian sources.

2. With the approval of the Commander, Medical Command (MEDCOM), and the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) (see para 18–8 and 18–11) HQDA, inpatient services may be continued beyond M–Day to D–Day for family members and retirees (if M–Day and D–Day do not coincide). Medical center (MEDCEN) (see Chapter 18)/medical department activity (MEDDAC) (see Chapter 18) commanders may continue outpatient services for family members and retirees as resources permit.

(k) Transportation support. The objective of the transportation support subsystem is to move the entire force (units, individual replacements, and materiel) within CONUS, and to and from overseas commands. Overall responsibility for transportation support is vested in USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands.

1. The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) coordinates intra-CONUS movements of mobilizing units and materiel in cooperation with installation transportation officers and various state and local agencies. Strategic transportation to and from overseas theaters is the responsibility of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the AFAMC, the other two component commands.

2. Management of the surface lines of communication is split among SDDC, MSC, and the theater commanders. SDDC is responsible for CONUS line-haul and common-user terminal operations. MSC is charged with ship contracting and scheduling. The theater commander manages intra-theater surface movements. The schedule for cargo movement and port operations must interface with the schedule for ships. Port throughput capacity, both in CONUS and in a theater of operations, is a major consideration and is often a limiting factor. Finally, surface transportation planning procedures must be flexible enough to allow planners to adjust to exigencies such as ship or port losses.

3. AFAMC is responsible for airlift operations. To meet response times postulated by the JSCP, planners must be able to develop and maintain flow plans that can be executed rapidly. This capability requires detailed planning among the users of common-user airlift assets. In addition, AFAMC requires 3–4 days to achieve a full-surge airlift capability. This time is required to marshal Active Air Force elements and to mobilize and position essential Air National Guard and Air Reserve units. Therefore, to develop realistic flow plans, planners must carefully balance airlift requirements with capabilities until a full surge capability can be achieved and maintained. A limiting factor to U.S. airlift capability is the availability of Strategic Air Command (SAC) tanker resources, which are periodically tasked to support other national-level operations. Planners must consider the potential availability of tanker resources when developing flow plans and must closely coordinate with other claimants for refueling aircraft.

4. USTRANSCOM coordinates and monitors time-sensitive planning and execution of force and re-supply movements for deployment of CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat forces. It also coordinates deployment planning with Navy and Marine Corps forces. (These deployments should not be confused with the normal rotation of units, ships, squadrons, etc. in peacetime.) USTRANSCOM assists the JS in resolving transportation shortfalls with supported and supporting commanders, military transportation agencies, and the Services.
f. Types of mobilization. Generally, the magnitude of the emergency governs the type of mobilization. As authorized by law or congressional resolution and when directed by the President, DOD mobilizes all or part of the Reserve Components as shown in Figure 6–11. Concurrently, the DOD and other Federal agencies marshal national resources in order to sustain the mobilized force.

(1) **Selective mobilization.** For “domestic emergencies”, the President may order expansion of the active armed forces by activation of RC units and/or individual Reservists to deal with a situation where the armed forces may be required to protect life, federal property, or to prevent disruption of Federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

(2) **Presidential reserve call-up (PRC).** The President may augment the active forces by an involuntary call-up of units and individuals of the Selected Reserve or any member of the IRR designated as essential up to 200,000 persons from all Services for up to 365 days to meet an operational requirement. No more than 30,000 of the 200,000 may be members of the IRR. The President must notify Congress whenever this authority to call up the RC is exercised.

(3) **Partial mobilization.** In time of national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months. Not more than 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty, without their consent, under partial mobilization at any one time.

(4) **Full mobilization.** In time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of a RC under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter.

(5) **Total mobilization.** Total mobilization involves expansion of the active armed forces beyond the approved force structure by organizing and/or activating additional units to respond to requirements of the emergency. All national resources, to include production facilities, needed to sustain additional forces will also be mobilized. Congressional authorization is required for these actions.

**g. Mobilization Authority.**

(1) The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and the Congress as outlined in the stages of mobilization shown in Figure 6–12. An example of the Army Reserve participation on the mobilization continuum is shown in Figure 6–13. The President, Congress, or both may declare a national emergency.

(2) The National Emergencies Act passed in 1976 provides that when the President declares a national emergency, the declaration or subsequent Executive order must specify the specific authorities being invoked. The President’s powers are limited to those invoked until the subsequent announcement of the invoking of additional specific authorities. Once the President declares a national emergency for a specific purpose, the national emergency will remain in effect for one year, unless sooner rescinded or extended. Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, all Executive orders must be published in the Federal Register.

(3) The SecDef, with the advice and recommendation of the CJCS and the Service Secretaries, recommends to the President and the Congress the mobilization authority required to support a given contingency, OPLAN, or national emergency. The SecDef directs mobilization of RC units and manpower through the military departments.

**h. Peacetime planning.** The Army plans and prepares for mobilization in peacetime. It participates in war planning to establish Army forces and the requirements for their augmentation. It programs and budgets resources and acts to man, equip, and train The Army and to prepare for its employment during a war or other national emergency. Planning is accomplished in accordance with the provisions of the JOPES and AMOPES. This peacetime planning essentially
consists of war planning, intended to develop the OPLANs for the conduct of operations (addressed earlier in the chapter and in Chapter 4), and mobilization planning.

**i. DOD mobilization planning process.** Mobilization planning, primarily a Service responsibility, is based on guidance from OSD and JCS. OSD guidance is included in the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) (see Chapter 4). JS guidance is contained in the JSCP (see Chapter 4). In addition, Joint Pub 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning, assigns general responsibilities and procedures for mobilization. The JS coordinates the mobilization plans of the Services and ensures the interface of these plans with deployment.

**j. Mobilization planning in other Federal departments and agencies.** In addition to DOD, approximately 50 federal departments and agencies have emergency planning responsibilities. FEMA is the federal government coordinator of these emergency management activities in both peace and war.

(1) FEMA’s responsibilities include policy guidance and planning to ensure that government at all levels is able to cope with and recover from emergencies. FEMA assesses national civil mobilization capabilities and develops concepts, plans, and systems for management of national resources. It identifies actual and potential shortages in natural, industrial, economic, and other resources; develops plans to mitigate their national security impacts; and fosters programs to reduce our national vulnerability to such resource shortages.

(2) FEMA is the principal respondent to military requirements for civilian sector resources during mobilization. It coordinates the response of the civil agencies to defense needs, always cognizant that without the might of the Nation’s industrial production, transportation networks, work force, financial institutions, energy, and natural resources, there could be no national security. Likewise, without food, clothing, housing, health care, and education, there would be no civilian population to support the defense of our way of life and our constitutional government. FEMA must, therefore, see to it that national resources are used to meet both the military and the essential civilian needs of the nation.

**k. Army mobilization planning.** Army mobilization planning provides the resources required to support various OPLANs. This includes mobilizing the units, manpower, and materiel required for immediate implementation of an OPLAN as well as the resources required to sustain the operation. AMOPES incorporates the guidance of the GDF, GEF, JSCP, and Joint Pub 4–05 and specifies the planning process used to develop HQDA and ACOM mobilization plans. The FORSCOM Mobilization Plan, with its associated FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), details the time-phased flow of mobilizing RC units from home stations to their mobilization stations. The TRADOC Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (TMOPEG) provide installations and training base augmentation units in the Army Reserve with guidance on training base expansion activities.

**l. Relationships of war planning and mobilization planning.** AMOPES provides the linkage between war planning under JOPES and mobilization planning as directed by DOD and the JS. AMOPES establishes the “who, what, where, why and how” of mobilization. It further prescribes the Army Crisis Action System for managing the execution of mobilization and OPLANs. The principal products of AMOPES are prepared executable plans, supporting information, and databases prepared and maintained for use during national crises. Mobilization plans incorporate the specific actions and responsibilities that must be accomplished both in peacetime and upon the order to mobilize. HQDA and ACOM mobilization plans that constitute the Army Mobilization Plans are based on guidance contained in AMOPES and other documents. Most mobilization plans are oriented toward full mobilization. For selected contingencies, however, the Army has developed partial mobilization plans.

**m. Peacetime preparation.** Preparation for mobilization proceeds concurrently with planning. The Army programs, budgets, and funds resources to overcome the shortfalls and limiting factors identified from a continuing analysis of the various operation plans. Concurrently, the Army trains units and individuals. Within its capabilities, it identifies and pre-assigns augmenting manpower and prepositions materiel to support those plans.

**n. Alert, mobilization, and deployment (Figure 6–14).**

(1) On receiving the order to mobilize, the Army begins a PRC, a partial mobilization or full mobilization, as directed by the SecDef, of RC units, pre-trained manpower, and materiel. A portion or all of the mobilizing force may augment an established theater force such as Europe, or may augment a force deployed in a contingency operation. Under the general supervision of HQDA FORSCOM, USAREUR, and USARPAC bring AC and RC units to combat-ready status and then deploy them by air and sea to the area(s) of operation according to the deployment plans.

(2) An initial pool of reserve materiel resources exists in war reserve stocks in the CONUS and pre-positioned stocks in overseas areas. The initial resources sustain the deployed force until reinforcement and re-supply pipelines can be established or the emergency is resolved. AC units in place in the theater of operations are referred to as "forward-presence" units. Other AC units, most of them CONUS-based, are earmarked by FORSCOM to support one or more requirements of the JSCP and AMOPES.

(3) When an emergency arises, units are alerted through FORSCOM, USAREUR, or USARPAC channels to deploy to the theater of operations in accordance with applicable OPLANs. RC units (ARNG and Army Reserve) are ordered to active duty by mobilization orders transmitted by HQDA through FORSCOM/USARPAC command channels. Units may be apportioned to support one or more OPLANs or they may be apportioned to become part of the CONUS base.

**o. FORSCOM mobilization planning.**

(1) FORSCOM publishes the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS),
FORSCOM Regulation 500–3, based on HQDA guidance contained in AMOPES. FORMDEPS contains planning directives and guidance to ACOM commanders, Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA), major troop units, FORSCOM installation commanders, other ACOM installation commanders, State adjutants general (in consonance with NGB), and the major U.S. Army Reserve commands (MUSARCs). FORMDEPS also contains annexes on the various functional aspects of mobilization and updates the GCCS–A Mobilization Planning Line based on OPLAN TPFDD.

(2) FORSCOM coordinates with USASOC, TRADOC, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), AMC, and NGB in preparing data. The GCCS–A Mobilization Planning Line includes scenario dependent data for RC deploying and redeploying MTOE and TDA units in the Army Status of Resources and Training System (ASORTS). The Mobilization Planning Line includes the following data (as applicable) for these units:

- Unit description, component, and home station.
- Power projection platform data.
- Unit mobilization data (notional).
- Ready-to-load dates.
- Deployment data for the applicable TPFDD(s).

p. Mobilization flow. Mobilization execution is decentralized to commands. FORSCOM, USARPAC, and USAREUR are the principal commands that command mobilizing RC units. Other commands (USASOC, TRADOC, MEDCOM, AMC, and SDDC) assume command of designated non-deploying units. Upon receiving the order to mobilize, most RC units move to one of 15 PPPs and 12 PSPs within the First Army area and the USARPAC area to train before deploying or augmenting the CONUS base. Cross leveling of equipment and personnel assets, required to make units mission-capable, takes place primarily at PPPs. AMC provides wholesale management for materiel. Human Resources Command (HRC) serves in a similar management role for personnel. Medical Command expands medical support services and facilities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers expands troop housing, training, industrial, and other facilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY LIMITS</th>
<th>• EXPAND BEYOND THE APPROVED PEACETIME FORCE STRUCTURE</th>
<th>• DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS</th>
<th>• DECLARATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY CONGRESS</th>
<th>• INVOKE THE DEFENSE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>• ALL EXISTING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE TO INCLUDE INACTIVE AND RETIRED</td>
<td>• DURATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY PLUS 6 MONTHS</td>
<td>• DECLARATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY CONGRESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIAL MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>• 1 MILLION ALL SERVICES</td>
<td>• 24 CONSECUTIVE MONTHS</td>
<td>• DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>• 200K ALL SERVICES</td>
<td>• 365 DAYS W/ NO EXTENSION</td>
<td>• PRESIDENTIAL ORDER</td>
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<tr>
<td>SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION</td>
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<td>CRISIS LEVEL</td>
<td>DOMESTIC EMERGENCY</td>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>1 OR 2 MCO</td>
<td>2 PLUS MCO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* PERSONNEL AND DURATION BASED UPON SITUATION

Figure 6–12. Stages of mobilization
6–13. Department of the Army mobilization processing system (DAMPS)
Subsequent to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Army Operations Center initiated development of an automated mobilization process resulting in DAMPS. DAMPS is the current system used to mobilize units and individuals. DAMPS electronically processes and tracks mobilization request packets through all necessary approval levels and stages enabling the rapid issuance of mobilization orders and improving the Army’s ability to account for and track units and individuals throughout the mobilization process. DAMPS is an Army mobilization resource that is essential for the timely expansion and sustainment of military forces.

Section V
Industrial preparedness

6–14. The need for industrial preparedness
In the post-Cold War era when global conflicts between nation states are unlikely, we must maintain a viable industrial
base that can replenish expenditures of critical war materiel following regional conflicts or MOOTW in a timely manner. Most future conflicts will be “come as you are” actions. Although the industrial base may be called upon to sustain the deployed forces, more than likely it will be needed to expeditiously replace losses in order to be prepared for another contingency.

6–15. DOD industrial base preparedness objectives

a. OSD’s objectives for improving the preparedness of our nation’s industrial base to meet contingency requirements have changed radically in recent years. There are six objectives set forth in the DOD strategy:

(1) Promote a strong, technologically advanced industrial base able to develop, produce, and support advanced military systems in a cost-effective manner.

(2) Foster integration of the civilian and military industrial and technology base by; encouraging and using commercial technologies in military equipment to the maximum extent feasible; eliminating defense-unique specifications and standards wherever possible; and demonstrating a clear preference for commercial and other non-developmental items, as well as commercial buying and manufacturing practices, to the extent permitted by law.

(3) Preserve only those unique defense-related skills, facilities, processes and technologies essential to execute the program, or that are highly likely to be essential beyond the program, and not likely to be reconstituted economically, or available from other non-domestic sources. This includes cost-effective investments in layaway/shutdown procedures for those assets deemed essential to support requirements; e.g., storage of blueprints, videotapes, data files, or other documentation of the production processes/skills and, where necessary, storage of production equipment and tooling, etc.

(4) Maintain real growth in industrial preparedness planning (IPP) (see Para 6–20a) funding levels. Use the funding to support planning and to accomplish the first three objectives.

(5) Program industrial preparedness measures (IPM) (see Para 6–20e) to permit accelerated production of only those munitions, critical support items, and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to maintaining full war reserve inventories.

(6) Reduce weapon system support costs without sacrificing readiness or wartime mission capability. Near-term actions are desired that will result in out year support cost reductions.

b. The DOD strategy that can be inferred from these objectives is relatively straightforward. To begin with, the focus is on producing advanced military systems cost-effectively. The next objective deals with utilizing commercial and dual-use technology by eliminating defense peculiar specifications and standards whenever possible. The next two deal with retention and enhancement of the industrial base. Retention will only be undertaken for those essential unique defense-related processes and technologies that cannot be economically replaced or for which a substitute is not available. Enhancement of the industrial base IPMs will only be employed to accelerate production of critical items when it is economically more advantageous then retention of assets.

6–16. DOD-level industrial preparedness management

a. It is DOD policy to maintain a state of industrial preparedness by working with private industry to produce, maintain, and repair materiel that meets mobilization requirements. Where it is determined that required mobilization items cannot be provided by the private sector, then government-owned facilities and equipment are acquired and maintained to produce them.

b. Overall responsibility for managing the DOD Industrial Preparedness Program is vested in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD(IP)). The Office of the DUSD(IP) develops policy to ensure the rapid and coordinated production of materiel to meet mission requirements; provides a basis for planning, programming, and budgeting related to improving industrial base responsiveness; and it directs the industrial preparedness programs of the Services and the DLA. It develops procedures to guide the allocation of available industrial production capacity for contingencies to avoid conflicts or over commitment.

c. The DUSD(IP) is responsible for advising the SecDef on the relative urgency of acquisition programs. The recommendations are presented as the DOD Master Urgency List (MUL) and provide the priority basis for assigning production resources. The DOD MUL includes only those programs that are designated as “DX” (use of the DX rating is limited to contracts and orders for programs approved by the President as of the highest national urgency and contracts and orders to which ratings may be applied or assigned as specified in Department of Defense Directive (DODD 4400.1, Defense Production Act Programs)). Essential support items are assigned to the same urgency category as their end items. Since the production of every item needed by the Services is prohibitively expensive, the key to a successful industrial preparedness program is the careful selection of critical materiel on which to apply scarce resources. The following paragraphs exemplify this management philosophy.

6–17. The defense priorities and allocations system (DPAS)

a. This regulatory system (15 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 700), administered by the Department of Commerce (DOC), is used to ensure the timely availability of industrial resources to meet approved national defense
and emergency preparedness program requirements, and to provide an operating system to support rapid industrial response in a national emergency.

b. The authority for this regulatory system is found in Title I of the Defense Production Act (50 USC App. 2061, et seq.), which authorizes the President to require—
   (1) The priority performance of defense contracts and orders over all other contracts and orders.
   (2) The allocation of materials, services, and facilities necessary and appropriate to promote the national defense.

c. The DPAS establishes two levels of contract priority—“DX” (highest national urgency) and “DO” (critical to national defense). DX priority rated contracts and orders take precedence over DO priority rated contracts and orders; and DX rated contracts and orders take precedence over unrated / commercial contracts and orders. The DPAS requires that—
   (1) Contractors and suppliers capable of their performance accept all priority rated contracts and orders.
   (2) Precedence is given to priority rated contracts and orders as necessary to achieve timely delivery.
   (3) Contractors extend the priority rating to contracts and orders placed with their vendors and suppliers.

d. Although the DPAS is self-executing, in the event of a problem involving acceptance, scheduling, production, or any situation that would interfere with timely delivery of a priority rated contract or order, Special Priorities Assistance may be requested. DOC may take “official action” under the DPAS to resolve the problem.

6–18. The national defense stockpile
The Federal Government has maintained a supply of strategic and critical materials designed to decrease our nation’s vulnerability to interruptions in the foreign supply of these materials in time of national emergency. Recently it was decided to dispose of the stockpile materials, retaining only a few of the most critical and essential to cover U.S. defense requirements for not less than three years of national emergency. The DOD through the Defense National Stockpile Center, a DLA organization, manages the stockpile.

6–19. DOD key facilities list (KFL)
KFL is a list of facilities of such importance that loss through sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or other hostile acts would seriously impair the national defense posture of the United States. FORSCOM uses the KFL in fulfilling its responsibility for CONUS land defense planning.

6–20. Army industrial preparedness program
The DOD-level management philosophy applies to the Army’s Industrial Preparedness Program as well. The Army depends on private industry as the foundation for production of military materiel. Therefore, when Army production facilities or depot-level maintenance do not exist, first consideration will be given to developing private industrial facilities that produce critically needed items. Management tools available include the following:
   a. Industrial preparedness planning (IPP). Conducted to ensure that an adequate industrial base is established, maintained, and retained to be responsive to military materiel requirements in the event of an emergency. It involves the assessment of the capability of the industrial base to support peacetime and emergency operations, and planning with industry to ensure adequate procurement, production, and maintenance capabilities to meet support requirements.
   b. DA critical items lists (DACIL). Prepared by HQDA (Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7), they provide biennially a priority list of items required to sustain war fighting for either an indefinite or surge contingency. They also provide stable mobilization requirements to support planning with industry. The DACIL are the basic documents from which IPP is conducted.
   c. Industrial preparedness planning list (IPPL). Prepared by AMC from the DACIL, the IPPL consists of critical items having long lead-time components. Many of these components require special manufacturing skills, or present other production challenges requiring detailed planning.
   d. Production base analysis (PBA). PBA, describes the status of the Army’s industrial readiness. It shows the base required for production and depot-level maintenance of IPPL items. Contingency production requirements are matched against the capacity of the industrial base and actions needed to improve industrial base readiness are identified.
   e. Industrial preparedness measures (IPMs). These actions aid industry to overcome production deficiencies in the Army’s industrial base. IPMs are designed to shorten production lead-time, increase production or repair capacity, and reduce inspection time. IPMs for accelerated production will only be used when they are cost-effective alternatives to stockpiling.

Section VI
Summary and references

6–21. Summary
The utility of the Army to the Nation depends to a large extent on whether its forces can be rapidly and effectively mobilized, deployed, employed, and sustained. The process of planning for contingencies or for emergencies where Army forces are needed to accomplish specified tasks is a continuous, all-encompassing process. It incorporates all
aspects of Army management including manpower procurement, training, materiel development, and fiscal assets and constraints. Central to the task of reinforcing active forces is the ability to mobilize RC assets and to deploy them with the least possible delay. Although the U.S. industrial base may be called upon to accelerate production to directly support the deployed forces, it will normally be utilized to repair and replace the damaged/destroyed equipment and munitions and other consumable expenditures following the conflict.

6–22. References

g. CJCS Manual 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III, (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), Current as of April 16, 2008..
h. CJCS Manual 3150.16D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP), December 1, 2008.
i. CJCS Manual, 3500.03B, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, August 31, 2007 (Current as of August 15, 2008.).
m. FORSCOM Regulation 55–1, Unit Movement Planning June 1, 2006.

7 Note: FM 3-0, Operations, dated February 2008 rescinded the terms combat arms,
How The Army Runs

RESERVED
Chapter 7

Reserve Components

“... Greater use of the Reserves ... means higher resource requirements for time, for training, and for equipment. Effective management of the Guard and Reserve as an operational force will require changes in how they are recruited, trained, equipped, compensated, and resourced. Over the past decade and a half some changes in force management have been made in support of the evolution of the Reserve components as an operational force. New management approaches evolved as the Department gained a better understanding of the demands of the new operational environment and the role played by the Guard and Reserve as part of an integrated total force. Yet the need for change has accelerated—the result of a nation at war. The Department is faced with a sea change in how the Reserve components are being used as part of the total force. This change is not temporary; it is not business as usual. Rather, it reflects a fundamental shift from the past. As such, a new approach to management is needed—one that also reflects a new way of doing business for the future. Incremental changes at the margin will no longer be enough.” Department of Defense White Paper “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force”, October 2008, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Section I
Introduction

7–1. Chapter content

Traditionally, the Reserve Components (RC) have provided the Army with the capacity to rapidly expand warfighting capability when the need arises. Over the last 17 years, the Army has relied more and more on the RC to meet demanding mission requirements in support of the NMS. In recent years, the Army has taken major steps to integrate the efforts of the Active Component (AC) and the RC of the Army and today's power-projection force can only accomplish its missions through such integrated efforts. This chapter will address the role, organization, structure and contributions of the RC of the Army.

7–2. Reserve components

The Reserve forces of the Army consist of two components: the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (AR). The Army National Guard represents Component 2 and Army Reserve represents Component 3.

Section II

The Army National Guard

7–3. An American tradition

The Army National Guard is an important link in a unique American tradition tracing its origin back to the militia in 1636. Many ARNG units in the eastern U.S. can trace their lineage back to the local militia organizations that fought on the side of the British during the French and Indian War and later against the British in the War for Independence. The term “National Guard” was first used to honor the Marquis de Lafayette. On his visit to New York in 1824, the American honor guard was renamed the “Battalion of National Guards” in tribute to Lafayette's command of the Garde Nationale of the French Army in Paris during 1789.


With the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA–1916), the term “National Guard” became the official name. The NDA–1916 also expanded the role of the National Guard in national defense. Though the Guard remained a State force, a direct result of the act was increased Federal oversight and assistance. NDA–1916 increased the number of times a National Guard unit was brought together for training, called drills. These four-hour drill periods increased from twenty-four to forty-eight. Additionally, NDA–16 authorized National Guard units to perform fifteen consecutive days of paid annual training (AT), pay for the drill periods, and increased overall Federal funding. NDA–1916 also required National Guard units to be organized like AC units, established Federal standards for commissioning officers in the Guard, and gave the President authority to mobilize the National Guard in case of war or national emergency.

7–5. World War I

The National Guard has made significant contributions to the Army’s combat power throughout this century. The National Guard provided 17 of the 43 divisions for the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I. The 30th Division, from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, received the highest number of Medals of Honor for the AEF. Following World War I, questions arose over the National Guard’s status and existence that were ultimately resolved in the National Defense Act of 1933. The 1933 Act created a new Army component, the National Guard of the United States, identical in personnel and units to the States’ National Guard. This new component was part of the Army, and could be ordered into Federal service by the President when Congress declared a national emergency. By
statute, the National Guard is the primary Reserve force for the Army. At the same time, the Guard provides the nation a force for disaster relief, maintaining public peace, and when in a State status, it provides the governors a force for utilization during state and local emergencies.

7–6. World War II
In World War II, total mobilization was ordered. New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery and two newly created tank battalions helped in the defense of the Philippines. They soldiered on with their Regular Army counterparts as prisoners of war after U.S. forces surrendered on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. Eighteen National Guard divisions fought in World War II, equally divided between the European and Pacific theaters. The first division to deploy overseas, the 34th Infantry Division, was a National Guard division. National Guard divisions were also an instrumental part of General MacArthur’s island hopping campaign in the Pacific theater. In the European theater, National Guard divisions participated in all major campaigns from North Africa, to Sicily and Italy, to the Normandy Invasion and the subsequent breakout, the race across France, the Battle of the Bulge, and the final campaign to conquer Germany. Following World War II, the Air National Guard was formed and remains part of the National Guard.

7–7. Korean War
The Korean War caused a partial mobilization of the National Guard. A total of 138,600 soldiers were mobilized, including eight infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams. Two of these divisions served in Korea, two divisions went to Europe, and four divisions remained in the U.S. to help reconstitute the strategic Reserve.

7–8. Vietnam War
During the Vietnam War, the National Guard played a much smaller role than in the past. This was primarily due to a political decision not to mobilize the country’s RC forces. After the Tet Offensive of January 1968, a small number of RC units mobilized, including 34 Guard units. Most were support units.

7–9. Desert Shield/Desert Storm
During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, RC units were on active duty within days after the invasion of Kuwait. The majority of the Army’s combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units were in the RC. The first ARNG units mobilized were transportation, quartermaster, and military police. Later, two ARNG field artillery brigades deployed to Southwest Asia, providing essential fire support capabilities. In total, 62,411 ARNG personnel were ordered to active Federal service, of which 37,848 deployed to Southwest Asia.

7–10. Post 9/11
In recent years, the role of the ARNG has expanded. Over the past decade, operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sinai have become ARNG missions. ARNG units have been transformed as a result of continuing AC/RC Rebalancing initiatives. Since 11 September 2001, 283,376 ARNG soldiers have been mobilized to support the war on terrorism as of 28 October 2008.

7–11. Current force
The Reserve Component - Army National Guard and Army Reserve - comprises nearly 52% of the Total Army’s military force. The ARNG is currently structured with eight combat divisions and 28 brigade combat teams (BCT). The ARNG has the only two RC Special Forces Groups which are part of USASOC. The Army Reserve is largely structured with CS and CSS units. These support units are absolutely essential for the Army’s operating force. For example, the Army Reserve provides the lion’s share of the Army’s medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations force capability...
Section III
The Army Reserve

7–12. Federal control
Whereas the National Guard evolved from the tradition of the decentralized colonial or State controlled militia system, the Army Reserve evolved from the reality that a significant portion of the nation’s military Reserve must be centrally controlled in times of peace and war, like the AC, by the Federal Government.

The Army Reserve of today can trace its roots as a reserve force back to the French and Indian War (1756–1763) through the Civil War (1861–1865) to the Spanish American War and Philippine Insurrection (1892–1902). Mobilization problems of the Army during the last of these conflicts, specifically shortages of Medical Professionals, caused the national leadership to establish a formal structure for federal volunteers during peacetime. The official predecessor of
the Army Reserve, created in 1908 and subsequently titled the Organized Reserve Corps, produced, in reality, a peacetime pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted men.


Using its constitutional authority to "raise and support armies," in 1916 Congress passed the National Defense Act which created the Officers' Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps and Reserve Officers' Training Corps. The Army mobilized 89,500 Reserve officers for World War I (1917–1919), one-third of which were medical doctors. More than 80,000 enlisted Reserve soldiers served, with 15,000 assigned to medical units. The individual Reserve Soldiers were placed into newly organized units, trained and sent into the war. After the war, the separate Reserve corps for officers and enlisted men was combined into the Organized Reserve Corps, a name that lasted into the 1950s. During the interwar period, the Army planned for an Organized Reserve force of thirty-three divisions, existing either as paper units or in a cadre status. The years between the world wars were austere, with few opportunities for training. A contingency for service, however, was created during the Great Depression. One of President Roosevelt's New Deal programs, the Civilian Conservation Corps, placed young men in barracks and military-style organizations to work in national forests and other outdoor projects. Between 1933 and 1939, more than 30,000 Reserve officers served as commanders or staff officers at the 2,700 conservation corps camps. Reserve participation in the American defense effort began before the United States entered the Second World War in December 1941. The Army began calling Reserve officers to active duty in June 1940. In the year that followed, the number of Reserve officers on active duty rose from less than 3,000 to more than 57,000. During World War II (1941–1945), the Army mobilized 26 Reserve (designated) infantry divisions. Approximately a quarter of all Army officers who served were reservists, including over 100,000 Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates. More than 200,000 Army reservists served in the war. Recognizing the importance of the Organized Reserve to the war effort, Congress authorized retirement and drill pay for the first time in 1948. The Korean War (1950–1953) saw more than 240,000 Army Reserve Soldiers called to active duty. That large number reflected the Army’s need for organized, trained personnel in a short period of time. More than 70 Reserve units served in Korea. While the Korean Conflict was still underway, Congress began making significant changes in the structure and role of the Reserve. These changes transformed the Organized Reserve into the United States Army Reserve. This new organization was divided into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Reserve units were authorized 24 inactive duty training days a year and up to 17 days of active duty (called annual training). The president was given authority to order up to one million Army Reserve Soldiers of all military specialties to active duty. These congressional actions were directly related to experiences gained during the activation and subsequent service of Army Reserve units in the Korean War. In mobilizations following the Korean War, for the first time, the Army intended to maintain the integrity of Army Reserve units mobilized. As a standard, officers and enlisted men were not stripped out of organized units and sent into operations as replacements. Instead, the Army attempted to mobilize and deploy fully trained and manned reserve units at the outbreak of the conflict. Thus, the lessons learned from the Korean War set the precedent for readiness of all Army Reserve organizations in future call-ups.


By the 1970’s, the Army Reserve became increasingly combat support and combat service support oriented. The end of the draft coincided with announcement of the Total Force Policy in 1973. That policy called for the United States to maintain an active force capable of maintaining peace and deterring aggression. Those forces would be reinforced, when necessary, by a well-trained, well-equipped reserve component. The effect of an all-volunteer active Army and the Total Force Policy was a shift of some responsibilities and resources to the Army Reserve. In the post Cold War period, the major restructuring of the Army’s reserve components, known as the 1993 ‘offsite agreement,’ stabilized reserve component force structure and end strength reductions, thereby making it possible for the Total Army to move forward with efforts to increase reliance on the reserve components. It led to National Guard specializing in combat arms and divisional level combat support and combat service support. The Army Reserve specializing in combat support and combat service support at corps and above levels. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 led to the largest call-up of reserve component personnel since the Korean War for operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. More than 84,000 Army Reserve Soldiers provided combat support and combat service support to the Coalition forces fighting Iraq in the Persian Gulf and site support to the armed forces of the United States elsewhere in the world. Of that number, over 40,000 reservists deployed to Southwest Asia. Included in the call-up were 20,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) who filled vacancies in units or performed other specialized duties. Army Reserve Soldiers were among the first reserve component personnel called to active duty, and were among the last to leave the desert, with units and volunteers preparing equipment for retrograde to the United States or Europe long after the conflict ended. More recent mobilizations included Operation Restore Hope (the Somalia relief expedition) whereby more than 100 Army Reserve volunteers staffed a postal company. Army Reserve civil affairs and public affairs Soldiers also served in Somalia until US forces departed in 1994. Three hundred and fifty Soldiers from 17 units served in Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. In 1995, 41 volunteers served as engineers, military police and radar specialists in the multi-national peacekeeping force in Egypt. Army Reserve Soldiers in 1995 made up 70 percent (16,000) of the Army peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the close of the twentieth century, the Army
Reserve comprised almost 40 percent of the Army’s total combat support and combat service support units. Now in the Global War on Terrorism the Army Reserve, as a fully operational force, is an integral part of the Army. Wherever the Army commits forces Army reservists are there. As of 10 March 2009, 172,109 Army Reserve Soldiers have been activated since 11 September 2001.

Section IV
Title 10 U.S. Code

7–16. United States Code (USC)
Title 10, U.S. Code, contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of Title 10 establish and govern the RC. Specific provisions of the Code pertaining to the Army and Air National Guard are contained in Title 32, U.S. Code.

7–17. Title 10 and Title 32
The role of the RC, as stated in section 10102, title 10, USC is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or when national security requires. Title 32 further states that ARNG units shall be ordered to Federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines they are needed. Policy statements further define these basic roles. The RC role clearly has expanded from one of a strategic reserve for wartime augmentation to being both an operational force day to day as well as a strategic reserve. The Army Reserve Components are an integral part of the force. The Army cannot prosecute a major contingency without the RC. The totally integrated Army is no longer just a concept; it is a guiding principle (Figure 7–1).

Section V
Reserve service

7–18. The categories
There are three major categories of reserve service: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve (Figure 7–2).

- Ready Reserve (ARNG/AR)
  - Selected Reserve
    - Troop Program Units (TPUs)
    - Active Guard Reserve (AGR)
    - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)
  - Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (AR Only)
  - Inactive National Guard (ING) (ARNG Only)
- Standby Reserve (AR)
- Retired Reserve (AR)

Figure 7–2. Reserve service categories

7–19. The Ready Reserve
The Ready Reserve has three subcategories:
  a. The Selected Reserve.
     1. The Selected Reserve consists of ARNG and Army Reserve unit members, Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members, and Individual Augmentees (IA) (Army Reserve only). Normally, members of ARNG and AR units attend forty-eight paid unit training assemblies (UTA) annually, each of which is a minimum of four hours duration, and perform two weeks of Annual Training (AT) each year (AR: 14 days, ARNG: 15 days). Commanders may extend AT, with approval, up to 29 days. Members may also perform additional training assemblies (ATA) as part of unit training. During UTA and ATA, members are in an inactive duty training (IDT) status. IDT is authorized training performed by a member of a RC not on active duty or active duty for training (ADT) and consisting of regularly scheduled unit training assemblies, additional training assemblies, periods of appropriate duty or equivalent training, and any special additional duties authorized for RC personnel by the Secretary concerned, and performed by them in connection with
the prescribed activities of the organization in which they are assigned with or without (though creditable for retirement) pay. IDT does not include work or study associated with correspondence courses. During AT members are in an ADT status. ADT is a tour of active duty, which is used for training members of the RC to provide trained units and qualified persons to fill the needs of the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency. The member is under orders that provide for return to non-active status when the period of ADT is completed. In addition to AT, ADT includes special tours, school tours, and the initial entry training performed by non-prior service enlistees.

(2) Officers, noncommissioned officers (NCO) (see Chapter 15), and members of high-priority units have increased AT and IDT requirements. The prevalent system in most units is to conduct multiple unit training assemblies (MUTAs) consisting of four consecutive assemblies (MUTA–4), the equivalent of one weekend per month. The minimum peacetime training objective is that each unit attains proficiency at platoon level in combat arms units and company level in CS/CSS units.

(3) Individuals are also eligible for active duty for operational support (ADOS). 10 USC § 115(b) empowers the Congress to authorize the maximum number of members of a reserve component permitted to be on active duty or full-time National Guard duty at any given time to provide operational support. The code also sets time limitations for ADOS periods. ADOS replaced the term active duty for special work (ADSW).

(4) Army Reserve soldiers are acquired primarily through Army Reserve AGR recruiters working for the USAREC, and with RC career counselors who move soldiers from the AC to RC at transition points. ARNG soldiers are acquired primarily by ARNG AGR recruiters working for State ARNG recruiting organizations and, like AR soldiers, with the assistance of RC career counselors at transition points. Both ARNG and AR units have military technicians who serve as Federal civil service employees during the week and as members of the unit during training assemblies or periods of active duty. RC personnel serving on active duty in an AGR status and members of the AC attached directly to the units, provide full-time support.

(5) The Human Resources Command St. Louis (HRC–STL) assigns officers from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) in coordination with the Regional Support Commands (RSC) and gaining troop program units (TPU). The vast majority of officers are assigned to Army Reserve TPU's based on voluntary assignments.

(6) Force Structure Allowance (FSA) permitted a situation where both ARNG and USAR components were over-structured. This caused authorized positions to go unfilled. To remedy this situation, Army reduced the reserve component FSA below the authorized end strength thereby creating Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) accounts (see para. 13–7). TTHS accounts are also referred to as “individuals' accounts”. (Note: (The Army Reserve has eliminated its over-structure and has had an established TTHS account since FY05)

(7) Selected Reserve includes the Army Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program,(AR 140–145). These are positions documented on Army MOBTDAs that are available for immediate support. All IMA’s (except General Officers) are funded to support 48 MUTA’s and 12 days of Annual Training. IMAs are also assigned to DOD, FEMA, Selective Service, and other positions as validated by the HQDA G3.

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (Army Reserve only).

(1) HRC–STL exercises command and control over the IRR, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. For strength accountability purposes, the IRR consists of pre-trained individual soldiers assigned to various groups for control and administration. The IRR is available for mobilization in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or the President and a portion of the IRR is available under Presidential Reserve Call-Up Authority (PRC). The control group “AT” consists of non-unit Ready Reserve members with a training obligation, who may receive a mandatory assignment to a unit by the Commander, HRC–STL. The control group “Reinforcement” consists of obligated members who do not have a mandatory training requirement and those non-obligated members interested in non-unit programs which provide retirement point credit. This includes AR, ARNG, and discharged AC soldiers that have met their training requirement but have not completed their eight-year service obligation. The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) replaced the Officer Personnel Management System-Army Reserve (OPMS–AR) and defines the training requirements and opportunities for IRR and unit officers. The Enlisted Personnel Management System-Army Reserve (EPMS–AR) (see para 13–21) focuses on training and management of IRR enlisted members. The Army Reserve created the Individual Augmentation (IA) program, which serves as a single, unstructured holding account in the Army Reserve for the assignment of individual Soldiers. Assigning individuals to one account precludes the need to break or reduce parent unit readiness and streamlines the mobilization process. Soldiers assigned to the IA Program are volunteers (primarily drilling Army Reserve Soldiers) who are readily and immediately available to meet individual mobilization requirements and contingency operational needs. The IA Program also allows qualified Soldiers to continue to serve, even though they do not reside near an Army Reserve unit. As of 30 September 2008 approximately 4,000 Army Reserve Soldiers were registered in the on-line volunteer database. Retention counselors’ assist in providing IA volunteers by advising qualified Soldiers who transfer from either the Active Army, Army Reserve troop program units (TPU), or the Army National Guard to the IRR.

(2) The IRR constitutes the largest category of the pre-trained individual manpower. These personnel provide the majority of filler personnel required to bring both the AC and Selected Reserve units to their wartime required personnel strength in the event of mobilization, and initial casualty replacement/fillers in fighting theaters. Currently, IRR strength is approximately 67,000 as of 30 September 2008.
c. Inactive Army National Guard (ING).

(1) The ING provides a means for individuals to continue in a military status in the ARNG who are otherwise unable to participate actively. While in the ING, individuals retain their federal recognition and Reserve of the Army status as members of ARNG units. Subject to immediate involuntary mobilization with their assigned units in time of Federal or State emergency, personnel transferred to the ING normally are attached to their former ARNG units and encouraged to participate in AT with their parent unit.

(2) Individuals assigned to the ING are included in the Ready Reserve strength of the Army. Each FY, ARNG units schedule an annual muster day assembly for their ING personnel that serves to:

- Screen soldiers for mobilization.
- Inform soldiers of unit training plans and objectives.
- Conduct lay-down inspections of clothing and/or equipment.
- Update personnel records
- Determine requirements for immunization and physical examination.
- Discuss transfer back to active status (especially with those individuals who possess a critical skill).

7–20. Standby Reserve (Army Reserve only)

a. The Standby Reserve includes those soldiers who have completed all active duty and reserve training requirements and have either requested reassignment to the Standby Reserve to maintain an affiliation with the military or who have been screened from RC unit or IRR roles for one of several cogent reasons. Key employees of the Federal Government (for example, members of Congress or the Federal judiciary), whose positions cannot be vacated during a mobilization without seriously impairing their parent agency’s capability to function effectively, are examples of Standby Reservists. Other reasons for a Standby Reserve assignment include graduate study, temporary (one year or less) medical disqualification, or temporary extreme hardship. Standby Reservists may not be ordered to active duty except during a declared national emergency.

b. The Standby Reserve is composed of an Active List and an Inactive list. Those assigned in an active status are authorized to participate in Ready Reserve training at no expense to the Government. Such participation includes training to earn retirement points or to qualify for promotion. Individuals assigned in an inactive status are normally not authorized to participate in reserve duty training. As of 30 September 2008, the Standby Reserve consisted of 2,136 individuals.

7–21. Retired Reserve (Army Reserve only)

a. Individuals who are eligible for and have requested transfer to the Retired Reserve are in this third category of reserve service. The Retired Reserve includes those individuals who are entitled to retiree pay from the Armed Forces because of prior military service or who have completed twenty or more qualifying years of reserve (ARNG or AR) and/or active service for which retirement benefits are not payable until age sixty. In addition, ARNG/AR officers and warrant officers who are drawing retired pay after completing twenty or more years of active Federal service are, by statute, members of the Retired Reserve. Regular Army enlisted personnel, retired after twenty, but less than thirty years of active service, are transferred to the Retired Reserve until they have completed thirty years of service.

b. Members of the Retired Reserve and those with less than twenty years of active service are not provided any form of training and are not available for military service except in time of war or a congressionally declared national emergency. However, Service Secretaries may recall retired personnel with twenty or more years of active service to active duty at any time in the interests of national defense.

Section VI
Reserve component management

7–22. Structure
As with the AC, the ARNG and the AR are governed by Congress, and affected by the OSD and the DA.

7–23. Congress

a. Committees. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) establish strength authorizations and other matters concerning the ARNG and AR. Certain areas such as pay and allowances and officer promotions are closely controlled. The most significant Congressional action may be establishing and approving the annual paid end strength authorizations. Each year, strength ceilings are authorized to support appropriations for reserve pay and allowances. Although strength levels are established, Congress has been known to appropriate less money than needed to fund them. The Defense Subcommittees of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees prepare the appropriation acts that allow funding.

b. Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). This Congressional action is significant because it protects RC Soldiers’ rights for employment and reemployment after military service or training. This act
does not replace the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), but further codifies and clarifies 50 years of case law and court decisions. The USERRA entitles Reserve Soldiers to return to their civilian employment with the seniority, status, and pay they would have attained had they been continuously employed. Among other protections, it expands health care and employee benefit pension plan coverage.

7–24. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

a. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD (RA)). Overall responsibility for all RC issues at the OSD level is vested in the Office of the ASD (RA).

b. Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). Also at the OSD level, the RFPB, acting through the ASD (RA), is, by statute, the principal policy adviser to the SecDef on matters relating to the RC. The RFPB includes a civilian chairman, Guard and Reserve general officers, the Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of each Service, and one active duty general or flag officer from each Military Department. A RC general officer is also designated as the executive officer. The SecDef is formally associated with the RC community through the RFPB. The RFPB is further required by statute to prepare and submit an annual report to the President and Congress on the status of the RC. That report normally reviews the progress made by the DOD and the Services in improving readiness and areas where, in the Board’s judgment, further improvements are required to make the Reserve Forces more effective.

c. National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. This OSD-level committee, in operation since 1972, is dedicated to improvement of relations between civilian employers and local ARNG and Army Reserve units. The committee has successfully resolved many employer/employee misunderstandings arising from RC service. It operates on an informal basis with the goal of ensuring that individuals have the freedom to participate in training without employment obstacles or loss of earned vacations. In FY 1979, State chairmen were appointed to work with the national chairman. The use of State committees provides widespread support for the program.

7–25. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

The 1998 DOD Authorization Bill created two new two-star positions in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant to the CJCS for National Guard Matters and the Assistant to the CJCS for Reserve Matters. They assist the CJCS in assuring that National Guard and Reserve Forces are fully integrated in the Joint arena and reach full potential in executing the NMS. As further outlined in Title 10 U.S.C.§155, “The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, shall develop appropriate policy guidance to ensure that, to the maximum extent practicable, the level of reserve component officer representation within the Joint Staff is commensurate with the significant role of the reserve components within the Total Force.”

7–26. Headquarters, DA

The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve management structure is shown in Figure 7–6. Except for OCONUS units commanded by USAEUR and USARPAC, almost all Army Reserve TPsU are commanded by the USARC (Figure 7–3. Army Reserve Command Relationships). State Governors command their respective ARNG units until the units are federalized by Presidential Executive Order.

a. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA (M&RA)). Within HQDA, overall responsibility for RC is vested in the Office of the ASA (M&RA).

b. Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC). The RCCC, established in 1976, reviews progress on RC matters related to readiness improvement, examines problem areas and issues, coordinates the tasking of issues to the ARSTAF, and reviews staff efforts. The Council, chaired by the VCJA, includes selected general officers from the ARSTAF, Chief of the Army Reserve, Director of the Army National Guard, the FORSCOM Chief of Staff, and the Deputy ASA (M&RA).

c. Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC). The ARFPC reviews and comments to the SECARMY and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA) on major policy matters directly affecting the RC and the mobilization preparedness of the Army. Membership of the committee, which is appointed by the SECARMY, consists of five AC general officers on duty with the ARSTAF, five ARNG general officers, and five AR general officers. There are also five alternate members appointed from the ARNG and five alternate members appointed from the AR. RC principal members are appointed for a three-year term and RC alternate members are appointed for a one-year term, and AC members are appointed for the duration of their assignment to the ARSTAF. The ASA (M&RA), ARNG, OCAR, U.S. Army TRADOC, and FORSCOM also provide liaison representatives. The Director of the ARSTAF serves as adviser to the committee. The committee chairman is selected from the RC members, and serves a two-year term. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 reassigned the committee from the Office of the CSA to the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA). The Chairman of the ARFPC now reports directly to the SECARMY. The act also modified the nomination procedures. The committee normally meets in March, June, September, and December.
7–27. The National Guard Bureau (NGB)

a. The NGB is a joint activity of the Department of Defense and the legally designated peacetime channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia as established by section 10501, Title 10, USC. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense and the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States. (10 U.S.C. §10502 as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008)

b. The CNGB works directly with the Governors and the adjutants’ generals (TAG) (Figure 7–4). Although the CNGB has no command authority in these dealings, cooperation is facilitated through control and coordination of funds, end strength, equipment, force structure programs, and by authority to develop and publish regulations pertaining to the ARNG when not federally mobilized. The CNGB is appointed to a four-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Appointment is made from officers of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States who:

1. are recommended for such appointment by their respective Governors or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard;
2. are recommended for such appointment by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force;
3. have had at least 10 years of federally recognized commissioned service in an active status in the National Guard;
4. are in a grade above the grade of brigadier general;
5. are determined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with criteria and as a result of a process established by the Chairman, to have significant joint duty experience;
6. are determined by the Secretary of Defense to have successfully completed such other assignments and experiences so as to possess a detailed understanding of the status and capabilities of National Guard forces and the missions of the National Guard Bureau as set forth in section 10503 of this title;
7. have a level of operational experience in a position of significant responsibility, professional military education, and demonstrated expertise in national defense and homeland defense matters that are commensurate with the advisory role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau;
(8) possess such other qualifications as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe for purposes of this section. (10 U.S.C. §10502 as amended by the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007).

c. The CNGB may succeed himself. The grade authorized for this position is general.

d. The functions of the NGB are delineated in 10 U.S.C. §10503 as amended by the national Guard Empowerment Act of 2007.

e. The CNGB is the appropriation sponsor of six appropriations: three ARNG and three Air National Guard (pay and allowance, operations and maintenance, and construction). The CNGB delegates administration of the appropriations to the Directors of the Air National Guard and Army National Guard.

f. The Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) is a federally recognized lieutenant general who directs resources to provide combat-ready units. In support of the Federal mission, the DARNG formulates the ARNG long-range plan, program, and budget for input to the ARSTAF. The DARNG administers the resources for force structure, personnel, facilities, training, and equipment. The Army Directorate assists the DARNG in these efforts.

(1) The Army National Guard Directorate, NGB serves as the Chief, NGB’s primary channel of communications between DA and the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. (Figure 7–5.) The Director, Army National Guard serves as the head of the Army Directorate which functions as part of the ARSTAF. Its mission is to acquire, manage and distribute resources to meet the ARNG priorities and influence the development of policies in order to support the Combatant Commanders, Services, States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. The Army Directorate is structured along the following functional areas:

(a) Personnel.
(b) Operations, training, and readiness.
(c) Force management.
(d) Installations, logistics, and environment.
(e) Aviation and safety.
(f) Comptroller.
(g) Information systems.
(h) Missile Defense.
(i) Operational support airlift.

(2) Figure 7–5 shows the organization of the Army Directorate, NGB. As part of the ARSTAF, the Army Directorate assists HQDA in identifying resource requirements and determining the allocation to ARNG units (including: funding, personnel, force structure, equipment, and supplies). To accomplish this, the Army Directorate coordinates with HQDA to ensure proposed policies are conducive and responsive to ARNG unique requirements. The Army Directorate assists the Chief, NGB and Director, ARNG in the execution and implementation of ARNG policies and programs, prepares detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans, and supervises execution of plans and instructions. Also, the Army Directorate serves as the Chief, NGB’s executive agent for policy, procedures, and execution of the military support to civil authorities (MSCA) program.

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Figure 7–4. NGB management structure

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How The Army Runs
7–28. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR)

a. The OCAR provides direction for Army Reserve planning to accomplish the mission of providing trained units and individuals to support Army mobilization plans. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and holds office for four years. The CAR may succeed himself one time, and holds the rank of Lieutenant General, Army of the United States, for the duration of the appointment. The CAR also serves as CG, USARC. Figure 7–6 shows the organization of OCAR.

b. The duties of the CAR:
   (1) Commander, USARC
   (2) Adviser to the CSA on Army Reserve matters.
   (3) Directly responsible to the CSA for matters pertaining to the development, readiness, and maintenance of the Army Reserve.
   (4) Responsible for implementation and execution of approved Army Reserve plans and programs.
   (5) Army Reserve representative in relations with governmental agencies and the public.
   (6) Adviser to ARSTAF agencies in formulating and developing DA policies affecting the Army Reserve.
   (7) Assists in development of Army Reserve mobilization policy and plans.
   (8) In coordination with other appropriate ARSTAF agencies, develops, recommends, establishes, and promulgates DA policy for Army Reserve training.
   (9) Appropriation sponsor for three Army Reserve appropriations (pay and allowances, operations and maintenance, and construction).
   (10) Member of DA and OSD committees as required.

c. In 2003, the Army Reserve Personnel Center was reorganized and re-designated as the Human Resources Command - St. Louis (HRC–STL). HRC–STL is subordinate to HRC–Alexandria, which is a field operating agency of HQDA G–1. The Total Army Personnel Command has been re-designated Human Resources Command-Alexandria. HRS–STL has the mission of providing personnel life cycle management to all members of the Active, Inactive, and Retired Reserve. The re-designation was more than a name change and represented a significant step towards the establishment of a truly integrated personnel system for the AC and RC.

(1) The current structure and mission of HRC–STL is very similar to that of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command that provides like services to the AC. Critical responsibilities for HRC–STL include:

• Conducting officer and enlisted selection boards required by law and policy.
• Managing officer and enlisted forces, including full-time support personnel (AGR Force).
• Managing life cycle personnel systems to optimize utilization of HR assets.
• Synchronizing personnel activities across the Army Reserve for peacetime, mobilization, and wartime.
• Administering the branch and functional area proponency and training requirements.

(2) HRC–STL provides necessary services for maintaining individual morale and esprit de corps by administering to those individuals who are veterans or retirees. In this capacity, HRC–STL provides information to various government agencies that is used as a basis for obtaining veteran/retiree entitlements or benefits. HRC–STL corrects records, replaces essential documents, verifies status and service, and accomplishes many other functions involving the individual military personnel record. In addition, HRC–STL provides administrative support for many DOD programs involving records in its custody, as well as records of discharged personnel in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration.

7–29. Army Commands

(1) The missions of the CG, FORSCOM, include command of all assigned Army Reserve TPU’s in CONUS and evaluation and support of training of the ARNG. The CG is responsible for organizing, equipping, stationing, training, and maintaining the combat readiness of assigned units. The CG, FORSCOM also manages the RC advisory structure and exercises command of the Army Reserve units through the CG, USARC.

(2) The USARC, established as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM on 18 October 1991, became fully operational on 1 October 1992. Today the USARC is a direct reporting unit (DRU) to the Department of the Army and commands and controls all Army Reserve TPU’s assigned to FORSCOM. The USARC commands and controls assigned units through Operational and Functional Commands. Operational and Functional Commands are deployable elements which command units of the same or similar functional capabilities. For instance, in the Future Force, Army Reserve MEDCOM will command all Army Reserve medical units while the 11th Aviation Command will command all Army Reserve aviation assets regardless of the unit’s geographic location. Operational and Functional Commands are fully deployable as headquarters, individual units, or both. (see Army Reserve web site at http://www.armyreserve.
Army Reserve units include such diverse organizations as CS and CSS units; training divisions with a mission to provide tri-component individual and collective unit training and simulation training: Army garrisons with a mobilization mission of staffing a post; special courses; and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) courses for AC, ARNG, and AR soldiers. The AR, in addition to maintaining units, has individuals in non-unit control groups as described in the section on the IRR [section 7–22b(1)]. In addition to the major Army Reserve organizations, there are almost 2,000 company/detachment-sized units.

b. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC is responsible for initial entry training for RC members. All non-prior service enlistees under the Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963 (REP–63) perform initial active duty for training (IADT). This includes basic training and advanced individual training (AIT) or one station unit training (OSUT) (see para 15–16c) under AC auspices. An alternative method of conducting this training is the “split-option training” concept whereby an RC member may do BT during one year and AIT the following year.

7–30. State Adjutants General (Army National Guard)

a. Army National Guard units are located in each of the fifty States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Command of the ARNG when not in active Federal service is vested with the Governors of the States and Territories, who command through their State Adjutant General (TAG). The TAG is appointed by the Governor in all States and Territories except for Vermont, South Carolina, and the District of Columbia. The TAG is a legislature appointee, South Carolina elects the TAG, and the President appoints the Commanding General of the district of Columbia. The TAG is also a State official whose authority is recognized by Federal law. The authorized TAG grade is normally major general.

b. State TAGs and their management staffs (which include both State and Federal employees) manage Federal resources to build combat-ready units. Under the TAG, ARNG commanders lead their combat-ready units in training during peacetime.

c. A Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) is organized within each state. Upon mobilization of ARNG units, the Continental Armies (CONUSA) assumes command and control of federalized ARNG units. The JFHQ is responsible for pre-mobilization actions such as cross-leveling of personnel and equipment of alerted units. Under the direction of the CONUSA, the JFHQ is responsible for providing increased levels of support to federalized units and moving federalized units to the mobilization station or port of embarkation as directed by the CONUSA. The JFHQ also provides installation support, family support, and mobilization support to other RC within the State upon declaration of a national emergency. The JFHQ continues to provide support to non-federalized ARNG units within the State. If the JFHQ is federalized, it will fall under the command and control of the respective CONUSA.

d. The U.S Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) is an officer (Colonel) of the National Guard of the United States (Army or Air) ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10, USC and is normally collocated with the JFHQ. The USPFO receives and accounts for all Federal funds and property and provides financial and logistical resources for the maintenance of Federal property provided to the state. The USPFO manages the Federal logistics support systems (Army and Air Force) for the State and, upon mobilization of a supported unit, provides the support necessary for the unit to transition to active duty status. Additionally, the USPFO functions as a Federal-contracting officer responsible for Federal procurement activities within the state. The USPFO is also responsible for certifying the accuracy of Federal payrolls.

e. Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 1803 “Facilities for Reserve Components”, provides for Federal support of construction of ARNG facilities. This law permits construction of facilities on sites furnished by States at no cost to the Federal Government, or on Federal property licensed to the State specifically for ARNG purposes. Funding for approved armory construction is normally 75 percent Federal funds and 25 percent state funds, with 100 percent Federal support for other construction such as administrative, logistics support, and training facilities in direct support to ARNG units. Operations and maintenance costs for these facilities are funded via cooperative agreements.
between the Federal Government and the State military departments. The Federal Government provides all funding for construction and maintenance of facilities for the Army Reserve.

Section VII
Training

7–31. Goals
The training goals of the ARNG and the AR are the same as the AC. Plans to achieve objectives are accomplished during IDT, commonly referred to as unit training assemblies (UTA), multiple unit training assemblies (MUTA), drills, or assembly periods; and during a fifteen-day period of Annual Training (AT). The same training standards apply to ARNG/AR units as that of their AC counterparts.

a. To meet the on-going operational requirements of OIF and OEF, Reserve component (RC) training is now based on a higher readiness requirement to meet the train-alert-mobilize deploy model, which reduces emphasis on post mobilization training. The RC force must be ready before mobilization. This change necessitated a new training strategy and increased resource requirements for additional individual and unit training. For example, the newly revised USARC Training Guidance sets the pace for disciplined, standards-based, task-oriented training that fortifies the RC wartime posture and establishes a steady and intense OPTEMPO. Proficiency is tested by semi-annual weapons qualification, annual warrior task training, semi-annual physical fitness tests, nuclear, chemical and biological proficiency, and a battle drill program prior to mobilization.

b. To continue providing capabilities to support the Army in sustained joint and expeditionary operations and to provide predictability for Soldiers, families and employers, the Army Reserve implemented the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) (see paragraph 7–49 Army Reserve Expeditionary Force). Beginning in 2005, ten like-structured deployable organizations called Army Rotational Expeditionary Packages (AREPs) were formed. Units in each AREP plan to mobilize for up to twelve months once every five years. Unit capabilities and readiness within an AREP are more formally validated as it approaches the employment window. The Army Reserve implemented the AREF in 10 phases. As the Army Reserve transforms, early AREP rotations and their timelines were condensed. As the concept is fully implemented, the rotations and their phases become more distinct and sequential.

c. The Army Reserve has sought innovative ways to continue contributing to the performance of training across the Army. To support combatant commanders, the Army Reserve created the Foreign Army Training Assistance Command (FA–TRAC), which conducts foreign army training. In OIF, the 98th Division deployed hundreds of Army Reserve Soldiers to train the newly operational Iraqi National Army.

d. The mission of FA–TRAC is to provide foreign armed forces with advice, training, and organizational practices in leadership, Soldier skills, and unit tactics. Army Reserve Soldiers assigned to FA–TRAC will deploy to the combatant command to live, train, and eat with the host-nation Soldiers. The FA–TRAC was built from the existing structure of a current Army Reserve division (institutional training). FA–TRAC will provide “plug and play” training teams to the combatant commander.

7–32. Challenges
A key factor to understanding Reserve-training challenges is comprehending the distinct differences between RC and AC training. Unlike AC units, which have MOS qualified soldiers assigned to them by HRC, RC units usually recruit soldiers from the local market area. Whether initial entry or prior service, these soldiers are assigned to the unit and then must attend MOS qualification training. Qualification training, sustainment training, additional duty training, and professional development education are often conducted in lieu of scheduled UTA and AT, and in some cases require more than a year to complete. Even though these RC Soldiers are counted against the unit’s assigned strength (pending full implementation of the TTHS program) they are generally not available to participate in collective training. Another training challenge is that RC Soldiers and units must meet the same standards as AC units in a fraction of the time. Non-Directed Mission Essential Task List (DMETL) training, Non-Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) training, and other events, such as Army physical fitness tests (APFT), weapons qualification, mandatory training, inventories, physicals, etc., have a greater impact because they take the same time as AC units within fewer available days.

7–33. Unit training assemblies
ARNG and AR units, as elements of the Selected Reserve, are normally authorized forty-eight drill periods and a two-week (14–17 days) AT during the training year, which starts on 1 October and terminates on 30 September of the following year. The general trend is to consolidate these unit-training assemblies (UTA) during the year so that four UTA (sixteen hours minimum) are accomplished during a single weekend. This MUTA–4 configuration provides continuity for individual and crew training, qualification firing, field training, and refresher training. Training for mobilization, i.e. completing Phase I and II actions identified in FR 500–3–3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) Volume III Reserve Component Unit Commander’s Handbook Annex E,
Mobilization Checklist for Unit Commanders, and Annex G, Required Documents Checklist, and the soldier readiness program (SRP) (see para 19–11b) checklist should be conducted during UTA.

7–34. Collective tasks
AT is primarily directed toward collective pre-mobilization tasks. Individual training and weapons qualification are typically performed during IDT. Soldiers and units train to established pre-mobilization levels of proficiency. Combat maneuver units generally train to individual/crew/platoon levels of proficiency. CS/CSS units are generally required to train to company level proficiency.

Section VIII
Equipment

7–35. Policy
The Army accepted risk over the years during the Cold War by not fully fielding force modernization equipment to authorized levels in its Reserve Components. This risk seemed prudent at the time. The Reserve Components were characterized as a “strategic reserve” and were not expected to immediately deploy in the event of a crisis. The global strategic environment has changed dramatically over the past two decades and, in order to meet the nation’s national security demands today, the Reserve Components function as both an operational force and a strategic reserve. In their operational role the Reserve Components’ deployment timeline has shortened considerably with the expectation that it will continue to move farther away from the Cold War paradigm of mobilize, train, deploy and move closer and closer to the Active Component model of train deploy. As a result, DA policy today distributes equipment to units in first-to-fight/first-to-support sequence. Later deploying units are provided the minimum-essential equipment required for training and to achieve acceptable readiness levels. The component to which a unit belongs (Active or Reserve), with the exception of specified programs (for example, National Guard Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) formerly known, as Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP) is not a factor in equipment distribution. This policy ensures units employed first in time of crisis have the necessary equipment to accomplish the mission. Under this policy, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard have received substantial amounts of modern equipment in recent years and they are programmed to receive even more in the near future.

7–36. National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriation (NGREA)
The NGREA is a special appropriation designated for the acquisition of equipment for the RC to improve readiness. Congress may further fence these funds for the purchase of specific items of equipment. NGREA funds complement the Service appropriations, which primarily fund force modernization, thereby improving training and readiness in the RC. Until the Army is able to support total Army modernization, the continued programming of NGREA funding will allow the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard to procure critical modernization equipment in order to improve survivability and interoperability.

7–37. Withdrawal
Procedures are in place to ensure that new and/or serviceable equipment is not withdrawn from the RC without justification. Requests for withdrawal of NGREA appropriated equipment must be coordinated with the SecDef. Waiver of this provision during a crisis allows the SecDef to delegate that authority to the ASD(RA) after coordination with the chairman, JCS. Requests for the delegation of authority for all withdrawals or diversions will be forwarded through the ASD(RA), who will coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict), for Ready Reserve units falling under his oversight, prior to submission to either the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef). The Secretaries of the Military Departments will develop and submit projected replacement plans in accordance with published DOD directives, not later than 90 days from the date that the affected units are released from active duty under any provision of law. Replacement plans are also required within 90 days from the date of withdrawal, or diversion, for units not ordered to active duty, but from which equipment was withdrawn or diverted.

a. Department of the Army (DA) has directed the USAR to leave equipment in theater known as Theater Provided Equipment (TPE). The continued use of Army Reserve equipment as TPE to remain in theater to support other services and forces continues to degrade the ability of redeploying Army Reserve units to reset and prepare for future deployments. Today almost 76 percent of on-hand Army Reserve equipment is deployed, mobilizing, demobilizing or assigned as Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) in theater. This equipment supports some 40% of the units assigned to the USARC.
b. The Army Reserve continues to support subsequent OIF/OEF rotations and other requirements only through using the assets from its stateside-based institutional training structure. Much of the equipment returning from OIF/OEF has had its service life rapidly expended under combat conditions. This equipment will need to be replaced. The concept of a transformed, modular Army of “plug and play” units demands that all units, regardless of component, be equipped to the same levels and with compatible and interoperable systems. Current Army procurement planning in conjunction
Section IX
Readiness/Mobilization Assistance

7–38. Background
In 1973, the Army leadership recognized the potential of many types of RC units for early deployment. Accordingly, the affiliation program was conceived to improve the mobilization and deployment readiness of selected RC units and provide added combat power earlier in the execution of contingency plans. As more structure and missions were added to the RC in the mid-to-late 1970s, the Army instituted several programs to facilitate achievement of higher training readiness levels for the RC. These included the AC/RC partnership program which aligned selected combat and Special Forces RC units with AC units, the counterpart program that aligned ARNG attack helicopter units with AC counterparts, and the Corps and Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN) that associated AC/RC combat units with a CONUS corps for command post exercises. Together these programs provided resources and opportunities for RC unit leaders and soldiers to work closely and share their experiences with their AC counterparts.

7–39. Training Support Organizations
In response to a lack of readiness and resources during RC deployments for the first Gulf War, Congress passed the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102–484). The Act as amended required the Army) to assign not less than 5000 active component personnel to RC units to provide training and readiness advice and support. The Army developed five USAR-flagged Training Support Divisions aligned with First and Fifth Armies composed of Active, Guard and Reserve personnel to provide collective training support for RC units. Additionally, a portion of the 5000 personnel were embedded in RC units as AC full-time support personnel. The Army Transformation Campaign Plan realigned the First and Fifth Armies into two different mission areas. Effective July 2006, Fifth Army became ARNORTH, the Army Service Component Command (ASCC), providing support to United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) for Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions. Effective October 2006, First Army assumed the mission for the entire continental United States of mobilizing, training, validating, and deploying RC units. First Army is organized with two divisions (First Army-East and First Army-West) which command Training Support Brigades (TSB), with associated ARNG and USAR elements, that provide exercise support, pre-mobilization training, and post-mobilization validation capability for RC units to ensure Army standards and doctrinal mission capabilities are achieved prior to deployment. The USAR provides additional support through two Regional Support Groups (East and West) with assigned training support structure to provide a capability to conduct quality training and exercise events. (Source: 1A Transformation Campaign Plan) In response to the army’s requirement to mobilize units more efficiently in order to maximize Boots on Ground (BOG) time the Army Reserve activated two (third programmed for FY10) Combat Support Training Centers (CSTC) to conduct pre-mobilization training for units prior to mobilization. The objective is to provide 1st Army with Army Reserve units that can be certified and deployed within 30 days of mobilization.

7–40. Force Management/Force Generation
Several transformational programs such as Global Force Basing, capabilities based versus threat based planning, the shift from Army of Excellence designs to modular Force designs and the shift from using the RC as strategic reserve to an operational force impact the way the Army manages its forces and prepares them for sustained as well as surge operations. The Army developed the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) to manage these forces and develop increased readiness and mission capability through a cyclic process. Within ARFORGEN, the USAR employs a five year cycle of not more than one-year deployed boots on the ground (BOG) and four years dwell. In the model, most USAR MTOE units are spread equally across the 10 Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) (see paragraph 7–52 Army Reserve Expeditionary Force) within the five-year group stacks. Some generating force units are held out of the rotational model: TDA training base expansion (TBE) and CONUS support base (CSB) units particularly. Theater aligned MTOE units, due to their unique capabilities and low density, are managed separately from the ARFORGEN model. Individuals accounts, such as trainee, transient, holdee and student (TTHS) accounts and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) are also managed outside of the ARFORGEN model.

a. Through the use of this five-year rotation cycle, the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) offers increased predictability to Army Reserve Soldiers, their families and employers. With this concept, the majority of Army Reserve units are assigned to one of the ten AREP. While units at one end of the five year spectrum are reconstituting after returning from a deployment units at the other end of the spectrum are prepared, trained and equipped to mobilize and deploy wherever needed.

b. In conjunction with the new AREF strategy, the Army Reserve is also implementing a new equipping strategy that is synchronized with the AREF. Resources are apportioned according to a unit’s location in the cycle in order to obtain increasing levels of readiness and mission capability. As units progress through each year of the five-year cycle their state of readiness increases. Units ready to deploy, are at the highest level of readiness. Units reconstituting from
a deployment, are at the lowest level. In the year prior to deployment, units receive full complements of modernized equipment compatible with AC equipment. This influx of equipment allows Army Reserve units to train up on their go-to-war systems prior to mobilization and deployment. In this way, equipment is located where it is needed the most, with the units heading for deployment.

7–41. Overseas Deployment Training (ODT)
Although ODT has been severely curtailed because of overseas contingency operations (formerly known as the GWOT), the program is still ongoing. The ODT program provides RC units the opportunity to exercise their skills in a realistic environment with the added benefits of reducing AC OPTEMPO and providing needed operational support to Combatant Commanders. Within the ARFORGEN cycle, selected units from the “Ready” or “Available” pool may be designated to train in JCS exercises and in non-exercise mission training that enhances their awareness of mobilization/deployment processing. The ODT program has provided training opportunities to an increasing number of companies/battalions. ODT reduces mobilization and deployment timelines, enhances readiness, and promotes unit cohesion.

7–42. Full time support (FTS)
   a. The FTS program was directed by Congress to increase the readiness of ARNG and Army Reserve units. The majority of FTS personnel work in ARNG and Army Reserve units. The FTS staff performs all the day-to-day support functions for the unit to operate including personnel, administration, training, operations, maintenance, and supply, which enables drilling reservists to use their limited training time (generally 39 days annually) to concentrate on their wartime tasks instead of sustenance functions.
   b. The FTS program consists of AGR Soldiers, military technicians, DA civilians, and AC Soldiers. AGR Soldiers are reservists who are on active duty. Military Technicians and DA civilians are full-time civilian employees; Military Technicians have the distinction of also being reservists who must maintain their reserve status as a condition of employment. The AC assigns Soldiers to support ARNG and AR units. (see paragraph 7–42 above) These soldiers are considered part of the FTS program.
       (1) ARNG and Army Reserve technicians provide full-time, day-to-day assistance and support and act as the representative for their commanders during non-drill periods. Technicians ensure continuity in administration, supply, maintenance, and training and their services are critical to mobilization preparedness.
       (2) Both ARNG and Army Reserve technicians are Federal Civil Service employees. The Army Reserve technicians are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service System. ARNG technicians are governed by the same provisions except as modified by Public Law 90–486 (National Guard Technician Act of 1968) as well as Title 32, USC, Section 709, and regulations prescribed by the NGB. As a provision of employment in the Military Technician Program (Civil Service) technicians must also be members of the ARNG or Army Reserve. Many technicians are employed in the same unit to which they are assigned.
       (3) AGR Soldiers serve on active duty in support of the RC. Title 10, United States Code AGR personnel are available for worldwide assignment, whereas Title 32, United States Code AGR personnel (unique to the National Guard) receive assignments within their state, territory, or the District of Columbia.

7–43. The Army School System (TASS)
   a. The Army School System (TASS) ensures all soldiers receive quality institutional training taught to a single standard throughout the Army. TASS is a composite school system made up of Army National Guard (ARNG), Army Reserve (USAR) and Active Army institutional training systems.
   b. The TASS mission statement is to "enhance Army readiness through an efficient, fully-integrated, educational system that guarantees soldiers of all components are trained to a single standard." In order to meet this mission TASS must complete and sustain the integration of training and develop future concepts.
   c. TASS decentralizes training allowing AC and RC soldiers to attend NCOES, OES or complete MOS reclassification close to their duty station, thus reducing unit temporary duty costs, improving soldier quality of life (less family separation), and fostering retention.
   d. TASS conducts initial entry military training, MOS–T training, officer, warrant officer (WO), and noncommissioned officer (NCO) training, as well as Department of the Army (DA) civilian education, functional training, and professional development training. Training is accomplished through both standard resident courses and distributed learning courses. TASS is the AC/RC integration vehicle for the Institutional Army which includes the TRADOC proponent schools, the United States Army Reserve Training Command, and the Army National Guard Regional Training Institutes.
   e. The TASS initiative is a TRADOC program designed to leverage existing school resources. Army Reserve TASS units are functionally aligned and linked to appropriate training school proponents. Courseware and standards are the same throughout the system and students are chosen from all three components depending on the situation. During mobilization, the TASS school battalions have the mission to assist TRADOC in MOS–T training or refresher training for IRR Soldiers and recalled retiree personnel.
   f. The Army Reserve 80th Training Command (TASS) provides MOS–T training and technical phases of NCOES for CS, CSS and health services education. The 80th Training Command (TASS) has subordinate divisions and
brigades responsible for these subject areas. USAR TASS Brigades are functionally aligned under respective Training Divisions with responsibility for aligned USAR TASS Battalions. The TASS training battalions and Regional Training Site Maintenance (RTSMs) are proponent accredited schools responsible for functionally aligned instruction. RTSMs are functionally aligned with the Ordnance proponent Quality Assurance Office (QAO). High Tech RTSMs located in California and Pennsylvania are functionally aligned with the Signal proponent QAO.

g. The 84th Training Command (Leader Readiness) provides functional and leader development training for RC Soldiers and Civilians. The 84th Training Command has subordinate Training Divisions, Training Brigades, and three Non-commissioned Officer Academies (NCOAs) responsible for Intermediate Level Education (ILE) portions of the Officer Education system (OES) and the NCO Common Core and other NCO Training courses for the Non commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

h. The USAR Training Command also coordinates and manages TASS training requirements with Multifunctional Training Brigades (MFTB). MFTBs are TASS training institutions located outside the continental United States (OCONUS). The MFTBs present unique situations because of their lack of proximity to other training facilities. They offer Officer and Non-commissioned Officer Professional Development Courses and MOS-T to all components of the Army. USAR MFTBs are located in Germany, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

i. The ARNG has faculty and support personnel executing the ARNG TASS mission in fifty-four States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. The ARNG mission is to conduct leadership, combat arms, and selected CS/CSS training. There are seven Army National Guard Leadership Training Brigades and all have an officer candidate school and an NCOA. The Combat Arms Training Brigades conduct training in the career management fields (CMF) of armor, field artillery, infantry, air defense artillery, and aviation. Additionally, in four of seven regions, the ARNG is responsible for the ordnance training battalion and provides assistance to the AR in the remaining three regions.

Section X
Reserve Component Pay, Benefits, and Entitlements

7-44. Individual status
In general, RC pay and allowances are determined on the basis of the individual reservist’s status. During IDT periods, members of the Selected Reserve receive one day of basic pay (based upon years of service and grade) for each attended UTA. During ADT periods, members essentially receive the same compensation (basic pay, housing, and subsistence allowances) as their AC counterparts. Depending upon assignment, some reservists may be eligible for additional special pay, such as aviation duty, medical or dental service or hazardous duty pay, all on a pro rata basis.

7-45. Benefits
Eligibility for other service-associated benefits also depends upon the status of the service member. For example, members of the Army’s RC, together with unaccompanied spouses with proper identification, are entitled to full use of the exchange and commissary systems. In addition, Reservists may use military clothing stores, official library services, and most clubs. Ready Reservists assigned or attached to units that schedule at least twelve drills yearly and ADT also are entitled to receive full-time Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance and dental insurance. While on active duty for operational support (ADOS) or ADT, Reservists receive the same benefits and privileges as AC members. However, they generally do not receive TRICARE coverage or dental care unless the training period exceeds thirty days. Members of the Retired Reserve under age sixty, known as “Gray Area Retirees,” are entitled to use the PX, commissaries, military clothing stores, official library services, and receive a burial flag. Note. Although retired AC enlisted soldiers with less than thirty years service are part of the Retired Reserve, their benefits differ. Upon reaching age sixty, members of the Retired Reserve receive basically the same benefits as their retired AC counterparts except for military burial assistance and a military death gratuity. In November 2003, a statutory change that governs the use of commissary stores was enacted that further benefits Army RC Soldiers and their families. Army RC Soldiers, their family members with ID cards, and Army RC retirees are permitted unlimited access to commissary stores.

7-46. Retirement
Members of the RC who accumulate twenty years of creditable service and reach age sixty are entitled to retired pay computed on the basis of accumulated retirement points. In general, a creditable year is one during which a Reservist accumulates fifty or more retirement points. Points are awarded on the basis of one point for each four-hour assembly, each day of active duty, and each three credits of completed correspondence courses. Additionally, fifteen points are awarded for membership. However, no more than ninety points per year may be awarded for IDT activities. Retirement pay for those whose date initially entered military service (DIEMS) is prior to September 1980 is computed by totaling all accumulated retirement points and dividing by 360 to determine years of satisfactory service. The quotient is then multiplied by 2.5 percent. The resulting percentage is then applied to the active duty basic pay of an individual with the same grade and number of years of service either at the time of separation for those who separate prior to age 60 or at age 60 for those who elect to transfer to the Retired Reserve until reaching age 60. For those who’s DIEMS is on or after 8 September 1980 retired pay is determined by multiplying the years of satisfactory service times 2.5 percent times the average of the highest 36 months of basic pay. The average of the highest 36 months of basic pay is
determined at separation for those under age 60 who do not elect to transfer to the Retired Reserve and at age 60 for those who transfer to the Retired Reserve.

7–47. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
The UCMJ was extended to RC members as of 14 November 1986, when President Reagan signed into law the “Military Justice Amendment of 1986” as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987. Under these changes, Army Reserve soldiers are subject to the UCMJ while in a drill (IDT) status. The military can now recall a Soldier to active duty for trial for crimes committed while performing ADT or IDT. The decision to activate a Soldier for trial must be approved through the Army Reserve chain of command to the SECARMY if confinement is contemplated. In other cases, the Active Army general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA) (see Chapter 19) is the final decision authority. National Guard personnel are subject to UCMJ authority when in Federal Service.

Section XI
Reserve Component Transformation Campaign Plan

7–48. Army Reserve transformation
Army Transformation is a comprehensive undertaking that impacts all aspects of the Army from the Operational Army to the Institutional Army and across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Implementation requires an adaptive and flexible plan that incorporates changes over time. The Army Reserve Transformation Campaign Plan (ARTCP) integrates and synchronizes the efforts of the Army Reserve with those of the Army. The goal of the Army Reserve Transformation Campaign Plan is to develop a seamless plan for transformation with the Army while maintaining near term capabilities and relevance. The ARTCP has been designed to complement the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan while recognizing the unique skills, capabilities and requirements of the Army Reserve.

7–49. Army Reserve Expeditionary Force

a. As part of integrating the Army Reserve with the Army’s Campaign plan, the Army Reserve is building modular force packages to leverage the two-thirds of the structure that is already organized at battalion-level and below. The move toward modularity provides a framework for more effectively identifying, defining, and organizing Army Reserve capabilities relevant to today’s battlefield. In FY05, the Army Reserve implemented the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). AREF enables the Army Reserve to use its resident capabilities to support the Army in sustained joint and expeditionary operations. The objective of AREF is to provide operationally ready units, give greater predictability in deployments to Soldiers and their families, and provide a force management process that incorporates readiness, mobilization, and deployments on a rotational basis. AREF adopts the model of train-alert-deploy versus the old model of alert-mobilize-train-deploy and represents a sea change for the Reserve Component culture.

b. The AREF concept designates a number of pools called Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP). Units assigned to the AREF maintain staggered states of readiness according to which package they are assigned. Under a steady state of Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC), each package is eligible for a nine- to twelve-month mobilization one time in a five year period. Operational requirements and AREP assignment determine which units in the package actually mobilize. Surges, such as major combat operations, in OPTEMPO will require the Army to surge AREF to meet those needs. This may require partial mobilization and extension of the mobilization period. This force management process cycles units over time and returning units “re-set” after each expeditionary mission. Each AREP contains capabilities whose readiness is formally validated prior to entering its employment window.

7–50. Multiple Component Units (MCU)

A Multi-COMPO Unit (MCU) combines personnel and/or equipment from more than one component on a single authorization document. The intent is to maximize integration of Active and RC resources. MCU have unity of command and control similar to that of single-component units. MCU status does not change a unit’s doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment, force packaging, or tiered resourcing. No limit has been established for the number of MTOE units that may become MCU and the concept is available to both Active and Reserve Component units. MCU selection is based on mission requirements, unique component capabilities and limitations, readiness implications, efficiencies to be gained, and the ability and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources. Experience has shown that this initiative works best in CS and CSS organizations. Today, Army MCU range from theater level headquarters (such as Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Theater Support Commands, Signal Brigade HQs, and Military Police Brigade HQs) to engineer battalions and separate transportation companies. MCU will not become seamless in the near term; however, the pursuit of that goal will influence the Army’s institutional systems to become more integrated. MCU have transitioned from experiment to “experience”. Adjustments past and present, although difficult, enabled the initiative to become a useful tool for organizing units in an austere environment.
Section XII
Summary and References

7–51. Summary
Over half of the Army’s total deployable forces are in the ARNG and the Army Reserve. The management of these forces is of paramount importance as the Army transforms. The structure for RC management includes Congress, DOD, HQDA, ACOMs, States, and units. Two key managers at HQDA are the NGB and OCAR. At the ACOM level, FORSCOM and its subordinate CONUS Armies and the USARC have a leading role in preparing RC forces for mobilization and deployment.

7–52. References
a. Title 10 United States Code.
b. Title 32 United States Code
h. DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Force, 7 April 2005.
Chapter 8

Force Readiness

The Army’s readiness process is currently aligned to meet Congressional National Defense Authorization Acts, OSD Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s readiness system and the Army’s Force Generation Process (ARFORGEN), reflecting the contemporary operational environment of persistent conflict. The Army’s readiness is an integral function supporting the Army’s strategic imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform the Army.

Section I

Introduction

8–1. Maintaining readiness

As the Army continues into the 21st century, it confronts the major challenge of maintaining readiness to meet operational demands. Maintaining readiness requires critical and often difficult decisions by the Army leadership, for they must strive for the proper balance between maintaining current readiness and resourcing future capability requirements. The demand on current Army capabilities continues; competing for scarce resources to build and sustain Army readiness for future demands. (Figure 8–1)
8–2. Chapter content
This chapter describes the updated and emerging changes to readiness and capabilities reporting systems throughout the Department of Defense. To make the decisions necessary for achieving and maintaining a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities, the DOD, the JCS, and the DA have developed systems to assist the leadership at all levels in managing force readiness. This chapter discusses the methods used for measuring force readiness and the systems and procedures used to respond to force readiness issues. It provides insights regarding the processes qualitatively and quantitatively defining and describing force readiness. Further, it provides an executive overview of the Chairman’s Readiness System that measures joint readiness; and the emerging Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment (JCCA) process providing oversight on issues for the entire Department of Defense. Finally, the readiness levels and capability assessments of Army organizations are reported in the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army (DRRS–A).

Section II
Managing Army readiness

8–3. Definitions of readiness
The Army has traditionally defined unit readiness as the ability of a unit to deliver the output for which it was designed. However, emerging operational demands have required the Army to build and employ organizations capable of performing a directed mission for which they may not have been specifically designed. This “assigned” mission may, in many cases, be just as important as the “designed” mission capability, and must be fully considered in the readiness reporting processes. To that end, readiness reports consider a unit’s ability to conduct its designed mission as well as its ability to perform a directed or “assigned” mission. Force readiness is defined as the readiness of the Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to mobilize, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war to accomplish assigned missions. DOD defines military capability in relation to force readiness, sustainability, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure. This definition is directly linked to how the total force is planned, programmed, and budgeted.

8–4. Factors affecting force readiness
a. Force readiness is affected by many quantitative and qualitative factors. For example, it is fairly easy to measure the status of personnel, equipment, or war reserves. It is not so easy to assign a value to morale or cohesion. Force readiness is dynamic, encompasses many functions, and is influenced by many factors. To illustrate its complexity, consider the following partial listing of factors that impact on the force readiness of the Army:

- Unit status.
- Design of weapons systems.
- Construction of facilities.
- Availability of supplies.
- Relationship with allies.
- Strategic intelligence capability.
- Application of unit manning principles.
- Civilian personnel force planning.
- Quality of soldier/family services.
- Civilian and military airlift.
- Civilian and military sealift.
- Civilian and military land transportation assets.
- Lines of communications.
- Availability of pre-stocked equipment.
- Mobilization capability.
- Recruitment of manpower for military and industry.
- Capability to receive, process, and transport forces in theaters.
- Senior leadership-quality of strategic planning and decision-making.
- Capability of the enemy.
- Quality and morale of personnel.

b. Estimating force readiness is difficult and highly situational. The American people and their elected representatives need to know how much capability is required and what it costs. Short of the military’s performance in war or
deterring war, a defined measure of return on the dollar that the Services can show is the level of force readiness to execute the defense strategy, as deduced from analytical tools and other indicators.


a. Force readiness is expensive and must be balanced against other program needs (Figure 8–2). Within a finite amount of resources, the purchase of a balanced program that satisfies future investment needs such as research and development and procurement can impact current readiness needs such as spare parts, depot maintenance, and war reserves. The need for immediate response to a wide variety of requirements place great demands on the Army to maintain forces at a high state of mission capability.

![Figure 8–2. The Cost of Force Readiness](https://example.com/figure82.png)

b. Readiness costs increase sharply as higher levels of readiness are approached. At the unit level, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A unit can attain a very high level of readiness and a short time later, without continued intensive resource allocation, have the trained expertise and peak maintenance levels ebb away. The availability of repair parts and supplies, length of time between training events, and personnel turbulence all have a tremendous influence on unit readiness.

c. In an Army-wide effort to focus high levels of mission capabilities at the needed times and places, and to provide a steady-state supply of trained and ready forces to accomplish the full range of operational missions, the Army has adopted the Army Force Generation Model, or ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN has become the central process used for bringing mission required units to their needed readiness levels, and employing those units as required to meet operational demand. ARFORGEN is a cyclic system and is designed to enable the Army to provide trained and ready units on a continuous basis. ARFORGEN is complex, but essential in managing total force capabilities for the Army, and is a major driver for the PPBE system as well as the justification of Army programs to Congress. The ARFORGEN process is described in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Section III
Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)

8–6. DRRS overview.

DOD published DOD Directive 7730.65 in June 2002 to establish the DRRS. DOD Directive 7730.65 was reviewed and certified as current in April 2007. DOD continues to develop and refine DRRS reporting requirements via
numbered memorandums promulgated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, responsible for 
DRRS implementation. When fully implemented, DRRS will replace the Joint Staff’s Global Status of Resources and 
Training (GSORTS). DRRS provides the means to manage and report the readiness of the DOD and its subordinate 
components to execute the military strategy as assigned by the Secretary of Defense in the Guidance for Employment 
of Forces (GEF) and the Unified Command Plan. DRRS measures an organization’s readiness to provide needed 
capabilities for missions, as expressed by the organization’s Mission Essential Tasks (METs). The assessment of an 
organization’s ability to execute its METs to a prescribed standard is the focus of readiness management in DRRS. 
DRRS is a network of interdependent programs, processes, applications, and systems that enable and support readiness-
related decision making. DRRS establishes a “framework” of architectures, databases, tools, networks, and information 
technologies that provide the backbone for the DOD’s readiness measurement, assessment, and reporting and readiness-
related decision support.

8–7. Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS).

a. Purpose. The CRS was implemented at the end of 1994. While it was incrementally modified since then, it was 
significantly revised in 2002, 2004 and again in 2007. It is designed to provide DOD leadership a current, macro-level 
assessment of the military’s readiness to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS). Title 10, USC section 117d, 
requires the Chairman to conduct, on a quarterly basis, a joint review to measure the level of current military readiness 
based upon the reporting of the capability of the armed forces to carry out their wartime missions. The quarterly Joint 
Combat Capabilities Assessment (JCCA) does this through the Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR) which compiles 
the Services’, Combatant Command and Combat Support Agency readiness assessments. Additionally, a plans assess-
ment and a readiness deficiency assessment are performed. The CRS, through JCCA, provides the means to meet the 
Chairman’s statutory requirements while supporting a process that provides timely and accurate reporting to the DOD 
leadership.

b. Responsibilities. The CJCS is responsible for assessing the strategic level of readiness of the Armed Forces to 
fight and meet the demands of the full range of operations required by the military strategy. Readiness at this level is 
defined as the synthesis of readiness at the joint and unit levels. It also focuses on broad functional areas, such as 
intelligence and mobility, to meet worldwide demands. Joint readiness is the responsibility of the Combatant Com-
manders (CCDRs). It is defined as the commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize combat and support forces to 
execute assigned missions. Unit readiness is the primary responsibility of the Services and USSOCOM. Unit readiness is 
defined as the ability to provide the capabilities required by CCDRs to execute their assigned missions. The Combat 
Support Agencies (CSAs) are responsible for providing responsive support to the operating forces in the event of war 
or threat to national security. These definitions are considered key because they delineate the responsibilities of the 
CJCS, Service Chiefs, CCDRs, and CSA directors in maintaining and assessing readiness (Figure 8–3). The forum 
within the CRS for the assessment of joint, unit, and CSA readiness is the Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR).
8–8. The Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment Process (Figure 8–4)
   a. **The Joint Capabilities Assessment (JCCA).** The Joint Capabilities Assessment (JCCA) process implements the Chairman’s Readiness System. The JCCA consists of a quarterly Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR), a quarterly readiness deficiency review and a quarterly plans assessment.
   b. **Quarterly Joint Force Readiness Reviews (JFRR).** The JFRR process evaluates the Combatant Commands, the Services, and the Combat Support Agencies readiness to execute their portions of mission capabilities required by the National Military Strategy.
   c. **JFRR Required Data.** Each quarterly review consists of the following data points:
      (1) **Overall Readiness Assessment.** The JFRR provides a snapshot of current and current plus 12-month assessment of Combatant Commands, Services and Combat Support Agencies using the 4–Tiered RA Readiness Assessment metrics shown in Figure 8–5.
      (2) **Top Concerns.** Commanders, Service Chiefs, and Directors will identify their top two readiness concerns. The purpose is to inform the Chairman of their most important, near-term readiness issues.
      (3) **Y, Q, N Assessments against JMETs and JCAs.** Commanders and Agency Directors will assess the ability of their organization to accomplish a task to standard under specified conditions IAW the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). This assessment should be informed by observed performance, resource availability, military judgment and will be measured against the 3–Tiered, Yes/Qualified Yes/No (Y/Q/N), readiness metric. (See Figure 8–5)
      (4) **Y, Q, N Assessments against Core Missions and Plans.** Service Chiefs will assess the ability of their Service to provide organized, trained and equipped forces capable of executing their designed tasks and providing required capabilities to support assigned missions, reported against the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) at an appropriate level of aggregation (tier); measured using the Y/Q/N metric.
      (5) **Deficiencies.** Combatant Commands, Services and Combat Support Agencies are required to report readiness deficiencies every quarter as part of the JFRR so the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other senior leaders can maintain situational awareness on shortfalls impacting DOD’s readiness to execute the NMS. Annually the J–3 will collect all
readiness deficiencies reported over a fiscal year and forward them as part of the Readiness Deficiency Report to J–8 to inform the Annual Report on Combatant Commander Requirements.

(6) Service/SOCOM Readiness data from DRRS/GSORTS. Service and USSOCOM readiness assessments will be reported IAW CJCSI 3401.02A Global Status of Resource Training System. The report will include current overall readiness for significant combat, combat support, and combat service support units using aggregated GSORTS C-level data. This will include currently deployed, next to deploy (will deploy within the next 120 days) as well as non-deployed forces. Report will include deployed and next to deploy forces ability to perform assigned missions using the Percent Effective (PCTEF) readiness metric. The report will also include all remaining non-deployed forces ability to perform designed missions using the Category (C–Rating) readiness metric.

The Joint Combat Capability Assessment Process

8–9. JFRR Metrics

a. JFRR Y/Q/N Criteria. These are defined in Figure 8–5. The Combatant Commands, and CSAs provide an overall Readiness Assessment of RA 1,2,3, or 4 and also assign a Yes, Qualified Yes, or No assessment to each of the Joint Mission-Essential Tasks (JMET) that apply to the execution of current missions, plus 12-month missions, and the required Mission Essential Tasks. The Services provide an overall Readiness Assessment of RA 1,2,3, or 4 and assign a Y/Q/N assessment to each Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). The CSAs assign a Y/Q/N assessment to each of the agency mission-essential tasks (AMET) that apply to the three assessment areas.

Components of the Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment Process

Figure 8–4. The Components of the JCCA Process
Readiness Assessment Definitions

- **Overall Assessment - Current, Current +12**
  - RA-1 - Negligible impact on readiness to accomplish mission(s)
  - RA-2 - Limited impact on readiness to accomplish mission(s)
  - RA-3 - Significant impact on readiness to accomplish mission(s)
  - RA-4 - Shortfalls preclude accomplishing mission(s)

- **Individual JMET / AMET / JCA Assessment**
  - Y - Issues or shortfalls have limited impact
  - Q - Issues or shortfalls have significant impact
  - N - Critical issues or shortfalls preclude accomplishment

Table 8–1
Joint Capability Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint OPR</th>
<th>Joint Capability Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J–8</td>
<td>Force Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J–8</td>
<td>Force Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J–5</td>
<td>Building Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM J–8</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J–6</td>
<td>Net-Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J–2</td>
<td>Battlespace Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAMDO</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J–4</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDJS</td>
<td>Corporate Management and Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **F. RR Deficiencies.** The Readiness Deficiency Assessment is a J–3 document that frames for senior leaders the cumulative impact of Combatant Command, Service and CSA reported deficiencies on DOD’s readiness to execute the NMS. Annually, the J–3 will collect readiness deficiencies reported over a fiscal year and identify readiness trends and highlight critical deficiencies, filtering all through the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) in order to provide context and a relative value for each. The JCCAG will review the results of the Readiness Deficiency Assessment and the DJ–3 will approve the assessment for release to inform J–8’s Annual Report on Combatant Command Requirements.  

 c. **JFRR Readiness Assessment (RA) Levels.** In addition to reporting deficiencies in meeting requirements and linking them to degraded JMETs, AMETs, or FAs, COCOMs, Services, and CSAs assign an overall RA-level to their ability to execute current missions, plus 12-month missions, and the scenario. To determine the RA-level, the reporting commands consider accepted deficiencies, new issues identified during the current JFRR, and cumulative risk in answering the three questions listed in Figure 8–7. Based on answers to these questions, a worksheet is provided in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.01D to assist in determining the RA levels. RA levels are defined in Table 8–2.
### RA Levels Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness Assessment Level</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RA–1</td>
<td>Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact on readiness and ability to accomplish assigned missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA–2</td>
<td>Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact on readiness and ability to accomplish assigned missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA–3</td>
<td>Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact on readiness and ability to accomplish missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA–4</td>
<td>Issues and/or shortfalls preclude accomplishment of assigned mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. Overall Assessment uses RA-levels to categorize risk to end state.

### 8–10. CRS Outputs

- The outputs of the CRS are synchronized to inform, through the Comprehensive Joint Assessment, other Joint Staff and OSD processes to include: J–5’s Chairman’s Risk Assessment; J–8’s Annual Report on Combatant Commander Requirements and OSD’s Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (Refer to Figure 8–6 below). Through these informative relationships the CRS:
  1. Ensures senior leaders and staffs are operating off a common readiness picture.
  2. Supports the development of coordinated strategic documents.
  3. Is synchronized to facilitate timely senior leader decision making.
  4. Helps the Secretary of Defense and Chairman fulfill their statutory requirements under Title 10, USC.

- The strategic documents mentioned above and discussed in greater detail below help align ends, ways, means and risks to accomplishing the NMS and enable the Chairman to provide the best military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
  1. Chairman’s Risk Assessment. IAW with Title 10, USC, Section 153 (b)(1), “the Chairman shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report providing the Chairman’s assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for in the NMS.” To help fulfill this statutory requirement the JCCAG will forward to the J–5, annually, the Joint Combat Capability Assessment and the results of Plans Assessments to inform the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (Figure E–2).
  2. Annual Report on Combatant Commander Requirements. IAW with Title 10, USC, Section 153 (c) (1), “the Chairman shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the requirements of the combatant commands.” In addition to consolidating the combatant command integrated priority lists, the report will “address each deficiency in readiness identified during the joint readiness review” (Title 10, USC, Section 117 (d) (1) (a)). To help fulfill this statutory requirement the JCCAG will forward to the J–8, annually, the Readiness Deficiency Assessment identifying:
    a. Combatant Command readiness deficiencies reported over the fiscal year.
    b. Combatant Command readiness deficiencies closed over the fiscal year.
    c. The status of Combatant Command readiness deficiencies not yet closed.
  3. Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. Section 482 of Title 10 USC requires that within 45 days following the end of each calendar quarter a report be sent to Congress based on military readiness. The QRRC is reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense, forwarded to Congress, and fulfills this requirement.
8–11. Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)
The SROC is an executive committee of the OSD, and is made up of the DepSecDef, who serves as Chair, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, the Chiefs of the Services, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and other senior OSD officials with an interest in readiness. The SROC meets periodically to review significant readiness topics and issues. Functions of the SROC include: advising the Secretary of Defense on readiness policy; reviewing results of the JCCA reporting on current and projected readiness issues; coordinating DOD positions on readiness to outside audiences; and ensuring the development of the Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress (QRRC).

8–12. Assessing future readiness
Broad responsibility for assessing future joint requirements falls under the purview of the JROC. The JROC, with membership of the VCJCS and the Vice Chiefs of each Service, reviews acquisition programs, validates requirements, and makes recommendations on the placement of scarce dollars and resources to the CJCS. The JROC provides a senior military perspective on the major weapons systems and other military capabilities required. (See Chapter 4 for discussion of JROC).

Section IV
Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System Army (DRRS–A)
DRRS–A is the Army-Specific Implementation of the DOD DRRS (see para 8–6 above).

8–13. DRRS–A overview
The Army continues to develop DRRS–A to accommodate the evolution of DRRS and also to provide the readiness reporting flexibility necessary to support the implementation of emerging Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) concepts and processes for manning, equipping, training and readiness. The key components of DRRS–A are: (1) NetUSR—a web based readiness data input tool that will import data from designated authoritative sources for
reference to support required commander readiness assessments. NetUSR has replaced PC–ASORTS as the Army’s official USR input tool. (2) The DRRS–A database has replaced the ASORTS database as the Army’s official readiness reporting database of record. (3) The Army Readiness Management System (ARMS) application which is the official Army readiness reporting database output tool. ARMS provide visibility to all Army readiness data and information contained in the readiness reporting database and facilitate the detailed analysis of readiness trends and issues.

8–14. NetUSR purpose

NetUSR is the Army’s input to DRRS. The primary purpose of the NetUSR is to provide the President, Secretary of Defense, JCS, HQDA, and all levels of the Army’s chain of command with the current status of U.S. Army units and necessary information for making operational decisions. The NetUSR is designed to measure the status of resources and training level of a unit at a given point in time. The reports should not be used in isolation to assess overall unit readiness or the broader aspects of Army force readiness. The NetUSR provides a timely single source document for assessing key elements of a unit’s status. It does not provide all the information necessary to manage resources.

8–15. NetUSR relationship to joint readiness

CJCSI 3401.01D and DODD 7730.65 establish policy and procedures for reporting and assessing the current readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces through the Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS). Units report their METs and their status in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training to their Service or Combatant Commands for later incorporation to the JFRR. DRRS–A is established by Army Regulation 220–1 and provides the data required of Army organizations by the CJCSI and the DOD. The Army requires additional data that increases the value of the NetUSR as a resource management and operations tool. The supplemental data required by the Army was selected by HQDA in coordination with the ACOMs, ASCCs and DRUs. This information passes through but is not retained by the JS. The higher level of detail allows units to better express their status and all levels of command to use the report to analyze key status indicators.

8–16. NetUSR procedures

a. Commanders of all measured units are required to determine and report a C-level that reflects their assessments of their units’ ability to accomplish the core missions for which the units are designed (C–Level), a directed mission level (D-level) that reflects their assessments of their units’ ability to accomplish their primary directed missions, and also a “chemical - biological defense readiness training” (CBDRT) level indicating their units’ readiness to perform their core mission under chemical or biological conditions. The C-level, D-level and the CBDRT level are overall levels that are described in Chapter 4 of AR 220–1. There are four measurements (personnel, equipment supply status, equipment readiness/serviceability status, and training) that support the C-level determination, three measurements, Directed Mission Manning (DMM) Directed Mission Equipment (DME), and Directed Mission Training (DMT) that support the D-level determination and two measurements (Equipment On Hand (EOH) and training) that support the determination of the CBDRT level determination. These resource and training status measurements are determined using the four tier rating scale. Analysis of these resource and training measurements provides insight into the measured unit’s tactical-level capability. (Figure 8–7).

b. Status levels are determined for each of these measured areas to support the overall assessments required. Measured area levels are determined by applying the specific resource or status criteria and/or metrics. Commanders cannot subjectively upgrade or downgrade the level of a measured area.

c. In general, measured units will measure and report readiness status against their currently effective MTOE/TDA document. However, in certain circumstances, units can report early against a future document. AR 220–1, Chapter 4 contains the details.

d. NetUSR data is transmitted through command and control communications channels (Figure 8–8). Reporting units are required to submit a NetUSR covering their specific resource and training status levels, their overall category levels (C-levels) and their individual and overall MET assessments.

e. Overall Levels. The overall category level (C–1, C–2, C–3, C–4, C–5) indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of fill for personnel and equipment, the training status of those personnel, and the maintenance status of the equipment. When assigned a current operational requirement, units also report a percent effective (PCTEF) or D–Level to indicate their readiness level for the current mission. The four areas for which specific levels are calculated to support the C–Level determination are: personnel, equipment on-hand, equipment readiness, and training. These measured area levels reflect the status of the unit’s resources and training measured against the resources and training required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. Category levels do not project a unit’s combat ability once committed to action. The overall unit category level will be based only upon organic resources and training under the operational control of the reporting unit or its parent unit. The C-level categories are:

(1) C–1. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

(2) C–2. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.
(3) C–3. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

(4) C–4. Unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with resources on hand.

(5) C–5. Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource action and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. C–5 units are restricted to the following:

(a) Units undergoing activation, inactivation, or conversion.

(b) Units that have their levels for authorized personnel and/or equipment established so that, even when filled to the authorized level, the established level does not allow the unit to achieve level 3 or higher.

(c) Units that are not manned or equipped but are required in the wartime structure.

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CUSR Measured Areas

Figure 8–7. Commander’s Unit Status Report Measured Areas
f. MET Assessments. The individual MET assessment (Y / Q / N) indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved proficiency in a mission essential task within prescribed conditions and standards when resources and training constraints are considered. The metrics to assess task capability are: Y - YES. Organization can accomplish task to standard under specified conditions. “Yes” assessment should reflect demonstrated performance in training or operations whenever possible. Unit possesses the necessary resources, or those resources have been explicitly identified to the unit, to allow it to execute when so directed (i.e. “Fight tonight”). Q - QUALIFIED YES. Organization is expected to accomplish the task to standard, but this performance has not been observed or demonstrated in training or operations. Organizations assessing their task or mission as a “Qualified Yes” can be employed for those tasks. Unit possesses the necessary resources, or those resources have been explicitly identified to the unit, to allow it to execute when so directed (i.e. “Fight tonight”). N - NO. The organization is unable to accomplish the task to standard at this time.

g. Mission Categories. There are two mission categories that the individual METs support: the core tasks mission category, and the directed task mission category.

(1) Core tasks. This overall mission category represents the basic capabilities which the organization was organized or designed by MTOE or TDA to perform. The overall assessment for this mission category is based on the commander’s assessment of the unit’s supporting core METs (CMETs)

(2) Directed tasks. This overall mission category represents the unit’s current capability to accomplish operations and tasks formally assigned to it for execution via an order through appropriate official command channels. This mission category is supported by applicable directed mission METs (DMETs) and may include named operations and specified HLD/HLS requirements.

h. Measured Area Levels.

(1) Personnel level. The NetUSR provides indicators of a unit’s personnel status (P-level). Wartime personnel requirement are compared to assigned personnel strength, available strength, MOS qualification and personnel turnover.

(2) Equipment-on-hand (EOH) level. The NetUSR provides indicators of a unit’s Equipment on Hand (EOH) status (S-level) by comparing full wartime requirement for a unit’s primary items of equipment to include: principal weapons systems and equipment (ERC A/P); each individual pacing item (ERC P); and support items of equipment (ERC B/C) with the on-hand quantities of those items.
(3) Equipment readiness (ER) level. The NetUSR provides an indication (R-level) of how well the unit is maintaining its on-hand equipment.

(4) Training data level. The NetUSR provides an indicator of the training level (T-level) for the unit. The T-level indicates the commander’s evaluation of the unit’s capability to employ its weapon systems and equipment to effectively perform its designed or assigned missions.

i. Determining the unit’s C-level. To determine the overall C-level, the commander reviews the status levels attained in the four measured resource areas. The overall unit C-level will normally be the lowest level recorded in any of the unit’s individually measured resource areas of personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and training. There may be circumstances in which Commanders may subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit’s C-level based on mission evaluation, but the status level computed for each individually measured area must be reported without adjustment.

j. Determining the unit’s D-level. The D-Level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish the directed mission and the associated directed mission essential tasks (DMETL) that it is currently assigned, preparing for, ordered to execute and/or is executing. Similar to the C-Level, the D-Level contains measured resource areas that indicate the availability status of resources (personnel and equipment) and unit training proficiency measured against the directed mission requirements that have been established or conveyed by the Army Tasking Authority. If the core mission is directed for execution, then the D-level and C-level will coincide.

k. C-Level and D-Level details are shown in Figures 8–9 and 8–10 below.

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**C-Levels**

1. **C1** = Unit is resourced & trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it was designed or organized. (No adverse impacts to flexibility or vulnerability.)

2. **C2** = Unit is resourced & trained to undertake most wartime missions for which it was designed or organized. The unit would require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies. (Isolated increases in flexibility but no increase in vulnerability under most operational scenarios.)

3. **C3** = Unit is resourced & trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the wartime missions for which it was designed or organized. The unit would require significant compensation for deficiencies. (Significantly decreased flexibility and increased vulnerability under many, but not all, envisioned scenarios.)

4. **C4** = Unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime missions, but may be directed to undertake some portions of its wartime mission with resources on hand.

5. **C5** = Unit is undergoing a DA directed resource action and is not prepared to undertake the wartime mission for which it was organized or designed. However, the unit may be capable of performing non-traditional missions.

**C-Level:** The Unit Commander’s assessment of the level at which the unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime (core) mission for which it is designed/organized.

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Figure 8–9. Commander’s Unit Status Report C–Levels
Figure 8–10. Commander’s Unit Status Report D–Levels

8–17. Use of DRRS–A data at HQDA

a. At HQDA, DRRS–A is part of a larger readiness picture compiled from many functional reports and sources. It provides a channel whereby the chain of command is alerted to the status of units and, thus, can exercise the appropriate management actions and provide the required assistance. DA uses DRRS–A in conjunction with other personnel and logistics reports to improve resource management of people, equipment, and the programming of facilities and training areas to increase the combat effectiveness of subordinate elements.

b. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 receives the reports from the major commands via DRRS–A which interfaces with GSORTS and the DoD Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Upon receipt, ODCS, G–3/5/7’s Army Readiness Management System (ARMS) allows all DA Staff elements and other ARMS users to access via SIPRNet all unit reports for analysis.

c. The Vice Chief of Staff receives a monthly Strategic Readiness Update from the ODCS G3/5/7, with significant input and analysis from the ODCS, G–1, ODCS, G–4, ODCS G–8 and other ARSTAF elements. The readiness and capability status of major units is provided as well as a trend projection of each of the four measured areas. This briefing provides an analysis of the latest DRRS–A information to the Army leadership.

d. Each principal DA Staff element uses the information provided by the ODCS, G–3/5/7 to influence resource allocation. Aggregate data in DRRS–A also serves as a yardstick to judge how well the functional management system for personnel, logistics, and training are performing.

Section V
Summary and references

8–18. Summary
Readiness is a primary mission of military forces. Recognizing that readiness is highly situational and subjective, it is, nevertheless, a yardstick for programming and budgeting. The Army’s readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources to meet the operational demands caused by ARFORGEN expeditionary requirements, and
contingency force requirements. The more accurately the Army captures and quantifies readiness, the better the Army can articulate resource needs to the DOD and the Congress.

8–19. References
   a. DOD Directive 5149.2, Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC).
   b. DOD Directive 7730.65, Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).
   c. CJCS Instruction 3401.01D, Chairman’s Readiness System.
   d. CJCS Instruction 3401.02, Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS).
   e. CJCS Manual 3150.02, Global Status of Resources and Training System.
   f. Army Regulation 220–1, Unit Status Reporting.
   g. Army Regulation 700–138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability.
Chapter 9

ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION PROCESS

Before the era of Secretary of Defense McNamara, each Service essentially established its own single-year budget and submitted it to Congress annually. Secretary McNamara, however, applied a different approach founded on a study by the RAND Corporation. He required the Services to prepare a single document, the then Five Year Defense Program, or FYDP, which detailed their resource requirements on a multi-year basis. He established himself as the sole authority for approving changes to the FYDP and Services that desired change to the approved FYDP had to obtain his approval. That formed the rudimentary beginning of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, or PPBS. PPBS is a continually evolving process that under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in 2003 changed to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.

Section I
Introduction

9–1. Chapter content

This chapter describes how, at the beginning of 2009, the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process and the Army PPBE process acquire, allocate, and manage resources for military functions. Prescribed by Army Regulation 1–1, the Army PPBE process is a component of the Department of Defense (DOD) PPBE process governed by DOD Directive 7045.14 and DOD Instruction 7045.7. This account describes the Army PPBE process in relation to its parent DOD PPBE process. It lays out the responsibilities of Army officials for overseeing Army PPBE, for managing the several phases of its process, and for performing PPBE-related operational tasks. Next, the chapter highlights principal forums and other key characteristics of the DOD PPBE process and then the Army PPBE process. After displaying a graphic representation of the process recurring events and organizational structure, the chapter concludes with a phase-by-phase discussion of the biennial process.

9–2. PPBS—a dynamic system

First, however, consider the history of the former PPBS now approaching its 48th year. Significant events recorded by presidential administration show how the system has evolved, revealing a dynamic system.

a. 1962–Kennedy/McNamara.

(1) The DOD PPBS began in 1962 as a management innovation of President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Robert McNamara. Before McNamara, each Military Department had prepared its budget following individual Service interests with very little guidance. Previous SecDef involvement was for the most part limited to dividing the budget ceiling of DOD between the Services. If the Services exceeded their “share of the pie,” the SecDef would reduce their budget, usually by a percentage cut across all appropriations. Introducing the PPBS changed all this.

(2) Based on a concept developed at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, the PPBS inaugurated a multi-year programmatic focus. Annual ceiling reductions gave way to analysis centered on 10 major force and support programs over a 5-year program period.

b. 1969–Nixon/Laird. The first major change in the PPBS occurred under President Nixon’s SecDef, Melvin Laird. The Laird management style stressed participatory management. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) no longer initiated detailed program proposals; it reviewed those put forward by the Services using specific budgetary ceilings.

c. 1977–Carter/Brown. President Carter introduced zero-based budgeting to the Federal Budget. It achieved only limited success. The goal of zero-based budgeting was to identify marginal programs more clearly. Decision Packages arrayed resources at three different levels, giving OSD greater opportunity to alter Service program proposals. Each Service developed procedures to array the decision packages. As an aid in building and displaying its program, the Army installed a program development increment package (PDIP). Used internally and not reflected in programs and budgets forwarded by the Army, the PDIP has since evolved into a management decision package (MDEP). In 1979, as a result of a RAND Corporation study (the Rice Study), Secretary of Defense Brown formed the Defense Resources Board (DRB). Designed to manage the PPBS more effectively, the DRB consisted of various OSD officials and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

d. 1981–Reagan/Weinberger. The Reagan Administration pledged to revitalize American military strength in the most effective and economical manner. This objective led to significant changes in the PPBS known as the Carlucci initiatives (Frank Carlucci was the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) and Chairman of the DRB). Initiatives included a greater emphasis on long-range planning, a greater decentralization of authority to the Services, closer attention to cost savings and efficiencies, a refocus of DRB Program Review to major issues only, and a general streamlining of the entire PPBS process. In addition, a restructured DRB added Service Secretaries as full members. The DRB would now review and approve policy and strategy in the planning phase, which produced defense guidance.
Calling the new body, The Strategic Planning Council. Combatant Commanders in the decision process by expanding the Senior Leader Review Group to include them and increasing the Combatant Commander’s role in the process by enhancing the Integrated Priority List process and including the Enhanced Planning Process (EPP) as a joint capabilities-based forum to analyze SecDef identified issues, develop alternative solutions to Programming Guidance (JPG). At the same time, the SecDef directed the establishment of the Enhanced Planning Guidance (DPG) replacing it with the SecDef Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the SecDef Joint Planning Guidance (JP) of the Joint Defense Capabilities Study (Aldridge Committee) and directed the elimination of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). On 31 October 2003, the SecDef agreed with the recommendation of the Joint Defense Capabilities Study (Aldridge Committee) and directed the elimination of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) replacing it with the SecDef Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the SecDef Joint Planning Guidance (JP) of the Joint Defense Capabilities Study (Aldridge Committee) and directed the elimination of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Moreover, one initiative invited commanders of the U.S. combatant commands to participate in crucial DRB deliberations during the development of the DG and the DRB Program Review.

- **1984—Enhancement of the role of commanders of U.S. combatant commands in the PPBS.** DepSecDef Taft introduced procedures to allow combatant command commanders a greater voice in the process for developing Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and the DRB Program Review. The procedures included: submission by the commanders of prioritized requirements (via integrated priority lists (IPLs)); tracking their concerns during POM development and execution; visibility of combatant command requirements in the POMs; enhanced participation by commanders in DRB program review; and an enhanced role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the review and coordination of commander concerns.

- **1986—Conversion from annual to biennial PPBS cycle.** In response to his Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) and the DOD Authorization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99–145), President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 219, directing that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DOD produce a 2-year budget beginning with the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget years. In response to this direction, OSD and the Military Departments implemented a biennial PPBS process. In practice, however, Congress still authorizes and appropriates annually, permitting an off cycle update of the five remaining POM years and the second budget year.

- **1987—Combatant command capabilities to participate effectively in the PPBS budget phase.** Earlier decisions of the DRB gave commanders of combatant commands a role in the planning and programming phases of the PPBS. In October 1987, the DRB expanded the role of the commanders to include the budget review and execution phase.

- **1989—Bush/Cheney.** During the early stages of DOD downsizing, President Bush instituted a series of defense management review decisions. In another initiative, SecDef Cheney modified the framework for PPBS decision-making, including in the structure a core group of DOD officials he used to help manage the Department.

- **1993—Clinton/Aspin, Perry, Cohen.** DOD downsizing continued under the Clinton Administration guided initially by SecDef Les Aspin’s Bottom Up Review and later by the results of the Defense Performance Review, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Clinton administration continued the PPBS framework of the Bush Administration, using a core group of DOD managers and several review forums including a program review group (PRG) expanded by the Administration.

- **2001—Bush/Rumsfeld.** Emphasis on Defense Transformation marked the early months of the Bush Presidency, a focus abruptly broadened by the events of September 11, 2001. U.S. Defense spending has since markedly increased—due not only to additional costs of the war on terror, but also to the end of the procurement holiday of the 1990s and the needs of Transformation. In a process change, DOD introduced closer program and budget correlation, requiring agencies to prepare a combined Program Objective Memorandum and Budget Estimate Submission (POM/BES) followed by an OSD concurrent program and budget review. Another initiative established a Senior Executive Council (SEC) to counsel the SecDef in applying sound business practices. Chaired by the SecDef, the council’s membership comprises the DepSecDef, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

- **2003—Bush/Rumsfeld.** On 22 May 2003, Management Initiative Decision 913 directed the elimination of the mini-POM and the amended budget estimate submission year and replaced them with program change proposals (PCPs) and budget change proposals (BCPs) respectively. On 31 October 2003, the SecDef agreed with the recommendation of the Joint Defense Capabilities Study (Aldridge Committee) and directed the elimination of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) replacing it with the SecDef Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the SecDef Joint Programming Guidance (JP). At the same time, the SecDef directed the establishment of the Enhanced Planning Process (EPP) as a joint capabilities-based forum to analyze SecDef identified issues, develop alternative solutions to resolve the issues, and determine the joint implications associated with each alternative solution.

- **2005—Bush/Rumsfeld.** Process changes continue during this administration. Principally— they include strengthening the Combatant Commander’s role in the process by enhancing the Integrated Priority List process and including the Combatant Commanders in the decision process by expanding the Senior Leader Review Group to include them and calling the new body, The Strategic Planning Council.

- **2006—Bush/Rumsfeld.** Process changes implemented during this administration include changing the program change proposals (PCPs) and budget change proposals (BCPs) concepts to combine both into one process renamed as Change Proposals (CPs). The ground rules for submitting change proposal effectively limited the ability of the Services to make changes to the next budget year being prepared to go to Congress.

- **2008—Bush/Gates.** New planning guidance documents for programming promulgated to replace the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SECDEF’s strategic guidance is captured in the Guidance for the Development of Forces (GDF) and the Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF). The SECDEF also continued the publication of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) as guidance for the Services as they begin planning for the development of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
Section II
System Responsibilities

9–3. Secretarial oversight

a. PPBE oversight and Army wide policy development. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)) oversees—

1. The PPBE process and develops and issues Army wide PPBE policy.
2. All Army appropriations and serves as the sponsor for all appropriations except Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (AR) appropriations. (See para 9–10d.)
3. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics, which performs cost analysis functions in support of the PPBE process and Executive Office of HQDA.

b. Functional oversight. Principal officials of the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) oversee operation of the PPBE process within assigned functional areas and provide related policy and direction.

9–4. System management

ASA(FM&C) manages the PPBE process with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, and Military Deputy for Budget and Execution acting as advisers. As provided in paragraphs 9–5, 9–6, and 9–7, below, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (ADCS) G–3/5/7, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), and the Director of the Army Budget (DAB) manage functional phases of the process, each establishing and supervising policies and procedures necessary to carry out phase functions.

9–5. Planning phase

a. Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–3/5/7. Responsible for operations and planning functions, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7—

1. Through the Assistant G–3/5/7—
   (a) Manages the PPBE planning phase.
   (b) Co-chairs the Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) with the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), and Director of the Army Budget (DAB).
   (c) Guides the work of Program Evaluation Groups (PEG) on planning and readiness matters to include requirements determination, prioritization, and the integration of security cooperation issues per the Army International Activities Plan. (See Table 9–1 and para 9–31)
   (d) Assesses capabilities, deficiencies, and risks of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force at the end of the current POM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Evaluation Groups</th>
<th>Co-chairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
<td>ASA(M&amp;RA)/G–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>ASA(M&amp;RA)/G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing</td>
<td>ASA(M&amp;RA)/AASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipping</td>
<td>ASA(ALT)/G–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining</td>
<td>ASA(ALT)/G–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installations</td>
<td>ASA(I&amp;E)/ACSIM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Serves as the principal adviser to the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) on Joint matters, National Security Council (NSC) matters, and the politico-military aspects of international affairs.

(a) Provides HQDA with strategic analysis pertaining to national security issues involving international and regional arms control treaties, agreements, and policies.

(b) Plans for employment of Army forces to meet strategic requirements and shape Army forces for the future.

(3) Serves as overall integrator of Army transformation.

(a) Makes sure that military requirements reflect future Army strategy, planning guidance, and policy and that the capability and applicability of total Army forces remain synchronized with the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).

(b) Provides the HQDA focal point for the organization, integration, and synchronization of decision making, as well as for requirements definition, force structuring, training developments, and prioritization.

(4) Prepares The Army Strategy (AS), Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), and Army Campaign Plan
(ACP) as sections of The Army Plan (TAP); coordinates publication of the Army Programming Guidance Memorandum (APGM) as a section of TAP with Director, PAE; coordinates and publishes completed four sections of TAP.

(a) Defines Army planning assumptions.
(b) Sets requirements and priorities based on guidance from the SecDef, Secretary of the Army (SECARMY), and CSA and priorities of the combatant commanders.
(c) Sets objectives to meet requirements and overcome shortfalls.
(5) Monitors and reports on current operations.

(a) Develops and coordinates policy, programs, and initiatives to achieve directed levels of individual, leader, and unit training readiness for the Army.
(b) Oversees Army readiness reporting requirements and the reporting of Army readiness to provide an accurate picture for prioritization and resource allocation decisions within HQDA and externally.
(c) Assesses and coordinates support to US combatant commanders and, through the Army Component Command (ACC), provides the operational link between each combatant command, HQDA, and the Joint Staff.
(6) Performs all mobilization functions.
(7) Provides the HQDA focal point for executing military support to civil authorities.
(8) Executes the Continuity of Operations Program (COOP) for HQDA and OSD, the Army Infrastructure Assurance Program, and the Domestic Preparedness Program provides support for special events.
(9) Provides support for special events.
(10) Provides the vision and strategy and manages the development of models and simulations.
(11) Develops policy and acts as the principal adviser to the CSA for information operations.
(12) Serves as proponent of the Training PEG. (See para 9–31.)
(13) Serves as proponent of programs within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP): programs 1–Strategic Forces, 2–General Purpose Forces, 4–Mobility, 10–Support of Other Nations, and 11–Special Operations Forces. Serves also as resource proponent for tactical intelligence, Army subprogram 3–Intelligence and proponent of Army subprogram 8–Training. (See para 9–12.)
(14) Manages force structure issues and manages functional requirements and program and performance for designated accounts of the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation. (See para 9–10 and Tables 9–2 through 9–8.)

b. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8. Responsible for the execution of approved materiel requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8—

(1) Provides the HQDA focal point for program development, materiel integration, and assessments like the QDR.
(2) With the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)), prepares the Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (RDA Plan), which is represented by the database for the FYDP augmented for the Extended Planning Period (EPP).
(3) Prepares the Army Modernization Strategy and helps prepare Army comments on the Guidance for Development of Forces (GDF).
(4) Serves as proponent of the Program Evaluation Group for Equipping. (See para 9–31.)
(5) Manages functional requirements for RDT&E and procurement appropriations. (See para 9–10b and Table 9–9.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9–2</th>
<th>Managers for manpower and force structure issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military manpower (Active)</td>
<td>G–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard manpower</td>
<td>Director ARNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Reserve manpower</td>
<td>Chief AR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian (end strength and full time equivalents)</td>
<td>G–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals account</td>
<td>G–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA)</td>
<td>G–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint and Defense accounts</td>
<td>G–1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9–3
Budget activity management structure for operation and maintenance appropriations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BA 1: Operating forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Land forces</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Collective Training Division (DAMO–TRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Corps combat forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Corps support forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Echelon above corps (EAC)–support forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Land forces operations support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Land forces readiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Force readiness operations support</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Collective Training Division (DAMO–TRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Land forces system readiness</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Training Simulations Division (DALO–TRS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Land forces depot maintenance</td>
<td>G–4 Directorate of Sustainment (DALO–SM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Land forces readiness support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Base operations support</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (land forces readiness support)</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Management and operational headquarters</td>
<td>G–1 Manpower Policy, Plans, and Program Division (DAPE–PRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>Unified commands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>Additional activities</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Resources and Programming Division (DALO–TRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BA 2: Mobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mobility operations</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Collective Training Division (DAMO–TRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Strategic mobility</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Collective Training Division (DAMO–TRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Industrial preparedness</td>
<td>G–4 Directorate for Force Projection/Distribution (DALO–FP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS)</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Collective Training Division (DAMO–TRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BA 3: Training and recruiting</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Accession training</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311</td>
<td>Officer acquisition</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>312</td>
<td>Recruit training</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313</td>
<td>One station unit training</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>314</td>
<td>Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
<td>G–3/6/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>315</td>
<td>Service Academy base support</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316</td>
<td>Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Basic skill and advance training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321</td>
<td>Specialized skill training</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>322</td>
<td>Flight training</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>Professional development education</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>324</td>
<td>Training support</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 Institutional Training Division (DAMO–TRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>Base support</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326</td>
<td>Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Recruiting, and other training and education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331</td>
<td>Recruiting and advertising</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332</td>
<td>Examining</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>333</td>
<td>Off duty and voluntary education</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>334</td>
<td>Civilian education and training</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335</td>
<td>Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336</td>
<td>Base support–recruiting and examining</td>
<td>ACSIM Resources Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BA 4: Administration and service wide activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Security programs</td>
<td>G–2 Directorate for Resource Integration (DAMI–RI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
<td>Security programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Logistics operations</td>
<td>G–4 Directorate for Sustainment (DALO–SM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>421</td>
<td>Service wide transportation</td>
<td>G–4 Directorate for Force Projection/Distribution (DALO–FP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>422</td>
<td>Central supply activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>Logistics support activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>424</td>
<td>Ammunition management</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
### Table 9–3
Budget activity management structure for operation and maintenance appropriations—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Manager ¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Service wide support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>R/P–G–1 Manpower Policy, Plans, and Programs Division (DAPE–PRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432</td>
<td>Service wide communications</td>
<td>P–CIO/G–6 Program Execution Div (SAIS–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433</td>
<td>Manpower management</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>434</td>
<td>Other personnel support</td>
<td>G–1 Resource Division (DAPE–PRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>435</td>
<td>Other service support</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>436</td>
<td>Army claims and administrative support activities</td>
<td>TJAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>437</td>
<td>Real estate management</td>
<td>ACSI Resource Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>438</td>
<td>Base support</td>
<td>ACSI Resource Division (DAIM–ZR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>439</td>
<td>Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA) (FY 94–95)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Support of other nations</td>
<td>G–3/5/7 international Plans, Policy, Programs, and Integration Division (DAMO–SSI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>441</td>
<td>International military headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>442</td>
<td>Miscellaneous support of other nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Closed account</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA) (FY96)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend for Table 9-3:
Army Manpower and total obligation authority
n Budget activity (BA)
nn Activity group (01 level)
nnn Budget sub activity
Records resources for Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO) nnn***, where nnn shows budget sub activity. (See chaps AO–2020a-d, h, and j, DFAS–IN Manual 37–100-*** for further information)

Notes:
¹ Manager for functional requirements and program and performance except as noted.
² Manager for functional requirements

### Table 9–4
Budget activity management structure for operation and maintenance appropriations-Army manpower only activity structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Manager ¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Medical manpower-reimbursable</td>
<td>TSG Manpower and Programming Division (DASG–PAE–M) ²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>841</td>
<td>Examining activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>846</td>
<td>Training medical spaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>847</td>
<td>Care in Army medical centers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>849</td>
<td>Defense medical spaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Special operations forces manpower-reimbursable</td>
<td>G–1 Manpower Policy, and Program Division (DAPE–PRA)³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Defense agency manpower (military only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Outside Department of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Transients, holdees, and operating strength deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend for Table 9-4:
Manpower only activity structure
The PPBE database generates categories 8 and 9 to meet manpower-reporting requirements. Category 8 records resources for AMSOC 84n*** where n-1, 6, or 7 shows the budget sub activity, category 9 records resources for AMSOC 9n****, where n=1, 2, 3, or 4 shows the 0–1 level structure.

Notes:
¹ 1. Manager for functional requirement and program except as noted.
² 2. Manager for functional requirements.
³ 3. Manager for program and performance.
Table 9–5
Budget activity management structure for operation and maintenance appropriation-Base operations support (BOS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****19, ****20 Child develop services, family centers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****53, ****54, ****56 Environmental conservation, pollution prevention, environmental compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****75 Ant-terrorism/Force protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****79 (Real Property Services)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J0</td>
<td>Operation of utilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M0</td>
<td>Municipal Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N0</td>
<td>Facilities engineering services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P0</td>
<td>Fire and emergency response services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****90 Audio visual and visual information production, acquisition, and support</td>
<td>P–CIO/G–6 Program Execution Div (SAIS–ZR)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****95 Base communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****96 (Base Operations Support) (BASOPS( ))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A0</td>
<td>Real estate leases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B0</td>
<td>Supply operations and management</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0</td>
<td>Materiel maintenance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D0</td>
<td>Transportation services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E0</td>
<td>Laundry and dry-cleaning services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F0</td>
<td>The Army food service program</td>
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<tr>
<td>K0</td>
<td>Civilian personnel management</td>
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<tr>
<td>L0</td>
<td>Morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M0</td>
<td>Military personnel support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q0</td>
<td>Reserve component support</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U0</td>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>ASA(F&amp;M&amp;C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V0</td>
<td>Management analysis</td>
<td>ASA(F&amp;M&amp;C)</td>
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<tr>
<td>W0</td>
<td>Contracting operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X0</td>
<td>Information technology, management and planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y0</td>
<td>Administrative services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.20</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30</td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.40</td>
<td>Public affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.60</td>
<td>Installation management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.70</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.90</td>
<td>Unaccompanied personnel housing management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend for Table 9-5:

Base Support

Base Operations Support (BOS) applies to sub activity groups 131, 315, 325, 336, and 438

Base support refers to the resources to operate and maintain Army installations (major, minor, stations, other). It comprises two sub activity groups: Base Operations Support (BOS) and Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM). Resources are recorded in Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO) and nnn*yy, where nnn shows budget sub activity group (SAG) and yy designates specified subdivisions. Sometimes, resources are recorded as nnn*yy.z0, where .z0 refers to letter accounts, as below for BASOPS (-) and SRM. (See chap A9–BSSPT, DFAS–IN Manual 37–100-**** for further information.)

Notes:

1. Manager for functional requirements and program and performance.
2. Manager for functional requirements.
3. Manager for program and performance.
### Table 9–6
Budget activity management structure for operation and maintenance appropriations-Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Account Manager 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.L0</td>
<td>Minor construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****78 (Maintenance and Repair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.10</td>
<td>Surfaced areas (including bridges and other appurtenances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.20</td>
<td>Airfields, paved and unpaved (including bridges and other appurtenances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.40</td>
<td>Railroads (including bridges and other appurtenances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50</td>
<td>Utility systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.A0</td>
<td>Maintenance and production facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.B0</td>
<td>Training and operations facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.C0</td>
<td>RDT&amp;E facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.D0</td>
<td>Supply and storage facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.E0</td>
<td>Administrative facilities (including information technology facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.F0</td>
<td>Unaccompanied personnel housing facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.G0</td>
<td>Other unaccompanied personnel housing facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.H0</td>
<td>Dining facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.Q0</td>
<td>Other facilities without facility category groups (FCG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.R0</td>
<td>Airfield facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.S0</td>
<td>Training/instruction support facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.T0</td>
<td>Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.U0</td>
<td>Medical and hospital facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.V0</td>
<td>Grounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.W0</td>
<td>Community support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.X0</td>
<td>Family housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSCO</td>
<td>****93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demolition of real property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. Manager for functional requirements and program and performance

### Table 9–7
BUDGET ACTIVITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATIONS-ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Manager 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BA 1: Operating forces</td>
<td>DARNG 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Land Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Corps combat forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Corps support forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Echelon above corps (EAC)-forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Land forces operations support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Land forces readiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Land forces system readiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Land forces depot maintenance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Land forces readiness support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Base operations support (land forces readiness support)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Sustainment, restoration, and Modernization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Management and operational headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 4: Administration and service wide activities</td>
<td>DARNG 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Service wide support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>431</td>
<td>Staff management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432</td>
<td>Information management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433</td>
<td>Readiness and personnel administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9–7
BUDGET ACTIVITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATIONS-ARMY NATIONAL GUARD—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Manager ¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>434</td>
<td>Recruiting and advertising</td>
<td>¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend for Table 9-7:
- Army National Guard
- Budget activity (BA)
- Activity group (01 level)
- Budget sub activity

Notes:

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### Table 9–8
Budget activity management structure for operations and maintenance appropriations-U.S. Army Reserve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Manager ¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BA 1: Operating forces</td>
<td>CAR ²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Land forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Corps combat forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Corps support forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Echelon above corps (EAC)-forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Land forces operations support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Land forces readiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Force readiness operations support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Land forces system readiness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Depot maintenance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Land forces readiness support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Base operations support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>Additional activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| BA 4: Administration and service wide activities | CAR² |
| 43   | Service wide support | |
| 431  | Administration | |
| 432  | Service wide communications | |
| 433  | Personnel/financial administration | |
| 434  | Recruiting and advertising | |

Legend for Table 9-8:
- U.S. Army Reserve
- Budget activity (BA)
- Activity group (01 level)
- Budget sub activity

Notes:
Table 9–9
Army appropriations-managers for functional requirements and program and performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource identification code</th>
<th>Appropriation (fund)</th>
<th>Manager for Functional Requirements (R)</th>
<th>Manager for Program and Performance (P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RDTE</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACFT (APA)</td>
<td>Aircraft Procurement, Army</td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSLS (MIPA)</td>
<td>Missile Procurement, Army</td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTCV</td>
<td>Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army</td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMO (PAA)</td>
<td>Procurement of Ammunition, Army</td>
<td>R–G–4 Directorate for Sustainment (DALO–SM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Other Procurement, Army</td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Military Construction, Army</td>
<td>R–ACSIM Facilities Division (DAIM–FD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCNG</td>
<td>Military Construction, Army National Guard</td>
<td>R–DARNG Engineering Directorate (NGB–AEN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAR</td>
<td>Military Construction, Army Reserve</td>
<td>R–CAR Army Reserve Engineer Directorate (DAAR–EN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEM</td>
<td>Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Army</td>
<td>R–G–8 Programs and Priorities (DAPR–FDR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHC</td>
<td>Family Housing, Army (Construction) Operations</td>
<td>R/P–ACSIM Facilities Division (DAIM–FD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>Environmental Restoration, Army and Formerly Used Test Sites</td>
<td>R/P–ACSIM Environmental Division (DAIM–ED)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
<td>R/P–ACSIM BRAC Office (DAIM–BO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHO</td>
<td>Family Housing, Army (Operations)</td>
<td>R/P–ACSIM Facilities Division (DAIM–FD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance, Army</td>
<td>See Tables 9–3 through 9–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMNG</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard</td>
<td>See Table 9–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAR</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve</td>
<td>See Table 9–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Military Personnel, Army</td>
<td>R/P–G–1 Manpower Policy, Plans, and Program Division (DAPE–PRA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGPA</td>
<td>National Guard Personnel, Army</td>
<td>R/P–DARNG Budget Formulation Branch (NGB–ARC–BF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Reserve Personnel, Army</td>
<td>R/P–CAR Budget Branch (DAAR–CFM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAF–D</td>
<td>Homeowners Assistance Fund Defense</td>
<td>R/P–COE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. ASA (FM&C) serves as appropriation sponsor for all appropriations (funds) except ARNG and AR appropriations, whose sponsors are the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Chief, Army Reserve, respectively.
2. Functional proponents and their supporting Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) bear responsibility for setting the funding level of validated military requirements and validating and funding nonmilitary requirements generated by new equipment for unit set fielding, force modernization, or other new mission or doctrine.

9–6. Integrated programming-budgeting phase
The DPAE and DAB jointly manage the integrated programming and budgeting phase to produce a combined POM and BES in the even years and change proposals (CP) in the odd years.

a. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE). The DPAE takes the lead on programming matters and—

1. Provides the SECARMY and CSA with independent assessments of program alternatives and priorities.
2. Provides analytical and administrative support for PPBE forums.
(3) Co-chairs the Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) with the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7 and the DAB.

(4) Exercises overall responsibility at HQDA for Army program development in support of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

(5) With the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7 and Director of the Army Budget (DAB), guides and integrates the work of Program Evaluation Groups (PEG) throughout the PPBE process. (See para 9–32.)

(6) With functional proponents:
   (a) Prepares Army responses to OSD programming guidance documents.
   (b) Structures the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM) and Technical Guidance Memorandum (TGM) to articulate direction and guidance from the GDF and senior Army leadership.
   (c) Develops the Army program, including review of integrated priority lists (IPLs) of the combatant commanders and program submissions of the ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.

(7) Codifies, and submits to OSD, the approved Army program in the POM.

(8) Serves as HQDA point of contact for the POM and FYDP within HQDA and with OSD and the Joint Staff.

(9) Manages the Management Decision Package (MDEP) architecture.

(10) Serves as host activity manager of the PPBE Enterprise System and with ASA(FM&C) and data proponents such as appropriation sponsors, manpower managers, the OSD Comptroller, OSD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Department of the Treasury, DPAE—
   (a) Through the PPBC has established a PPBE Strategic Automation Committee (PSAC) to implement configuration management of the PPBE Enterprise System and oversee long-term plans for investing in information technology to improve the performance of PPBE functions.
   (b) Maintains the resource management architecture for automated support of PPBE processes and information systems and their integration into a common PPBE database. In particular—
      1. Hosts the web services that provide coordination for the common data architecture, including program elements (PE), Army program elements (APE), resource organization (command) codes, the SSN–LIN Automated Management and Integrating System (SLAMIS) and, in coordination with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the Army Management Structure (AMS).
      2. Maintains an integrated data dictionary of data elements in the PPBE data element structure and disciplines its use without re-keying by database users and component databases.
      3. Controls data entry and makes sure that PPBE data elements are consistent not only internally for programming, budgeting, and execution but, also externally with reporting requirements of the Standard Data Collection System (SDCS), Service Support Manpower System (SSMS), and Comptroller Information System (CIS) or their successors.
   (c) Maintains the official database position for Army Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) and through the SDCS, SSMS, and CIS or their successors updates OSD resource management databases with data that reflect the POM, BES, and the President’s Budget. Affected data include the Army BES for manpower, Army appropriations, and Army-managed Defense appropriations.
   (d) Makes sure that the Army portion of FYDP submissions to OSD includes defense appropriations managed by the Army and that force structure and manpower information match positions in the force structure and accounting databases for the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (AR), and civilian work force.
   (e) Issues the PBG after each PPBE phase.

(11) Provides feedback to each combatant commander as to the resource status of the command’s issues on forwarding the even year combined Program Objective Memorandum and Budget Estimate Submission (POM/BES) and odd fiscal year change proposals (CPs) to OSD.

b. **Director of the Army Budget (DAB).** The DAB takes the lead on budgeting matters and—

   (1) Co-chairs the PPBC with the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7 and DPAE.
   (2) Establishes budgeting policy and processes.
   (3) Guides and integrates the work of the PEGs on budget matters. (See para 9–31.)
   (4) Reviews and consolidates the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (AR) budgets with the Active Army budget.

(5) Provides feedback to each combatant commander on major budget issues affecting the command’s resource requirements.

(6) Justifies the Army budget before OSD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress.

(7) Maintains liaison and acts as point of contact with Congressional appropriations committees except for Civil Works issues.

(8) With the DPAE and data proponents, performs system and data management functions described in paragraph a (10), above.

(9) Serves as proponent of FYDP program 6–Research and Development and program 7–Central Supply and Maintenance. (See para 9–12.)
Manages functional requirements and program and performance for designated appropriation accounts. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–3 through 9–8.)

Manages the data architecture of Army program elements (PE) and Elements of Resource (EOR).

Translates final budget decisions into program changes, posting program elements (PE), Army program elements (APE), MDEPs, and command distributions, as required, updating the PPBE database to produce the President’s Budget position submitted to OSD and Congress.

Manages the Program Budget Decision (PBD) and Major Budget Issue (MBI) processes, and throughout the review—

(a) Maintains coordination between the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and HQDA.

(b) Makes sure that adjustments to fiscal controls are correct on all records for each PBD. (Verifying corresponding manpower controls, however, is a Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 responsibility.)

(14) Translates final budget decisions into program changes, posting program elements (PE), Army program elements (APE), MDEPs, and command distributions, as required, updating the PPBE database to produce the President’s Budget position submitted to OSD and Congress.

Manages the Program Budget Decision (PBD) and Major Budget Issue (MBI) processes, and throughout the review—

(a) Maintains coordination between the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and HQDA.

(b) Makes sure that adjustments to fiscal controls are correct on all records for each PBD. (Verifying corresponding manpower controls, however, is a Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 responsibility.)

(15) Gives special attention to any PBD under appeal since the DepSecDef may, on review, revise pending adjustments

c. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7. The ADCS G–3/5/7 ensures the optimal allocation of army resources by evaluating the integrated programming-budgeting phase for compliance with TAP and Army priorities.

9–7. Execution phase

a. Military Deputy for Budget and Execution. For the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)), the Military Deputy for Budget and Execution—

(1) Reviews program performance and, specifically, overseer Cost and Performance Measures designed to provide the senior Army leadership with a corporate view of business efficiencies and program accomplishment.

(2) Applies funds appropriated by Congress to carry out authorized programs.

(3) Through the DAB, manages the PPBE execution phase.

b. Director of the Army Budget (DAB). As provided in a(3), above, the DAB manages the PPBE Execution phase and, during financial execution—

(1) Establishes funding policy and processes.

(2) Supervises and directs financial execution of the congressionally approved budget.

(3) Allocates funds appropriated by Congress and monitors their execution

(4) Oversees accounting for and reporting on use of Army-managed funds to OSD and Congress by appropriation. As applicable to each appropriation, includes FYDP program, program element (PE), Army program element (APE), project number, budget line item number (BLIN), standard study number (SSN), quantities, budget activity (BA), budget activity group (BAG), budget sub activity (BSA), element of resource (EOR), and financing data. Also as applicable to an appropriation, accounts for and reports on the use of the manpower-by-manpower category

(5) With functional proponents and within stated restrictions and specified dollar thresholds, reprograms funds as required to meet unforeseen requirements or changes in operating conditions.

(6) With the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)—

(a) Oversees the development and maintenance of standard Army systems in support of financial accounting; and oversees implementation of the same standard Army systems in support of distribution, accounting, and reporting of funds.

(b) Makes sure that execution reports meet HQDA management information needs.

c. Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE). During programmatic execution, the DPAE monitors how programmed resources are applied to achieve approved objectives to gain feedback for adjusting resource requirements.

d. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7. The ADCS G–3/5/7 ensures the optimal allocation of army resources by evaluating the execution phase for compliance with TAP and Army priorities.

Section III
Responsibilities for PPBE–Related Operational Tasks

9–8. HQDA principal officials

a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)).

(1) Exercises responsibility for, and oversees, all matters and policy related to acquisition, logistics, technology, procurement, the industrial base, and security cooperation (that is, security assistance and armaments cooperation).

(2) Serves as the designated Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).

(3) Represents the Army on the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee, and the Conventional Systems Committee.

(4) Chairs the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

(5) Integrates the development and acquisition of materiel into all phases of the PPBE process.
With the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8 helps prepare the Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (RDA Plan).

Manages functional requirements and program and performance for RDT&E and procurement appropriations, the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Army appropriation, and designated Miscellaneous accounts in Table 9–9, as well as the Contract Operations account of the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation, tables 9–3 through 9–8. (See para 9–10.)

b. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) (ASA(I&E)). Exercises responsibility for, and oversees, all matters and policy related to installations, housing, installation-related-military construction, real estate and environment, safety, and occupational health.

c. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)).

(1) Promulgates Army wide policy for and oversees, all matters related to manpower, personnel, and Reserve affairs across all Army components (Active, Guard, Reserve, civilian, and contractor).

(2) Sets policy and oversees—

(a) Army organization and force structure to include Army force management initiatives that affect the Operating and Generating Forces (Active, Guard, and Reserve).

(b) Army manpower requirements determination and resource allocation for all Army components across all major Army commands (ACOM) and separate agencies (Active, Guard, Reserve, Joint, and Defense).

(3) Reviews policies and programs pertaining to readiness, resource allocation, training, force structure, and professional and leader education and development.

d. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (AASA).

(1) Plans, programs, budgets, and accounts for the execution of resources for Headquarters, Department of the Army and its field operating and staff support agencies.

(2) Serves as proponent (provisional) of the Organizing PEG. (See para 9–31.)

e. The Chief Information Officer and Army G–6 (CIO/G–6).

(1) Exercises responsibility for Army information management functions per 10 USC 3014(c) (1) (D) and sets policy and determines objectives for, and oversees, all matters related to Army command, control, communications, and computers (C4) and information technology (IT) functions.

(2) Provides CIO-validation of C4/IT requirements, and monitors the performance of information technology programs for war fighting, base operations, administrative, and other mission-related processes associated with a C4/IT impact.

(3) Serves as Program Integrator for Information Technology. (See fig 9–1.)

(4) Serves as proponent of the Army FYDP subprogram 3–Communications. (See Table 9–11.)

(5) Develops, maintains, and facilitates the information technology architecture, that is, the Army Knowledge Enterprise Architecture (AKEA).

(6) Makes sure through advice and technical assistance that Army acquires information technology and manages information resources in a manner that implements the policies, procedures, and goals of the Army Knowledge Management Strategic Plan.

f. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1.

(1) Develops, coordinates, and implements programs and policies directly associated with accession, development, distribution, and sustenance of military and civilian personnel readiness to include the personnel readiness of Army units and organizations.

(2) Develops human resource programs, budgets, and activities to execute life-cycle functions of manning, well-being, personnel technologies, Soldier-oriented R&D, and personnel transformation.

(3) Serves as proponent of the Manning PEG. (See para 9–31.)

(4) Serves as proponent of FYDP program 9–Administration. (See Table 9–11.)

(5) Serves as the Army proponent of Directed Military Over strength (DMO) and military manpower requirements outside the DOD.

(6) Manages issues related to Army manpower accounts except for Army National Guard and Army Reserve manpower and manages functional requirements and program and performance for the Military Pay, Army appropriation and for designated personnel accounts and Manpower-Only accounts of the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–2 through 9–9.)

g. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2.

(1) In coordination with the Department of Defense and National Intelligence Community, sets policy for Army intelligence and counterintelligence and security countermeasures.

(2) Prepares, justifies, and submits the program and budget for the Army portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) per the policy, resource, and administrative guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence and DOD NFIP Program Managers.

(3) Serves as Army Staff lead for integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) matters into all phases of the PPBE process.
How The Army Runs

(4) Serves as the resource proponent for operational and strategic intelligence of Army FYDP subprogram 3–Intelligence. (See Table 9–11.)

(5) Manages functional requirements and program and performance for Security Programs of the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–3 through 9–8.)

h. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4.

(1) Develops and resources Army wide logistics operation programs for strategic mobility, supply, maintenance, war reserves and prepositioning, aviation, munitions, transportation, distribution, readiness, and integrated logistics support.

(2) Integrates and balances between acquisition and logistics the sustainment functions of readiness, supply, services, maintenance, transportation, aviation, munitions, security assistance, and related automated systems.

(3) Through the integration of logistics supportability, manages the readiness of new systems throughout the acquisition life cycle as well as current readiness of legacy systems.

(4) On behalf of the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)—

(a) Develops policies for, and oversees, the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of integrated logistics support.

(b) Makes sure that program executive offices have programmed and incorporated supportability requirements into the acquisition and fielding of new systems.

(5) Serves as proponent of the Sustaining PEG. (See para 9–31.)

(6) Manages functional requirements for the Procurement of Ammunition, Army appropriation and the Army Working Capital Fund and manages functional requirements and program and performance for Logistics Operations accounts of the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation, including those for Base Operations. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–3 through 9–9.)

i. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM).

(1) Develops and directs planning, programming, and budgeting of installation management functions and the funding of installation-related military construction, housing, environmental protection, and facilities operation and sustainment.

(2) Provides ACSIM validation of requirements for managing and funding Army installations.

(3) Makes sure that installation management and environmental programs are integrated into all aspects of Army operations.

(4) Serves as proponent of the Installations PEG. (See para 9–31.)

(5) Manages functional requirements and program and performance for military construction appropriations and environmental restoration as well as Installation Management Operations and Maintenance appropriations. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–3 through 9–9.)

j. The Chief of Engineers (COE).

(1) Supports and promotes resource requirements of the engineer regiment.

(2) Represents and promotes resource requirements of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

(3) Acts for SECARMY in executing SECARMY Executive Agent responsibilities for military construction to include construction for the Air Force, Navy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and selected DOD activities and foreign nations.

(4) Manages functional requirements and program and performance for the Homeowners Assistance Fund, Defense. (See para 9–10 and table 9–9.)

k. The Surgeon General (TSG).

(1) Exercises responsibility for development, policy direction, organization and management of an integrated Army wide health services system.

(2) Represents and promotes resource requirements of the U.S. Army Medical Department.

(3) Manages functional requirements and program and performance for reimbursable medical manpower of the Operation and Maintenance, Army appropriation. (See para 9–10 tables 9–3 through 9–9.)

l. The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). Through the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG)—

(1) Plans and administers the budget of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and serves as appropriation sponsor for ARNG appropriations.

(2) Serves as proponent of the ARNG subprogram, FYDP program 5–Guard and Reserve Forces. (See Table 9–11.)

(3) Manages ARNG manpower issues and manages functional requirements and program and performance for ARNG appropriations and ARNG accounts of the Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard appropriation. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–2 through 9–9.)

(4) Serves as Program Integrator for the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of the ARNG. (See fig 9–1.)

m. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR).

(1) Plans and administers the budget of the U.S. Army Reserve (AR) and serves as appropriation sponsor for AR appropriations.
(2) Serves as proponent of the AR subprogram, FYDP program 5–Guard and Reserve Forces. (See Table 9–11.)
(3) Manages AR manpower issues and manages functional requirements and program and performance for AR appropriations and AR accounts of the Operation and Maintenance, U.S. Army Reserve appropriation. (See para 9–10 and tables 9–2 through 9–9.)
(4) Serves as Program Integrator for the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of the AR. (See fig 9–1.)

### Program Integrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army National Guard (ARNG)-DARNG</th>
<th>Information Technology(IT)-CIO/G-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs and monitors actions to integrate into all phases of the PPBES process the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of the Army National Guard.</td>
<td>Provides advice and technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs to make sure that the Army acquires information technology and manages information resources in a manner that implements the policies, procedures, and goals of the Army Knowledge Management Strategic Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracks ARNG program performance during budget execution.</td>
<td>Validates information technology requirements and monitors the performance of information technology programs throughout all phases of the PPBES process. Develops, maintains, and facilitates the information technology architecture, that is, the Army Knowledge Enterprise Architecture (AKEA), across the Army.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 9–9. Army commanders

a. **Commanders of Army commands and heads of other operating agencies.** Commanders of Army Commands (ACOMs), Program Executive Officers (PEO), and heads of other operating agencies—
   (1) Plan, program, and budget for assigned missions, responsibilities, and functions.
   (2) Document manpower in their subordinate organizations per allocated manpower levels.
   (3) Execute the approved ACOM or agency program within allocated resources, applying the inherent flexibility allowed by law and regulation.
   (4) Assess ACOM or agency program performance and budget execution and—
      (a) Account for and report on use of allocated funds by appropriation and MDEP. As applicable to each appropriation, include FYDP program, Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO), Army program element (APE), project number, BLIN, SSN, BA, BAG, and EOR. Also account for and report on use of allocated manpower by unit identification code (UIC).
      (b) Use manpower data and financial data from budget execution in developing future requirements.
      (c) Make sure that below threshold reprogramming remains consistent with Army priorities.

b. **Commanders of Army commands serving as commanders of Army Component Commands.** ACOM commanders serving as commanders of Army Component Commands (ACC) identify and integrate with their other missions and operational requirements the requirements of the combatant command.

c. **Commander, Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC).** Serves as proponent of Army FYDP subprogram 3–Space. (See Table 9–11.)

### 9–10. Staff managers and sponsors for congressional appropriations

The Military Deputy for Budget and Execution, the Director of Army National Guard (DARNG), Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), and designated functional managers manage and control Army resources. One set of functional managers addresses manpower and force structure issues. Another set of functional managers assists appropriation sponsors. Tables 9–2 through 9–9 list assignments of appropriation sponsors and functional managers. Their general responsibilities are as follows.
a. Manager for manpower and force structure issues. The manager for manpower issues and the manager for force structure issues work together to maintain a continuous exchange of information and collaboration during each PPBE phase. As appropriate, they—

1. Coordinate instructions to the field, and the processing of requests from the field, for manpower or force changes.
2. Align and balance manpower and unit information among such PPBE database systems as the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), the PPBE Enterprise System, and the FYDP.
3. Provide lead support on manpower issues to PEG chairs.
4. Verify manpower affordability.

b. Manager for functional requirements. The manager for functional requirements—

1. Determines the scope, quantity, and qualitative nature of functional requirements for planning, programming, and budgeting.
2. Checks how commands and agencies apply allocated manpower and dollars to make sure their use fulfills program requirements.
3. Prioritizes unfunded programs submitted by ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.
4. Using Army program and budget guidance and priorities, resolves conflicts involving unfunded requirements or decrements on which ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies fail to reach agreement in developing the program or budget.
5. Recommends to the PPBC (para 9–30, below) the allocation of available resources, unfunded programs, and offsetting decrements.
6. During program and budget reviews, and throughout the process, coordinates resource changes with agencies having responsibility for affected MDEPs and with the appropriate appropriation sponsor for relevant resources.

c. Manager for program and performance. The manager for program and performance—

1. Represents the functional program and monitors its performance during each PPBE phase.
2. As required, helps the appropriation sponsor perform the duties listed in d (2) and d (3), below.
3. Translates budget decisions and approved manpower and funding into program changes and makes sure that data transactions update affected MDEPs and, in coordination with the appropriation sponsors, affected appropriations.
4. Checks budget execution from the functional perspective.
5. For investment appropriations—
   a. Operates and maintains databases in support of the PPBE Enterprise System.
   b. During budget formulation, determines how changes in fiscal guidance affect budget estimates and reviews and approves the documentation of budget justification.
   c. During review of the budget by OSD and OMB and by Congress, serves as appropriation advocate, helps prepare the Army response to OSD PBDs, and prepares congressional appeals.
   d. During execution determines fund recipients, monitors execution, performs decrement reviews, plans reprogramming, and controls below threshold reprogramming. On RDT&E and procurement matters and otherwise as required, testifies before OSD and Congress.

d. Appropriation sponsor. The appropriation sponsor—

1. Controls the assigned appropriation or fund.
2. Serves as Army spokesperson for appropriation resources.
3. Helps resource claimants solve manpower and funding deficiencies.
4. Issues budget policy, instructions, and fiscal guidance.
5. During budget formulation—
   a. Bears responsibility for updating the PPBE database.
   b. Prepares and justify budget estimates, coordinating with functional and manpower representatives to make sure appropriate exhibits and database systems match.
6. Testifies before Congress during budget justification.
7. Manages financial execution of the appropriation and reprograms allocated manpower and funds to meet unforeseen contingencies during budget execution.

Section IV
DOD PPBE Process Description

9–11. Purpose
The DOD PPBE process serves as the primary resource management system for the Department’s military functions. Its purpose is to produce a plan, a program, and finally the Defense budget. The system documents the program and budget as the FYDP.
9–12. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)

a. The FYDP officially summarizes forces and resources for programs developed within the DOD PPBE process and approved by the SecDef. The FYDP specifies force levels and lists corresponding total obligation authority (TOA) and manpower. For example, in addition to historical data, the FYDP for the FY 2010–2011 budget would, as shown in figure 9–2—

(1) Record totals for each resource group by—
   (a) Prior fiscal year (PY), in this case FY 2008.
   (b) Current fiscal year (CY), in this case FY 2009.
   (c) Budget fiscal years (BY), in this case FY 2010–2011.

(2) Extend total obligation authority (TOA) and manpower totals 4 years beyond the FY 2010–2011 budget to FY 2015.

(3) Extend force totals 7 years beyond the FY 2010–2011 budget to FY 2018.

b. The FYDP comprises 11 major Defense programs. Table 9–11 lists the programs together with Army sub-programs and Army proponent agencies. Each program consists of an aggregation of program elements (PE) that reflect a DOD force or support mission. PEs identifies specific activities, projects, or functions and contains the fiscal and manpower resources needed to achieve an objective or plan. PEs permit cross-Service analysis by OSD and congressional staff members.

c. HQDA submits the Army portion of the FYDP database to OSD at least twice each even year.

(1) The first submission, forwarded in August, records the position of the combined Army POM/BES.

(2) The second submission, forwarded in late January or early February, records the position of the President’s Budget.

d. HQDA submits the Army portion of the FYDP database to OSD at least once each odd fiscal year in late January or early February recording the position of the President’s Budget.

e. For each FYDP position, OSD publishes a Summary and Program Element Detail volume on a CD ROM.

f. As prescribed by 10 USC 221(a), OSD provides the President’s Budget version of the FYDP to Congress each year at or about the time the PB is submitted to Congress.

g. OSD’s Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation manages the program element data structure and serves as the approval authority for any changes to that structure. Beginning with the FY 2002–2007 POM, OSD began gradually replacing the nearly 40-year old FYDP database format with a new Defense Programming Database (DPD). Transition to the DPD over the succeeding several PPBE cycles seeks to standardize budget and program data while consolidating many of the FYDP’s currently required supplemental reports and annexes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Major Defense program</th>
<th>Proponent ¹</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strategic Forces</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Communications, Intelligence, and Space Communications</td>
<td>CIO-/G–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>G–2/G–3/5/7²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Space</td>
<td>SMDC³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Guard and Reserve Forces</td>
<td>DARNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Central Supply and Maintenance</td>
<td>ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Training, Health and Other Personnel Activities</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>TSG⁴</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>G–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Support of Other Nations</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

¹ 1. Within each applicable program, ACSIM serves as proponent for base operations and real property services and G–1 serves as proponent for management headquarters and manpower functions.

² 2. G–2 is the resource proponent for operational and strategic intelligence. G–3/5/7 is the resource proponent for tactical intelligence.


⁴ 4. The Surgeon General
9–13. Key participants
DOD officials, assisting the Secretary of Defense as key participants in the PPBE process, include the following:

a. The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef). The DepSecDef assists the SecDef in overall leadership of the Department. He exercises authority delegated by the SecDef and conducts the day-to-day operation of DOD. The DepSecDef manages the PPBE process.

b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS serves as the principal military adviser to the President and SecDef and helps them provide strategic direction to the armed forces. Shouldering responsibilities for planning, advising, and policy formulation, the CJCS participates in DOD’s senior councils, where he speaks for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and combatant commanders.

c. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). The VCJCS, who is the second-ranking member of the Armed Forces, acts for the Chairman in his absence and chairs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

d. The Service Secretaries. The Service Secretaries convey the Service perspective on Defense matters to the SecDef and DepSecDef and, as key advisers, provide them with candid personal views.

e. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). The USD (AT&L) exercises responsibility for all matters relating to Defense acquisition, technology, and logistics and serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).

f. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (Policy)). The USD (Policy) represents DOD on foreign relations and arms control matters and serves as the principal adviser to the DepSecDef for the PPBE planning phase.

g. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD (C)). The USD (C) exercises responsibility for all budgetary and fiscal matters.

h. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD (P&R)). The USD (P&R) exercises responsibility for all matters relating to Total Force Management as it concerns readiness, National Guard and Reserve Affairs, health affairs, training, and personnel requirements and management.

i. The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). The Director, PA&E serves as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for program analysis and evaluation.

9–14. Department of Defense Decision Bodies
The following groups have been organized to assist the SecDef in making planning, programming, budgeting and execution resource decisions.

a. The three bodies that counsel the SecDef in applying sound business practices in the Military Departments, DOD agencies and other DOD components include the Defense Senior Leader Conference (DSLC), the Senior Leader Review Group (SLRG) and the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG)

(1) When determined by the chair, heads of other DOD components participate as appropriate.

(2) As appropriate, the chair may invite officials to participate from other Departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC).

b. Defense Senior Leader Conference (DSLC) is the senior decision body in the Department of Defense resource management system.

(1) The SecDef chairs the DSLC.

(2) Membership includes the Senior Leader Review Group principals (enumerated in subparagraph c. below) and all Combatant Commanders.

c. The Senior Leader Review Group (SLRG) assists the SecDef and DepSecDef in making major program decisions.

(1) The Secretary of Defense chairs the SRLG with the CJCS serving as vice chairman. The DepSecDef designates other OSD principals to participate in deliberations as necessary. SRLG members are as follows:

(a) From OSD. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Personnel and Readiness; and Intelligence, Director Program Analysis and
Evaluation, the General Counsel, Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Public Affairs and Networks and Information Integration, Chief Management Officer, Deputy Chief Management Officer, Director of Administration and Management.

(b) From the Joint Staff and Services. The Chairman of the Joint Staff, VCJCS, Director, Joint Staff and Secretaries of the Military Departments, who normally are accompanied by Chiefs of Services, Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

(2) Considering broad policy and developing guidance on high-priority objectives, the SLRG helps promote long-range planning and stability in the Defense program

(3) Among other functions, the SLRG—

(a) Reviews guidance for planning and programming.

(b) Evaluates high-priority programs.

(c) Considers the effect of resource decisions on baseline cost, schedule, and performance of major acquisition programs and aligns the programs with the PPBE process.

(d) Helps tie the allocation of resources for specific programs and forces to national policies.

(e) Reviews the program and budget.

(f) Reviews execution of selected programs.

(g) Advises the SecDef on policy, PPBE issues, and proposed decisions.

(4) When the SLRG meets to deliberate major issues on DOD-funded intelligence programs, it expands to include representatives of appropriate intelligence agencies. The DepSecDef and Director of Central Intelligence co-chair this Expanded SLRG (ESLRG).

(5) The Director, PA&E acts as Executive Secretary for both the SLRG and ESLRG. In this capacity, the Director manages the program review process and, with the chairs of the ESLRG, the intelligence program review. The Director also manages the preparation of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) and the intelligence PDM (IPDM) that reflect the SecDef’s program decisions.

d. The Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG) was established to facilitate the development of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 and has continued to monitor its implementation as well as address other subjects as required.

(1) The Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff co-chair the DAWG. Membership is as follows:

(a) From OSD. The Undersecretaries of Defense; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Comptroller, Personnel and Readiness; and Intelligence, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, Assistant Secretary Defense Network Integration/ CIO, Director and Principal Deputy, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Director Administration and Management, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs and the General Counsel.

(b) From the Joint Staff and services. Service Undersecretaries and Vice Chiefs, the Director Joint Staff, Director J–8 and Director J–5, Director National Guard Bureau and Deputy Commander US SOCOM.

(2) The DAWG generally meets weekly to consider ongoing and cyclic issues including

(a) Capability Portfolio development and management

(b) Defense Planning Scenarios and related analytical efforts

(c) Program and Budget Review

(d) Program Decision Memorandum- directed studies

(e) Strategy and Policy Development including periodic reviews

(f) Regional and Functional Challenges

(g) Transformation

(3) Combatant Commanders or their Deputy Commanders are welcome when issues are being considered that impact their regional or functional responsibilities.

e. The OSD Three Star Group analyzes major issues and develops decision options during program review. It forwards issues sufficiently significant to warrant action by the SLRG to that body for consideration. Supporting the endeavor, OSD principal staff assistants conduct a series of Front End Assessments (FEA). As directed by the SLRG, assessments address topics or decisions that will influence the next POM and subsequent program review. Prepared in coordination with other OSD principal assistants, representatives of the CJCS, and Service chiefs, the assessments are briefed to the Three Star Group. As appropriate they are also briefed to the DepSecDef or SLRG.

(1) The Director, PA&E chairs the Three Star Group. Adding other OSD principals to participate in sessions as appropriate, the Three Star Group includes the following members:

(2) From OSD. Representatives from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller, Policy, Intelligence, and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Force Management Policy, Health Affairs, and Reserve Affairs, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and Commander USSOCOM.

(3) From the Joint staff. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J–8).

(4) From the Services. The Army G–8, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements
and Assessments), the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant (Programs and Resources), and the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs).

9–15. Intelligence Program Review Group
   a. The Intelligence Program Review Group (IPRG) identifies opportunities to advance the U.S. Government’s Intelligence Strategy. It evaluates potential program changes from a mission perspective, considers tradeoffs, and forwards issue analyses to the Expanded SLRG (ESLRG) for consideration.
   b. The Director, PA&E and the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs co-chair the IPRG. Members include representatives of all Executive Branch organizations that manage or oversee intelligence capabilities.

9–16. Defense Acquisition Board and Joint Requirements Oversight Council
   a. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) oversees Defense system acquisition, providing discipline through review of major programs. At each milestone in the system’s life cycle, the Board assures that programs have met established performance requirements, including program-specific exit criteria. As chairman and vice chairman, respectively, the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) direct the efforts of the DAB.
   b. The USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), with the DAB and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) (below), helps link the acquisition process to planning, programming, and budgeting. Serving as a key adviser to the SecDef and DepSecDef, the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) participates in all resource decisions affecting the baselines of major acquisition programs, including costs, schedules, and performance.
   c. The VCJCS chairs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Through the Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB) and Joint Requirements Board (JRB), the JROC explores new alternatives by assessing joint military war fighting capabilities and requirements posed by the combatant commanders, Services, Joint Staff, and supported Defense agencies. The forum helps forge consensus underlying the Chairman’s statutory advice to the SecDef on program and budget proposals. The JROC also helps the DAB and USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) articulate military needs and validate performance goals and program baselines at successive milestones of each DAB program.

Section V
Army PPBE

9–17. Army’s primary resource management system
The PPBE process serves as the Army’s primary resource management process. A major decision-making process, PPBE interfaces with joint strategic planning and with planning conducted by OSD. Linking directly to OSD programming and budgeting, the PPBE process develops and maintains the Army portion of the Defense program and budget. PPBE supports Army planning, program development, and budget preparation at all levels of command. Similarly supporting program and budget execution, it provides feedback to the planning, programming, and budgeting processes.

9–18. PPBE concept
   a. The PPBE process ties strategy, program, and budget all together. It helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs, programs from requirements, requirements from missions, and missions from national security objectives. The patterned flow from end purpose to resource cost defines requirements in progressively greater detail.
   b. Long-range planning creates a vision of the Army 20 years into the future. In the 2- to 10-year midterm, long-range macro estimates give way to a specified size, composition, and quality of operational and support forces. Derived from joint strategic planning and intermediate objectives to achieve long-range goals, this operational and support force provides the planning foundation for program requirements.
   c. In the midterm, guided by force requirements, the integrated program-budget process distributes projected resources. It seeks to support priorities and policies of the senior Army leadership while achieving balance among Army organizations, systems, and functions. For the 0- to 2-year near-term, the integrated process converts program requirements into budget requests for manpower and dollars. When enacted into appropriations and manpower authorizations, these resources become available to carry out approved programs.
   d. By formally adding execution to the traditional emphasis on planning, programming, and budgeting, the Army emphasizes concern for how well program performance and financial execution apply allocated resources to meet the Army’s requirements.
   e. Documents produced within the PPBE process support Defense decision-making, and the review and discussion that attend their development help shape the outcome. For example:
      (1) The Army helps prepare the SECDEF’s Guidance for the Development of Forces (GDF) and planning documents produced by the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Army participation influences policy, strategy, and
force objectives considered by the SecDef and the CJCS, including policies for development, acquisition, and other resource-allocation issues.

2) ACOM commanders, PEOs, and heads of other operating agencies similarly influence positions and decisions taken by the SECARMY and CSA. Commanders and heads of agencies develop and submit force structure, procurement, and construction requirements as well as assessments and data to support program and budget development. Through periodic commanders’ conferences held by the CSA, they also make their views known on the proposed plan, program, and budget.

3) Combatant commanders influence Army positions and decisions through ACOM commanders serving as commanders of Army Component Commands (ACC), who integrate operational requirements of the combatant command into their program and budget submissions. Combatant commanders also highlight requirements in an integrated priority list (IPL) that receives close review during program development.

9–19. PPBE objectives

The main objective of the PPBE process is to establish, justify, and acquire the fiscal and manpower resources needed to accomplish the Army’s assigned missions in executing the National Military Strategy. Phase by phase objectives follow:

a. Through planning, to size, structure, man, equip, train, and sustain the Army force to support the national military strategy.

b. Through integrated programming and budgeting, to—

   (1) Distribute projected manpower, dollars, and materiel among competing requirements according to Army resource allocation policy and priorities, making sure that requirements get resourced at defensible, executable levels.

   (2) Convert resource allocation decisions into requests for congressional authorization and appropriations.

   c. Through program execution, to apply resources to achieve approved program objectives, and adjust resource requirements based on execution feedback.

   d. Through budget execution, to manage and account for funds to carry out approved programs.

9–20. Control of planning, programming, and budgeting documents

a. Papers and associated data sponsored by the DOD PPBE process give details of proposed programs and plans. The proposals often state candidate positions and competing options that remain undecided until final approval.

b. Access to such tentative material by other than those directly involved in planning and allocating resources would frustrate the candor and privacy of leadership deliberations. Moreover, access by private firms seeking DOD contracts would imperil competition and pose serious ethical, even criminal, problems for those involved. For these reasons, DOD closely controls documents produced through the DOD PPBE process and its supporting databases. Thus, OSD restricts access to DOD and other governmental agencies directly involved in planning, programming, and budgeting Defense resources, primarily OMB.

c. Exceptions to the limitations described require SecDef approval. After coordination with the General Counsel, Army proponents may request an exception, but only for compelling need. Statutes and other procedures govern disclosure of information to Congress and the General Accountability Office (GAO).

d. The list that follows cites some of the major PPBE and related PPBE documents and material requiring restricted access.

   (1) Planning phase:

      (a) Guidance for the Development of Forces (GDF)

      (b) Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF)

      (c) The Army Plan (TAP)

   (2) Programming phase:

      (a) Fiscal Guidance.

      (b) Joint Programming Guidance (JPG).

      (c) Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

      (d) FYDP documentation including FYDP annexes.

      (e) Issue papers (for example, major issue papers, and cover briefs).

      (f) Proposed Military Department program reductions (or program offsets).

      (g) Tentative issue-decision memoranda.

      (h) Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).

   (3) Budgeting phase:

      (a) FYDP documents for the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and President’s Budget, including procurement, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and construction annexes.

      (b) Program Budget Decisions (PBD).

      (c) Automated Program and Financing Statements.

      (d) Reports generated by the automated Comptroller Information System (CIS).
Section VI
Recording Resources

9–21. The MDEP: what it is and how it is used

a. The Army Management Decision Package (MDEP) serves as a key resource management tool. Collectively, MDEPs account for all Army resources. They describe the capabilities programmed over a 9-year period for the Active Army, Guard, Reserve, and civilian work force.

b. Recording the resources needed to gain an intended outcome, an individual MDEP describes a particular organization, program, or function and applies uniquely to one of the following areas for resource management:
   (1) Missions of MTOE (modified tables of organization and equipment) units.
   (2) Missions of TDA (tables of distribution and allowances) units.
   (3) Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of weapon and information systems (with linkage to organizations).
   (4) Special visibility programs (SVP).
   (5) Short term projects (STP).

c. In short, the MDEP—
   (1) Specifies the military and civilian manpower and dollars associated with a program undertaking.
   (2) Displays needed resources across relevant Army commands and relevant appropriations.
   (3) Justifies the resource expenditure.

d. HQDA uses the MDEP to help—
   (1) Develop programs to support the requirements.
   (2) Carry out approved programs.
   (3) Check program results.

e. HQDA uses the MDEP to link decisions by the SECARMY and CSA and their priorities to:
   (1) FYDP accounts that record Service positions in OSD.
   (2) Army Management Structure (AMS) accounts that record funding transactions in Army activities and installations.

f. HQDA uses the MDEP also to link key systems within the PPBE Enterprise System, for example:
   (1) The Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS).
   (2) The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) whose product, the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT), shows valid training requirements and associated training programs.
   (3) Depot maintenance programs.

g. For investment accounts, managers for construction, RDT&E, and procurement first allocate program and budget resources by Army Management Structure code (AMSCO), Army program element (APE), project number, and budget line item number (BLIN). They then distribute the resources to MDEPs within the resource management areas, listed in subparagraph b, above.

9–22. Program and budget years covered by the MDEP

a. The MDEP records manpower and total obligation authority over the 9 fiscal years needed to display the program and budget. Which program year or which budget year each fiscal year addresses, depends on whether interest in the MDEP centers on the program or budget. Figure 9–3 shows the fiscal year structure of an MDEP applying to the President’s FY 2010–2011 budget.

b. The MDEP shifts 2 years forward in the even (or biennial POM/BES submission) year. At the start of the cycle for the next biennial POM/BES, the PPBE database (para 9–28a, below) drops the 2 earliest years from the database and adds 2 new years. Thus for the FY 2012–2017 POM/BES, the MDEP would display the 6 years of the new program period and the 3 preceding years (fig 9–4). The first of the preceding years is the prior fiscal year (PY). It records resources spent in executing the budget the year before the current fiscal year (CY). The CY shows resources in the budget being executed. The last preceding year is called the budget year (BY). It lists resources requested in the President’s Budget being reviewed by Congress.

c. Another shift occurs the next odd year (the year in which the President submits the next 2-year Defense budget). The shift leaves each year’s resources intact but changes their relative position in the program or budget process as shown in figure 9–5. For the FY 2012-budget, budget years 09 and 10 both become prior years; budget year 11 becomes the current year; and the first 2 program years become budget years 12 and 13. The last 4 years (years 14 through 17) become the remaining program years.
9–23. Extent that manpower and dollars can be redistributed in the MDEP

a. The MDEP, as just described, has both budget-year and program-year increments. The two increments differ primarily by the flexibility the Army has with manpower and funds.

b. During the program or POM years, HQDA is constrained by Congress on total military end strength. HQDA determines and approves civilian work year levels by balancing workload and available funding. Similarly, HQDA restricts program dollars only by total obligation authority (TOA), not by individual appropriation. The distinctions allow redistributing previously programmed manpower and dollars to meet changing requirements. In later POM or budget submissions, for example, HQDA can, as needed, move program year resources between MDEPs, appropriations, and Army program elements (APE).

c. Once HQDA sends the BES to OSD, OSD must approve any changes to manpower and dollars. Even tighter controls govern changes in manpower and funding in the budget years after the President’s Budget has gone to Congress.

(1) HQDA can redistribute previously budgeted manpower and dollars between MDEPs or commands and agencies, but must leave current budgeted dollars unchanged until current year appropriations become law.

(2) Some flexibility during execution permits financing unbudgeted requirements to meet unforeseen needs or changes in operating conditions. Even so, congressional rules and specified dollar thresholds severely restrict spending for purposes other than those originally justified and approved. In addition, during execution, HQDA can transfer military and civilian manpower within appropriations without a corresponding transfer of funds.

9–24. How flexibility affects the MDEP

a. Frequent change in MDEP resources. Competition at each stage of program development and budget formulation can produce frequent change in an MDEP’s resource levels. Decisions resulting from OSD review of the POM/BES will further change amounts initially approved. Sometimes decisions may even affect requests in the President’s Budget already before Congress. Authorization and appropriation decisions by Congress often change amounts requested in the
President’s Budget. Budget execution sometimes results in different rates and quantities of expenditure from those planned, and, at times, it results in different purposes.

b. Keeping MDEP resources current. Program and budget analysts continually update MDEPs through their respective feeder systems to reflect the position of the last program or budget event. The kinds of changes described require that resource managers continually weigh how the stream of program and budget actions affect the MDEP and how a change in the program year or budget year portion of the package may affect the out years. Managers continually ask, “In what ways do the changes—
(1) Alter MDEP resource levels?
(2) Shift resources between years?
(3) Affect resources in related MDEPs?”

9–25. Resource recording structures

a. Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). As mentioned, the FYDP accounts for the total of all resources programmed by the Department of Defense (DOD). Using OSD program elements, DOD apportions decisions on dollars and manpower among the FYDP’s 11 major force programs.

b. Army Management Structure (AMS). The AMS serves as a second major resource recording structure. Based on congressional appropriations, the AMS relates program dollars and manpower to a standard classification of activities and functions per DFAS–IN Manual 37–100.**** (where **** stands for the current fiscal year, e.g., 2009). Army Management Structure codes (AMSCO) help record the data in the detail needed for budgeting, execution, and accounting.

c. Other structures. Other fiscal management structures include the 01 level budget activity structure for operation and maintenance appropriations shown in tables 9–3 through 9–8, standard study numbers (SSN) and budget line item numbers (BLIN) for weapon systems, and project numbers for military construction.

9–26. Automated support

The automated Army PPBE System supports Army PPBE functions and DOD PPBE data submissions to OSD, OMB, and Congress. Known simply as the PPBE database, it encompasses forces, funds, and manpower and serves as the database of record for Army resources.

a. PPBE database. The PPBE database organizes and registers 9 years of dollar and manpower data used in the process, and 12 years of forces data. It gathers manpower and dollar data through keys tied to the Management Decision Package (MDEP), appropriation (appn), program element (PE), Army program element (APE), and other identifiers including the command or resource organization code. HQDA uses the database to—
(1) Support user analysis.
(2) Build and record the combined POM/BES.
(3) Prepare the Army portion of the FYDP to reflect the POM/BES and later the President’s Budget.
(4) Report consistent Army resource positions to OSD through the Select and Native Programming (SNaP) Data Collection System, Standard Data Collection System (SDCS), Service Support Manpower System (SSMS), and Comptroller Information System (CIS).
(5) Issue Army commands Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) reflecting the FYDP resource position after each FYDP update.
(6) Provide MDEP execution and expenditure information.

b. Future System enhancement. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) Business Operating System (BOS) is a project to standardize and better integrate the transactional automated information systems used in the Headquarters Department of Army level Programming and Budgeting processes. These systems are core to the PPBE business processes of the headquarters for gathering programmatic requirements, balancing resources and delivering the Army’s program budget to OSD. This project is streamlining programming and budgeting business processes and significantly improving strategic analysis capabilities. The project is architecting, reengineering, streamlining and consolidating HQDA systems, feeder database systems, and streamlining the business processes associated with them. The project brings to bear powerful business intelligence analytical tools to support strategic planning, programming and budgeting within Headquarters Department of the Army. These improvements will improve capability, eliminate redundancies and reduce overall costs of operations. The PPB BOS project is a complementary to the Army’s GFEBS program.

Section VII
Army PPBE Deliberative Forums

9–27. Army Resources Board

The Army Resources Board (ARB) is chaired by the SECARMY with the CSA as the vice chair. The board serves as a senior Army leadership forum, through which the SECARMY and CSA review Army policy and resource allocation
issues, particularly those emanating from the Army PPBE process. It sets policy and approves guidance and priorities. The ARB approves the prioritization of Army programs and selects resource allocation alternatives. In addition, upon their completion, the ARB approves TAP, POM/BES, and Change Proposal (CP). Table 9–12 shows the composition of Army PPBE deliberative forums.

Table 9–12
Composition of Army PPBE deliberative forums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forum</th>
<th>Chairs</th>
<th>OSA members</th>
<th>Army staff Members</th>
<th>Advisory and support</th>
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<tr>
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<td>SecArmy-Chair</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>VCSA</td>
<td>Other participants as required</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>CSA–Vice chair</td>
<td>ASA(ALT)</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
<td>Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
<td>G–6</td>
<td>ADCS G–3/5/7</td>
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<td>ASA(I&amp;E)</td>
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<td>DPAE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ASA(M&amp;RA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>DAB</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Counsel</td>
<td></td>
<td>ARB Executive Secretary, ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIO/G–6</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRG</td>
<td>USA–Co-chair</td>
<td>ASA(ALT)</td>
<td>G–1</td>
<td>Other participants as required</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VCSA–Co-chair</td>
<td>ASA(CW)</td>
<td>G–2</td>
<td>Advisors</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
<td>G–3/5/7</td>
<td>ADCS G–3/5/7</td>
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<td>ASA(I&amp;E)</td>
<td>G–4</td>
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<td>General Counsel</td>
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<td>ACPIM</td>
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<td>PPBC</td>
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<td>G–1</td>
<td>Other participants as required, including—</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>G–2</td>
<td>Director of Operations and Support, ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
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<td>DPFAE–Co-chair for Pro-</td>
<td>ASA(I&amp;E)</td>
<td>G–4</td>
<td>Director of Investment, ASA(FM&amp;C)</td>
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<td>gramming</td>
<td>ASA(M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ACPIM</td>
<td>Director of Requirements, G–3/5/7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DAB–Co-chair for Budget-</td>
<td>AASA</td>
<td>TSG</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ing and Execution</td>
<td>CIO/G–6</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, G–3/5/7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Representives of—</td>
<td>DARNG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Director of Force Development, G–8</td>
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<td>Representatives of—</td>
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<td>CIO/G–6</td>
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9–28. Senior Review Group

a. Co-chaired by the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) the Senior Review Group (SRG) serves as a senior level forum to resolve resource allocation and other issues but generally does not revisit decisions made at lower levels. The SRG monitors staff implementation of decisions of the ARB and makes recommendations to the ARB on—

1. The prioritization of programs.
2. Resource allocation alternatives.
3. Final TAP, POM/BES, and change proposals (CPs).
4. Other issues as determined by the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and VCSA.

b. See table 9–12 for composition of the SRG.

9–29. Planning Program Budget Committee

a. The Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) has three co-chairs, one of whom presides over the forum depending upon the subject matter under consideration - the ADCS G–3/5/7 for planning, the DPAE for programming, and the DAB for budgeting and execution.

b. The PPBC serves the PPBE process in both a coordinating and executive-advisory role. It provides a continuing forum in which planning, program, and budget managers review, adjust, and recommend courses of action on relevant issues. The PPBC may return the results of committee deliberations to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action. It may pass them, in turn, to the SRG and ARB for review or approval. Among its responsibilities, the PPBC—

1. Maintains overall discipline of the PPBE process.
2. Oversees the PPBE schedule, with each chair controlling the chair’s respective portion of the schedule.
3. Monitors force management and preparation of TAP, POM/BES, CP, and President’s Budget.
4. Makes sure that Army policy remains internally consistent and that program adjustments remain consistent with Army policy and priorities.

c. The PPBC maintains the PPBE Strategic Automation Committee as a Joint DOD Committee to implement configuration management of the PPBE Enterprise System and to oversee long-term plans for investing in information
technology to improve the performance of PPBE functions (para 9–6a(10), above). As required, the PPBC may set up other standing committees or working groups to resolve issues that arise in managing the program or budget.

d. See table 9–12 for composition of the PPBC.

9–30. PPBC Council of Colonels
A group of colonels or civilian equivalents, who represent PPBC members, meet throughout the PPBE process in a forum known as the Council of Colonels. The Council is co-chaired by the Chief, Resource Analysis and Integration Office, G–3/5/7; Chief, Program Development Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; and Deputy Director of Management and Control, ASA(FM&C). The group packages proposals, frames issues, and otherwise coordinates matters that come before the PPBC when it convenes.

9–31. Emerging Fora
As this text was going to print, subsets of the three groups addressed in paragraphs 9–28 through 9–30 were becoming more active in the process. These groups called the “Budget, Requirements and Program” (BRP or “burp”) 9, 8 and 6, are composed of: the G–3, G–8 and MILDEP ASA(FM&C); ADCS, G3, Dir PAE and Dir ABO; and the Chief DAMO–CIR, Chief Program Development Division, PAE and Deputy Director Management and Control, ABO. These groups meet on a regular basis, and handle planning, programming, budgeting or resourcing decisions and issues appropriate to their level. The BRP can call meetings of the larger groups as needed to share information or gain wider perspective.

9–32. Program Evaluation Groups
HQDA uses six Program Evaluation Groups (PEG) to support planning, programming, and budgeting (fig 9–6). Each is co-chaired by a representative of the Secretariat and a representative of the PEG’s proponent, who provides the PEG with executive and administrative support. Permanent members include representatives of ASA(FM&C) appropriation sponsors, G–3/5/7 program prioritizers and requirements staff officers, and G–8–PAE program integrators.

a. PEGs program and monitor resources to perform Army functions assigned by 10 USC, Subtitle B - Army and to support the combatant commands and OSD-assigned executive agencies. Each PEG administers a set of Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) within one of the following functional groupings: Manning, Training, Organizing, Equipping, Sustaining, and Installations.

b. Each PEG, subject to existing program and budget guidance, sets the scope, quantity, priority, and qualitative nature of resource requirements that define its program. They monitor PEG resource transactions and, as required, make both administrative and substantive changes to assigned MDEPs. MDEP proponents, subject matter experts, and, as appropriate, representatives of commands and agencies participate in PEG deliberations.

c. The DARNG, CAR, and CIO/G–6 serve as Program Integrators to the PEGs (fig 9–1). Program Integrators provide technical assistance and monitor actions to integrate priorities and statutory, Defense, and Army requirements for the ARNG, AR and information technology programs into the Army’s overall program.

d. PEGs, assisted by the Program Integrators, help HQDA functional proponents—

(1) Build TAP and the Army program and help convert the program into budget-level detail.

(2) Maintain program consistency, first during planning and later when preparing, analyzing, and defending the integrated program-budget.

(3) Track program and budget performance during execution.

(4) Keep abreast of policy changes during each phase of the PPBE process.
Program Evaluation Groups

Manning (MM)

Co-chaired by ASA(M&RA) and G-1

Provides the Active Army, ARNG, and AR with authorized personnel by grade and skill. Integrates these activities for the ARNG and AR.

Training (TT)

Co-chaired by ASA(M&RA) and G-3/5/7

Provides resources for Active Army, ARNG, and AR unit readiness (to include medical units) and unit and collective training (Ground OPTEMPO and the Army Flying Hour Program), fixed wing aircraft operation and maintenance, combat training centers (CTC), mobilization, theater security cooperation activities, and military contingency operations.

Provides for collective training, institutional training (initial entry training, leader development, professional development, functional training), and officer acquisition (USMA, ROTC, OCS). Supports multinational force compatibility through integrated training, military exercises, and command control exchanges with allies and coalition partners.

Deals with programs, systems, and activities to satisfy intelligence requirements of the President and Secretary of Defense as well as those of the senior Army leadership. (These are requirements funded in the Army portions of the NFIP under Program 31 and Army intelligence support to national agencies under Program 9. (The Equipping PEG, however, addresses most requirements for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) managed by G-8-FD under Programs 2, and 4 through 10 as well as acquisitions to meet other intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) requirements.

Organizing (OO)

Co-chaired by M&RA and AASA (provisional)

Provides minimum essential Generating Forces for peacetime sustainment and training and wartime mobilization and power projection capabilities for Army Operating Forces.

Supports special programs that meet needs of The Army.

Equipping (EE)

Co-chaired by ASA(ALT) and G-8

Provides resources for the integration of new doctrine, training, organization, and equipment to develop and field warfighting capabilities for the Active Army, ARNG, and AR. Focuses mainly on materiel acquisition, which

Equipping (EE)—continued

comprises RDT&E and procurement of weapons and equipment

Considers operating and support costs to field weapons and equipment as well as the cost of combat development.

Sustaining (SS)

Co-chaired by ASA(ALT) and G-4

Provides resources to sustain operations of the Active Army, ARNG, and AR, stressing worldwide readiness. Scope embraces strategic mobility, Army reserve stocks, industrial preparedness, and central supply, and also internal operations of Army depots and arsenals, procurement of secondary item Army reserves, and transportation. Includes depot materiel maintenance.

Includes measures to assure the quality and timeliness of sustainment resources and to develop and maintain strategic logistics systems, manage weapon systems, provide security assistance, conduct logistics long-range planning, and reshape Army logistics.

Addresses measures to streamline Army business operations, improve information management structure, and develop concepts of operations and procedures to further the integration, sharing, standardization, and interoperability of information systems.

Installations (II)

Co-chaired by ASA(I&E) and ACSIM

Provides resources to support Active Army. Reserve and National Guard installations-the operational and service support centers where soldiers, families and civilians work, live and train.

Plans and Programs Installation funding for Base Support, Military Construction, Army Family Housing, Base Realignment and Closure and Environmental Restoration programs. Base Support is subdivided into two parts:

Base Operations Support (BOS) consisting of Base Operations (BASOPS), Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, Family Programs, Environment, and Audio Visual/Base Communications.

Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) providing for maintenance, demolition, improvement or replacement of facilities and infrastructure.

Provides for minimal essential workforce in support of Installation Management and continuously seeks to leverage current and strength by converting non-core military to civilian employees or contract, where appropriate.

Figure 9–6. Program Evaluation Groups
9–33. A principal PPBE-related committee
Although not a PPBE forum, the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) helps integrate the development and acquisition of materiel into all PPBE phases. Chaired by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), the ASARC serves as the Army’s senior-level review body for Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II programs. (ACAT IC and ACAT IAC programs are Major Defense Acquisition Programs for which the AAE exercises Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)). An ACAT II program is one that fails to qualify as an ACAT I program, but nevertheless meets the criteria for a major system.)

Section VIII
Process and Structure
Beginning with the planning phase, sections IX through XIII, which follow, present a phase-by-phase description of the DOD and Army PPBE process. First, however, a graphical overview of system process and structure sets the stage.

9–34. System process
Figure 9–7 (folded insert at rear of text) shows the general sequence and interrelationship of events of the biennial cycle of the PPBE process.

9–35. System structure
Figure 9–8 displays the structure within which the PPBE process operates.
Figure 9–8A. PPBE framework and acronyms
### Legend

Note: - Bold structure lines in the diagram link decision makers and deliberative forums with key events and contributing commands and other operating agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAE</td>
<td>Army Acquisition Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>AASA</td>
<td>Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>Army command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSIM</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Army Materiel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARB</td>
<td>Army Resources Board</td>
</tr>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA (ALT)</td>
<td>ASA (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)</td>
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<td>ASA (CW)</td>
<td>ASA (Civil Works)</td>
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<td>ASA (FM&amp;C)</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Chief, Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Chief of Chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/JCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/L</td>
<td>Chief, Legislative Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Chief of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CbtCdr</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Change Proposals</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Chief of Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAB</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Board/Director Army Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>DARNG</td>
<td>Director Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Director of the Army Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>DSC for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>DSC for Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3/5/7</td>
<td>DSC for Operations and Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>DSC for Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-8</td>
<td>DSC for Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy SECDEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISC4</td>
<td>Director of Information Systems for Command Control, Communications, and Computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPAE</td>
<td>Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSA (IA)</td>
<td>Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSA (OR)</td>
<td>Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOH</td>
<td>Executive Office of the Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCB</td>
<td>Functional Capabilities Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Future Years Defense Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GDF</td>
<td>Guidance for Development of Forces</td>
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<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>House Appropriations Committee</td>
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<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
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<td>HBC</td>
<td>House Budget Committee</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JPG</td>
<td>Joint Program Guidance</td>
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<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
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<td>MDEP</td>
<td>Management Decision Package</td>
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<td>MILDEP</td>
<td>Military Deputy</td>
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<td>OSA</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>Program Executive Officer(s)</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Project or Program Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pri</td>
<td>Priority</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDAP</td>
<td>Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Army Requirements Determination Process</td>
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<td>RDTE</td>
<td>Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Senate Appropriation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBC</td>
<td>Senate Budget Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SLRG</td>
<td>Senior Leader Review Group</td>
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<td>SRG</td>
<td>Senior Review Group</td>
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<td>Struct</td>
<td>Structure</td>
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<td>System</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>The Army Plan</td>
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<td>TIG</td>
<td>The Inspector General</td>
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<td>TJAG</td>
<td>The Judge Advocate General</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>US Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>The Surgeon General</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>Under Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA (AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of the Army/ Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJCJS</td>
<td>Vise Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCSA</td>
<td>Vise Chief of Staff, Army</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Figure 9–8B. PPBE framework acronyms**
Section IX
DoD PPBE Planning Phase

9–36. NSC guidance
The National Security Strategy (NSS) set by the National Security Council (NSC) bears importantly on the PPBE process. Also bearing on the process are two sets of NSC documents: Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) and Presidential Review Directives (PRD). PDDs promulgate presidential decisions implementing national security policy and objectives in all areas involving national security. PRDs direct studies involving national security policy and directives.

9–37. Planning by OSD and the Joint Staff
PPBE planning is conducted by drawing on guidance from the National Security Council (NSC), OSD policy and resource planning and Joint Staff strategic planning. PPBE planning examines the military posture of the United States in comparison to national security objectives and resource limitations. It develops the national military strategy, and it identifies force levels to achieve the strategy. In addition, PPBE planning provides a framework of requirements, priorities, and risk. OSD uses the framework to give each combatant commander the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within defined fiscal constraints.

9–38. Joint Strategic Planning System
The Joint Strategic Planning System is used by the CJCS to provide advice to the President and SecDef concerning the strategic direction of the armed forces and defense policy, programs and budgets. The system is described in detail in Chapter 4 of this text; however the two key documents produced by the system to inform the PPBE process are described here.

a. Chairman’s Program Recommendation. Presented before publication of the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) compares planning guidance and objectives with current and projected resource profiles from the most recent President’s Budget and related FYDP. The CPR focuses on recommendations that will enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint war fighting requirements. As needed, it expands, refines, or modifies initial recommendations provided in the Joint Planning Document (JPD).

b. Chairman’s Program Assessment. The Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) checks the balance and capabilities of composite force and support levels recommended by Service POMs. It compares recommended capabilities and levels with priorities established by the SecDef. The document helps the SecDef make decisions during OSD program and budget review reflected in PDMs and PBDs.

9–39. OSD Planning Process
For the building of the 10–15 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) The Secretary of Defense established new guidance documents – The Guidance for Development of Forces (GDF) and the Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF) In May of 2008 the Secretary of Defense replaced the SecDef’s Strategic Planning Guidance with the Guidance for Development of Forces (GDF) and the Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF). The SECDEF also publishes the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) outlining how joint programs will be run.

a. The GDF is largely policy and strategy guidance with some programmatic direction on issues of paramount importance to the SecDef concerning the development of the force during and beyond the POM period.

b. The Guidance for Employment of Forces provides guidance for the use of the force in being. It outlines strategic objectives for campaign planning as well as strategic assumptions, objectives and priorities for contingency planning, security cooperation, global posture and global force management.

c. The JPG, a fiscally constrained document, contains the SecDef’s decisions on Joint Program and provides direction for incorporating those decisions into the programs and budgets of the military departments and defense agencies.

Section X
PPBE Planning

In response to National, Defense and Joint strategy documents the Army Concept Strategy (ACS) documents lay out future Army Warfighting concepts that will allow the Army to transform to meet the challenges of our changing national security environment. This family of concepts forms the analytical basis for determining the solutions for
capability gaps that will, when approved through the Army Capability Integration and Development System, form the basis for resource allocation decisions. The ACS considers a period extending several decades.

9–41. The Army Plan

a. Army planning responds to and complements OSD planning and joint strategic planning. In particular, Army planning:
   (1) Helps the senior Army leadership determine force requirements and objectives and set priorities.
   (2) Provides the basis for positions and comments supporting Army participation in OSD and joint processes.
   (3) Lays the planning basis for the Army program.

b. The foundation of Army planning lies in The Army Plan (TAP), which provides strategic planning, priorities, programming, and execution guidance in four sequentially developed and substantively integrated sections:
   (1) The Army Strategy (AS), which forms section I of the TAP—
      (a) Nests Army planning in National, OSD, and Joint strategic guidance.
      (b) Gives rationale for transforming The Army per the Army Vision.
      (c) Provides senior leader guidance.
      (d) Identifies joint demand for Army capabilities.
   (2) Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), which is section II of TAP, links requirements to strategy and guides development of resource priorities for operational tasks.
   (3) The Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM), which exists as section III of TAP, relates operational tasks to resource tasks, thereby helping link operational tasks and their associated resources to Army Title 10 functions.
      c. The Army Campaign Plan supercedes the Army Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP) and is Section IV of TAP. The eight campaign objectives of the ACP- support global operations, Transform from the current to future force, optimize RC contribution, sustain the right all-volunteer force, adjust the global footprint, shape the future force, adapt the institutional Army, and develop a joint, interdependent logistics structure - incorporate Army transformation into the context of ongoing strategic commitments.

9–42. Army Strategy

The G–3/5/7 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate prepare Army Strategy (AS) (TAP section I). The AS is the Army’s institutional strategy. It provides strategic guidance to translate requirements “to serve the Nation”-principally in terms of trained and ready forces capable of decisive action across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict-into fielded capabilities. The AS provides a long-term general perspective (10–20 years) for planners through a common understanding of the Army’s contribution to national security and the Joint Team. It also articulates the key Army concerns that must be addressed during the next POM period.

9–43. Army Planning Priorities Guidance

The G–3/5/7 Resource Analysis and Integration Office prepare the Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG) (TAP section II). The APPG covers the mid-term period of the next 6-year Program Objective Memorandum (POM) plus 5–7 additional years. Adding substantial detail to Army Strategy, the APPG identifies and prioritizes enduring operational capabilities needed now and in the future to maintain The Army’s core competencies cited in Field Manual 1 (FM 1), The Army. The APPG provides risk guidance as it relates to Army capabilities in accordance with the QDR Risk Framework.

9–44. Army Program Guidance Memorandum

The G–8 Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate prepares the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM) (TAP section III), which links operational capabilities and programming. Providing direction to Program Evaluation Groups (PEG), the APGM conveys Army senior leader intent as well as broad, general guidance concerning acceptable levels of risk for the initial POM/BES build. Applying readiness and war fighting requirements derived from strategic and operational capabilities in TAP sections I and II to program development, it completes the succession of guidance from strategic planning to mid-term planning to programming. Guided by planning priorities, the APGM translates operational tasks known as core competencies to resource tasks to perform Army Title 10 functions. It then prescribes other, non-operational task requirements to assure carrying out the three interdependent components of the Army Vision-People, Current Readiness, and Future Forces. Through Management Decision Packages (MDEPs), the APGM relates resource tasks to the Army’s Title 10 functions, grouped under the PEG structure as Manning, Training, Organizing, Equipping, Sustaining, and Installations. A forwarding memorandum from the SECARMY and CSA provides HQDA agencies additional guidance.

9–45. Army Campaign Plan

The G–3/5/7 Army Campaign Plan and Transformation Office prepares and maintains the Army Campaign Plan. The ACAP is an order that implements Army Strategy, is informed by the CSA Vision and is integrated with the Army Imperatives. It provides campaign and other major objectives and integrates other major efforts of the department.
currently including Grow The Army, Modular Conversion and ARFORGEN. It is as much a process as a product as there is an established battle rhythm that provides continuous monitoring of progress towards its goals.

9–46. Required Capability determination

a. The Army Concept Strategy (ACS) is the process that identifies needed future capabilities and potential solutions across the DOTMLPF domains. The process is designed to maintain consistency with both Defense and Joint capabilities guidance.

b. The Army retains approval authority for validating military required capabilities at the level of the Chief of Staff, Army. Centralizing validation focuses efforts to develop clear value-added capabilities matched to both Joint and Army future goals. Toward this end, HQDA applies rigorous analysis of the contribution made by a required capability to overall operational objectives of the future Army force as well as to its joint interoperability and affordability.

(1) HQDA procedure employs an Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) chaired by the VCSA. The AROC validates DOTMLPF requirements and recommends them for approval to the CSA through the Army Requirements Review Council (RRC). In discharging its function, the AROC aligns Army requirements closely to the Joint Staff Requirements Generation System (RGS) and reviews Army and Joint requirements for validation within the Joint process.

(2) HQDA uses G–3/5/7’s Directorate of Requirements (DAMO–RQ) as the Army’s single point of entry for military requirements, whether emergency or routine. With representatives from selected commands and across the HQDA staff, the directorate shepherds each requirement through the validation and approval process. A major objective is to ensure that the Army program remains requirements based.

a. In furtherance of that aim, the directorate coordinates closely with the PEGs. Beginning in October and November, in the early stages of program development, requirements staff officer’s work with PEGs to make sure that funded programs have a clearly definable and documented link to military requirements or leadership designated capabilities. Together, PEGs and their requirements staff representatives attempt to strengthen linkages of programs meeting this criterion and to terminate those failing to do so. From January, when formal preparation of the program gets under way through April, these efforts continue during deliberations to approve the individual Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) that make up each PEG program. Once again, the aim is to make sure the unfolding PEG program links to validated military requirements and leadership-designated capabilities.

b. If unresolved at the PEG level, a program earmarked for termination is forwarded through the ADCS G–3/5/7 to the PPBC for decision.

c. More detailed information on this process can be found in Chapters 5 and 11 of this text.

9–47. Army Modernization Strategy

a. G–8 prepares the Army Modernization Strategy (AMS). The AMS outlines the vision for modernizing the future force and a strategy for near- to mid-term force development and long-term evolution. Its modernization objectives reflect the vision and guidance of the senior Army leadership.

b. The AMS describes required capabilities resourced through the PPBE process. It describes the relationship between desired future capabilities and the materiel solution.

c. The AMS, the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP), and the Weapons System Handbook present the total picture of the Army’s RDA investment. The AMS also supports the review of the President’s Budget by congressional authorization and appropriation committees and their staffs.

9–48. Army Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan

The G–8 with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)) prepares the Army Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) Plan. The RDA Plan analyses requirements for battlefield and infrastructure capabilities and ranks the requirements in priority order. It matches the requirements to materiel solutions, that is, to RDT&E and procurement programs. Developed by HQDA and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and guided by the National Military Strategy (NMS) and The Guidance for Development of Forces (GDF), the materiel solutions provide an integrated RDA position. What follows describes the plan in greater detail.

a. The RDA Plan is a 15-year plan for developing and producing technologies and materiel to advance Army modernization. Imposing mandatory TOA controls, the plan restricts modernization to those efforts that are both technically and fiscally achievable. The process truncates requirements developed through unconstrained planning into an RDA program that, within limited resources, maximizes war fighting capabilities and supporting infrastructure.

b. Represented by the G–8 RDA database, the plan presents the RDA program as a required set of Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) arrayed in 1-n order by G–8 and ASA(ALT). Each MDEP describes a program, function, or organization and the dollars and system quantities needed. It not only covers the 6-year FYDP but also the 9-year Extended Planning Period (EPP).

c. A continuous process, the RDA Plan focuses on periodic revisions to the RDA database. Revisions typically occur during preparation of the even year combined POM/BES (February to August) and the President’s Budget
How The Army Runs

(September to January). During these periods, HQDA adjusts the FYDP years, or first 6 years of the RDA Plan. Then, the Army’s RDA community adjusts the final 9 years making sure progression from POM/BES to the President’s Budget and Extended Planning Period (EPP) is not only affordable, but also executable.

d. Each December, TRADOC provides HQDA its recommendations on materiel requirements, arriving at the recommendations through a Capability Needs Analysis (CNA). The process takes into account such guidance as the NMS and Guidance for Development of Forces as well as the TAP, the AMS, and integrated priority lists (IPLS) of the combatant commanders. The CNA compares future capabilities required by the total force against the fiscally constrained budgeted force. The comparison determines force modernization needs that TRADOC rank orders according to their contribution to mission accomplishment.

9–49. Force Development and Total Army Analysis

Force Development and its component Total Army Analysis are the systems and processes used by the Army to define military capabilities, design force structures to provide these capabilities, translate organizational concepts based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. These topics are addressed in detail in Chapter 5 of this text.

Section XI

Operational Planning Link to the DOD PPBE

9–50. Operational planning

Operational planning is addressed in detail in Chapter 6 of this text.

9–51. Missions and tasks

The JSCP carries out the NMS through unified command operation plans (OPLAN). Its accompanying intelligence estimate assesses potential threats and their impact on available U.S. Forces. Based on the assessment, the document assigns missions and planning tasks to combatant commanders. It also apportions the combat forces expected to be available. Annexes amplify guidance, capabilities, and tasks in specified functional areas.

Section XII

Integrated Programming-Budgeting Phase

9–52. Army programming and budgeting

An integrated decision process, Army programming-budgeting produces a combined Program Objective Memorandum and Budget Estimate Submission (POM/BES) in the even years and program change proposals (CP) odd years. In conjunction with OSD review, Army integrated programming and budgeting supports development of the President’s Budget. Once the President’s Budget goes to Congress, the Army presents and defends its portion of the budget in congressional hearings.

9–53. Guidance

a. Guidance for the Development of the Force and Joint Programming Guidance. The primary products of the OSD planning phase, the Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) provides key strategy, policy and limited programmatic guidance to the services and defense agencies. The Joint Programming Guidance announces early SecDef decisions that are to be incorporated into service and agency programs and budgets.

b. Army Program Guidance Memorandum. Discussed in paragraph 9–44, above, the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM) provides direction to Program Evaluation Groups (PEG) to prepare them for the POM/BES build. It outlines strategic guidance and issues programming guidelines. In addition, it defines resource tasks for PEG goals, relating each task to one or more Management Decision Packages (MDEPs).

c. Technical Guidance Memorandum. G–8’s Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) complement the APGM with a Technical Guidance Memorandum (TGM) outlining program intent with respect to allocating resources to attain the Army Vision. The TGM also provides coordinating instructions to guide PEGs during the POM/BES build. Additional, PEG-by-PEG, guidance lays out programming priorities for specific programs set by the SecArmy and CSA and, for some programs, specifies a particular level of funding.

d. Fiscal Guidance. Before completion of the POM/BES build, OSD issues Fiscal Guidance establishing the Army’s total obligation authority (TOA) over the program years. DPAE then apportions the TOA to the PEGs for building their portion of the program. The guidance includes inflation factors and other administrative instructions.

e. Program and Budget Guidance. DPAE issues Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) typically twice each even year, after forwarding the combined POM/BES to OSD for review and after the President’s Budget is forwarded to Congress. An enterprise product, the PBG is produced jointly by ASA(FM&C)’s Budget Formulation Division (SAFM–BUC–F) and the G–8’s Program Budget Data Management Division (DAPR–DPI) in coordination with G–3/5/7’s Force Accounting and Documentation Division (DAMO–FMP). The PBG provides resource guidance to major Army commands (ACOM), Program Executive Offices (PEO), and other operating agencies. Narrative Guidance
instructs commands and agencies, in addressing resource requirements, such as those related to flying hours, ground operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and rates for fuel, inflation, and foreign currency. A related automation file reflects the resource status of each command and agency. Commands and agencies use their PBG resource information to update their databases for the forthcoming PPBE cycle.

f. Integrated program-budget data call. HQDA publishes a multivolume Resource Formulation Guide (RFG) to facilitate the PPBE process. Issued in the fall, RFG volume 3 (Integrated Program-Budget Data Call) describes the data ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies must submit to HQDA to prepare the POM and BES. Commands and agencies may propose changes to their resources over the program years. Volume 3, however, requires that changes remain zero-sum within the command or agency.

g. Programming Data Requirements. Before each POM submission, OSD updates a web-based manual entitled Programming Data Requirements (PDR). The PDR provides instructions for preparing and submitting data, requirements, and program justifications to support component POMs. Prescribing formats and exhibits, its instructions describe programming data requirements and some budgeting data, which components submit using OSD’s Select and Native Programming (SNaP) Data Collection System.

h. POM preparation guidance. As required, HQDA issues RFG volume 4 augmenting OSD PDR with additional guidance for preparing the POM.

i. BES preparation guidance. Two OSD budget guidance documents affect content of the BES. Volume 2 of the DOD Financial Management Regulation prescribes various exhibits and displays to be used in presenting the budget. The Annual Budget Call Memorandum provides supplemental information such as current rate and pricing guidance. Complementing these documents, ASA(FM&C) also issues administrative instructions for preparing the Army’s BES.

9–54. Resource framework
The Army Resource Framework is designed to layout the Army’s resources in a consistent manner to facilitate resource decision making in all PPBE cycles. The major categories, People, Readiness, Materiel, and Service & Infrastructure align with the emerging Army Enterprise Management structure.

9–55. POM preparation

a. Start up. The biennial integrated programming-budgeting phase of the process starts in October of the odd years as OSD reviews the recently forwarded change proposals. In developing the Army program, programmers translate planning decisions, OSD programming guidance, and congressional guidance into a comprehensive allocation of forces, manpower, and funds. In doing this they integrate and balance centrally managed programs for manpower; operations; research, development, and acquisition; and stationing and construction. Concurrently, they incorporate requirements presented by ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies for manpower, operation and maintenance, housing, and construction.

b. Initial programmatic review. From October through December, HQDA—
(1) Reviews the existing program to determine program deficiencies.
(2) Sorts existing Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) by Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs).
(3) Establishes force structure and civilian manpower authorizations.
(4) Responds to changes recorded in Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) and Program Budget Decisions (PBD) generated by the OSD program and budget review (para 9–64, below).
Preparing the database.

(1) Formal preparation of the POM/BES starts once the President’s Budget goes to Congress. This usually occurs after the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in February. As a start point, DPAE establishes a base file in the PPBE database that reflects the President’s Budget resource position. Afterwards, in a series of zero-sum adjustments that leave resource levels in the President’s Budget unchanged for the budget years, HQDA revises the database. The adjustments:

(a) Update earlier estimates with new information and revise them for inflation.

(b) Move resources between and among current Army Management Structure codes (AMSCO) and MDEP structures...

(c) Consolidate or otherwise restructure individual programs through rolls and splits to make the overall Army program more manageable.

(d) Re-price existing programs as needed and, when required by modified resource levels, identify offsetting deductions as bill payers.

(2) Figure 9–10 shows timelines for updating the PPBE database and other significant events for the FY 2012–2017 POM/BES build.
Figure 9–10. Representative Timeline for POM/BES build

Legend

ABO  Army Budget Office  PEG  Program Evaluation Group
ACC  Army Commanders Conference  P&F  program and financial
ACOM  Army command  PF  POM file
Appn  appropriation  POM  Program Objective Memorandum
ARB  Army Resources Board  PPBC  Planning Program Budget Committee
BES  Budget Estimate Submission  Prep  prepare (preparation)
Bdgt  budget  Pres  President
BF  Base File  Prog  program
BRP  Budget Requirements & Programs  Rev  review
Conf  conference  Rgmts  requirements
Disappr  disapprovals  Sched  schedule
db  database  SRG  Senior Review Group
EOH  Executive Office of the Headquarters  TAA  Total Army Analysis
FYDP  Future Years Defense Program  TAP  The Army Plan
GDF  Guidance for Development of Forces  TGM  Technical Guidance Memorandum
Guid  guidances  USF  Unit Set Fielding
HODA  Headquarters Department of the Army
OSD  Office Secretary of Defense

Note: — Timeline, summer 2006.
d. Command participation. ACOMs participate in the PPBE process as do PEOs, which report through the Army Acquisition Support Center (ASC). These and other operating agencies make mission and operating requirements known through Commander’s Narratives, Command-Requested Changes, and additional data submissions prescribed by RFG volume 3. ACOM commanders serving as commanders of Army Component Commands (ACC) integrate operational requirements of the combatant command into their program and budget input. In addition, combatant commanders highlight their pressing requirements in an integrated priority list (IPL) that receives close review during program development by HQDA, the Joint Staff, and OSD.

e. Use of Program Evaluation Groups.

(1) As mentioned, HQDA packages program requirements into MDEPs, each associated with one of five resource management areas (para 9–21, above). HQDA then assigns each MDEP to a PEG to help build and track the Army POM that forms the Army portion of the DOD FYDP.

(2) PEG POM-building activity begins in the fall and peaks March through May of the following year. Figure 9–6, above, outlines PEG areas of interest.

(3) PEGs administer assigned MDEPs. They set the scope, quantity, priority, and qualitative nature of resource requirements that define each PEG program. They monitor PEG resource transactions, making both administrative and substantive changes to their MDEPs as required. In the process, PEGs review assigned MDEPs in terms of total obligation authority (TOA) guidance. They review command and agency requested requirements submitted via Schedule 1s and their POM. At the same time, PEGs review integrated priority lists (IPLs) of the combatant commands as well as resource needs expressed by the supporting Army Component Command (ACC). PEGs relate these command operating requirements to HQDA guidance as well as to existing MDEPs and new initiatives.

(4) Meanwhile, serving as Program Integrators, the DARNG, CAR, and CIO/G–6 provide technical assistance to the PEGs and monitor actions to integrate priorities and statutory, Defense, and Army requirements for their respective programs.

(5) Based on review of military requirements related to their Title 10 area of responsibility, each PEG builds an executable program characterized by affordability, continuity, and balance. In the process, the PEG—

(a) Validates requested changes submitted by ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.

(b) Reconciles conflicts involving unfunded requirements or decrements on which commands fail to reach agreement.

(c) Recommends the allocation of available resources and offsetting decrements to support approved unfunded programs.

(d) Rank orders validated programs as PEG input to G–3/5/7’s overall POM 1-n prioritized program list.

(e) Evaluates HQDA, command, and other agency zero-sum realignments that reallocate programmed resources to meet existing shortfalls and changed requirements.

(f) Coordinates resource changes with appropriate Service, DOD, and non-DOD agencies when required.

(g) Makes sure that proposed reallocations conform to legal restraints and Army policy and priorities, avoid imprudently high risk, and maintain the ability to execute mandatory programs and subprograms.

(h) Prices programmatic decisions that the Army can defend during review by OSD, OMB, and the Congress.

f. Internal program review. The Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) meets periodically throughout the POM/BES build to review and adjust the developing program, devising courses of action and recommendations on relevant issues as appropriate. Bearing on the PPBC review is the Army Commanders’ Conference scheduled in February, which gives field commanders the chance to express their views on the prospective program. The Senior Review Group (SRG), in turn, convenes early in the process to approve guidance and, at key stages, to ratify PPBC decisions. The Army Resources Board (ARB) convenes in one or more sessions in July to review and approve the completed even year program and associated budget estimate submission and the odd year developed program change proposals and budget change proposals.

g. Program Objective Memorandum. The biennial, even year POM, which documents the program decision of the SECARMY and CSA, presents the Army’s proposal for a balanced and integrated allocation of its resources within specified OSD fiscal and manpower constraints. POM subject matter remains relatively constant from cycle to cycle, but varies as required to address special issues. Topics of the FY 2010–2015 POM appear in table 9–13.
9–56. Program and budget correlation

a. The POM defines what the Army intends to do over the 6-year program period. It uses the MDEP to package required resources by mission, function, and other program objectives. Throughout program development, however, both programmers and budgeters make sure that programmatic decisions receive proper costing and that Army resource decisions can be defended during budget reviews conducted by OSD, OMB, and Congress. Working closely together, programmers and budgeters help the senior Army leadership consider all relevant information before the leaders make resource allocation decisions. The approach precludes the need, later in the integrated process, to revisit most issues. Moreover, it presents a near seamless transition from program to budget.

b. Figure 9–13 shows the complementary way that programmers and budgeters view resource requirements. The display shows from left to right the manpower and dollars needed to carry out missions and functions. From top to bottom, the display shows how these requirements are distributed among Army programs to form appropriation requests to Congress.

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**Table 9–13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics covered in POM/BES 10–15</th>
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<td>Introduction</td>
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<td>Combatant Commanders Integrated Priorities List (IPLs)</td>
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9–57. BES preparation

a. As mentioned, HQDA prepares the BES concurrently with the POM, submitting the combined POM/BES to OSD in August every even year. The BES covers the first 2 years of the program approved by the SECARMY and CSA.

b. In fact, however, one or more events may cause HQDA to re-address certain POM/BES decisions. For example, during program-budget preparation, Congress reviews the budget for the upcoming fiscal year. The review requires that the Army track resultant congressional actions and make appropriate adjustments in the BES. Also, after completing the POM, changes occur in rates and prices available during POM build. The later information often requires altering such rates and prices as those for the Army Working Capital Fund, pay, fuel, or inflation.

9–58. OSD program and budget review

OSD begins review of the even year combined POM/BES and odd year change proposals (CPs) soon after their submission (POM/BES and CPs submitted in the August through October timeframe). The program and budget review continues until late December. The review concludes when the Administration makes final Presidential Budget decisions. Figure 9–12 highlights events during review of POM/BES FY 10–15.

a. Issues center on compliance with the Guidance for the Development of Forces and JPG, the overall balance of Service programs, and late-breaking significant issues.

b. As issues arise, representatives of HQDA principal officials meet with their OSD counterparts. The Army representatives present the Army position and try to clarify the issue. If possible, the issue is resolved at this level.

c. By late November, after review officials have debated and decided program issues, the DepSecDef issues one or more Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) directing specific changes to program positions of the submitted POM. Before completing the budget, if it is needed, the DepSecDef publishes a Summary PDM along with a memorandum describing the disposition of programmatic issues.

d. Budget issues during the review are decided through Program Budget Decisions (PBD). Focusing on proper pricing, reasonableness, and program execution, PBDs present at least one alternative to the BES position in the budget area addressed. A PBD may be based on errors or on strength of justification. It may result from analytical disagreement or, it may be motivated by cost savings or changes in policy. Whatever the reason, the Army analyzes each PBD and responds to OSD, either agreeing or disagreeing with the OSD position.

e. After the DepSecDef or USD (Comptroller) has signed most PBDs, each Service selects as Major Budget Issues (MBI) certain adverse resource decisions. Army MBIs center on decrements to specific initiatives or broad issues that would significantly impair its ability to achieve its program intentions. An MBI addresses the adverse impact that would occur if the decrement were to prevail. At the end of the process, the SECARMY and CSA meet with the SecDef and DepSecDef on Major Budget Issues. After the meeting, the SecDef decides each issue, if necessary meeting with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the President to request additional funds or recommend other action.
9–59. President’s Budget

a. In December, at the end of the PBD cycle, OSD normally issues a final PBD or OSD memorandum incorporating any changes from deliberations on MBIs, thus completing the PBD process.

b. After implementing the final resource distribution at the budget activity and object class level, Army sends the information to OSD. OSD forwards the information as the Army’s portion of the Defense budget to OMB and OMB incorporates the Defense budget into the President’s Budget. The President’s Budget covers prior year obligations and updated resource estimates for the current year. During the biennial POM/BES cycle, the President’s Budget covers total obligation authority (TOA) estimates for the budget year and budget year plus 1. For the off-cycle update the following year, the budget year plus 1 becomes a revised second budget year.

9–60. Justification

a. Congressional budget hearings.

   (1) During budget justification, the Army presents and defends its portion of the President’s Budget before Congress. The process proceeds formally and informally under the staff supervision of the Chief of Legislative Liaison and ASA(FM&C).

   (2) After the President formally submits the budget, the Army provides detailed budget justification to the authorization and appropriations committees. First, however, appropriation sponsors will have prepared material in Army justification books to conform to decisions of the President and SecDef and congressional requirements for formats and supporting information. Justification books undergo internal Army review by ASA(FM&C) and are then sent to OSD for final review.
(3) The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and House Armed Services Committee (HASC) conduct authorization hearings for the various programs and appropriations. Concurrently, the Army’s budget request goes before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. In these hearings, the SECARMY and CSA normally testify first. Then with assistance from ASA(FM&C)’s Budget Liaison Office and the Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison, appropriation sponsors and functional proponents present and defend the details of the budget.

b. Legislative approval and enactment.

(1) When congressional committees complete their review, the Senate and House vote on the committee bills. Differences between the Senate and House versions are resolved via a joint conference.

(2) Budget justification ends when the President signs the authorization and appropriation bills for the coming fiscal year. Enacted into law, Army appropriations provide the legal authority to incur obligations and make payments.

c. Continuing Resolution Authority. When Congress fails to pass an appropriation by the end of September, it may pass a continuing resolution. Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) derives from emergency legislation that authorizes the funding of Government operations in the absence of appropriations. A temporary measure, the CRA usually restricts funding to the prior year level and prohibits new initiatives. HQDA separately publishes specific policy on how the Army will operate under the CRA. Failure to pass either an appropriation or CRA could result in a temporary shutdown of government operations. Normally, however, until an appropriation or CRA is enacted, DOD would continue minimum essential operations based on national defense requirements.

9–61. POM/BES updates

a. Congress requires the President to submit annual budgets notwithstanding the biennial PPBE cycle. The requirement has led OSD to update the combined POM/BES in the off-cycle year. The focus centers on revising the program, now minus 1 year to—

(1) Keep the 5 remaining years consistent with original decisions and strategy.

(2) Adjust to program decisions reflected in PDMs and budget decisions reflected in PBDs.

b. An important aspect of the update centers on program resource allocations for the upcoming (or second) budget year. The aim is to make the allocations as correct as possible in terms of program balance and execution. By re-examining the program, the task of making resource changes shifts from budget analysts to program analysts.

c. The process focuses on change proposals (CPs). For the update, the ADCS G–3/5/7, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), and Director of the Army Budget (DAB)—

(1) Re-assess the resource allocation strategy and determine what changed since the last POM/BES development and review.

(2) Assess how conditions have changed and determine what resource allocation adjustments are needed.

(3) Capture current positions and guidance of the Army senior leadership to detect changes since the spring and summer before, when preparing the original POM/BES.

(4) Adjust for the latest fiscal guidance.

(5) Review issues raised by PEG chairmen.

Section XIII
Budget Execution Phase

9–62. Management and accounting

During execution, the Army manages and accounts for funds and manpower to carry out approved programs. Army checks how well HQDA, ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies use allocated resources to carry out program objectives. Through the Army Joint Reconciliation Program, Army strengthens financial accounting and management to make sure financial reports accurately reflect the results of budget execution. The Army (and of even greater importance) OSD, OMB, and Congress apply execution feedback to adjust resource requirements during deliberation on the Army’s budget.

9–63. Financial management

The budget execution process applies funds appropriated by Congress to carry out authorized programs. This process first entails apportioning, allocating, and allotting funds. It then entails obligating and disbursing the funds and then reporting and reviewing the effectiveness of executing them. The procedure also involves performing in-progress evaluations and making necessary course corrections to reallocate resources to meet changing requirements that develop during execution. Known as reprogramming, making course corrections involves financing unbudgeted requirements that result from changed conditions unforeseen when submitting the budget and having higher priority than the requirements from which funds are diverted.

a. Funds control.

(1) Several events must occur before the Army can execute its programs for a new fiscal year under a new appropriations act:
OMB must apportion the appropriations, which provides obligation/budget authority. An apportionment distributes funds by making specific amounts available for obligation.

The Department of the Treasury must issue a Treasury Warrant providing cash.

The USD (Comptroller) must release program authority.

(2) Before the Army can execute its programs for the new fiscal year, it must load all these authorities into the Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), which is operated by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). Additionally, PBAS must be loaded with execution restrictions in accordance with congressional language. Finally, appropriation sponsors must spread undistributed decrements in the appropriations act to the appropriate program.

b. Apportionment.

(1) An apportionment requires a specific request. Using SF 132, Apportionment and Reapportionment Schedule, the ASA(FM&C) Funds Control Officer (SAFM–BUC–E) prepares the request within 5 days of the availability of an appropriations act or in response to approved reprogramming requests, supplementals, or rescissions. OSD approves or revises the apportionment requests and submits them to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. OMB approves, changes, or disapproves the requests and returns apportionments through OSD to the Army for entry into PBAS. OMB apportions—

(a) Operating accounts—Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Military Personnel (MILPERS), and Army Family Housing, Operations (AFHO)—on a fiscal quarterly basis.

(b) Investment accounts—RDT&E, Procurement, Military Construction (MILCON), and Army Family Housing (Construction) (AFHC)—at the start of the fiscal year rather than on an incremental basis, funding the entire amount of the appropriation.

(2) The apportionment determines the Budget Authority (BA) available in PBAS. For the operating accounts—even after releasing the entire program to the command—it is the cumulative amount of BA issued to commands and agencies by quarter that determines the execution level for the appropriation.

c. Program release.

(1) For investment accounts, the Army releases program and budget authority in equal amounts. Actual expenditure, however, depends on OSD program controls wherein the USD (Comptroller) gives the Army specific program releases that further control expenditures.

(a) For the RDT&E appropriation, the program is released at the program element (PE) level (SD Form 440, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Program/Fund Authorization). These are the same levels as those authorized and appropriated by Congress and reported in the DD Form 1414, Base for Reprogramming Actions and DD Form 1416, Report of Programs, which are provided to Congress to show execution changes to appropriated amounts.

(b) For the procurement appropriations (Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and Other Procurement), the program is released at the budget line item (BLIN) level (SD Form 440).

(c) Both the MILCON and the AFHC appropriations are released at the project level (OSD Format 460 for Military and Family Housing Construction accounts) as contained in the conference report accompanying the Military Construction Appropriations Act.

(2) Program releases for the operating accounts (Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) are contained in the obligation authority (OA) letter issued by the USD (Comptroller). OSD issues a separate OA letter for Army Family Housing (Operations) (AFHO).

d. Allocation, obligation, and reconciliations. Guided by HQDA appropriation sponsors and using the PBAS, ASA(FM&C) allocates apportioned funds to commands and agencies. Then—

(1) ACOMs and other operating agencies, in turn, make funds available to subordinate commands and installations by an allotment. Allotments authorize users to place orders and award contracts for products and services to carry out approved programs.

(2) Installations obligate funds as orders are placed and contracts awarded. They authorize payments as materiel is delivered or as services are performed.

(3) Installations, commands, and appropriation sponsors conduct joint reconciliations (para 9–78, below). Reconciliations make sure financial statements and reports accurately represent the results of the apportionment, allocation, and allotment program. Reconciliations also make sure payments align properly with supporting obligations. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) (SAFM–FO) manages the Army’s Joint Reconciliation Program.

e. Changes from the President’s Budget.

(1) After appropriations are enacted, appropriation sponsors and the Army Budget Office review the legislation to determine changes to the submitted budget. Changes include congressional adds, denial of programs, and changes to submitted funding levels. Changes also include identification of congressional special interest items, undistributed reductions, and any language relating to execution of the programs. Army applies such changes to amounts loaded into the PBAS.
9–64. Revised approved program for RDT&E

HQDA issues a Revised Approved Program (RAP) for the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation. The RAP shows congressional changes at both the program element (PE) and project level. In addition, the RAP spreads general reductions at the project level. It includes the amounts set aside for the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology Transfer Pilot Program (STTR). The RAP also includes amounts withheld by the USD (Comptroller) and HQDA and provides language on congressional restrictions as well as congressional special interest items. Because of the level of detail and the extensive information included, the RAP does not become available until several months after the appropriations act is enacted.

9–65. Program Budget Accounting System

a. The Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS) is used to issue both the program and its Budget Authority (BA) to commands and agencies for all appropriations. Once appropriation sponsors determine the revised appropriated level for each appropriation, they adjust the amounts in PBAS. Each program and its Budget Authority (BA) are released in equal amounts for all appropriations except O&M, MILPERS, and AFHO. These accounts receive the total program for the fiscal year but receive Budget Authority (BA) quarterly throughout the year. Budget Authority (BA) controls the total amount of obligations a command or agency can execute through any given quarter but allows flexibility in its application against the program received.

b. ASA(FM&C) controls PBAS at the HQDA level. The appropriation sponsor may request release of the program and Budget Authority (BA) or below threshold reprogramming actions. ASA(FM&C)’s Funds Control Officer (SAFM–BUC–E) reviews requests for compliance with congressional language and guidance of the USD (Comptroller) before entering the action in PBAS. PBAS produces documents that display both Budget Authority (BA) and the program. The documents include a section for remarks for executing the program and footnotes that provide statutory restrictions according to provisions of 31 USC 1517.

c. PBAS agrees with the program detail contained in DFAS–IN Manual 37–100.**** (The Army Management Structure (AMS)). Changes to PBAS appropriation structure can only be made at HQDA and must be approved as a change to DFAS–IN Manual 37–100.****. This manual initially agrees with the detail obtained in the President’s Budget request and is changed to incorporate congressional adds. Any additional changes may be controlled by congressional language and vary from one appropriation to another.

d. PBAS uses special reprogramming keys either to allow commands and agencies to move the program below threshold or to restrict the ability to reprogram below threshold at HQDA. The use of the keys in PBAS varies from one appropriation to another. PBAS also has special keys that identify congressional special interest items or programs that have been denied by Congress.

9–66. Obligation and outlay plans

a. During December and January, ASA(FM&C), in coordination with field activities and appropriation sponsors, develops obligation plans for each appropriation. Outlay plans are developed unilaterally at the ASA(FM&C) level. Obligation plans address unexpended funds. Outlay plans address unexpired, expired and no-year funds.

b. ASA(FM&C) sends completed outlay plans to the USD (Comptroller). Although the USD (Comptroller) discontinued a requirement to submit obligation plans, the Army continues their use internally since OSD still reviews Army obligation rates and requests rationale for execution rates that fall outside normal parameters.

c. Based on command estimates of annual obligations, both obligation and outlay plans tie to obligation and outlay controls in the President’s Budget. The importance of the outlay plan is that it relates directly to projected amounts the Treasury must borrow to maintain proper balances to meet expected disbursements (outlays).

9–67. Financing unbudgeted requirements

a. Congress recognizes the need for flexibility during budget execution to meet unforeseen requirements or changes
in operating conditions, including those to address minor, fact-of-life financial changes. Congress accepts that rigid adherence to program purposes and amounts originally budgeted and approved would jeopardize businesslike performance or mission performance. Thus, within stated restrictions and specified dollar thresholds, Congress allows federal agencies to reprogram existing funds to finance unfunded requirements. Typically, reprogramming diverts funds from undertakings whose requirements have lower priority than the new requirements being financed.

b. Congressional reprogramming language specifying budget authority limits, which varies by appropriation, controls the Army’s ability to move budget authority within appropriations (below threshold reprogramming). Moving the program in excess of specified limits requires congressional approval via a formal reprogramming request (DD Form 1415, Reprogramming Action). Moving amounts between appropriations (transfer authority) always requires a formal reprogramming request.

c. Provided reprogramming authority is not required, another way to finance unfunded requirements is to apply obligation authority harvested from joint reconciliations. This means using unexpired funds originally obligated against a contract or order but identified as excess to the need and subsequently deobligated. Reutilizing funds in this way gives allotment holders greater leverage in executing the budget and increases the buying power of the Army’s financial resources.

d. Fiscal year 1991 marked the first year of the Omnibus Reprogramming procedure, which except for construction accounts (that use a different process), consolidated all non-emergency DOD prior approval reprogramming actions into one very large reprogramming action. It identified all DOD reprogramming requirements at one time. This allowed the Congress and DOD to set priorities for limited funding and to make smarter decisions.

9–68. Oversight of non-appropriated funds
Applying various methods, the ASA(FM&C) also oversees non-appropriated funds. One method is by participating on the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Board of Directors. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) is a voting member of the MWR Executive Committee. In addition, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C) chairs the Audit Committee, and the Chief Resource Analysis and Business Practices serves on the Investment Subcommittee. Through these positions the ASA(FM&C) influences virtually all aspects of MWR financial policy. As part of the responsibility of overseeing non-appropriated funds, the ASA(FM&C) presents non-appropriated funds issues to the SECARMY and CSA for decision.

Section XIV
Program Performance and Review

9–69. Program implementation
ACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies carry out the approved program within manpower and funds provided. They review budget execution and account for and report on the use of allocated funds by appropriation and MDEP. As applicable to each appropriation, they include FYDP program and subprogram, Army Management Structure code (AMSCO), Army program element (APE), project number, budget line item number (BLIN), standard study number (SSN), budget activity (BA), budget activity group (BAG), and element of resource (EOR). They also account for use of allocated manpower by Unit Identification Code (UIC). The manpower and financial data obtained help commands and agencies develop future requirements.

9–70. Performance Assessment
a. ASA(FM&C) oversees the Cost & Performance Portal (CPP) which collects Army financial and performance data from disparate Army data systems, centralizes the data into a single data warehouse, and displays analytic information through various reports and graphical displays. The CPP is accessible to all Army users including resource managers, functional experts, and senior leaders through web-based interfaces with the ability to login via the Army CAC.

b. The CPP provides real-time, relevant, accurate and transparent financial and performance information to senior leaders and HQDA staff to support decision-making.

9–71. Review of selected acquisition systems
The means for checking system program performance include milestone reviews of designated acquisition programs conducted by ASA(ALT) using the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) and Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC).

9–72. Joint Reconciliation Program
This program applies the skills of those responsible for various aspects of financial management. The skills include those of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, and internal review auditors. The program applies these combined skills to verify the validity of unliquidated obligations, contractor work in progress, billing status, and the continued need for goods and services not yet delivered. The program achieves dollar savings by identifying and canceling obligations for goods and services no longer needed or duplicative. The program
also reconciles current appropriations to verify the correctness of amounts obligated. In addition, the program assures the liquidation of appropriations to be canceled by the end of the fiscal year.

Section XV
SUMMARY AND References

9–73. PPBE concept
The PPBE process ties strategy, program, and budget all together. It helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs, programs from requirements, requirements from missions, and missions from national security objectives. The patterned flow-from end purpose to resource cost-defines requirements in progressively greater detail.

9–74. System products and process
The PPBE process produces a departmental plan, program, and budget. Figure 9–10 lists typical events that occur during the process. Figure 9–8 shows the organizational framework within which the process operates.

9–75. References
  a. DOD Instruction 7045.7, Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
  b. CJCS Instruction 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System.
  c. Army Regulation 1–1, Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process.
Chapter 10

Resource Management

Our goals are to be good stewards of the resources we are provided by Congress and to free human and financial resources for higher priority operational needs. Through the use of innovations such as Lean Six Sigma we are improving support to our people while reducing waste and inefficiencies. Integral to achieving our goals is the development of an Army-wide cost-management culture in which leaders better understand the full cost of the capabilities they use and provide and incorporate cost considerations into their planning and decision-making. This approach will enable us to achieve readiness and performance objectives more efficiently. Concurrently, we are strengthening our financial and management controls to improve contracting in expeditionary operations and ensure full compliance with the law and regulations. The United States Army 2008 Posture Statement

Section I

Introduction

10–1. The need for resource management

a. The United States Army 2008 Posture Statement emphasizes the need for effective resource management throughout the Army. Because the Army has a large and complex set of missions to execute and a limited set of resources with which to accomplish its missions and supporting tasks, the necessity to maximize the spending power of every dollar the Congress appropriates to the Army becomes paramount. Further, because the Army is vested with the public’s trust and confidence for defending our Nation, all Army leaders have an incumbent responsibility to exercise effective and responsible stewardship for all the resources that have been entrusted to them. As such, responsible, effective and efficient resource management is an integral part of all Army leaders’ duties and functions and is essential for maintaining the Army’s readiness to accomplish its assigned missions.

b. Resource management at the strategic level must address the issues of affordability, required force capabilities, and the entire supporting structure. Resource managers at this level must also deal with the larger questions of whether particular programs are needed, how they serve the specific missions assigned to the Army, and whether the strategies designed to accomplish the mission are correct and necessary. Programmatic and financial resource perspectives examine the efficiency with which funds are allocated and spent and how effectively particular programs are managed and integrated. At the program level this process encompasses the ways in which the soldiers, civilians, facilities, equipment, information, time, and funds are integrated into the Army.

c. Implicit in this programmatic resource management perspective is the recognition that all of us participate in a resource decision stream that requires some of these decisions, once made, to remain unalterable. For example, placing a new facility at an installation requires a minimum of four years. Training instructors and then troops on a new piece of equipment requires three years. Ordering the secondary spares for new end items requires at least two years. Integrating all three of these resource decisions requires that we consider them to be “irreversible,” otherwise we could find new facilities constructed at one installation for a new piece of equipment and soldiers trained on that equipment, while we have actually placed the equipment and soldiers on another installation.

d. More importantly, this “unalterable decision base” will have created “a receivables stream” such as aircraft, training packages, equipment shops, displaced equipment, and so forth of substantial proportion. Reconfiguring these “receivables” into one’s own conception without considering the previous decision rationale may well create resource management disconnects which tend to surface in OSD resource review forums and Congressional hearings.

10–2. Resource management—a definition

Resource management is the direction, guidance, and control of financial and other resources. It involves the application of programming, budgeting, accounting, reporting, analysis, and evaluation.

10–3. Resource management terms

Throughout this chapter, there are a number of unique terms associated with resource (specifically financial or fiscal) management that if understood enable you to more readily understand and use this chapter.

a. Obligation. Any act that legally binds the United States Government to make a payment is an obligation. The concept of the “obligation” is central to resource management in the Government. From the central concept of “obligating the U.S. Government to make a payment” springs forth the foundation of our fiscal law and the legal parameters under which the Army must operate as a part of the U.S. Government. The obligation may be for a service rendered by a contractor, the acquisition of material items (for example, a tank), the construction or repair of a facility, salary for a soldier or civilian, and so forth.

b. Congressional authorization. A law passed by the Congress and signed by the President that establishes or continues a Federal program or agency, and sets forth guidelines to which it must adhere. Generally for every FY, the Congress passes a National Defense Authorization Act (for example, Public Law 110–417, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), which directs by law what can be purchased, what manpower resource levels each
Service can have, and how many weapon and other materiel systems can be bought. It also provides additions and changes to Title 10 of the United States Code that, among other laws, guides the management of the Army and the other activities of the DOD. An authorization act however does not provide the budget authority (BA) to draw funds from the U.S. Treasury to pay an obligation.

c. Congressional appropriation. A law passed by the Congress and signed by the President that provides BA for the specific purpose(s) stated in the law. In the case of the annual DOD appropriations acts (for example, Public Law 110–329, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Budget Authority (BA) is provided for a number of appropriations (for example, Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA); Military Personnel Army (MPA); Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army (RDT&E,A); MILCON, Army (MCA), and so forth) for a specified period of time for the Army to incur legal obligations as it executes the programs authorized by Congress and other laws that guide Army operations.

d. Budget authority. BA is the authority to incur a legal obligation to pay a sum of money from the U.S. Treasury. BA is not “money.” The U.S. Treasury actually disburses cash only after an agency (for example, Army, DFAS accounting office activity, and so forth) issues U.S. Treasury Check withdrawing money from the Treasury and thus disburses the money to pay a previously incurred obligation.


f. Fiscal year (FY). The FY is the Government’s accounting period. For the Federal Government it begins on 1 October and ends on 30 September. The FY is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. For example, FY 2006 begins on 1 October 2005 and ends on 30 September 2006.

g. Outlays. Outlays are the amount of money the Government actually disburses in a given FY.

h. Asset leverage. The combination of government assets with private sector knowledge, expertise, equity and or financing in a venture (partnership), which results in long term benefit to the government.

10–4. Key players in Army resource management

There are a number of different actors who play in the Army’s resource management arena:

a. Congress. Central to the function of obligating the Government to make a payment is the power invested by the U.S. Constitution in the Congress for the following: to raise revenue and borrow money (U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 1–2); to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy (U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 12–13); and no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law (U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 9, Clause 7). For Congress to meet these requirements they pass authorization and appropriation acts as described above.

b. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB assists the President of the United States in overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and in supervising its administration in Federal agencies. It evaluates, formulates, and coordinates management procedures and program objectives within and among Federal departments and agencies. It also controls the administration of the Federal budget, while routinely providing the President with recommendations regarding budget proposals and relevant legislative proposals. Additionally it plans, conducts, and promotes evaluation efforts that assist the President in assessing Federal program objectives, performance, and efficiency. Finally, OMB also oversees and coordinates the Administration’s procurement, financial management, information, and regulatory policies. Further details on the OMB organization and its functions can be viewed on-line at: “http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb".

c. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)). Within the OSD there is appointed an USD(C). The USD(C) advises and assists the SecDef in exercising the SecDef’s budgetary and fiscal powers. As such the USD(C) supervises and directs the preparation of DOD budget estimates and establishes and supervises the execution of policies and procedures to be followed in connection with organizational and administrative matters relating to: preparation of budgets; fiscal, cost, operating, and capital property accounting; and progress and statistical reporting. Finally the USD(C) establishes and supervises the execution of policies and procedures relating to the expenditure and collection of funds administered by DOD and establishes uniform fiscal terminology, classifications and procedures used in the DOD’s fiscal management. The USD(C) is the DOD Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (see para 10–28). Further details on the Office of the USD(C) organization and its functions can be viewed on-line at: “http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/".

d. Secretary of the Army (SECARMY). Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef and subject to the provisions of section 3013 of Title 10, United States Code, the SECARMY is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the DA, including the following functions:

(1) Recruiting.
(2) Organizing.
(3) Supplying.
(4) Equipping (including research and development).
(5) Training.
(6) Servicing.
(7) Mobilizing.
our needs there are other models that describe the elements of resource management, for our discussion the “4–A’s” model meets to use a model called the “Four A’s”:

1. A framework to help study resource management non-appropriated funds is accomplished in accordance with fiscal law and governing regulations and policies. Executed and certified. This responsibility includes ensuring accounting and fund status reporting for appropriated and missions and responsibilities. Further, they are accountable for ensuring approved program budgets are properly executed and certified. This responsibility includes ensuring accounting and fund status reporting for appropriated and non-appropriated funds is accomplished in accordance with fiscal law and governing regulations and policies.

10–5. A framework to help study resource management

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(8) Demobilizing.
(9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
(10) Maintaining.
(11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
(12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified.
(13) Further, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef, the SECARMY is also responsible to the SecDef for: the functioning and efficiency of the DA; the effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or the SecDef relating to functions of the DA; and the performance of the functions of the DA so as to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the unified Combatant Commands. As such the SECARMY can be considered the Army’s top resource manager because of the position’s inherent decision-making authority over the affairs of the DA.

f. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)). Within the OSA there is appointed an ASA(FM&C). The ASA(FM&C) exercises the comptroller functions of the DA and advises the SECARMY on financial management as directed by 10 USC Sec. 3016. To execute this mission, the Office of the ASA(FM&C) is organized as follows (see Figure 10–1):

1. **Military Deputy for Budget.** The Military Deputy for Budget is responsible for the Department of the Army’s budget execution. The Director for Army Budget, the Chief, Congressional Budget Liaison, and the Director, Financial Information Management report directly to the Military Deputy for Budget.

2. **Director for Army Budget (DAB).** The DAB is responsible for the Army’s budget formulation, the presentation and defense of the budget through the congressional appropriation process, budget execution and analysis, reprogramming actions, and appropriation/fund control and distribution. The DAB is a co-chairman of the HQDA Two Star Budget Requirements and Program (BRP) Board. To accomplish its missions and functions, the Office of the DAB is organized into four directorates (Operations and Support; Investments; Business Resources; and Management and Control).

3. **Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) (DASA(FO)).** The DASA(FO) is responsible for: policies, procedures, programs and systems pertaining to finance and accounting activities and operations; Army financial management systems and data integration activities; Army programs for management control, internal review and audit compliance; the Government Travel Charge Card, and fraud, waste and abuse; and other management evaluation activities. To accomplish its missions and functions, the Office of the DASA(FO) is organized into four directorates (Management Services, Internal Review, Financial Reporting, and Finance and Accounting Oversight). Additionally, the U.S. Army Finance Command, a HQDA FOA, is under the control of the DASA(FO).

4. **Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics (DASA(C&E)).** The Deputy is responsible for implementing the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Program through the development and promulgation of cost and economic analysis policy, cost estimating models, and cost databases for Army wide use. DASA (C&E) conducts component cost analysis for weapons and automated information systems (AIS) and manages the Army Cost Review Board and Army Cost Position (ACP) (see para 11–31b (5)) Process. DASA(C&E) is responsible for conducting force structure, operations and support (OPTEMPO), personnel, and installation cost analyses. Other functions include implementation of the Army Activity Based Costing/Management Strategic Plan and management of the Army Cost Research Program.

5. **Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller OASA(FM&C)).** Further details on the OASA(FM&C) organization and its functions can be viewed on-line at: www.asafm.army.mil.

f. **Commanders of Army Commands (ACOMs) & heads of other operating agencies.** Commanders of Army commands and commanders and heads of operating agencies (for example, PEOs, PMs, President, National Defense University) are responsible for developing, justifying, presenting and defending programs supporting their assigned missions and responsibilities. Further, they are accountable for ensuring approved program budgets are properly executed and certified. This responsibility includes ensuring accounting and fund status reporting for appropriated and non-appropriated funds is accomplished in accordance with fiscal law and governing regulations and policies.
Figure 10–1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)

Figure 10–2. Resource Management's "4–A's"
Section II
Acquire Resources

10–6. Getting the fiscal resources for the Army to use
Described in detail in Chapter 9, the Army’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process provides the means by which the Army justifies and acquires its resources from Congress. After passage and signing into law of the authorization and appropriation acts, several interrelated functions are performed by OMB, the U.S. Treasury, OUSD(C) and OASA(FM&C) to acquire the Army’s financial resources and distribute them to the field for execution. Figure 10–3 graphically portrays this process of getting resources to the Army.

a. Apportionment requests. Apportionment is a process for the administrative control of appropriations and funds. It is also a distribution of a specified “amount of obligation authority (OA)” in an appropriation/fund that is available for specified time periods (for example, fiscal quarter), activities, projects or a combination thereof as approved by the OMB. The amounts so apportioned limit the obligations that may be incurred by the Army. After Congress passes an appropriation bill and the President signs it into law, the OASA(FM&C) submits an apportionment of funds request through OUSD(C) to OMB. OMB reviews the request, adjusts the amounts as may be necessary based on their analysis of prior Army spending patterns, approves the request, and transmits the approved request back down through OUSD(C) to the OASA(FM&C). Within OASA(FM&C), the HQDA Funds Control Officer loads the approved apportioned amounts into the Program-Budget Accounting System (PBAS). PBAS is the official funds control management system of the DOD and is used throughout the Army financial management community to control the fund distribution process. Figure 10–3. Fund Distribution Process

b. Program documents. In addition to the approved apportionment mentioned above, OUSD(C) may issue further restrictions on using the OA provided in the apportionment document by withholding amounts for specific programs. These restrictions come to HQDA via an OA letter (for O&M, MILPERS, and AFHO appropriations), a DD Form 440 (for Procurement and RDTE appropriations), or a DD Form 460 (for the MILCON appropriations).

10–7. Treasury warrants
After the President signs the appropriations bill(s), the U.S. Treasury issues appropriations warrants to establish “bank accounts” on the books of the U.S. Treasury for each appropriation. The Treasury Warrant is a financial controlling mechanism and gives the Army the authority to disburse funds (“cut a check to pay for an obligation”) from those accounts. Without this authority, the Army cannot make any payments citing the non-warranted appropriation.
Allocate Resources to the Field

10–8. Fund distribution and control
“Pass funds through command channels and make the commander responsible for their control.” This is the basic tenet by which the Army’s funding distribution system operates. In this case the use of the term “funds” implies that the authority to create obligations, for which the U.S. Government has to pay, has been granted. Distribution of funds is any documented action that makes funds available for obligation. This distribution is made in a stated amount for specific purposes and to a specific organization for a specific time period. The commander’s authority to incur obligations is received on a funding document, which specifies the appropriation and budget program for which the funds may be used, and identifies applicable statutory limitations. This process is used to facilitate control over funds and the reporting of violations of laws (see below about Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) violations) and directives. Starting in FY03 however, the mission commander is no longer responsible for BASOPS funding that will be centrally controlled by the Installation Support Activity (a FOA of the OACSIM).

a. The distribution procedure. After obtaining OA from OMB and OUSD(C), HQDA directs major commands and other subordinate operating agencies to execute their approved budgeted programs (see Figure 10–3). Using the PBAS, the HQDA Funds Control Officer in the OASA(FM&C) allocates program and OA to ACOMs and operating agencies based upon guidance from the appropriation sponsors. Army commands and operating agencies in turn sub-allocate or allot to the appropriate subordinate organization (for example, installation, major unit, PM, and so forth) where the program will be actually executed by obligating for such things as payroll, travel orders, contracts, purchase orders, and so forth. Although this funds distribution system is a means of controlling obligations and fixing responsibility, the policy is to minimize the formal distribution and to fund an operation at the highest practical level. As an example, the MPA appropriation is held and controlled centrally at HQDA, whereas the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation is decentralized through the Army Commands to the installations.

b. Funding Guidance. Along with program and BA moved out to Army activities through the PBAS, HQDA normally issues additional specific spending guidance at the beginning of the FY. The appropriation sponsors for OMA and the Army Family Housing (Operations) (AFHO), issue annual funding letters to ACOMs with required or specialized fiscal guidance that is to be used in the execution of the budget for the FY. ACOMs and Operating agencies may also issue specific funding guidance to their subordinate commanders and activities for the execution of their programs and budgets. The Chief of the Army Reserve issues a funding guidance letter to subordinate Army Reserve activities, for executing the Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) appropriation and the Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) appropriation. Likewise, the Director of the Army National Guard issues a funding guidance letter to subordinate Army Guard activities, principally the State adjutants general, for executing both the Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard (OMNG) appropriation and the National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA) appropriation.

Using the PBAS, the HQDA Funds Control Officer issues Funding Authorization Documents (FADs) to allocate OA and program authority to ACOMs and operating agencies. The ACOMs and operating agencies in turn use PBAS to issue FADs to their subordinate activities (for example, installations) to allot OA and program authority. For the procurement and RDTE appropriations, an approved program document accompanies the FAD to provide further administrative limitations on the use of those funds.

10–10. Fund allowance system
Some ACOMs and operating agencies have implemented a fund allowance system whereby the lowest formal distribution of funds is at the ACOM/Operating Agency level with funding allowances being issued to subordinate installation commanders or activity heads. The advantages of this system are that it allows more flexibility in fund control and lessens the possibilities of reportable statutory violations. Commanders are still responsible for assuring the execution of their mission remains within the provided fund allowance and violations of that guidance may warrant administrative disciplinary action. Exceeding this funding allowance does not constitute a statutory violation but could cause an over-obligation or over-expenditure of the ACOM allotment provided on the Funding Authorization Document. Nevertheless, individuals responsible for exceeding their allowances will be named responsible for any resultant ADA violations (see paragraph 10–17).

10–11. Delegation of funding authority
Commanders to whom funds are made available may delegate authority to establish and maintain such administrative controls as may be necessary to comply with the provisions of Federal fiscal law and Department financial management regulations. This may be done keeping these key points in mind——
Delegation of authority must be in writing. (Verbal or telephonic authorizations will not be recognized except in emergency circumstances (i.e. those jeopardizing health and/or safety of the command) and must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.).

Authority may be delegated to a named individual or a position so long as the authority is vested in a readily identifiable person at all times.

Delegation of authority does not relieve commanders of their fiscal responsibilities under the law.

10–12. Special classified programs

Classified programs, which are sensitive “need to know,” may be compartmentalized for security reasons. Specific funding distribution procedures have been created to accommodate the unique security requirements of such programs. Generally, the VCSA must approve the use of the procedures.

10–13. Secretary of the Army Representation Funds

Congress gives the SECARMY a specific level of authority to be utilized for emergency and extraordinary expenses from within the OMA appropriation. These authorities are identified under limitations entitled with the limit codes .0012, .0014, .0015, .0017, and .0019. They are described in AR 37–47, Representation Funds of the Secretary of the Army. The utilization of these authorities are very closely monitored and fall under audit responsibilities of the Army Audit Agency to ensure that funds used under these authorities are solely for the purposes intended and approved by the SECARMY. The rules for using the authorities are very specific and exceptions to deviate should be obtained from higher headquarters. A brief description of these authorities is provided below.

a. Limitation .0012 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category A). For official representation expenses, as authorized by the SECARMY, in connection with official functions at times of national holidays; dedication of facilities; visits of distinguished guests; purchase of floral wreaths, decorations, and awards upon occasions of national holidays and similar observances in foreign countries; and gifts and mementos by the authorized host, costing not more than $200 each, used in connection with official ceremonies or functions. Commanders of ACOMs, their subordinate commanders, and installation commanders are authorized to present gifts or mementos in circumstances that they personally document as being a necessary part of the event or occasion being observed.

b. Limitation .0014 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category B). For miscellaneous expenses, other than for official representation, which are not provided for in other appropriations. Examples of these expenses are awards for emergency rescues, witness fees for the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, and settlement of meritorious claims.

c. Limitation .0015 (Criminal Investigation Activities, AR 195–4). For emergency and extraordinary expenses in support of the worldwide expenses of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command’s activities.

d. Limitation .0017 (Intelligence Contingency Funds, AR 381–141). For expenses related to worldwide intelligence activities.

e. Limitation .0019 (Compartmented Special Operations, SECARMY Letter of Instruction (proponent ODCS, G–357)). For emergency and extraordinary expenses related to worldwide-compartmented operations.

Section IV

Account for the Use of the Resources

10–14. Legally using the resources to accomplish the mission

This section gives a brief overview of the controlling principles used in accounting for the use of fiscal resources. Title 31, United States Code, Section 1301(a) states that “Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.” Congress initially enacted this statutory control in March 1809. The act, generally referred to as the “Purpose Statute,” was passed as a part of a reorganization of the War, Navy and Treasury Departments to limit the discretion of the executive branch in spending appropriations. Thus it becomes abundantly evident that the Congress, for close to two hundred years, has taken a keen interest in how the Army spends the funds that have been appropriated to it. To preclude the misappropriation/misspending of funds, a body of laws, regulations, court decisions and rules has evolved over many years to direct how fiscal resources will be used to accomplish the Army’s missions and tasks. Because Congress provides funds in specific amounts for specific purposes through the enactment of public law, the expenditure of those funds must be within the boundaries established by the law. The term “administrative control of funds,” as required by law is used to identify those actions, events or systems that are required to ensure essentially three things:

• Funds are used only for the purposes for which they were intended.
• Amounts of funds in excess of that available, are neither obligated, neither disbursed nor further distributed.
• The agency head is capable of fixing responsibility in the event of violations of either of the first two.
10–15. Availability of appropriations for obligations

Congress determines how long an appropriation or fund may be used, that is, new obligations may be made against the specified appropriation or fund. Most appropriations used by the Army have a limited time period for which new obligations can be made against them. Note: In the past Congress has made exceptions to the normal periods of availability of appropriations such as making two year or “X” year O&M appropriations, three year RDTE appropriations, and so forth, as well as continuing with the “normal” periods of availability.

a. Annual appropriations. These appropriations, generally having a one-year period of availability to be obligated, include:

• Operation and maintenance appropriations like OMA; OM Army National Guard (OMNG); OM Army Reserve (OMAR); and Army Family Housing Operations (AFHO).
• Military personnel appropriations like MPA, NGPA and RPA.

b. Multi-year appropriations. These appropriations having a multi-year period of availability include:

• The RDT&E appropriation is available for two years.
• Procurement appropriations (Aircraft Procurement, Army; Missile Procurement, Army; Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV), Army; Procurement of Ammunition, Army; and Other Procurement, Army (OPA)) are available for three years.
• MCA; MC National Guard (MCNG); MC Army Reserve (MCAR); and Army Family Housing Construction (AFHC) are available for five years.

c. “No-year” appropriations. These appropriations and funds have an unlimited period of availability. Examples include the appropriation for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF).

d. Expired appropriations. Once an appropriation’s period of availability is over for incurring new obligations, it is considered “expired.” For five years after an appropriation expires (i.e., no new obligations can be incurred) both obligated and un-obligated balances of that appropriation shall be available for adjusting and liquidating (that is, disbursing against a previously incurred obligation) obligations properly charged to the account. As an example, the FY 09 Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation has a period of availability for obligation from 1 October 2008 through 30 September 2009. The appropriation has a five-year expiration period from 1 October 2009 through 30 September 2014.

e. Canceled appropriations. After the fifth year of expiration an appropriation is canceled on the books of the U.S. Treasury. The appropriation is no longer available for any purpose, for example, accounting adjustments. Obligated and un-obligated balances are canceled. Using the FY 09 OMA example above, it would cancel on 30 September 2014. Note: If an obligation adjustment, such as a final settlement to a disputed contract, has to be made from what is now a canceled appropriation, then the payment is made out of the activity’s current year appropriation subject to several limitations such as total amounts of such transactions cannot exceed 1% of the current appropriation and cannot exceed the un-liquidated balance of the initial, now cancelled, appropriation.

10–16. Properly obligating the resources

An obligation is the action taken to establish a liability against the U.S. Government that will ultimately result in a disbursement from the U.S. Treasury. There are several principles that must be followed in executing and accounting for obligations. The foundations for these principles are contained in Title 31 Money and Finance of the United States Code. While only the most important “obligating” principles are outlined here, the entire listing is provided in the DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14–R or in DFAS–IN Regulation 37–1 (Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation).

a. Bona fide need of the current FY. A determination must be made that supplies or services required pursuant to contracts entered into or orders placed obligating an annual appropriation are intended to fill a bona fide need of the current FY. There are provisions when lead-time is an important factor to obligate funds in the current year for a subsequent year delivery.

b. Intent of performance. Contracts entered into or placed for supplies or services are executed only if there is a bona fide intent on the part of the contractor (or other performing activity) to commence work promptly or to perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions (to include beginning date).

c. Assure availability. The responsible official must ensure that proper funds are available before binding the U.S. Government in an agreement with a second party, which will result in an obligation for which the Government is required to pay.

d. Documentary evidence. Each obligation recorded in the official record must be supported by proper documentary evidence. These may be originals, duplicates, or copies of appropriate documents so long as signatures are visible. A memorandum of telephone conversation or an electronically received written message may be used temporarily until the actual document is received.

e. Charge immediately. Obligations, when incurred, must be charged immediately to the applicable account. The
recording of obligations incurred cannot be deferred until additional funds are received. The obligation must be recorded even if there are insufficient funds to cover it, thereby incurring a statutory violation, which must then be reported through command channels. Failure to record an obligation will not obviate a suspected violation of the ADA statute.

f. Prompt adjustment. Any adjustment to previously recorded obligations, either as an increase or decrease, must be entered in the accounts as soon as the necessity for an adjustment is evident and the amount can be determined.

10–17. The Anti-deficiency Act (ADA)

Chapters 13 and 15 of United States Code Title 31 contain prohibitions with respect to the legal use of funds and establish punitive provisions in the event there are violations. When the ADA was codified into the United States Code, its provisions were incorporated into a number of sections of Title 31. The sections that are most frequently cited are sections 1341, 1342, and 1517.

a. How Anti-deficiency Act violations occur. Generally, ADA violations may occur when:

• Funding authority is issued in excess of the amount available and the excess amount is obligated or expended.
• There are violations of the special and recurring statutory limitations or restrictions on the amounts for which an appropriation or fund may be used.
• There are violations of statutory or regulatory limitations on the purposes for which an appropriation or fund may be used.
• Obligations are authorized or incurred in advance of funds being available.
• Obligations or expenditures of funds do not provide for a bona fide need of the period of availability of the fund or account and corrective funding is not available.

b. Administrative and criminal penalties for ADA violations. The person who caused the violation may be subject to discipline, to include suspension without pay or removal from office (31 USC 1349 and 1518). The Army’s implementation procedures of these statutes are contained in DFAS–IN Regulation 37–1(Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation). If an action is taken knowingly and willfully and results in a conviction for violating the ADA, the person may be fined up to $5000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both (31 USC 1350 and 1519).

10–18. Accounting for the obligation

a. Legal mandate to account for funds. By law the DOD is required to maintain accounting systems that provide:

• Complete disclosure of the financial results of the Department’s activities.
• Adequate financial information the Department needs for management purposes.
• Effective control over, and accountability for, assets for which the Department is responsible.
• Reliable accounting results that will be the basis for—

— Preparing and supporting the Department’s budget requests.
— Controlling the Department’s budget execution.
— Providing financial information the President requires.
— Suitable integration of the Department’s accounting with the central accounting and reporting responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury.

b. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). As can be surmised, if the DOD is required to account for the ways it spends its funds, so too does the Army have to account in the same way for how it uses its funds. Most of the financial management accounting required by the Army is performed by DFAS. This organization was established in January 1991 to reduce the cost and improve the overall quality of DOD financial management through consolidation, standardization and integration of finance and accounting operations, procedures and systems. DFAS took over responsibility for five finance and accounting centers and 338 installation finance and accounting offices that belonged to the military services and Defense agencies. Through its mandated consolidation efforts, DFAS now consists of a headquarters located in Washington, D.C., five centralized sites located in Indianapolis (formerly the U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center), Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Kansas City, and 20 field sites or operating locations (OPLOCs). Personnel staffing levels were reduced from 31,000 in 1992 to the current level of 18,000. Since 1991 DFAS has consolidated and standardized 324 finance and accounting systems down to 109 systems in 1998. In the future DFAS expects to reduce down to 32 systems.

c. Accounting systems used by the Army. The Army and its subordinate activities use a number of the remaining accounting systems operated by DFAS. The principal system used is the Standard Finance System (STANFINS). This system performs the accounting for the majority of Army installations. It records funding authorization, accumulates and reports on obligations and disbursements against fund authorizations for control purposes, and provides standardized accounting reports for the installation, ACOM, and HQDA financial managers. STANFINS serves as the Army’s
primary formal record of account at the installation level for installation-level appropriation accounting. Other accounting systems are used by the Research, Development and Acquisition activities, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Army National Guard.

10–19. The Army management structure (AMS)
The AMS provides a resource management language and coding structure that is based on congressional appropriations. It relates program dollars and manpower to a standard classification of activities and functions required and used by Congress as they deliberate on Army programs and budget requests. AMS codes (AMSCO) help record data in the detail needed for budgeting, execution and accounting. Army activities use the AMS to record obligations and disbursements in the requisite accounting system. The details for constructing the accounting and classification codes for all funds received by the Army are contained in DFAS–IN Manual 37–100-xx, where the “xx” indicates the last two digits of the FY. For instance the AMS for FY 2009 would be outlined in DFAS–IN Manual 37–100–09. Using the AMS coding structure assists Army activities to fulfill Federal accounting requirements. A simple illustration translating an accounting classification code (as one could see on a purchase request, a set of TDY orders, and so forth) would be the following accounting fund cite on a supply purchase transaction at Fort Sill: 21 2 2020 57–3106 325796. BD 26FB QSUP CA200 GRE12344019003 AB22 WORNAA S34031.

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10–20. Year end certification of accounts
Since DFAS was established, the subordinate Defense Accounting Office (DAO) has had the responsibility for preparing and monitoring “accounting reports” at the installation. Commanders who receive FADs authorizing them to incur obligations not in excess of certain amounts and for specific purposes have a legal requirement to “certify the status” of those funds as of 30 September, that is, the end of FY. Commanders may delegate the authority to certify FY-end reports to the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Garrison Commander, or Director of Resource Management.

a. The DAO will make the certification on the “accounting reports” substantially as follows: “I hereby certify that the attached reports and associated schedules include all transactions received which have been properly recorded and are supported by subsidiary accounting records.”

b. The DAO will forward the certification to the Commander or a designated representative, who, in turn, will make the following certification: “I hereby certify that the attached reports and schedules include all known transactions. Those meeting the criteria of 31 USC 1501(A) have been obligated and are so reported. All reports and schedules for all transactions for the fiscal year ended September 30, ____ , are correct and are supported by subsidiary accounting records. All individual upward obligation and open allotment disbursement adjustments in excess of $100,000 of expired appropriations have been properly approved and are on file for audit purposes.”

c. Certifications are required for all appropriations and for any reimbursable activity performed by the command or agency. The ASA(FM&C) certifies all Army appropriations to the U.S. Treasury.

Section V
Analyze the Use of Resources

10–21. 1981 - A change in responsibilities
The Army Chief of Staff renamed the Army’s PPBS in 1981, adding “Execution” to the process title - PPBES. This constituted a marked change from the prior decentralized concept in which PPBS execution responsibility was
transferred to the field commanders. The CSA charged Army leaders with the responsibility to evaluate or analyze and report on the effectiveness of program and budget accomplishment. These evaluations and reports relate funds and personnel inputs in output terms to the Army’s Title 10 responsibilities. (Note: In 2003 DOD, the military departments, and agencies renamed their resource management processes to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.)

10–22. Execution reviews
Using the information presented by the accounting systems and other data feeder systems, functional, programmatic and fiscal managers along with commanders track the course of program and budget execution in their organization or functional area. Inherent in this analysis is the need to judge program performance and effectiveness, to consider the need for more resources to accomplish the specified program, and finally to consider reallocation of resources to higher priority missions and programs. This process takes place at all of the resourcing echelons of the Army.

10–23. HQDA Quarterly Reviews
The Army conducts quarterly reviews of program performance and fiscal execution focusing on strategic priorities and performance metrics. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller is responsible for the conduct of the quarterly reviews.

10–24. Shifting resources
During the course of analyzing the execution of resources, there often arises the need to shift resources outside the boundaries of programs for which Congress authorized and appropriated funds (APF) (see para 14–2a). Examples of such real life events may be an emerging contingency operation, storm damage to an installation, increasing cost of installation utilities, accelerating the procurement of an item to achieve an economic savings, new bills resulting from a newly assigned mission, and so forth. The congressional committees concerned with DOD’s operations have generally accepted the view that rigid adherence to the amounts justified for budget activities, appropriations, or for subsidiary items or purposes may unduly jeopardize the effective accomplishment of planned programs in a businesslike and economical manner.

   a. Reprogramming procedures have been worked out with the congressional committees (House and Senate Appropriations and Authorization Committees (and for intelligence related items, the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees)) to accommodate different degrees of interest in the reprogramming of funds; that is, certain reprogramming require prior approval by the appropriate committees of Congress, while others require advance notification, and still others are provided notice after the fact. Reprogramming reapplies funds from one project to another within the same appropriation or transfers funds from one appropriation to another to resolve financial shortfalls or to adjust programs to meet unforeseen requirements. The process is subject to designated dollar thresholds and congressional requirements for advance approval or notification. No transfers (shifts between appropriations) are allowed without prior consent of Congress and must be requested in writing by the submission of the Congressional Reprogramming Request (DD 1415).

   b. Other flexibility is obtained through additional laws, committee reports, or by requesting supplemental appropriations. The OASA(FM&C) manages the reprogramming process for Army appropriations.

10–25. Analyzing the “accounting books”– Joint Reconciliation Program
The Joint Reconciliation Program is an effort combining the skills and expertise of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, internal review auditors, and DFAS personnel for the purpose of verifying the validity of un-liquidated obligations, contractor work in progress, billing status, and validating the continued need for goods and services that have not yet been delivered. The reconciliation must be performed by all commands and, when performed properly, will result in real dollar savings through the identification and cancellation of nonessential goods and services, reconciliation of current appropriations to ensure the correctness of amounts obligated, and liquidation of appropriations expiring at the end of the FY.

   a. The primary objectives of the Joint Reconciliation Program are to “harvest” OA by:
      • De-obligating funds supporting invalid obligations
      • Eliminating the use of current funds to pay liabilities arising from appropriations that expired.
      • Reconciling and liquidating delinquent travel advances.
      • Eliminating and avoiding unmatched disbursements (UMD)
      • Eliminating and avoiding negative un-liquidated obligations (NULO)

   b. As a result of performing effective joint reconciliation, commands increase their purchasing power which directly enhances mission accomplishment. Purchasing power is increased in that:
      • Canceled account liabilities are reduced
      • Current OA is harvested for reutilization.
      • Erroneous payments and over payments are identified and eliminated.
• Visibility over contractor work in process (WIP) and contract in process (CIP) is increased.
• Delinquent travel advances are eliminated.

c. Additionally, joint reconciliation increases the Army’s stewardship credibility with Congress. The integrity and accuracy of financial records has improved and the cycle time for processing financial transactions has been reduced. History has proven that using a thorough and intense joint reconciliation program is an excellent investment of time and resources and adds value to financial management, logistics, and procurement activities.

Section VI
Improving Management and Business Practices in the Army

10–26. Efforts to improve Army management
Over the last ten years, major legislative and Army management initiatives have introduced an unprecedented focus on performance and results. These initiatives all point to the transition to more outcome-oriented program management and performance budgeting.

10–27. Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982
a. This act requires all Federal agencies to establish and maintain effective accounting and administrative controls to provide “reasonable assurance” that:
• Obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable laws.
• Funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation.
• Revenues and expenditures are properly recorded and accounted for.

b. The Act also requires agency heads to submit an annual statement to the President and the Congress indicating whether agency management controls are reasonable and, where they are not, material weaknesses are identified and corrective actions are taken.

a. The CFO Act was enacted to implement more effective financial management practices in the Federal Government. Its key purpose is to provide more accurate, timely, and reliable financial information for decision-makers through improved accounting systems, integrated functional and financial management, and strengthened internal controls. The law also establishes initial requirements for the “systematic measurement of performance” by shifting the management focus from resource acquisition to resource execution—not in terms of obligation and outlay rates, but in how well taxpayer dollars are spent.

b. A major provision of the Act mandated the preparation of audited annual financial statements for revolving funds, trust funds, and substantially commercial activities. As the first DOD pilot under the CFO Act, the Army broke new ground in a number of important areas—for example, physical inventory policy, valuation of assets, interface between military pay and personnel systems, the incorporation of outcome-oriented program performance measures in financial reports, and the restructuring of the management control process. The U. S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and congressional committees have acknowledged Army efforts and improvements. However, the Army cannot by itself achieve full compliance with the standards of the CFO Act. The resolution of long-term problems with financial systems is a DOD-wide effort, and there must be government-wide accounting principles and standards to support both management decision-making and public accountability.

a. GMRA implements the requirements for audited annual financial statements “covering all accounts and associated activities of each office, bureau, and activity of the agency” for all Federal agencies. Beginning in 1998, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of the OMB, is required to submit to the President and Congress government-wide audited financial statements that cover all accounts and associated activities of the executive branch of the Federal Government. With the end of the CFO Act pilot project and full implementation of reporting under the Act, the Army continues working to implement the letter and the spirit of the legislation and to improve all aspects of Army financial management and stewardship.

b. The most recent financial report for the U.S. Government can be viewed online at http://www.gao.gov/financial.html

c. The most recent financial report for the Army can be viewed online at http://www.asafm.army.mil/fo/fod/cfo/afr/afr.asp

a. GPRA is major management reform legislation and a critical step in the inevitable transition to more outcome-
oriented program management and performance budgeting. As noted above, the CFO Act intended to integrate financial and functional systems to provide better information for decision makers and shift management focus to how well taxpayer dollars are spent. Although implementation of the CFO Act and audited financial statements have led to significant improvements in financial reporting, the law itself provided only limited guidance with regard to its provisions for “the systematic measurement of performance”.

b. The GPRA builds on the CFO Act and establishes the framework for full integration of financial and functional data in all phases of the resourcing cycle. GPRA was implemented to improve government-wide programs by linking resource expenditures to results achieved. OSD has implemented GPRA by establishing corporate and annual performance goals, and linking specific performance measures to each goal. The most recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) serves as DOD’s strategic plan in accordance with the GPRA requirements.

c. The purpose of the GPRA is to increase public confidence in the Federal Government and improve program effectiveness and public accountability by systematically holding agencies accountable for achieving program results. The law also is intended to improve congressional decision-making by providing more objective information on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending.


(2) Through its PPBE process the Army reviews and monitors its strategic plans and mission objectives. The PPBE process supports the Army’s implementation of GPRA by using the—

• Army Strategy (AS) that amplifies The Army Vision then in force and helps promulgate Army goals, strategies, objectives and the required capabilities to achieve them.
• Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG) that leads to the preparation of capabilities-based action plans and, where needed, the prioritized allocation of resources to carry them out.
• Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM) that links operational tasks and their associated resources to the DA’s United States Code Title X functional responsibilities.
• Army Campaign Plan (ACP) that establishes eight campaign objectives incorporating Army transformation into the context of ongoing strategic commitments.

(3) The biennial Army POM/BES that results from the PPBE integrated programming and budgeting phase allows the Army to balance program and budget resources based upon more definitive resource objectives. Management Decision Packages (MDEPs), the building blocks of the Army program, are linked to objectives, sub-objectives, and prioritized resource tasks. Program resources that govern levels of accomplishment are adjusted according to affordability.

e. Appropriations approved by Congress in the budget phase are applied in the execution phase. Execution of programs is constantly monitored to insure congressional and other legally mandated requirements are met.


This law builds upon and compliments the acts discussed above. It requires auditors to report as part of their report on agencies’ annual financial statements whether the agencies’ financial management systems comply substantially with three requirements: (1) Federal financial management systems requirements; (2) applicable Federal accounting standards; and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. These requirements are critical for ensuring that agency financial management activities are consistently and accurately recorded, and timely and uniformly reported throughout the Federal Government.

10–32. Management controls

a. Management controls are the procedures we establish to ensure that we accomplish our objectives and guard Army resources against fraud, waste, and abuse. Numerous audit and inspection reports, however, continue to find serious management control deficiencies in DOD and the Army. This damages our reputation as stewards of public resources and hinders our ability to compete effectively in Congress for additional resources. Congress has made clear that their emphasis on management controls will continue.

b. Army Regulation 11–2, Management Control, establishes policies and guidelines for implementing the provisions of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act. It describes the Army’s current management control process which was restructured effective in FY 95 to reduce the administrative burden, to provide commanders and managers with greater flexibility in scheduling and conducting their evaluations, and to make them directly accountable for the
effectiveness of their management controls. The restructured process requires management control evaluations only for the most critical controls (the “key management controls”) and encourages commanders and managers to use existing review and oversight processes wherever possible to accomplish evaluations.

10–33. Improving business practices

a. An essential element of Resource Management is the process of reviewing, revising and reengineering the business practices of the Army to increase revenues, reduce costs, and leverage Army assets. Several tools have been developed to assist in furthering business practices improvements:

- The Business Practices Initiatives focus on Army operations to avoid or reduce costs, generate and collect revenues, leverage assets, streamline and consolidate functions, form partnerships, and use the latest technology to help the Army better utilize scarce resources.
- The development of initiatives under the focused leadership of the Army Business Initiatives Council is intended to support transformation of the business sides of the Department of the Army, resulting in a more efficient and effective business environment from which the total Army is supported.
- The Legislative Program expedites processing of viable, high payoff, reengineering legislative proposals through OSD, OMB, and Congress.
- The Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) Financial Oversight prepares policy guidance and conducts reviews of NAF finances and encourages NAF activities to operate more like a business.
- The Waiver Program facilitates preparation, coordination, and submission of waiver requests to gain exceptions to certain policies or regulations on a case-by-case basis to improve processes.

b. The Army is implementing new and improved business practices to bridge the gap between Army resources and Army requirements. Many private sector business practices “make sense” for the DOD and can potentially be applied to optimize the use of Army resources. The overall objective is to stretch available resources by generating revenues, reducing costs, leveraging assets, and improving the delivery of service.

c. A major example of the successful use of business practices to bridge the gap between Army resources and requirements is in the area of real property assets (land and facilities). Historically, the Army relied primarily upon APFs (MILCON Funds) to build, modify, and upgrade Army facilities. The Army also relied upon APFs (Operating Funds) to maintain and repair the real property assets. The lack of sufficient funds allows construction of only the most critical facilities and causes a backlog of maintenance and repair that ultimately reduces the useful life of Army assets. As the size of the Army was reduced over the last decade, the Army began to dispose of real property assets that were underutilized and no longer needed. There is a significant cost associated with maintaining assets, even when the assets are maintained at a minimal level. This disposal effort is continuing. However, a problem surfaces when facilities are needed, but there are insufficient APFs to construct, modify, or maintain them.

d. To address this problem, the Army began using a new private sector tool - public private ventures (PPV’s). PPV’s can take many forms - the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) Program; Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program (ARMS); leasing initiatives that use Title 10, Section 2267 authority; Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Program initiatives; utilities privatization; and energy saving projects. What is unique about PPV’s is (1) they involve a significant contribution of private capital and expertise to meet Army resource needs; and (2) the private sector requirements for successful business ventures must also be met. With the PPV approach, the Army is not buying a specified product in the traditional sense. The Army is selecting a private sector “partner” to work jointly on a solution that will line up both with Army requirements and those for commercial success.

e. The past several years have witnessed a quantum leap forward in the planned use of PPV’s as a tool to bridge the gap between Army resources and requirements for real property assets. The Congress has repeatedly shown its general support for using this tool by passing very significant enabling legislation in areas such as housing privatization, utilities privatization, energy savings, and enhanced lease authority. These PPV efforts will have a prominent role in the way the Army manages its real property assets in the future. We will succeed if we (1) use PPV’s as part of a sound strategic plan; (2) adequately weigh the long-term implications of our actions; and (3) realize that PPV’s make new and different demands on program and financial managers.

f. The Army also is wrestling with similar resource management issues for activities supported by NAF. Base closures, troop realignments, and declining AFV support create a challenging environment for NAF. Policy decisions for NAF must take into account a resource management strategy that considers the interrelationship between APFs and NAF. Coordination between the NAF and APF communities is essential to ensure appropriate execution of both the appropriated and NAF programs. For example, a facility built as a NAF major construction project may be authorized APFs for maintenance and repair support. In such instances, a one-time NAF expenditure could result in a significant and continuing AFV operating expense. Conversely, reduction of AFV support for NAF activities can force dramatic changes in the level of quality-of-life programs available to soldiers and their families.

g. Enabling and encouraging improved operating efficiency, better use of information, implementation of private sector practices, and enhanced utilization of Army resources through asset leveraging is essential to maximizing the use of The Army’s scarce resources. Improving business and operating practices is not only complementary to financial
reform, but is in the spirit of reinventing government and the “battle on bureaucracy”, and is absolutely necessary to fully support Army transformation to meet future challenges.

10–34. Cost management (CM)

a. Cost management (CM) must play a critical role in support of decision-making. Managers at all levels fight a war every day in resourcing and operating today’s Army. It is a cost war. We are drawn into it and forced to fight it in order to maintain the maximum number of well-trained and properly equipped forces possible. In the cost war, we do not lose forces to an enemy on a conventional battlefield, but to the constant reduction of dollars available to resource the force. This is an unfamiliar war, fought on an unfamiliar battleground by commanders and leaders generally new to the weapons needed to win. CM, focused on the activities necessary to produce the products or services required for mission success, is the most important war-fighting “doctrine” available for employment. Given full understanding of the potential of CM and complete knowledge and use of its working parts, the cost war can be won.

b. The Army has chosen to implement Activity Based Costing (ABC) as a tool to assist the local manager in maximizing scarce resources and as a means of continuous process improvement. The Army Implementation Plan mandates CM/ABC implementation in the Army’s eleven support business areas. These business areas are Acquisition, Base Operations, Civilian Human Resources (CHR) (see Chapter 14), Contracting, Depot Maintenance, Information Support, Institutional Training, Ordnance, R&D Laboratories, Supply Management, and Test & Evaluation.

10–35. Cost modeling

CM/ABC focuses managerial skills and action at all levels on the results of a cost modeling process that presents useful, accurate cost data based on the activity (a product or service) that the manager wishes to accomplish. Traditional cost accounting systems and processes in DOD do not allow managers to do this. Instead, they focus cost models on bags of money that are available to accomplish grossly defined categories of expenditures. Amounts of money are allocated to the bag by passing down a limit or budget, then managers at all levels use up the money until someone tells them that the budget is exhausted. This is and has been the conventional way of operating. In fact, using up the entire budget allocated down to low levels in the organization has generally been viewed as a good thing. The budget has come to be thought of as an entitlement to spend. This is far from a desirable way to operate at a functional level. The objective should be to use as little money as possible to achieve a defined level of quality and thereby have as much money as possible available to allocate to other command priorities. These available funds must be identified early in the FY to enable execution of other priority missions.

10–36. Planning

a. Managers at all levels should accurately plan their future resourcing needs just as tactical commanders plan combat engagements in order to win the next battle and the overall campaign. Relative CM/ABC success should be measured based on how much and how often that manager can reduce the resourcing need over time while accomplishing the required tasks to an acceptable level of quality. Resources saved in the production of one product or service is then available to commanders to redirect to high priority tasks otherwise destined to be unfunded. The CM/ABC process, focused on important activities, in conjunction with other leadership tools, provides the manager the information needed to know how much something needed really costs and provides a structure to do something about the unit cost of producing it.

b. Integration of CM/ABC practices into the twenty-first century Army is designed to enhance decision making at all levels. This requires a cultural change within the Army, recognizing that CM/ABC is a necessary discipline for all managers and decision makers both military and civilian. Effective CM/ABC practices will assist us in understanding the true costs of producing goods and services, improving operations, and linking execution to Army strategies. CM/ABC fully supports continuous improvement to achieve the most efficient organization. Therefore it is useful in streamlining cost competition (Competitive Sourcing), productivity and performance programs, and perhaps most of all, decision making by local managers. Executing CM/ABC doctrine controls costs and improves efficiency and effectiveness.

c. The support business areas will continue to be vital to the mission of the Army. CM/ABC is the Army’s tool to maximize the effectiveness of existing fiscal resources. Aggressive, proactive management of existing resources is the best way to provide resources for higher priority mission needs such as improved mission support services, quality of life, and force retention.

d. Successful implementation of CM/ABC combines strong leadership support, a cycle of commitment and performance review, employee empowerment, and motivational incentives. With Army leadership serving as strong advocates, the new CM/ABC culture establishes goals and encourages participative behavior to achieve improved performance.

10–37. Building an ABC model

a. An ABC model is needed because the traditional cost accounting system used by the DOD does not allow the assignment of all relevant costs to a product or service (activity). For example, a commander should know the total cost of activities under his control (e.g. the cost of overhauling a tactical vehicle, or training a soldier in a new MOS, or renovating a set of family quarters). More importantly, the manager that has the power to influence costs must know
and understand them. By analyzing them and the process that produces them, the effective manager is prompted to discover numerous changes that will affect costs. The manager should expect subordinates to understand, explain, and improve cost performance. Unfortunately, a process of collecting and allocating costs that contribute to the creation of a product or service is not readily available. An ABC model needs to be built based on the real way the production mechanism functions in each business area and location. Building a specific model is a time consuming but necessary function to be able to deal with real data vice a template model, provided by others, that can produce only theoretical or standard costs. The creation and regular updating of a specific model is often viewed as too much work and therefore not attempted. The loser is the manager faced with more requirements than assets to get them done.

b. A process to build a model has to be used to capture and allocate costs. A useful model is built by allowing the people who do the work to build their model using a simple question and answer walk-through of what they do each day in performing their mission. All relevant costs are then allocated to the product or service that the tasks produce. No salary or other relevant expense can be left out. Managerial tasks commonly referred to as overhead and other costs have to be accounted for. On the other hand, precision, carried to an extreme, can overly complicate the process and diminish usefulness of the results. This outcome has been observed in many initial attempts at creating a useful cost model. Together, CM and the ABC model give the manager a structure to be as cost effective as possible.

c. A concrete example of the CM/ABC process at work: During the FY’s first quarter CM performance review the first-line manager in the vehicle maintenance shop presented his second quarter spending plan. During previous reviews under similar circumstances, he stated he would need many hours of overtime in the second quarter to immediately repair vehicles returning from an extended deployment. Instead for this review, because of his understanding and use of cost management and the cost model that represents what he does, he has become conscious of all costs and consistently tries to reduce them. The culture of the workforce has been changed to include reduced cost into the definition of mission success. To that end, he spent additional time and effort better allocating work throughout his workforce and managing the second quarter’s employee leaves more carefully. He also gave priority to repair to only the vehicles that commanders told him were most critical to have repaired right away. This extra effort resulted in no overtime being required in the second quarter which he can now brief as a unit cost for vehicle repair that was below the planned level. This identified alternative process, discussed in the performance review, will be recognized for possible wider application throughout the organization.

10–38. Using the ABC model

a. Once a model is built and is repetitively presenting unit cost results, a managerial process to use the data has to be implemented. Leaders with power to change the way things function must view the unit cost data, be presented with managers’ analyses, and approve or create new work processes and direct their implementation.

b. A regularly scheduled performance review and planning meeting can be the single vehicle to do all these things. The manager is presented with the data, preferably by the individuals responsible for spending the money to produce the product, and its correctness is evaluated. The best results are usually reached if the first line manager is the person explaining what the costs are and why his planned resource needs were either exceeded or improved upon. Since the overall goal is to reduce unit costs without sacrificing performance, that discussion ensues. It is important to remember that this same manager previously presented his spending plan, using his ABC model as the basis, for the quarter that is now being reviewed.

c. The commander or senior manager should be the leader at the review as this is the person who has the ultimate authority to implement procedural changes that result in cost reductions in the process under scrutiny. The commander is also the one that will reallocate the savings produced to higher priorities. An integral part of the overall methodology must be to provide incentives for managers at all levels to think and work smarter.

d. In the previous example, the commander may choose to divide the money now available for reallocation between his desire to pay for another need and to provide a reward to the manager that is helping him win the cost war. The commander might ask the first line manager and his supervisor what is needed to improve the function of the organization that produced this improvement. The commander could choose to buy that new forklift for Supply that they commander might ask the first line manager and his supervisor what is needed to improve the function of the organization that produced this improvement. The commander could choose to buy that new forklift for Supply that they commander might ask the first line manager and his supervisor what is needed to improve the function of the organization that produced this improvement. 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e. Commanders focus on the tactical component of CM/ABC by managing cost and performance throughout the cycle of planning and review to achieve continuous improvement. Leadership sets efficiency challenges to be achieved through the managing of activities (CM/ABC), processes, and cost. Gaining a better understanding of cost and performance will better enable managers to achieve the strategic goals set by Army leadership.

10–39. Cost commitment and review

a. The cycle of commitment and review is the key for each business area to practice CM/ABC successfully. This process has been established through prototypes and is depicted in Figure 10–4.

b. Commanders and senior managers must provide the leadership support and need for CM/ABC information. The necessity to pull or lead the cost reconnaissance process creates an atmosphere of cost awareness throughout the command. A cycle of forecasting and after action review provides frequent feedback and accountability that drives continuous improvement and allows for the most efficient use of resources.
c. A good analogy of cost managing in the future is the existing C3I used in the tactical Army. The same principles can be applied to inform decision-makers in ways that lead to improved execution. This can easily fit the emerging requirements of better cost management.

d. ABC represents the intelligence or information gathering process. In battlefield management these are the intelligence technologies that acquire information for war-fighters. Cost warrior pull recognizes the war-fighter as the customer of the management information system. The cost warrior will command what needs to be measured and how to present the information. Cost forecasting recognizes the value and importance of projecting the current cost situation into the future in order to control future spending. In financial terms this means that the cost control system should facilitate forecasting, what-ifing, and simulation. After-action cost review completes the cycle by considering actual mission execution and communicating the results. In financial terms this means that cost warriors must ultimately be measured and held accountable for cost performance. The trend of cost based performance metrics should be expected to show continuous improvement.

e. Effective development of CM/ABC should provide an important weapon for winning the cost war. Strategies, tactics, and weapons that improve the command, control, and communication of cost will be important.

10–40. Links to principles

a. Visionary leadership. Commanders, leaders, and managers must determine the strategies for obtaining and managing costs. Their emphasis on mission accomplishment must be complemented by an emphasis on controlling mission costs.

b. Continuous improvement and learning. CM/ABC is not yet universally understood. Leaders must foster and encourage a continuous improvement and learning mentality within their organizations. The modeling concepts and cycle of commitment and review discussed in this chapter provide a starting point for the learning process.

10–41. Summary

CM principles offer Commanders greater flexibility in mission execution by providing more information in the decision making process. Planning and the ABC model provide the foundation for CM. Use of the model in the commitment and review cycle enables Commanders and other senior leaders to conserve resources within individual operations. By reducing the costs of individual operations, the manager has flexibility with funds during the execution year. These
available funds must be identified early in the FY to enable execution of other priority missions. CM/ABC provides a mechanism for accomplishing the mission within the funds provided.

Section VII
Non-Appropriated Funds

10–42. Non-appropriated funds definitions.

a. Non-appropriated funds (NAF). NAF are cash and other assets that are not appropriated by Congress. NAF come primarily from the sale of goods and services to authorized patrons, DOD military and civilian personnel and their family members, and are used to support MWR programs for the collective benefit of authorized patrons who generate them. NAF are government funds, but they are separate and apart from APF that are recorded on the books of the U.S. Treasury.

b. Non-appropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI). A NAFI is a U.S. Government fiscal entity that performs an essential government function. It acts in its own name to provide, or assist other DOD organizations in providing, MWR and other programs for military personnel, their families, and authorized civilians.

10–43. NAFI management.

a. Every NAFI is legally constituted as an “instrumentality of the United States.” Funds in NAFI accounts are U.S. Government funds and NAF property including buildings and real estate is U.S. Government property. NAF are not commingled with APF and are managed separately, even when supporting a common program or activity. This means that:

• Each NAFI operates under the authority of the U.S. Government in accordance with applicable Federal laws and departmental regulations.
• Because NAFIs operate under the authority of the Federal Government, they are entitled to the same sovereign privileges and immunities as the U.S. Government accorded by Federal law.
• Applicable DOD directives and implementing Army regulations have the force and effect of law.

b. A NAFI is administered and managed by military or civilian personnel acting in an official capacity. The NAFI is generally immune from Federal taxes and exempt from most direct State, local, and host country taxes. It must account for and report financial operations through command and department channels. NAFI operations are subject to review by Congress. AR 215–1, Military Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Programs and Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentalities, provides more information on management of Army NAFIs.

10–44. Fiduciary responsibility for NAF (10 United States Code Section 2783)

NAF are U.S. Government funds entitled to the same protection as funds appropriated by the Congress.

a. Individual responsibility. There is an individual fiduciary responsibility to use NAF properly and prevent waste, loss, mismanagement, or unauthorized use. This responsibility extends to all DOD personnel to include members of the Armed Forces and appropriated funded and non-appropriated funded civilian employees.

b. Violations. Commanders are responsible for the prompt detection and proper investigation of possible violations and instituting appropriate corrective action. Individuals reporting NAF violations are protected from reprisal. Commanders will take appropriate administrative action against violators. Where evidence indicates criminal conduct, commanders will refer the matter to the appropriate criminal investigative organization. Penalties for violations of waste, loss, mismanagement, or unauthorized use of NAF apply to military, appropriated funded civilian personnel and NAF civilian personnel. They include the full range of statutory and regulatory sanctions, both criminal and administrative, and are the same as those under provisions of Federal law that govern the misuse of appropriations. Reporting of suspected violations at the lowest organizational level possible is encouraged. However, reports may be made to senior management, organizational inspector generals, or to the Defense Hotline.

10–45. Management of MWR and NAF

a. MWR and NAF are managed by a Board of Directors (BOD). Members of the BOD are the four-star commanders, the Sergeant Major of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The senior military member chairs the BOD. The MWR BOD develops goals and objectives, approves financing strategies, monitors performance, prioritizes NAF major construction requirements, and ensures fiduciary responsibility for MWR.

b. An Executive Committee (EXCOM) reports to the MWR BOD. The EXCOM is chaired by the G1. The BOD structure also includes Strategic Planning, Finance, and Audit Committees that report to the EXCOM. An Investment Subcommittee reports to the Finance Committee.

10–46. HQDA oversight of non-appropriated funds

As part of the responsibility of overseeing NAF, the ASA (FM&C) participates in addressing non-appropriated fund issues to the SECARMY and CSA for decision. Applying various means, the ASA (FM&C) provides HQDA level
financial management oversight of Army controlled NAF. One method is by participating the various levels of the Soldier and Family Readiness Board of Directors’ (SFRBOD) various forums. A representative from the Army Budget Office participates in all SFRBOD working group level meetings where major MWR financial policy issues can be addressed. The Military Deputy for Budget advises the SFRBOD and is a voting member of the SFRBOD three star level Executive Committee. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Operations chairs the SFRBOD Audit Committee. A senior member of the Army Budget Office serves on the Investment Committee for the Army Banking and Investment Fund. The Military Deputy for Budget is also a voting member of the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Board of Directors and its Finance Committee. The AAFES is a major revenue contributor to Army MWR. Through these positions, the ASA (FM&C) influences all aspects of MWR financial policy.

Section VIII
Summary and References

10–47. Summary
a. Resource management in our Army continues to evolve. New legislation, new requirements, new management initiatives, new missions and the proviso to get the “biggest bang for the buck” out of Army resources continually force resource managers to develop new approaches to resource management. On top of this, the application of IT has literally revolutionized the resource management community. The power of the computer and its sophisticated software has provided decision makers at all levels with powerful tools to maximize the allocation and application of resources.

b. The real innovation lies, however, in the thrust of the entrepreneurial approaches being advocated in the resource management community. Recognition that Army budget levels in the 1990s were declining forced us to reexamine business practices, to integrate in a far more comprehensive manner programming and budgeting, and to look seriously at ways of enhancing the productivity of the people that constitute the Army team. The MDEP concept was a forerunner of this integration effort.

c. Third-party financing, value engineering, charge-back/direct-customer payment, self-sufficiency, organizational efficiency reviews, and output focus based on unit cost are some of the concepts that allow us to examine the way we manage our Army in a more productive way to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources that Congress and the American taxpayer provide to us to forge combat capabilities.

d. This chapter summarized the more pertinent features of resource management systems using a minimum of the complex terms associated with the process. We have identified the major players, the major steps they must take, and the various controls that guide their actions in the resource management process particularly during the execution stage.

10–48. References
a. United States Code, titles as follows:
   (1) Title 5 USC, Government Organization and Employees.
   (2) Title 10 USC, Armed Forces.
   (3) Title 31 USC, Money and Finance.
   (4) Title 32 USC, National Guard.
   (5) Title 41 USC, Public Contracts.


d. Army Regulation 11–2, Management Control, August 1, 1994.
e. Army Regulation 37–47, Representation Funds of the Secretary of the Army, March 12, 2004.
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Chapter 11

Materiel System Research, Development, and Acquisition Management

“...We must ensure that our warfighters have the capabilities they need to accomplish the Nation’s military demands in this new and emerging global environment...We must develop, acquire, and sustain key military capabilities that enable us to prevail over current challenges and to hedge against, dissuade, or prevail over future threats...The world situation demands an Army that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations. We are working hard to ensure that America’s soldiers continue to be the best trained, best led, and best equipped land force on earth.” Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)

Section I
Introduction

11–1. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army acquisition management system.
This chapter describes the DOD and U.S. Army management systems used for capabilities integration and development and research, development, and acquisition (RDA) of materiel systems. These systems can be viewed simply as a combination of structure, process, and culture.

a. Structure is the sum of the guidance provided by law, policy or regulation, and the organization provided to accomplish the RDA management functions.

b. Process is the interaction of the structure in producing the output.

c. Culture is the cumulative sum of past practices and their impact on interpretation of guidance and attitude toward institutional changes to the system.

11–2. System focus.
For the Army, the focus of the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS) is producing military units that are adequately trained, equipped, and maintained to execute the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) effectively by developing and acquiring warfighting systems that are affordable and support the national strategies. To facilitate an understanding of the process, this chapter will begin by highlighting some of the critical aspects of capabilities integration and development.

Section II
Capabilities Integration and Development.

11–3. Policy.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01F mandates policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C mandates procedural guidance for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to include guidance on key performance parameters (KPPs) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Army supports JCIDS through the Army’s CIDS process discussed in Army Regulation 71–9 and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 71–20. As of this chapter update, the CJCSI 3170.01F is being replaced with CJCSI 3170.01G and CJCSM 3170.01G is being replaced with a supporting JCIDS Manual.

11–4. Joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS).

a. The JCIDS, the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS), and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process form the DOD’s three principal decision support processes for transforming the military forces to support the NMS. The procedures established in JCIDS support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CICS) and the JROC in advising the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capabilities-based requirements (needs).

b. JCIDS is a need driven joint capabilities-based requirements generation process. The objective is to develop a balanced and synchronized doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solution proposal that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable by outside agencies, and based on mature technology that is demonstrated in a relevant operational or laboratory environment. JCIDS implements an integrated, collaborative process, based on top-level strategic direction, to guide development of new capabilities through changes in DOTMLPF. Change recommendations are developed and evaluated in consideration of how to optimize the joint force’s ability to operate as an integrated force. This integrated, collaborative approach requires a process that uses joint concepts and integrated architectures to identify prioritized high risk capability gaps and integrated joint DOTMLPF and policy approaches (materiel and non-materiel) to resolve those gaps.

c. As joint concepts are developed, a capabilities identification methodology will emerge that flows from top-level strategic guidance. Based on this guidance, the family of joint operations concepts (JOpsC) portrays how future joint forces are expected to operate across the range of military operations in 8–20 years in support of strategic objectives. The JOpsC consists of a capstone concept for joint operations (CCJO), joint operating concepts (JOCs) (e.g., Homeland
Security), joint functional concepts (JFCs) (e.g., Focused Logistics), and joint integrating concepts (JICs) (e.g., Joint Forcible Entry Operations). As they are developed, these concepts provide the conceptual basis for the JCIDS directed capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to identify required capabilities (RCs), capability gaps and redundancies, and potential non-materiel and materiel approaches to resolve the gaps in capability. Army implementation of JCIDS was previously discussed in detail in chapter 5.

11–5. DOD science and technology (S&T).
Since World War II, owning the technology advantage has been a cornerstone of our National Military Strategy (NMS). Technologies like radar, jet engines, nuclear weapons, night vision, global positioning, smart weapons, and stealth have changed warfare dramatically. Maintaining this technological edge has become even more important as high technology weapons become readily available on the world market. In this new environment, it is imperative that joint forces possess technological superiority to ensure success and minimize casualties across the broad spectrum of engagements. The technological advantage enjoyed by the United States in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) in 2002 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and still enjoyed today, is the legacy of decades of wise investments in S&T. Similarly, our warfighting capabilities 10 to 15 years from now will be substantially determined by today’s investment in S&T.

11–6. Defense science and technology strategy.
The DOD Research and Engineering Strategic Plan (DODR&E(SP)) is supported by the DOD Basic Research Plan (BRP) and the DOD Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP). It provides DOD’s S&T vision, strategy, plan, and a statement of objectives for the planners, programmers, and performers. These documents and the supporting individual S&T master plans of the services and DOD agencies guide the annual preparation of the DOD S&T budget and program objective memoranda (POMs).

a. Basic Research Plan (BRP). BRP presents the DOD objectives and investment strategy for DOD-sponsored basic research (6.1) performed by universities, industry, and service laboratories. In addition to presenting the planned investment in 12 technical disciplines, the current plan highlights six strategic research areas (SRAs) holding great promise for enabling breakthrough technologies for 21st century military capabilities. The BRP is updated as necessary.

b. Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP). The objective of the JWSTP is to ensure that the S&T program supports priority future joint warfighting capabilities. The JWSTP looks horizontally across the services and agencies ensuring that the near-, mid-, and far-term needs of the joint warfighter are properly balanced and supported in the S&T planning, programming, budgeting, and assessment activities of DOD. The JWSTP is structured to support the technological achievement of capabilities associated with the joint functional concepts, developed by the Joint Staff FCBs, in accordance with the JCIDS process previously discussed. The JWSTP is issued annually as Defense guidance. Advanced concepts and technologies identified as enhancing high priority joint warfighting capabilities, along with prerequisite research, receive funding priority in the President’s Budget (PB) and accompanying Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The JWSTP is updated biennial, in the even year.

11–7. Army Science and Technology (S&T).
The Army’s science and technology investments are focused on the future modular force while, at the same time, seeking opportunities to provide advanced technology to the current modular force. This dual strategy requires a dynamic technology portfolio that is strategically aligned with the Army’s future operational capability needs and that maintains an awareness of the lessons learned from current War on Terrorism (WOT) operations. Fundamentally, the Army S&T program is seeking to provide solutions that enable faster, lighter and smarter systems.

a. The ultimate goal of the Army’s S&T program is to provide the Soldier with a winning edge on the battlefield. The accelerating pace of technological change continues to offer significant opportunities to enhance the survivability, lethality, deployability, and versatility of Army forces. High technology research and development is, and will remain, a central feature of the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). Key to the ACP strategy is the planned transition of promising technology developments into tomorrow’s operational capabilities. Technology demonstrations (TDs), discussed later, which evolve into systems and system upgrades incorporated in the Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) accomplish this transition.

b. The Army’s S&T program is an integral part of capabilities development and system acquisition management. The S&T program consists of three stages - basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3). The identifiers—6.1, 6.2, etc.—are commonly used for identifying funds; but they are also used as a shorthand technique by members of the R&D community to identify levels of research development. For example, instead of referring to some project as being “in applied research,” it is often referred to as being “6.2”. The 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 categories are known as the “tech base”. Basic research (6.1) includes all efforts of scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields related to long-term national security needs. Applied research (6.2) includes all efforts directed to the solution of specific military problems, short of major development projects. Advanced technology development (6.3) includes all efforts directed toward projects, which have moved into the development of hardware for testing of operational feasibility. Initiatives, such as the DOD
Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs), discussed later in the chapter, obscure the distinction between S&T and development — pre-and post-Milestone B activities.

c. The Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP). ASTMP is the strategic plan for the Army’s S&T program. The SA and the CSA approve it. It is the Army’s S&T roadmap for achieving Army transformation. This plan is provided to government, industry, and academia to convey the Army’s S&T vision, objectives, priorities, and corresponding strategy. This document is explicit, resource-constrained HQDA guidance to drive funding priorities and the S&T program as a whole. The ASTMP provides “top down” guidance from HQDA to all S&T organizations. It also provides a vital link between DOD technology planning and Army Commands and laboratories. The core of DOD’s S&T strategy is to fuel and exploit the information technology explosion; conduct extensive and realistic demonstrations of new technology applications; and provide for early, extensive and continued involvement of warfighters in S&T demonstration programs. S&T programs must be responsive to numerous national security considerations.

d. A mainstay of the Army strategy for military technology is a viable in-house research capability. Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), Research, Development, Engineering Centers (RDECs) and laboratories are the key organizations responsible for technical leadership, scientific advancements and support for the capabilities development and system acquisition management processes. Activities of these organizations range from basic research to the correction of deficiencies in field systems. Academia and industry as well as hands-on bench work contribute to the S&T mission. Technology insertion into systems is accomplished via the flow of patents, data, design criteria, and other information into TDs, ATDs, JCTDs, new designs, and fielded systems.

e. Overall, the Army’s S&T strategy and programs are committed to the maintenance of technological superiority, while preserving the flexibility to cope with a wide array of possible threat, technology, and budget environments. The Army’s investment in S&T is paramount and is playing a greater role in acquisition than ever, particularly since the advent of DOD JCTDs.

f. A series of reviews of current and proposed S&T activities guide focused research. The first is an annual assessment of all proposed Army funded S&T projects. It is conducted based on an appreciation of current capabilities, ongoing S&T activities and their applicability to the force operating capability (FOC), described earlier in chapter 5, in TRADOC Pamphlet 525–66. Building from the S&T project review, a list of the top Army technology objectives (ATOs) candidates—the Army’s most important technology projects—is generated. There are two distinct types of ATOs. ATO–Research, or ATO(R), focus on laboratory applications to determine feasibility and potentially provide technology options in the mid and far terms. ATO–Demonstration, or ATO(D), focus on products and transition to the acquisition Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase for warfighting capability. Based on formal developmental milestones and achievement measures, the Army Science and Technology Working Group (ASTWG) approve each ATO, which is then listed in ASTMP. The ASTMP and the AMP provide the basis for ATDs, which showcase a variety of advanced technologies and their potential military merit. In addition to advancing the technology, these S&T activities aid the TRADOC ARCIC chartered ICDTs, previously discussed in chapter 5, to better understand the “art of the possible” and refine the many requirements associated with them.

g. As with some concepts, S&T research occasionally produces an item that is recognizable as a defined requirement that should be documented and resourced. Most S&T products must be evaluated in warfighting experiments (previously discussed in chapter 5) before a decision is made to document them as materiel requirements.

h. Oversight of the S&T program is provided by the Army Science and Technology Advisory Group (ASTAG), which is co-chaired by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) and the VCSA (figure 11–1). The ASTWG, is co-chaired by the Army S&T executive (the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology) and the G–8 Director, Force Development. The ASTWG provides general officer level resolution of pressing S&T issues prior to meetings of the ASTAG; recommends to the ASTAG revisions to the Army’s S&T vision, strategy, principles, and priorities; and reviews and approves ATOs.
11–8. **Army technology transition strategy.**

The basic strategy of the S&T program is to transition mature technologies into operational systems that satisfy approved warfighting capabilities-based materiel requirements. Key to this strategy are demonstrations. TDs, ATDs, JCTDs exploit technologies derived from applied research (6.2), which in turn build on new knowledge derived from basic research (6.1) programs. These TDs, ATDs, and JCTDs provide the basis for new systems, system upgrades, or advance concepts which are further out in time. The critical challenge is to tie these programs together in an efficient and effective way. TDs are not new. What is new is the scope and depth of the TDs, the increased importance of their role in the capabilities development and system acquisition management processes, and the increased emphasis on user involvement to permit an early and meaningful evaluation of overall military capability. The following sections provide an explanation of technology maturity, TDs, ATDs, JCTDs, as well as systems/system upgrades.

*a.* Technology maturity measures the degree to which proposed critical technologies meet program objectives and is a principal element of program risk. A technology readiness assessment (TRA) examines program concepts, technology requirements, and demonstrated technology capabilities to determine technological maturity.

(1) TRAs for critical technologies occur sufficiently prior to Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS) milestone decision review (MDR) points B and C to provide useful technology maturity information to the acquisition review process.

(2) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Technology) DASA(R&T) directs the TRAs and, for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), submits the findings to the AAE who submits the report to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology DUSD(S&T) with a recommended technology readiness level (TRL), figure 11–2. In cooperation with the DASA(R&T), the DUSD(S&T) evaluates the TRAs and, if he/she concurs, forward findings to the DOD overarching integrated product team (OIPT) leader and Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) or the Information Technology Acquisition Board (ITAB). If the DUSD(S&T) does not concur with the TRA findings, an independent TRA, under the direction of the DUSD(S&T), is required. DOD OIPTs and acquisition boards will be discussed later in this chapter.

(3) TRLs are a measure of technical maturity that enables consistent, uniform, discussions of technical maturity, across different types of technologies. Decision authorities must consider the recommended TRLs when assessing program risk. TRL descriptions appear in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.
b. Technology demonstrations (TDs) primary focus is to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of a technology for solving specific military requirements. They are incorporated during the various stages of the 6.2 and 6.3 development process and encourage technical competition. They are most often conducted in a non-operational (lab or field) environment. These demonstrations provide information that reduces uncertainties and subsequent engineering cost, while simultaneously providing valuable development and requirements data.

c. Typically, Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) are integrated demonstrations conducted to demonstrate the feasibility and maturity of an emerging technology. ATDs provide a relatively low-cost approach for assessment of technical risks and uncertainties associated with critical technologies prior to the incorporation of these technologies into a system entering the formal acquisition process. They are conducted at the service and DOD agency level with internal funding. They focus on evolving a specific element of technology nominally at the 6.3 advanced technology development point (typically TRL 5–6) to reduce its risk of implementation by an acquisition program or even feed to a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD).

d. The Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) process was initiated by DOD in 2006 to permit the early and relatively inexpensive evaluation of mature advanced technologies. The warfighter evaluates JCTDs to determine military utility of the technologies and to develop the concept of operations that will optimize effectiveness. JCTDs are structured and executed so that, when successful, DOD can proceed rapidly into formal acquisition systems.

e. By introducing new technologies in the field prior to the initiation of formal systems acquisition, DOD allows operators, who have experience in combat, to evaluate and assess the military utility and develop the tactics to ensure that we can realize the full potential of the substantial technology base that is available to both defense and commercial. JCTDs are not a means by which to circumvent the formal acquisition process, but rather a means to enter that process based on a user assessment of the value of the new capability that reduces the user acceptance risk. This process helps DOD make more informed acquisition decisions and improve its acquisition cycle time.

(1) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD(AS&C)) designs JCTDs to transfer technology rapidly from the developers to the users. JCTDs are user oriented and represent an integrated effort to assemble and demonstrate a significant, new or improved military capability based on mature advanced technologies. They also are on a scale large enough to demonstrate operational utility and end-to-end system integrity. As key participants, the operational user and materiel development communities jointly develop and implement a demonstration. JCTDs allow the warfighter to:

• Evaluate a technology’s military utility before committing to a major acquisition effort.
• Develop concepts of operation for employing the new technology.
• Retain a low-cost, residual operational capability, if desired.

(2) When an JCTD has been completed, DUSD(AS&C) elects one of the following alternative actions based on the results of the exercises:

• Based on demonstrated military utility, execute the transition of the successfully demonstrated technology directly to the warfighter. Make only necessary minor, or perhaps no, modifications to the existing hardware or software. This transition approach is particularly appropriate where warfighters require only small quantities of the new equipment.
• Based on demonstrated military utility, enter the formal systems acquisition process at the appropriate milestone (MS) B or C per the appropriate Materiel Development Decision.
• If little or no military utility is determined, terminate the efforts or restructure them based on the evolved concept of operations and lessons learned during the JCTD.

(3) Over the past three (3) years, the Joint Staff, unified commanders, and military services have forwarded proposals for a number of JCTDs to DOD. Industry and many DOD research and development agencies have also proposed candidate JCTDs. Throughout their history, JCTDs have addressed virtually every major area of warfighter need. Some JCTDs are completed in less than 1 year and evaluate a very specific technology or address a particular mission area; others are several years long and include coordination of multiple developing technology programs into a series of specific demonstrations. The goal is to complete a JCTD within one (1) to three (3) years.

(4) DUSD(AS&C) coordinates all JCTD proposals, including recommendations on potential participants, with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L) and the VCJCS, based on prioritization from the JROC and reviews by the JCTD “Breakfast Club” (senior members of the OSD, service, agency, and combatant command (COCOM) S&T community).

f. The development of the next set of materiel systems requires prior demonstration of the feasibility of employing new technologies. These systems are those next in line after the ones currently fielded are in production. For these systems, most technical barriers to the new capability have been overcome. Generally, these systems can enter the DAS EMD phase relatively quickly as a result of the successful demonstration of enabling technologies. Based on current funding guidance, the number of “new-start” systems is in a sharp decline.

g. In the absence of “new-start” systems, the Army is pursuing incremental improvements to existing systems to maintain its technological edge. As defined in the ASTMP, these improvements are designated as systems modifications. System modifications are brought about through technology insertion programs, service life extension programs (SLEPs), preplanned product improvements (P3I), and block improvement programs. These modifications are based primarily on the success of funded 6.3 TDs/ATDs. The 6.3 TDs/ATDs either are the basis for the system modification or have a high probability of forming the basis for the system modification.

Section III
Materiel Capabilities Documents (MCDs)

11–9. Generating and documenting capabilities-based materiel requirements.
MCDs establish the need for a materiel acquisition program, how the materiel will be employed, and what the materiel must be capable of doing. As the acquisition program progresses, statements of required performance and design specifications become more and more specific. The functional area focused initial capabilities document (ICD) is the document that initiates the DAS. The capability development document (CDD) and the capability production document (CPD) are the documents that define the system capabilities needed to satisfy an approved materiel need (high risk capability gap).

a. Initial capabilities document (ICD) is a non-system specific statement of functional required materiel capability (need). It documents the need for a materiel solution to resolve a specific high risk capability gap derived from the JCIDS CBA process (previously discussed in chapter 5). It describes capability gaps that exist in warfighting functions as described in the applicable warfighting concepts and integrated architectures. The capability gap is defined in terms of the functional area, the relevant range of military operations, and timeframe under consideration. The ICD replaces the mission needs statement (MNS) format.

(1) The ICD summarizes the results of the CBA analysis and identifies any changes in U.S. or Allied doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, organization, and training that were considered in satisfying the identified high risk capability gap. The ICD also describes why such nonmaterial changes have been judged to be inadequate in addressing the complete capability.

(2) The ICD documents the evaluation of balanced and synchronized DOTMLPF approaches that are proposed to provide the required capability. The ICD further proposes a recommended materiel approach based on analysis of the different materiel approaches and describes how the recommended approach best satisfies the desired capability.

(3) Once approved, an ICD is not normally updated, but is archived to the Joint Staff, J–8 Knowledge Management/Decision Support (KM/DS) tool database, so that all approved MCDs are maintained in a single location. When
approved, capability development documents (CDDs) (described below) bring the desired capability specified in the ICD into the EMD phase. The CDD then serves as the living document to carry the program and its increments through the acquisition process.

(4) The ICD format and detailed content instructions are provided in the JCIDS Manual, Appendix A, Enclosure E.

b. Capability development document (CDD) is the warfighter's primary means of providing authoritative, measurable and/or testable capabilities for EMD phase of an acquisition program. The CDD is guided by the ICD and captures the information necessary to deliver an affordable and supportable capability using mature technology within a specific increment of an acquisition strategy (AS) - the framework (roadmap) for planning, directing, and managing an acquisition program to satisfy an approved materiel requirement.

1) The CDD is generated during the Technology Development (TD) phase of the acquisition process prior to MS B (program initiation). The CDD describes a technically mature and affordable increment of militarily useful capability that was demonstrated in a relevant environment. The CDD supports entry into EMD phase and refinement of the integrated architecture.

2) In an evolutionary acquisition program, the capabilities delivered by a specific increment may provide only a partial solution of the ultimate desired capability therefore; the first increment's CDD must provide information regarding the strategy to achieve the full capability. Subsequent increments, leading to the full capability, are also described to give an overall understanding of the program strategy. This strategy is updated with each subsequent increment to reflect lessons learned from previous increments, changes in the warfighting concepts or changes in the integrated architecture.

3) The CDD describes the operational capability; threat; integrated architectures; required capabilities; program support; supportability; force structure, DOTLPF impact and constraints; schedule; and program affordability for the system.

4) The CDD identifies the operational performance attributes (testable or measurable characteristics), in threshold-objective format, necessary for the acquisition community to design a proposed system and establish an acquisition program baseline (APB). The CDD states performance attributes, including key performance parameters (KPPs) that guide the development, demonstration, and testing of the current increment. The performance attributes and KPPs apply only to the current increment. Each increment must provide an operationally effective and useful capability in the intended mission environment that is commensurate with the investment and independent of any subsequent increment.

5) The CDD articulates the key attributes (KPPs and KSAs), that are further refined in the capabilities production document (CPD). The CDD is updated or appended for each MS B decision.

6) The CDD format and detailed content instructions are provided in the JCIDS Manual, Appendix A, Enclosure F.

c. Capability production document (CPD) is the warfighters primary means of providing authoritative and testable capabilities for the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase of an acquisition program. A CPD is finalized after the Post Critical Design Review (CDR) Assessment and is validated and approved prior to the MS C (Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) approval) decision. The CPD development is guided by the ICD, CDD, developmental and operational testing results, and the Post CDR Assessment. It captures the information necessary to support production, testing, and deployment of an affordable and supportable increment within an acquisition strategy (AS).

1) The CPD provides the operational performance characteristics necessary for the acquisition community to produce and field a single increment of a specific system. The CPD presents performance characteristics, including KPPs and KSAs, to guide the production and deployment of the current increment. Since a CPD applies to only a single increment of a program’s development, the performance attributes, KPPs, and KSAs apply only to the increment described in the CPD. Each increment must provide an operationally effective and useful capability in the intended environment, commensurate with the investment.

2) The CPD refines the threshold and objective values for performance attributes and KPPs that were validated in the CDD for the production increment. Each production threshold listed in the CPD depicts the minimum performance that the PM is expected to deliver for the increment based on the post CDR system design. The refinement of performance attributes and KPPs is the most significant difference between the CDD and the CPD.

3) The CPD format and detailed content instructions are provided in the JCIDS Manual, Appendix A, Enclosure G.

11–10. MCD performance characteristics, KPPs, and KSAs.

a. The CDD and CPD state the operational and support related performance attributes of a system that provides the capabilities required by the warfighter - attributes so significant they must be verified by testing or analysis. The CDD and CPD identify, in threshold-objective format, the attributes that contribute most significantly to the desired operational capability. Whenever possible, attributes are stated in terms that reflect the operational capabilities necessary to operate in the full range of military operations and the environment intended for the system, family of systems (FoS), or system of systems (SoS). These statements guide the acquisition community in making trades decisions between the threshold and objective values of the stated attributes. Operational testing assesses the ability of the system to meet the production threshold and objective values.

1) Each attribute is supported by an operationally oriented rationale. Below the threshold value, the military utility
of the system becomes questionable. The objective value for an attribute is the desired operational goal, beyond which any gain in military utility does not, according to the warfighter, warrant additional expenditure.

(2) KPPs are those system attributes considered most essential for an effective military capability. The CDD and the CPD contain a minimum number of KPPs that capture the minimum operational effectiveness and suitability attributes (testable or measurable characteristics) needed to achieve the overall desired capabilities for the system during the applicable increment. Failure to meet a CDD or CPD KPP threshold can result in the reevaluation of the selected system, the program’s reassessment or termination, or the modification of the content of production increments.

(3) KSAs are those system attributes considered most critical or essential for an effective military capability but not selected as a KPP. KSAs provide decision makers with an additional level of capability prioritization below the KPP but with senior sponsor leadership control (generally 4–Star level, Defense agency commander, or OSD principal staff assistant).

(4) Net-ready (interoperability compliance) is a required KPP. The NR–KPP assesses information needs, information timelines, information assurance, and net ready attributes required for both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange. The NR–KPP consists of measurable and testable characteristics and/or performance metrics required for the timely, accurate, and complete exchange and use of information to satisfy information needs for a given capability (JROC Memorandum (JROCM) 236–03, 19 December 2003).

(5) A NR–KPP is developed for all information technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS) used to enter, process, store, display, or transmit DOD information, regardless of classification or sensitivity. IT and NSS interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide data, information, materiel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units, or forces to use the data, information, materiel, and services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

(6) The NR–KPP should reflect the information needs of the capability under consideration and the needs of appropriate supported systems. It should cover all communication, computing, and electromagnetic spectrum requirements involving the exchange of products and services between producer, sender, receiver, and consumer for the successful completion of the warfighter mission, business process, or transaction. The NR–KPP identified in CDDs and CPDs will be used in the information support plan (ISP) to identify support required from outside the program.

(7) Force protection and survivability are congressionally required KPPs for all manned systems and systems designed to enhance personnel survivability in an asymmetric threat environment. The Joint Staff Protection Functional Capability Board (FCB), in coordination with the lead FCB, assess these KPPs and their applicability for Joint Capability Board (JCB) and Joint Requirements Oversight Board (JROC) Interest CDDs and CPDs and make a recommendation to the JROC on validation. The sponsoring component validates the KPPs for non-JCB/JROC Interest CDDs and CPDs. A single KPP can be developed provided it complies with the congressional direction pertaining to force protection and survivability (JROCM 120–05, 13 June 2005).

(a) Force protection KPP attributes are those that contribute to the protection of personnel by preventing or mitigating hostile actions against friendly personnel, military and civilian. This may include the same attributes as those that contribute to survivability, but the emphasis is on protecting the system operator or other personnel rather than protecting the system itself.

(b) Survivability KPP attributes is those that contribute to the survivability of a manned system. This includes attributes such as speed, maneuverability, detectability, and countermeasures that reduce a system’s likelihood of being engaged by hostile fire, as well as attributes such as armor and redundancy or critical components that reduce the system’s vulnerability if it is hit by hostile fire.

(8) A Sustainment KPP (JROCM 131–06, 29 June 2006) (materiel availability) and two mandatory supporting KSAs (materiel reliability and ownership cost) are developed for all JCB and JROC Interest programs involving materiel solutions. For non-JCB/JROC Interest programs, the sponsor determines the applicability of this KPP.

(a) Materiel availability is a measure of the percentage of the total inventory of a system operationally capable (ready for tasking) of performing an assigned mission at a given time, based on materiel condition. This can be expressed mathematically as the number of operational end items/total population.

(b) Materiel reliability KSA is a measure of the probability that the system will perform without failure over a specific interval. Reliability must be sufficient to support the warfighting capability needed. Materiel reliability is generally expressed in terms of a mean time between failures (MTBF).

(c) Ownership cost KSA provides balance to the sustainment solution by ensuring that the operations and support (O&S) costs associated with materiel readiness are considered in making decisions.

(9) The JROC has defined two KPPs to be selectively applied to programs - system training and energy efficiency. The sponsor will perform an analysis on the use of these parameters as KPPs.

(a) System training KPP ensures system training is addressed in the analysis of alternatives (AoA) and supporting analysis for subsequent acquisition phases and ensures projected training requirements and associated costs are appropriately addressed across the proposed acquisition program life cycle.

(b) Energy efficiency KPP includes fuel efficiency considerations for fleet purchases and operational plans consistent with mission accomplishment. Life cycle cost analysis will include the fully burdened cost of fuel during the AoA and subsequent analyses and acquisition program design trades.
b. DOTmLPF integrated capabilities recommendation (DICR) is prepared by TRADOC ICDTs or proponents when it is necessary to implement changes in the DOTMLPF to resolve or mitigate a capability gap. As such, the DICR focuses on changes that are primarily non-materiel in nature, although there may be some materiel changes as well. For changes that are primarily non-materiel in nature, the Army uses the acronym DOTmLPF.

1) A DICR is a tool used to apprise the ARSTAFF of a recommendation for a major DOTmLPF change. This recommendation will have impacts across the Army, and will create a need for the Army staff to take some action to reprogram or obtain resources to implement the DICR’s recommendations. While it is recognized that system-specific DOTMLPF and policy changes are an integral part of any new start major acquisition program, those system-specific changes are addressed by the CDD and/or CPD and not through the DICR process. The DICRs are normally referred to as non-materiel solutions, while new start acquisition programs are referred to as materiel solutions.

2) A DICR may request additional numbers of existing commercial or non-developmental items. As innovations, new technologies, experimentation, testing, capability reviews, combatant commander integrated priority lists (IPLs), and lessons learned spawn potential enhancements to operational capabilities, the AROC reviews specific change recommendations for joint and Army warfighting utility and programmatic implications. Based on the findings, the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) will provide recommendations for review and action.

(a) The DICR may be submitted to:

- Change, institutionalize, and/or introduce new joint and/or Army DOTmLPF and policy resulting as an output of joint and Army experimentation, lessons learned, or other assessments to meet operational needs.
- Change, institutionalize, and/or introduce new joint and Army DOTmLPF and policy resulting from the functional solutions analysis (FSA), which is outside the scope or oversight of a new defense acquisition program.
- Request additional numbers of existing commercial or non-developmental items previously produced or deployed via the JCIDS process in addition to other considerations of DOTmLPF.
- Introduce existing non-materiel solutions available from other DOD, U.S. interagency, or foreign sources.

(b) The Army DICR, its format and preparation guidance is described in AR 71–9.

c. DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCRs) documents are a recommendation for changes to existing joint resources when such changes are not associated with a new defense acquisition program. The DCR format and detailed content instructions are provided in the JCIDS Manual, Appendix A, Enclosure H.

d. A War on Terrorism (WOT) Army capability request is an Army capability request to HQDA that constitutes a request for a materiel solution to correct a current force deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment. These capability requests come to HQDA and fall into two general categories; authorized/pre-validated resourcing requests and operational needs statements (ONSs).

1) Authorized/pre-validated resourcing requests (equipment and quantities already validated by HQDA, ODCS G–3/5/7):

(a) Deployed and deploying units (in support of a WOT named operation) or other HQDA designated high priority units, may submit resourcing requests for authorized/pre-validated equipment (i.e., modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) shortages, table of distribution and allowances (TDA) shortages, brigade combat team (BCT) basis-of-issue plan (BOIP) shortages, or other equipment shortages already HQDA validated). The unit submits a request for equipment resourcing through the chain of command to HQDA G–8 for resourcing via the Army equipping common operating picture (ECOP) database. ECOP is the SIPRNET-based Army “start to finish” database for determining initial equipment authorizations for a named operation; creating, submitting and monitoring operational needs statements (ONSs); and requesting sourcing of pre-validated and validated equipment requirements via equipment sourcing documents (ESDs).

(b) Other means are still available for units to request equipment resourcing of authorized/pre-validated equipment such as MTOE shortages. For example, units can and should continue to use the unit status report (USR) process (IAW AR 220–1) to identify critical shortages affecting unit readiness.

2) Operational needs statements (ONSs). Operational field commanders use an ONS to document the urgent need for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment in the WOT.

(a) The ONS provides an opportunity for the operational field commander to initiate the HQDA Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process. The AR2B is the forum for presenting critical operational needs (ONSs) to the Army’s senior leadership for rapid decision making (accelerated fielding solutions).

(b) The ONS is not a materiel capabilities document (MCD). The CBTDEV, TNGDEV or MATDEV communities do not initiate or develop an ONS.

(c) Response to an ONS varies depending on the criticality of the need for the proposed item. Response can range from a HQDA directed requirement and fielding of a materiel system to the forwarding of the action to TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARVIC) for review and appropriate action. HQDA may decline to favorably consider an ONS for a variety of reasons, including conflicting needs, higher priorities for funding, existence of a similar system, or non-concurrence of the criticality of the need. The response to an ONS is based on an ARSTAF validation supported by TRADOC, AMC, and MATDEV reviews. HQDA AR2B determines validity of the need.
availability of technology, and source of resources to fill the requirement. If the need is determined to be critical, and can be resourced (at least for the present situation) a directed requirement may result.

(d) All ONS are reviewed by the CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs to determine applicability to future requirements or continuing need for which a standard requirement and acquisition is needed. If validation of the ONS indicates that the concept has potential for Army-wide application and development of a new system is appropriate, TRADOC ARCIC will initiate a functional area ICD and/or CDD as appropriate.

Section IV
Material Requirements Approval
In 2007 the Army revised its warfighting requirements validation and approval process to adjust for rapidly changing technology, constraints on the Army budget, increased sustainment costs, the need to provide a concrete linkage between requirements and resources, and increasing emphasis on joint interoperability. Within the Army, the VCSA approves and the CSA retains veto authority for all warfighting materiel requirements. Requirements meeting specific threshold criteria may be approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7, in order to facilitate timely processing, if delegated by VCSA.

11–11. Joint requirements approval.

a. The process of obtaining validation and approval of JCIDS documents begins with the submission of a materiel capability document (MCD) proposal to the JS, J–8 Knowledge Management/Decision Support (KM/DS) tool database and continues until the document is validated and approved by the appropriate authority. The details of the process are presented below.

b. Services and other DOD organizations conducting JCIDS CBA analyses, previously discussed in chapter 5, may generate ideas and concepts leading to draft ICDs, CDDs, CPDs, and joint DCRs. JCIDS initiatives may also be generated within a JS Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) as a result of analyses conducted by, or in support of, the FCB. As the initiative develops into proposed DOTmLPF or materiel solutions to provide the desired capabilities, an FCB may task a lead service or component with sponsoring the initiative. Further development of the proposal would then become the responsibility of the sponsor. The FCB is responsible for the organization, analysis, and prioritization of joint warfighting capability needs within assigned functional areas. The FCB is an advisory body to the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) and JROC for JCIDS initiatives assigned with joint potential designators (JPDs) of JCB Interest or JROC Interest. The FCB chairman advises the JCB or JROC when required JCIDS decisions lay outside the scope of FCB decision authority.

c. All JCIDS documents (ICDs, CDDs, CPDs, and DCRs) are submitted to the J–8 KM/DS tool database by the sponsoring component. Submission of the document to the KM/DS database triggers the Vice Director, J–8 and the gatekeeper process to determine whether the document has joint implications or is component unique. Normally the document has undergone an appropriate component staffing process before submission to the J–8 KM/DS tool database.

d. The Gatekeeper. The JS, Vice Director J–8, serves as the gatekeeper of the JCIDS process. The gatekeeper, with the assistance of the J–8 Requirements and Acquisition Division (RAD), and J–6 Requirements and Assessments Division, evaluate all JCIDS documents submitted through the J–8 KM/DS tool database.

1. JCIDS documents are submitted for gatekeeper review to determine whether the proposal affects the joint force. The gatekeeper review is conducted for each document regardless of potential acquisition category (ACAT), previous delegation decisions, or previous JPD decisions.

   (a) An ACAT is designated as ACAT I, II, or III when the materiel requirement and manner of acquisition have been identified. Dollar criteria and visibility of the potential program determine the ACAT.

   (b) The ACAT determines the level of review, and who will make the milestone decisions. The three acquisition categories are defined in figure 11–3A and 11–3B.

2. Based on the content of the submission, the gatekeeper assigns a JPD of JROC Interest, JCB Interest, Joint Integration, Joint Information, or Independent to the ICD, CDD, CPD or DCR.

   (a) The “JROC Interest” designation applies to all potential ACAT I/IA programs and programs designated as JROC Interest. All JROC Interest documents receive JS threat validation; command, control, communications, and computers (C4) interoperability and supportability; intelligence; or insensitive munitions (IM) certifications as required. These documents are staffed through the JROC for validation and approval. On 20 June 2008, the JROC directed that all capabilities documents within the Battlespace Awareness, Command and Control, Logistics, and Net-Centric portfolios be designated as JROC Interest.

   (b) The “JCB Interest” designation applies to all ACAT II and below programs where the capabilities and/or systems associated with the document affect the joint force and an expanded joint review is required. These documents will receive all applicable certifications, including a weapon safety endorsement when appropriate, and be staffed through the JCB for validation and approval.

   (c) The “Joint Integration” designation applies to potential ACAT II and below programs in which the concepts and/or systems associated with the document do not significantly affect the joint force, for which an expanded review is not
required; but for which JS threat validation, C4 interoperability and supportability, intelligence, or IM certifications are required. All weapons and munitions will be designated Joint Integration as a minimum. Once the required certifications are completed, Joint Integration proposals are validated and approved by the sponsoring component.

(d) The “Joint Information” designation purpose is to keep the services and combatant commands informed of ongoing efforts for programs that do not reach the threshold for JROC Interest, JCB Interest, or Joint Integration designation. Joint Information programs undergo a FCB review for concurrence on the assignment of the Joint Information JPD. Based upon this review, the FCB will continue processing as a Joint Information programs or elevate the program to a JROC Interest, JCB Interest, or Joint Integration designation. Joint Information programs are briefed as recommended by the FCB and returned to the sponsor for validation/approval.

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**Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Category</th>
<th>Primary Criteria</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACAT I *</td>
<td>$ = FY00 Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACAT ID</td>
<td>RDTE &gt; $365M or PROC &gt; $2.19B (PEO / PM Managed)</td>
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**ACAT IA**

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<td>ACAT IAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Technology Transition Mechanisms to MS B**

* Acquisition Information Management (AIM) Database

**Pre ACAT Technology Projects**

* JCTDs: Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstrations
* JWES: Joint Warfighting Experiments

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**Figure 11–3A. Acquisition categories (ACATS)**

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**Major Systems**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACAT II</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACAT II</td>
<td>RDTE &gt; $140M or PROC &gt; $660M</td>
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**Non - Major Systems**

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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>ACAT III</td>
<td>All acquisition programs that are not classified as an MDAP or Major System (ACAT I or II) (includes less than major AISs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 11–3B. Acquisition categories (ACATS)-continued**
The “Independent” designation applies to potential ACAT II and below programs in which the concepts and/or systems associated with the document do not significantly affect the joint force, an expanded review is not required, and no Joint Staff certifications are required. Once designated, these documents are returned to the sponsoring component for validation and approval.

3. The J–8, using the KM/DS tool, maintains a database of JCIDS documents processed through the gatekeeper function. The database includes the JPD as defined above; which FCBS have equity in the proposal (if any); and the lead FCB for the proposal (if any). The database helps the Vice Director, J–8 ensure consistency of staffing as JCIDS proposals progress through the JCIDS process.

4. Once the JPD has been assigned, the document moves into the staffing and approval process.

e. Staffing process. The J–8 CAD staffs all JCB Interest and JROC Interest proposals before FCB review. During the review process, the FCB evaluates how well the proposed solution documented in a ICD, CDD, or CPD addressed the capability needs identified in the JCIDS CBA analyses. f Certifications and Weapons Safety Endorsement. Applicable certifications and the weapons safety endorsement will be processed as part of the staffing process for each JCIDS document. If a certification/endorsement authority determines the content is insufficient to support a required certification/endorsement, it is the sponsor’s responsibility to resolve the issue with the certification/endorsement authority. If resolution cannot be achieved, the sponsor may request review of the issue by higher authority.

1. Threat Validation and Intelligence Certification - (JS J–2).

(a) Threat Validation. For all JCB Interest, JROC Interest and Joint Integration ICDs, CDDs, and CPDs, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides validation of threat information appropriate to the proposal through the intelligence certification process. DOD components may validate intelligence information for programs designated as Joint Information or Independent proposals using DIA-validated threat data and/or data contained in DOD Service Intelligence Production Program products and data.

(b) Intelligence Certification. JS J–2 provides intelligence certification as part of the JCIDS staffing of CDDs, and CPDs, regardless of ACAT level, unless a waiver has been granted by JS J–2. J–2 will assess intelligence support needs for completeness, supportability, and impact on joint intelligence strategy, policy, and architectural planning. The J–2 certification will also evaluate intelligence-related information systems with respect to security and intelligence interoperability standards.

2. Information Technology (IT) and National Security System (NSS) Interoperability and Supportability Requirements Certification - (JS J–6). The J–6 certifies all CDDs and CPDs designated as JROC Interest, JCB Interest or Joint Integration for conformance with joint IT and NSS policy.

3. Weapon Safety Endorsement. The J–8 Deputy Director Force Protection (DDFP) provides a weapon safety endorsement coordinated through the Force Protection FCB as part of the JCIDS staffing of ICDs, CDDs, CPDs, and DCRs regardless of ACAT. A weapon safety endorsement is the means for documenting the extent to which weapon capabilities documents provide for safe integration into joint warfighting environments. Endorsement recommendations are prepared by the Joint Weapon Safety Technical Advisory Panel (JWSTAP) and submitted to the J–8/DDFP for appropriate staffing and coordination with the FP FCB. The endorsement will indicate that required joint warfighting environment attributes and performance parameters, from a weapon safety perspective, are judged to be adequately prescribed in the ICD, CDD, CPD, or joint DCR. The endorsement may also convey identified limitations in the prescribed attributes or performance parameters that are deemed acceptable from a weapon safety perspective, yet foreseen as potential military utility hindrances or joint operation limitations. If the weapon safety endorsement identifies restrictions/limitations, the sponsor will coordinate with the FP FCB for resolution or acceptance of the restrictions/limitations.

11–12. Army requirements approval.

a. In order to provide more effective management of the total requirements process for all aspects of Army needs, the requirements process was modified to consolidate all DOTMLPF requirements at HQDA for staffing, validation, and approval. This process ensures that the Army pursues requirements that can compete for and retain resources that are tied to the future Army and joint visions and goals. The changes to the current Army CIDS are evolutionary. The new process places increased emphasis on analysis of the requirement, potential alternatives, affordability and joint interoperability. The goal is to evaluate all DOTMLPF requirements, regardless of origin, against the goals, vision and needs of the current and future modular force. The lead organization for the implementation of the JCIDS process is HQDA OADCS, G–3/5/7.

b. Within the OADCS, G3/5/7, the Future Warfighting Capabilities Division (DAMO–CIC) is the single entry point for Army and joint DOTMLPF requirements. DAMO–CIC is the proponent for policy development, Army CIDS process oversight, and interface with the JCIDS process (previously discussed). Within DAMO–CIC, the requirements staff officer (RSO) is directly responsible for leading HQDA staff integration and coordination efforts for all Army and joint DOTMLPF requirements issues. The RSO coordinates with his/her ODCS, G–8 counterpart, the synchronization
staff officer/system synchronization officer (SSO), to facilitate the transition from capabilities-based requirements development and approval to requirements solutions (execution and resourcing).


a. The AROC, coordinated by OADCS, G–3/5/7 Future Warfighting Capabilities Division (DAMO–CIC), is assigned responsibility for advising and making recommendations on the disposition of materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) to the VCSA. DAMO–CIC schedules and executes the AROC forum. TRADOC’s ARCIC continues to be responsible for balanced development of concepts, requirements, and products in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). The Director, ARCIC evaluation and recommendation must accompany all MCDs submitted to HQDA for AROC approval.

b. The AROC reviews MCDs for military need and risk; synchronization with Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) and Army Campaign Plan (ACP); program affordability; program supportability; and program definition and interoperability. In reviewing for military need and risk, the AROC seeks to validate that:

- deficiencies cannot be corrected by nonmateriel means, such as changes to doctrine; organizations, training, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities (DOTLPF);
- suitable, lesser cost, materiel alternatives do not exist;
- failure to pursue the program will result in an unacceptable risk to the Army’s warfighting capabilities.

c. The AROC also considers the execution risk to ensure capabilities can be available to the field in the timeframe required. The AROC review validates the recommended strategy for MCDs is consistent with Army modernization plans, and contributes to a balanced, synchronized modernization program. The AROC reviews cost and affordability of concepts and programs to ensure that they are within budgeting and programming limits for short and long term. This includes potential supportability requirements for the concept or system. The AROC ensures that the definition of the system CDD is clear, and consistent with joint and Army warfighting concepts. The AROC reviews, in the CDD, the KPPs for the system and ensures the proposed system meets Army and joint interoperability requirements.

d. The AROC may not review all Army requirements. Approval of selected documentation may be delegated to the DCS, G–3/5/7 by the VCSA. Disapproval authority remains at the VCNSA level. In addition a “paper AROC” may be used, at the discretion of the AROC chair, to staff noncontentious issues. An information copy of all issues approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7 is provided to the VCSA/CSA.

e. The AROC consists the following permanent members:

- Vice, Chief of Staff, Army (Chair)
- Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)
- Chief Information Officer (CIO)/Deputy Chief of Staff, G–6
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8
- Director, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC).

f. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Cost & Economics and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Test and Evaluation are permanent advisors.

g. AROC Process Review Board (APRB) serves as the AROC intermediate review body inserted prior to and immediately following the initial staffing of JCIDS proposals and as required to review and comment on other documentation, analysis, or actions. The APRB ensures topics are suitably developed in accordance with AROC objectives and determine the required method of presentation for approval of the submission.

(1) The APRB meets weekly, as required, to manage workload and ensure value added without unnecessary slowing the Army CIDS staffing process. The meeting date, time, and location supports an orchestrated staff battle rhythm and provides efficiency to the overall process by ensuring document readiness and identification of special coordination requirements prior to 1–Star staffing, resolution of complex issues across the ARSTAF prior to moving the document in to AROC review, and providing situational awareness to senior leaders for issues not resolved or jeopardizing successful staffing/review.

(2) The APRB is co-chaired by the Chief, Future Warfighting Capabilities Division, G–37 and Colonel/GS–15 representatives from the Force Development Directorate, G–8 and TRADOC ARCIC. The APRB is composed of representatives of the AROC principals and permanent advisors. Other ARSTAF elements and external organizations provide subject matter expertise as required. The APRB makes recommendations to and executes the decisions of the AROC Secretary - DCS, G–3/5/7.


a. The process of obtaining validation and approval of JCIDS proposals begins with the submission of a proposal to
the Capabilities and AROC Management System (CAMS). CAMS is the Army DCS, G–3/5/7 database driven knowledge management decision support information technology system that supports AROC document staffing and commenting from numerous users and organizations within the Army into a central database repository. The system allows users to view document information and monitor document progress through AROC validation until submission to the JROC staffing and approval process. Staffing continues until the document is validated and approved.

b. All JCIDS proposals are entered into CAMS by the sponsor. Submission of the proposal will trigger the Army “gatekeeper” process. The JCIDS proposal will be subjected to HQDA staffing and coordination. All proposals undergoing the review process are considered draft until after validation and/or approval by the designated validation authority.

c. JCIDS proposals will be submitted for Army “gatekeeper” review to determine accuracy and completeness. Based on the content of the proposal, the “gatekeeper” will assign the proposal to the functional requirements staff officer (RSO) and initiate Army staffing utilizing CAMS as a staffing tool.

d. The Army JCIDS staffing process includes the APRB, 1–Star initial staffing, 3–Star AROC principal/advisor review phases. The Army validation process optimally takes 95 to 100 business days.

e. At the conclusion of the AROC validation process the Army “gatekeeper” enters the document into Knowledge Management/Decision Support (KM/DS) web-based staffing tool for Joint Staff (JS) staffing.

f. The Army “gatekeeper” signals completion of Army and joint staffing, validation, and approval by publishing the G–3/5/7 approval memorandum with a Catalog of Approved Requirement Documents (CARDs) reference number.

11–15. Configuration steering board (CSB).
A CSB is now required to be established for every Army ACAT I program. In the Army, CSB’s are chaired by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) with broad membership from the Army acquisition and CBTDVE communities as well as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), and the JS. The CSBs review all proposed requirements changes and any proposed technical configuration changes which have the potential to result in cost, schedule or performance impacts to the program. Final decisions on option implementation are coordinated with the JS and the appropriate military department officials responsible for the requirements.

Section V
Materiel Systems Acquisition
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) establishes a management process to translate user needs (broadly stated functional high risk capability gaps developed in the JCIDS or business needs responding to new ways of doing business) and technological opportunities (developed or identified in the S&T program based on user needs) into reliable and sustainable systems that provide capability to the user.

11–16. DOD system acquisition policy.

a. The basic policy is to ensure that acquisition of Defense systems is conducted efficiently and effectively in order to achieve operational objectives of the U.S. Armed Forces in their support of national policies and objectives within the guidelines of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A–11, part 3: Major System Acquisitions. DOD Directive 5000.01: The Defense Acquisition System, DOD Instruction 5000.02: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, and a guidebook containing additional supporting discretionary, best practices, lessons learned, and expectations posted to the DOD 5000 Resource Center at http://DOD5000.dau.mil are the documents that provide the DOD guidance for system acquisition policy and procedure. AR 70–1 provides Army acquisition policy for materiel and information systems. These documents establish an integrated management framework for a single, standardized DOD-wide acquisition system that applies to all programs including highly sensitive, classified programs. Tailoring is encouraged in the process to reflect specific program needs. In accordance with DODD 5000.01, “There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to accomplish the objective of the Defense Acquisition System.” The essential features of the DAS are:

• a clear acquisition strategy (AS)
• a thorough program plan
• risk management techniques
• systematic program tracking against the plan.

b. An acquisition program is defined as a directed, funded effort designed to provide a new, improved or continuing weapon system or information technology system (IT) capability in response to a validated operational need. Acquisition programs are divided into three different acquisition categories (ACATs), which are established to facilitate decentralized decision-making, and execution and compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. Acquisition phases provide a logical means of progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into well-defined system-specific requirements and ultimately into operationally effective, suitable, and survivable systems. All the tasks and activities needed to bring the program to the next milestone (MS) occur during acquisition phases. A MS is the major decision point that initiates the next phase of an acquisition program. Major defense acquisition program (MDAP)
milestones may include, for example, the decisions to begin technology development (TD), or to begin low-rate initial production (LRIP).

11–17. Materiel systems acquisition management.

a. In the broad sense, the event driven materiel acquisition system consists of a series of management decisions made in DOD or the Army as the development of a materiel system progresses from a stated materiel requirement to a fielded system. Product improvements (PIs) to existing systems or acquisition of nondevelopmental items (NDI) usually occur through acquisition streamlining. The system that is used is shown in figure 11–4. A key aspect of the process is that it is divided into three distinct activities (pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, sustainment); five phases (materiel solution analysis, technology development, engineering and manufacturing development, production and deployment, and operations and support); and six work efforts (integrated system design, system capability and manufacturing process demonstration, low-rate initial production (LRIP), full-rate production (FRP) and deployment, sustainment, and disposal). Entry into the acquisition management system is at one of the formal MS decision points dependent on the appropriate Materiel Development Decision.

b. Key policies and principles governing the operation of the DAS are (DODD 5000.01):

(1) Flexibility. There is no one best way to structure an acquisition program to accomplish the objective of the DAS. Milestone decision authorities (MDAs) and PMs tailor program strategies and oversight, including documentation of program information, acquisition phases, the timing and scope of decision reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations and the time-sensitivity of the capability need.

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**Figure 11-4. Defense Acquisition Management System**
(2) Responsiveness. Advanced technology is integrated into producible systems and deployed in the shortest time practicable. Approved, time-phased capability needs matched with available technology and resources enable evolutionary acquisition strategies. Evolutionary acquisition strategies are the preferred approach to satisfying operational needs.

(3) Innovation. Throughout DOD, acquisition professionals continuously develop and implement initiatives to streamline and improve the DAS. MDAs and PMs examine and, as appropriate, adopt innovative practices (including best commercial practices) that reduce cycle time and cost, and encourage teamwork.

(4) Discipline. PMs manage programs consistent with statute and regulatory requirements. Every PM establishes program goals for the minimum number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters that describe the program over its life-cycle. Approved acquisition program baseline (APB) parameters serve as program control objectives. PMs identify deviations from approved APB parameters and exit criteria.

(5) Streamlined and effective management. Responsibility for the acquisition of systems is decentralized to the maximum extent practicable. The MDA provides a single individual with sufficient authority to accomplish MDA approved program objectives for development, production, and sustainment. The MDA assures accountability and maximize credibility in cost, schedule, and performance reporting.

c. Technology projects (e.g., ATDs, JCTDs, concepts development, and capabilities development) are efforts that occur prior to acquisition program initiation. These are referred to as pre-ACAT technology projects. The MDA for projects which will likely result in a major defense acquisition program (MDAP) or major automated information system (MAIS), if successful, is the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

d. The DAS is initiated as a result of output—approved warfighting materiel capabilities-based requirements—from the JCIDS (previously discussed). Identified warfighting requirements are first assessed to determine if they can be satisfied by nonmateriel solutions. Nonmateriel solutions include changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTLFP). Only if these nonmateriel solutions will not satisfactorily overcome the deficiency is a new materiel development program initiated. A hierarchy of potential materiel alternatives (strategies) must be considered before committing to a new start acquisition program. In order of preference, the DOD directed materiel alternatives are:

1. Procurement/modification of commercially available products, services, and technologies, from domestic or international sources, or the development of dual-use technologies.
2. Additional production/modification of previously developed U.S. and/or Allied military systems or equipment.
3. A cooperative development program with one or more Allied nations.
4. A new joint component or government agency development program.
5. A new component-unique development program.

11–18. Acquisition strategies and program plans.

a. The acquisition strategy (AS) is the framework (roadmap) for planning, directing, and managing an acquisition program to satisfy an approved materiel requirement. Acquisition strategies and their supporting program plans are tailored to accomplish established program objectives and to control risk. They must also provide the information essential for milestone decisions. In this regard, the AS is an event-driven and explicitly link major contractual commitments and milestone decisions to demonstrated accomplishments in development and testing.

b. Evolutionary acquisition. Evolutionary acquisition is DOD’s preferred strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments recognizing, up front, the need for future capability improvements. The success of the strategy depends on the consistent and continuous definition of capabilities-based requirements and the maturation of technologies that lead to disciplined development and production of systems that provide increasing capability towards a materiel concept.

c. Program plans provide for a systems engineering approach to the simultaneous design of the product and its associated manufacturing, test, and support processes. This concurrent engineering approach is essential to achieving a careful balance among system design requirements (for example, operational performance, produce ability, reliability, maintainability, logistics and human factors engineering, safety, survivability, interoperability, and standardization). Maximum practicable use is made of commercial and other NDI. The Army’s first preference is to use performance specifications, the next is to use non-government standards (NGS), and as a last resort military specifications and standards (MILSPECS/STDs) may be used. Use of MILSPECs/STDs requires a waiver from the MDA. Additionally, changes to DODI 5000.02 resulting from the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASTA) of 1994 state the AS should be tailored to the extent feasible to employ commercial practices when purchasing commercial products or other NDI.

d. Cost as an independent variable (CAIV). CAIV is the DOD cost reduction methodology utilized throughout the entire life-cycle of a programs acquisition process to ensure operational capability of the total force is maximized for the given modernization investment. In other words, cost is treated as an independent variable along with others used to
define a system. Cost performance analysis is conducted on a continuous basis throughout the life-cycle. CAIV directly impacts the preparation of a program’s materiel capabilities documents (ICDs/CDDs/CPDs), as well as acquisition documents (AS and APB).

Environmental impact is always considered in Defense acquisitions. *The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969* mandates analysis of potential environmental effects of proposed federal actions. For materiel acquisitions, NEPA applies to all “new starts”, SLEP, P3I, and block modifications in all ACATs. NEPA analysis begins during the Technology Development (TD) phase and continues through the system capability and manufacturing process demonstration and low-rate initial production work efforts, accounting for all direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts. NEPA compliance is key to support production, testing, and fielding of the system as well as to ensuring the system can be operated, maintained and sustained throughout the remainder of its life-cycle. The NEPA documentation process can be lengthy and costly, but environmental issues and concerns represent a risk to the program that must be managed. Inadequate environmental analyses can lead to dramatic increases to overall program costs, can delay testing and fielding schedules, and may produce a system that cannot be operated or maintained at the location where Soldiers need it most. Early consideration of environmental impacts and NEPA requirements help protect not only the environment, but helps ensure a well-trained Soldier.

Program risks and risk management plans are explicitly assessed at each milestone decision point prior to granting approval to proceed into the next acquisition phase. Risks must be well understood, and risk management approaches developed, before MDAs can authorize a program to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. To assess and manage risk, MATDEVs use a variety of techniques. They include TDs, prototyping, and T&E. Risk management encompasses identification, mitigation, and continuous tracking and control procedures that feed back through the program assessment process to decision authorities. PMs, and other MATDEVs develop a contracting approach appropriate to the type system being developed and acquired.

Section VI
DOD Acquisition Organization and Management

11–21. DOD system acquisition management.

a. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) is the senior procurement executive and the principal staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and takes precedence in DOD for all matters relating to the DAS - research and development; test and evaluation; production; logistics; command, control, and communications, and intelligence activities related to acquisition; military construction; and procurement.

b. The USD(AT&L) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) with responsibility for supervising the performance of the entire DAS in accordance with the laws, Congressional guidance and direction, and *OMB Circular No. A–11, part 3*. The DAE establishes policy for all elements of DOD for acquisition. The basic policies of the DAE are established and implemented by *DODD 5000.01 and DODI 5000.02*. The DAE also serves as the chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), assisted by overarching integrated product teams (OIPTs) that relate to the acquisition process. As DAB chairman, the DAE recommends to the SECDEF acquisition resource matters and other acquisition management matters required implementing acquisition milestone decisions. A clear distinction exists between responsibility for weapons systems acquisition and budgetary authority. While the DAE, as DAB chairman, makes recommendations on whether to proceed with plans to acquire major materiel systems, the Senior Leader Review Group (SLRG), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), makes budgetary recommendations on the same programs. Acquisition programs must operate within the parameters established by the SLEP and the SECDEF through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution (PPBE) process.

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)). The ASD(NII)’s acquisition related responsibilities include:

- establishing policy for management of data and information as a corporate resource
- advising SECDEF on information technology (IT) investments
- developing the IT Strategic Plan
- designating chair of overarching integrated product team (OIPT) for review of acquisition category (ACAT) IAM programs
- chairing the IT Acquisition Board (ITAB) and making milestone decisions for ACAT IAM, when delegated by the USD(AT&L).

d. Under Secretary of the Air Force. As the DOD executive agent for space, the Under Secretary of the Air Force acquisition related responsibilities include:
11–22. Organizational linkage.
The managerial process of transforming a materiel requirement into a fielded and supported system consisting of hardware, software, and personnel is conducted by various organizational structures in DOD and the services responsible for RDA. Figure 11–5 shows the primary elements involved for the Army, including the linkage between the Defense community, industry, and academia. The arrows in the figure depict the flow of business in the process of this transformation.

![Figure 11–5. Organizational linkage for Army materiel acquisition](image)

* Materiel Developer includes Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Program, Project, Product Managers (PPMs).

The Army's primary Combat Developer is U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), TRADOC CoE Capability Development And Integration Directorate (CDI(Ds)), Integrated Capabilities Development Teams (ICDTs) and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) support the MATDEV/CBTDEV Team.

DARPA is a unique management tool of the SECDEF. It consists of a mix of military and civilian scientists and engineers, and has a broad charter to conduct advanced research that fills research and development (R&D) gaps between service lines of responsibility or handles high priority problems that cross service lines. DARPA is charged with the maintenance of leadership in forefront areas of technology so DOD can be aware as soon as possible of developments of potential military significance. DARPA’s purpose is to review ongoing R&D, determine whether or not the concept is feasible, determine its usefulness, and transfer it to the appropriate service. DARPA does not have its own in-house research facilities and relies on the services and other government agencies for technical and administrative support. Once a decision to support a research proposal is made, responsibility for contracting is generally assigned to one of the services. Examples of past DARPA contributions include the M–16, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Net (current Internet).

11–24. Defense Acquisition University (DAU).
The DAU is a corporate university that includes the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). Its operation and structure is designed to be similar to a state university with many campuses each specializing in certain acquisition
disciplines. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) required the formation of the DAU with operation commencing in 1992. Also, the law required the establishment of a senior course for personnel serving in critical acquisition positions (CAPs) that is equivalent to existing senior professional military education programs. The USD(AT&L) has oversight authority for the acquisition curriculum of the course, located at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) of the National Defense University.

The DSMC is the USD(AT&L) institution for ensuring the up-to-date training of military and civilian professionals in the management of materiel acquisition programs in DOD. The DSMC, founded 1971, is a joint military professional institution, operating under the direction of the DAU Executive Board, to support acquisition management as described in DOD Directive 5000.01, and to assist in fulfilling education and training requirements set out in appropriate DOD directives and public laws. The mission of the DSMC is to:
- Conduct advanced courses of study in defense acquisition management as the primary function of the college.
- Conduct research and special studies in defense acquisition management.
- Assemble and disseminate information concerning new policies, methods, and practices in Defense acquisition management.
- Provide consulting services in defense acquisition management.

Section VII
Army Acquisition Organization and Management


a. The Secretary of the Army (SA) is responsible for functions necessary for the research, development, logistical support and maintenance, preparedness, operation, and effectiveness of the Army. Also required is supervision of all matters relating to Army procurement. The SA executes his acquisition management responsibilities through the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).

b. Special emphasis is placed on medium and long-range materiel planning, product modification and life extension programs. Major state-of-the-art advancements are sought only in carefully selected areas. Stability of materiel acquisition programs is a matter of utmost interest, especially after the system passes the acquisition MS B decision. Reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) goals; manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT); integrated logistics support (ILS); survivability; effectiveness; safety; and product quality are incorporated into system performance objectives. Contractual incentives for the improvement of RAM and ILS are encouraged.

11–27. Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA[ALT]) is the AAE. The AAE is designated by the SA as the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) and the senior procurement executive within DA. He is the principal HQDA staff official for the execution of the AAE responsibilities. When serving as the AAE, the ASA[ALT] is assisted by a military deputy (MILDEP).

a. The MILDEP is assigned to the Office of the ASA[ALT] and provides staff support to the AAE in managing the R&D, developmental test (DT) , and the acquisition of materiel for all Army major weapon and support systems. The MILDEP, delegated down from the AAE, is also the Army’s Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM). The DACM is responsible for directing the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) as well as implementation of the acquisition career management requirements set forth in the DAWIA legislation. The day-to-day management of Army acquisition programs is shown in figure 11–6.

b. Similar to the DAE, the AAE develops Army acquisition policies and procedures and manages the Army’s production base support and industrial mobilization programs. The AAE, acting with the full authority of the SA, is responsible for administering acquisition programs according to DOD policies and guidelines, and exercises the powers and discharges the responsibilities as set forth in DODD 5000.01 for Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs). In addition, the AAE:

(1) Appoints, manages, and evaluates program executive officers (PEOs) and direct-reporting program, project, or product managers (PMs).

(2) Coordinates with Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (ODCS, G–3/5/7) to establish policy and guidance for analysis of alternatives (AoAs); for acquisition category (ACAT) I and II programs, designates the organization responsible for performing system engineering trade-off analyses for the AoA; and provides issues and alternatives to ODCS, G–3/5/7 for inclusion in the AoA tasking document.

(3) Carries out all powers, functions, and duties of the SA with respect to the acquisition work force within the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SA.

(4) Develops guidance, in coordination with the ODCS, G–3/5/7, and serves as co-proponent for the Army’s research, development, and acquisition (RDA) plan.
(5) Formulates Army-wide S&T base strategy, policy, guidance, and planning.
(6) Establishes and validates Army technology base priorities throughout the planning, programming, budgeting, execution system (PPBE).
(7) Acts as the final authority of all matters affecting the Army’s acquisition system, except as limited by statute or higher-level regulation. Develops and promulgates acquisition, procurement, and contracting policies and procedures.
(8) Chairs all Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) meetings.
(9) Directs the Army Science Board (ASB).
(10) Appoints the source selection authority (SSA) for specified programs. The *Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)* is the primary contracting regulation. It is the first regulatory source to which DA acquisition personnel refer. The ASA(ALT) issues the *Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS)* to implement and supplement the *FAR* and the *Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)* and to establish uniform policies and procedures for use in the Army.
(11) Reviews and approves, for ACAT ID programs, the Army position at each decision milestone before the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review. This includes the review and approval of acquisition program baselines (APBs). The AAE also serves as the milestone decision authority (MDA) for ACATs IC, IAC, selected II, and assigns the MDA for ACAT III programs to PEOs. The MDA is the individual designated to approve entry into the next acquisition phase. ACATs are defined in figure 11–3A and 11–3B.
(12) Approves the establishment and termination of all program management offices (PMOs) and PEOs. The AAE has authority to designate a system for intensive, centralized management and prescribe the appropriate level of management at any point in the program management process.

c. HQDA system coordinator (DASC). The DASC is the primary acquisition staff officer at DA. The DASC is responsible for the day-to-day support of his/her assigned programs and serves as the PM’s representative and primary point of contact (POC) within the Pentagon. The DASC reports to the ASA(ALT), Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management. The DASC is responsible for keeping the acquisition chain of command informed of the status of assigned acquisition programs. In addition, the DASC assists the PM in issue resolution at DA and OSD levels. The
DASC is the “eyes and ears” of the PM at the Pentagon and ensures that the PM is advised of any actions or circumstances that might negatively impact their program.

**11–28. The program executive officer (PEO).**

a. The PEO system structure was implemented by the Army in 1987 in response to requirements established by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, and the recommendation of the Packard Commission that President Reagan approved and then ordered by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 (figure 11–7).

b. The PEO, administering a defined number of AAE assigned MDAPs, major and/or non-major programs, is responsible for making programmatic (materiel acquisition cost, schedule, and total system performance) and for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) necessary to guide assigned programs through each milestone. In addition, the PEO provides program information to the AAE, DA, DOD, and Congress; defends assigned programs to Congress through the Army Office Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL); and participates in the development of data to support AAE programmatic decisions in the PPBE. Other PEO and direct-reporting PM responsibilities include assisting the combat developer (CBTDEV) and training developer (TNGDEV) in developing materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) by providing technical, availability, performance, anticipated materiel acquisition cost, and schedule type information as needed.

c. The AAE currently has eleven PEOs-Missiles and Space; Aviation; Chemical and Biological Defense; Command, Control, Communications -Tactical; Intelligence, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Sensors; Ground Combat Systems; Combat Support/Combat Service Support Systems; Enterprise Information Systems; Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation: Ammunition; Soldier-responsible for the intensive management of RDA weapon and information systems. Unless a waiver is granted by the DAE or AAE, a PEO must be experienced and certified in acquisition management.

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**Figure 11–7. DOD Acquisition authority chain**

- Establishes DOD policy for: -- acquisition / procurement / R&D
- Supervises acquisition system
- MDA for ACAT ID / IAM programs
- Approves ACAT ID / IAM APBs

- MDA for ACAT IC / IAC & some ACAT II programs
- Approves ACAT IC / IAC & some ACAT II APBs
- Reviews ACAT ID / IAM APBs

- Oversees program execution
- MDA for some ACAT II & all ACAT III programs
- Approves ACAT III APBs
- Reviews ACAT I & II APBs

- Manages / executes assigned program
- Reports to PEO for program matters
- Develops APBs

APB: Acquisition Program Baseline
ASA(ALT): ASA (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)
ACAT: Acquisition Category
MDA: Milestone Decision Authority

PM Tenure: Average 36.4 months
The Army’s primary CBTDEV, referred to above, is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC formulates and documents operational concepts, doctrine, organizations, and/or materiel requirements for assigned mission areas and functions. The CBTDEV serves as the user representative during acquisitions for their approved materiel requirements as well as doctrine and organization developments.

e. A materiel developer (MATDEV) is the RDA command, agency, or office assigned responsibility for the system under development or being acquired. The term may be used generically to refer to the RDA community in the materiel acquisition process (counterpart to the generic use of CBTDEV).

f. A training developer (TNGDEV) is a command or agency that formulates, develops, and documents or produces training concepts, strategies, requirements (materiel and other), and programs for assigned mission areas and functions. The TNGDEV serves as user (trainer and trainee) representative during acquisitions of their approved training materiel requirements and training program developments. TNGDEVs perform the following functions solely in support of training systems:

(1) Fund and conduct concept formulations for all system training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) in support of assigned systems.

(2) Embed system training capabilities into assigned materiel systems in accordance with the approved system MCD and in coordination with the CBTDEV.

(3) Develop, acquire, and field the subsystem training package with the materiel system.

(4) Plan and program resources for the execution of new equipment training (NET) using distance learning (DL) technology and/or contract NET as the desired training strategy in support of TRADOC developed/approved system training plans (STRAPs).

(5) Program and budget resources for TADSS as specified in the training support requirements (TSR) annex of the capability development document (CDD).

(6) Program and budget resources to support and ensure attention to and integration of MANPRINT in the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) processes.

(7) Provide TNGDEV perspective through input to the Army RDA Plan and the Army Modernization Strategy (AMS).

(8) Conduct a crosswalk, with the CBTDEV (TNGDEV for TADSS), of the materiel capabilities document (MCD) to the request for proposal (RFP) to verify that the RFP, to include system specification or purchase description and the statement of work (SOW), accurately reflects the operational requirements stated in the capabilities document for all programs. The MATDEV and CBTDEV (MATDEV and TNGDEV for TADSS) must formally certify that the RFP has been cross walked with the capabilities document and is in agreement prior to the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) or program review.

11–29. The program/project/product manager (PM).

a. The program management approach to system acquisition management is a distinct departure from the services’ traditional practice of establishing functionally oriented organizations to carry out well defined, repetitive, and continuous long-term tasks. Organization for program management is a tailored, task-oriented process. This approach requires the PM to establish management arrangements among the PM office (PMO), other military organizations, and various contractors to coordinate their efforts and to accomplish program objectives effectively, efficiently, and economically. A variety of PMO organizations have been established. They operate on the matrix management principle and must draw all functional support from a host command or installation. In addition to the formal PM organization, the PM directs the informal MATDEV/CBTDEV team to execute the assigned materiel acquisition program. MATDEV/CBTDEV team is the terminology used to describe the informal, but essential close working relationship among the MATDEV, CBTDEV, and other players in the RDA management process (figure 11–5).

b. The PM has authority and responsibility for all programmatic (cost, schedule, and performance) decisions to execute the assigned program within the approved acquisition program baseline (APB) and subject to functional standards established by regulation, Secretarial direction, or law. Generically, all PMs are program managers, but they are chartered as a program manager, a project manager, or product manager based on the value and importance (visibility) of the program they manage. The criteria established for designation of a program manager are generally the same as those which cause a system acquisition to be designated as a MDAP, major, or non-major program-high defense priority, high dollar value, or high Congressional or OSD interest. Since October 26, 2001, all Army acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category (ACAT), are managed by a program/project/product manager (PM) either overseen by a program executive officer (PEO) or directly reporting to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). All PEOs report directly to the Defense Acquisition Executive (ACAT ID programs) or to the AAE (for ACAT IC and below). Project managers report to a PEO or the AAE. All product managers report to a project manager. As a general rule, a program manager is a general officer or Senior Executive Service (SES); a project manager is a colonel.
or GS 15; a product manager is a lieutenant colonel or GS 14. This distinction between PMs is unique to the Army and does not apply to the other services or within industry.

c. Normally project managers are assigned until at least a major milestone decision closest to four (4) years with project managers staying 3 years in position. Unless a waiver is granted by the DAE or AAE, a PM must be experienced and certified in acquisition management.

11–30. PEO resource control.
The Army has revised its resource support system structure for the PEOs to improve their control over the funding and manpower resources they need to carry out their responsibilities. PEOs and subordinate PMs receive dollars and personnel authorization resources directly from HQDA rather than through the materiel commands. The materiel commands continue to provide a variety of support services without duplicating any of the PEOs or PMs management functions. This enhanced resource control system ensures PEO and PM-managed programs operate as centers of excellence (CoEs), managed with modern efficient techniques, without administrative burdens or materiel command layers being inserted into the chain of command.

11–31. Acquisition career management.
a. As previously discussed, the MILDEP to the ASA(ALT) serves as the Army Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM). The DACM is assisted by the Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management (DDACM) and the Acquisition Support Center in OASA(ALT). The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy) and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 work closely with the DACM in implementing the requirements and intent of DAWIA for the Army.

b. The Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) was established for both military and civilian personnel and is a subset of the entire Army acquisition and technology work force (A&TWF). The A&TWF consists of those personnel who work directly with acquisition in the various acquisition career fields at the CPT/GS–5 and above levels. The AAC consists of military and civilian personnel at the rank/grade of MAJ/GS–13 and above who have met the statutory requirements for experience, education and training. The AAC focuses on accessing individuals at the GS–14 and above level into the AAC. All A&TWF positions at rank/grade of LTC/GS–14 and above are designated critical acquisition positions (CAPs) and must be occupied by AAC members. For program management and contracting positions, statute or regulation further dictates education, training, and experience requirements that must be met prior to placement of an individual in these positions.

(1) AAC vision. The strategic vision for the AAC forms the foundation for all policies and initiatives impacting the A&TWF. This vision is to develop “a corps of leaders willing to serve where needed and committed to providing Soldiers the systems critical to decisive victory now and in the future through development, integration, acquisition, fielding, and sustainment...one integrated corps ...It is these leaders the Army must develop early in their careers to ensure they possess the requisite experience and skills to successfully manage the acquisition challenges of the 21st century.” The key to developing the best possible leaders for the Army lies in educating the workforce, particularly at the lower levels, as to the DAWIA requirements and the policies, procedures, and tools available to meet those requirements.

(2) Career development as a mission. The leader development career pattern for an AAC officer is clearly defined. Military acquisition career development is covered under DA Pamphlet 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization. An officer should normally serve eight years in branch qualifying assignments prior to entering the AAC. Upon AAC selection, the officer attends functional area (FA) specific military training courses, and selected officers have the opportunity to attend advanced civil schooling (ACS). Attendance at ACS is contingent on the officer’s manner of performance, potential for academic success, and support of his/her career time line. Graduate level education opportunities are an important part of career development within the AAC. However, job experience and strong performance across a variety of acquisition positions remains the key indicator for success. Recent initiatives seek to increase developmental acquisition experience opportunities while providing improved support for alternative advanced degree schooling. AAC officers compete for product/project management or acquisition command positions in the same manner as field commands. AAC LTGs and COLs are ineligible for selection to non-acquisition command positions. For career development of civilians, IAW Army Policy AAC–96–01, the Army has developed a civilian acquisition career model as well as a matrix of quality achievement factors as a “roadmap for success.” The focus of the career model is to begin to develop acquisition leaders and managers early in their careers, giving them a broad-based knowledge of the various acquisition functions supported by leadership and management experience. The quality achievement factors are the combination of training, education, and experience at the higher grade.

11–32. Headquarters, Department of the Army.
a. Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The CSA is responsible by law to the SA for the efficiency of the Army and its preparedness for military operations. The CSA acts as the agent of the SA in carrying out the plans or recommendations submitted by the ARSTAF and approved by the SA. The Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA) supports the CSA by managing the day-to-day operations of the Army. The VCSA chairs the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) and in the area of RDA, the VCSA co-chairs the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).
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b. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA[FM&C]). The ASA(FM&C) has secretariat responsibility for all financial management activities and operations for appropriated funds. While the budget is in preparation, the ASA(FM&C) receives and consolidates procurement and research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) budget forms from Army commands and PEOs.

c. The ASA(FM&C) also:

1. Works with the AAE on all cost and economic analysis (EA) matters related to the acquisition process.
2. Carries out all financial management responsibilities assigned under Title 10.
3. Tasks the appropriate CBTDEV or MATDEV to conduct program office estimates (POE) and/or economic analyses (EA) to milestone decision review (MDR) and PPBE requirements.
4. Manages all budgeting activities in support of the Army materiel requirements processes and RDA modernization program, within the framework of PPBE.
5. Develops statutory independent life-cycle cost estimates (ICEs) and component cost estimates (CCEs) for weapon and information systems.
6. Chairs and oversees the Army Cost Review Board (CRB) and approves the Army cost position (ACP) for all major acquisition programs.

d. The ASA(FM&C) Deputy for Cost Analysis ensures that the ACP reflects the costs and risks associated with the program in concurrence with the cost as independent variable (CAIV) process.

e. The Military Deputy (MILDEP), ASA(FM&C) co-chairs the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) in support of the War on Terrorism (WOT).

f. Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). The ACSIM is responsible for developing criteria for the mitigation of environmental impacts, and reviewing emerging Army RDA systems for environmental effects. The ACSIM is a regular member of the AR2B.

g. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 (DCS, G–1). The DCS, G–1 has ARSTAF responsibility for personnel management. ODCS, G–1 monitors planning for the manpower and personnel aspects of new systems. Also, the ODCS, G–1 is the proponent and has primary ARSTAF responsibility for the DOD human systems integration (HSI) program (called MANPRINT program in the Army). The emphasis of the MANPRINT program is to enhance total system performance (Soldier in the loop) and to conserve the Army’s manpower, personnel and training (MPT) resources. The DCS, G–1 is a regular member of the AROC, ASARC and AR2B.

1. The HQDA personnel system staff officer (PERSSO) is the ARSTAF representative of the personnel community. The PERSSO provides for the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the smooth integration of new equipment, materiel systems, and new organizations. The PERSSO responsibilities include, but are not limited to: preparing and justifying force structure requests in conjunction with the ODCS, G–3/5/7 organization integrator (OI) and ODCS, G–8 synchronization staff officer (SSO); reviewing and coordinating the development of force structure changes; personnel supportability architecture, officer and enlisted issues related to new organizational concepts and doctrine; and ensuring programming and budgeting of manpower spaces.

2. The PERSO participates in all HQDA actions to develop the staff position on CBTDEV proposals for potential MDAPs, the designation of a proposed system, the recommendations on the elements of system fielding including the proposed basis of issue plan (BOIP), the initial issue quantity (IIQ), and the Army acquisition objective (AAO). The PERSO represents the DCS, G–1 at force modernization-related, HQDA-sponsored conferences, forums, and meetings on issues of supportability concerning the introduction of new and/or reorganized existing TOE/TDA units.

h. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2 (DCS, G–2). The DCS, G–2 provides scientific and technical intelligence and threat projections in support of all aspects of the Army RDA programs. The DCS, G–2 is a regular member of the ASARC, AROC, and AR2B.

1. In addition, a HQDA threat integration staff officer (TISO) is designated by the DCS, G–2 to function as the HQDA threat integration coordinator for designated mission areas, programs, and systems. The TISO represents the DCS, G–2 on all aspects of threat support throughout the system life-cycle or study process. The TISO system complements the ODCS, G–3/5/7 requirements staff officer (RSO) and DCS, G–8 synchronization staff officer (SSO) and is designed to foster closer coordination among the intelligence community, Army commands, and ARSTAF agencies to ensure the timely integration of the threat into the materiel acquisition process.

2. The DCS, G–2 is the approving authority for either establishing or ending TISO monitorship of systems. Generally, all programs will be assigned to a TISO for monitorship on an as required basis with approval of the ODCS, G–2.

i. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DCS, G–3/5/7). As the Army’s force manager, the DCS, G–3/5/7 serves as the HQDA proponent for all Army force structure related policies, processes, and actions. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is a regular member of the ASARC, AROC, and co-chairs the AR2B. The ODCS, G–3/5/7:

1. Integrates Army doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) capability-based requirements into structure.
2. Recommends for DCS, G–3/5/7 approval operating and generating force requirements and allocates resources to accomplish DCS, G–3/5/7 prioritized Army missions and functions.
(3) Develops and maintains force planning guidance and active and reserve component force structure through the total army analysis (TAA) force accounting, force documentation and other force management forums.

(4) Oversees the force management, training, battle command simulations and experimentation, prioritization, and requirements approval processes for the Army. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is assisted by the Director, G–37 Capabilities Integration, Prioritization, and Analysis (DAMO–CI), who has supervisory responsibility for:

(a) Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (DAMO–CIB) - current WOT warfighting operational requirements.

(b) Testing and Experimentation Division (DAMO–CIA) - testing, experiments, and analysis.

(c) Resource Analysis and Integration Division (DAMO–CIR) - prioritization process.

(d) Future Warfighting Capabilities Division (DAMO–CIC) - requirements validation and approval process.

(5) ODCS, G–3/5/7, Future Warfighting Capabilities Division (DAMO–CIC). Within the ODCS, G–3/5/7, DAMO–CIC is the single entry point for all Army and joint DOTMLPF requirements. DAMO–CIC is the proponent for policy development and joint/Army CIDS process oversight. Within DAMO–CIC, the requirements staff officer (RSO) is directly responsible for leading HQDA staff integration and coordination efforts for all Army and joint DOTMLPF requirements issues within Army CIDS. The RSO coordinates with his/her G–8 counterpart, the synchronization staff officer (SSO), to facilitate the transition from requirements development and approval to requirements solutions (execution and resourcing).

(6) DAMO–CIC functions and responsibilities are:

- Interacts with the Joint Staff and other services for all joint, other service, and Army DOTMLPF requirements issues.
- Provides ARSTAF lead for coordinating applicable Army requirements through the JS, Vice Director, J–8 for JCIDS review.
- Maintains catalog of approved requirements documents (CARDs) files.
- Provides the Army position for all science board (Army Science Board (ASB) or Defense Science Board (DSB)), General Accounting Office (GAO), Army Audit Agency (AAA), Inspector General (IG) or similar agency audits or special reviews that impact the CIDS process.
- Develops policy and procedures, and coordinates operational needs statements (ONS), directed requirements, and other immediate operational requirements for approval.
- Participate in all combat development and acquisition associated initiatives that have a potential impact on the Army’s CIDS process.
- Provides the Army’s position for all science board (Army Science Board (ASB) or Defense Science Board (DSB)), General Accounting Office (GAO), Army Audit Agency (AAA), Inspector General (IG) or similar agency audits or special reviews that impact the CIDS process.
- Develops policy and procedures for development and management of manpower estimate reports (MERs).
- Utilizes RSOs to lead requirements analysis teams to analyze, coordinate, and provide recommendations on all DOTMLPF requirements.

(7) Requirements staff officers (RSOs). Within G–37 (DAMO–CIC), RSOs facilitate the staffing, validation, approval, and prioritization of all Army DOTMLPF requirements. Primary functions and responsibilities are:

(a) Enable ODCS, G–3/5/7 to validate and prioritize requirements.

(b) Ensure DOTMLPF integration for all requirements.

(c) Establish a single ARSTAF focal point for Army requirements.

(d) Link requirements and resources to the Army Campaign Plan (ACP)

(j) Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 (DCS, G–4). The DCS, G–4 assesses the logistical supportability of materiel systems during the system acquisition management process. The DCS, G–4 participates in all phases of the RDA management process to ensure equipment is logistically reliable, supportable, and maintainable. ODCS, G–4 is also responsible for secondary item requirements including secondary item war reserve requirements. The DCS, G–4 is a regular member of the ASARC, AROC and AR2B.

(1) The DCS, G–4 has been designated the responsible official for sustainment (ROS) to the AAE. As the ROS, the DCS, G–4 is assisted by the Deputy ASA(ALT) for Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), who is the DA focal point for a system’s ILS program.

(2) The DA logistics support officer (DALSO) is the HQDA representative of the logistics community, providing logistics coordination. The DALSO monitors the progress of the assigned system and ensures that all elements of ILS, as outlined in AR 700–127, are satisfactorily completed. Because of the interrelationships of assigned responsibilities in materiel acquisition, close and continuous coordination and cooperation is essential between the DALSO and his counterparts at TRADOC, AMC, and the ARSTAFF. In addition to new items of equipment, DALSOs also have responsibility for existing weapons and materiel systems in the Army force structure. This responsibility covers all phases of logistics support to include readiness, redistribution, and disposal.

(3) The DALSO’s primary mission is to provide HQDA general staff supervision over the ILS management of assigned commodity materiel/weapons systems from concept to disposal. Other responsibilities include:

- ARSTAF responsibility for logistical acceptability, deployability, and supportability of materiel systems, interoperability, ILS, materiel release, and logistics R&D programs for the Army.
• Serving as the logistician in the DAS for other than medical equipment, and conduct surveillance over logistics aspects of materiel acquisition and modification programs to ensure supportable systems.

• Providing policy guidance for logistics for medical and engineer materiel acquisition.

k. Army Chief Information Officer (CIO)/ Deputy Chief of Staff, G–6. The CIO/G–6 has ARSTAF responsibility for Army automated information systems (AIS) and information technology (IT) activities. These include establishing and approving policies, procedures, and standards for the planning, programming, life-cycle management, use of Army IT resources, and responding to and validating all warfighting requirements. The G–6 also serves as the Army CIO as directed in the Clinger-Cohen Act (originally known as the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996). The CIO primary responsibility, under Clinger-Cohen Act, is the management of resources for all Army information programs. The DCS, G–6 is a regular member of the ASARC, AROC, and the AR2B.

l. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8 (DCS, G–8). The ODCS, G–8 prepares the Army program objective memorandum (POM). In this capacity the ODCS, G–8 integrates and synchronizes the POM process and provides analysis and evaluation of Army programs to senior Army leadership. The DCS, G–8 is a regular member of the ASARC, AROC, and co-chairs the AR2B with the DCS, G–3/5/7 and MILDEP to the ASA(FM&C). The ODCS, G–8 responsibilities include:

• Army program advocate to OSD, the JS, other military departments, government agencies and organizations.

• Overseeing materiel fielding across the Army and ensuring integration of DOTMLPF into materiel solutions in accordance with (IAW) approved Army requirements.

• Serving as principal advisor to the CSA on joint materiel requirements representing the Army in the JS Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process.

• Serving as the lead for all Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) activities.

• Oversees the Army Studies Program.

(1) G–8, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE). Within ODCS, G–8, the DPAE is responsible for reviewing and analyzing requirements and programs in force structure development, providing analytical support to the Army Resources Board (ARB) and subordinate committees, developing resource guidance, developing and compiling the POM, maintaining the Army portion of the DOD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and presenting an affordability analysis to the ASARC. Other responsibilities include conducting and presenting affordability assessments to support DOD and DA ACAT I programs and managing the programming phase of the PPBE process.

(2) G–8, Force Development Directorate (Dir, FD). Within ODCS G–8, the Director, FD translates approved Army DOTMLPF requirements into programs, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions. In addition Dir, FD exercises life-cycle management of materiel programs.

(a) The Dir, FD is organized into a Directorate of Materiel (DOM), Directorate of Joint and Futures, Directorate of Integration (DOI) and a Directorate of Resources (DOR).

(b) Synchronization staff officers/system synchronization officers (SSOs). Within G–8 DIR, FD, the SSOs focus on systems and fielding to deliver capabilities and functions to the warfighting force structure of the Army. SSOs are the single ARSTAF POCs for integration and synchronization of all Army materiel programs to achieve Army Vision, Army Campaign Plan (ACP) priorities, and Army modernization strategy (AMS). Generally, the SSO is responsible for the integration, synchronization, and coordination of hardware, software and associated equipment in support of the ACP. All equipment is fielded using the total package fielding (TPF) methodology managed by G–8 Dir, FD (DAPR–FDH).

m. The Surgeon General (TSG). TSG has ARSTAF responsibility for medical research, development, test and evaluation, and is the Army medical MATDEV. The TSG is also responsible for the medical aspects of all other development and acquisition programs ensuring functional area interface with CBTDEVs. The TSG serves as a member of the ASARC and AR2B for medical issues, including health hazard assessment, personnel safety, and hazards remediation. Other responsibilities include:

• Developing policy, responsibilities, and procedures to ensure implementation of systems acquisition policy as it applies to combat medical systems, medical readiness and health care programs, and other assigned Army and joint requirements.

• Assigning support responsibilities for medical materiel development and acquisition to agencies and activities under TSG command and control.

• Recommending to TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) capabilities-based materiel requirements and associated priorities for medical readiness and health care programs.

• Establishing functional area interface with TRADOC ARCIC for all medical programs, ensuring that requirements and interests of each participating service are provided full consideration in medical programs for which the Army has lead agency or executive agency responsibility.

n. Chief of Engineers (COE). The COE monitors requirements and research and development necessary to provide
construction design criteria, construction techniques, and construction material for the Army, Air Force, and other
government agencies. The COE provides fixed-facility concealment, camouflage, and deception; real estate manage-
ment techniques; and engineering support for maintenance of installation and facilities. It is the COE’s mission to
preserve and improve environmental quality associated with construction and facilities and Army environmental quality
and R&D activities covering atmospheric, terrestrial, and topographical sciences. The COE is also responsible, under
the general direction of the AAE, for the RDTE of fixed and floating power systems, and high voltage generation
applications (to include nuclear applications). The COE reviews all emerging Army systems for digital terrain data
requirements and environmental effects such as climate, terrain, or weather. The review also includes minimization of
toxic and hazardous wastes and those hazardous wastes associated with normal system test, operation, use, and
maintenance. The COE serves as a member of the AR2B.

o. The General Counsel (GC). The GC advises the AAE and the ASARC on any legal issue, which arises during the
acquisition of a weapon or materiel system. The GC reviews all Army acquisition policy and supervises all attorneys
providing legal advice relating to programs within the Army RDA management system. The GC is also responsible for
all legal advice in the negotiation, oversight, and review of international cooperative RDA programs.

11–33. Army Commands (Major).

support of materiel systems, and other system acquisition management functions required by HQDA. AMC is a regular
member of the ASARC and AR2B. The AMC mission, in support of RDA, is to:

1) Equip and sustain a trained, ready Army.
2) Provide development and acquisition support to MATDEVs (PEOs and PMs).
3) Provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance Program.
4) Define, develop, and acquire superior technologies.
5) Maintain the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army in emergencies.
6) Exercise delegated authority, under ASA(ALT) oversight, in the following areas: metrication; design to cost;
   production readiness reviews; manufacturing technology, standardization; reliability, availability, and maintainability;
   quality; risk management; value engineering; parts control; and industrial modernization improvement.
7) Provide survivability, vulnerability, or lethality assessments and survivability enhancement expertise for all
   Army materiel programs.
8) Evaluate and recommend improvements to the industrial base.
9) Responsible for the logistics support of assigned materiel in response to approved capabilities-based materiel
   requirements.
10) Plan, coordinate, and provide functional support to PEOs and PMs. Support includes, but is not limited to,
    procurement and contracting, legal, managerial accounting, cost estimating, systems engineering, conducting system
    TADSS and embedded training concept formulation, developmental test, logistics support analyses, MANPRINT,
    environmental, intelligence and threat support, configuration management, and conducting various independent assess-
    ments and analyses.
11) Provide overall management of the Army’s technology base (less Class VIII), including identification of
    maturing technologies necessary to support acquisition of warfighting materiel systems.
12) Provide RDA science and infrastructure information to HQDA for the Army RDA Plan.
13) Provide initial and updated cost and system performance estimates for battlefield and peacetime operations as
    inputs to supporting analysis and program decisions.

b. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC is the Army’s primary “user representative”
in the capabilities development and system acquisition management processes. As the Army’s principal CBTDEV,
TRADOC guides, coordinates, and integrates the total combat development effort of the Army. Combat developments
are a major component of force development and encompass the formulation of concepts, doctrine, organization,
materiel objectives, capabilities-based requirements, and operational tests (OT) of products of the Army’s capabilities
integration and development system (CIDS). TRADOC is a regular member of the ASARC and AR2B.

1) As the Army’s primary CBTDEV/TNGDEV, TRADOC is the Army’s architect for the future and is charged to
chart the course for the Army. In doing this, CG, TRADOC:
   a) Guides and disciplines the Army CIDS by:
   • providing capabilities-based requirements generation and documentation procedures and process guidance
   • establishing and implementing horizontal requirements integration (HRI) policy
   • generating all Army warfighting DOTMLPF requirements prior to their submission to HQDA for approval and
resourcing
   • approving integrated capabilities development team (ICDT) minutes or reports containing proposing solution sets for
      force level force operating capabilities (FOCs)
• coordinating materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) produced by the Army community and forward to HQDA ODSCS, G−3/5/7 Future Warfighting Capabilities Division (DAMO−CIC) for staffing, validation, approval, and prioritization.

(b) Assists HQDA to prioritize and justify warfighting requirements by:

(c) determining applicability of operational needs statements (ONSs) to future Army-wide requirements and assign to a proponent for requirement documentation

(d) providing insights and descriptive information for materiel programs

(e) supporting ODSCS,G−37 (DAMO−CIC) by presenting documents and information to the JCIDS capabilities-based assessment (CBA) process and assisting in issue resolution.

(f) Coordinates and integrates the total combat/training developments efforts of the Army by

• providing, with appropriate support from other Army commands, the capstone and subordinate warfighting concepts and FOCs, the start point for the Army CIDS
• developing and maintaining the C4I operational architecture (OA)
• being the primary source for determining need for and preparing capabilities-based requirements and MCDs for TADSS and embedded training
• determining need for and obtain CSA approval for conduct of advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs).

(g) conducts analysis of alternatives (AoA) for ACAT I, IA, and most II programs when required by HQDA. When required by the MDA, conduct AoA for all other ACAT programs.

(h) Serves as member of the Army S&T Advisory Group (ASTAG).

(i) Provides representative to Army S&T reviews and management teams. (2)TRADOC is organized into integrating centers and Center of Excellence (CoE) functional area schools and centers. The principal integrating centers are the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Fort Monroe, VA and the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS. The functional area schools and centers are the branch schools and centers for Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, etc. The CoE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorates (CDIDs) at the TRADOC functional area school and centers work very closely with the PEO community in the RDA management process.

(2) Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC)

(a) Determines and integrates force requirements and synchronizes the development of DOTMLPF solutions across the Army.

(b) Leads joint and Army CDE efforts through TRADOC and non-TRADOC proponents.

(c) Leads the execution of the JCIDS process by TRADOC and/or non-TRADOC proponents to determine capability requirements for the force. Identifies joint and Army gaps and overlaps in capability, proposes DOTMLPF solutions to resolve or mitigate gaps, and recommends divestitures to help fund new requirements.

(d) Leads asymmetric warfare (AW) efforts within TRADOC per charter signed by CG TRADOC, ICW HQDA DCS, G−3/5/7 Army Asymmetric Warfare Office (AAWO). Integrates and synchronizes proponent activities within the AW areas of electronic warfare, force protection, and improvised explosive device - defeat.

(e) Validates research and development priorities for Army S&T needs (to include Special Access Programs (SAP)), for the required capabilities outlined in Army concepts and CCPs ICW the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)). Conducts a review of SAP and new S&T initiatives, as required to ensure technology is aligned with future needs.

(f) Provides guidance for the execution of TRADOC force design goals and objectives and recommends approval to release organizational changes and adjustments for Army-wide staffing.

(3) Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). On February 15, 2006 the SECARMY directed the formation of the ARCIC from the resources and organization of the TRADOC Futures Center. The Director ARCIC, through the CG TRADOC, is directly responsible to the SECARMY and CSA to ensure that the FCS program technologies are spun-out into the current modular force as soon as they are ready, and the FCS program is integrated and coordinated with co-evolution of joint warfighting doctrine.

(a) The ARCIC has four primary responsibilities:
• Using wargaming, experimentation, and concepts, develop and integrate force capability requirements for the Army from a comprehensive perspective of DOTMLPF.
• Identify and integrate Army current and future modular force DOTMLPF requirements and synchronize the development of DOTMLPF solutions across the Army.
• Provide the management structure for identifying capability gaps and directing analytical support for DOTMLPF developments, including validating research and development priorities for key Army science and technology needs, and the development and validation of integrated operational architectures depicting warfighting capabilities.
• Serve as lead Army agency for coordination with joint agencies and other services for identification and integration of joint required capabilities, including joint wargaming, concept development, and experimentation.

(b) In support of these responsibilities, ARCIC is organized in directorates:

1. Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (CDED) prioritizes, manages and synchronizes TRADOC’s efforts in joint and Army concept development and experimentation.

2. Architecture Integration and Management Directorate (AIMD) is responsible for the operational architectures (both current and future modular forces) for the Army.

3. Accelerated and Capabilities Developments Directorate (ACDD) analyzes concepts and identifies tasks, capability gaps, and DOTMLPF solutions to achieve the required capabilities (RCs).

4. Capabilities Development and Assessments Directorate (CDAD) ensures all DOTMLPF capabilities are integrated for both the current and future modular forces.

5. Force Design Directorate (FDD) is the TRADOC lead in developing operational force design and force structure solutions.

6. Future Force Integration Directorate (FFID) synchronizes the delivery, preparation, and evaluation of all FCS-related products for the FCS-equipped Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, Texas.

7. International Army Programs Directorate coordinates TRADOC activities with multinational partners across TRADOC schools and centers.

(c) The Forward element stationed in Arlington, VA acts as personal representatives of the ARCIC Director with the ARSTAF, Joint Staff, OSD, and others in the Washington DC area.

4. Combined Arms Center (CAC). CAC provides leadership and supervision for leader development and professional military and civilian education; institutional and collective training; functional training; training support; battle command; doctrine; lessons learned and specified areas the CG, TRADOC designates in order to serve as a catalyst for change and to support developing relevant and ready expeditionary land formations with campaign qualities in support of the joint force commander.

5. Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM). CASCOM, the logistics Center of Excellence (CoE), has the mission to develop logistics leaders, doctrine, organizations, training, and materiel solutions. There are three major functions performed by CASCOM.

(a) Develops and evaluates combat service support (CSS) concepts, doctrine, organizations, systems, materiel concepts and requirements, and planning factors for the Army and in concert with joint logistics doctrine. It ensures the personnel service support, supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and facilities systems designed for the Army in the field and the CONUS-based theater logistics systems are compatible with the sustaining base system.

(b) It acts as TRADOC proponent for CSS training and monitors and evaluates CSS training at TRADOC schools. It ensures CSS course content is consistent with approved doctrine. It assesses the training evaluation process at associated schools.

(c) It serves as a principal adviser to HQDA, TRADOC, and AMC on all CSS matters. It provides direction, guidance, and tasks to assigned capabilities development activities, associated schools, other Army Commands, and HQDA staff agencies for their contribution to CSS development and training.

6. CoE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID). CDID represents the CoE in execution of its responsibilities for concept development, experimentation, and requirements determination. CDID’s purpose is to facilitate the development, assessment, management, validation, and synchronization of DOTMLPF-integrated combined arms capabilities that complement joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities. It serves as the primary activity to develop proponent, Army and joint concepts; review Army and joint doctrine, support experimentation efforts, review requirements documentation, and review training material; assists in the development of training materials; and develops proponent equipment operational mode summary/mission profiles (OMS/MP). The OMS/MP describes the anticipated missions; units (active, reserve, and institutional training base); or mix of units that will use the system over time to include times of peace, crisis situations, national conflict, and war; in what environments and under what conditions (climate, terrain, battlefield environment, etc.) as well as how it will be supported and maintained.

7. TRADOC capability manager (TCM). The TRADOC counterpart to the PM, the TCM, is a central figure in the RDA process and a key member of the CBTDEV/MATDEV team. The TCM is chartered by the CG, TRADOC to function as focal point for coordination of the CBTDEV /TNGDEV efforts in the development and acquisition of a
materiel and/or automated information systems (AIS) capability. The TCM is responsible to synchronize all doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTLPF) domains that are impacted by the fielding of major materiel capability. A TCM is appointed early in the development cycle, normally at the same time as the PM. The TCM is usually located in the CDID at the CoE proponent school or center.

11–34. Other DA agencies.
   
a. U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC). The CG, ATEC is responsible for management of the Army’s operational testing (OT), developmental testing (DT), and system evaluation (SE) processes. Their evaluations of materiel and IT systems’ operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability are independent of the CBTDEV/MATDEV and are reported directly to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). CG, ATEC is a member of the ASARC, advisor to the AROC, and chairman of the Test Schedule and Review Committee (TSARC). The TSARC is the HQDA centralized management forum for user (operational) testing resources. ATEC provides advice and assistance to the CSA, the VCSA, other members of the ARSTAF, and other elements of DA in regard to Army T&E. Other responsibilities include:
   
   • Reviewing all draft MCDs for T&E implications.
   • Assisting TRADOC ARCIC in developing evaluatable, operationally relevant, and totally system focused critical operational issues and criteria (COIC).
   • Provide advice concerning methods and measures to evaluate the system against the COIC and advice on the resources and ability to test and evaluate the system.
   • Supporting the TRADOC advance warfighting experiment (AWE) program and concept experimentation program (CEP).

   b. U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). INSCOM is the CBTDEV for strategic signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems and INSCOM sole-user intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) systems used for formulating doctrine, concepts, organization, materiel requirements, and objectives. INSCOM responsibilities include:
   
   • Preparing MCDs and serving as the Army CBTDEV during development and fielding of new SIGINT and information security (INFOSEC) systems under the purview of the National Security Agency (NSA) and having sole application to U.S. SIGINT and INFOSEC systems. INSCOM forwards warfighting concepts and MCDs to TRADOC ARCIC for review and appropriate action.
   • Coordinating with the PEO/PM on matters pertaining to acquisition of INSCOM sole-user SIGINT and intelligence, security and electronic warfare (ISEW) systems.
   • Coordinating with the TRADOC ARCIC, on capabilities-based requirements generation for other INSCOM sole user ISEW systems and conduct combat and training developments for these Army systems when directed by HQDA, and/or Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), or at the request of TRADOC’s ARCIC.
   • Ensuring documentation of requirements for training support products, system TADSS, and/or embedded training for INSCOM systems.
   • Providing threat documentation to HQ, TRADOC as validated and approved by HQDA DCS, G–2.
   • Recommending to TRADOC ARCIC capabilities-based materiel requirements and associated priorities for strategic intelligence and security readiness.

   c. U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). In support of systems acquisition management, USASOC establishes functional area interface with TRADOC ARCIC for all programs, ensuring that requirements and interests of each participating agency are provided full consideration in programs for which the Army has lead agency or executive responsibility, and serves as the special operations trainer and user representative. The USASOC is a regular member of the Army AR2B. In addition, USASOC:
   
   • Forwards all SOC unique and non-SOC unique warfighting capability requirements and documents to TRADOC ARCIC for appropriate action.
   • Monitors TRADOC projects and identifies needs that affect the USASOC mission and responsibility.
   • Supports TRADOC field activities, conducts and supports testing, and monitors RDA projects to include potential force standardization and interoperability.
   • Participates in warfighting experiments, as appropriate.

   d. U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). USASMDC is the principal assistant and advisor to the SA and the CSA for all matters pertaining to space and strategic defense. The USASMDC is responsible for technology development programs related to strategic and tactical missile defense, space defense, and satellite technology. The command conducts missile defense technology base research and development activities in support of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), assures transfer of technology between MDA and Army systems, and provides matrix support to PEO Air and Missile Defense. USASMDC is also chartered by CSA to be the operational advocate and focal point for theater missile defense (TMD) at Army level. The CG, USASMDC, assists in the development of Army
TMD positions, reflective of work being done in TRADOC, and represents those positions at HQDA, OSD, MDA, JS, Congressional, and other high-level forums.

e. U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM). MEDCOM is the medical CBTDEV, TNGDEV, trainer, and user representative. MEDCOM conducts medical combat and training development activities as assigned by CG, TRADOC and TSG; reviews and evaluates materiel and TADSS requirements documents to identify and assure that adequate consideration is given to the prevention of health hazards from operating or maintaining materiel systems, and conduct the health hazard assessment (HHA) program, as required; conducts and supports assigned operational tests (OTs); and forwards all medical warfighting concepts and requirements documents to TRADOC for review and appropriate action.

f. U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). SDDC provides transportability engineering advice and analyses to the MATDEV, CBTDEV and TNGDEV; provides item, unit, and system transportability assessments for milestone decision review (MDR); provides transportability approval or identify corrective actions required to obtain approval for all transportability problem items; and reviews all materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) to assess adequacy of transportability.

g. U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC). USAMRMC is the medical MATDEV, logistician, and developmental tester and is responsible for RDA and logistic support of assigned materiel in response to approved materiel capabilities-based requirements. In addition, USAMRMC:

- Plans, programs, budgets, and executes medical RDTE tasks that support system RDA to include required system training support products, TADSS, and/or embedded training.
- Plans, coordinates, and provides functional support to USAMRMC organizations. Support includes, but is not limited to, procurement and contracting, legal, managerial accounting, cost estimating, systems engineering, conducting system TADSS and embedded training concept formulation, developmental testing, ILS, MANPRINT, environmental management, configuration management, and conducting various independent assessments and analyses.
- Assists the medical CBTDEV/TNGDEV in the Army CIDS process.
- Reviews MCDs to determine their adequacy and feasibility and for logistical support aspects of materiel systems to include ILS.
- Develops and maintains the physiological, psychological, and medical database to support the health hazard assessment (HHA), system safety assessments (SSA), and human factors engineering analysis (HFEA).
- Evaluates and manages the materiel readiness functions in the medical materiel acquisition process.
- Functions as TSG agency for the materiel acquisition of medical nondevelopmental items (NDI), commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, and sets, kits, and outfits.

h. U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S). AMEDDC&S is the medical CBTDEV, TNGDEV, doctrine developer, and operational tester. In addition, AMEDDC&S develops doctrine, organizations, and systems requirements within the guidelines established by the TRADOC ARCIC and in accordance with Army health care standards established by TSG.

Section VIII
Acquisition Activities, Phases and Milestones

11–35. Pre-systems acquisition activity.

Pre-system acquisition is composed of on-going activities in development of user needs, in S&T, and in materiel solution analysis (MSA) and technology development (TD) work specific to the development of a materiel solution to an identified, validated capabilities-based materiel requirement.

a. The capability needs and acquisition management systems use joint/service concepts, integrated architectures, and an analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) in an integrated, collaborative process to define needed capabilities to guide the development of affordable systems. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), with the assistance of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), assesses and provides advice regarding military capability needs for defense acquisition programs. This process, JCIDS, is described in CJCI 3170.01F, previously discussed.

b. Representatives from the services and multiple DOD communities assist the CJCS in formulating broad, time-phased, operational goals, and describing requisite capabilities in the initial capabilities document (ICD). When the ICD demonstrates the need for a materiel solution, the JROC or AROC recommends that the MDA convene a formal Materiel Development Decision (MDD) Review.

11–36. Materiel development decision (MDD) review.

a. At the MDD review, the approved ICD is presented to the MDA. The ICD includes: the preliminary concept of operations, a description of the needed capability, the operational risk, and the basis for determining that non-materiel approaches will not sufficiently mitigate the capability gap. The OSD Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation (DPA&E), (or service equivalent) proposes study guidance for the Milestone (MS) analysis of alternatives (AoA).

b. The MDA designates the lead agency to refine the initial concept selected, approves the AoA study guidance, and
establishes a date for a MS A review. The MDA decisions are documented in an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). This effort normally is funded only for the MSA work. The MDA decisions to begin MSA DOES NOT yet mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated.

c. Following approval of the study guidance, the organization conducting the AoA immediately prepares an AoA study plan to assess preliminary materiel solutions, identify key technologies, and estimate life-cycle costs. Following the MDD, the MDA may authorize entry into the DAS at any point consistent with phase-specific entrance criteria and statutory requirements. Progress through the DAS depends on obtaining sufficient knowledge to continue to the next phase of development. The MDD review is the formal entry point into the DAS and is mandatory for all potential acquisition programs. The Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase begins with the MDD review.


a. The purpose of this phase is to assess potential materiel solutions, to satisfy the phase-specific entrance criteria for the next program MS designated by the MDA and develop a technology development strategy (TDS). Entrance into this phase depends upon an approved ICD resulting from the analysis of potential materiel concepts across the services, international systems from Allies, and cooperative opportunities; and MDA guidance for conducting an AoA for the selected materiel concept, documented in the approved ICD.

b. The ICD and the AoA study guidance guide the AoA and MSA phase activities. The purpose of the AoA is to assess the potential system-level materiel solutions to satisfy the selected materiel concept (approach) documented in the approved ICD. The AoA assesses the critical technology elements (CTEs) associated with each proposed system-level materiel solution, including technology maturity, integration, risk and manufacturing feasibility, and, where necessary, technology maturation and demonstration needs. A CTE is a technology element which is critical if the system being acquired depends on this technology element to meet capability thresholds.

c. The results of the AoA provide the basis for the TDS, to be approved by the MDA at MS A. The TDS documents the following:

1. The rationale for adopting either an evolutionary strategy (the preferred approach) or using a single-step-to-full-capability strategy (e.g., for common supply items or commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items). For an evolutionary acquisition, the TDS includes a preliminary description of how the program will be divided into technology development increments, an appropriate limitation on the number of prototype units that may be produced and deployed during technology development, how these units will be supported, and specific performance goals and exit criteria that must be met before exceeding the number of prototypes that may be produced under the research and development (R&D) program.

2. A program strategy, including overall cost, schedule, and performance goals for the total research and development (R&D) program.

3. Specific cost, schedule, and performance goals, including exit criteria, for the first technology demonstration (TD).

4. A test plan to ensure that the goals and exit criteria for the first TD have been met.

d. MSA ends when the AoA has been completed, materiel solution options for the capability need identified in the approved ICD have been recommended and the phase-specific entrance criteria for the initial review milestone have been satisfied.

11–38. Milestone (MS) A.

At MS A, the MDA designates a lead agency, approves Technology Development (TD) Phase exit criteria, and issues the ADM. The leader of the CBTDEV-led integrated capabilities development team (ICDT), working with the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) system team (AST), develops an integrated evaluation strategy that describes how the capabilities in the MCD will be evaluated once the system is developed. For potential acquisition category (ACAT) I programs, the integrated evaluation strategy is approved by the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the cognizant overarching integrated product team (OIPT). The MDA complies with the congressionally directed certification requirements at MS A. This effort normally is funded only for the advanced technology development work. TD for an MDAP cannot proceed without MS A approval. Favorable MS A decisions DOES NOT yet mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated.


The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk, determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system, and to demonstrate CTEs on prototypes. TD is a continuous technology discovery and development process reflecting close collaboration between the S&T community, the CBTDEV, and the system MATDEV. It is an iterative process designed to assess the viability of technologies while simultaneously refining user requirements.

a. Entrance into this phase depends on the completion of the AoA, a proposed materiel solution, and full funding for planned TD phase activity. Full funding is the dollars and manpower needed for all current and future efforts to carry out the acquisition strategy (AS).
b. The TDS and associated funding approved at MS A provides for competitive prototyping (two or more competing teams (contractors) producing prototypes of the system and/or key system elements prior to, or through, MS B). Prototypes are employed to reduce technical risk, validate designs and cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements.

c. The ICD and the TDS guide, and systems engineering (SE) planning support this effort, but multiple technology development demonstrations may be necessary before the CBTDEV and MATDEV agree that a proposed technology solution is affordable, militarily-useful, and is based on mature, demonstrated technology. Initial life-cycle sustainment of proposed technologies is planned during this phase. Technology developed in S&T or procured from industry or other sources are demonstrated in a relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational environment to be considered mature enough to use.

d. A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is conducted for the candidate design(s) to define a high-confidence design. All system elements (hardware and software) must be at a level of maturity commensurate with the PDR entrance and exit criteria. A successful PDR inform requirements trades; improve cost estimation; and identify remaining design, integration, and manufacturing risks. The PDR is conducted at the system level and includes CBTDEV representatives and associated certification authorities. The PM provides a PDR report to the MDA at MS B and includes recommended requirements trades based upon an assessment of cost, schedule, and performance risk.

e. If a PDR has not been conducted prior to MS B, the PM must plan for a PDR as soon as feasible after program initiation. PDR planning must be reflected in the acquisition strategy (AS). Following PDR, the PM plans and the MDA conducts a formal post-PDR assessment. The PDR report is provided to the MDA prior to the assessment and reflects any requirements trades based upon the PM’s assessment of cost, schedule, and performance risk. The MDA must consider the results of the PDR and the PM’s assessment, and determines whether remedial action is necessary to achieve APB objectives. The result of the MDA’s post-PDR assessment is documented in an ADM.

f. The proposed system-level solution exits the TD phase when an affordable program or increment of militarily-useful capability has been identified; the technology and manufacturing process for that program or increment has been demonstrated in a relevant environment; manufacturing risks have been identified and assessed; and a system or increment can be developed for production within a short timeframe (normally less than 5 years for weapon systems); or, when the MDA decides to terminate the effort. During TD, the CBTDEV prepares the capability development document (CDD) to support initiation of the acquisition program, refines the integrated architecture, and clarifies how the program will lead to warfighting capability. The CDD builds on the ICD and provides the detailed operational performance and support parameters necessary to complete design of the proposed system. A MS B decision follows the completion of TD.


Systems acquisition is the process of developing system-level materiel solutions into producible and deployable products that provide capability to the user. The solution to exploit in systems acquisition is based on the AoA conducted in the MS A phase to meet the military need, including commercial and non-developmental technologies and products and services determined through market research (a process for gathering data on product characteristics, suppliers’ capabilities, and the business practices that surround them, plus the analysis of that data to make acquisition decisions). The responsible CBTDEV for the functional area in which a capability gap or opportunity has been identified, but not the MATDEV, normally prepares the AoA. The goal is to develop the best overall value solution over the system’s life-cycle that meets the user’s operational requirements. If existing systems cannot be economically used or modified to meet the operational capabilities-based requirement, an acquisition program may be justified.

11–41. Milestone (MS) B.

MS B is normally the initiation of an acquisition program. The purpose of MS B is to authorize entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase.

a. MS B approval can lead to integrated system design or system capability and manufacturing process demonstration. Regardless of the approach recommended, PMs and other acquisition managers continually assess program risks. Risks must be well understood before MDA can authorize a program to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. The types of risk include, but are not limited to, schedule, cost, technical feasibility, risk of technical obsolescence, software management, dependencies between a new program and other programs, and risk of creating a monopoly for future procurements.

b. There is only one MS B per program or evolutionary increment. Each increment of an evolutionary acquisition has its own MS B unless the MDA determines that the increment will be initiated at MS C. At MS B, the MDA approves the acquisition strategy (AS) and the acquisition program baseline (APB). The MDA decision is documented in an ADM.

c. At MS B, the MDA determines the low-rate initial production (LRIP) quantity for MDAPs and major systems. The LRIP quantity for an MDAP cannot exceed ten (10) percent of the total production quantity. Any increase in quantity must be approved by the MDA. The OSD Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, (DOT&E), following consultation with the PM, determines the number of production or production-representative test articles required for live-fire testing (LFT) and initial operational testing (IOT) of programs on the OSD T&E Oversight List. For a system
that is not on the OSD Oversight List, the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), following consultation with
the PM, determines the number of test articles required for IOT.

d. In general, a MS B is planned when a system-level materiel solution and design have been selected, a PM has
been assigned, requirements have been approved, and system-level integration is ready to begin. In no case will MS B
be approved without full funding (i.e., inclusion of the dollars and manpower needed for all current and future efforts
to carry out the AS in the budget and out-year program), which are programmed in anticipation of the MS B decision.

11–42. Engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase.
The purpose of the EMD phase is to develop a system or an increment of capability; complete full system integration
(technology risk reduction occurs during TD); develop an affordable and executable manufacturing process; ensure
operational supportability with particular attention to minimizing the logistics footprint; implement manpower and
personnel integration (MANPRINT); design for producibility; ensure affordability; and demonstrate system integration,
interoperability, safety, and utility. The CDD, AS, systems engineering plan (SEP), and test and evaluation master plan
(TEMP) guide this phase.

11–43. Entrance criteria.
a. Entrance into the EMD phase depends on demonstrated technology maturity (including software), validated and
approved capabilities-based requirements, and full funding. Unless some other factor is overriding in its impact, the
maturity of the technology determines the path to be followed. Programs that enter the acquisition process at MS B
must have an approved ICD that provides the context in which the capability was determined, validated, and approved.

b. The management and mitigation of technology risk, which allows less costly and less time-consuming systems
development, is a crucial part of overall program management and is especially relevant to meeting cost and schedule
goals. Objective assessment of technology maturity and risk is a continuous aspect of system acquisition. Technology
developed in S&T or procured from industry or other sources must be demonstrated in a relevant environment or,
preferably, in an operational environment to be considered mature enough to use for product development in systems
integration. Technology readiness assessments (TRAs), previously discussed, and where necessary, independent assessments,
are also conducted. If technology is not mature, the MATDEV uses alternative technology that is mature and
that can meet the user’s needs.

c. Prior to beginning EMD, CBTDEVs identify and the requirements authority validates a minimum set of key
performance parameters (KPPs), included in the CDD, that guide the efforts of this phase. These KPPs may be refined,
with the approval of the requirements authority, as conditions warrant. Each set of KPPs only apply to the current
increment of capability in EMD (or to the entire system in a single step to full capability). To maximize program trade
space and focus test and evaluation, the MDA, PEO, and PM work closely with the requirements authority to minimize
KPPs and limit total identified program requirements. Performance requirements that do not support in achievement of
KPP thresholds are limited and considered a part of the engineering trade space during development. During operational
testing (OT), a clear distinction is made between performance values that do not meet threshold requirements in the
user capabilities document and performance values that should be improved to provide enhanced operational
capability in future upgrades. At MS B, the PM prepares and the MDA approves an acquisition strategy (AS) that
guides activity during EMD. In an evolutionary acquisition program, each increment begins with a MS B, and
production resulting from that increment begins with a MS C.

d. Each program must have an acquisition program baseline (APB) establishing program goal—thresholds and
objectives—for the minimum number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters that describe the program over its
life-cycle.

e. The affordability determination is made in the process of addressing cost in the JCIDS process (previously
discussed) and included in each CDD, using life-cycle cost or, if available, total ownership cost. Transition into EMD
also requires full funding - e.g., inclusion of the dollars and manpower needed for all current and future efforts to carry
out the AS in the budget and out-year program. In no case can full funding (at least 6 years) be done later than MS B,
unless a program first enters the acquisition process at MS C.

f. EMD effectively integrates the acquisition, engineering, and manufacturing development processes with T&E.
T&E is conducted in a continuum of live, virtual, and constructive system and operational environments. Developmental
and operational test activities are integrated and seamless throughout the phase. Evaluations take into account all
available and relevant data and information from contractor and government sources. The independent planning of
dedicated IOT and follow-on OT (FOT), if required, is the responsibility of ATEC. The PM prepares and the MDA
approves an AS to guide activity during EMD. The AS describes how the PM plans to employ contract incentives to
achieve required cost, schedule, and performance outcomes.

g. The MDA selects the contract type for a development program at MS B. The contract type must be consistent
with the level of program risk and normally is a fixed price contract.

h. EMD has two major work efforts: integrated system design, and a system capability and manufacturing process
demonstration. Additionally, the MDA conducts a Post-PDR Assessment when consistent with the AS, and a Post-
Critical Design Review (CDR) Assessment to end integrated system design.
11–44. Integrated system design work effort.
This work effort is intended to integrate subsystems and reduce system-level risk. The program enters integrated system design when the PM has a technical solution for the system, but has not yet integrated the subsystems into a complete system. The CDD guides this effort. This effort typically includes the demonstration of prototype articles or engineering development models (EDMs).

11–45. Post-PDR assessment.
If a PDR has not been conducted prior to MS B, the PM will plan for a PDR as soon as feasible after program initiation. PDR planning is reflected in the AS. Following PDR, the PM plans and the MDA conducts a formal post-PDR assessment. The PDR report is provided to the MDA prior to the assessment and reflects any requirements trades based upon the PM’s assessment of cost, schedule, and performance risk. The MDA considers the results of the PDR and the PM’s assessment, and determines whether remedial action is necessary to achieve APB objectives. The results of the MDA’s post-PDR assessment are documented in an ADM.

11–46. Post critical design review (CDR) assessment.
   a. The MDA conducts a formal program assessment following system-level CDR. The system-level CDR, which is conducted as soon as practicable after MS C (program initiation), provides an opportunity to assess design maturity as evidenced by measures such as: successful completion of subsystem CDRs; the percentage of hardware and software product build-to specifications and drawings completed and under configuration management; planned corrective actions to hardware/software deficiencies; adequate developmental testing; the identification of key system characteristics, manufacturing feasibility, and critical manufacturing processes; an estimate of system reliability based on demonstrated reliability rates; etc.
   b. The PM provides a post-CDR report to the MDA that provides an overall assessment of design maturity and a summary of the system-level CDR results. The MDA reviews the post-CDR report and the PM’s resolution/mitigation plans and determines whether additional action is necessary to satisfy EMD phase exit criteria. The results of the MDA’s post-CDR assessment are documented in an ADM. Successful completion of the post-CDR assessment ends the integrated system design work effort and continues the EMD phase into system capability and manufacturing process demonstration work effort.

11–47. System capability and manufacturing process demonstration work effort.
   a. This work effort is intended to demonstrate the ability of the system to operate in a useful way consistent with the approved KPPs and that system production can be supported by demonstrated manufacturing processes. The program enters system capability and manufacturing process demonstration upon completion of the post-CDR assessment and establishment of an initial product baseline. This work effort ends when the system meets approved requirements and is demonstrated in its intended operational environment using the selected production-representative article; manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and the system meets or exceeds exit criteria and MS C entrance requirements.
   b. Successful DT to assess technical progress against critical technical parameters, early operational assessments, and, where proven capabilities exist, the use of modeling and simulation (M&S) to demonstrate system/system-of-systems integration are critical during this effort. T&E assess improvements to mission capability and operational support based on user needs and is reported in terms of operational significance to the user. The completion of this EMD phase is dependent on a decision by the MDA to commit to the program at MS C or a decision to end this effort.

The purpose of the P&D phase is to achieve an operational capability that satisfies functional needs. OT determines the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the system. The MDA makes the decision to commit to production at MS C, and documents the decision in the ADM.
   a. MS C authorizes entry into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for MDAPs and major systems; into production or procurement (for non-major systems that do not require LRIP); or into limited deployment in support of OT for major automated information systems (MAIS) programs or software-intensive systems with no production components.
   b. This phase has two major work efforts (LRIP and full-rate production and deployment) and includes a full-rate production decision review. MS C can be reached directly from pre-systems acquisition (e.g., a commercial product) or from the EMD phase. For DOT&E oversight programs, a system cannot be produced at full-rate until a Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production Report has been completed and sent to Congress.

11–49. Entrance criteria.
Regardless of the entry point, approval at MS C is dependent on the following criteria being met (or a decision by the MDA to proceed):

- acceptable performance in DT; and operational assessment; mature software capability; and no significant manufacturing risks
11–50. Milestone (MS) C.

a. Prior to making the milestone decision, the MDA considers the component cost analysis (CCA); and for MAISs, the CCA and economic analysis; the manpower estimate; the program protection for critical program information including anti-tamper recommendations; and an established completion schedule for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance covering testing, training, basing, and operational support.

b. At MS C, the MDA approves an updated AS prior to the release of the final RFP and approves an updated development APB, exit criteria for LRIP (if needed) or limited deployment, and the ADM.

c. The DOD DOT&E and cognizant OIPT leader approve the TEMP for all OSD T&E oversight programs. IT acquisition programs (regardless of ACAT) that entered system acquisition at MS C are registered with the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) before MS C approval.

d. A favorable MS C decision authorizes the PM to commence LRIP or limited deployment for MDAPs and major systems. The PM is only authorized to commence full-rate production with further approval of the MDA.

11–51. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) work effort.

a. This work effort is intended to result in completion of manufacturing development in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide production configured or representative articles for IOT; establish an initial production base for the system; and permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing.

b. Deficiencies encountered in testing prior to MS C are resolved prior to proceeding beyond LRIP (at the full-rate production (FRP) decision review) and any fixes verified in IOT. Test resources plans (TRPs) are provided to the DOT&E for oversight programs in advance of the start of OT.

c. LRIP may be funded by RDTE appropriation or by procurement appropriations, depending on the intended usage of the LRIP systems.

d. LRIP quantities are minimized. The MDA determines the LRIP quantity for MDAPs and major systems at MS B, and provides rationale for quantities exceeding ten (10) percent of the total production quantity documented in the AS. Any increase in quantity after the initial determination must be approved by the MDA. When approved LRIP quantities are expected to be exceeded because the program has not yet demonstrated readiness to proceed to full-rate production, the MDA assesses the cost and benefits of a break in production versus continuing annual buys.

11–52. Full-rate production (FRP) decision review.

a. An acquisition program may not proceed beyond LRIP without approval of the MDA at the FRP decision review. Before making the full-rate production and deployment decision, the MDA considers:

• the CCA, and for MAISs, the CCA and economic analysis
• the manpower estimate (if applicable)
• the results of operational and live fire test (if applicable)
• CCA compliance certification and certification for MAISs
• C4I supportability certification
• interoperability certification

b. The MDA approves the AS prior to the release of the final RFP, the production APB, and the ADM. The decision to continue beyond low-rate to full-rate production, or beyond limited deployment of AISs or software-intensive systems with no developmental hardware, requires completion of IOT, submission of the Beyond LRIP Report for DOT&E oversight programs, and submission of the LFT&E Report (where applicable) to the USD(AT&L), the SECDEF, and to Congress.

11–53. Full-rate production and deployment work effort.
This work effort delivers the fully funded quantity of systems and supporting materiel and services to the users. During this work effort, units attain initial operational capability (IOC). The IOC is the first attainment of the capability by a
modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) unit and supporting elements to operate and maintain effectively a production item or system provided the following:

- the item or system has been type classified as standard or approved for limited production
- the unit and support personnel have been trained to operate and maintain the item or system in an operational environment
- the unit can be supported in an OE in such areas as special tools, test equipment, repair parts, documentation, and training devices.

11–54. Sustainment activity/operations and support (O&S) phase.

The objective of this activity/phase is the execution of a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life-cycle. When the system has reached the end of its useful life, it must be disposed of in an appropriate manner. Planning for this phase begins prior to program initiation and is documented in the life-cycle sustainment plan (LCSP). The O&S phase has two major work efforts: life-cycle sustainment and disposal.

11–55. Life-cycle sustainment work effort.

a. The life-cycle sustainment program includes all elements necessary to maintain the readiness and operational capability of deployed systems. The scope of support varies among programs but generally includes supply, maintenance, transportation, sustaining engineering, data management, configuration management, manpower, personnel, training, habitability, survivability, safety (including explosives safety), occupational health, protection of critical program information (CPI), anti-tamper provisions, IT (including national security system (NSS)) supportability and interoperability, and environmental management functions. This activity also includes the execution of operational support plans in peacetime, crises, and wartime. Programs with software components must be capable of responding to emerging requirements that will require software modification or periodic enhancements after a system is deployed. A follow-on operational test (FOT) program that evaluates operational effectiveness, survivability, suitability, supportability, and interoperability, and that identifies deficiencies is conducted, as appropriate.

b. Supporting the tenets of evolutionary acquisition, sustainment strategies must evolve and be refined throughout the life-cycle, particularly during development of subsequent blocks of an evolutionary strategy, modifications, upgrades, and re-procurement. The PM ensures that a flexible, performance-oriented strategy to sustain systems is developed and executed. This strategy includes consideration of the full scope of operational support, such as maintenance, supply, transportation, sustaining engineering, spectrum supportability, configuration and data management, manpower, training, environmental, health, safety, disposal and security factors. The use of performance requirements or conversion to performance requirements are emphasized during re-procurement of systems, subsystems, components, spares, and services after the initial production contract.

c. The PM works with the CBTDEV to document performance and sustainment requirements in performance agreements specifying objective outcomes, measures, resource commitments, and stakeholder responsibilities. The PM employs effective performance-based life-cycle product support (PBL) planning, development, implementation, and management. Performance-based life-cycle product support represents the latest evolution of performance based logistics. Both can be referred to as PBL. PBL offers the best strategic approach for delivering required life cycle readiness, reliability, and ownership costs. Sources of support may be organic, commercial, or a combination, with the primary focus optimizing customer support, weapon system availability, and reduced ownership costs.

11–56. Disposal work effort.

At the end of its useful life, a system must be demilitarized and disposed in accordance with all legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to safety (including explosives safety), security, and the environment. During the design process, PMs document hazardous materials contained in the system, and estimate and plan for demilitarization and safe disposal.

11–57. Additional considerations.

The above discussion examined the activities performed in each phase of the nominal life-cycle of an acquisition system according to the current DODD 5000.01, DODI 5000.02, and AR 70–1. This is not to imply that all system developments must follow this exact sequencing of life-cycle phases and activities. On the contrary, DODI 5000.02 specifically authorizes and encourages a PEO/PM to devise program structures and acquisition strategies to fit the particulars of a program - an approach called “tailoring.” Other aspects of acquisition planning and strategy (e.g., preplanned product improvement (P3I) and technology insertion) can also be accommodated under the broad guidance and direction contained in DODD 5000.01 and DODI 5000.02. What remains constant is the task to develop and deliver combat-capable, cost-effective, and supportable systems to our Soldiers.

Section IX
War on terrorism (WOT) acquisition and fielding initiatives
The Army continues to improve and adapt its acquisition and fielding processes in response to the WOT and transformation. Major successes were the operational needs statement (ONSs)/Army requirements and resourcing board (AR2B) process, rapid fielding initiative (RFI); rapid equipping force (REF); joint improvised explosive devices defeat organization (JIEDDO); capability development for rapid transition (CDRT)/immediate warfighter needs (IWN); rapid acquisition authority; total package fielding (TPF); and the life-cycle management commands (LCMCs) initiative. All acquisition and fielding initiatives provided timely support to Soldiers deployed in combat while facilitating Army transformation.

11–58. Operational needs statement (ONSs)/Army requirements and resourcing board (AR2B) process.

a. An Army capability request to HQDA constitutes a request for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment. These capability requests come to HQDA via the SIPRNET-based Army Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) database and fall into two general categories; authorized/pre-validated equipment sourcing documents (ESDs) and operational needs statements (ONSs). The final validation, prioritization, and resourcing decision for these capability requests are made by the AR2B.

b. The AR2B is the mechanism (forum) for validating, prioritizing, and resourcing critical operational needs (ONSs and ESDs) for rapid senior leadership decision making (accelerated fielding solutions) in support of a named operation. It identifies solutions in the year of execution and/or budget year that require possible resource realignment. Established in December 2004, the AR2B replaced the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) and Setting the Force Task Force.

c. Authorized/pre-validated equipment sourcing requests (equipment and quantities already validated by HQDA, ODCS G–3/5/7):

   (1) Deployed and deploying units (in support of a war on terrorism named operation) or other HQDA designated high priority units, may submit ESDs for authorized/pre-validated equipment (i.e., MTOE shortages, table of distribution and allowances (TDA) shortages, brigade combat team (BCT) basis-of-issue plan (BOIP) shortages, or other equipment shortages already HQDA validated). The unit (05 level command) submits an EDS, via the ECOP database, through the chain of command to HQDA G–8/G–4 for resourcing.

   (2) Other means are still available for units to request equipment resourcing of authorized/pre-validated equipment such as MTOE shortages. For example, units can and should continue to use the unit status report (USR) process (IAW AR 220–1) to identify critical shortages affecting unit readiness.

   d. Operational needs statements (ONSs) are used by operational field commanders to document the urgent need for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment in the war on terrorism.

      (1) The ONS provides an opportunity for the operational field commander (06 level) to initiate the HQDA AR2B process.

      (2) The ONS is not a materiel capabilities document (MCD0 and the CBTDEV, TNGDEV or MATDEV communities do not initiate or develop an ONS.

      (3) Response to an ONS varies depending on the criticality of the need for the proposed item. Response can range from a HQDA directed requirement and fielding of a materiel system to the forwarding of the action to TRADOC ARCIC for review and appropriate action. HQDA may decline to favorably consider an ONS for a variety of reasons, including conflicting needs, higher priorities for funding, existence of a similar system, or non-concurrence of the criticality of the need. The response to an ONS is based on an ARSTAF validation supported by TRADOC, AMC, and MATDEV reviews. HQDA AR2B determines validity of the need, availability of technology, and source of resources to fill the requirement. If the need is determined to be critical, and can be resourced (at least for the present situation) a directed requirement may result.

      (4) All ONS are reviewed by the CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs to determine applicability to future requirements or continuing need for which a standard requirement and acquisition is needed. If validation of the ONS indicates that the concept has potential for Army-wide application and development of a new system is appropriate, TRADOC ARCIC will initiate a functional area ICD and/or CDD as appropriate through the capabilities development for rapid transition (CDRT) program, discussed later in the chapter.


a. The RFI program represents a dramatic improvement in the Army’s traditional acquisition and fielding processes by aggressively modernizing individual and small-unit equipment for active and reserve Soldiers throughout the operational Army. RFI allows the most recently developed commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) items to be packaged in unit sets and delivered to Soldiers as they deploy to operational theaters. This initiative has been tremendously successful because it has provided millions of articles of mission-essential equipment to deploying Soldiers and units in a matter of weeks and months, instead of the months and years characteristic of the traditional long Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS).

b. Central to the RFI is the concept of spiral development, through which rapidly developing technologies are
selected for additional emphasis to bring them to a point where they can be useful to the Soldier today instead of years
in the future. Spiral development, especially in optics, weapons and fabric technology development, has already
enabled quantum advancement in Soldier lethality and force protection in both Afghanistan (OEF) and Iraq (OIF).

c. To maintain currency and relevance, the RFI list of equipment issued to Soldiers is updated regularly by
TRADOC. The RFI list comprises two types of equipment: (1) equipment every Soldier receives (such as helmets,
clothing items and hydration systems) and (2) equipment fielded to units. While all organizations receive certain unit
equipment, a more expansive list is provided to BCTs and other selected organizations identified by HQDA, to include
lethality and specialty items such as weapons optics and military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) kits. In parallel,
PEO–Soldier also fields a variety of other items essential to readiness that are not RFI items, to include interceptor
body armor, thermal weapon sights, night vision goggles, multi-band inter-/intra-team radio, and Army combat uniform
items.

11–60. Rapid equipping force (REF).

a. The REF program is a staff support agency reporting to the Army G–33 under the operational direction of the
Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Office (AAWO) that also responds to the -senior Army leadership. Established in
October 2002 by the VCSA, REF provides rapid equipping solutions (off-the-shelf (government and commercial), or
near-term developmental items) to forces operating in theater (Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa). Rapid equipping
increase force protection, lethality and survivability. From this beginning, the REF evolved from a small experiment to
a thriving new initiatives entity providing a much needed stream-lined equipping process specifically for new
initiatives.

b. The REF seeks out operational in-theater needs and/or receives ONS for consideration. Based on this and other
similar input, such as Command-directed or documented good ideas, the REF equips promising new initiatives to
Soldiers on an accelerated basis.

c. The REF is responsible for the training, materiel support and recommended distribution plan for the new
technologies they sponsor. The REF fills materiel requirements that are not available through the Army’s traditional
acquisition and logistics system. Typically, the rapid equipping cycle is measured in weeks - sometimes days - from
operational commanders articulating a requirement to the Army providing a solution. Key items deployed into combat
have included armored kits for vehicles, improvised webcams to assist in searches for weapons caches, systems for
searching dangerous areas, and nondestructive devices to open doors during search operations.

d. The REF works directly with operational commanders to find promising materiel solutions to their identified
urgent operational requirements. The REF continues to rapidly insert new technology solutions that address the current
battlefield issues of deployed and deploying forces. It also continues to develop, experiment with and evaluate key
technologies and systems for achieving future force capabilities under operational conditions.

e. As of this chapter update, the REF has provided over six hundred plus different types of equipment. Since its
inception, REF solutions include: robots like the PACKBOT and MARCBOT for interrogating caves and suspicious
packages for booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); personnel and vehicle scanning systems; persistent
surveillance systems; digital translators for Soldiers to communicate with locals in their own language; explosive
material detectors; and much more.

f. The normal model for providing materiel solutions involves letting a contract and managing a contractor’s
performance. The REF embodies a new model (see figure 11–8) that changes the focus and requires being personally
involved in responding to the warfighting commander; working with Soldiers; observing/participating in operations;
and modifying systems on the spot as required. The REF concept of operations includes frequent in-theater canvassing
of Soldier requirements in an operational environment. For example, over a twenty-four (24)-hour period a REF liaison
officer (LNO) in Afghanistan learned of a mission need, created a technical solution, and went on an Army infantry
company combat mission for three days. The REF LNO learned that Soldiers on patrol either were endangering
themselves by dropping into wells to look for weapons caches or were simply dropping in a “chem light” to check
depth and then moving on if nothing was visible. The REF LNO quickly jury-rigged a web-camera attached to Ethernet
cable and a laptop. On its first mission, this capability (dubbed well-cam) found a weapons and equipment cache inside
a 70–80-foot well. Providing materiel solutions can’t always happen in 24 hours, but the REF’s forward presence at
operating bases in Afghanistan and Iraq helps focus and accelerate the process that produces materiel solutions. The
REF coordinates closely with other key major Army organizations, primarily HQDA Staff, Forces Command
(FORSCOM), TRADOC’s Combined Arms Centers (CAC) and ARCIC, and AMC to complete the rapid transition
process.

a. In response to an urgent need to develop countermeasures to IEDs in Iraq, the VCSA established the IED TF on 5 January 2004. The Army’s IED TF evolved into the joint IED TF and eventually into the current JIEDDO. The JIEDDO is co-located with, and works in partnership with REF (previously discussed) in preparing Soldiers and leaders to face the pervasive IED threat in the current operating environment. The JIEDDO orchestrates joint efforts to respond to and defeat IED threats.

b. The JIEDDO has rapidly expanded to provide operational capabilities in support of field commanders wherever the IED threat may be encountered. As the enemy’s use of asymmetric attacks has evolved on the battlefield, the mission of the JIEDDO was broadened to include counter-mortar and counter-rocket propelled grenade programs. In addition to developing doctrine and training strategies, the JIEDDO directs the accelerated development and fielding of selected DOTMLPF solutions.

c. The JIEDDO is designed to integrate intelligence, training and materiel solutions into a holistic response. The key operational arm of the JIEDDO consists of the forward-deployed field teams in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. Chartered to perform on-the-ground observation, information collection and dissemination, and IED training in-theater, these teams assist in collecting technical, operational and contextual details relating to IED events. They provide an immediate and vital link to theater intelligence and operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) developed from lessons learned form the basis of a multi-echelon, pre-deployment training program for units identified for future rotations.

d. The JIEDDO can be viewed as a prototype of a permanent organization capable of conducting operations in support of Army and joint force commanders to mitigate and defeat identified asymmetric threats. In FY 2004, the IED initiative was funded solely through existing Army programs, at a cost of $21 million. In light of its success, the DOD senior leadership decided to make the joint task force a permanent organization.
11–62. Capability development for rapid transition (CDRT)/immediate warfighter needs (IWN).

a. The CDRT is currently only one of two mechanisms designed to transition rapid acquisition systems/technologies to the Army’s deliberate DAS. The other mechanism is the Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWN) process.

b. The CDRT initiative, formerly known as spiral to the Army at large, provides a holistic assessment and review of those systems/technologies rapidly equipped to deployed forces in a named operation to determine a path forward for each system. Candidates are evaluated by operational and generating forces as to their applicability to meet current and/or future force needs. Candidates are identified for either termination, continuation as a sustain capability, or for potential enduring capability (acquisition program or non-materiel capability) status. CDRT intent is to identify systems/technologies that meet required capabilities (RCs) through the deliberate JCIDS/DAS processes, and complete the action to inform the next program objective memorandum (POM) build.

1. In the past four plus years of military operations in OEF and OIF over six hundred plus new capabilities were equipped to units in the operational theater using the rapid equipping force (REF) initiative. Accelerated materiel solutions were tailored to the operational commander’s specific urgent unforeseen operational needs - ONSs. An ONS is not a formal requirement document. In October 2004, the VCSA tasked TRADOC ARCIC to identify promising rapidly equipped systems/technologies for Army wide fielding. Two annual iterations (2004; 2005) produced fourteen (14) recommended systems for program of record (POR) status. In November 2005, the VCSA directed ARCIC to include ‘niche’ (now called sustain) systems in their assessments and provide a path forward recommendation on previously equipped systems. The third annual CDRT iteration (March 2007) produced four systems for potential POR status. The recently completed 5th CDRT iteration (December 2008) produced six (6) enduring capabilities (two (2) acquisition programs and four (4) non-materiel capabilities).

2. Today, CDRT is the semi-annual VCSA directed process to identify promising rapidly equipped systems/technologies, used in OEF/OIF, for potential Army wide fielding.

3. Candidate materiel system criteria include:
   - not a current acquisition program - no milestone B or later decision
   - in use in theater for at least one hundred and twenty (120) days
   - completed operational assessment - Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Capabilities & Limitations Report (C&L) as a minimum
   - completed operational assessment (in theater) - forward operational assessment (FOA)
   - applicable to all appropriate Army units
   - addresses current and future force capability gaps
   - potential for increased production without major modifications

4. Recommendations to the VCSA include:
   - Enduring Capability (acquisition program or non-materiel capability) - accelerated materiel and non-materiel development and formal JCIDS documentation to compete for formal POM consideration
   - Sustain Capability (formally niche) - sustained in theater, retain in war reserves, or warehouse in AMC depots
   - Termination - terminate HQDA support (DA funding) for sustainment because either it is obsolete or a better replacement is available. If a unit in the field wants to continue using the terminated item, they can use their own funding to do so.

5. TRADOC’s ARCIC manages the CDRT process for the Army. The goal is to evaluate initiatives in theater that have had an operational assessment. The second mechanism designed to transition rapid acquisition efforts to the Army deliberate acquisition system is the immediate warfighter needs (IWN) process. The IWN ensures that rapidly fielded systems/technologies, which have not already been transitioned by the CDRT initiative, are assigned either to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAWO) or to AMC and resourced for initial program management or life cycle support.

   a. The IWN process includes representatives from the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Office (AAWO), Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), AMC, Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), TRADOC, and HQDA G–2, G–3/5/7, G–4, and G–8.

   b. AWO plays a key role in the transition of new initiatives to the Army. The AAWO mission is to rapidly organize, train and equip Army organizations with the inherent ability to apply and defeat asymmetric threats while simultaneously changing the culture of the Army to a mentally agile and adaptive force. AAWO was established in May 2006 as the Army’s focal point for all WA initiatives and serve as the Army’s link to the JIEDDO in the current and future IED fight. Moreover, AAWO develops the Army’s service-specific broad perspective and policy/planning efforts in AW.

   c. AAWO initiated the IWN process in 2007 to formalize the transition of projects from JIEDDO, previously discussed, to the Army. The AAWO leadership soon expanded the process to include non-JIEDDO initiatives. The IWN takes candidate initiatives/systems from REF, TRADOC, RDECOM, JIEDDO and other agencies and vets them for possible transition to the Army. The IWN incorporates CDRT input as well as candidates from other new initiatives. The process brings all of the HQDA staff principal elements together to decide what initiatives should go
through the ASA(ALT), as the AAE, to a PM; and which should be managed for life cycle support by AMC Life-Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs).

11–63. Rapid acquisition authority.
   a. Congressional legislation uses the term Rapid Acquisition Authority to describe measures with respect to procurement that the SECDEF can take to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities. The legislation permits the SECDEF to waive statutes and regulations for testing and procurements (contracting) short of criminal statutes; and to move up to $100 million in authority, per fiscal year, regardless of “color” of money. The $100 million is not funding appropriated by Congress for this purpose, it is the authority to expend up to $100 million of existing DOD funding using this waiver authority.
   c. This Rapid Acquisition Authority, as well as the Iraq Freedom Fund (supplemental funding), are the primary sources of funding for the accelerated capabilities and materiel development initiatives, discussed in this chapter, responding to unforeseen urgent operational needs of the military and coalition forces engaged in the war on terrorism.

11–64. Total package fielding (TPF) process.
   a. TPF is currently the Army’s standard fielding process. In 1984 the Army began using TPF on a test basis and made it the standard fielding process in 1987. It is designed to ensure thorough planning and coordination between CBTDEVs, TNGDEVs, MATDEVs, fielding commands, gaining Army commands and using units involved in the fielding of new materiel systems. At the same time, it is designed to ease the logistics burden of the using and supporting Army troop units. Regulatory and instructional guidance for materiel release, fielding, and transfer is contained in AR 700–142, and DA Pamphlet 700–142 respectively. The TPF process is shown in figure 11–9.
   b. Identification of the TPF package contents for a particular fielding is known as establishment of the materiel requirements list (MRL). It is the responsibility of the MATDEV/fielding command to identify everything that is needed to use and support the new system and coordinate these requirements with the CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs and the gaining Army commands. The total fielding requirements are documented, coordinated, and agreed on through the materiel fielding plan (MFP) and/or memorandum of notification (MON), the mission support plan (MSP) and the materiel fielding agreement (MFA).

**Figure 11–9. Total package fielding concept**
c. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) operates unit materiel fielding points (UMFPs) in Pennsylvania, Texas, and California that support the Army. These three DLA UMFPs are sites where initial issue items are consolidated at unit identification code (UIC) level to support TPF worldwide. The staging site is the facility or location where the total package comes together. It is usually here that all end items, support equipment, initial issue spare and repair parts are prepared for handoff to the gaining units. To support TPF outside the Continental United States (OCONUS), the AMC operates a number of central staging sites in Europe, and two sites in Korea.

d. A joint supportability assessment takes place about ninety (90) days before the projected first unit equipped date (FUED) and sixty (60) days before fielding to a unit in CONUS. The fielding command assures that those items requiring deprocessing are inspected and made fully operational-ready before handoff to the gaining units. A joint inventory is conducted by the fielding and gaining commands to ensure all needed items are received, or placed on a shortage list for later delivery.

e. The fielding command provides, at the time of handoff, a tailored customer documentation package for each gaining unit that allows the unit to establish property accountability and post a receipt for TPF materiel. The transactions in the package are tailored to the specific supply system in use at the unit. Logistics changes are helping the Army transform to the future force. Many of these changes apply directly to TPF.

11–65. Life-cycle management commands (LCMCs) initiative.

a. Since the passage of the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act (DAWIA) Act in November 1990, the Army has continually attempted to reduce total life-cycle costs for warfighting systems, specifically sustainment costs which account for approximately eighty (80) % of system life-cycle costs. Under acquisition reform efforts the PM has been made responsible and accountable for all system life-cycle phases including sustainment, but the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of sustainment funding resided in the AMC.

b. In an effort to improve system life-cycle management, a memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed by the ASA(ALT) and the CG, AMC to establish the LCMCs to bring the acquisition, logistics, and technology communities together in supporting the PM as the single total life-cycle manager or “the trail boss” for assigned warfighting systems. The LCMC MOA was signed on 2 August 2004 and the LMSC initiative was approved by the CSA on 16 August 2004. The LCMC MOA:

   (1) “Dual hatted” the military deputy (MILDEP) to the ASA(ALT) as the AMC Deputy CG, Acquisition and Technology (A&T) - the MILDEP is no longer the AMC Deputy CG.

   (2) Aligned the AMC system commodity commands with related program executive officers (PEOs) into four product focused LCMCs. The four LCMCs are:

      (a) Aviation and Missile LCMC, Huntsville, Alabama - aligned Aviation and Missile Command with PEO Tactical Missiles and PEO Aviation.


      (c) Communications and Electronics LCMC, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey - aligned Communications and Electronics Command with PEO Command, Control, and Communications Tactical and PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors.

      (d) Joint Munitions and Lethality LCMC, Rock Island, Illinois - aligned Joint Munitions Command with PEO Ammunition. Aviation and Missile LCMC, Huntsville, Alabama - aligned Aviation and Missile Command with PEO Tactical Missiles and PEO Aviation.

   c. PEO Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, PEO Joint Chemical Biological Defense, and PEO Electronic Information Systems were not affected under the LCMC initiative. PEO Air, Space, and Missile Defense were combined with PEO Tactical Missiles under this initiative.

Section X
Acquisition Oversight and Review (O&R)

The Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS) is controlled by decisions made as the result of various acquisition programs milestone decision reviews (MDRs) conducted by appropriate management levels at program milestones (MSs). The reviews are the mechanism for checking program progress against approved plans and for developing revised APBs. Approval of APBs and plans in these reviews does not constitute program funding approval; allocation of funds in the PPBE process is required.

11–66. Integrated product teams (IPTs).

DODD 5000.01 directs the DOD acquisition community to utilize IPTs to facilitate the management and exchange of program information. IPTs are a management technique that integrates all acquisition activities starting with capabilities development through production, fielding/deployment and operational support in order to optimize the design,
manufacturing, business, and supportability processes. The IPT is composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines working together with a team leader to build successful and balanced programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and timely recommendations to facilitate decision making. There are two general levels of IPTs: overarching integrated product teams (OIPTs) focus on strategic guidance, program executability (cost, schedule, risk), and issue resolution; and working-level integrated product teams (WIPTs) that identify and resolve program issues, determine program status, and seek opportunities for acquisition reform.

a. Overarching integrated product teams (OIPTs). In support of all ACAT ID and IAM programs, an OIPT is formed to provide assistance, oversight, and review as that program proceeds through its acquisition life-cycle. The OIPT for ACAT ID programs is led by the appropriate OSD principal staff assistant (PSA). The DASD(C3ISR, Space, IT Programs) is the OIPT leader for ACAT IAM programs. Program OIPTs are composed of the PM, PEO, component staff, Joint Staff, USD(AT&L) staff, and the OSD program principals or their representatives, involved in oversight and review of a particular ACAT ID or IAM program.

1. In the Army, an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) OIPT is established at the direction of the MDA for ACAT IC, IAC, and most II programs. The ASARC OIPT is a team of HQDA staff action officers and the PEO/PM/TCM responsible for integration of oversight issues to be raised to the MDR forums.

2. The secretary/facilitator of the ASARC OIPT for Army ACAT I and II programs is the OASA (ALT) system coordinator (DASC) for that specific program. OIPT membership consists of empowered individuals appointed by ASARC members (ACAT IC, IAC, or selected II programs), and the MDA for ACAT III programs. Team membership is tailored based on the needs and level of oversight for the individual program. Typical ASARC OIPT responsibilities include:

- Meeting together and individually with the PEO/PM throughout the program development to raise and resolve issues early, providing recommendations for tailoring and streamlining the program.
- Linking vertically with the PM’s WIPTs.
- Helping the PM successfully achieve a MS decision.
- Providing an independent assessment for the MDA in preparation for the MDR.
- Developing a memorandum documenting the issues/risks to be raised to the MDA with a recommendation to the MDA.

3. The OIPT, at all levels, generally follow the general procedures that are described below for a typical ACAT ID and IAM program. Initially the OIPT meets to determine the extent of WIPT support needed for the potential program, who shall be members of the WIPTs, the appropriate MS for program initiation, and the minimum information needed for the program initiation review. The OIPT leader is responsible for taking action to resolve issues when requested by any member of the OIPT or when directed by MDA. The goal is to resolve as many issues and concerns at the lowest level possible, and to expeditiously escalate issues that need resolution at a higher level, bringing only the highest-level issues to the MDA for decision. The OIPT meets as necessary over the life of a program.

4. The OIPT leader provides an integrated program assessment (IPA) at MDRs using data gathered through the IPT process. The OIPT leader’s assessment focuses on core acquisition management issues and takes account of independent assessments that are normally prepared by OIPT members.

b. Working-level integrated product teams (WIPTs). WIPTs are established for all acquisition programs. The number and membership of the WIPTs are tailored to each acquisition phase based on the level of oversight and the program needs. They are comprised of HQDA and/or service/functional action officers and normally chaired by the PM or designee. WIPTs provide advice to the PM and help prepare program strategies and plans. Each WIPT focuses on a particular topic(s), such as T&E, cost/performance, risk management (both programmatic and safety), etc.


a. The function of the DAB is to review DOD ACAT ID programs to ensure that they are ready for transition from one program phase to the next. The DAB is the DOD senior level acquisition forum for advising the USD(AT&L), as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), on critical decisions concerning ACAT ID programs. DAB reviews focus on key principles to include interoperability, time-phased requirements related to an evolutionary strategy, and demonstrated technical maturity. The DAB is composed of DOD senior acquisition officials. The board is chaired by the USD(AT&L). Other principal members include the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness); Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/Department of Defense Chief Information Officer; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is available to comment on interoperability and integration issues that the JROC forwards to the DAB. The DAE may ask other department officials to participate in reviews, as required.

b. Approximately one week prior to the DAB review, the OIPT meets to pre-brief the OIPT leader. The purpose of the meeting is to update the OIPT leader on the latest status of the program and to inform the senior acquisition officials of any outstanding issues and to insure program is ready for a formal DAB review.
c. The JROC reviews all deficiencies that may necessitate development of ACAT I and ACAT IA systems prior to any consideration by the DAB or, as appropriate, Information Technology Acquisition Board (ITAB) at MS B. The JROC validates an identified materiel need and forwards the MCD with JROC recommendations to the USD(AT&L) or ASD(NII), as appropriate. In addition, the JROC continues a role in validation of KPPs in program baselines prior to scheduled reviews for ACAT I and ACAT IA programs prior to all successive MDRs.

d. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) reviews the component (Army) cost position (ACP), prior to the scheduled MDR and determines if additional analysis is required. The product is an independent cost position assessment and recommendations based on its independent review of the life-cycle cost estimates(s), validation of the methodology used to make the cost estimate(s), and determination if additional analysis or studies is required.

e. A formal DAB review is the last step of the DAB review process. The PM briefs the acquisition program to the DAB and specifically emphasizes technology maturity, risk management, affordability, critical program information, technology protection, and rapid delivery to the user. The PM addresses any interoperability and supportability requirements linked to other systems, and indicates whether those requirements will be satisfied by the acquisition strategy (AS) under review. If the program is part of a system-of-systems architecture, the PM briefs the DAB in that context. If the architecture includes less than ACAT I programs that are key to achieving the expected operational capability, the PM also discusses the status of and dependence on those programs.

f. Following presentations by the PM and a full discussion, the USD(AT&L), as DAE, decides to continue, alter, or terminate the program. This decision is published as an ADM. With the approval of the DAE, other committee reviews may be held for special purposes, such as to develop recommendations for the DAE on decisions other than milestone or program reviews (e.g., release of “withhold funds,” baseline changes, AS changes).

11–68. DOD Information Technology Acquisition Board (ITAB).

a. The DOD ITAB provides the forum for ACAT IAM milestones, for deciding critical ACAT IAM issues when they cannot be resolved at the OIPT level, and for enabling the execution of the DOD ITAB’s acquisition-related responsibilities for IT, including National Security Systems (NSS), under the Clinger-Cohen Act and Title 10. Wherever possible, these reviews take place in the context of the existing IPT and acquisition milestone review process. Where appropriate, an ADM documents the decision(s) resulting from the review.

b. The ITAB is chaired by the USD(AT&L). Principal participants at DOD ITAB reviews include: the Joint Staff (JS) J–8; Deputy DOD CIO; IT OIPT leader; ACAT ID OIPT leaders; cognizant PEO(s) and PM(s); CAEs and CIOs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Participants also include (as appropriate to the issue being examined) executive-level representatives from the following organizations: Office of USD(AT&L); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of DOT&E; Office of the Director, PA&E; and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).


a. The ASARC is the Army’s senior-level acquisition advisory body for ACAT IC, IAC, and selected II programs, ACAT ID programs (DAB managed) prior to a DAB, and ACAT IAM programs prior to a ITAB. The ASARC convenes at formal milestones to determine a program or system’s readiness to enter the next phase of the materiel acquisition cycle, and makes recommendations to the AAE on those programs for which the AAE is the MDA. An ASARC may also be convened at any time to review the status of a program. The ASARC is chaired by the AAE.

b. ASARC membership includes the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) - AAE; Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Deputy Under Secretary of the Army - Test and Evaluation Executive; Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller); Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment); Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); CG, Army Materiel Command; CG, Training and Doctrine Command; Office of the General Counsel; DCS, G–1; DCS, G–2; DCS, G–3/5/7; DCS, G–4; CIO/G–6; and the DCS, G–8. Other organizations are invited to attend if a significant issue is identified within their area of responsibility. The AAE makes the final decision as to attendance at the ASARC.

c. The effectiveness of the ASARC review process results from presentation of thorough analysis of all relevant issues and face-to-face discussion among the principals from the Army Secretariat, ARSTAF, AMC and TRADOC.

11–70. In-process review (IPR).

a. The IPR is a formal acquisition review forum for ACAT III programs. General policies for reviews for IPR programs are the same as for ACAT I and II programs. Reviews are conducted at milestones and at other times deemed necessary by the MDA. The MDA, usually the program executive officer (PEO), chairs the IPR.

b. The IPR brings together representatives of the MATDEV, the CBTDEV, the trainer, the logistician, and the independent evaluators for a joint review and decision on proceeding to the next phase of development. Their purpose is to provide recommendations, with supporting rationale, as a basis for system concept, system development, type classification, and production decisions by the appropriate level of authority. They are the forums where agencies responsible for participating in the materiel acquisition process can present their views and ensure that those views are
considered during development, test, evaluation, and production. Participation is extended to the appropriate testing agencies, HQDA representatives, and to such others as the IPR chairman designates.

Section XI
Acquisition Documentation

Acquisition management documentation is designed to support the management process as the life-cycle development of a materiel system progresses.

11–71. Materiel capabilities documents (MCDs).
MCDs establish the need for a materiel acquisition program, how the materiel will be employed, and what the materiel must be capable of doing. As the acquisition program progresses, statements of required performance and design specifications become more and more specific. The functional area initial capabilities document (ICD) is the document that initiates the DAS. MCDs were discussed in detail in section III.

11–72. Other service requirements.
The CBTDEV/TNGDEV reviews other service warfighting capability requirements documents for potential Army interest. When the Army chooses to participate in the RDA of another service program, HQDA initiates action to validate and approve the documentation. When another service’s MCD, to include an approved production request for proposal (RFP), adequately describes an Army requirement, the document may be approved as the Army requirement. The Army may also acquire other service equipment with a national stock number (NSN) that has been identified through the MATDEV market investigation and meets an approved Army need. For joint programs, capabilities documents are prepared and processed in accordance with the lead services procedures. Service peculiar requirements may be documented in the other service’s capabilities documents.

11–73. Catalog of approved requirements documents (CARDS).
Army CARDS is an unclassified HQDA ODCS, G–3/5/7 publication that provides information on the status of all approved MCDs. It includes both active and inactive requirement documents. An active document or assignment of a CARDS reference number does not automatically authorize the expenditure of funds. Each program must compete for funds in the Army prioritization and programming process. The DA G–37 Futures Warfighting Capabilities Division (DAMO–CIC) assigns a CARDS reference number to each MCD after approval and prior to publication and distribution. DAMO–CIC has developed the capabilities and AROC management system (CAMS) automation tool to automate the CARDS publication system.

11–74. Program review documentation and program plans.
The milestone decision authority (MDA) is responsible for identifying the minimum amount of documentation necessary for milestone review purposes. Only those mandatory formats called for by statute or DODI 5000.02 are required. All other formats are used as guidance only. Program plans are a description of the detailed activities necessary for executing the AS. Program plans belong to the PM and are used by the PM to manage program execution throughout the life-cycle of the program. The PM, in coordination with the PEO, determines the type and number of program plans, except those required by statute or DOD policy. Some of the typical program plans used to support the execution of a program is:

a. System threat assessment report (STAR). The STAR is the basic authoritative threat assessment that supports the development and acquisition of a particular ACAT I or IA system. The STAR contains an integrated assessment of projected enemy capabilities (doctrine, tactics, hardware, organization and forces) at initial operational capability (IOC) and IOC plus 10 years, to limit, neutralize or destroy the system. It explicitly identifies critical intelligence categories (CICs), which are a series of threat capabilities that could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the program. The STAR is a dynamic document that is continually updated and refined as a program develops. It is approved and validated in support of milestone decision reviews (MDRs). This report is the primary threat reference for the CDD, the modified integrated program summary (MIPS), the AoA, and the TEMP developed in support of a MDR. The STAR is approved by ODCS, G–2 and validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for all ACAT I, IA, and DOTE Oversight List programs at MS B and updated at MS C. The STAR is called the system threat assessment (STA) and approved by HQ, TRADOC (ODCSINT) for ACAT II and III programs.

b. Modified integrated program summary (MIPS). The MIPS, with its annexes, is the primary Army decision document used to facilitate top-level acquisition milestone decision making. It provides a comprehensive summary of program structure, status, assessment, plans, and recommendations by the PM and the PEO. The primary functions of the MIPS include a summary of where the program is versus where it should be; a description of where the program is going and how it will get there; an identification of program risk areas and plans for closing risks; and a basis for establishing explicit program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. It also includes thresholds in the stand-alone APB and program-specific exit criteria for the next acquisition phase. The MIPS provides answers to the following five key MDR core issues:

(1) Is the system still needed?
(2) Does the system work (from the viewpoints of the user, functional staffs, and the PM)?
(3) Are major risks identified and manageable?
(4) Is the program affordable (is adequate programming in the POM)?
(5) Has the system been subjected to cost as an independent variable (CAIV) analysis?

c. Acquisition strategy (AS). The AS is the framework (roadmap) for planning, directing, and managing a materiel acquisition program. It states the concepts and objectives that direct and control overall program execution from program initiation through post-production support. An AS is required for all Army acquisition programs regardless of ACAT. The AS documents how the acquisition program will be tailored and identifies risks and plans to reduce or eliminate risks. The AS, prepared by the PM-led working level integrated product team (WIPT), is a living document that matures throughout the program. It provides fundamental guidance to the functional elements of the MATDEV/CBTDEV organizations. Individual functional strategies leading to the preparation of detailed program plans required to implement the AS are depicted in figure 11–10.

d. Environmental analysis. This is a congressionally mandated analysis of the potential environmental impacts of weapons systems. It identifies land, sea, or air space requirements of the most promising alternatives and describes the potential effects on the land, sea, and air environment. It also describes the potential impacts on public health and safety by the development, test manufacturing, basing operation, and support of the proposed system. The environmental impact data is weighed against system cost, schedule, and performance (programmatics) in deciding how to best minimize environmental harm.

e. Program office life-cycle cost estimate (POE) and component cost estimate (CCE). These documents are prepared in support of MS B and all subsequent MS reviews. The cost estimates are explicitly based on the program objectives, operational requirements, and contract specifications for the system, including plans for such matters as peacetime utilization rates and the maintenance concept. The estimates identify all elements of additional cost that would be entailed by a decision to proceed with development, production, and operation of the system. They are based on a careful assessment of risks and reflect a realistic appraisal of the level of cost most likely to be realized. Two cost estimates are prepared. The CBTDEV-led integrated capabilities development team (ICDT) in support of MS A, and the program office in support of MS B and all subsequent decision reviews prepare the POE. The other estimate is prepared by an organization that does not report through the acquisition chain. In the Army, this independent cost estimate, entitled CCE, is prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Cost and Economics (DASA–CE) for MDAP systems.

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**Figure 11–10. Acquisition strategy**

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* Other Strategies Include Industrial Preparedness, Environmental, Standardization, Interoperability, Affordability, Non-Developmental Item Utilization, etc.
f. Army cost position (ACP). The ACP is the Army’s approved life-cycle cost estimate for the materiel system. It is used for DOD milestone reviews and is the basis for Army planning, programming and budgeting. For all MDAP programs, the Army’s Cost Review Board (CRB) develops the proposed ACP after an intensive review of both the POE and CCE. This proposal becomes the ACP when it is approved by the ASA(FM&C) and then is provided to the AAE. DODI 5000.02 requires the component’s cost position.

g. Analysis of alternatives (AoA).

(1) The independent AoA provides information to the decision authority at the MS A review to assist in determining whether any of proposed alternatives to an existing system offer sufficient military and/or economic benefit. AoAs provide information to the analytical underpinning to support the recommendation to initiate, modify, or terminate a program. The AoA is required for potential ACAT I and most ACAT II programs and is typically conducted by TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) during the acquisition Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase (previously discussed).

(2) The AoA focuses on broad operational capabilities, potential technology concepts, and materiel solutions that could satisfy the MCD. It examines the full range of materiel alternatives (including those identified in the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) review ADM). AoAs illuminate the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternatives being considered by identifying sensitivities of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., selected performance capabilities). The AoA provides insights regarding KPPs for preferred alternatives and indicates how these parameters contribute to increases in operational capability. It identifies opportunities for trades among performance, cost, and schedule; and determines operational effectiveness and costs (including estimates of training and logistics impacts) for all alternatives.

(3) If a new program is approved (MS B), the AoA may be useful for identifying alternatives that will be refined by cost-performance trades during EMD phase. It should be useful for limiting the number of alternatives to be considered during the EMD phase. The MDA may direct updates to the AoA for subsequent decision points, if conditions warrant (e.g., AoA may be useful for examining cost-performance trades at MS C).

h. Acquisition program baseline (APB). APBs consist of the concept baseline, the development baseline, and the production baseline approved at MS B, C, and full rate production (FRP), respectively. The purpose of the baselines is to enhance program stability and to provide a critical reference point for measuring and reporting the status of program implementation. Each baseline contains objectives for key cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Key parameters must meet minimum acceptable requirements, known as thresholds, at each milestone decision point. The thresholds establish deviation limits from which a PM may not trade-off cost or performance without authorization from the MDA. The APB must cross-walk to the program CDD or CPD for performance parameters. Failure to meet the threshold requires a reevaluation of alternative concepts or design approaches. APBs and deviation reporting are required for all ACAT programs.

i. Test and evaluation master plan (TEMP). The TEMP is the executive level planning document required for a system that focuses on the overall structure, major elements, and objectives of the T&E program. The TEMP is consistent with the AS as well as the approved CDD, CPD and C4I Support Plan (C4ISP). It is a reference document used by the T&E community to generate detailed T&E plans and to ascertain schedule and resource requirements associated with a given system. The TEMP provides a road map for integrated simulation, test, and evaluation plans, schedules, and resource requirements necessary to accomplish the T&E program. The TEMP describes what testing (e.g., developmental test and operational test) is required, who will perform the testing, what resources will be needed, and what are the requirements for evaluation. It relates program schedule, test management strategy and structure, and required resources to critical operational issues; critical technical parameters; measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and suitability; and milestone decision points. While the PM has the overall responsibility, each T&E WIPT member contributes to the TEMP development and maintenance. The TEMP is initially developed at a system’s first milestone review and is updated before each subsequent MS, when the CDD/CPD/C4ISP has changed significantly, or when the acquisition program baseline (APB) has been breached. Upon approval, the TEMP serves as a contract between the CBTDENV, MATDEV and T&E community for executing the system’s T&E program. The TEMP provides key management controls for T&E in support of the acquisition process. Detailed TEMP procedures and format are in DA Pamphlet 73–1.

j. Manpower estimate report (MER). This congressionally directed report documents the total number of personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) that are or will be needed to operate, maintain, support, and train for a ACAT I program upon full operational deployment. The validity of the MER is dependent upon force structure, personnel management, and readiness requirements, as well as on the acquisition decision on the size of the buy (procurement).

k. Life-cycle sustainment plan (LCSP). LCSP spans a system’s entire life cycle, from materiel solution analysis (MSA) to disposal. It translates force provider capability and performance requirements into tailored product support to achieve specified and evolving life cycle product support availability, reliability, and affordability parameters. Life-cycle sustainment planning is considered during MSA, and matures throughout the TD phase. An LCSP is prepared for MS B. The planning is flexible and performance-oriented, reflecting an evolutionary approach, and accommodates modifications, upgrades, and re-procurement. The LCSP is part of the program’s AS and is integrated with other key
program planning documents. The LCSP is updated and executed during production and deployment and operations and support. Life-cycle sustainment considerations include supply; maintenance; transportation; sustaining engineering; data management; configuration management; HSI; manpower, personnel, training, habitability, survivability, environment, safety (including explosives safety), and occupational health; protection of critical program information and anti-tamper provisions; supportability; and interoperability.

11–75. Typical waivers and reports.
   a. Live-fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) report. Independent OSD report to Congress that provides test results and assessment of realistic survivability testing on a covered major system, and realistic lethality testing on a major munitions or missile program. Congress mandates this report.
   b. Live-fire test and evaluation waiver. This certifies to Congress when live-fire survivability testing of a covered major system would be unreasonably expensive and impractical. However, some testing must still be accomplished at the subsystem level as described in the alternate LFT&E plan.
   c. Developmental test report. This provides the results of developmental tests to include live-fire test results and reports.
   d. Beyond low-rate initial production report. This provides Congress with an assessment of the adequacy of initial operational testing (IOT) and whether the test results confirm the items are effective, suitable, and survivable for combat prior to the full-rate production (FRP) decision to proceed beyond low-rate initial production (LRIP). Congress mandates this report.
   e. Defense acquisition executive summary (DAES). The DAES is a early-warning report to DOD’s USD(AT&L). The DAES describes actual program problems, warns of potential program problems, and describes mitigating actions taken. The DAES is a multi-part document, reporting program information and assessments; PM, PEO, AAE comments; and cost and funding data. The PM may obtain permission from USD(AT&L), as appropriate, to tailor DAES content. At a minimum, the DAES reports program assessments (including interoperability), unit costs, current estimates, exit criteria status and vulnerability assessments.
   f. Selected acquisition report (SAR). The SAR reports the status of total program cost, schedule, and performance; as well as program unit cost and unit cost breach information. For joint programs, the SAR reports the information by participant. Each SAR includes a full, life-cycle cost analysis for the reporting program. The SAR is provided to Congress.
   g. Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach report. A Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach occurs when a MDAP experiences an increase of at least fifteen (15)% in program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) or average procurement unit cost (APUC) above the unit costs in the acquisition program baseline (APB). For programs with unit cost increases of at least twenty-five (25)%, a SECDEF certification is required. Certification responsibility has been delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD(AT&L)). Unit cost reporting is required by 10 USC 2433.

11–76. Other documentation.
   a. Acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). The ADM documents the MDA’s decision on the programs AS goals, thresholds, and the exit criteria for the next phase of the program. The ADM is used to document the decision for all ACAT I, II, and III programs.
   b. Integrated program assessment (IPA). Information derived from the PM’s modified integrated program summary (MIPS) allows the DOD overarching integrated product team (OIPT) to develop the IPA for program MDR. The IPA summarizes the DOD independent assessment of the PM’s program. It identifies critical areas, issues, and recommendations for the MDA. For ACAT ID and IAM programs the IPA is prepared by the OIPT, approved by the OIPT leader, and submitted to the USD(AT&L).

Section XII
Testing and Evaluation

There are four major sub-processes that support the overall management of the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS). The first major sub-process is T&E.

11–77. T&E strategy.
   a. All Army acquisition programs must be supported by a TEMP, previously discussed, that reflects an adequate and efficient T&E program. T&E is the principal tool with which progress in system development and acquisition is measured. T&E is structured to support the DAS and user by providing essential information to decision-makers, assessing attainment of technical performance parameters, and determining whether systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for intended use. Primary reasons for conducting T&E is to facilitate learning, assess technical maturity and interoperability, facilitate integration into fielded forces, and confirm performance. T&E can also assess and reduce program risk (e.g., schedule, cost, technical feasibility, technical obsolescence, and software management).
The primary product of the T&E sub process is information (hard facts) plus an independent evaluation of all credible data on a system so that the MDA can make informed decisions.

b. The planning, programming, and budgeting for T&E begins early in the acquisition process, concurrent with coordination of the validated initial capabilities document (ICD). Early T&E integration is accomplished through the independent evaluator’s involvement in the ICDT and the planning of the acquisition team within the T&E WIPT. The primary purpose of the T&E WIPT is to optimize the use of the appropriate T&E expertise, instrumentation, targets, facilities, simulations, and models to implement test integration, thereby reducing costs and decision risk to the Army. The primary product of the T&E WIPT is a TEMP. The Army Test and Evaluation Executive, within the office of the DUSA, is the TEMP approval authority for all ACAT I/IA and any II/III on the OSD T&E Oversight List prior to final OSD approval. The acquisition MDA approves TEMPs for ACAT II and III programs not on the OSD T&E Oversight List.

c. Continuous evaluation (CE) is used to provide a continuous flow of information and data to decision-makers, MATDEV, and CBTDEV. The data generated in early development phases is visible and maintained as the system moves into the formal testing, thereby avoiding duplication of testing. Continuous evaluation continues through a system’s post-deployment so as to verify whether the fielded system meets or exceeds demonstrated performance and support parameters.

11–78. Developmental testing (DT) and operational testing (OT).

a. DT encompasses models, simulation, and engineering type tests that are used to verify that design risks are minimized, system safety is certified, achievement of system technical performance is substantiated, and to certify readiness for OT. DT generally requires instrumentation and measurements, is accomplished by engineers and technicians, is repeatable, may be environmentally controlled, and covers the complete spectrum of system capabilities. The PM designs DT objectives appropriate to each phase and milestone. Key DTs are the live fire test (LFT) that is mandated for covered systems, and the production qualification test (PQT) that is the system-level test that ensures design integrity over the specified operational and environmental range.

b. OT is a field test of a system (or item) under realistic operational conditions with users who represent those expected to operate and maintain the system (or item) when fielded or deployed. Key OTs are:

   (1) Initial operational test (IOT). It is conducted before the full-rate production (FRP) decision and is structured to provide data to determine the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of a system operated by typical users under realistic conditions (e.g., combat and representative threat). Before an IOT commences for all programs on the OSD T&E Oversight List, OSD (DOT&E) must approve the Operational Test Agency (OTA) test plan (OTA TP).

   (2) Follow-on operational test (FOT). FOT may be necessary during (or after) production to refine the estimates made during the IOT, provide data to examine changes, and verify that deficiencies in materiel, training, or concepts have been corrected. A FOT provides data to ensure that the system continues to meet operational needs and that it retains its effectiveness in a new environment or against a new threat.

c. The Army’s Test Schedule and Review Committee (TSARC) is a high-level centralized management forum to review and coordinate the resource commitment (e.g., personnel, instrumentation, and equipment) from outside the tester’s command required to support the tests included in the Army’s Five-Year Test Program (FYTP). The TSARC is chaired by CG, ATEC and operates under AR 73–1. When approved for inclusion in the FYTP, a program’s test resource plan (TRP) becomes authority for tasking in the current and budget years. The TRP is the acquisition system’s formal T&E resource planning and tasking document.

Section XIII
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)

The second major sub-process in support of the DAS is integrated logistics support (ILS). ILS is a disciplined, unified, and interactive approach to the management and technical activities necessary to integrate logistics support into system and equipment design. ILS is the process used by the Army to implement the mandatory life-cycle logistics policies and procedures and includes all elements of planning, developing, acquiring, and supporting Army materiel throughout its life cycle.

11–79. ILS Overview and Management

a. The supportability integrated product team (SIPT) is a working-level IPT to support both the capabilities development and system integration management processes. The CBTDEV proponent school/center establishes an SIPT at the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase for all potential ACAT I/II and selected ACAT III acquisition programs to coordinate overall ILS planning and execution. At MS B, or when the PM is assigned, the designated MATDEV integrated logistic support manager (ILSM) assumes responsibility to chair the SIPT.

b. SIPT members develop performance-based logistics (PBL) concepts and ILS program documentation and conduct supportability/tradeoff analyses to determine the optimum PBL strategy or ILS concepts. The SIPT make recommended ILS-related planning, programming, and execution decisions to the PM. The SIPT is a working body, and the roles and
The third major sub-process in support of the DAS is the MANPRINT program. MANPRINT is the Army’s application

Section XIV

Supportability strategy (SS). The SS (formerly known as the Integrated Logistics Support Plan) is a government-prepared working document that serves as a record of planning, programming and execution of ILS (including PBL) for an acquisition program. The SS is based upon the ten ILS elements and defines how analysis will be used throughout the systems engineering process to define the system, design the support, and support the design. The intent of the SS is to methodically gather data, review the data, assess alternative support concepts, develop information for use in decision making, coordinate plans and execute the selected logistics support concept. The SS is a compliance document and will serve as a record to document the actions taken during the development and implementation of the ILS management program. The SS for all ACAT levels will be approved and managed by the SIPT. All SSs will be updated prior to each milestone and major event not to exceed three years from the previous update. The initial SS will be prepared by the MATDEV; be coordinated with CBTDEV, MATDEV, Army logisticians, the technical and operational testers/evaluators, and other program participants; and will be available 60 days prior to MS B. If there is no PM prior to MS B, the PEO, who is assigned system responsibility, will lead the effort to develop the initial SS.

Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Program

The third major sub-process in support of the DAS is the MANPRINT program. MANPRINT is the Army’s application
of the DOD Human Systems Integration (HSI) requirements in systems acquisition (DODD 5000.01 and DODI 5000.02), in compliance with Title 10. MANPRINT, described in detail in AR 602-2, is the Army’s program to ensure that the Soldier and human needs are considered throughout the entire system life-cycle acquisition process, and that human performance is always considered as part of “total” system performance.

11–81. Seven MANPRINT domains.
MANPRINT integrates and facilitates trades among the following domains but does not replace individual domain activities, responsibilities, or reporting channels:

a. Manpower. Manpower is the personnel strength (military and civilian) available to the Army. It refers to the consideration of the net effect of Army systems on overall human resource requirements and authorizations (spaces), to ensure that each system is affordable from the standpoint of manpower. It includes analysis of the number of people needed to operate, maintain, and support each new system being acquired, including maintenance and supply personnel, and personnel to support and conduct training. It requires a determination of the Army manpower requirements generated by the system, comparing the new manpower needs with those of the old system(s) being replaced. If an increase in personnel is required to support a new (or modified) system, “bill payers” must be identified from existing personnel accounts.

b. Personnel capabilities. Military and civilians possessing the aptitudes and grades required to operate, maintain, and support a system in peacetime and war. Personnel refers to the ability of the Army to provide qualified people in terms of specific aptitudes, experiences, and other human characteristics needed to operate, maintain, and support Army systems. It requires a detailed assessment of the aptitudes that personnel must possess in order to complete training successfully as well as operate, maintain, and support the system to the required standard. Iterative analyses must be accomplished for the system being acquired, comparing projected quantities of qualified personnel with the requirements of the new system, any system(s) being replaced, and overall Army needs for similarly qualified people. Personnel analyses and projections are needed in time to allow orderly recruitment, training, and assignment of personnel in conjunction with system fielding.

c. Training. Considerations of the necessary time and resources required to impact the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to qualify Army personnel for operation, maintenance, and support of Army systems. It involves:
   (1) formulating and selecting engineering design alternatives that are supportable from a training perspective,
   (2) documenting training strategies, and
   (3) determining resource requirements to enable the Army training system to support system fielding. It includes analyses of the tasks that must be performed by the operator, maintainer, and supporter; the conditions under which the tasks must be performed; and the performance standards that must be met. Training is linked with personnel analyses and actions because availability of qualified personnel is a direct function of the training process.

d. Human factors engineering. Human factors engineering is the technical effort to integrate design criteria, psychological principles, and human capabilities as they relate to the design, development, test, and evaluation of systems. The human factors engineering goals are:
   (1) To maximize the ability of the Soldier to perform at required levels by eliminating design-induced error.
   (2) To ensure materiel maintenance, support, and transport are compatible with the capabilities and limitations of the range of fully equipped Soldiers who would be using such materiel. Human factors engineering provides an interface between the MANPRINT domains and system engineers. Human factors engineering supports the MANPRINT goal of developing equipment that will permit effective Soldier-machine interaction within the allowable, established limits of training time, Soldier aptitudes and skill, physical endurance, physiological tolerance limits, and Soldier physical standards. Human factors engineering provides this support by determining the Soldier’s role in the materiel system, and by defining and developing Soldier-materiel interface characteristics, workplace layout, and work environment.

e. System safety. System Safety involves the design features and operating characteristics of a system that serve to minimize the potential for human or machine errors or failure that cause injurious accidents.

f. Health hazards. Health hazards are the inherent conditions in the use, operation, maintenance, support and disposal of a system (e.g., acoustical energy, biological substances, chemical substances, oxygen deficiency, radiation energy, shock, temperature extremes, trauma, and vibration) that can cause death, injury, illness, disability, or reduce job performance of personnel.

g. Soldier survivability. A Soldier within the context of MANPRINT may refer to a military or a civilian.
   (1) System. The characteristics of a system that can reduce fratricide, reduce detectability of the Soldier, prevent attack if detected, prevent damage if attacked, minimize medical injury if wounded or otherwise injured, and reduce physical and mental fatigue.
   (2) Soldier. Those characteristics of Soldiers that enable them to withstand (or avoid) adverse military action or the effects of natural phenomena that would result in the loss of capability to continue effective performance of the prescribed mission.

11–82. MANPRINT objectives and concept.

a. MANPRINT is intended to influence the design of developmental systems and the selection of nondevelopmental
item (NDI) systems with the primary objective of achieving maximum total system effectiveness at a reasonable and affordable life-cycle cost of ownership. The implementation of MANPRINT impacts total system performance (both effectiveness and availability) by making explicit the role that Soldier performance plays and is shaped by design factors. MANPRINT also addresses the manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) resources needed to achieve the required performance and, where possible, indicates more affordable configuration of MPT resources.

b. The engineering design philosophy of MANPRINT is focused on optimum system performance on the battlefield, which includes consideration of both Soldier and equipment capabilities and survivability. MANPRINT is an option-oriented process as opposed to an objective-oriented process. The MANPRINT process provides decision makers information upon which to make trades in areas such as quality and numbers of people, training times, technology, conditions, standards, costs, survivability, safety, health hazard risks, design and interface features, and personnel assignment policy.

c. The body of MANPRINT expertise, formerly known as the MANPRINT joint working group, continues to function through the ICDT and IPT process, previously discussed. The MANPRINT members of the ICDT transition to the MANPRINT WIPT when applicable. The purpose of this body is to:

- Assist the CBTDEV (or functional proponent) and PM to ensure MANPRINT principles are applied to the system,
- Provide MANPRINT input to the MCDs, and
- Provide a tracking system and historical database of MANPRINT issues.

d. The Army Research Laboratory (ARL)’s Human Research & Engineering Directorate serves as the MANPRINT focal point for coordinating domain support for ICDTs and IPTs. Additional MANPRINT information and references are available online at http://www.manprint.army.mil.

Section XV
Training Development

The fourth major sub-process in support of the DAS is training development.

11–83. Training development (TD) overview.

a. Training development is a vital component of TRADOC’s mission to prepare the Army for war. TRADOC is responsible for developing training and providing support for individual and unit training. This responsibility includes determining requirements for range, ammunition and training devices and facilities, as well as education/training courses, products, and programs. The single manager for training in TRADOC is the Deputy Chief of Staff G–3/5/7. The Army Training Support Center (ATSC), a TRADOC field operating agency (FOA) under TRADOC G–3/5/7, provides training support services for the planning and integration of products and programs that support individual and collective training in the total force.

b. The Army’s TD process, the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), is a systematic approach to making training/education decisions. SAT is a systematic, spiral approach to making decisions about collective, individual, and self-development training for the Army. The SAT involves five training related phases: evaluation, analysis, design, development, and implementation. Evaluation is continuous throughout the SAT process and the entire process must operate within a given set of resources. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) drive training and TD requirements.

c. The Army’s implementation of DAS is a complex, lengthy process and training development is embedded throughout the process. The capabilities development and system acquisition management process provide a structure for system management. Training impacts and costs are vital to system performance. Coordination between the CBTDEV/MATDEV/TNGDEV must be close and continuous to develop and field a complete material system that meets the capabilities development document (CDD) requirements (previously discussed).

11–84. System training plan (STRAP).

The STRAP is the master training plan for a new system. It outlines the development of the total training strategy for integrating a new system into the training base and gaining units; plans for all necessary training support, training products, and courses; and sets milestones to ensure the accomplishment of the training strategy.

11–85. Army modernization training (AMT).

AR 350–1 provides policy and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the planning and execution of new systems training. The regulation provides a process for the expeditious integration of equipment into the force structure through new equipment training (NET), displaced equipment training (DET), doctrine and tactics training (DTT), and sustainment training (ST).

a. New equipment training (NET). NET is designed to support force integration and modernization through identification of personnel, training, and training devices required to support new or improved equipment; by planning for the orderly transfer of knowledge from the MATDEV to the trainer, user, and supporter by documenting requirements in
NET plans (NETP); and the deployment of NET teams (NETT) to train Soldiers to operate, maintain, and provide instruction on modernized equipment

b. Displaced equipment training (DET). DET applies to systems that are being replaced by new equipment, but remain in the inventory. Planning for and executing DET is similar to the process used in NET.

c. Doctrine and tactics training (DTT). DTT is conducted in conjunction with NET or DET. DTT provides commanders, battle staffs, operators, and trainers with a doctrinal basis for employment of new or displaced materiel.

d. Sustainment training (ST). ST is a command responsibility. The training base shares the responsibility for ST by assuring that a pool of trained replacements is established to support the sustainment effort. The ultimate responsibility for ST, however, remains with the commander.

11–86. Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS).
TRAS is a long and short-range planning and management process for the timely development of peacetime and mobilization individual training. It integrates the TD process with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE) by documenting training strategies, courses, and related resource requirements. The TRAS ties together related acquisition systems for students, instructors, equipment and devices, ammunition, dollars and facilities.

11–87. Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).
TADSS are developed and acquired to support training at the unit and/or combat training centers (CTCs) and within the institutional training base. TADSS are categorized as either system or non-system.

a. System TADSS are designed for use with a system, family of systems or item of equipment, including subassemblies and components. They may be stand-alone, embedded, or appended. They are funded and documented as part of the weapon system they support. The weapon system PM is responsible to procure the system TADSS.

b. Non-system TADSS are designed to support general military training and non-system specific training requirements. They are funded and documented as a separate program under the training mission area (TMA). The PEO Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation is responsible to procure non-system TADSS.

Section XVI
Acquisition Resources Management

The “color of money,” or kind of appropriation, is an important factor in system acquisition management. In general, a particular appropriation can be expended only for specified activities, and money cannot be changed from one appropriation to another without transfer authority. Acquisition management involves at least two appropriations, and may involve four. The two-year research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) appropriation provides funds for research, design engineering, prototype production, low rate initial production (LRIP) for operational testing (OT), and T&E activities in the course of developing a materiel system. The three-year procurement appropriation provides funds for procuring materiel that has been fully tested and type classified. Procurement funds are also used to procure LRIP for initial spares, support and training equipment. The one-year Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation provides funds for retiring and retrograding the old equipment being replaced; for repairing systems after fielding; for fuel and ammunition for training and operations; for periodic system rebuild; for training both system operators and maintainers, except new equipment training; and, in general, anything else to keep a system in the field and operating. Some systems may require 5-year Military Construction (MILCON) appropriated funds for the construction of special facilities required for fielding that system. The period of years identified for each appropriation refers to the time period that the appropriation is available to be obligated.

11–89. Program and budget process.
Funds of the correct amount and appropriation must be planned and programmed into the Army budget, in general, two years before they are needed. In the program and budget process, funding requests are initiated and reviewed annually. Congress appropriates funds for RDTE (Title IV, DOD Appropriations Act) and Procurement (Title III, DOD Appropriations Act) as part of the annual Defense Appropriation Act. The RDTE and procurement budget requests must first be approved by DOD, submitted to Congress by the President, and then be authorized and appropriated in two separate Congressional actions before any money can be spent. In the year of budget execution, the Army may reprogram funds, except for Congressional interest items, within an appropriation subject to budget authority dollar limits, or in excess of dollar limits with prior Congressional approval. Up to $10 million of RDTE and $20 million of procurement may be reprogrammed from a lower priority program to a higher priority program without prior Congressional approval (see Table 11–1). The PM is responsible for planning and programming the RDTE and procurement funds to cover a program, and the MILCON funds, when needed. The PM also is responsible for programming all life-cycle system costs for the system while the system remains under his management control. This includes programming for out-year sustaining resources as well as RDTE and procurement. Once the management responsibility transitions to the Lifecycle Management Commands (LCMCs), it then becomes that command’s responsibility to continue the depot-level
sustaining program. The field user Army command is responsible to program day-to-day system below-depot operational support. The field user Army command is also responsible for planning and programming the OMA funds needed to ensure continued readiness of the fielded system. Responsibility for planning and programming funds for product improvements and sustaining supply spare parts is complex and divided between the LCMCs and the field Army command.

Table 11–1
Below Threshold Reprogramming Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPN</th>
<th>MAX IN</th>
<th>MAX OUT</th>
<th>Level of Control</th>
<th>OBL AVAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RDTE</td>
<td>&lt; $ 10M</td>
<td>Greater of $ 10M or 20% of Program Element</td>
<td>Program Element</td>
<td>2 Years + 5 Years (Execution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROC</td>
<td>&lt; $ 20M</td>
<td>Greater of $ 20M or 20% of Line Item</td>
<td>Line Item</td>
<td>3 Years + 5 Years (Execution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>&lt; $ 15M</td>
<td>No Congressional Restriction</td>
<td>Budget Activity</td>
<td>1 Year + 5 Years (Execution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>Lessor of +$ 2M or 25% of Project</td>
<td>Lessor of + $ 2M or 25% of Project</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>5 Years + 5 Years (Execution)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11–90. RDTE appropriation activities.
To assist in the overall planning, programming, budgeting, and managing of the various R&D activities, the RDTE appropriation is divided into seven R&D budget activities. These categories are used throughout DOD. The current RDTE budget activities are as follows.

a. Budget Activity 1? Basic Research. Basic research includes all efforts and experimentation directed toward increasing fundamental knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life sciences related to long term national security needs. Basic research efforts precede the system specific research described in the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP), previously discussed.

b. Budget Activity 2? Applied Research. This activity translates promising basic research into solutions for broadly defined military needs, short of development projects. This type of effort may vary from systematic mission-directed research, which is beyond that in Budget Activity 1, to sophisticated breadboard hardware, study, programming, and planning efforts that establish the initial feasibility and practicality of proposed solutions to technological challenges. These funds are normally applied during the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase of the DAS life-cycle.

c. Budget Activity 3? Advanced Technology Development. This activity includes all efforts that have moved into the development and integration of hardware for field experiments and tests. The results of this type of effort are proof of technological feasibility and assessment of operability and producibility rather than the development of hardware for service use. These funds are normally applied during the Technology Development (TD) phase of the DAS life-cycle.

d. Budget Activity 4? Advanced Component Development and Prototypes. This budget activity includes all efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies in as realistic an operating environment as possible to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of advanced technology. These funds are normally applied during TD, but could be applied throughout the DAS life-cycle.

e. Budget Activity 5? System Development and Demonstration. The budget activity includes those projects in system development and demonstration but not yet approved for low-rate initial production (LRIP) at MS C. These funds are normally applied during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the DAS life-cycle.

f. Budget Activity 6? RDTE Management Support. Includes efforts directed toward support of RDTE installations or operations required for use in general R&D and not allocable to specific R&D missions. Included are technical integration efforts, technical information activities, space programs, major test ranges, test facilities and general test instrumentation, target development, support of operational tests, international cooperative R&D, and R&D support.

g. Budget Activity 7? Operational System Development. This activity includes R&D effort directed toward development, engineering, and test of changes to fielded systems or systems already in procurement which alter the performance envelopes. Operational system development may include operational testing (OT) costs.

11–91. Procurement appropriations.
Procurement is used to finance investment items, and covers all costs integral and necessary to deliver a useful end item intended for operational use or inventory. The Army budget includes five separate procurement appropriations:

a. Aircraft Appropriation. Aircraft procurement includes the procurement of aircraft, aircraft modifications, spares, repair parts, and related support equipment and facilities.

b. Missile Appropriation. Missile procurement includes the procurement of missiles, missiles modifications, spares, repair parts, and related support equipment and facilities.
11–92. Military construction (MILCON) appropriation.

MILCON funds the cost of major and minor construction projects such as facilities. Major or specified military construction projects exceed $2.0M and require congressional line-item authorization. Minor or unspecified military construction projects are $2.0M or less, but can be increased to $3M if the project is intended to correct a life, health, or safety deficiency. Each military department receives an appropriation for minor military construction. The military department Secretary controls expenditure of minor military construction funds and is required to notify Congress of minor military construction projects that exceed $750K. A twenty-one (21) day waiting period is required after notification before work begins. Project costs include architecture and engineering services, construction design, real property acquisition costs, and land acquisition costs necessary to complete the construction project. The OMA appropriation can be used to fund unspecified minor military construction projects up to $750K or up to $1.5M if the project is intended to correct a life, health, or safety deficiency.


OMA finances those things that derive benefits for a limited period of time, i.e., expenses, rather than investments. Examples are Headquarters operations, civilian salaries, travel, fuel, minor construction projects of $750K or less, expenses of operational military forces, training and education, recruiting, depot maintenance, purchases from Defense Working Capital Funds, and base operations support.

11–94. Research, development, and acquisition plan (RDA Plan).

a. Overview. The Army RDA Plan is a 15-year plan for the development and production of technologies and materiel to advance Army modernization. Modernization is “the continuous process of integrating new doctrine, training, organization and equipment to develop and field warfighting capabilities for the total force.” Under ideal circumstances Army modernization would be fully supported by an unconstrained RDA Plan. However, the realities of limited resources restrict modernization to those efforts that are both technically and fiscally achievable. The RDA Plan, therefore, is the result of a process that converts the Army’s unconstrained planning environment into a constrained RDA Plan that maximizes warfighting capabilities and supporting infrastructure requirements within limited resources.

b. The RDA Plan assumes the form of a 1–N priority list of RDTE and procurement program packages called management decision packages (MDEPs) with funding streams for the entire 15-year planning period. An MDEP represents a particular program, function or organization and displays the resources (dollars, civilian and military manpower) needed to achieve an intended goal. An MDEP may receive its resources (funding streams) from any number of appropriations; the RDA Plan, however, includes only the RDTE and procurement funding streams of its MDEPs. There is no limitation to the number of commands to which the resources of an MDEP may be assigned. The RDA Plan is recorded in and represented by the HQDA, G–8 RDA database.

c. RDA database. The G–8 RDA database represents the RDA plan. The principal elements of the RDA database, MDEPs, are grouped by joint capability area (JCA). A JCA is a set of MDEPs that represent a common function on the battlefield or a common activity of the supporting Army infrastructure (e.g., aviation, ammunition). JCAs were formally called budget operating systems (BOS). In fact, JCA data is still named BOS in Army databases. Most JCAs are managed by a HQDA G–8 division. The division chief (known as the JCA manager), assisted by his staff and his ASA(ALT) counterpart determines required capabilities for each of the MDEPs within his or her JCA. The Equipping (EE) Program Evaluation Group (PEG) co-chairs determine EE PEG wide priority ranking of MDEPs. The EE PEG prioritization is forwarded to HQDA G–3/5/7 for Army-wide prioritization.

d. The RDA Plan is a continual process comprising periodic revisions to the 15-year planning period of the RDA database. The revisions occur during the even fiscal year POM/BES cycle and the odd fiscal year program budget review (PBR) cycle. During the POM/BES cycle, the Army adjusts the first six years (called the future years defense program (FYDP)) of the 15-year planning period. These six years are also referred to as the program objective memorandum (POM) years. During the PBR cycle, the Army adjusts the final five years of the POM/BES cycle. After each cycle, the Army’s RDA community adjusts the final nine years, called the extended planning period (EPP). The 15-year planning period of the RDA database moves forward by two years in January of even fiscal years. For example, the FY10–24 RDA plan began in January 2008.

11–95. TRADOC current force warfighter needs analysis (WIN).

a. The TRADOC ARCIC performs WFN to identify Army inabilities to achieve desired effects in present and future
missions, and to support change recommendations across the DOTMLPF spectrum to support new or evolving missions. WfN is critical to identifying and building required capabilities (RCs) now, allowing for better execution of joint operations by the current force while developing future force capabilities to provide relevant, ready, responsive, and dominant land power. A capability gap is defined as the inability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. These gaps may be the result of no existing capability, lack of proficiency, or insufficient existing capability.

b. The WfN is a collection and grouping of unfilled capability needs derived semi-annually from review, research, and analysis of recent operational experiences. The intent of the current force gap analysis is to highlight capability shortcomings for senior leadership, provide input to prototyping and experimental efforts, identify needs to influence industry research and development efforts, and identify potential candidate solutions to satisfy gaps. The WfN also informs Army budget year execution priorities and supplemental request development.

c. The primary data sources supporting the analysis are operational needs statements (ONS) including joint urgent operational needs (JUONS), Army and joint lessons learned and combatant commander integrated priority lists (IPLs). Additional relevant sources include Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) assessments and CSA focus area feedback and their focused gap analysis work such as the Convoy Protect ICDT gap work. ARCIC conducts the WfN in six month cycles allowing for periodic reports that are timely yet reasonably comprehensive.

11–96. TRADOC capabilities needs assessment (CNA).

a. The CAN assists the Army’s future modular force development process by assessing joint and Army capability requirements, assessing how the programmed DOTMLPF solutions support these Army requirements, and identifying capability gaps for those capability requirements that are not being met.

b. CNA is an interactive process based on Army CIDS CBA (previously discussed in chapter 5). Among TRADOC’s schools, proponents and HQDA staff. The TRADIC ARCIC conducts the annual capabilities assessment that supports future modular force capabilities development, POM development, capabilities gap identification, and S&T focus. The assessment is based on a macro level capabilities and risk analysis approach that establishes a baseline of required capabilities (RCs) extracted from approved joint and Army concepts documents. Using these RCs as a base the CAN process does the following:

1. Assesses the risk to the future force if those baseline RCs are not performed to standard.
2. Identifies and assesses the value of RC associated DOTMLPF solutions that can collectively provide the ability to perform a RC to standard.
3. Assesses how well programmed DOTMLPF solutions support joint/Army RCs.
4. Informs HQDA program objective memorandum (POM) preparation.

c. CNA is a living evolving process that informs the CG, TRADOC’s developmental priorities, and its POM recommendations to HQDA G–3/5/7, G–4 and G–8. CNA establishes focus for TRADOC ARCIC capabilities development work and informs S&T efforts requiring innovation and/or new technology.

d. Achieving early program objective consensus and following a good investment strategy will yield a stable program, clearly showing where we are today and where we want to be when we bring on the new system. To be successful, new systems acquisition programs must be developed and acquired in a timely and economical manner. Life-cycle cost estimates and changes to programs and schedules must be controlled. Changes to programs affecting established goals will be fully documented in the program management documentation, providing the justification for change (e.g., budget cut, design change). After entering the acquisition Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase B, design changes in system components that are meeting the approved requirement are discouraged and must be individually justified. The design should be frozen in sufficient time prior to DT and OT to provide an adequate system support package for testing. Changes to programs as a result of DT/OT must be of the “objective” nature to satisfy the requirement and not a “threshold” type of change, unless it can be demonstrated that the change will not have a significantly negative impact on the cost, schedule, producibility, and ILS aspects of the program.

Section XVII
Summary and References


a. This chapter provided a basic introduction to the management process, organization, and structure of the joint/Army capabilities integration and development system (CIDS) and system acquisition management process. Through the chapter description, the reader should have gained an appreciation of the logic of the process, its organization and management including recent changes. This chapter also highlights the current basic DOD and Army policies for materiel systems acquisition, and descriptions of capabilities development and system acquisition managers.

b. Difficult decisions, war on terrorism (WOT), a scarcity of dollar resources, and honest differences of opinion cause disruptions and delays. It is unlikely that there will be total agreement on the best technical approach to satisfy a need—or, indeed, on the need itself. The annual budget cycle and budget constraints almost ensure that some projects
will not be funded at the level desired—if at all. Tests are not always successful. Estimates of time, costs, effectiveness, and technical feasibility are often wide of the mark for complex systems. After all, they are estimates that are projected well into the future based on sketchy data. These real-world problems reinforce the fact that system acquisition management is complex tasks of great importance to national defense. System acquisition can be a wellspring of new and effective weapons systems where effective management and professionalism can make the difference on the WOT. As with any activity involving the use of scarce resources to meet organizational goals and objectives, the people involved—the capability developers, acquisition managers and the Soldier users and maintainers—constitute the most vital link to mission accomplishment.

11–98. References.


b. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), Title 10 USC Sections 1701–1764, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990, as amended by Section 808, Public Law (PL) No. 106–398, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, October 30, 2000; Section 824, PL No. 107–107, December 28, 2001; and as may be subsequently amended by future statutory changes.


f. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, 2 December 2008.


h. 2007 DOD Research and Engineering (DODR&E) Strategic Plan.


j. 2008 DOD Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP).


m. CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, 9 July 2007.


o. CJCS Manual 3170.01C, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 1 May 2007 (currently being replaced by a JCIDS manual, see l).


w. Army Regulation 70–1, Army Acquisition Policy, 31 December 2003.

x. Army Regulation 73–1, Test and Evaluation Policy, 1 August 2006.


(2) DA Pamphlet 70–3, Army Acquisition Procedures, 28 January 2008.

(3) DA Pamphlet 73–1, Test and Evaluation in Support of Systems Acquisition, 30 May 2003.


(9) Memorandum of Agreement between Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)


Chapter 12

Logistics

“Twenty-first-century defense logistics must meet two objectives in order to support the national military strategy: (1) timely delivery of forces and sustainment to the combatant commanders and (2) minimization of the logistics ‘footprint.’” “Logistics has its roots in the national economy. In this area it is dominated by civilian influences and by civilian authority... [so] the major criterion of logistics is production efficiency. On the other hand, the end product of logistics lies in the operations of combat forces. There logistics is dominated by military influence and by military authority... [so] the major criterion is its effectiveness in creating and sustaining combat forces in action against an enemy. Because logistics is under two dominant influences, it is obvious that circumstances may arise under which the civilian criterion and the military criterion are in harmony - or at times, they are opposed. This is the root of many of the existing differences of opinion as to national defense organization: the criteria of judgment used by civilian executives are frequently different from criteria used by military commanders.” Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense

Section I
Introduction

12–1. Chapter content

   a. The Nature of Logistics. Webster’s defines logistics succinctly as: “The procurement, maintenance, distribution, sustainment and replacement of personnel and materiel.” The logistics lessons of World War II and subsequent full-spectrum operations have taught us that the luxury of time is not always available and that planning and preparing pays off in logistics as it does in all other operations. The post-Cold War environment is no exception, and requires an adaptive and smaller force projection Army rather than relying on a Cold War-style, large and forward-based force. This environmental change has significant logistics implications, to include requiring smaller permanent “logistics footprint” Outside Continental U.S. (OCONUS) and relying on anticipatory, swift, and dependable “reach-back” capabilities along lengthy strategic lines of communications augmented by deployable national capabilities when dictated by operational requirements. The primary mission of the Army logistics system is to economically support the joint force commander (JFC) with resources needed, when and where.

   b. The Paradox of Logistics. As the opening quotation reflects, logistics must be both efficient and effective, at times creating a paradox for the DOD. For example, to be efficient, the Army must purchase, store, distribute, and dispose of materiel efficiently and economically. At the same time, to be effective, the numbers and types of logistics capabilities required in operations depend not only on cost effectiveness, but on factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations (hence, the Army acronym, METT–TC, is pronounced “met-tee-see”). Efficiency and effectiveness often compete in formulating decision criteria that affect all logistics policy and activity.

   c. Chapter Contents. This chapter provides an executive overview of the nature and structure of the Army’s national logistics system. It describes:

   - Key definitions and concepts (from End-to-End [E2E]).
   - National Logistics (The Army G4 and USAMC)
   - National Logistics (Other Organizations)
   - Standard systems.
   - Funding.

12–2. Key definitions and concepts (from E2E)

   a. Principles of Logistics. Based on over 200 years of experience, the following principles have general applicability to logistics (developed by James A. Huston, The Sinews of War):

   - First with the most. The primary purpose of logistics is to deliver adequate personnel, equipment, supplies and materiel to the right places in adequate time to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.
   - Equivalence. Strategy, tactics, and logistics together form the basis for major operations and campaigns.
   - Materiel precedence. Materiel mobilization must precede personnel mobilization because the lead times are much longer.
   - Economy. Logistics resources are almost always limited and it is necessary to concentrate them in the best way to achieve the primary mission.
   - Dispersion. Within reasonable bounds storage and other logistics activities should be dispersed, and multiple lines of communication should be used when possible.
   - Flexibility. Since often it is not possible to count on prior strategic plans, it is necessary to be prepared to support any of a number of different plans or decisions across the entire spectrum of military operations.
• Feasibility. Not only are military plans limited by the feasibility of logistics support, but also logistics plans themselves are subject to the capabilities of the national economy.

• Civilian responsibility. Procurement activity must be coordinated with the needs of the civilian economy, and the chief reliance for the production of military goods remains with private industry.

• Continuity. The perfection of logistics organization and development of production models of essential systems should be a continuous process in peacetime for war.

• Timing. Timing must be relative to the objective, whether in high-level procurement or tactical supply.

• Unity of Command. Logistics is a function of command.

• Forward Impetus. A system of continuous replenishment from sanctuary to elements engaged in operations is vital.

• Information. Accurate, accountable and up-to-date information is the key to logistics planning and distribution.

• Relativity. All logistics is relative to time, space, and circumstances and can never be absolute.

b. The Army can be viewed from two major levels of logistics support: national and theater.

(1) National. “National logistics is the process of planning for and providing goods and services for the support of the nation’s military forces and its operations, a nation’s civilian economy, and its international obligations and requirements.” National-level logistics concerns include assurance of availability of strategic materials and fuels, supporting a military industrial base, developing and procuring new materiel systems, maintaining and improving critical logistics infrastructure, and rebuilding and improving old materiel systems. National logistics is governed by civilians, in both the Executive Branch, through the President and Secretary of Defense, and the Congress, through oversight activities and budget appropriations. The “strategic-national” logistics tasks to “provide sustainment,” identified in the Universal Joint Task List (CJCSM 3500.04C), are:

• Set Sustainment Priorities
• Acquire Materiel
• Acquire, manage, and distribute funds
• Procure and distribute personnel
• Provide for Base Support and Services
• Provide for Personnel Support
• Reconstitute National Forces and Means

(a) DOD relies on the Services the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and non-DOD government agencies (such as the General Services Administration (GSA)) to manage these concerns. National-level functions have been generally performed in the CONUS and are intended to support and sustain theater activities in the homeland or abroad. The Secretary of Defense issues logistics guidance to the Services as part of the Defense Programming Guidance (DPG). Within this broad guidance, the Services and defense agencies develop programs for logistics.

(b) The Army’s national logistics functions stem from its primary mission required by law. The Army shall “be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.” (10 USC, Sec. 3062). Army organization for national logistics has evolved in response to the changing global environment. Some key national logistics functions are to: Develop requirements and capabilities for national logistics. Identify strategic risk to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Congress when logistics requirements exceed national and/or international capabilities. Serve as the bridge between the Nation’s economy and its military needs. Develop logistics policy, systems, and processes to create and sustain support to forces across the full spectrum of military operations. Establish reserves of equipment and supplies required for crises and mobilization. Formulate logistics doctrine (both Army and with our joint and allied partners). Acquire, distribute, maintain, and dispose of Army materiel systems. Develop equipped, trained and ready Army logistics forces. Assure bases of operations and training are established, developed, secured, and maintained both in the homeland and overseas. Assure strategic lines of communication are created and have sustained support. Provide logistics support to other Services and allies and perform Federal-level executive agent tasks as directed.

(c) HQDA establishes broad logistics policy direction and exercises staff supervision primarily through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, or ASA (ALT). The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 (“Army G4” for short) and USAMC are the Army’s national level logistics staff and operator.

(d) Other organizations that contribute to national-level logistics include:

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
• CONUS Army Commands (ACOMs), including TRADOC, USAMC, and FORSCOM.
• Theater-oriented ASCC (such as U.S. Armies Europe, Pacific, and South, and Third U.S. Army).
• The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES).
• Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
• Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).
• Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).
• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA)
Theater. Theater logistics is the “process of planning for and providing goods, services and materiel in support of military forces” that operates in specified geographic areas of the world directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President in concert with the geographic COCOM commander. Logistics support is focused on the movement and sustainment of forces operating in joint and combined environments. Theater-level logistics concerns are oriented on sustaining full-spectrum operations both homeland-based (CONUS) and forward-based (OCONUS). The “strategic-theater” logistics tasks to “sustain theater forces,” identified in the Universal Joint Task List (CJCSM 3500.04C), are:

- Coordinate the fixing and maintaining of equipment
- Coordinate support for forces in theater
- Establish and coordinate distribution of supplies/services for theater campaign and the communications zone.
- Develop and maintain sustainment bases
- Acquire, manage, and distribute funds
- Minimize safety risks
- Theater-level functions may be subdivided into three types:

  (a) General support. (GS) GS-level activities are normally concerned with area logistics support to forces within the COCOM commander’s geographic area of responsibility and in concert with a specific theater or joint operations area when designated. GS is provided by echelon-above-brigade (EAB), units contained within the Combat Sustainment Support Brigades (CSSB), Army garrison-type activities (table of distribution and allowances or “TDA” organizations), contractor, and/or host nation support (HNS) activities.

  (b) Direct support. (DS) DS field units support specific user units and activities on a habitual and dedicated basis.

  (c) User. User logistics activity includes performing unit and operator maintenance on unit equipment and accomplishing internal unit supply and distribution functions. The national and theater logistics concepts are evolving (see table 12–1). It is important to note that distinction between national and theater logistics processes is being blurred by movement toward more centralized management, flattening to a two-level maintenance (TLM) system, and a vision of logistics support that transcends traditional lines of communication (i.e. strategic lines of communication may extend all the way to the objective area). To that end, all logistics functions whether performed at the national or tactical level, are referred to as sustainment. Other initiatives such as the single stock fund (SSF), national maintenance program, and efforts to modernize logistics automated information systems are designed to create more seamless logistics levels and to ensure that units are fielded, equipped, and sustained in a more integrated manner. Logistics tasks and roles at national or theater-in-nature are merging to create a more networked organization from depot to foxhole. The strategic Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) war reserve program is a premier E2E logistics processes example, (directed by HQDA, managed by USAMC, and executed in theater, by AMC AFSBs), as shown in Figure 12–1. Perhaps the Army logistics system of the future will not distinguish between these levels. Figure 12–1 shows how lines of operation and communication might exist both strategically and within theater.
The difference between national- and theater levels of logistics tasks are becoming blurred as the Army continues to streamline logistical processes "End-to-End (E2E)."

Table 12–1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foci of national and theater logistics</th>
<th>Foci of national and theater logistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National logistics Foci (DOD, services, Non-DOD)</td>
<td>Theater logistics Foci (CBT, CDR, JFC, and/or ASCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization and deployment Requirements</td>
<td>Deployment sequence/prioritization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition and industrial base Stockpiling (Ammunition, and Metals) Global positioning Strategic mobility RESET Army Forces Redeployment Demobilization Strategic lines of communications Installation/Bases</td>
<td>Reception, staging, onward movement and integration of Army forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat service support of the campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to other services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basing/sustainment engineering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Host nation agreements/implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lines of communication to the tactical units</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

12–3. Army logistics

Army logistics includes the following activities: Mobilization, acquisition, military human resource management, civilian personnel management, health service support, installation management are discussed extensively as unique “logistics” activities in Chapters 6, 11, 13, 14, 17, and 19, respectively. For the purposes of this chapter, supply, transportation, distribution, maintenance, services, security assistance, facilities engineering, sustainment and logistics technical system development and application are considered logistics.

a. Supply involves acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, issuing, and maintaining visibility and control of all classes of supply required to equip and sustain forces across the full spectrum of military operations. It is a wide-ranging function that extends from determination of requirements and buying materiel at the national level down to the issue of items to the user in the joint operations arena, as well as the retrograde of both serviceable and unserviceable materiel to be made available for other requirements.

b. Classes of supply include:

I - Subsistence (food and water)
II - General items (everything from expendable office supplies, clothing and individual equipment, and tools to tents)
III - Petroleum, oils, & lubricants
IV - Construction materiel (fortification, barrier, and construction materiel)
V - Ammunition
VI - Sundries (packages and personal items that could be purchased in a commercial store)
VII - Major end items of equipment (such as an M1A2 Abrams tank)
VIII - Medical items of supply
IX - Repair Parts (includes spares)
X - Non-military or civil-governmental unique items

c. Transportation is moving and transferring unit personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of National objectives and the Joint Forces Commands (JFC) concept of operations. Transportation incorporates military, commercial, and host- or allied-nation capabilities. Transportation activities include: linking motor, rail, air and water transportation modes; operating terminals and ports, creating and maintaining transportation infrastructure; and, the movement planning and control of personnel, equipment and supplies.
d. Distribution is the integration of personnel, supply and materiel, and transportation to ensure the users receive the right resources when needed and at the right place. It includes all actions performed to deliver required resources (units, materiel, personnel, and services) to, from, and within a theater. Some call this “inventory in motion.”
e. Maintenance keeps materiel in operational condition, returns it to service, and/or modernizes its capability. It includes performing preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). High technology allows materiel to be produced or upgraded with embedded diagnostics and prognostics. Maintenance also involves recovering and evacuating disabled equipment; diagnosing equipment faults; substituting parts, components, and assemblies; exchanging serviceable materiel for unserviceable materiel; and repairing equipment.
f. Services and Troop Support involves feeding, clothing, and providing personal services to forces. It consists of clothing exchange, laundry, shower, textile repair, mortuary affairs, preparation for aerial delivery and airborne activities, and food services.
g. Security Assistance (SA). SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, and other related statutes. These programs include: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, which are grants; and the FMS Program, which is cash or financed purchases. Through these programs, the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other related services to allied and friendly foreign countries in furtherance of national security.

h. Facilities engineering (sometimes called “sustainment engineering”) is concerned with buildings, real property, environmental management, etc. This activity affects the ability of Army logistics elements to support joint operations. Joint forces are often dependent on underdeveloped logistics infrastructure. National logistics foci for engineers include creating or developing bases, ports, roads, bridges, waterways, and so on to support mobilization and deployment. Theater logistics operations, such as force reception, staging, and onward movement and integration, require storage facilities, road and rail networks, and seaports and airfields built and/or sustained by engineers. Though not a doctrinal Army logistics function, engineering support is considered a logistics activity in joint doctrine. Engineers play a critical role in the delivery of logistics by enhancing these capacities. Their responsibilities include support to other Services, agencies, and allied military forces in joint and multinational theaters of operations. Planning factors include the size of the support bases required, existing HN infrastructure, and the force protection situation.

i. Logistics technical system development and application. The logistics technical system consists of the tools, techniques, processes, devices, artifacts, methods, configurations, procedures and knowledge used by organizational members to acquire inputs, transform inputs into outputs and provide outputs or services to clients or customers. The logistics system is holistic and interdependent, also comprised of military organizations and contractors, working within established policy, toward creating, moving, and providing sustained support to U.S. Army forces, other Services, and allies. The Army has developed and applied many “standard” systems that connect the parts of the logistics system. These will be covered in more detail in this chapter.

Section II
National Logistics Organization: ASA (ALT); the Army G–4; and, Army Materiel Command

12–4. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA (ALT)).

a. The ASA (ALT) is a civilian political appointee and as such is responsible to provide Executive Branch/DOD civilian oversight of Army logistics. The office of the ASA (ALT) consists of the following sub-elements: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research & Technology; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation; Deputy for Systems Management; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs and Resources; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition Policy and Logistics; Director Acquisition Support Center; and, the Executive Secretary for ASB. ASA (ALT) also provides staff supervision over the U.S. Army Contracting Agency. ASA (ALT) serves, when delegated, as the AAE, the Senior Procurement Executive, the Science Advisor to the Secretary, and as the senior R&D official for the DA.

b. The ASA (ALT) also has the principal responsibility for all DA matters related to logistics. Among these logistics responsibilities are:
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(1) Advising the SECARMY on all matters relating to acquisition and logistics management.
(2) Overseeing the logistics management function including readiness, supply, services, maintenance, transportation, and related automated logistics systems management.
(3) Reviewing the SA portions of the Army International Affairs Plan to ensure that they are logistically sound and supportable and compatible with the Army’s Research, Development, Acquisition, and Industrial Base Programs.
(4) Overseeing the Army Industrial Base and Industrial Preparedness Programs.

12–5. Deputy for Acquisition Policy and Logistics DASA (APL).
The DASA (APL) serves as the Army logistician on acquisition programs. The DASA (APL) is responsible for providing an independent ILS assessment of equipment and weapons systems requirement documents, equipment and systems in development and of fielded systems, to ensure supportability and sustainability is adequately addressed and maintained throughout the system’s lifecycle. Members of the DASA (APL) staff serve on integrated product teams as Army logisticians to influence product definition, design and supportability beginning with pre-systems acquisition planning.

12–6. Mission and Organization of the Army G–4

a. Army G–4, The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 exists to enhance the logistics readiness of our Soldiers and their units. The G–4 does so through the formulation of policies, procedures and programs that creates an environment conducive to efficient and effective logistic operations.

b. Mission and vision. The Army G–4 mission is to deliver a ready Army by providing the best logistics capabilities, policies and programs. The vision is a world class G–4 organization leading the Army logistics enterprise in sustaining, preparing, resetting, and transforming the Nation’s Army in support of full spectrum operations.

(1) General Orders No. 3 responsibilities.
(2) Establish logistics policy and programs, and overseeing their execution.
(3) Develop logistics programs and budget input. (3)Ensure integration of logistics supportability throughout acquisition life cycle for new systems and current readiness of legacy systems.
(4) Principal military advisor to ASA(ALT) for logistics.
(5) Lead and integrate logistics transformation.
(6) Integrate Army logistics with Joint programs.
(7) Reduce logistics life-cycle costs.
(8) Advocate for professional development of the logistics workforce.

c. The G–4 oversees seven directorates, each with different missions, plus the Logistics Innovation Agency and the Army Innovations Group:


(2) Establish logistics policy and programs, and overseeing their execution.


(3) G–45/7: Strategy & Integration. The G–45/7 mission is to direct the G–4 strategic planning; provide CSS force integration guidance, data and analysis to meet force structure requirements; lead G–4 Title 10 and Joint exercise participation; review Joint and Multinational concepts and doctrine and shape Joint and Multinational logistics. The key focus areas include—
CSS Force Structure Using Total Army Analysis (TAA) Process.

The Army Campaign Plan (ACP).

Capability Portfolio Management (CPM).

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).

Provide regional logistics planning expertise for each COCOM and ASCC for adaptive and crisis action plans.

4) G–44(S) Supply Directorate.

The G–44 mission is to provide Headquarters, Department of the Army policy, programming, and oversight of the Army supply system ... we cover beans to bullets to boots.

(b) Key focus areas include—

2. Retrograde.
3. Class IX Stockage Initiatives.
4. Property Accountability.
   a. Property accountability is the responsibility of every leader, supervisor and Soldier and is an obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation for keeping control of property.
   b. Accountability is established and maintained through standardized procedures and consistent records, and, most importantly, set by a commander’s priority in relation to all additional tasks.
   c. Poor property accountability reduces overall readiness and preparedness of the Army and detracts from the precision in procurement needed to buy the right items.
   d. Lack of property accountability traps the Army in a constant cycle of purchasing too much or too little.
   e. Munitions Readiness

(c) Army G–4, in concert with the Army Materiel Command, PEO Soldier, Installation Management Command, and the Defense Logistics Agency, works day-to-day to support changes in CIE that occur due to technological changes in the battlefield.


The G–44 mission is to enhance logistics readiness by providing integrated maintenance policy and programs to maintain a ready Army.

(b) Key focus areas include—

1. Maintenance Policy.
2. Reset.
3. Depot Maintenance.
4. Left Behind Equipment.
7. Item Unique Identification (IUID).
8. Corrosion Prevention and Control

6) G–46: Corporate Information Office.

The G–46 mission is to provide HQDA-level strategic planning guidance, governance, policy, and investment strategy for sustaining current Logistics Information Technology investments, while transforming to a Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE) to provide increased visibility, accountability, and efficiency in support of full spectrum warfighter and humanitarian relief operations.

(b) Key focus areas include—

1. Army logistics IT Strategic Plan.
2. Army logistics IT Implementation Plan.
3. Army logistics IT Investment Governance.
4. Support current Army logistics IT systems.
5. Bridge to enhanced near-term capabilities.
6. Deliberately move to modernized ERP capabilities
7. Deliver the Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE).
8. Advocate for funding.
9. Alignment with LandWarNet/Battle command strategy


The G–48 mission is to manage the Sustainment Program Evaluation Group (SS PEG) and integrate logistics resources across the Army.

(b) Key focus areas include—

1. Managing the Sustainment Program Evaluation Group (SS PEG).
2. Funding the dollars and manpower requirements needed to sustain the Army less OPTEMPO.
3. Including programs such as Depot Maintenance, Second Destination Transportation, Sustainment of APS sets, and so on.
4. Integrating Logistics Resources across the Army.
5. Working with other PEGs (for example, equipping, training, and so on).
9. Industrial Operations (Depots/Arsenals)
   (8) Logistics Innovation Agency (LIA).
   (a) The LIA mission is to provide innovative capabilities and solutions for future logistics.
   (b) Key focus areas include—
      1. The Common Logistics Operating Environment (CLOE).
      2. Logistics Business Intelligence Tools.
         a. “Easy to use” software that enables an integrated user interface to an organization’s disparate data — providing meaningful information & analysis.
      b. Focused on G–4 metrics to help make good logistics policy & program decisions.
      c. Class IX retrograde; Supply Support Operations; Class VII visibility & readiness.
   8. Small Business and Innovation Research (SBIR) Program.
   9. Part of the process to review, approve, and prioritize plans & programs.
     (9) Logistics Initiatives Group (LIG).
          (a) The LIG mission is to set the strategic direction for Army and Joint logistics by synchronizing internal and external strategic communication pertaining to Logistics.
          (b) Key focus areas include—
             2. Prepare/review written testimony for the Army G–4.
             3. Prepare G–4 presentations and speeches as directed.
             4. Conduct analysis of critical issues and provide confidential assessments to the G–4.
             5. Prepare/review logistics input for Army and Joint strategic documents.
             6. Research issues and prepare agency positions for G4 approval.
             7. Work special projects and coordinate information requirements to prepare the G–4 for meetings conferences, field and industry visits.
             8. 8. Plan and execute major conferences and events such as AUSA, offsites, and the G–4 global video teleconference.
d. Army G–4 functions. On the ARSTAF side, is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 (or “Army G–4”) and is responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army for policy, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation, oversight and information system support for logistics programs and operations of the DA. The Army G–4 has staff responsibility for overall coordination of the major logistics disciplines: Supply, Maintenance, Readiness, Materiel, Integrated Logistic Support Troop Support, Energy, Transportation and Mobility, and is responsible for coordinating the logistics mission requirements and activities of the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard with those of Active Component (AC) forces. The Army G–4 is responsible for the development and staff supervision of Army logistics organization, operations, and systems worldwide, including logistics readiness, planning, policies, doctrine, resource determination and allocation, objectives, force structure, and standards. The Army G–4 serves as the principal ARSTAF representative and focal point for SA matters. The Army G–4 participates in and contributes to all phases of the research, development, and acquisition process (concept through deployment) and is responsible for support of materiel systems from production output through disposal. The Army G–4 exercises general staff supervision over the Army Surgeon General as pertains to Army class VIII management for medical materiel. The Army G–4 is responsible also for stewardship and advocacy of logistics resources in support of the operational capability of the Army, assessing and improving the efficient use of logistics resources, and the planning and implementing of business management concepts and practices for logistics programs. Finally, the Army G–4’s charter for Army Transformation, as part of the Army Campaign Plan, is to assure that the Army is capable of rapidly deploying in support of current and future forces, effectively sustaining the full spectrum of military operations, and synchronize Army and joint efforts. The plans to meet this challenge have foci on enhancing strategic responsiveness, reducing the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) “footprint” in the JOA, and transforming Army administration of logistics by reducing costs for logistics support without reducing combat readiness and effectiveness. The key to this effort is the Army G–4’s full spectrum Common Logistics Operating Environment (CLOE) effort to synchronize logistics concepts, architectures, organizations, and a new generation of technologies into an integrated, net-centric logistics domain.
CLOE provides Warfighters, Logisticians and commanders with logistics situational awareness, substantially improved agility, effectiveness, and increased unit combat power.

1. The office of the DG–4 for Reserve Component Integration (RCI). The mission of the Office of the Deputy G–4 for Reserve Component Integration is to insure that the issues, concerns, and mission requirements of the USAR and ARNG logistics community are adequately represented at the Army staff level, and that all plans, programs and policies of Army logistics are disseminated, discussed, and understood throughout reserve and guard sustainment commands. The Deputy G–4 RCI represents the DCS for Logistics, G4 at all guard and reserve forums, conferences, and major exercises to include the Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC), the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC), the Commission on the Guard and Reserve (CNGR), and Army Campaign Plan Initiative Number Four, (ACP–A14) Operationalizing the Reserve Component. The DG4 maintains close coordination and communication with the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the reserve component Theater Sustainment Commands (TSC).

2. Directorate of Supply. The purpose of Army Supply is to ensure availability of materiel and accountability of equipment to sustain combat power while optimizing capital investment in materiel and equipment. The guiding principle of supply centers on optimizing availability at the right time and place while providing 100% accountability and visibility of materiel. Army G4 accomplishes this by organizing responsibilities by type of commodity type of support required. Current Supply Divisions are, Secondary items managing repair parts, Major End Items managing accountability processes for major end items, Ammunition managing munitions repair and programming, Clothing Individual Equipment and Field Services managing uniforms and soldier systems; Food/liquids managing soldier feeding, water requirements and fuel support,

(a) The Major End Item Division provides policy guidance for CLASS VII supply functions, as well as Depot Operations, End Item Demilitarization requirements, equipment loans to Coalition Forces, accountability of general and military equipment, management of Army Materiel Command Managed Line Item Numbers (LINs), and reporting of obsolete LINs. The Major End Item Division is also responsible for the Standard Study Number-Line Item Number Automated Management and Integrity System (SLAMIS) which provides “cradle to grave” visibility of equipment acquisition from approval of requirements through funding, authorizing, fielding, and sustainment to retirement.

(b) The Secondary Items Division optimizes the manner in which secondary items (repair parts, spare parts, and consumables) are managed, and to modernizing and streamlining supply management processes. The Army leverages requirements against multiple sourcing capabilities, including Performance Based Logistics, Direct Vendor Delivery, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) capabilities (forward distribution depots and strategic distribution depots, Retrograde and redistribution of serviceable items and optimizing Supply Support Activity retail performance, Principle regulatory responsibilities include AR 710–1, Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System, AR 710–2, Supply Policy below the National Level Operations.

3. Petroleum Logistics Management. The Directorate has policy and staff supervision over petroleum and packaged petroleum logistics matters. Primary functions include developing and implementing policies for bulk petroleum supply, distribution and accountability; single fuel on the battlefield concept; and assisting in the development of prepositioned war reserve policies, guidance, stock levels and computation factors for bulk petroleum products worldwide. Army G–4 also participates in planning and development of force structure for petroleum units; establishes policy for DA quality surveillance programs for fuels and lubricants; provides liaison with other government agencies and military departments with respect to bulk petroleum matters; and coordinates with the Air Force and the Navy in the joint development of equipment requirements. Army G–4 serves as the functional proponent for the Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) operational project

4. Troop support. The Directorate has staff responsibility for Soldier support policy, which resides with the Troop Support Division. The primary troop support programs are food, clothing and individual equipment, and field services support. To achieve management of these programs, the Troop Support Division is comprised of three separate teams, the Subsistence Team, the Clothing and Individual Equipment Team, and the Field Service Support Team.

5. The Chief, Troop Support Division serves as the Army member of the DOD Food Policy Council, the DOD Joint Formulation Board of Food and Nutrition Research, and the Joint Service Operational Ration Forum. The Troop Support Division also provides the Army representative on the DOD Steering Committee for Subsistence Prime Vendor (direct vendor delivery of subsistence), and provides Army G–4 representation on the Tri-annual Airdrop Malfunction Review and Safety Analysis Group, and the Joint Committee for Tactical Shelters. The Chief serves as the executive secretary for the Army Uniform Board and the Subsistence Review Committee, and the co-chair for the Army Nutrition Planning Committee.

(a) The Subsistence Team provides policy for the Army Installation Food Service Program and the Field Feeding Program. The Subsistence Team provides policy and supervision for the Army Installation Food Service and Field Feeding Programs including:

   1. Development of plans, programs and standards, and reviewing doctrine for management of the installation food service programs.

   2. Development of plans and formulation of policy to support Army field feeding concepts, force structure, testing, and introduction of new equipment and rations.
3. Developing nutrition policies and programs of dining facilities consistent with The Surgeon General’s (TSG) nutrition policies.

4. Monitoring DeCA support to Army personnel and families.
   (b) The Subsistence Team also serves as the DA functional proponent for:
      1. Designing and equipping of installation dining facilities and troop subsistence activities.
      2. The Army Food Management Information System (AFMIS).

3. Recognition for excellence in the Army Food Program to include the Philip A. Connelly Award for Excellence in Food Service and the Army Culinary Arts Program.

(c) The Clothing and Individual Equipment (CIE) Team is responsible for developing plans and formulating policies for management of Class II CIE (with the exception of chemical protective clothing) and Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) managed Army Military Clothing Sales Stores (AMCSS), clothing initial issue points, and central issue facilities. The Army G-4 chairs the Army Uniform Board, which recommends CIE changes clothing bag, dress, and optional purchase items to the CSA. The CIE Team serves as DA functional proponent for concept approval and type classification of clothing bag, dress, and optional purchase items included in Common Table of Allowance (CTA) 50–900. The CIE team also coordinates CIE and AMCSS issues with DOD, other Services, other federal and civilian agencies, ACOMs/ASCCs, the RC, and also serves as the HQDA functional interface for DOD standardization and modernization of CIE.

(d) The Field Service Support Team (FSST) is responsible for developing plans, formulating policies and procedures to improve the quality of life for the Soldier in the field. They serve as the Army G-4 independent logistician in the acquisition process for the Mortuary Affairs Program, aerial delivery and airdrop systems and equipment, Class II (rigid and soft wall shelters) and Class VII to include tactical mobile electric power systems, physical security equipment, topographic equipment and map material, camouflage netting, field laundries and clothing repair equipment, and containerized self-service laundry, showers, shelters and latrines. Additionally, the FSST supports the War Reserves Division in functional implementation of the collective support system, bridging systems and aircraft landing mats operational projects. Limited functional oversight is provided for Army Special Forces operational equipment (diving equipment and rubber tactical boats).

(e) Tactical water management. The Army is designated the DOD executive agent for land-based water resources (for generating drinking water and water for other military purposes). The Army established a water office under this Directorate to carry out several primary duties. In coordination with the other military department secretaries, the office: develops and implements policy concerning joint plans, procedures, and requirements for water resources in support of land-based forces; and, advises the ASA (ALT) of water resource requirements and significant developments in connection with water resource research, equipment acquisition, and doctrine. The office establishes procedures for coordination of policy documents and plans affecting water resources for joint employment and support, R&D, and equipment acquisition. The office develops, in coordination with appropriate DOD components, joint doctrine for the employment of water resources. Office initiatives include development of an improved, expanded, and automated water resources intelligence database for the rapid retrieval of information on an area or point basis to assist commanders in making water support logistics decisions. This data is provided to the Defense Image and Mapping Agency for incorporation into its terrain analysis program. The office established a Joint Water Resources Management Action Group (or JWRMAG) as a mechanism to coordinate and resolve joint water support issues.

(f) Directorate of Maintenance. The purpose of Army maintenance is to generate and regenerate combat power and preserve the capital investment of combat systems and equipment to enable training and mission accomplishment. Army maintenance is founded on the principle that the useful service life of Army equipment is achieved when the item is operated within its intended purpose and parameters and is maintained in accordance with its designed or engineered specifications. When an equipment item achieves its useful service life, the Army will use acquisition or recapitalization to replace or renew service life of the equipment.

(a) To meet the Army’s transformation objectives, the Directorate has incorporated the evolution of two-level maintenance into policy. The development of a new maintenance policy and structure for reducing the forward deployed logistics “footprint” is critical to improve the Army’s ability to deploy. Two-level Maintenance improves mobility across the tactical, operational, and strategic spectrums of warfare. Two-level maintenance consists of field- and sustainment -levels of maintenance. Field maintenance, a combination of the unit maintenance (i.e. 10, 20 level) and Direct Support (DS) maintenance (i.e. 30 Level), will consist of repair-and-return-to-user on-system tasks, those tasks that do not require disassembly of a component (primarily line replaceable unit or line replaceable module replacement), and will be performed as far forward as possible. Sustainment maintenance tasks return components, subassemblies, and/or end item systems to a serviceable condition and back into the supply system. Sustainment maintenance, the combination of General Support (i.e. 40 level) and Depot maintenance (i.e. 50 level), is performed by military, government civilians, and/or contractors, and takes place at designated locations in forward deployed locations (e.g. Forward Repair Activities, Component Repair Platoons) or in CONUS (e.g. Government Depot, Contractor Facility).

1. The Directorate controls maintenance policy through the various regulations governing Army Maintenance. The center piece policy is AR 750–1 which addresses both field and sustainment maintenance.
2. The Maintenance Directorate is the lead for programming and oversight of sustainment engineering and depot maintenance. Sustainment engineering is the systems engineering program by which the Army preserves the capability of weapon systems that are out of production.

3. Hardware sustainment engineering is supported by the System Sustainment Technical Support (SSTS) program. Areas addressed by SSTS are: configuration management, air worthiness, engineering changes, test program sets, Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs), obsolete components, all aspects of systems engineering.

4. Maintenance of embedded software (e.g. Abrams fire control computer, Q–36 Firefinder computer) is supported through Post Production Software Support (PPSS). Areas addressed by PPSS are: certification and accreditation, software license fees, mandated Information Assurance Vulnerability Assessment (IAVA), software blocking, and Engineering Change Proposals, related training devices.

5. Depot maintenance operations support both the combat forces and the overall wholesale supply system. It is essential that capability for repair of all items of a weapon system coded for depot level repair be available at time of first unit equipped (FUE).
   a. In support of the combat forces, depot maintenance operations furnish backup to field maintenance units and assistance in technical training to the forces during peacetime and mobilization.
   b. In support of the overall wholesale supply system, depot operations serve as a source of combat ready materiel.

6. Army maintenance principles include:
   a. Maintenance is a command responsibility
   b. Unserviceable materiel that cannot be repaired because of the authorized level of repair assigned is to be promptly evacuated to the appropriate echelon and a replacement item issued.
   c. Unserviceable materiel being evacuated should have the same movement priority opportunity as serviceable materiel.

(b) Currently, the Army’s key maintenance management thrusts are focused on:
   1. Visibility: having the ability to see your inventory, your requirements and critical sustainment activities such as Retrograde, Reset, and the associated costs whether private or public sector.
   2. Control: having the ability to provide appropriate authorities in the form of policies, legislative initiatives and agreements. Clearly articulating the roles and responsibilities of the key enterprise stakeholders is critical for success. And, finally, ensuring the enterprise is appropriately resourced.
   3. Capacity: having the ability to maintain the Army’s equipment to meet ARFORGEN operational requirements. (7) Directorate for Plans, Operations, and Readiness. This Directorate is the Army G4 logistics planner, operator, and integrator. The Directorate also serves as the principal advisor for concepts, doctrine, policy, logistics force structure, and materiel readiness. In addition, the Directorate represents the Army G–4 for joint actions.
      a. Logistics planning, operations and force integration processes. The Director for Plans, Operations, and Readiness under the Army G–4 serves as the Army General Officer point of contact to the Director of Logistics (J4) of the JS; chairs the Logistics Studies Steering Committee; serves as the Army G4 representative on the FAA GOSC; and, serves as a principal Army G4 member of the TAA GOSC.
      b. Specific responsibilities include: Serves as HQDA proponent for the development, evaluation, coordination, and implementation of plans establishing major combat operations/smaller scale operations wartime lines of communication with the appropriate COCOM Commanders /ACCs. Evaluates analyzes, and recommends improvement on all regional OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans and other COCOM commander plans. Evaluation includes the assessment of logistics supportability, enhancement of logistics planning efforts and adequacy of the logistics force structure. Establishes the Logistic Operations Center that functions as the primary logistics monitor during the execution of current operations, contingencies and exercises. Provides logistics staff supervision over long and mid-range planning to include interpretation and dissemination of logistics aspects of the SPG, and TAP.
      c. The Directorate also identifies requirements and inadequacies in both current and future logistics force structure and systems, which impact support and sustainment of HLS, OCONUS military operations, strategic reserves and the National capacity for force generation. Also serves as the advocate for a balanced mix of logistics units to supported forces in the requirements and resourcing phases of TAA. The logistics planning process focuses on the transitions across the full spectrum of military operations. The operations process focuses on the execution of current plans, contingencies and exercises. The force integration process focuses on identifying requirements in logistics force structure and systems.
      d. A major consideration of this Directorate is to oversee the Army logistics portions of time-phased force deployment lists (TPFDLs) - the major tool used by the unified commanders to request forces to support their OPLANs. In determining the adequacy of the logistics support for the TPFDL, the major factors considered are:

   • Strategic lift.
   • Sustainability.
   • Prepositioned war reserve stocks.
   • Force shortfalls.
The Directorate provides staff oversight of allied and coalition support requirements. The United States continues to rely on allies for logistics support of the full spectrum of military operations. Wartime HNS (WHNS) is one means to supplement the organic support capabilities of theater U.S. forces. WHNS capabilities are used in such areas as transportation, maintenance, construction, civilian labor, communications, facilities, utilities, air/seaport operations, rear area security, and the movement of U.S. forces and materiel between the ports of debarkation and combat areas. Other means include use of mutual support agreements under Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreements and International Standardization Agreements that are forged with multinational coalition partners.

The Directorate provides policy and staff supervision over the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) - also considered as an alternative to complement organic force and WHNS capabilities. LOGCAP may be used if shortfalls are identified from other support sources, or if the other sources are not considered in the best interests (e.g., operational, fiscal, political) of the U.S. Government. The Army G–4 is the LOGCAP proponent for program policy, guidance and sources. USAMC is the Army’s manager for LOGCAP planning, support to exercises and the full spectrum of military operations.

The Contingency Division is responsible for:

1. Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF). The CAAF Branch of the Contingency Division develops and promulgates the Army’s Policies and Guidance for the use of Contractors on the Battlefield and for the Army’s premier contingency contracting program, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). CAAF Branch also acts as the primary interface with the civil augmentation programs for other services, such as the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and for allied nations, such as the Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program (CANCAP). The G–4 CAAF works with the DoD Joint Staff to research and develop changes in joint policy and operations concerning contingency contracting. It also works to build effective courses of instruction at institutional training venues such as the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).

2. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) logistics policy, budget formulation, and implementation. APS consists of “go to war” equipment and supplies stored at strategic locations around the world on land and afloat, with designated backup stocks in CONUS. USAMC and OTSG’s U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency are executive agents for the program. Storage sites house brigade-sized and smaller unit sets, operational project stocks for special mission requirements, war reserve sustainment equipment and supplies, and war reserve stocks for allies. These stocks have been heavily drawn upon to support both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and continue to support the Global War on Terrorism. By the time APS stocks are reconstituted in FY2015, they will be prepositioned in six foreign countries and Hawaii and loaded on up to 10 ships sited in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Division serves as the Army G–4 focal point for all APS issues, reviews, concepts, and policies pertaining to logistics portions of contingency and mobilization operational plans which insure adequacy of APS materiel stock policies.

Logistics Readiness. The Directorate has staff responsibility to assess and improve the logistics readiness and sustainability of the Army in the field. The basic ingredients of military readiness are adequate, well-trained personnel in particular skills, possessing proper equipment in a combat-ready condition. Logistics readiness deals in large part with the equipment and is measured by EOH compared to that authorized (i.e. a measure of shortages) and equipment status (i.e. in terms of serviceability). The Directorate’s specific responsibilities for readiness include:

1. Exercising staff supervision of, and provides policy and guidance for major end item distribution and redistribution of equipment based on Army priorities.

2. Determining Army-wide logistics conditions and trends as they affect overall Army readiness. Army G4 develops solutions and directs action to correct readiness deficiencies.

3. Serving as proponent for logistics objectives and performance metrics for the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) Strategic Readiness System.

4. Determining supportability of USF strategy, concepts and implementation and the impact Unit Set Fielding will have on logistics operations and supportability from both the unit and Army perspectives. Develops, coordinates, and synchronizes the plans, policy, and procedures for logistics functions in support of Unit Set Fielding.


The Directorate provides policy and staff supervision for Army transportation, distribution strategic movement and mobility, transportation and distribution programs, development of transportation policy for DA-sponsored cargo and passenger movements, management of Army responsibilities for the DOD Customs and Border Clearance Program and exercising responsibility for policy, and concepts.

The Director is also the Army representative and member of the Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The JTB is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the effective employment of common-user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD. The director is also the ARSTAF member of: the Mobility Studies Steering Group and the High Speed Sealift Executive Steering Committee; Army liaison representative to the National Defense Transportation Association; and, a member of the Army Power Projection Program (AP3) GOSC. The Directorate serves as Career Program Manager (Functional Chief Representative) for the Army Civilian Transportation Career Program. The
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Directorate also supports the force projection and distribution responsibilities, assigned by the SECARMY to Army G-4 in General Order Number 3, by maintaining the status of current operations and contingency plans and resource programs that support Army-wide operations in the following areas: strategic mobility, war readiness, transportation, and distribution. The Directorate represents the Army in assigned areas with the JS, OSD, Commander, USTRANSCOM, other Services, ACOMs/ASCCs and other agencies and activities. Three Divisions in the Directorate manage transportation programs: the Strategic Mobility Division, the Transportation Policy Division and Distribution Division.

(3) The Strategic Mobility Division exercises supervision over strategic mobility initiatives, develops strategic transportation concepts, coordinates Army mobility and transportation input to Army/Joint studies and plans/programs for a balanced “fort to foxhole” capability to ensure rapid power projection of Army forces. Strategic mobility is defined as the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. The DOD concept for strategic mobility includes airlift, sealift, and OCONUS prepositioning of materiel. In conjunction with DOD, Joint and Service transformation efforts, the Army plans to transform into a more strategically responsive and deployable force with a focus on pursuit of strategic mobility enablers. Transformation initiatives will ensure sufficient lift capability and IT architecture, to support the Army’s deployment goals. The Army Power Projection Program (AP3) is a successor program to the Army Strategic Mobility Program and seeks the capabilities required to achieve a paradigm shift, where “deploy equals employ,” to fully support the Combatant and Joint Force Commanders in a dynamic new strategic environment. The Chief, Strategic Mobility Division, serves as the DCS G-4 functional proponent for the Division serves as the functional proponent for deployment process improvements and strategic sealift and airlift policies. The Chief, Strategic Mobility Division, serves as the Army member of the Joint Logistics Board (JLB) and the JTB secretariat and co-chairs the Power Projection Council of Colonels with his G-3 War Plans Division counterpart on all matters dealing with Army/Joint strategic studies.

(4) The Transportation Policy Division develops, manages, evaluates, and promulgates HQDA policies, programs, procedures, and guidance on transportation and traffic management policy for worldwide shipments of Army sponsored cargo. It also serves as the Army proponent for the Defense Travel Regulations (DTR). The Division is organized into three teams: Transportation Financial Policy, Cargo Policy, and Personal Property/Passenger Policy. The Division provides program oversight, information, and guidance for ACOMs/ASCCs and installation transportation offices worldwide, and provides policy and technical advice to the Army leadership. Financial Policy functions include: managing the Army’s Second Destination Transportation (SDT) and transportation operations programs, from requirements development through funds execution; developing processes governing reengineering initiatives intended to streamline the acquisition and payment of transportation services; serving as Army Transportation Account Code (TAC) coordinator; and providing transportation functional direction for the development and implementation of automated billing and payment processes. SDT funds the over-ocean and inland costs associated with the movement of equipment (principally class VII, major end items) thru the Defense Transportation System (DTS), which includes the USTRANSCOM Transportation Working Capital Fund, as well as via commercial carriers. Cargo Policy functions include: developing transportation and traffic management policy governing the shipment of Army freight and cargo worldwide; plus, the provisioning of management oversight for critical day-to-day operations associated with Army air cargo channel requirements, Defense Traffic Management Regulation, small package programs, Air Line of Communications (ALOC), and shipment of hazardous materials. Personal Property/Passenger Policy functions encompass: transportation quality of life issues, the assistance and advocacy for travel of Soldiers, and the shipment of household goods.

(5) The Distribution Division monitors and oversees the modernization of the Army’s intermodal platforms in the distribution system, and provides policy guidance and integration planning that drives future programs. The Division is structured into four teams: Containers/CADS/Flatracks Developments, Policy/Processes, Visibility/Awareness, and Distribution Developments. The Containers/CADS/Flatracks team monitors and guides the Army Intermodal Distribution Platform Office (AIDPMO) operations, oversees container accountability automation, and is the Army representative at the Joint Intermodal Working Group (JIWG) for containers, flatracks, and 463–L pallets. Distribution policy issues in the DOD and Joint Staff environment are worked by the Policy/Processes team. Policy/Processes other functions include assisting in the publishing of Army regulations pertaining to distribution, providing input to the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) for integration within the joint system, and continually working to enhance the distribution portion of Supply Chain Management. Visibility/Awareness functions provide recommendations for In-transit Visibility capabilities for total situational awareness of materiel moving through the distribution system. The team assesses asset visibility enablers in the Distribution System, and coordinates with Defense Staff, DPO, Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, and other Services for Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) In-transit Visibility enablers. The Distribution Developments team recommends solutions for improving the distribution system. Tasks include providing G-4 transportation policy, guidance, and oversight as required and monitoring developments and advancements in Configured Loads, Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System, Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System, Node Management, and Deployable Depot.

f. Directorate for Strategy & Integration. The Strategy and Integration directorate assists in guiding Army Logistics by providing logistics strategy and manages its implementation, shaping logistics strategic planning and CSS force management activities to enable transformation and balancing the Army. It directs the integration of Army logistics
capabilities, concepts, and doctrine across the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and Multinational Partners to optimize logistics resource allocation. Strategy Synchronization Division within the Directorate produces integrated and synchronized Army Logistics input to strategic guidance and apply logistics capability to support adaptive and strategic planning activities to assist in enabling transformation and the restoration of balance to the Army.

1. The Army Campaign Plan is simultaneously a strategy that develops, synchronizes and integrates the Army as part of the military instrument of power to achieve national objectives by synchronizing ends, ways and means. It is also an executable order with mission, intent, objectives and tasks to Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Direct Reporting Units (DRU) and HQDA Staff that direct detailed planning, preparation and execution of Army transformation.

2. The Army Vision describes the future warfighting capabilities the Army must attain as it transforms from the Army of Excellence current force of today to the Army Modular Force and beyond. To implement the Vision, the Army has promulgated the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and its accompanying synchronization tools. The ACP is a conditions-based synchronized plan consisting of Joint and Army processes, a transformation glide path, and subordinate objectives.

3. Army Transformation produces evolutionary and revolutionary changes intended to improve Army and Joint Force capabilities to meet current and future full-spectrum requirements. Army transformation is informed by and supports the National Security Strategy as articulated by concepts and required joint force capabilities and interdependencies. The Army Campaign Plan directs planning and execution of Army activities and operations across DOTMLPF domains and within Force Integration Functional Areas, which collectively accomplish the Army mission and achieve the Army Vision.

(a) The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 is responsible for Logistics Transformation under Major Campaign Objective 6.0 “Enhance Logistics Readiness” and Annex M (Logistics Transformation) to the ACP. This responsibility encompasses identifying, managing and executing programs that meet the Army Strategy and established Transformation goals. The G–4 supports this effort by using the HQDA approved “Logistics Governance” structure to integrate logistics concepts, studies, initiatives, and programs that meet the conditions-based criteria of the ACP. The Logistics Governance forums ensure supporting logistics efforts are synchronized with the overall ACP objectives, milestones, and events that transform Army logistics to meet ACP goals. Force Integration Division within the Directorate provides guidance, planning data and analysis to enable CSS force management and lead the integration of Army logistics capabilities, concepts and doctrine across the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and Multinational Partners to ensure that Army Logistics is a force multiplier.

(b) Provides guidance, planning data and analysis to enable CSS force management and leads the integration of the Army logistics capabilities, concepts and doctrine across the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and Multinational Partners to ensure that Army logistics is a force multiplier. Force integration includes identifying requirements and inadequacies, in the current and future CSS force structure and systems, which impact support and sustainment of military forces across the full spectrum of operations and during the ARFORGEN process. This also includes advocating a balanced mix of sustainment units to supported forces in the requirements and resourcing phases of the TAA.

(c) The division provides staff oversight of joint, allied and coalition support requirements and synchronizes the support arrangements to cover requirements. This works requires coordination with the Joint Staff, other Services, Combatant Commands and Multinational Partners (includes NATO allies, bilateral arrangements, and multilateral arrangements.)

(d) The division coordinates and evaluates logistics planning data for each class of supply to support TAA plus Army, Joint Staff and other organizations’ requests in accordance with AR 700–8, Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management. This work with planning data also supports responses to the Joint Staff requests for input to the Logistics Factors File per CJCSM 3150.23B, Joint Reporting Structure Logistics Factors Report.

g. Directorate of Resource Integration. The Director of Resource Integration is responsible for the overall planning, programming, management, and execution of all matters pertaining to resource management of Army programs under the purview of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4.

1. Serves as the focal point for guidance, preparation, review, and submission of annual Sustaining PEG POM.

2. Coordinates and provides support for the Planning, Program, Budget Committee, Senior Resource Group, Army Resource Board, and resource meetings of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4.

3. Also responsible for the integration of logistics resources across all the Army PEGs.

h. G–4 Corporate Information Office (CIO). The Chief, Corporate Information Office is responsible for administering the Logistics Domain Governance Process to ensure all Army Logistics Information Technology (IT) investments conform to the G–4’s Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE) strategy, including information sharing with the Joint Logistics Community.

1. The G–4 CIO develops the Logistics Domain IT Strategic and Implementation Plans which lay the foundation for all other Army and Joint Logistics efforts and Army engagement with Congress.

2. The G–4 CIO is responsible for ensuring funding is consistently available for Logistics Automation, keeping
current Logistics automation systems functional, developing new systems on schedule, and coordinating systems 
fielding.

3. The Army Integrated Logistics Architecture (AILA) is the Army’s designated overarching logistics architecture 
and provides the means to move and translate data into meaningful information from multiple sources. In order 
to establish the required global visibility of logistics information within the Logistics Domain and within the larger Army 
and Joint environments, an end-to-end architecture must be defined and integrated. The AILA spans from the tactical 
through strategic echelons and supports a Joint integrated environment. The AILA informs, guides, and supports 
decisions for the Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE) and assists the Army logistics community in achieving 
integration and interoperability in both the Logistics and Warfighter domains. The AILA supports Army modularity 
and provides the framework for implementing net-centric warfare principles in the logistics domain. This effort is 
producing the Army’s Common Logistics Operating Environment (CLOE) to provide an Army/Joint methodology that 
defines the Focused Logistics Vision and synchronizes individual embedded diagnostic and prognostics efforts into a 
common architecture.

i. Logistics Innovation Agency (LIA). LIA is the Field Operating Agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, 
IAW AR 10–25 (dated 27 June 2007) the mission of the LIA is to provide innovative capabilities for future logistics 
readiness. This mission supports the DCS, G–4 objectives in the areas of strategic readiness, future logistics, logistics 
domain automation, policy, business transformation, and innovation. Consistent with Army objectives, LIA is responsible 
for logistics innovation, technology exploration, and changes to logistics processes to facilitate the development and 
fielding of concepts of support that enable Joint interdependency and keep pace with the current and evolving future 
net-centric operating environments. These changes are designed to enhance capabilities that support Combatant 
Commanders’ operational requirements, Department of Defense (DOD) and Joint concepts, enablers, and interdepen-
dencies. The LIA identifies, assesses, and integrates innovative logistics concepts, technologies and business prac-
tices with a focus on improving enterprise-wide logistics planning and execution.

"Need to be faster, more agile, and less bureaucratic - Need to fight this every day." General Benjamin Griffin, CG, 
AMC.

a. USAMC Mission. The mission of USAMC is to provide superior acquisition, logistics and technology (ALT) 
support to ensure dominant land force capability for our Soldiers, the United States, our Allies, and coalition partners. 
In short, USAMC is the Army’s strategic operator and provider. USAMC operates through its Major Subordinate 
Commands (MSCs), Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs), and Separate Reporting Agencies (SRAs) that 
direct the activities of maintenance depots, laboratories, arsenals, ammunition plants, information logistics systems, 
Army Field Support Commands and acquisition, logistics and technology (ALT) worldwide. USAMC performs 
assigned materiel management and related functions for research, ALT and technical assistance for materiel systems; 
and other materiel acquisition and end-to-end (E2E) distribution management functions. The USAMC strategic man-
agement mission can be restated as the acquisition of materiel; the responsibility to support materiel readiness at field 
and strategic levels; and the materiel distribution direction and instruction. In coordination with the partnered Program 
Executive Offices, Program and Product Managers, the USAMC performs acquisition, supply and maintenance man-
agement tasks to provide the means through which the Combatant Commander’s can maintain and generate combat 
power. USAMC also provides numerous acquisition and logistics services to the other components of DOD and many 
other government agencies. USAMC has approximately 50,000 civilian and military employees working in approxi-
mately 150 locations in over 40 States and 38 foreign countries. USAMC has been assigned responsibility to integrate 
Army logistics management information systems. Currently, the process is twofold: the Global Combat Support 
System-Army (Tactical/Field) (GCSS–A (F/T)) provides an integrated, evolutionary enterprise information system for 
Army combat service support (CSS) functions, and the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) modernizes national 
logistics processing. Streamlining logistics information systems through logistics web-based information and decision 
support systems are important enablers to produce a more responsive and focused logistics effort for Army logistics 
transformation.

b. The major components of the USAMC mission are:

(1) Participate in the governance to design and field an integrated Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE) that 
ensures seamless end-to-end business processes and automated systems that best support Army needs.

(2) Provide guidance, development, and acquisition support to the PEOs and PMs throughout the weapon system life 
cycle.

(3) Coordinate commercial and in-house industrial capabilities necessary to support the full spectrum of military 
operations.

(4) Manage Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS); Army Prepositioned Stock Operational Projects (OPROJ); Army 
War Reserve Sustainment (AWRS); and War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), less Class VIII, worldwide.

(5) Provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance (SA) Program.

(6) Acquire equipment and spare parts to support weapons systems.

(7) Provide development, acquisition and contracting support to PMs.
(8) Define, develop, and acquire superior technologies.

(9) Manage and execute the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

(10) Maintain the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army.

(11) Provide national sustainment maintenance management operations. Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command is designated as the National Maintenance Manager (NMM). The NMM focuses on centralized management; decentralized execution of Army sustainment maintenance programs, and consolidates the planning and program execution conducted by all national maintenance organizations under a single management structure. The NMM is a program for the repair of AWCF–SMA Class II, IV and IX reparable components and their return to the AWCF–SMA account as well as major end item programs in support of the ARFORGEN process. The National Maintenance Program (NMP) encompasses the Army strategy of a centrally coordinated and controlled repair-based logistics system for secondary items that is managed by the NMM. The overall objective is to increase fleet readiness for weapon systems and reduce operation and sustainment costs. The sustainment maintenance structure consists of organic depots, the industrial base, and qualified non-depot activities to include Component Repair Platoons and the Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depots (AVCRAD). Sustainment maintenance units or activities may repair items at permanent facilities or be employed in the area of responsibility (AOR). The overall focus is sustainment readiness and items repaired to a single standard that are returned to the supply system.

(12) USAMC performs depot-level maintenance on Army weapon systems and equipment in government-owned facilities; determines the core depot maintenance required to be performed in-house in support of the essential weapon systems used in wartime; and assigns work load to the army-owned maintenance depots in sufficient quantity to retain that capability. This includes managing contracts for similar work performed by private sector providers at their own facilities or on-site at government facilities. For USAMC-managed weapon systems and equipment, USAMC determines the best value solution for non-core work load and places that workload with the appropriate public or private sector supplier. For PEO-managed systems, USAMC, through its LCMCs, advises the PEO on best-value decisions for assignment of depot maintenance and manages the critical depot facilities and plant equipment necessary to perform depot maintenance.

(13) USAMC manages the AWCF account (a revolving fund designed to ensure logistics processes are available to meet customer needs) with sole obligation authority for the AWCF, Supply Management Army (AWCF–SMA). Non-Army managed items (NAMIs) such as fuel, subsistence, clothing, engineer supplies, and medical items are Defense Working Capital Fund items. Unit funded requisitions for those items are transmitted directly to DLA or another supporting agency. Army interest in these items is overseen by a NAMI commodity business unit now known as the Product Support Integration Directorate (PSID) of the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Life Cycle Management Command.

(14) Serves as the DOD executive agent for conventional ammunition and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive (CBRNE) defense.

(15) Provides technical direction, guidance and support for LOGCAP services such as laundry, dry-cleaning, clothing initial issue points, central issue facilities, field laundry and showers. In accordance with life cycle management business practices, USAMC also provides demilitarization and disposal direction.

c. Organization. The present USAMC organization includes six MSCs, four LCMCs and two separate reporting activities (SRA). The MSCs include the Research Development and Engineering Command, concerned with R&D missions; the Army Sustainment Command (ASC), the CONUS Sustainment Command to include APS support and management; Joint Munitions Command, manages ammunition manufacturing, maintenance and distribution missions; the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), concerned with security assistance programs to include foreign military sales (FMS); The U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC). Its mission is to provide global effective and responsive contracting support for Army and other Federal Agencies to meet the warfighter needs across the full spectrum of military operations from installation operations to the last tactical mile; and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), concerned with ground transportation and port operations. The SDDC is under the combatant command (COCOM) to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The four remaining LCMCs which are commodity oriented and perform life-cycle management over the initial and follow-on procurement and materiel readiness functions for items and weapon systems in support of the Army in the field. Figure 12–3B shows the major elements of USAMC.

(1) The U.S. Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM LCMC) is headquartered in Warren, Michigan. Its mission is to support and sustain mobility, lethality, and survivability for warfighters, joint commanders, allies, and other customers. By partnering with Program Executive Offices and multiple research, development and engineering centers, TACOM LCMC is able to support a diverse set of product lines throughout their life cycles. In all, TACOM LCMC supports over 3,500 fielded systems and over 29,000 components that make those systems work. TACOM LCMC and its partner PEOs and assigned RDECs constitute the Soldier and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), concerned with ground transportation and port operations. The SDDC is under the combatant command (COCOM) to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The four remaining LCMCs which are commodity oriented and perform life-cycle management over the initial and follow-on procurement and materiel readiness functions for items and weapon systems in support of the Army in the field. Figure 12–3B shows the major elements of USAMC.
Customer, Lean/Six Sigma and other Enterprise Excellence Federation tools to help provide the best possible support to the joint warfighter. With other ongoing programs like the Leadership Competencies for the Future training program, TACOM LCMC is devoted to changing its culture and institutionalizing its ability to easily deal with change. Together with its partners, TACOM LCMC is now leading the way in land warfare and soldier technologies to help ensure America’s military remains relevant and ready in the 21st century.

(2) The Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM LCMC) was established in 1997 as a readiness command to develop, acquire, field and sustain Army aviation and missile weapons systems. The Command is headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. AMCOM LCMC provides life-cycle management of Army aviation and missile systems, from research and development to procurement and production, from spare parts availability to flight safety, and from maintenance and overhaul to eventual retirement. AMCOM LCMC ensures the Army’s aviation and missile systems are technologically superior, affordable, and always ready. AMCOM LCMC provides support to the Army Program Executive Office, Aviation; the Army Program Executive Office, Tactical Missiles; and the Army Program Executive Office, Air and Missile Defense. Redstone Arsenal is home to some of the nation’s most advanced missile and rocket research, development and test facilities, with a replacement value of more than $2.5 billion. AMCOM LCMC manages seven of the Army’s 16 SORTS systems, and most of the Army’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. AMCOM LCMCs predecessor organizations have achieved a number of firsts in the history of rockets and guided missiles and in the history of aviation, including the development and launch of the missile that placed the first American scientific satellite in earth’s orbit and advances which resulted in the air mobile Army we know today.

(3) The Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command (CECOM LCMC) is headquartered at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. CECOM LCMCs mission is to acquire, field, sustain and integrate superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for the Joint warfighter. CECOM LCMC focuses on three major objectives to ensure this mission is achieved: sustaining C4ISR and related systems; providing C4ISR enterprise integration; and providing acquisition support to C4ISR and related systems. CECOM LCMC achieves this mission through three major centers and two subordinate commands. The Software Engineering Center manages most of the Army’s deployed software, which involves over 100 million lines of code across more than 300 Tactical, Logistics, and Business Systems. The Logistics Readiness Center is responsible for 59,000 items managed by the Army. Tobyhanna Army Depot provides depot level maintenance and support for electronics systems and equipment, to include C4ISR, avionics and tactical missile guidance and control systems for the Army, other Services, agencies and our allies, and is performing all of the Air Force’s ground communications depot level repair work. The Information Systems Engineering Command supports PEO EIS in upgrading the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure at every Army post, camp and station, upgrades command centers, and is modernizing the Pentagon’s IT infrastructure.

(4) The US Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) was established on 1 December 2003, as an agency under USAMC. Once part of the former US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and the former Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, it combines the Army’s storage and demilitarization functions under a single organization. The Agency is headquartered at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. The CMA has the mission for the safe and secure storage of the chemical stockpile, and the safe and quick destruction of all chemical warfare and related material, while ensuring maximum protection for the public, the personnel involved in the destruction effort, and the environment.

(5) The Army Field Support Command (AFSC) transformed to the U.S. Army Sustainment Command (ASC) on 1 October, 2006. Headquartered in Rock Island, Illinois, ASC is the CONUS Sustainment Command. The transformation of AFSC to ASC, with its resulting consolidation of logistics missions and deliberate sharing of logistics resources, enhanced efficiencies and reduced redundancies across the operational logistics continuum. The primary purpose of ASC assuming the role of the CONUS sustainment command was to achieve true logistics synergy. This allowed USAMC to further leverage the capabilities of the ASC and the LCMCs to support the warfighter in generating and projecting combat power. The requirement to integrate sustainment and force projection operations is central to supporting the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) strategy and creates an environment that spans strategic (LCMCs), operational (ASC) and tactical (Sustainment Brigade/Brigade Combat Team) logistics and processes. This integrated effort provides units in the ARFORGEN force pools freedom of action at the installation and power generation platforms to deploy and sustain operations. The desired outcome is for ASC to promote operational readiness of the CONUS Army force and to facilitate ARFORGEN. By attaining improved operational readiness through the partnering of efforts at the national sustainment base, the warfighter is provided with an enhanced planning flexibility and superior levels of logistics readiness. ASC is also responsible for transferring equipment and materiel to warfighters whenever and wherever required in support of the Army’s global power projection mission. The ASC Distribution Management Center (DMC) inherited the CONUS materiel management functions previously performed by Army divisions and corps materiel management centers (DMMC, COSCOM) upon Army Transformation. During training and combat operations, ASC leverages the capabilities of the APS located ashore and afloat. It maintains the readiness and accountability of the Army’s war reserve combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment and materiel globally prepositioned; this includes prepositioned sets, operational stocks, and sustainment stocks. ASC hands-off APS, equipment and materiel when and where required in support of the Army’s global power projection mission. It further reconstitutes Army prepositioned stocks upon completion of operations. ASC also manages the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), which uses contractor assets to augment support to units in the field. USAMC is the PM for LOGCAP, under the policy auspices of HQDA, Army G–4. LOGCAP is a commercial acquisition program designed to plan contractor logistics services to operations by leveraging commercial contractor’s global corporate assets. LOGCAP complements and augments the Army’s force structure and is accounted for in Army force structure as component (“COMPO”) 9. LOGCAP is not designed to replace force structure, but to provide the JFC, through his ASC, with a valuable logistics alternative. When operations are complete, ASC is responsible for reconstituting APS stocks and preparing them for future contingencies. ASC maintains a global network of facilities in the United States and in overseas nations where APS stocks are stored and maintained and logistical services are provided. During deployments and exercises, ASC provides general and direct support to combat units and deploys logistics assistance personnel that form the Logistics Support Elements (LSE) and Brigade Logistics Support Teams (BLST) near forward areas. ASC is also responsible to deploy the Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) that has Acquisition (includes contingency contracting), Logistics and Technology (ALT) capabilities across the theater. ASC is a global organization with installations and activities in 35 States, 15 foreign nations. ASC provides a single USAMC face to the ASC/combatant commander during contingencies by exercising centralized command and control over USAMC’s deployed support elements. There are seven ASC major subordinate organizations; AFSB–Pacific, AFSB–CONUS East, AFSB–CONUS West, AFSB–Europe, AFSB–Far East, AFSB–Iraq, and AFSB–Southwest Asia; plus Army Field Support Battalion (AFSBn)-Europe (previously the CEG–E) and AFSBn-Afloat (previously the CEG–A). The AFSBs integrate ALT support with strategic and field logistics support down to the user-level, and provide technical assistance to forward-deployed and homeland-based forces every day. The AFSB may forward deploy ALT capabilities to the LSE as appropriate. A deployed AFSB provides resources to fill gaps in functions where deployed military units may need technical or logistics assistance (e.g., ALT, maintenance support, supply support, etc.). The primary mission is to enhance and sustain combat power through unified and integrated application of logistics power projection of CONUS and CONUS-based capabilities. The footprint of the AFSB in an area of operation (AO) is based on METT–TC and the desires of the ASC/combatant commander. With the use of LOGCAP (see next paragraph), which is managed by the AFSB, the AFSB can provide oversight over assigned logistics support assets. The AFSB can function in a variety of scenarios ranging from a hostile environment, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, to other contingency operations such as disaster/ humanitarian relief, for example, the cleanup in Louisiana and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. AFSBs also help the JFC plan USAMC support across the full spectrum of operations. In the event of surge requirements, USAMC has a rapidly deployable pool of highly skilled technicians available to augment AFSBs with additional capability. In addition to its military and DA civilians, the AFSB can call forward contractor personnel to augment the Army’s force structure.

(6) The Joint Munitions Command (JMC) is headquartered at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is a new USAMC MSC as of 1 October, 2006. The JMC is the Field Operating Activity representing the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA). JMC is the Army’s premier provider of munitions and ammunition. It is the single manager for conventional ammunition and the DOD agent for buying, making, maintaining, storing, transporting, and renovating conventional ammunition for all U.S. military services and other customers. The command serves as the national maintenance point (NMP) and the national inventory control point (NCIP) for the ammunition commodity. JMC manages the industrial base, both organic and non-organic as it relates to ammunition, as well as the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center. It also manages two manufacturing arsenals. The JMC manages the production, storage, issue and demilitarization of conventional ammunition for all U.S. military services. JMC serves as the DOD field operating agency for the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition mission, and therefore, provides support to all branches of the U.S. military and to selected non-DOD customers. To meet the needs of the transformed fighting forces of the 21st century, JMC is developing and modernizing systems that provide theater and field commanders with accurate, up-to-the-minute information on the status of munitions; making the most effective use possible of the existing ammunition stockpile; and maximizing the capabilities and cost effectiveness of munitions production facilities. Through an initiative known as Centralized Ammunition Management, JMC is expanding its ability to supply combat units with the right munitions, at the right time and in the right place. JMC operates a nationwide network of installations and facilities where conventional ammunition is produced and stored. To assure the reliability, quality, and safety of the ammunition stockpile, specialists from JMC often work alongside units in the field and accompany them on deployments. Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command (JM&L LCMC) is headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ and is a new LCMC of USAMC as of 1 October 2006. The JM&L LCMC was created to provide unity of effort between the ALT community and USAMC’s JMC and RDECOM. JM&L LCMC provides ammunition life cycle management to the Army, Services, Combatant Commands (COCOMs), Allies and Coalition partners. The JMC, a MSC to USAMC, reports to both commands. The JM&L LCMC was formed to leverage the synergies of strategically aligned ALT capabilities for ammunition commodities. The Commander, JM&L LCMC is the commander of the LCMC and the PEO Ammunition. The JM&L LCMC focus is for ammunition acquisition and technology matters (Picatinny Arsenal) while the JMC focus is for ammunition logistics (Rock Island Arsenal). JM&L LCMC also partners with Anniston Army Depot and Watervliet Arsenal.

(7) The U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) became a USAMC MSC on March 1, 2004 after consolidating the Army’s core research, development and engineering capabilities under one organization and is headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. RDECOM combines USAMC’s laboratories
and research, development, and engineering centers into one command. Established as a provisional command in October 2002, RDECOM has moved independent organizations into an integrated command of interdependent organizations. The goal of RDECOM is to accelerate the pace of transition from concept to fielding, improve integration across USAMC, and to enhance technical agility. RDECOM promotes and facilitates coordination and agility to stay ahead of ever-changing technological advances. RDECOM vastly expands working relationships with Army elements, industry, academia, military services, government agencies, and international partners by focusing on improving management, coordination and integration of research, development and engineering. The command has established Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to increase coordination between these commands and the Army’s science and technology community. RDECOM’s technology expertise, analytical capabilities and unparalleled collaboration with academia and industry provide cutting edge technology to the warfighters in all services. The RDECOM Forensic Cell ensures sharing of information throughout the Department of Defense and other federal agencies that support the development of new systems that detect and defeat radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. RDECOM conducts jammer development and modification, develops surrogate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for countermeasure system testing, training and demonstrations. Forensics can also provide information that helps identify and locate insurgents and terrorists, as well as providing important information about adversary capabilities against all types of challenges.

(8) The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, traces its origins to the Army’s technical service era, and was designated a major subordinate command (MSC) of the U.S. Army Materiel Command in 1975. The mission of USASAC is to implement approved U.S. Army security assistance programs, including Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments. USASAC is responsible for life cycle management of FMS cases, from development to execution, financial management, accounting, and settlement. The Command manages approximately 4,000 FMS cases. USASAC manages the Army’s co-production program and development of the Army position on commercial license applications for export of munitions, services, and technology. In addition, USASAC is responsible for Army security assistance information management and financial policy, and provides logistics guidance to the Army security assistance community. The Command is increasingly responding to support of U.S. government emergency assistance, humanitarian relief, and Operations Other Than War, including United Nations peacekeeping operations. Security assistance is a national program administered by the State Department. In conjunction with the White House, Congress, and the Treasury Department, military security assistance programs are executed by the DOD. Security assistance promotes regional stability, deters aggression, maintains alliances, and disseminates democratic values between the United States and its allies. In carrying out the Army security assistance mission, USASAC - “The Army’s Face to the World” - calls on all USAMC MSCs, as well as other Department of Defense agencies and U.S. industry for support. Each sale of equipment to overseas customers comprises the same “total package” of quality materiel, spare parts, training, publications, technical documentation, maintenance support, and other services that USAMC provides to U.S. Army units.

(9) U.S. Army Contracting Command. The initial location for the ACC headquarters will be Fort Belvoir, VA. The final location will be determined based on BRAC and other considerations. AMC provisionally stood-up the ACC on 8 February 2008, by issued Permanent Order 039–2. The Provisional Command is a two-star level Major Subordinate Command under AMC. The ACC includes two subordinate commands; a one-star command focused on contracting support to forward deployed forces, and a one-star level command focused on contracting support for CONUS installations. The establishment of the ACC consolidates Army expeditionary and installation contracting worldwide with AMC Acquisition Center support to missions. Contracting missions and personnel organic to the US Army Corps of Engineers USACE), the US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USAFOC), the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq / Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) and the US Army Intelligence and Security Command INSCOM) remain with those commands and outside the structure of the ACC.

(10) Surface Distribution and Deployment Command. With USTRANSCOM’s designation as the DOD’s Joint Distribution Process Owner in the fall of 2003 and as a result of MTMCs changed missions to meet the demands of the Global War on Terror, the Command changed its name officially on 1 January 2004 to the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). The name change better reflects its increased emphasis on deployment operations and end-to-end distribution of surface cargoes from depots to the war fighters. It is headquartered in Scott AFB, IL with its Operations Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia. SDDC became a MSC of USAMC effective 16 October, 2006 and remains an ASCC of USTRANSCOM. The mission of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command is to provide global surface transportation and traffic management services to meet National Security objectives in peace and war. SDDC acts as a liaison between government shippers and commercial carriers. SDDC is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of contracts, solicitations and agreements with the carrier industry to deploy and distribute Department of Defense (DOD) supplies, personal property and personnel worldwide. Additionally, SDDC maintains contracts with information technology firms to assist in the development of software applications to manage transportation movements.

(11) The Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) is a Separate Reporting Activity to the Army Materiel Command
(AMC), Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, and is the Army’s center of excellence for logistics information and solutions. The LOGSA’s mission is to provide critical integrated logistics information, services and analysis products to customers around the globe within the Department of the Army (DA) and Joint community at the national, tactical, and strategic level. The LOGSA’s key missions collectively and directly influence Army readiness as it supports all phases of weapon systems, from acquisition life cycle management to the sustainment of fielded systems. LOGSA is the Army and DOD “champion” for the integrity and integration of logistics data in exercising its mission in support of weapon systems maintenance, readiness, supply, transportation, equipment authorizations, and asset and in-transit visibility. LOGSA is also responsible for many key Army and DOD missions that reach across the logistics disciplines. These missions include serving as the Program Management Office for the Army Oil Analysis Program; the Army’s Electronic Technical Manuals; and Packaging, Storage and Containerization, including packaging and handling of hazardous materials. It’s also responsible for operating the Army’s only Automatic Identification Technology Equipment Acquisition Lab and assigning critical codes in support of peace and wartime operations. LOGSA is also the responsible authority for the Army acquisition policy and procedures, as well as the development of lifecycle management tools for weapon systems “from cradle to grave.” LOGSA’s support to Army transformation initiatives through conversion of key tools and products to a web-based environment continues to enable and improve on-line access and availability to Warfighters around the globe. LOGSA recently created a single authoritative data source for logistics information to better support the Warfighter’s logistics needs by merging several logistics databases and applications into a single source known as Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW). The LIW empowers the Warfighter with critical logistics information and enables him to make positive impacts to equipment availability and unit combat power. This continuous improvement will ensure the Warfighter’s success as we embark upon the digital battlefield of the future.

(12) Deputy for Army Logistics Enterprise Integration (DALEI) mission. The Army leadership has assigned the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command (CG, USAMC) the responsibility to establish an integrated logistics enterprise that provides end-to-end sustainment support. Thus USAMC is the Army Logistics Enterprise Integrator. This function is a principal component of Logistics Transformation and is specified in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). The USAMC has established and resourced the Office of the USAMC Deputy G–3 for Enterprise Integration (USAMC DG3 EI). The incumbent, who functions as the Deputy for Army Logistics Enterprise Integration (DALEI), is vested with the responsibility to ensure end-to-end functional integration, integrated business processes and Joint interoperability of the Army logistics business enterprise. The incumbent will integrate Army logistics modernization efforts through a collaborative matrix environment with functional requirements managers across the Army in support of Army Transformation. The USAMC DG3 EI (DALEI) serves as the key integration element responsible to the CG, USAMC to exercise requirements oversight, schedule and resource integration over Army-wide logistics modernization efforts. This includes logistics business process engineering efforts built upon the principles of the Future Logistics Enterprise; an integrated process to collaborate with the Army Enterprise Integration Oversight Office; and responsibility for articulating and developing a cohesive, integrated strategy to retire current legacy systems and stand-up modernized capabilities. Figure 12-3A Single Army Logistic Enterprise (SALE). The Logistics Enterprise Vision for the Future Force is an integrated digital environment stretching E2E that enables generating, building and sustaining warfighting capability through a fully integrated logistics enterprise based on collaborative planning, knowledge management and best business practices. Within the Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE), logistics, financial, acquisition, and product data will be integrated in a modernized environment, which operates in a near seamless fashion across the major Army Commands (ACOMs)/ASCCs, across the Services, across the Department of Defense (DOD) and across industry, drawing on the best business practices and technology.
Figure 12–3A. Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE)

Figure 12–3B. Major Elements of USAMC
12–8. USAMC Changing

a. Vision. USAMC is committed to continuously improving support to soldiers by leading the development of new technologies and sustainment processes to transform the Army and reshape the workforce of the 21st Century.

b. Changes are Necessary. As USAMC continues to maintain its global support responsibilities of today while simultaneously transforming itself to support the Army’s Future Force and Joint Team, new research, development, and engineering organizations and processes are needed to ensure that the best technology is provided to our combatant commanders quicker than in the past. An industrial base of depots, arsenals, and ammunition activities that was built during World War II must be modernized to meet future requirements. The risks and rewards of privatization must also be balanced regarding privatization to ensure that the most efficient and effective industrial base is developed while still maintaining the capabilities of our depots, arsenals and activities. Partnering between industry, academia, and the government will also be needed to improve our research and industrial organizations. USAMC continues to serve warfighters and our allies around the world. New field support organizations are being developed to ensure that soldiers receive more responsive, integrated logistics support from the industrial base. This will require modernization of our logistics bases around the world to ensure that they are postured for future operations. Finally, USAMC recognizes that the pace of change will continue and that it must design and develop a learning organization that embraces change, is responsive, and adaptive as required by operational tempo.

c. Life-Cycle Management Command Initiative. USAMC and the Assistant Secretary of Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA [ALT]) began this initiative to get products to the soldier faster, make good products even better, minimize life cycle cost, and to enhance the synergy and effectiveness of the ALT communities. It is intended to integrate significant elements of ALT leadership responsibilities and authority to enable a closer relationship between the USAMC Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs) and the Program Executive Officers (PEOs). PEOs will work as an integral part of the USAMC LCMCs, while continuing to report directly to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE); likewise, logisticians in USAMC will have enhanced input into acquisition processes to influence future sustainment and readiness. The LCMC initiative provides an integrated, holistic approach to product development and systems support. The concept of operations is to create Life Cycle Management Commands by aligning USAMC systems/commodity oriented commands (AMCOM LCMC, CECOM LCMC, TACOM LCMC and JMC) with the PEOs with whom they already work. RDECOM RDECs was strategically and operationally linked with the LCMCs.

12–9. Functions of USAMC

USAMC functions include materiel management, maintenance management, ILS, development of equipment, sustainment maintenance, operation of strategic maintenance depots and arsenals, development and fielding of logistics systems and supporting automated systems, ALT integration through life cycle management of weapon systems and platforms, and logistics systems enterprise integration across the Army. USAMC through ASC also provides management of the worldwide Logistics Assistance Program. During contingencies, USAMC provides platforms for deploying ALT, maintenance, supply and technical support teams to the field Army. USAMC is increasingly serving as the Army’s vehicle for contracted logistics support to the warfighter and warfighter plans.

a. National maintenance management (NMM) operations. The Commanding General, USAMC is designated as the National Maintenance Manager (NMM). The NMM focuses on centralized management; decentralized execution of Army maintenance programs, and consolidates all national maintenance organizations under a single management structure. The NMM started as a program for the repair of AWCF–SMA Class II, IV and IX repairable components and their return to the AWCF–SMA account and now encompasses Reset support to the Army Force Generation Process as well as the sustainment of the Leave Behind Equipment (LBE) for deployed Forces. It is transitional based on total Army need. The Supply Management Account-Army managed stocks are the first source of supply to satisfy national requirements placed on the supply system. The National Maintenance Program (NMP) encompasses the Army strategy of a centrally coordinated and controlled repair based logistics system that is managed by the national maintenance manager. The overall objective is to increase fleet readiness of weapon systems and reduce operation and sustainment costs by accomplishing repairs to a higher standard. National sustainment maintenance consists of organic depots, the industrial base, and qualified non-depot activities to include Component Repair Companies that provide overall repair to a single standard and return to the supply system.

b. Integrated Materiel Management Centers (IMMCs). The materiel management functions for USAMC managed commodities are accomplished by the IMMCs of the LCMCs. Each commodity has materiel managers that accomplish the following functions:

1. Computer requirements
2. Provide cataloging input to DLA
3. Direct procurement actions within their respective commodity and area of responsibility
4. Direct overhaul, rebuild, and repair
Perform configuration management
Develop maintenance publications
Determine provisioning of repair parts for equipment initially issued to units
Direct materiel disposal and reutilization.

U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC). As mentioned above, USAMC is assigned the responsibility to integrate Army Logistics Information Systems across the Army Logistics Enterprise and with the other Services and DOD.

The Army strategy to achieve the modernized logistics capability based on the SALE and supporting E2E architecture. This architecture is the critical driving force in the Logistics Enterprise Modernization (LEM) effort. LEM takes the Army from fragmented stove piped custom coded development efforts to an Enterprise wide COTS ERP solution. The enterprise capability is the only viable strategy to achieve compliance with DOD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA), Force - Centric Logistics Enterprise (FLE) (Logistics Domain), Net-centricity, Clinger Cohen Compliance, and Joint Focused Logistics Doctrine. USAMC is continuing to work with OSD to maintain compliance as the BEA and Joint Doctrine evolve.

USAMC will accomplish this by using commercial off-the-shelf enterprise software to implement SALE. The three primary components of SALE are: Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS−A (F/T)) that provides an integrated, evolutionary enterprise information system for tactical Army combat service support (CSS) functions. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) that modernizes national logistics processing. Army Enterprise System Integration Program (AESIP) that integrates business processes across the Army, manages master data, and provides the single gateway to other services and agencies.

Implementation of the SALE will simplify and standardize operations, resulting in improved decision-making while conserving scarce resources via shared data at multiple levels.

The SALE will extend from small unit level (Shop Stock, Property Book, Unit Maintenance, etc.) through the Army’s national level. Further, it must work in unison with the DOD Future Logistics Enterprise environment, including the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), industry, the Joint warfighting community, and coalition partners. The SALE will enable our current and future forces to be capable of working concurrently in all environments. When fully implemented, SALE will provide commanders and staffs common integrated business processes with a view of the entire Army logistics value chain from the national sustainment base E2E to the tactical support levels.

The Army and USAMC have established the following specific objectives for SALE:

(a) Implement a centralized, integrated and responsive management process to oversee functional requirements, schedules, architecture, configuration control, performance goals, allocate resources and, when necessary, associated costs.

(b) Implement a core Army logistics Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solution using commercial off the shelf software in a phased process starting with the USAMC.

(c) Implement subsequent logistics ERP solution implementation at the installation and tactical Army.

(d) Assess migration of legacy capabilities not encompassed by core ERP solutions wherever and whenever possible, with a goal of continual integration with core ERP.

(e) Enable continuous improvements to logistics automation business processes/systems via ERP improvements offered by the software provider.

(f) Implement an integrated logistics solution featuring one set of integrated end-to-end business processes within a single Army Enterprise.

(g) Align the SALE architecture with the OSD Business Enterprise Architecture and Future Logistics Enterprise requirements.

(h) Include robust decision support tools (strategic issues, prioritization, and risk mitigation).

(i) Integrate technical data with product data flow across all domains in a Product Lifecycle Management environment.

(j) Establish a single set of shared Master Data and one set of external interfaces that use software solutions to internally integrate Enterprise Resource Planning instances.

Requirements computation. In computing requirements, materiel is separated into major end and secondary items. A major end item is a final combination of parts and/or materiel ready for its intended use and of such importance that it is subject to centralized (HQDA) individual item authorization and management throughout all command and support echelons.

Army Acquisition Objective (AAO), Classes II and VII. The AAO is the quantity of an item of equipment or ammunition required to equip and sustain Army forces, together with allies, in wartime from D-Day through the period prescribed in the latest DPG. The development of the AAO is joint effort between the Army G-3/5/7, who sets Army prioritization for modernization and the Army G-8 (Force Development). AAO computations for Class II (non-major items) and Class VII (major items) are no longer made by the G-3 Force Builder. Both the POM and OTOE AAO computations are made within, produced by, and displayed within the Equipping Enterprise System. The AAO can be the total Army requirement for an item if that item is replacing an item that is facing obsolescence or is a new item to
the force. In most cases the AAO is for an item that modernizes only part of the force (usually the first deploying units). Late deploying units will retain the older items that have not reached the end of the service life. The condition of these items to meet force requirements may result in changes to the AAO at a later date. The resulting procurement program is developed on a commodity approach and reflects the various line items of equipment that are to be purchased to support recognized Army requirements. The basic source calculations identifying overall procurement objectives are derived from the AAO concept.

(a) Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ) and Decrement Stocks. The IIQ is derived from the LOGSACS and is computed based on the MFORCE of the SAMAS, as developed through TAA and ACOM/ASCC plans. It contains all of the Army requirements for each item as modified by basis-of-issue plans. The IIQ is a tabulation of all of the TOE and TDA requirements for that item in the Army’s force structure. Decrement Stocks reflect the difference between peacetime authorizations and wartime requirements. The IIQ also includes the APS.

(b) Additive Operational Project (OPROJ) Stocks are supplies and equipment above normal TOE, TDA and CTA authorizations tailored to support one or more Army operational plans and/or contingencies. Quantities are approved by HQDA and become a specific component of the total APS requirement.

(c) Army War Reserve Sustainment (AWRS) (AWRS) stocks are stocks acquired in peacetime and held to meet the Army’s increased wartime sustainment requirements, until re-supply at wartime rates or emergency rates are established. This requirement is arrived by a computer model that deploys forces on a time-phased deployment schedule, utilizing a specified scenario and applying predetermined inter-theater and intra-theater attrition factors. It should be noted that sustainment stocks are reduced by an amount equal to IIQ left behind by units that deploy OCONUS and draw APS.

(d) War reserve stocks for allies (WRSA). WRSA is a DOD directed program to assist designated allies in case of war. Computed quantities are included in this component of the gross requirement.

(e) Army Maintenance Regeneration Enablers (maintenance floats). The maintenance system requires that additional equipment be available for issue while repair and maintenance of unit equipment is being performed. These are called “floats.” Four types of floats are included in this component of the AAO: the Operational Readiness Float (ORF) for unit and intermediate levels of maintenance; the Repair Cycle Float (RCF) for depot maintenance; the Ready To Fight (RTF) vehicles for battle damage replacement that consists of vehicles that have all components installed prior to issue (such as C4ISR) and is mission capable to be introduced into combat; and the Tactical Computer Exchange (TCE) float for Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS).

(f) Class V (Ammunition) requirements are developed by HQDA G–3/5/7 Ammunition Officer in coordination with the G–4 and Munitions CoC.

(8) Army procurement objective (APO). The AAO is what the Army wants to procure; the APO is what the Army can procure. The AAO is constrained through several different mechanisms, the two major ones being fiscal constraint and projected obsolescence. When these factors are applied to the AAO, they reduce the number of items. This becomes the APO. Fiscal restraints on procurements, in most cases, are caused by the limited availability of procurement dollars to meet all the Army’s requirements. Thus, many systems are procured at a reduced quantity over a greater period of time than initially envisioned. By the time the availability of funding allows for an item procured to the AAO level, its replacement may be available for procurement instead. For example, the Army had three types of medium tactical trucks in its fleet, 800 series, 900 series and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV). None of these items were procured up to the AAO level, but all have been procured to a reduced APO level. At the current funding profile, the FMTV program will take 38 years to reach its AAO. Prior to reaching AAO the FMTV will be replaced by the Future Tactical Truck System.

(9) Procurement plan development. When the AAO computations are completed, the requirements are analyzed to assist in the development of the procurement plan phased throughout the budget cycle. Development of the procurement plan requires careful attention to ensure that at least the eight factors listed below are incorporated while attempting to achieve the AAO in a balanced and progressive manner at the end of each funded delivery period (FDP). The FDP data is reviewed and adjusted by the acquisition PEO/PM and the ARSTAF in terms of overall Army requirements to accommodate new guidance and/or priorities and to assure the materiel program is fully integrated into and supported by other appropriations. Articulation of Army requirements and recommended procurement programs and budget are the responsibility of the ASA (ALT) in coordination with the Army G–3/5/7 and Army G–4.

(a) Fiscal guidance
(b) DA, DOD, OMB, congressional decisions
(c) User Priority needs (compiled by Army G–3 and TRADOC)
(d) Current asset positions and projected loss data including FMS
(e) Product improvement programs
(f) Secondary item requirements (those procured within procurement appropriations-engines, transmissions, etc.)
(g) Production base status and capabilities
(h) Interface of modernization programs (new products) with current procurement programs

(10) AAO purpose. The AAO is the Army’s requirement for an item of materiel to modernize all or part of the existing force and is used to justify budgets and programs submitted to DOD, OMB and Congress. The component
parts of the AAO computation system are clearly definable and aid in the explanation of the total requirement. Tentative conclusions can be drawn about Army readiness by comparing current asset data to the AAO. AAO data is used repeatedly by the Army leadership in justifying the Army’s need for procurement funds.

d. Cataloging Direction.

(1) Within disciplines established by the Federal Catalog System (a DLA administered system), this process develops a Federal Item Identification to describe an item-of-supply and acquires a NSN to establish and fix the unique identity of the item.

(2) The NSN is a 13-digit number used in all materiel management functions. The first four digits are the federal supply classification (FSC) class code. The FSC relates like items of supply and, conversely, separates unlike items of supply. For example, in the FSC 5305, the notation ‘53’ indicates that the item falls within the group “Hardware and Abrasives and the ‘05’ indicate that the item falls within the class of screws. The last nine digits of the NSN are called the national item identification number (NIIN). Each NIIN is permanently assigned to only one item-of-supply and remains with the item as long as it is used in the government supply system. The first two digits of the NIIN also identify the country of origin; 00 and 01 indicate the United States.

(3) LOGSA maintains a consolidated Army Master Data File (AMDF) of all NSNs that the Army uses or manages. This file contains coded item management data, nomenclature, packaging, freight classification information, interchangeable/ substitutable data, component references, and historical records on stock numbers. This information is disseminated throughout the Army with changes made monthly.

e. Procurement direction. Computers absorb much of the administrative burden of initiating a purchase request. As a by-product of the supply control study, the computer provides a procurement work directive containing available technical specification data needed for the pre-award phase of a procurement contract. Depending upon a variety of factors including dollar value of the procurement, this request may be reviewed by the item manager, their supervisors, or it may be forwarded automatically for procurement without review. Secondary items have an economic order quantity (EOQ) computed using a modified EOQ algorithm. Secondary items are procured in quantities ranging from three months’ to three years’ supply, depending on the cost to buy versus the cost to store the item. When procurement is solicited, the prospective contractors are told where the item is to be delivered. This decision is made based on transportation costs, storage requirements, and the geographical location of the ultimate user.

f. Distribution management of major items. Distribution management is primarily a three-fold process: accounting for existing assets through the Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW), projecting the distribution of equipment against planned force structure utilizing the AFM, TAEDP, and executing the equipment distribution program through the use of the Requisition Validation Report (REQVAL) and the Equipment Release Priority System (ERPS).

g. Accounting for assets. The LIW Asset Module is an accounting system operated and maintained by LOGSA that provides worldwide asset visibility for the Army’s reportable items. It covers approximately 14,500 NSNs (primarily major end items, but also includes other selected items such as medical and secondary of which worldwide visibility is required). LIW reflects on-hand assets in units, storage, and in transit and is reconciled with property books and stock record accounts at least annually. LIW data is used by ACOMs/ASCCs and HQDA to assess and manage the overall preparedness of the force as the source of on-hand asset data in the Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S) in the Army Flow Model (AFM) subsystem and when merged with unit equipment authorization data which determines if requisitions are filled. For ammunition, retail/strategic visibility is accomplished by the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System (WARS). The WARS data is used as a baseline for requirements computation, procurement, distribution, maintenance direction, and disposal. Unique item tracking provides visibility of small arms, controlled cryptographic items and radioactive testing and tracking systems.
Projecting equipment distribution. TAEDP is a program which projects distribution requirements and priorities using on-hand assets and projected deliveries to produce an equipment distribution program for the current, budget, and program years. The data source for requirements is LOGSACS. LOGSACS incorporates near-term authorizations from TAADS with planned force structure as depicted in SAMAS. Requirements are prioritized by the Army G–3 through the DAMPL now known as DARPL in conjunction with equipment readiness codes (ERCs) as stated in TOEs (Figure 12–5). Assets from LIW are used as the baseline from which projected distribution of deliveries begins. Deliveries consist of new procurements, depot maintenance returns, and redistribution of displaced systems or assets generated through force structure changes. Figure 12–5 depicts the merging of the inputs in order to create the projected distribution plan. The distribution is generally accomplished in ERC and DARPL sequence, which allows decisions to achieve optimal readiness. As such, distribution rules and priorities can be changed to reflect current or envisioned priorities, such as Army National Guard Redesign Study (ADRS), Medical Reengineering Initiative, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), light infantry divisions, etc., when determined by Army G–3. TAEDP projects distribution to all valid unit and non-unit claimants which include MTOE, TDA, TDA–Augmentation, Army War Reserves, Operational Project Stocks, ORF, Army Reserves, etc. The TAEDP is normally synchronized with the Army planning, programming, budgeting and execution system (PPBES) process, but can be run at any time for special analyses.
i. Executing the distribution plan. The REQVAL and ERPS reports are used to validate requisitions and release equipment. The REQVAL matches current equipment authorizations as stated in TAADS against assets reported in LIW in order to validate requisitions (Figure 12–6).

(1) ERPS takes the process one step further and overlays out-of-DARPL or special initiative priorities as reflected in the planning system. The NICP item manager uses ERPS to prioritize and determine which units or non-unit claimants will receive equipment and in what order. The Major Item REQVAL system compares ERPS and item manager equipment backorder files, validates requirements, and provides the proper equipment distribution sequence in an automated product (Figure 12–7).
(2) The management of equipment distribution is a complicated process primarily used for allocating equipment, analyzing force capability, programming, budgeting, and as the link to correctly documenting Army distribution. The Committee for Ammunition Logistic Support (CALS) determines ammunition distribution for items in short supply. CALS is co-chaired by Army G–4 and Army G–3. Distribution is generally accomplished in DARPL sequence. CALS meets twice each year and allocates supplies to the ACOMs/ASCCs for the upcoming six-month period. The ACOMs/ASCCs in turn sub-allocate down to the field level.

(3) The Army retrograde process is part of the Army’s Distribution and Supply Chain Management. USAMC is the functional organization responsible for resourcing Army’s spares program, proponent for spares requirements determination and inventory optimization, implementation and institutionalization of Single Stock Fund (SSF), provide management oversight and policy/procedural guidance of Army Working Capital Fund-Supply Management Army (AWCF–SMA), and oversee USAMC’s SSF Installation Supply Representatives (ISR) program. USAMC integrates and synchronize USAMC managed equipment requirements for units undergoing modular conversions, home station needs, pre-deployment and operational theater support and subsequent re-deployment equipping needs in consonance with the Army’s transformation efforts. Develop and apply equipping and unit set fielding guidance, policy and procedures, data analysis, documentation, resourcing solutions and management oversight to accomplish this mission in support of unit readiness. USAMC in coordination with HQDA G8, HQDA G4, and the Army commands determine disposition instructions for all equipment to include Army Prepositioned Stocks war reserve materiel affected by re-stationing, modularity, and the impacts or changes requiring disposition of Army equipment and supplies. USAMC in coordination with HQDA G–4 and G–8 staffs and through forecasting techniques determines repair levels to sustain Army requirements. Retrograde or reverse pipeline distribution processes are established for repair parts such as engines, transmissions, and many other items of support AWCF repair programs to return unserviceable assets to serviceable condition. USAMC in coordination with operating forces and DOD agencies maintain in-transit visibility of retrograde assets from point of origin to final destination through Joint in-transit visibility systems. The Army retrograde and Reverse Pipeline Distribution process also supports the Army RESET Program by returning Department of the Army selected equipment from the battle or OCONUS to repair depots.

(4) RESET is a series of actions taken to restore unit equipment to a desired level of combat capability after returning from contingency operations. The reset process brings unit equipment to full combat-ready condition, either for its next rotation in support of current operations or for other, unknown future contingencies. Reset actions include the repair of equipment, the replacement of equipment lost during operations, and the recapitalization of equipment where feasible and necessary. This can be accomplished by a combination of field level maintenance, sustainment maintenance and work done by original equipment manufacturers (OEM).

(5) Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable, performance package designed to optimize system readiness and meet performance goals for a weapon system through long-term support arrangements with clear lines of authority and responsibility. Application of Performance Based Logistics may be at the system, subsystem, or major assembly level depending on program-unique circumstances and appropriate business case analysis (BCA). The essence of Performance Based Logistics is buying performance outcomes, not the individual parts and repair actions. This is accomplished through a business relationship that is structured to meet the requirements. Performance Based Logistics support strategies integrate responsibility for system support in the Product Support Integrator (PSI), who manages all sources of support. Source of support decisions for Performance Based Logistics do not favor either organic or commercial providers. The decision is based upon a best-value determination, evidenced through a business case analysis (BCA), of the provider’s product support capability to meet set performance objectives. This major shift from the traditional approach to product support emphasizes what level of support program manager teams buy, not who they buy from. This major acquisition paradigm shift represents the Army’s philosophical directional change from the past practice of buying set levels of spares, repairs, tools, and data, the new focus is on buying a predetermined level of availability to meet the objectives.

Section III
National logistics organization: other

12–10. Other Logistics-related organizations

a. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Designated a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU), the USACE plays a major role in the Army logistics system to include the Army’s responsibility in supporting joint operations. USACE performs MILCON, installation support, real estate, R&D, and civil works missions. It provides an organizational structure for rapid conversion of its resources to support general war and other national emergency conditions. The six components of the USACE mission are: Manage and execute engineering, construction, and real estate programs for the U.S. Army and Air Force and perform R&D in support of these programs. Manage and execute installation support programs for Army installations. Manage and execute civil works programs, including the design, planning, engineering, construction, and R&D functions in support of this program. Perform R&D through non-system-specific advanced development.
in systems, specialized equipment, procedures, and techniques relevant to engineer support of combat operations. Develop and maintain a capability to mobilize readily in response to national security emergencies, domestic emergencies, and emergency water planning programs. Develop technology, and design and construct facilities and structures in support of Army space initiatives.

b. Army Command ACOMs-CONUS.

(1) The ASCC is responsible for providing administrative control (that includes logistics support) to all Army units and contractors in the theater. This responsibility is executed through one or more subordinate theater sustainment commands (TSC) or a functional command such as personnel, transportation, medical, or engineer commands. The Army commander manages theater logistics support by establishing broad policies, allocating critical supplies, and assigning missions in concert with the JFC’s guidance. Additionally, the Army theater commander manages and controls supply, maintenance, and other logistics services through the TSC and provides for centralized movements control for U.S. Army forces through the Theater Movement Control Agency (TMCA).

(2) SDDC an AMC MSC (ADCON) is the DOD single surface traffic manager and provides traffic management, transportation engineering and common-user surface terminal services to all DOD customers and contractors. As a jointly staffed land component command of USTRANSCOM, SDDC’s primary mission is executing the nation’s military strategic mobility. In this capacity, it ensures the safe, secure, and economical worldwide movement of DOD units, personnel, and materiel. It is also responsible for the movement of personal property for Service members, DOD civilians, and other government agency members, manages the contract for commercial bus, federal rental cars, and the Army’s commercial travel program; and assists the GSA in management of the city-pairs airfare program.

(a) To accomplish its role, SDDC is developing and fielding a number of information systems dedicated to the improvement of global transportation. These include the Transportation Coordinator - Automated Command and Control Information System (TC ACCIS), which provides automation of Army user-unit deployments and peacetime transportation functions at U.S. and OCONUS mobilization stations. Global Freight Management (GFM) System provides automated electronic data interchange (EDI) electronic commerce (EC) for the managing, rating, and routing of DOD freight movements within CONUS. It increases the efficiency and accuracy of general cargo government bill of lading (GBL) preparation. The Worldwide Ports System (WPS) supports SDDC’s terminal management and cargo documentation mission during peace and war. The Strategic Deployment System (STRADS) is SDDC’s command and control system for peacetime planning and wartime execution support. The Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) automates and standardizes the personal property movement, storage, and management functions at DOD transportation offices worldwide.

(b) SDDC Transportation Engineering Agency provides the scientific engineering and transportation expertise to analyze and improve the transportability of military equipment, the deployability of Army units, and the effectiveness of the DOD transportation programs for national defense.

(c) The Army Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is a subordinate command and normally falls under the ASCC. Across the full spectrum of military operations, the TSC provides direct and general supply and maintenance support to
all theater units and sometimes forward to include EAC units, joint elements, allied forces, and units passing through the AOR. The Army Sustainment Brigade (SusBde) provides maintenance, supply, transportation, health services, and field services support to the Army corps’ and/or divisions. Within the corps AO, non-divisional units receive supply and maintenance support from the SusBde. Additionally, the SusBde provides backup and GS to the BCTs and support brigades. The SusBde Support Operations Section provides functional materiel management and movement control to include the major tasks of managing the supply, maintenance, and transportation functions.

(d) The legacy division support commands (DISCOMs) functions and operations have been dispersed to the Sustainment Brigades and Brigade Support Battalions of the BCTs.

(3) Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES).

(a) AAFES is the provider of supply Class VI (personal demand items) for the Army and Air Force. It is a joint command of the Departments of the Army and Air Force. The AAFES commander is a general officer responsible to the AAFES Board of Directors (BOD). In turn, the BOD is responsible to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through their respective chiefs of staff. The chairmanship of the BOD alternates between the two Services approximately every three years. The AAFES positioned of commander and vice commander alternate between the Army and the Air Force. Primarily a civilian-run organization under military leadership, AAFES employs about 52,400 people, and operates approximately 1,500 facilities worldwide. AAFES worldwide headquarters is located in Dallas, Texas and two subordinate headquarters manage operations within the Europe and Pacific Regions.

(b) The mission of AAFES is to provide merchandise and services of necessity and convenience to authorized patrons at uniformly low prices, and to generate funds to supplement APFs for the support of MWR programs. AAFES does this in peace and wartime. To accomplish its mission, AAFES:

1. Operates retail, food, personal service, vending centers, theaters, automotive facilities, Army military clothing sales stores, on military installations,

2. Provides basic exchange support to military personnel engaged in contingency operations or field exercises by establishing military-run tactical field exchanges (TFEs) where regular AAFES operations are not possible. Class VI support in the field can be limited to basic health and hygiene needs or expanded to include food, beverages, and other comfort items based upon the requested needs of the theater commander,

3. Generates earnings that support MWR programs. AAFES pays dividends to the Army, which in turn allocates funds to specific MWR programs on installations. The Army MWR BOD, which is formed under the Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC), controls the allocation of AAFES-generated MWR funds within the Army.

4. GSA. The GSA provides general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the Government. The GSA has multi-mission responsibility to manage the varied business activities of the Federal Government. GSA provides an extensive amount of supply support to the DOD for such commonly used items as leased commercial-style vehicles, office furniture and supplies, machine and hand tools, photo supplies, etc.

12–11. Defense Logistics-related organizations

a. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, VA, DLA performs its worldwide logistics with both civilian and military personnel, in facilities ranging from supply centers, to property reutilization offices. DLA is the DOD’s primary source for consumable items, whether for combat readiness, emergency preparedness or day-to-day operations. DLA functions include the following:

(1) Management of more than 4 million consumable items.

(2) Execution of a worldwide distribution system.

(3) Worldwide property reutilization and marketing services as well as information on available excess DOD property.

(4) Worldwide HAZMAT disposal services and information on management of hazardous materials.

(5) Management of the Federal Catalog System, including sources, item descriptions and prices.

(6) Technical logistics services, such as specialized product testing.

(7) Management of federal strategic materials reserves.

b. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA provides contract administration services in support of all the DOD components, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other designated federal and state agencies, and foreign governments. These services include contract management, pre-award surveys, quality assurance, payment to contractors, support to small business and labor surplus areas, transportation and packaging assistance, and surveillance of contractor progress to ensure timely delivery of materiel. DCMA also provides contract management for Army LOGCAP.

c. Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).

(1) The DeCA was established in May 1990 and assumed full operational control of Army and other Services’ commissary operations in October 1991. DeCA is headquartered at Ft. Lee, VA. DeCA is an agency of the DOD operating under the direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD (P&R)). DeCA is organized with a director and headquarters staff, three CONUS regions, a European region, and a DOD Liaison Office. The DOD Liaison Office is administratively assigned to the Director, DeCA. DeCAs’ primary mission is to:
(a) Provide an efficient and effective worldwide system of commissaries for the resale of groceries and household supplies at the lowest practical price to members of the military Services, their families, and other authorized patrons, while maintaining high standards for quality facilities, products, and service consistent with standards similar to those in commercial food stores.

(b) Operate commissaries as APF activities as an integral element of the military pay and benefits package. Provide an income-effect benefit through savings on food and household items necessary to subsist and maintain the household of the military member.

(2) The Commissary Operating Board has representatives from the different military services and serves as a forum for the discussion and resolution of issues concerning the commissary services provided by DeCA, addresses operational and policy concerns, and implements broad policy as directed by Defense Management Council (DMC).

d. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA). NGIA provides geospatial information to the national security community. Maps, nautical charts, and aeronautical charts are essential for logisticians to plan logistics support.

Section IV
Standard Systems

12–12. Defense standard systems.

There are a number of defense standard systems necessitated by the ever-increasing language of codes and formats readable by the computer, the supporting communications equipment, and the human operator. GSA, DLA, the LCMCs of USAMC or any of the other military departments may supply items requisitioned by a single Army unit, thus the need for standard codes and formats. DLA has been assigned the responsibility for administering the 10 DOD standard systems generally referred to as the Defense Logistics Management Standards Office (DLMSO).


(1) MILSTRIP procedures prescribe the uniform code and data elements to be used in requisitioning and issuing supplies. Within the DOD, a single line item requisition is used. Each requisition is for one specific item. The form and format are fixed, but some of the data elements may be manipulated and other data elements added may produce a variety of documents essential to supply operations. Common documents thus produced are requisitions, cancellations, supply status, shipment status, follow-up answers, materiel release orders, confirmations, and denials. Much of the information contained in these documents is the same. For example, each document contains the NSN, quantity, requesting unit, priority, funding data, etc. These procedures permit the requesting unit to say what they want, and provide the supply system with the necessary documents for processing the request.

(2) The DLMS is a process managed by the Defense Logistics Management Standards Office (DLMSO) located at the Defense Logistics Agency that governs logistics functional business management standards and practices rather than an automated information system. The DLMS interprets, prescribes, and implements DOD policy in the functional areas of supply, transportation, acquisition (contract administration), maintenance, and finance. Joint committees administer the requirements of these functional areas. The DLMS provides a functional infrastructure for the establishment and maintenance of procedural guidelines required for its user community to carry out DOD logistics policy. The DLMS is authorized by DODD 4140.1; and is prescribed by DOD 4140.40–1–R.

b. Uniform Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). In the issue and movement of supplies it is necessary to determine the relative importance of competing requisitions. The force activity designator (FAD) is what authorizes the requestor to use certain priorities based on the urgency of need. The urgency of need refers to the unit’s need for the particular item being requisitioned, that is, a repair part to get equipment off deadline, stock replenishment, etc. The application of these two factors produces a total of 15 priorities. UMMIPS establishes time standards based on priority. From requisition to receipt, the standards are in Table 12–2. These time standards are further subdivided for each activity involved in the supply and movement of materiel, that is, NICP, depot, transportation agencies, etc.
Table 12–2
UMMIPS Time Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requisitioning Priority</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01–03</td>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>11–12 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04–08</td>
<td>11 days</td>
<td>15–16 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09–15</td>
<td>28 days</td>
<td>67–82 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR). This system is designed to manage, control, and document materiel (including personal property, exchange, and commissary) moving in the DTR and clearly define the responsibilities of shipping, clearance, terminal, and receiving activities. DTR is structured to interface directly with MILSTRIP and to support the movement criteria prescribed by UMMIPS. It functions through a discipline of uniform documentation procedures, formats, data elements and codes, and data transmission time standards. It also supports the performance-assessment requirements of MILSTEP through in–transit data collection and the inventory visibility requirements of the Services and agencies. USAMC is the Army focal point for DTR.

d. Military Supply and Transportation Evaluation Procedures (MILSTEP). The basic tools for evaluating the strategic system are the MILSTEP reports. This system of reporting uses the uniform data elements produced by MILSTRIP and MILSTAMP as a database to produce the various MILSTEP supply and transportation reports. To produce these reports, a reduced version of the computer history file for each commodity command is extracted onto tape and forwarded to LOGSA. The supply effectiveness reports display such things as: the percentages of requisitions on which stock was available, the number and age of back-ordered requisitions, and the number of stock numbers causing back orders. Using this same database, other reports are generated to evaluate depots, LCMCs, and USAMC’s overall performance in key functional areas. USAMC is the Army focal point for MILSTEP.

e. Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS). TOPS is a joint Service system which has the capabilities to automate, streamline, and coordinate virtually every aspect of handling personal property shipments to include counseling, outbound, inbound, non-temporary storage, and quality assurance, and ends duplication of effort and documentation. The system is a network of computer systems located at a personal property shipment office (PPSO). Each site has a telecommunications link to central switching (SWITCHER), a site at SDDC, Alexandria, Virginia that serves as a data sorting and distribution point.

12–13. Department of the Army standard systems

The Army envisions a single, seamless, integrated logistics system under the SALE architecture and component ERP systems discussed earlier in this chapter that will provide accurate and real-time information and, improve overall responsiveness and situational awareness. There are many initiatives underway to modernize and streamline logistics. These initiatives cover the full spectrum of logistics and will support the full Joint ROMO. The logistics systems tomorrow must:

- Enhance deployability.
- Enable Joint Interoperability/interdependence
- Help reduce the logistics footprint in the battlespace.
- Reduce total logistics costs.

a. The Army has established logistics standard systems for use by its various elements. The overall concept for Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE), which was discussed under the AMC missions and functions sections of this chapter. At the time of this writing, the Army is transitioning from the STAMIS systems, wholesale and retail, to the new SALE architecture and systems. This transition is based on the fielding of the SALE ERP environment with LMP, AESIP, and GCSS–Army (F/T). See Figure 12–8.

b. The Army is managing the transition and modernization of systems through the Portfolio Management process (PFM). All IT investments (older being retired or new being integrated) will be managed through this process. Logistics Domain governance is administered by the G–4 as the domain owner and provides strategic guidance through Logistics Domain Business Process Counsel. The Logistics Domain transformation objectives are documented in a yearly domain IT Strategic Plan and domain IT Implementation Plan.

c. There are two wholesale standard systems developed and used by AMC that are being phased out with the fielding of LMP. They are the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS), which is used to support the NICPs; and the SDS, used to support depot operations.

d. Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW). LIW is the official Army database that provides accurate, timely, and auditable worldwide (down to property book level) visibility of major end items of equipment. LIW furnishes Army management with inventory numbers for equipment procurement and distribution decisions. Logistics Information Warehouse Asset Module will be phased out with the completed fielding of LMP.


The Army currently employs a set of retail logistics systems that were each designed for a specific functional area. These systems will be retired with the fielding of GCSS–Army (F/T).

(1) The Standard Army Ammunition System Modernized (SAAS–Mod) supports tactical ammunition management and storage operations to produce accurate and timely Class V information during peacetime, contingency, and wartime operations. SAAS–Mod is a multilevel system providing munitions management functionality from brigade through theater level for the operational Army. SAAS–Materiel Management Center (SAAS–MMC) operates at Theater Sustainment Command levels in the Distributions Management Center (DMC) and Sustainment Brigade DMC. SAAS–MMC maintains asset visibility of munitions with the theater area of operations and requisitions munitions from the National Inventory Control Points. SAAS–Ammunition Supply Point (SAAS–ASP) is the system of record for retail level accountability at Ammunition Support Activities including Ammunition Supply Points, Corps Storage Areas, and Theater Storage Areas. SAAS–Division Ammunition Office (SAAS–DAO) (soon to be redesigned SAAS–Brigade Ammunition Office (SAAS–BAO)) operates in the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Support Operations section and provides Task Force munitions management. SAAS–Ammunition Transfer & Holding Point (SAAS–ATHP) operates in the BSB Distribution Company ATHP to provide, receive, store, and issue support to maneuver forces in the Brigade Combat Team area of operations.

(2) The Standard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced (SAMS–E) is used to manage maintenance operations at the installation and in all tactical units. SAMS–E acts as a bridge between current functionality in the field and the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solution Global Combat Service Support - Army (Field/Tactical). Enhancements include transition from DOS to Windows XP by and merging ULLS–G, SAMS–1, SAMS–2 and now SAMS–1/TDA functionality into SAMS–E using the Oracle 10g relational database for Host -Client capability. SAMS–E systems are across the battlefield from brigade level echelons down to separate companies. Usual locations include (but not limited to) the Sustainment Brigades, Support Battalions (BSB, CSSB, STB, ASB, etc.), Company level units to include tactical (POL, MP, ENG, MI, TRANS, etc) and field support organizations (FSC, FMC, SMC, HHCs, etc.). Normally consolidated in maneuver units at the support organization within the Forward Support Company (FSC) and Field Maintenance Company (FMC) SAMS–E provides maintenance and CL IX requisitions data management. SAMS–E modernizes unit level automated maintenance status reporting including weapon systems, sub-components, day-to-day maintenance supply related and readiness repair part issues as the transition to the two-level maintenance concept continues to evolve. It currently provides interfaces with legacy SARSS, ULLS–G, SAMS–1/2/TDA, ULLS–A, LOGSA LIW, IMPA (National Guard AWPS interface) and receives files from AWRRS.

(3) Standard Army Retail Supply System supports retail supply management operations. It consists of four integrated systems (SARSS–1, SARSS–2AD, SARSS–2AC/B, and SARSS–Gateway). SARSS–1 is the standard supply system for receipts, storage, issues, replenishment and storage operations. It is a real-time, transaction-oriented system where users can interactively enter, retrieve, and update supply information. SARSS–1 processes customer unit requests, cancellations, modifications, and follow-ups for supplies. SARSS–1 also provides an interactive query capability. The Materiel Release Order Capability (MROC) and the Automated Manifest System (AMS) are resident in the SARSS–1 baseline to control the flow of materiel, manage performance and produce productivity reports. SARSS–1 operates at the tactical Supply Support Activity (SSA) in the Distribution Company of Brigade Support Battalions and Combat Service Support Brigades, Installation SSAs, and other Army approved selected locations with SSA missions. SARSS–2AC/B supports the Materiel Management requirements for all Class II, IIIP, IV and IX processing. SARSS–2AC/B has asset visibility of SARSS–1 activities. Processes include all SARSS2A functionality plus SARSS–2B non-time sensitive actions such as catalog, document history, demand history and interface capability with financial systems. SARSS–Gateway offers improved communications and advanced automation functionality that allows users, to place orders on the Source of Supply (SOS), the same day the customer produces them when not issued from on hand stocks. The Standard Army Retail Supply System-Gateway (SARSSSS–GW) relocation of Production Operation from DISA St. Louis, MO to AMC Logistics Support Activity (AMC LOGSA), Redstone Arsenal, AL was completed on 27 April 2008. This relocation supports the Army’s objective to collocate information technology resources. This relocation will help bridge the gap to the Global Combat Support System-Army (Field/Tactical) (GCSS–F/T) system. Corps/Theater ADP Service Center (CTASC) hardware systems have been collocated to a fixed production site, at LOGSA Redstone Arsenal Alabama Facility. Relocation was completed as of April 2007. A Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) CTASC is located at Fort Lee, Va.

(4) ULLS consisted of three applications (ULLS–G, ULLS–A, ULLS–S4). ULLS -G has been replaced by SAMS–E, ULLS–A is being upgraded to the new ULLS–A enhanced (ULLS–A(E)), and ULLS–S4 has been replaced by PBUSE. The ULLS–A (E) system provides an enhanced aviation maintenance management capability. It is a multi-user system incorporating a Local Area Network (LAN) to link the functions of Tech Supply, Production Control and Quality Control, phase team, and back shop sections within the aviation field maintenance organization. The program incorporates a back shops module that gives the maintenance units the capability to initiate and complete work orders. The Aviation Flight Records Systems (AFRS) Module will allow the user to send the DA Form 759 (Individual Flight Record and Flight Certificate - closeout) data to Flight Operations. The Aviation Maintenance Automated Tracking System (AMATS) provides the capability to automate DA Form 2410 (Component Removal and Repair/ Overhaul Record) processes. An Integrated Maintenance Phase System (IMPS) module provides a “real time” Phase Maintenance Management Tool. The program also provides decision support and ad hoc query tools.
(5) Standard Property Book System-Redesign (SPBS–R) was used for property accountability at battalion and higher levels in both tactical and installation environments. SPBS–R has been replaced by PBUSE. Property Book / Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) is the Army’s unclassified, web-based, property accountability system. The centralized database servers are located behind the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) firewall in the Strategic and Advanced Computer Center (SACC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The system maintains accountable records for the Army’s inventory of property in the hands of Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTOE), Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), and Installations units. PBUSE is Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA)/Chief Financial Officer (CFO) compliant.

(6) Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign (DAMMS–R) system. Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movements System (version 2) (TC AIMS II), which is a joint Service system being developed by Army. TC–AIMS II assists force providing organizations in rapidly identifying unit equipment and personnel necessary to support a Combatant Commanders’ requirements. Key functionalities of the system are; source the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), organize deployment data into mode specific load planning data, support in-theater and redeployment unit movement, support installation transportation freight movement, provide source data for in-transit visibility, create actual movement documents, support theater distribution, support movement control, provide Common-User Land Transportation Management. TC–AIMS II addresses critical shortfalls in the movement of materiel and personnel in support of DOD transportation operations. As documented in reference c, TC–AIMS II is expected to provide a single effective and efficient automated information system (AIS). This joint AIS will support force projection and transportation management of unit movements, passengers, and cargo during day-to-day and crisis operations within the Defense Transportation System (DTS). TC–AIMS II replaced the Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign (DAMMS–R) system.

(7) AFMIS automates management of food service and subsistence supply operations at the troop issue subsistence activity (TISA), installation food advisor (IFA), and the dining facility operations (DFO). The TISA module of AFMIS tracks issues, receipts, sales, reorders, and storage. The IFA module produces reports on dining facility operation and menus. The DFO module assists the dining facility manager in menu planning, production scheduling, inventories, headcount, and requisitioning. AFMIS currently interfaces with Defense Subsistence Management Information System (DSSMIS), STANFINS, and the Subsistence Total Order and Receipt Electronics System (STORES), the Joint Subsistence Prime Vendor Food Ordering System.

(8) The central issue facility (CIF) module of the installation support modules (ISM) provides a standardized Army-wide, automated, user-friendly system for the receipt, storage, issue, exchange, and turn-in of authorized organizational clothing and individual equipment OCIE at Army installations. A standard automated CIF system is needed to support peacetime operations and deployment/redeployment of Soldiers in support of both military operations and military Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The Army must field an automated CIF system worldwide, which is capable of outfitting Soldiers with needed OCIE in time to meet deployment schedules while maintaining property accountability. The CIF module improves property accountability and inventory management. The module will allow CIF personnel to provide better support to Soldiers and improve management.

(9) Initiatives. Many of the legacy systems mentioned above were designed and developed based on old 1960’s technology, i.e. data exchange via floppy diskette and modem, standalone workstations, fragmented/stove-piped, not dependent on constant communications, MILSTRIP, MILSTRAP data formats, just to name a few. These systems have served the Army well, but in an era of rapidly changing requirements and technology, many have reached the end of their life expectancy. As the Army moves forward to transform into a more agile, lethal, and versatile force, it must transform itself to distribution-based logistics, by reengineering its logistical capabilities. This will include inserting technology, reconfiguring logistics processes, adopting modern business rules, and modernizing automated systems.

f. The most significant modernization communication and automation initiatives include:

(1) Bridging systems. The Army is fielding upgrades to SAMS (SAMS–E), ULLS–A, and Fielding a new property book system PBUSE as bridging systems to maintain units in the field until GCSS–Army (F/T) is fielded.

(2) Movement tracking system (MTS) incorporates digital maps in vehicles and allows two-way satellite messaging thereby allowing the transportation coordinator the ability to talk to the driver of any truck, regardless of location, without having to put up antennas or involve more Soldiers. MTS is fielding the incorporation of RF technology in its current configuration. This enhances in-transit visibility of assets to the truck level. Future versions will allow automatic reporting of vehicle diagnostics, and other features that support in-transit visibility to the item level.

(3) Automatic Identification Technologies (AIT). AIT is a family of devices that facilitates the accurate capture, storage, retrieval, transfer and transmission of source data information to reduce processing times, improve accuracy, and enhance asset visibility. AIT is being integrated into Army logistics processes including the deployment of troops and equipment, logistics supply and re-supply, and maintenance. The purpose of AIT applications is to provide an accurate and efficient automated means to capture, store, and retrieve source data, with a minimum of human intervention. Since no single AIT device can satisfy the Army’s logistics source data automation, identification and tracking requirement, the Army embraces a family of AIT devices. These devices include linear and two-dimensional bar codes, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, contact memory buttons, optical memory cards and smart cards. AIT initiatives include: Ammunition-AIT integration, implementation of RFID Army-wide, and maintenance-AIT integration.
How The Army Runs

(4) Army Total Asset Visibility (ATAV). ATAV is an information process that integrates data from automated systems and provides commanders and logisticians with information on location, quantity, condition, and movement of assets. It is the responsibility of AMC to ensure ATAV fits in as part of a larger Defense and Joint TAV (DTAV/ JTAV) system (under constant and continuous development). The TAV system is a fully automated, near-real time, and has “open architecture” capability that is migrating to be Defense Information Infrastructure and Common Operating Environment compliant under the Logistics Integrated Database (LIDB). TAV has visibility of over 1.4 million Army NSNs (and 6 million DOD NSNs) and provides related logistics data to users throughout the Army and DOD. It has been successfully used during operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard and Task Forces Eagle and Falcon to track assets. The Army has identified ATAV as the authoritative source for obtaining Army logistics data in support of joint programs. ATAV JTAV is being subsumed into the DLA Asset Visibility System, a modernized version of the ATAV/JTAV capability.

(5) Wireless CAISI and VSAT terminals are part of the G4 Connect the Logistician focus area. These two enablers are being fielded to enhance the logistician’s ability to communicate on the battlefield. The wireless CAISI establishes a wireless local area network capability within the support area and the VSAT provide satellite communications capability down to the brigade area. Logistics Integrated Data Base - (LIDB) The LIDB, managed by LOGSA, is the Army’s Logistic Data Warehouse. It has transitioned from a set of 66 disparate individual databases to an integrated environment and enabler for Army Logistics Transformation. The LIDB does this by providing logistics intelligence, life cycle support, and technical advice and assistance to the current and future force. It Integrates force, readiness, authorization, and asset logistics information for worldwide equipment readiness, performs distribution pipeline performance analysis, and asset visibility for timely and predictive decision-making.

(6) The LIDB is evolving from a multi-system data repository to an integrated analysis-based logistics intelligence source for the Army called the Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW). It is an integral part of team developing Army’s enterprise (LMP, GCSS–A (F/T) and AESIP) and provides a full suite of automated tools for weapon system lifecycle management.

Section V
Funding

12–14. Appropriations
Congressionally approved funds and the Army budget structure are divided into appropriations, which support both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components. For logistics management purposes, these appropriations can be addressed in two categories; procurement appropriations and operations and maintenance appropriations.

a. Procurement appropriations are used to buy all major items and other selected end items. Selected end items with a unit price in excess of $25,000 are purchased with procurement appropriations. The current expense/investment threshold cost is established at $100,000 for budget purposes. This same threshold is also used for accounting and capitalization purposes.

b. Operations and maintenance appropriations support day-to-day operations. It pays for such things as training; unit and major item depot maintenance; and administrative and associated activities. The operations and maintenance appropriation is allocated by Department of Army, to Army commands worldwide based upon their mission and the importance of that mission to the Army. These funds are referred to as consumer funds. Between consumer funds and the procurement appropriations, the field commander purchases all of his or her secondary items.

National logistics operations and support costs for secondary items are funded by the AWCF. The AWCF, an element of the Defense Working Capital Fund, was established by OSD beginning in FY 97, following Congressional concerns over the Defense Business Operating Fund. The AWCF incorporates the commercial or business operations previously managed within the individual revolving funds (Stock Fund and the Industrial Fund) into a single revolving or business operations fund. The AWCF is designed to provide a more effective means for controlling the costs of goods and services and a more flexible way of financing and accounting for those costs; to create and recognize contractual relationships between the activity and its customers; to enhance the effective acquisition and use of manpower, materiel, and other resources; and to support the performance budgeting concept by facilitating budgeting, reporting, and control of costs of secondary items. Simply, this means that the cost of providing a product or service “the cost of materiel and logistics support” is passed on to the customer, as in private industry. The payments by Army and other DOD customers (and other government agencies and private concerns as authorized) provide the capital to replenish the AWCF. The AWCF is an integral part of the DOD team, providing support services that are essential to the success of the operating forces. USAMC manages functional and financial performance with AWCF. The two activity groups that make up the fund are:

a. Supply Management, Army (SMA). This activity group operates on a buyer-seller relationship basis, buying from industry and maintaining through depot and GS level maintenance, assigned stocks for sale to it customers - primarily to Army operating units. The availability of this materiel impacts equipment readiness. Until implementation of SSF, the SMA activity consisted of a wholesale division (USAMC) and retail divisions operated at ACOM level (to include
USAMC, which is an operator of some installations. Under SSF, the two have been merged into one national fund, which is subdivided according to commodity and assigned to the LCMTs of USAMC. This activity group also manages the Army’s prepositioned war reserves. The SMA activity also funds the inventory control point logistics support expenses. The prices for items purchased by the consumer cover the acquisition cost plus the cost of supply operations and transportation. On a FY basis, the SMA has a total operating cost authority (OCA), which limits the total amount of supplies and equipment that can be purchased and/or repaired. OCA is “earned” at the national level through sales to consumers. The SMA incorporates the funding procedures needed to purchase supplies in advance from industry for stockage so that items are available upon requisition. Industrial Operations. This activity group is comprised of two organic capabilities:

b. Depot Maintenance. The Depot Maintenance activity group gives the Army the capability to repair, overhaul, restore and improve reliability and maintainability; upgrade weapon systems and equipment; to store and distribute ammunition, war reserve materiel, and other selected items; and to provide tenant support to other USAMC, Army, and DOD activities. The Depot Maintenance Group both competes with and partners with private industry to deliver goods and services efficiently and effectively.

c. Ordnance. The Ordnance activity group produces conventional munitions, manufactures large-caliber weapon system components, and provides stockpile management. The group’s activities are managed by JMC, a major subordinate command of the USAMC. The JMC serves all branches of the DOD, providing the industrial capability for the manufacture, renovation, and demilitarizing of materiel—specifically of howitzers, gun tubes, mounts, mortars, grenades and smoke rounds, gas masks, and tool sets and kits. Security Assistance

Section VI
Security

12–16. Security Assistance Responsibilities (SA)

a. The Secretary of State is responsible for the overall supervision and general direction of the SA program. The primary responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is to determine military equipment and training requirements, and to procure and supervise the use of equipment by each recipient country. The military departments execute and manage their portion of the SA program under the general direction of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). They also provide technical support and information for use in negotiations on acquisition and co-production agreements that will ultimately affect their plans and programs.

b. The President, through Department of State (DOS) channels, determines which foreign countries are eligible to purchase defense articles, training, and other services from U.S. sources. Purchase requests from foreign countries of major items of equipment are sent to their respective U.S. Embassy with copies to DOS, DSCA, and the military departments. Purchases of parts and other non-major items can be addressed directly with the military departments. Congress must be notified of any offer to sell defense articles and services valued at $50,000,000 or more, major defense equipment valued at $14,000,000 or more, and design and construction services valued at $200,000,000 or more.

c. ARSTAF SA responsibilities are to develop and issue overall policy and program guidance. Operations are assigned to ACOMs/ASCCs/DRUs. The major SA policy player in the ARSTAF is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA [DEC]). The DASA (DEC) coordinates the development and issuance of Army-wide SA policy in coordination with the Army G–3, Army G–1, Army G–2, USACE, Judge Advocate General, and the various agencies within the ARSEC. The SA responsibilities of the various DA staff elements are focused on overall program guidance with coordination of the various functional areas a prime responsibility of the DASA (DEC). The operational aspects of the SA program including management of FMS cases, FMF, and IMET are assigned to ACOMs/ASCCs/DRUs. USAMC, as the Army executive agent for materiel services, is responsible for the operational aspects of approved FMF (except training and design and construction services) and military assistance programs (MAP). TRADOC manages the operational aspects of FMS training at CONUS and OCONUS schools, and IMET programs.

(1) Again, the DASA (DEC) is the principal ARSTAF spokesman and ARSTAF proponent for SA. S/he is responsible for SA policy and procedural guidance. He or she has direct access to and interacts with the Vice CSA, the Under Secretary of the Army and other members of the ARSEC, OSD, other Military Departments, agencies, commands, and activities relative to SA matters. S/he has DA tasking authority over all ARSTAF agencies, ACOMs/ASCCs/DRUs, and field activities on matters pertaining to SA. As the ARSTAFF spokesman for SA, s/he is responsible for providing policy and guidance to the Army executive agent and other agencies or ACOMs/ASCCs/DRUs for SA when required.

(2) USAMC is the Army’s principal agent for supplying FMS materiel. It fulfills its responsibilities through USASAC. USASAC, working with other USAMC elements, develops the necessary data to consummate sales and supervise their execution. This operational responsibility extends from the initial long-range planning, which involves the development of requirements for materiel and services, to the signing of agreements, coordination of all aspects of support, delivery of the goods and services, and completion of final accounting. USASAC is the focal point between the U.S. Army and friendly nations, ensuring that actions remain on course throughout the life cycle of the SA process.
(3) USASAC also oversees USAMC’s participation in the Munitions Control Program. This program involves the development of Army positions on commercial export license applications for the export of military items, technical data, and services to foreign countries. Export license applications, commonly called munitions cases, pertain to the export of defense articles and services, or technical data, described in the U.S. Munitions List contained in the DOS’s International Traffic in Arms Regulation. The DOS and the Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense (Trade Security Policy) refer certain export license applications to the Army for evaluation. The objectives of this evaluation are to control the export of classified or critical technology for which the United States has the technological lead, and which has the potential to significantly threaten U.S. national security if provided to certain foreign governments; to provide the Army position on the effect of proposed exports on national security; and to control export sales that could interfere with Army programs. Through coordination with appropriate USAMC technical elements, USASAC provides a recommended position on whether particular export license applications should be approved.

12–17. Co-production
Another facet of USASAC’s SA responsibilities is co-production, which encompasses any program that enables an eligible foreign governmental organization, or designated commercial producer, to acquire substantial “know-how” to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain, and operate a specific system or individual military item. The “know-how” furnished by the United States is on a reimbursable basis and may include research, development, production data, and/or subassemblies, managerial skills, procurement assistance, or quality control procedures. Co-production may be limited to the assembly of a few end items with a small input of in-country produced parts, or it may extend to a major manufacturing effort requiring the build-up of capital industries. As in the case of conventional military sales and associated supply support arrangements, the co-production programs perpetuate utilization of items common to U.S. forces, thereby promoting rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

Section VII
Summary, references, websites, & professional reading list

12–18. Summary

a. This chapter addressed the nature and structure of the Army logistics system. It is a large, complex system that must be properly managed if it is to perform to the expectations of the COCOM commanders. The struggle continues to find balance between logistics effectiveness and logistics efficiencies.

b. The Army G–4 is the policy, with overall responsibility to assure that the individual pieces fit together and operate in harmony, one with the other. To do this, the Army G–4 establishes broad policies and procedures, and monitors and guides the development of standards.

c. Logistics systems for use at all echelons. The Army’s national-level logistics system is operated by the USAMC in concert with other key Army, joint and non-DOD agencies. USAMC operates through its major subordinate commands, LCMCs and SRAs to fulfill the Army’s need for national logistics support. The Army’s materiel requirements are divided into commodity groupings with each LCMC assigned one or more of these groupings. The LCMCs collectively determine the Army’s requirement, procure or overhaul necessary assets, position them in the appropriate depots, and issue in response to the Army’s needs.

12–19. Selected official military references

a. DOD Directive 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
b. DOD Directive 5134.1, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD(ATL)
c. CICS Manual 3500.04C, Uniform Joint Task List
d. Army Regulation 10–5, Organizations and Functions, Headquarters, Department of the Army
e. Army Regulation 10–25, United States Army Logistics Innovation Agency
f. Army Regulation 12–1, Security Assistance, International Logistics, Training, and Technical Assistance Support and Responsibilities
g. Army Regulation 60–10, Army and Air Force Exchange Service General Policies
h. Army Regulation 700–4, Logistics Assistance
i. Army Regulation 700–127, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
j. Army Regulation 700–137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
k. Army Regulation 700–138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability
l. Army Regulation 725–50, Requisition, Receipt, and Issue System
m. Army Regulation 750–1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy
n. Joint Publication 4–0, Doctrine for Logistics Support in Joint Operations
o. Field Manual 3–0, Operations
q. Field Manual 63–3, Corps Support Command
r. Field Manual 63–4, CSS–Theater Army Area Command. (Under revision to address the restructured and re-named Theater Support Command (TSC))
s. Field Manual 63–11, Logistics Support Element, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
t. Field Manual 100–10, Combat Service Support
u. Field Manual 100–10–1, Theater Distribution
v. Field Manual 100–10–2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield
w. Field Manual 100–16, Army Operational Support
x. Field Manual 100–17–3, Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration
y. Field Manual 100–21, Contractors on the Battlefield.
RESERVED
Chapter 13

Military Human Resource Management

Our mission is to develop, manage, and execute all manpower and personnel plans, programs and policies - across all Army components - for the entire Army team. Our vision is responsive, reliable, and joint-networked personnel services and systems which are continuously available worldwide across the spectrum of conflict to man and sustain the Army team. Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G–1

Section I

Introduction

13–1. Military human resource management (MHRM)

The term “human resource management” (HRM) has been accepted by the Army leadership and over time has been integrated into policy and doctrine formerly used to describe the functions of “personnel management” and “personnel administration.” In the most general sense, HRM is a series of integrated decisions about the employment relationship that influences the effectiveness of employees and organizations. Military HRM is the major component of the Army’s overall HRM operations. It has evolved from a supporting role to that of a strategic enabler for the Army. Today’s challenges require informed decisions on force structure requirements, recruiting and retention programs, well-being programs, and personnel readiness from both individual and unit perspectives. HR leaders must possess professional and specialized skills to meet these challenges and manage the programs that comprise the functions and integrating systems of the HR life cycle model.

13–2. Personnel transformation (PT)

These are dynamic times for the Army as it energetically pursues transformation in order to become more relevant and responsive to contingencies across the entire spectrum of military operations. The HR community is active in this process. Personnel Transformation (PT) is integral to the success of the Army’s Campaign Plan. PT is a comprehensive strategy to ensure the military HR system is relevant and responsive for Soldiers and commanders now and in the future. PT is multi-faceted, but has four primary components as briefly described below:

a. Business Process Redesign. Personnel management procedures of the past included in excess of 1200 processes that were primarily stubby-pencil, work intensive actions that were designed to involve personnel specialists at every level, as well as the chain of command at every level until the specified action reached the appropriate approval authority. Not only did it take an extraordinary length of time to obtain decisions, the prescribed procedures unnecessarily demanded time from numerous individuals. Under PT, all these business processes have been thoroughly reviewed in order to eliminate those that are not necessary, streamline others to cut out unnecessary contacts, and to apply web technology where possible. Thus far, the result has been a much more responsive HR system that is faster (often times immediate/real time), and more accurate because there are fewer steps and individuals handling the action. Often, Soldiers and commanders are empowered to interact with the top of the system without direct involvement with personnel specialists.

b. Web Technology. Closely related to the initiative above is the leverage of automation and web technologies for HR activities. While the number of processes enabled or improved as a result of web applications is growing dramatically a few examples of this initiative today are: Assignment Satisfaction Key (ASK), which allows enlisted Soldiers to update their assignment preferences on-line and to volunteer for assignments; Officer Preference Statement is on-line for the officer corps; Interactive Web Response System (IWRS) allows officers and rating officials to check on-line if evaluation reports have been received and processed; “2X a Citizen” is a portal for USAR Soldiers at Army-Human Resources Command (HRC) that provides an abundance of information and allows them to verify documents and data in their official file and in some cases update that information on-line; OMPF On-line allows AC Soldiers to review their official files on-line from anywhere in the world and negates the need to request a copy of their OMPF on microfiche; Army Knowledge On-Line (AKO) permits email communication with, and between, every Soldier in the Army and allows Soldiers access to enormous amounts of information; DA Photo Management Information System (DAPMIS) permits Soldiers to review and transmit their official photo digitally; Civilian Personnel Online (CPOL) is an information portal for all to obtain information regarding the dynamic world of civilian personnel management; and eArmyU.com is a web application that allows Soldiers access to education opportunities no matter where they are in the world, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. These are but a few of the ways PT is exploiting web technology.

c. Corporate Data Base. There are two databases that support the AC (separate databases for officers and enlisted personnel although integrated within TAPDB (Total Army Personnel Database)). The USAR and the NG also have their own personnel databases. The goal of PT is to have a corporate database (Integrated Total Army Personnel Data Base (ITAPBD)) to integrate all these databases, improve data accuracy, allow us to better account for personnel in multi-component units, facilitate manifesting Soldiers of all components for deployment, and to perform other HR missions and provide management information to HR managers and commanders that will facilitate operational decisions.
**13–3. Military HR life cycle functions**

In a broad sense, MHRM describes the process of managing people by performing the essential functions of planning, organizing, directing, and supervising effective procedures necessary in administration and operation of personnel management. The life-cycle HR management functions are derived from the Army’s life cycle, as follows.

a. **Personnel structure.** The HR portion of the Army’s force development function where personnel requirements and authorizations are determined and documented.

b. **Acquisition.** This function ensures the Army is staffed with the correct grades and skills in numbers sufficient to satisfy force requirements, and has three components.

   (1) **Manpower management.** The process of linking accession, retention, and promotion targets to Army requirements as measured against the military manning program in the PPBE.

   (2) **Accession and retention management.** The process that converts manpower targets to missions and oversees execution.

   (3) **Training integration.** The establishment of a demand for training programs and a system to control input and tracking of trainees and students.

c. **Distribution.** The function of assigning available Soldiers to units based on Army requirements and priorities.

d. **Development.** This function begins with accession training and continues throughout a Soldier’s entire period of service. It includes institutional training, self-development, leader development and supporting programs such as the counseling, evaluation, promotion, and command selection systems.

e. **Deployment.** This function enables the Army to transition from the “prepare mode” to the “conduct of military operations” mode. Deployment includes mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, reset, non-combatant evacuation, and repatriating.

f. **Compensation.** This function encompasses the management of all pay, allowances, benefits, and financial entitlements for Soldiers and retirees. The dollars involved exceed one-third of the Army’s total obligation authority.

g. **Sustainment.** This function involves the management of programs to maintain and advance the well being of Soldiers, civilians, retirees, and family members.

h. **Transition.** As individuals leave the Active Component (AC) for either the Reserve Components (RC) or civilian life, this function provides assistance to Soldiers, Army civilians, and family members.

**13–4. Human resources (HR) leadership**

a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)) has principal responsibility for the overall supervision of manpower, personnel, and RC affairs.

b. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–1, as the Army’s personnel proponent, determines the broad objectives of the military personnel management system. The DCS, G–1 establishes policy for and exercises ARSTAF proponent supervision of the system’s functions and programs.

c. The CG, Human Resources Command (HRC) is the Army’s functional proponent for the military personnel management system and operates the Army’s military HR systems within the objectives set by the DCS, G–1. The CG,
HRC also supports the MHRM system’s automation requirements in the design, development, and maintenance of personnel databases and automation systems.

d. The CG, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute (USASSI) develops and coordinates operational concepts, materiel requirements, organization and force design requirements, and integrates training into courses of instruction at the Adjutant General School.

13–5. Key military human resource (HR) publications

a. Army Regulation 600–8, Military Personnel Management. This regulation establishes the military personnel management system. It describes the functional structure of the system and sets forth the organizational structures that direct, integrate, and coordinate the execution of the system. The AR 600–8 series addresses specific subjects within the military personnel management arena.

b. Field Manual 12–6, Personnel Doctrine. This field manual describes the Army’s personnel doctrine and how it fits into the Army’s operational concept, as well as how it supports unit commanders and Soldiers. It provides a common understanding of human resource support and encompasses the management concepts of personnel information and readiness; replacement, casualty, and postal operations; personnel accounting and strength reporting, mobilization and demobilization and other essential personnel services.

c. AR 600–3, The Army Personnel Proponent System.

(1) The HRC manages the personnel proponent system, designating personnel proponents, assigning their basic responsibilities, and defining the personnel life-cycle management functions. The objectives of the personnel proponent system are to:

(a) Identify a single agent (proponent) responsible for all personnel matters for each career field (officer, warrant, enlisted, and civilian).

(b) Fix responsibility for all career field-related matters.

(c) Ensure the civilian work force is integrated into the personnel proponent system.

(d) Ensure personnel management policies and programs established by HQDA incorporate career field-related considerations.

(e) Foster awareness and achievement of the objectives of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) (see Para 13–34), the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS), the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS), and the Civilian Integration into the Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS).

(2) The functions of personnel proponency are accomplished through approximately 54 personnel proponent offices in conjunction with HRC. Together the proponents assist the DCS, G–1 in all personnel-related matters.

(3) The framework for proponency consists of the eight life-cycle management functions. The personnel proponent system serves as the “honest broker” ensuring fairness, completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of all aspects of the personnel system.

13–6. Military occupational classification and structure system (MOCS)

a. The MOCS system translates manpower requirements into specific skills and grade levels. System policy is set forth in AR 611–1, Military Occupational Classification and Structure Development and Implementation. DA PAM 611–21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, contains the procedures and detailed officer, warrant officer, and enlisted classification and structure guidance. Both publications are available as electronic publications on the U.S. Army Publishing Agency (USAPA) web site (www.usapa.army.mil).

b. Changes to occupational identifiers within the MOCS are generally driven by the requirements determination process (see Chapter 2). Personnel proponents submit proposed changes to the system in accordance with responsibilities in AR 600–3 for recommending classification criteria. The Personnel Occupational Specialty Code Edit (POSC–Edit) System, an automated system maintained by HRC DCSOPS, is the official military occupational edit file used to edit and update data on authorized automated personnel systems. The file is updated based on approved revisions to the MOCS. It contains a listing of all authorized commissioned officer, warrant officer, and enlisted identifiers; grades associated with those identifiers; and other personnel information.

13–7. Key terms and interrelated documents and systems at the heart of the human resources (HR) process

a. End strength (ES). The total number of personnel authorized by the Congress to be in the Army on the last day of the FY (30 September). This is normally provided in the National Defense Authorization Act.

b. Force structure allowance (FSA). The sum of authorized spaces contained in all MTOE units and TDA type organizations.

c. Total strength. The total of all personnel serving on active duty in the Army, including Soldiers in units and organizations and those in the individuals account.

d. Operating strength (OS). Those Soldiers available to fill spaces in MTOE units and TDA organizations sometimes referred to as the “distributable” inventory.

e. Individuals account. This account, often referred to as the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS)
account, is comprised of those personnel unavailable to fill spaces in units. The six sub-accounts are trainees, officer accession students, transients, holdees, students, and USMA cadets.

f. The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). The manpower program is produced as monthly updates and as decision programs for the POM, OSD budget submission, and President’s Budget. It is the report produced by the Enlisted Grades (EG) Model. Using a linear program, the EG Model operates within constraints such as end strengths, man years, and recruiting capability to develop an OS that matches the FSA as closely as possible. It also carries six years of historical loss behavior to use as a projective (predictive) database. Inputs are the latest available strength, gains, and loss data. Vital data for the AAMMP comes from (or will come from) several manpower systems, most of which are discussed later in this chapter. These systems include the Budget Allocation Resource of Notional Force (BARON) Model; Competitive Category Army Tracking System (CCATS) Model; Enlisted Strength (ES) model; the Individuals Account (IA) Model; and the ATRRS. The AAMMP records and/or projects strength of the Army; losses and gains; FSA; training inputs; officer, cadet, and female programs; and the TTHS account.

g. Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB). An automated, standardized database containing military personnel data to fully support Manning and sustaining functions during peacetime and under mobilization required by HRC, HRC–ST. LOUIS, and the NGB. It consists of integrated but physically distributed databases (Active Officer (TAPDB–AO), Active Enlisted (TAPDB–AE), USAR, ARNG, and Core). TAPDB Core contains selected data elements from each component database needed to support mobilization. Under development as an integral part of Personnel Transformation is the Integrated Total Army Personnel Database (ITAPDB), which will provide the Army with a single, corporate database, making all personnel activities easier and more accurate, better serving Soldiers and commanders.

h. eMILPO. This web-based automated personnel information system replaced SIDPERS 3 and is currently the Army’s primary system. eMILPO provides commanders with management information reports; performs automated field records maintenance; and provides automated personnel information to the EDAS and TOPMIS. Unlike SIDPERS, eMILPO is web based, uses a centralized database and provides near real-time, Army-wide visibility on personnel information.

i. Enlisted Specialties (ES) Model. This is part of the HQDA decision support system. It is a personnel planning optimization model that computes recommended MOS and grade mix, enlisted accessions, training to support accessions, and in-service reclassification/reenlistment and promotions to maintain force alignment through the POM cycle.

j. CCATS and BARON. The CCATS Model uses goal-linear programming to develop optimal officer accessions, promotion rates, promotion pin on points, and forced losses. It maintains force alignment by minimizing the difference between the desired and projected OS in each competitive category and grade. The major inputs are authorizations data, inventory data, loss rates, and promotion targets. The model provides output data that can be imported into spreadsheets or word processing documents for analysis and reporting. The BARON Model outputs support program and budget development, policy analysis, and other management activities.

k. Active Army Strength Forecaster (A2SF). This system developed and used by DCS, G–1, will replace several legacy systems used in forecasting officer and enlisted strengths, gains, losses, and force manning. Using updated methodologies, the object-oriented design of this system provides more accurate and timely forecasting, as well as significantly enhanced detail (rates for specific populations, gender, etc.) to support DCS, G–1 decisions. It draws upon TAPDB for personnel source data and produces the AAMMP as one of its primary reports.

l. Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). ATRRS is the Army’s system of record for training. It is an automated information system that provides personnel input to training management information for HQDA, commands, schools, and training centers during both peacetime and mobilization operations. The system contains information at the course level of detail on all courses taught by and for the Army. A major product of ATRRS is the ARPRINT.

m. Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). The ARPRINT is a mission document that provides officer and enlisted training requirements, objectives, and programs for the AA, Army RC, DA civilians, other U.S. Services, and foreign military. Training is planned and executed on a FY basis and the goal is to train sufficient numbers in each MOS/branch and functional area to equal the projected authorizations as of the end of the FY.

Section II
The structure function

13–8. Military manpower management
In Chapter 5, we addressed unit structure and force planning, describing how the force is sized and configured and how that force is accounted for in the documentation system. This paragraph, which should be viewed as an extension of Chapter 5, will focus on how the Army manages manpower and personnel once the force is configured and sized.

a. Manpower management at the macro level is the function of determining requirements, obtaining manpower, and allocating resources. It includes the determination of minimum-essential requirements, alternative means of providing resources, and policies to be followed in utilization of manpower. It involves the development and evaluation of organizational structure and review of utilization. It includes Soldiers in the AC, ARNG, and USAR, Army civilian
manpower assets, and certain contractor assets when a requirement is satisfied by contractual services rather than by Army military or civilian personnel.

b. Manpower managers deal with HR requirements from the perspective of the organizational structure in which they will be most efficiently and economically used. First, they focus on requirements demanding explicit grades and skills to perform specific tasks. Then, they focus on determining which requirements will be supported with authorizations (“spaces”). Finally, they combine force structure authorizations with requirements in the TTHS Account, also referred to as the Individuals Account, to determine the needs of the Army by grade and skill within constraints that exist. Simultaneously, HR managers focus on supporting requirements through the acquisition, training, and assignment of personnel (“faces”) to authorized positions.

c. The Congress, the OMB, OSD, and the OSA are not directly involved in the management of individual military personnel. They do, however, establish policies that prescribe the availability of this resource and the management latitude available to those involved in personnel management. For example, policies which limit permanent changes of station (PCS), establish tour lengths, set officer grade limitations, or place a ceiling on the hire of local national personnel affect the flexibility of personnel managers. OSD and, to a more limited extent, OMB, are involved in the force-structuring process. Managers, above the DA level, are concerned primarily with the management of spaces, while at descending levels below HQDA, they are increasingly concerned with the management of people and their associated costs. Much of the work at the departmental level involves decisions dealing with the aggregate of the force structure and inventory rather than the subsets of grade and skill. At lower levels, the HR process turns its focus more towards the “faces” and the management of people. Whenever the force structure changes, there is a significant cause and effect relationship on the many systems that support manpower planning and HR management.

13–9. Manpower management at HQDA

a. In managing military manpower at the macro level, the key measurement used by HR managers is the Operating Strength Deviation (OpSD). OpSD is a measurement of how much the OS (faces) is deviating from the FSA (spaces). The OS must not be confused with the FSA. The anticipated size of the OS, however, gives a good idea as to how large a structure can realistically be manned. Throughout the year there can be many causes for these deviations, such as unpredicted changes in retention rates and seasonal surges in acquisitions. Personnel managers must constantly monitor the OpSD and adjust personnel policies to ensure the Army has an optimum match of faces to spaces. At the same time, the Army must comply with the congressional mandate to be at the authorized end strength on the last day of each FY.

b. Although the goal is to minimize the difference (delta) or deviation between the FSA and the OS, some deviation, the OpSD, almost always exists. A positive deviation (OS greater than FSA) means personnel are present in units in excess of structure requirements. A negative deviation (FSA exceeds OS) means the structure is larger than the quantity of personnel available to fill it. The OS is easily computed by subtracting TTHS personnel from the total strength. The OpSD is computed by subtracting the FSA from the OS.

c. The size of the OS is affected by fluctuations in the two elements employed in its calculation: the total strength (“ES” at year end) and total TTHS at any particular time. Changes in the OS over time and the magnitude of the FSA affect the OpSD. Often these quantities are compared only at the end of the FY (end strength). It is, however, often much more meaningful to view the situation on an average throughout the year by calculating man year values for each of these quantities. This provides more information than the frequently atypical and skewed end strength picture, which represents only one day in the entire year. Figure 13–1 illustrates the relationships between the components of the force just discussed.

d. The total number of personnel in TTHS will fluctuate considerably throughout the year due to a variety of reasons, such as the seasonal increase in transients during the summer and in trainees during the fall and winter. Past experience and estimates of the effects of policy changes make the number of personnel in this account fairly predictable. In the recent past, it has averaged about 13 percent of the total strength.

e. By knowing the TTHS and total strength projections, manpower planners can easily determine the size of the OS and use that as a basis for developing a FSA for building authorized units. TTHS, FSA, and OSD projections are all contained in the AAMMP.

f. The number of personnel in the TTHS is often directly attributable to the personnel policies in effect. Soldier casualties, fill of projected deploying units, and training requirements and policies are but a few examples of policies which affect the size of TTHS. Since TTHS has a direct effect on the faces available for FSA manning, these same policies have a direct impact on the number of units and organizations which the Army can field. Thus, manpower and personnel managers face a constant challenge to ensure a balance exists between the use of authorized spaces and the acquisition, training, and distribution of personnel assets to meet the needs of the Army. The stated personnel needs of the Army as expressed in its various organizational documents change on a daily basis as different units and organizations are activated, inactivated, or changed. However, the process of providing personnel to meet these changing needs is much slower.
The PMAD is built from annual updates of the force structure reflected in the HQDA DCS, G–3 Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) files. In between command plans, decisions are often made which cause significant changes to authorizations. An Updated Authorizations Document (UAD) which makes adjustments to PMAD authorizations is produced periodically to capture such changes. The personnel community uses PMAD and its most current UAD as the sole source of AC authorizations to Unit Identification Code (UIC), Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), grade, and ASI level of detail for the current and budget years. The focus of the PMAD and UAD is on detail for near-term distribution. The PMAD is the basis for decisions regarding accessions, training, force alignment, promotions, and distribution of personnel. Throughout this text the term PMAD refers to the PMAD itself or its most current UAD.

13–11. Notional force (NOF) system
a. TAADS, SAMAS, and, therefore, PMAD provide affordable MOS and grade requirements only in the execution and budget years. For personnel planning through the POM years, DCS, G–1 has developed a NOF that converts broad force structure guidance into MOS and grade projections. The NOF modifies the PMAD to make force structure changes that have been envisioned by DCS, G–3 but have not been decided or coordinated. The NOF then generates data at Army command, type code (TYPCO) (modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE), TDA, augmentation TDA (AUGTDA)), MOS, and grade level of detail. The NOF does not generate UIC level of detail. NOFs are built to examine supportability of special projects, specifically the TAA program. The output from the NOF is available to users of the HQDA decision support system.
b. In contrast to the PMAD, which is focused on the execution and budget years, the NOF is focused on the program years. Combined with the PMAD, the NOF provides a clear picture of affordable authorizations for the AC.
c. When a NOF is not published, the PMAD is the sole document for the execution, budget and POM years.

13–12. Military force alignment
Force alignment is “managing changing faces and spaces” simultaneously by grade level and CMF/MOS-reshaping a force today to also meet tomorrow’s needs. The always changing AAMMP, PMAD, and budget are intensively managed monthly for the PPBE six-year cycle (see Chapter 9); ensuring military personnel strength is skill-qualified and available for distribution. Force alignment strives to synchronize military personnel programs: promotions, recruiting, accessions, training, reenlistment, reclassification, and special and incentive discretionary pay. Simultaneously, every effort is made to provide professional career development consistent with Army force manning levels for qualified Soldiers. Management forums are the functional review (FR), personnel functional assessment (PFA), structure manning decision review (SMDR), monthly military personnel review (M2PR), training requirements arbitration panel/process (TRAP), and Career Management Field (CMF) reviews. Representation in shaping the officer and enlisted forces involves the entire personnel community in varying degrees of programming and execution. ES is a
major planning tool for enlisted force alignment analysis. The goal: to achieve a PMAD grade-CMF/MOS match to OS for the current year, budget year, and program years.

Section III
The acquisition function

13–13. Enlisted procurement

a. Based on input from the PMAD (authorizations by skill and grade), TAPDB–AE (skills and grades on hand), and the AAMMP (projected accessions in the aggregate), the MOSLS projects the numbers and training requirements for the various MOSs. This in turn is used to develop the annual program (ANNPRO) and the ARPRINT and feeds the personnel input to the ATRRS which is linked to the Recruiting and Training Reservation System (REQUEST) and the Reenlistment Reservation System (RETAIR) (Figure 13–2).

b. The mission of the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is to obtain the quantity and quality of recruits to meet both AC and USAR requirements. Enlistment options provide the vehicle by which Army applicants are attracted. The option packages vary and contain such incentives for applicants as training guarantees, unit/station of choice assignments, guaranteed periods of stabilization in a specific unit or area, and payment of bonuses or education incentives. Additionally, the length of the enlistment period varies for certain options and skills.

(1) Quality constraints. The recruiter is constrained by quality standards which must be met. A potential enlistee is classified as a result of an Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) which has 10 aptitude areas. ASVAB results place individuals into test score categories and determine both basic enlistment and specific MOS eligibility. Both law and Army policy constrain the number of certain test categories the recruiting force may enlist. The Army non-prior service (NPS) accession quality program seeks to maximize the number of high school diploma graduates and those in the upper test score categories, with a ceiling established for the lower test score categories.

(2) MOS training targets. All new Soldiers receive a minimum of twelve weeks of initial entry training (IET) prior to becoming available for deployment. All new Soldiers recruited by USAREC contract for a specific MOS, which is supported by a resourced training seat. Using projections from ES, HRC projects annual IET requirements for new Soldiers in the ANNPRO for each MOS. These requirements then feed into the ATRRS. In ATRRS, IET requirements combine with professional development and other training requirements and are presented at the SMDR for resourcing. Once approved by the Army leadership, all training requirements and approved training programs are identified in the ARPRINT.

(3) Management of recruiting objectives. The. Recruit Quota Enlistment System (REQUEST) is an automated enlistment and training space management system designed to support the Army’s recruiting and RC retention missions. The system is a worldwide, real-time, interactive system and is the controlling element for recruiters and RC retention NCOs in translating aggregate mission objectives to the MOS needs of the Army. It uses a worldwide telecommunications network with remote data terminals accessing a common data bank containing the Army’s training
programs determined by the ARPRINT. ATRRS provides class schedules and quota allocations to REQUEST, which becomes visible to Army recruiters to enlist Soldiers to fill those quotas. The system provides reservation processing for enlistment options, accession controls, and management information reports from remote data terminals.

(a) REQUEST, designed to enhance the efficiency of Army recruiting, provides the Army with a means of allocating training resources to accessions. Enlistment options during periods of nonmobilization result from a review of the applicant’s qualifications based on the ASVAB, physical testing, individual preference, and Army MOS requirements. An automated matching algorithm aligns the applicant’s qualifications, desires, and aptitudes to the Army’s needs. Qualification checks and other features of the system preclude erroneous enlistments into skills for which the applicant does not qualify.

(b) The REQUEST Unit Distribution Program (RUDIST) adds a unit vacancy and distribution guidance file to the REQUEST System. A portion of the training spaces for, MOSs available under an enlistment option, guarantees a first assignment is allocated to specific units and stations. Allocations of first assignment are based upon projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

(c) The REQUEST System is the controlling element for recruiters in translating aggregate recruiting objectives to the MOS needs of the Army.

(4) Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS).

(a) The MEPS is a jointly staffed Service activity charged with aptitude testing, medical examination, moral evaluation, and administrative processing of applicants for the Armed Forces. DA is the DOD Executive Agent for the MEPS. The Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) commands and controls the MEPS.

(b) Once the recruiter has determined the applicant’s desire to enlist and his or her areas of interest, he or she can administer an enlistment screening test which gives an informal indication of how the applicant might fare on the ASVAB. If the applicant continues his or her interest, he or she goes to a MEPS for processing.

13–14. Warrant officer (WO) procurement

a. Warrant officers are single-specialty, system-oriented officers, appointed based on technical competence to perform in a single function for an entire career. USAREC procures warrant officer candidates for the AC. DCS, G–1 develops a recruiting goal by MOS for each FY. USAREC uses this and an internally created lead refinement list, to direct recruiting efforts, especially for hard-skill MOSs with existing or projected critical shortages. Most applicants for non-aviation MOS come from the AC enlisted ranks, primarily sergeants and staff sergeants, while approximately 40% of aviation applicants come from outside the Army. Applicants also come from other in-service sources such as other Services, commissioned officers, and members of the RC.

b. Applications of all eligible individuals are evaluated by a HQDA selection board. USAREC conducts the board which is composed of a field grade officer president and warrant officer members from each branch with applicants to be considered. Those recommended by the board on an order of merit list are slated to attend, the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), in a candidate status, as procurement openings present themselves Each WO1 attends the appropriate warrant officer basic course (WOBC) to complete certification training.

c. The recruitment, application processing, and selection of warrant officers for the USAR is performed in a similar manner as the AC. However, USAREC recruits warrant officer candidates against specific USAR unit vacancies. In addition, USAREC accepts and processes applications for Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), IMA, and IRR vacancies. The USAR uses boarding and school-slating procedures similar to those used by the AC. The ARNG solicits applications through announcement of vacancies via an internal recruiting effort. The boarding and school-slating procedures are as determined by each individual State Adjutant General. All RC WO applicants attend WOCS and WOBC. A RC version of WOCS and most WOBCs is available.

13–15. Commissioned officer procurement

The PMAD is the basis for projecting officer requirements while the ARPRINT projects the FY officer training needs of the Army by career field. This projection is based on an analysis of the current inventory and the known losses as determined by HRC and the special branches (Chaplain, Judge Advocate General (JAG), and AMEDD). There are some very important constraints associated with the management of officer end strength. First, OSD, with the consent of Congress, mandates officer strength ceilings. Second, Title 10, USC restricts the numbers of officers serving in the grade of major or higher. Third, enough new officers must be brought into the Army each year to ensure an adequate number of trained individuals by grade, branch, functional area, and skill are available, assuming normal attrition, to meet Army requirements over the life cycle of the year group. There is a definite floor below which failure to procure enough officers in a given year will result in a future shortage by grade.

(a) Officer sources. Sources of officer procurement for basic branch officers include the OCS (see Chapter 15), ROTC, and USMA. FY requirements are determined by the DCS, G–1 and filled through the various commissioning programs and Special Branch Programs. To supplement the above pre-commissioning programs, a few officers may be accessed each year through direct appointments, recall of reserve officers, recall of retired officers, the reinstatement of temporary disability retirees and inter-service transfers. In FY04, the Army implemented a program (Blue to Green) to access members of the Air Force and Navy during periods when the Army end strength was increasing and the other services decreasing. The FY05 NDAA directed that all new officers commissioned to the Active Duty List (ADL)
receive regular appointments regardless of the method or source of commission. All services had to be in compliance with this policy within six months of the NDAA approval. Those officers then on the ADL, who were reservists and already met the requirements of the law, were switched to Regular Army within one year of the NDAA signing. Commissioned officers on the ADL who could not meet the requirements of regular appointment under 10 USC (e.g. citizenship and security clearance) were allowed to continue to serve with reserve appointments for no more than five years from the signature of the Act. No later than the end of that period, all commissioned officers on the ADL must either hold a regular commission or have obtained a waiver from the SecDef. All commissioned officers incur a statutory eight-year military service obligation (MSO), but may serve it in a variety of ways depending on the source of their commission.

b. OCS.

(1) OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia, trains and commissions officers for the AC and RC. AC OCS graduates incur a three-year active duty service obligation (ADSO) and may serve the remainder of their 8-year MSO on AD or in the RC. RC graduates receive an USAR appointment and revert to Reserve status after completing basic officer leader course (BOLC 3) (see 15–20b). RC graduates incur only the statutory MSO, but must serve 6 years of that in a TPU.

(2) In-service candidates are enlisted Soldiers serving on active duty. Semiannual selection boards at HRC select qualified Soldier applicants for OCS. Branches are assigned based on the needs of the Army and Soldier qualifications and preferences. There is currently a MILPER message that also authorizes general officer commanders to directly select for OCS without board consideration. In-service candidates incur a 3 year ADSO, and their remaining MSO depends on how long they served in an enlisted status (must be at least 8 years).

c. ROTC. The majority of new officer accessions each year are commissioned through ROTC which trains and commissions officers for both the AC and RC. Branching is accomplished through a HQDA board based on the needs of the Army and the cadet’s qualifications and individual preferences.

(1) AC. Scholarship cadets have a four-year ADSO, while non-scholarship cadets have a three-year obligation. The remainder of the eight-year MSO may be served on AD or in the RC.

(2) RC. Scholarship cadets must serve in a TPU all eight years, while non-scholarship cadets must serve at least six years in a TPU. The remaining two years may be spent in the IRR.

d. United States Military Academy (USMA). The USMA trains and commissions officers for active duty. A formal branch selection procedure based on branch quotas established by HQDA is conducted at West Point during the cadets’ senior year. The active duty service obligation for USMA graduates is five years and the remainder of their MSO may be served on AD or in the RC.

e. Special branches. The special branches generally procure officers through their individual programs, and service obligations vary depending upon the program. Medical and Chaplain Officer procurement has been assigned to the USAREC.

Section IV
The compensation function

13–16. Compensation overview

a. Compensation is a relatively recent addition to the military HR life cycle. Over one third of the Army’s total obligation authority relates to compensation and only through controlling the cost drivers (number, grade, and skill of Soldiers) can the Army manage the dollars appropriated by the Congress.

b. The Army’s personnel assets are centrally managed as are Army resources tied to these assets. The Army pays against the inventory (assigned strength), but authorizations and personnel policies are the cost drivers.

c. Personnel management policies, force structure decisions, and content of the force influence the MPA appropriation requirement. Among these cost drivers are the following:

- Pay rates.
- Stationing plans and manpower.
- Clothing bag.
- Entitlements.
- Reenlistment rates.
- Marital status.
- Size of the Army OCONUS and overseas station allowances.
- Tour lengths.
- Variable housing allowance.
- Force changes.
- Grade and skill content.

d. The MPA account pays the force, moves the force, subsists the force, and supports the force. Pay includes pay and allowances for officers, enlisted, and cadets. Movement is managed under the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) account, which is sub-divided into accessions, separations, training, operational, rotational, and unit moves. Subsistence
provides payment for the basic allowance for subsistence and subsistence in kind. Finally, support comes in other military personnel costs such as education, adoption, unemployment, death gratuities, and survivor benefit programs.

13–17. Manning Program Evaluation Group (PEG)
At the departmental level, all personnel related programs are contained within the Manning PEG. The Manning PEG has responsibility to determine the valid requirements for those programs in Figure 13–3. All should come together in providing the right skills, at the right place and time.

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<tr>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Readiness</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military Pay, Army (MPA)</td>
<td>Examining (MEPCOM)</td>
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<td>National Guard Pay, Army (NGPA)</td>
<td>PERSCOM/AR PERSCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Pay, Army (RPA)</td>
<td>Reception Battalions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Technicians (ARNG)</td>
<td>Recruiting &amp; Advertising</td>
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<td>Service Wide Support</td>
<td>Reserve Recruiting/Retention/Fam Spt</td>
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<td>Acquisition Corps</td>
<td>Officer accession programs</td>
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<td>Army Broadcasting</td>
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<td>Chaplain Support Agency</td>
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<td>Correctional Facilities</td>
<td>e-MILPO</td>
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<td>Disposition of Remains</td>
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<td>CHRA-Regions</td>
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<td>Special Programs</td>
<td>KEYSTONE</td>
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<td>Army Career Alumni Program</td>
<td>PERMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bands (Special &amp; Garrison)</td>
<td>MEPCOM Automation</td>
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<td>Boy/Girl Scouts</td>
<td>HRC-STL Automation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Golden Knights</td>
<td>Total Army Personnel DB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior ROTC</td>
<td>HRC Automation Spt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Museum Program</td>
<td>USAREC Automation Spt</td>
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<td>Veterans Education Assistance Pgm</td>
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Figure 13–3. Manning programs

Section V
The distribution function

13–18. Enlisted distribution and assignment

a. Distribution challenge. In theory, the distribution planning and assignment processes place the right Soldier with the right skills at the right place at the right time. In fact, the system does a very credible job for those MOSs and grades which are nearly balanced, those for which the overseas-to-sustaining base ratio is supportable, and for those in which there is a high density of personnel in substitutable skills. The problem arises in the MOSs where these conditions do not exist, and a sharing of shortages is required for all commands. When certain commands, or organizations, are exempted from “shortage-sharing” based upon special guidance, it compounds shortages to be shared by the organizations lower in priority. The readiness cost of this compounded “shortage-sharing” comes to light when each organization must assess its mission capable status in the monthly readiness reporting. The personnel component of the report involves several calculations, but its principal factors are assigned strength, available strength, available senior grade personnel (SGT and above), and MOS qualification.

(1) Enlisted personnel distribution is a very complex business, replete with pitfalls and shortcomings because of the rapidly changing variables which exist-force structure changes, recruiting success, training attrition rates, retention rates, military personnel authorizations, dollar constraints, and most of all, the unpredictability of the individual Soldier, his or her health, and his or her family. All of these variables point up the critical factors which govern
successful distribution - the accuracy and timeliness of the databases being used for analysis. Authorizations not approved and posted expeditiously to PMAD and individual change data not properly reported for posting on the TAPDB–AE make the already complicated distribution system less responsive.

(2) Soldiers have the ability to influence their assignment is several ways. One is by submitting an assignment preference. They do so via a web based application called ASK (Assignment Satisfaction Key), which allows the Soldier to update his/her assignment desires and volunteer for valid requirements directly with HRC in real-time.

b. Distribution planning and priorities.

(1) The Army introduced the program of Force Stabilization in FY04, in order to provide Soldiers and their families more predictability and stability during periods of high OPTEMPO, and build more cohesive, combat-ready units. This program has two primary components: Stabilization and Unit Focused Stability. Stabilization is designed to assign Soldiers, on their initial assignment, for much longer periods of time than in the past. During this extended period, the soldier may deploy several times, but his/her family would enjoy a level of stability. Also during the Soldier’s career, he/she would return to that installation repeatedly, if possible. Unit Focused Stability synchronizes the Soldier’s tour with the unit’s operational cycle, but also allows commanders flexibility to manage turbulence within their unit by focusing training around replacement periods.

(2) The basic document which defines priorities for the distribution of enlisted personnel to all units/activities is the FY HQDA AC Force Distribution Policy. DCS, G–1 publishes and distributes this guidance to HRC and to Army commands for implementation. The policy encompasses initial assignments, PCS reassignments, reassignments within commands, and unit moves. Distribution is driven by requirements to fill approved authorizations documented in PMAD/UAD, DMO, space imbalanced MOS (SIMOS), and overstrengths in specific high priority units. Distribution is affected by recruiting and retention goal achievement; unprogrammed losses; and fiscal constraints affecting promotions, PCS movements, and end strength. Special priorities are based on operational and training requirements for special skills, such as Ranger qualifications and linguists.

(3) In 1999, the CSA dramatically changed the distribution priorities in the Army, by establishing four general priorities. The priorities were: 1) AC divisions, ACRs, and other high priority organizations/positions (e.g. Drill Sergeants, prison guards, recruiters, 75th Ranger Regiment, AC/RC positions, CTCs, etc.); 2) early deploying units; 3) the remainder of the TOE Army not previously filled; 4) TDA Army. These priorities were designed to first fill warfighting formations, but had to be accomplished without breaking any organizations in the process. Manning the Force in accordance with the CSA priorities, a key ingredient of the Personnel Transformation initiative, postured the Army very well to respond to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As these operations became more protracted enlisted distribution guidance changed in FY04 to focus primarily on units that were deployed, units preparing to deploy, and other high priority units based on policy or statute and the guidance has been adjusted almost annually. FY08–10 G–1 distribution guidance employs a phased readiness methodology and is reflected in Figure 13–4.
c. Enlisted Distribution Target Model (EDTM).

(1) The EDTM is an automated system which creates enlisted distribution targets by MOS, grade and UIC. The model fills each UIC reflected in the PMAD with projected available inventory from the ES in accordance with the DCS, G–1 distribution policy. This results in an optimum distribution of scarce resources consistent with distribution policy fill priorities. The EDTM constrains the assignment process to coincide with the projected OS targets. It represents the assets the Army realistically expects to be available for distribution.

(2) The EDTM is maintained by the Enlisted Distribution Division, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD), HRC. The targets are produced monthly with EDTM targets for grade bands E1–4, E5–8 and E9. Calendar month (CM) +6 through CM+18 are visible to field personnel managers via Personnel Network (PERNET) using the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS).

d. Management systems. HRC uses several automated data-processing systems to distribute, manage, and develop active duty enlisted personnel. These systems are described below and reflected in Figure 13–5.

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1 In Reset could be as low as 50% Aggregate fill
2 USMA & USMA Garrison Priority 1 fill
3 100% fill Drill Sgts and Recruiter only
4 Enlisted PE positions targeted at 100%
5 OPM-SANG and AFSC coded positions are MP1 elements

Figure 13–4. Manning Priorities and Standards
(1) TAPDB is the heart of the overall system. It consists of three logical components containing personnel, requisition, and organizational data. The personnel component (PER DB) contains personnel information on every active duty Soldier. HRC and DCS, G–1 use this information to determine Army readiness, strength, promotion eligibles, reassignable personnel, and training requirements. The requisition component (REQ DB) contains information on requirements to move individuals and information on those who have been directed to move (assignments). The organization component (ORG DB) contains information on location and status of Army units; it does not contain any authorization or unit strength information.

(2) HRC Enlisted Personnel Data Update System (PEPDUS) is one of the major systems used to update the data on the TAPDB. It consists of two components, a batch component and an on-line, interactive component that allows managers worldwide to query and update personnel data.

(a) The batch component receives transactions daily from other systems. The primary source is eMILPO, but other sources such as the Centralized Promotion System and the EDAS submit transactions. PEPDUS is also designed to support mobilization. During a mobilization scenario it is able to process over 500,000 transactions daily. As PEPDUS updates the TAPDB, it also creates transactions that are passed back to eMILPO (receipt notices, update transactions, DA error notices, etc.), in order to update the TAPDB Mobilization Databases (TAPDB–MOB), and provide feedback to other systems.

(b) The on-line interactive component allows EPMD managers to update data items on the PER DB. Some examples are CONUS and OCONUS assignment preferences, assignment eligibility, and date eligible for return from overseas (DEROS). As EPMD managers update, PEPDUS updates the eMILPO Personnel File.

(3) Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) is an on-line system which allows EPMD managers to create, review and update requisition and assignment data. It also provides reports for those managers for strength management of the force. It has several batch programs that exchange information with external systems. EDAS allows EPMD distribution and assignment managers to work with one collection of information on the same computer. Under previous systems, updates to information occurred only during the weekend; updates are now instantaneous. Consequently, decisions made by one manager are immediately available to all other managers. Moreover, EDAS provides field users the capability to view and in some cases update the same information that distribution and assignment managers use to make decisions. Finally, EDAS reduces the time to validate a requirement, select a Soldier to fill the requirement, and transmit the assignment instructions to the field. A more detailed explanation on how EDAS is used in distributing and assigning Soldiers is presented in a subsequent section.
(4) Assignment of newly trained personnel.

(a) Permanent unit assignments are based on input to HRC from basic and advanced individual training centers via the Student/Trainee Management System-Enlisted (STRAMS–E), a module within the ATRRS. Information is passed by ATRRS to EDAS which processes newly trained personnel for assignment.

(b) If an individual has an enlistment agreement for a unit in an area, he or she is assigned according to the enlistment contract upon satisfactory completion of training. Soldiers who have no unit/area options are assigned against requirements in accordance with a distribution plan prepared by HRC. Assignment instructions are generated by EDAS and sent directly to losing commands. The transaction is processed through EDAS and is posted to the TAPDB. EDAS advises the gaining command of the assignment.

e. Enlisted distribution management. HRC Enlisted Readiness Division manages the strengths of major overseas commands, Army commands, and special management and functional commands worldwide. HRC established a direct requisition authority to each of the divisions/ACRs to ensure projected gains to those organizations were not diverted by installation strength managers. Under modularity and brigade centric organizations, brigades with organic military HR assets will requisition and receive replacements directly from HRC. Strength managers at HRC project the assigned strength of an activity ranging from the current month’s strength out to 12 months, and determine how many Soldiers are needed each month to ensure the commands meet targets established by the FY enlisted distribution policy (Figure 13–4). These aggregate totals (arranged by individual rank and rank bands, i.e., private-specialist, sergeant-staff sergeant, sergeant first class-master sergeant, and sergeant major) are the basis for transition into individual MOS requirements. These “top of the system” strength managers then determine how many requisitions for replacements should be submitted, by coordinating with field commanders.

(f) Overseas requisitions. Requirements for Korea, USAREUR, and USARPAC are analyzed 10 months into the future (8 months for USARPAC). Using the EDTM targets, distribution managers allocate requisitions to each command at the 4-character MOS level, allowing commands 2 weeks to submit requisitions at the 9-character MOS level, including any other special requirements.

g. CONUS requisitions.

(1) For CONUS installations, requisitioning is partially constrained through a process known as requisition allocation plan–CONUS (RAP–C). Since fill of vacancies in CONUS commands is partially based on eligible overseas returnees, RAP–C keys on DEROS data in the TAPDB–AE and calculates the number of Soldiers in an MOS and grade who are expected to return to CONUS in a requisition month (two months after DEROS month). CONUS requisitions are normally validated 12 months out. Distributors at HRC, using the EDTM, allocate these Soldiers. If the EDM requires more requisitions than Soldiers returning from overseas, additional requisitions are loaded, which will require CONUS-to–CONUS moves.

(2) The next effort for HQDA distribution managers is validation, whether for CONUS or OCONUS. If an apparent over or under requisitioning exists, the manager attempts to resolve the discrepancy with the command/installation prior to making a decision to validate, or not validate, requisitions. Discrepancies in the two projections may be caused by a proponent-approved authorization change at the unit level not yet recorded in the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS), or by more current authorizations data available to HRC through the use of the PMAD, or by more current gain and loss data. The problem is resolved prior to the submission of the validated requisitions for assignment processing in the EDAS.

(3) Distribution managers continually monitor command and installation strength projections and adjust accordingly. Deletions, authorization changes, and other variables may create need for top loading or canceling requisitions.

h. EDAS. EDAS consists of several major subsystems: management information, requisition, policy, assignment, and personnel.

(1) EPMD distribution managers use the management information subsystem to determine an organization’s authorized, assigned, and projected strength. Managers can obtain this information by MOS, skill, CMF, grade, special qualification identifier (SQI), ASI, language, Distribution Management Level/Sub-Level (DML/DMSL), location (installation, state, and country), command, requisition activity code, TPSN, and/or UIC. This information is used to determine the number of valid requisitions needed to maintain that organization at an acceptable strength level.

(2) After the distribution managers determine the number of valid requisitions, the assignment managers must fill them. The policy and nomination subsystems assist assignment managers by recommending which Soldier should be assigned to each requisition and also provide alternate recommendations.

(3) The policy subsystem allows EPMD managers to enter assignments into EDAS that are in accordance with current policies. For example, Soldiers with Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program (HAAP) agreements can only be recommended for assignments which fulfill HAAP agreements.

(4) In addition to making assignments, the assignment subsystem provides the capability to delete or defer Soldiers. If field users have the authority to approve a deletion or deferment, they can complete the action interactively through the assignment subsystem as an alternative to submitting it through eMILPO. If field users do not have the authority to approve the action, they can request a deletion or deferment electronically through EDAS. Throughout this entire process, the field user can interactively monitor the current status of the request.

(5) One important aspect of EDAS is that the system tightly controls access and what the user can do in the system.
Some modules allow users to query data, while others allow updates. EDAS controls access by individual user and provides system managers with audit trails which can be used to determine who accessed or changed data in the system. Additionally, EDAS controls which records a user can query and/or update.

(6) The EDAS promotion points update module allows field personnel managers to post promotion point data for Soldiers in grades E4 and E5 directly to the TAPDB. This function allows personnel managers to review and update the information that is resident on the TAPDB. This information is then used by HRC to determine the numbers of promotions for each month by MOS. By using the promotion subsystem, field managers can see those Soldiers, by name, who were considered eligible for promotion when the calculations were performed. If the data on the Soldiers is incomplete or in error, field managers use the EDAS promotion point update and promotion update functions to update the data, promote the Soldier, or alert HRC managers as to why Soldiers will not be promoted. EDAS returns the promotion on the Soldier to eMILPO which then updates local databases and the DFAS.

(7) EDAS fully supports mobilization scenarios. The policy subsystem can store and maintain any number of scenarios (peace, limited mobilization, full mobilization, etc.) and the user can invoke any one of the scenarios in seconds. The system can also evaluate “what if” questions.

i. The Army Automated Reenlistment/Recalssification System (RETAI

The DDS process.

b. Distribution planning. The officer distribution planners and managers at HRC are influenced by three principal factors: officer assets (inventory), authorizations, and priorities. All three are in a constant state of change. Therefore, there is a need for a master distribution plan that will ensure that all commands, agencies, and activities receive, according to priority, an appropriate share of the available officer assets/inventory. The foundation of this master plan is a management tool known as the Dynamic Distribution System (DDS), formerly the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP), and also formerly the Officer Distribution System (ODS). The DDS brings assets/inventory, authorizations, and priorities into balance and is one of the Army’s most important systems for officer distribution planning. Compared to ODP and ODS, DDS provides commanders greater latitude in distributing officers assets allocated to them and allows distribution adjustments with less required lead time. DDS allows the Army to be more flexible during times of war and transformation, as DDS allows us to shift with the Army’s changing priorities.

b. The DDS process. If available officer assets matched the requirements identified through the PMAD, by branch, functional area, and grade, officers would simply be assigned against authorizations. However, this is rarely the case. As with most resources, there is generally a greater demand than there is a supply, and officer shortages result. Some system of priorities is needed to help manage these shortages. After the officer inventory has been compared with the authorizations in the PMAD, a computer system called the Personnel Priority Model (PPM) is used to resolve the identified differences. The PPM apportions officer assets to the appropriate commands based on the Dynamic Army Resourcing Priority List (DARPL) and any special distribution guidance as determined by HQDA (Figure 13–6). Under DDS, a movable officer fits into one of two categories: non-discretionary or discretionary. A non-discretionary move
includes those moves that involve hard dates in an officer’s career, e.g. a DEROS from an overseas assignment, a report date to a professional school, a graduation date from a school, a command selection, a PMS selection, a joint tour completion, a sequential assignment report date, or a retirement date. These can generally be determined from data analysis from TOPMIS. A discretionary move includes those moves that are triggered by an assignment officer working to ensure an officer continues appropriate career development, e.g., an officer needs a new skill set (Joint or Army Staff), an officer’s skills are no longer applicable to the current assignment, or where an officer is pre-positioned for a career enhancing position (Command, Schools, etc.). Moves driven by the individual needs of the officer are also included in this category, e.g., EFMP, joint domicile, and compassionate reassignments and personal preference.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 13–6. Officer distribution**

c. *Officer requisition system.* The officer requisition system is designed to fill the officer requirements of all commands and activities.

(1) *Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS).* This is a fully integrated management information system which supports the officer management process within HRC and at worldwide requisitioning activities. TOPMIS is composed of seven operational modules:

(a) The control module provides security of access and updating, creates individual user profiles, and provides online electronic mail service to all TOPMIS users.

(b) The strength module displays operating and projected strength down to the CMF level for requisitioning activities in various report formats.

(c) The goaling and monitoring module displays assignment goals for the FY by grade and CMF. It is also used to plan the DDS and monitor its progress.

(d) The requisition module allows distribution managers and the requisition activity managers to generate, edit, validate (based on the DDS), and update requisitions. This module generates and maintains requisitions based on projected strength. The final product is a list of requisitions for career managers to fill.

(e) The asset/officer record brief (ORB) module provides an online version of the ORB and the capability for online updating of ORB fields by career managers. This module also provides access to by-name reports of officers assigned and/or on orders.

(f) The assignment module provides access to personnel, requisition, and organization data; provides online extract/update capability from the TAPDB–AO via TOPMIS; and processes assignments generated by HRC managers in the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD). Assignment instructions are transmitted electronically on a daily basis to the gaining and losing requisition activity.

(g) The user assistance module allows users to review data name definitions and tables of valid codes used in officer management.
(h) TOPMIS interacts with the TAPDB–AO and is used by assignment and distribution managers of the basic branches, medical department branches, the Chief of Chaplains, and JAG offices. Worldwide requisition/officer management activities can access TOPMIS through the Defense Data Network (DDN) or a variety of host-to-host systems.

(2) Requisition cycles. Officer requisitions are generated on an alternating bimonthly basis for either overseas or CONUS. As a general goal, requisitions are validated so that officers will arrive 12 months after validation, which also allows a 12 month notification to the officer concerned. As a normal rule, overseas returnees, school requirements and units preparing to deploy drive the assignment system because these officers must move on time and deploying units must have necessary officer assets. Overseas returnees and various school requirements is largely due to tour length policies and graduation dates respectively. Others are assigned to replace these personnel and the cycle continues.

(3) Assignment challenge. Assignment officers within the divisions and branches of OPMD must take into consideration a wide variety of competing factors in the process of identifying the right officers to fill valid requisitions. Some, but by no means all, of these factors are listed below. They are in no particular order, because each assignment action is unique.

- Army requirements.
- Gaining and losing organizations’ requirements.
- Tour equity (CONUS vs OCONUS)
- Time-on-station and Dwell time.
- Professional development.
- Officer preference.
- Joint domicile.
- Compassionate situations.
- CTC experience.
- Joint duty.

Section VI
The development function

13–20. Enlisted development
There must be a way of developing leadership, evaluating, and rewarding those who do well, and eliminating those who do not measure up. This section will address some of the programs designed to accomplish these tasks and to create an environment which will motivate men and women to become career Soldiers.

13–21. Enlisted personnel management system (EPMS)
   a. The EPMS provides a logical career path from private to sergeant major, career-long training, and performance-oriented evaluation. Additionally, it is designed to eliminate promotion bottlenecks, provide all Soldiers with promotion opportunities, make assignments more flexible, and provide greater challenge by making MOSs more multi-functional.
   b. A key feature of EPMS is to associate five standardized skill levels for the enlisted ranks, with privates and specialists having skill level 1 and master sergeants and sergeants major having skill level 5. EPMS skill levels were selected so that the vital middle-grade NCOs would be distinct and visible for management purposes.
   c. Another major feature of EPMS is the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) which is discussed in detail in Chapter 15 of this text. EPMS and NCOES are part of the same continuum.

13–22. Enlisted evaluation system (EES)
At the heart of EPMS is the EES. It is used to assist in the identification of Soldiers for assignment, promotion, reenlistment, reclassification, special training, elimination, and other personnel management actions. The EES consists of academic evaluation reports (AER) and a NCO evaluation report (NCOER) for sergeant and above. Both reports serve as the official evaluation of duty performance and academic success and provide a record of each individual NCO’s potential.

13–23. The NCO leader self-development career model
   a. The NCO Leader Self-Development Career Model provides enlisted Soldiers a guide in the selection of self-development activities recommended by CMF proponents. Career models have been developed by SMEs for each CMF and are published in DA Pamphlet 600–25.
   b. The career models correspond to the Army’s leader development process relating self-development activities to institutional training and operational assignments. The models can help Soldiers establish planned, progressive, and sequential self-development programs which enhance and sustain military competencies as well as required skills, knowledge, and attributes (SKAs). The career models also contain CMF-proponent recommended goals, e.g., licensure,
certification, or academic degree, and allow Soldiers to combine experience and training with self-development activities for career progression as well as goal achievement.

c. Activities and goals are recommendations, not requirements, and do not preclude mission assignments and training. Completion does not guarantee advancement. The career models are tools for use by supervisors and professional education counselors to help guide Soldiers in their professional and personal growth. They also may be used to help Soldiers prepare for NCOEs and NCO functional resident courses.

d. The elements in the leader development process—education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement—create a dynamic synergy to prepare Soldiers for increasing responsibilities. Self-development is the only aspect of that process over which the Soldier has direct control. The career model can stimulate involvement in this vital imperative, which should be the goal of every career Soldier. To foster this desire requires close cooperation between commanders, supervisors, education counselors, and the Soldier.

13–24. Enlisted promotions

a. The objectives of the enlisted promotion system are to ensure advancement of the best qualified Soldiers, to provide career incentive, to promote Soldiers based on potential rather than as a reward for past service, and to identify and preclude promotion of Soldiers who are nonproductive and ineffective. Three programs make up the promotion system: the decentralized program which controls advancements from private through specialist; the semi-centralized program which controls promotions to SGT and SSG; and the centralized program which controls promotions to SFC through SGM/CSM.

b. Under the decentralized program, authority to appoint and promote Soldiers is delegated to local commanders, but there must be compliance with standard policies and procedures established by HQDA. Promotion boards are not required.

c. Authority to promote Soldiers under the semi-centralized program is delegated to field commanders who are serving in an authorized lieutenant colonel or above command position in accordance with guidance from HQDA. In this case, eligible Soldiers compete Army-wide on the basis of relative standings by points attained on a standardized point system. Soldiers recommended for promotion are required to appear in person for evaluation by a selection board. Names of Soldiers recommended for promotion by the board are placed on a locally maintained recommended list and grouped by MOS in an order of merit based on the total points attained under the point system. HQDA controls the number of Soldiers who can be promoted in each MOS by establishing cut-off scores according to the needs of the Army. Soldiers whose scores equal or exceed the announced cut-off scores are promoted without regard to assignment. Those not immediately promoted remain on the recommended list until promoted, unless they are removed for administrative reasons or for cause. Soldiers on a recommended list may request reevaluation to improve their standing. Recent program changes due to SGT shortages mandate that Specialists and Corporals (E-4) meeting minimum time-in-grade and time-in-service requirements for promotion to SGT be automatically integrated on the promotion standing list without local board action unless his/her commander takes action to prevent such action.

d. Promotions to sergeant first class through sergeant major are centralized and a board, convened by HQDA, makes selections. Selections are based on the “whole person concept.” No one single factor should be considered disqualifying, but rather an individual’s entire record is given careful consideration. Selections are made on a best-qualified basis in conjunction with Army needs.

13–25. Command sergeants major program

This program ensures the selection and assignment of the best-qualified sergeants major, first sergeants, and master sergeants for command sergeant major positions. These positions are the principal enlisted assistants to commanders of organizations with enlisted troop strength equivalent to a battalion or higher level and commanded by a lieutenant colonel or above. Boards convened by HQDA make selections. A list of those selected is published and maintained within HRC for use in appointing personnel to fill vacancies. Command sergeants major are assigned only to positions which have been designated by the DCS, G-1.

13–26. Total army retention program

This program consists of the AA Retention and RC Transition Programs and is responsible for assisting in manning the force with quality Soldiers by achieving and maintaining a balanced career content in the Regular Army enlisted force. The Retention Program also focuses on improving quality through the retention of trained, qualified, and experienced enlisted Soldiers in the correct MOS and grade. Those not retained in the Active Force, being otherwise qualified, are recruited to serve in USAR or ARNG units. AC Retention and RC Transition Program objectives are assigned to commands by DCS, G-1 while HRC provides overall program and personnel management of the programs. Personnel and fiscal support of the RC Transition Program is provided by the ARNG and USAR.

13–27. Qualitative management program (QMP)

a. This program was developed as a means of improving the enlisted career force and consists of two subprograms—qualitative retention and qualitative screening.
b. The qualitative retention subprogram specifies that a Soldier cannot reenlist beyond the time-in-service limits established for the Soldier’s rank. These limits are called retention control points (RCPs). The qualitative screening subprogram is the DA bar to reenlistment aspect of the QMP. Regularly scheduled, centralized promotion/selection boards for sergeant first class, master sergeant, sergeant major/command sergeant major select individuals for promotion or retention in grade, as well as those Soldiers to be barred. These boards consider the Soldier’s entire record using the “whole person concept,” not just his or her current job or term of service. Soldiers separated with a DA bar receive a reenlistment eligibility code of “4” (no further military service authorized, any branch of Service). Bars to reenlistment were designed as a personnel management tool to assist commanders in denying further service to Soldiers whose separation under administrative procedures is not warranted, but where service beyond current ETS is not in the best interest of the Army. There are two types of bars to reenlistment: field imposed and DA imposed (QMP). Locally imposed bars and DA-imposed bars to reenlistment are two distinct and separate actions. Imposition of one does not preclude imposition of the other. Reenlistment is deemed a privilege and not a right. It is the responsibility of commanders, at all levels to ensure that only those Soldiers of high moral character, personal competence, and demonstrated performance are allowed to reenlist in the Army. Reenlistment should be denied Soldiers who by their performance, conduct, and potential indicate further service will be non-productive and unproductive. Under QMP, commanders must initiate separation actions not later than 60 days following the date the Soldier is notified of the bar unless the Soldier elects to retire, appeal, or requests voluntary discharge. If an appeal is denied, commanders will initiate separation action not later than 60 days from the date of notification of denial. Appeals must be submitted within 90 days of completion of the option statement. Soldiers who have less than 90 days to ETS and who submit appeals may be extended until results of the appeal have been received from CG, HRC. Soldiers who have a DA-imposed bar to reenlistment must separate within 90 days of decision not to appeal or denial of appeal. Soldiers who have 18 but less than 20 years of service on that date may remain on active duty to attain retirement eligibility.

c. Under the Army Mobilization Operation Plan, Annex E, Personnel, the QMP program can be suspended for the period the Army is under partial mobilization.

13–28. Warrant officer development

a. The implementation of TWOS in 1986, the Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) of 1991, the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) (see Para 15–19) in 1992, the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) (see Para 13–30 and 15–19) in 1993 and the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) decisions in 2002, have had a major impact on the management and professional development of warrant officers. The Army’s current goal is to recruit warrant officers earlier in their careers, train them better, and retain them longer. About half of all warrants retired after 23 years of combined (enlisted and warrant officer) active Federal service. Under WOMA, decisions on promotions, training, and assignments are based on years of warrant officer service (WOS). A careerist will have an opportunity to serve up to 24 years of warrant officer service unless twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade.

b. Every Active Army warrant officer position in authorization documents has been classified by rank based on the skills, knowledge, abilities, and experience needed in that position. Formerly there was no rank differentiation in warrant officer positions.

13–29. Warrant officer management act (WOMA)

a. WOMA provided a comprehensive and uniform personnel management system, similar to DOPMA, for warrant officer appointments, promotions, separations, and retirements. The key provisions of WOMA include:

1. Authorized the grade of CW5, to include pay and allowances. Maximum number of CW5s on active duty is limited to five percent of the total number of warrant officers on active duty.

2. Eliminated the dual promotion system and established a DOPMA style promotion system for warrant officers.

3. Established minimum time in grade (TIG) requirement for consideration for promotion.

4. Established authority to convene selective retirement boards (SRB) to consider retirement eligible warrant officers for involuntary retirement.

5. Established the management of warrant officers by years of WOS rather than by active Federal service (AFS). A CW5 may serve for 30 years WOS. Retirement eligibility at 20 years AFS remains unchanged.

6. Established selective continuation for warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion (very limited use and normally in shortage skills).

7. Modified the involuntary separation date from 60 days to the first day of the seventh month after board results are approved. This provision applies to warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion and those selected for involuntary retirement.

b. WOMA modernized warrant officer life cycle management, offers all warrant officers the potential for a full career, provides tools to shape the force, and enhances readiness by providing the Army with a highly qualified and experienced WO Corps.
13–30. Warrant officer education system (WOES)

The WOES was based on a select-train-utilize concept, where warrant officers receive the training required to serve in the next higher grade only after selection for promotion. This linkage concept has been abandoned due to emerging modularity implications and force stabilization initiatives, as well as the large number of warrant officers deployed and unable to meet military education gates in order to be promoted. The Army leadership did not want to disadvantage these officers. WOES consist of the courses depicted in Figure 13–7. Chapter 15 provides additional information on these courses and warrant officer training and education. At this writing, the courses described below are still in effect, but ATLDP recommendations may integrate warrant officer education with evolving commissioned officer education courses (e.g. BOLC, ILE, SSC) to the extent that it makes sense. The procedures for this integration are still evolving and are expected to be codified in the revision of DA PAM 600–3.

a. The WOAC is a combination of common core and MOS proponent training that prepares warrant officers to serve in CW3 level positions. WOAC is provided in a non-resident common core phase and a resident phase, which includes a common core module and a MOS specific module. Career status is required for enrollment in the non-resident phase and selection for CW3 is a prerequisite for attendance at the resident phase.

b. The WOSC is a resident MOS/branch immaterial course to prepare warrant officers to serve in CW4 positions. Selection for CW4 is a prerequisite for attendance.

c. The WOSSC is a resident MOS/branch immaterial course to prepare warrant officers to serve in CW5 positions up to the HQDA staff level. Selection for CW5 is a prerequisite for attendance.

d. Constructive or equivalent credit is permitted for courses that generate a change to the warrant officer’s MEL code. Credit may be granted for active duty experience, service school faculty service, or for attendance at equivalent schools. Warrant officers complete civilian schooling and MOS functional training as required.

e. The proponent for WOES is the Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) (see Para 15–19) at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The WOCC serves as the TRADOC executive agent for the WOES. The WOCC evaluates Common Core instruction within the proponent specific program of instruction for WOBC and WOAC.
Warrant Officer Training and Education

- Active - WOAC, WOSC, and WOSSC may either precede or follow promotion
- RC - WOAC, WOSC, and WOSSC completed prior to promotion

Figure 13–7. Warrant Officer Training and Education
13–31. Warrant officer promotions

Warrant officers are promoted under a single permanent promotion system similar to the commissioned officer system under Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) (see Para 13–46).

a. Promotions to CW3, CW4 and CW5 for warrant officers on the active duty list (ADL) are administered at HQDA. Promotion authority to CW2 is delegated to commanders in the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. Warrant officers may be promoted to CW2 after completion of 24 months in the grade of WO1 under current policy. WOMA allows CW2 promotion consideration after 18 months in grade. Promotions to CW3, CW4 and CW5 occur at approximately six year intervals that may be adjusted to meet grade and end strength requirements. WOMA allows chief warrant officers to be considered for promotion after the completion of three years in their current grade.

b. The promotion opportunities for warrant officers, based on the first time considered (primary zone) population, and the ideal TWOS pin on point for warrant officer promotions are depicted in Table 13–1. These may be adjusted to meet end strength requirements and other management objectives.

c. Warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade will be discharged or retired, if eligible, unless selectively continued on active duty to meet a valid Army requirement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To grade</th>
<th>Promotion opportunity</th>
<th>Years AWOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W2</td>
<td>Fully qualified</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W3</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>7 ±1/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W4</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>12 +/-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W5†</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17 +/-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
† 1. By law the number of CW5s is limited to 5% of the warrant officer force.

13–32. Warrant officer retention programs

a. Voluntary indefinite (VI) status is offered in conjunction with promotion to CW2. The board to consider warrant officers for VI in their fourth year of warrant officer service may be used as a force-shaping tool.

b. Regular Army integration is concurrent with promotion to CW3. Officers who decline Regular Army integration will not be promoted and shall be separated 90 days after the declination date or upon completion of any active duty service obligation, whichever is later.

c. Separate Regular Army integration boards were discontinued during the Army drawdown. Future boards are planned to only consider exceptions; for example, an USAR CW3 who requests and is called to active duty to fill a valid requirement.

d. Warrant officers are released from active duty after being twice non-selected for promotion to the next higher grade unless they are selectively continued.

13–33. Officer development

The OPMS provides a framework for developing the required number of officers with the necessary skills and for managing the careers of all commissioned officers, except those assigned to the special branches (AMEDD, JAGC, and Chaplain Corps). This framework consists of all OPMS functional categories, with each one being a grouping of duty positions whose skill, knowledge, and job requirements are mutually supportive in the development of officers to successfully perform in the functional category. Each functional category contains sufficient duty positions to support progression to the grade of colonel. Military and civilian educational opportunities are also geared to the officer’s functional category. Army requirements and an individual’s qualifications and preference are the major considerations in determining the designation of functional categories. OPMS consists of three major and interrelated subsystems: strength management, professional development, and evaluation.

13–34. Officer personnel management system (OPMS)

In May 1997, the CSA approved implementation of several changes in OPMS as a result of the recommendations of the OPMS XXI Task Force. During 2002, the DCS, G–1 changed the name to OPMS III (vice OPMS XXI) to reflect the system as progressive and evolving to support emerging needs for the 21st century. In 2006 the DCS, G1 eliminated the numerical designation in recognition that OPMS was designed to be a continual evolution.

a. Historical perspective.

(1) OPMS exists to balance the needs of the Army with the aspirations and developmental requirements of the officer corps. OPMS was instituted in 1972 as a result of the U.S. Army War College Study on Military Professionalism and a follow-on analysis directed by the DCS, G–1. After passage of the DOPMA by Congress in 1981, the
CSA ordered a major review to examine the impact of the legislation on OPMS policies. As a result, OPMS II was developed in 1984 to accommodate the changes brought about by DOPMA, including the creation of functional areas, dual tracking and Regular Army integration. In 1987, the CSA directed a review of officer leader development to account for the changes in law, policy, and procedures that had occurred since the creation of OPMS II. As a result of the study, the Leader Development Action Plan was approved for implementation in 1989.

(2) During the last decade plus, the Army has undergone significant changes with widespread affect on the officer personnel system, brought about by the drawdown at the end of the Cold War and by major legislative initiatives. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (“Goldwater-Nichols”) required the Services to improve interoperability and provided the statutory requirements for joint duty assignments, joint tour credit and joint military education. In 1986, Congress also passed Public Law 99–145, which specified the acquisition experiences and education necessary for an officer to be the project manager of a major weapons system. This law later led to the creation in 1990 of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC). The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvements Act of 1990 (DAWIA) placed additional requirements on Acquisition Corps officers and directed them to single track in their functional area. Congressional Title VII (1992) and XI (1993) Legislation placed additional officer requirements on the AA in their support of the RC. The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) of 1996 brought the RC officer promotion systems in synchronization with the AC. This legislation established a best-qualified promotion system for RC officers, thereby replacing the fully qualified system previously used.

b. Initiation of OPMS III.

(1) In 1994, a team of senior field grade officers was assembled to examine a series of OPMS-specific issues and to determine whether a general review of the OPMS was warranted. This OPMS XXI Precursor Study Group ultimately reviewed more than 60 individual issues. Based on the collective body of these issues, the OPMS XXI Task Force convened in July 1996 to review and revise the personnel management system as necessary to ensure its viability for meeting future challenges. The Task Force focused on the development and career management of officers of the Army Competitive Category (ACC). The special branches (Chaplain, JAG, and the branches of the AMEDD) were not specifically addressed although some OPMS XXI issues and solutions dealing with education, officer evaluation, and general promotion policies will apply to them as well.

(2) The Task Force linked its work with other ongoing Army planning efforts: Force XXI for the near-term, Army XXI initiatives for the mid-term, and Army After Next projections for the long-term planning environment. In designing the personnel system for the future, the CSA directed the Task Force also create a conceptual framework that integrated OPMS with the Leader Development System, ongoing character development initiatives and the then new officer evaluation report (see Para 13–37 and 13–42).

(3) The Task Force concluded that, in order for OPMS III to work effectively, three sets of strategic recommendations for change must be jointly addressed.

(a) The first recommendation called for the creation of an officer development system (ODS) as part of an overall Army development system. ODS will encompass and integrate officer leader development, character development, evaluation and personnel management.

(b) The second recommendation recognized the need to adopt a holistic, strategic human resource management (SHRM) approach to officer development and personnel management for the 21st Century.

(c) The final strategic recommendation by the Task Force called for the creation of an officer career field-based management system composed of four career fields: Operations, Operational Support, Institutional Support and Information Operations. Under OPMS III, officers are designated into a single career field after selection for major and general promotion policies will apply to them as well.

(d) The results of these strategic recommendations, approved by the CSA in December 1997, formed the basis for the changes to OPMS until 2005.

(e) In 2005 the CSA directed that OPMS be reviewed to determine if the system met the developmental needs of the officer corps for the future. After study by a new OPMS Task Force, and a vetting process for recommendations with subject matter experts, a Council of Colonels representing all stakeholders, and General Officer Steering Committees, many changes have been approved or are under consideration at this writing. Driving many of the changes is the Army leadership’s view that the future officer corps needs to be more multi-skilled and afforded assignment and educational opportunities that fosters this end. Among the changes approved was changing the four career fields to three functional categories as depicted in Figure 13–8. The new design is considered more conducive to bringing balance to the officer corps - breadth and depth, was less prescriptive, and provided multiple career paths. There have been some changes to this initial construct as functional areas were eliminated or consolidated (e.g. Comptroller, HR) and other created (e.g. Logistics Corps)
13–35. Fundamentals of officer management
The Army needs, and will continue to need, the finest officers imbued with the warfighting ethos and with the right skills, knowledge and experience to effectively meet any challenges. Further, the Army continues to be a values-based organization, steeped in core principles and beliefs that set the “muddy boots” Soldier apart as a unique professional. In order to grow an Officer Corps with the right skills, knowledge and attributes to respond to evolving future challenges—to remain ready not only today, but also tomorrow—OPMS changed many aspects of how officers are managed, developed and promoted.

a. Functional category based management. Officers are developed in only one branch, and the branch remains primary for approximately the first ten years of an officer’s career (an exception exists for those officers being branch detailed as a new lieutenant and a small number of officers in selected functional areas). Career field or functional category designation will occur at four years of service for a small number of officers and at seven years of service for the remainder. Officer preference will be a key factor in terms of board selection criteria in the functional category designation process, but Army requirements are always paramount.

b. Functional areas. Functional areas are not directly related to any specific branch. Incorporating what are referred to as non-accession specialties, functional areas provide a management and development system to effectively use the vast talents of a diverse officer corps and meet Army requirements.

13–36. Functional categories
Officers compete for promotion only with other officers in the same functional category. Each functional category, or branch or functional area within a functional category, has its own unique characteristics and development track for officers which reflects the readiness requirements of the Army today and into the 21st century. DA PAM 600–3 outlines all aspects of OPMS, officer training, education and development. Officers from every branch and functional area will also fill officer generalist and combat arms generalist (01A/02A) positions across the Army. Functional categories are depicted in Figure 13–8. As of this writing, there are numerous actions and pending decisions relative to these new functional categories that will impact promotion consideration, command opportunity, and education.

13–37. Functional category assignment
Functional categories are assigned through a career field or functional category designation process, under the direction of HRC. An important part of the process is the convening of a formal board to recommend functional categories for
individual officers. HRC identifies officers in the window for functional category designation and notifies them of required actions to be taken in advance of the board. HRC also provides the board with the number of officers to be designated into each functional category, as well as the branches from which these officers will be drawn, based on Army requirements. This process is similar to the way in which promotion requirements by branch and functional area are determined. The board is charged to identify and take into consideration officer preference, aptitudes, and abilities in order to best meet the needs of the Army. The functional category designation process includes the following considerations:

13–38. Centralized selection for command and key billet positions
OPMS III changed the name of this process from command designated position list (CDPL) to centralized selection list (CSL). This process emphasizes the preference-based approach to an officer’s career pattern. The CSL includes four functional categories of commands and key billets as depicted in Figure 13–9. The CSL commands include all LTC and COL command positions approved by the Army. The list of centrally selected command positions changes regularly. In FY04 key division staff positions (G1, G2, and G6) were added to the list of centrally selected positions. Prior to convening each command selection board, officers being considered will be given the opportunity to indicate the functional category(ies) in which they desire to compete for selection. The board selects officers for command within the given categories and HRC conducts the slating process and recommends the specific unit or organization for the officer to command. The CSA has the final decision on the command slate.

**Figure 13–9. Centralized Selection List Categories**
13–39. Army acquisition corps (AAC)

a. The mission of the AAC is to create a corps of dedicated military and civilian acquisition managers capitalizing on their operational experience and technical skills. Successful weapon system development, and all the support activities required throughout its life cycle, requires a balance between keen regard for current operational realities and technical knowledge.

b. The AAC program develops world-class acquisition specialists to fill approximately 3850 critical positions. Critical positions require the level of education, training, and experience stated in the DAWIA and the DOD implementing instructions. The positions include Program Managers (PMs), Program Executive Officers (PEOs) (general officer/ Senior Executive Service level), deputy or assistant PEOs/PMs, senior contracting officials, and selected positions in procurement commands, matrix support commands, and headquarters staffs.

c. The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (the ASA (ALT)), is dual-hatted as the AAE), acting for the SECARMY through established structure, implements DOD Acquisition Workforce policy and tailors the Army program. The Director, Acquisition Career Management (military deputy to the AAE) provides requirements to the DCS, G–1.

d. DCS, G–1 provides personnel policy management for the AAC as for the rest of the Army. The AAC Management Office (AACMO), OPMD, HRC, centrally manages all officer and civilian AAC members. The AACMO consists of a Military Acquisition Management Branch and a Civilian Acquisition Management Branch. Each branch manages members of its component from accession through the members’ entire career life cycle.

e. Only qualified officers and civilians may fill critical positions. The AAC targets branch-qualified captains and civilians in grade GS–13 as candidates for competitive entry into the AAC. Once accessed into the AAC, members attend schooling and obtain acquisition experience to meet acquisition certification requirements for critical positions.

f. Recognizing the difficulty in pursuing branch qualification for battalion and brigade command and at the same time achieving the acquisition requirements, AAC members are precluded from TOE command. AAC officers compete for acquisition-related TDA commands and product manager (battalion-level command equivalent) and project manager (brigade-level command equivalent) positions.

g. DA Acquisition Selection Boards select AAC commanders and product and project managers. Commanders normally serve three-year tours and product/project managers four years.

h. AAC TDA commands include the research & development centers and laboratories, and procurement and contracting offices. Product/project managers are charged with managing and executing the day-to-day activities for development, production, and fielding of a system in accordance with approved performance, schedule, and cost requirements.

i. DA Pamphlet 600–3 details the professional development requirements for commissioned officers within the AAC. AR 690–950 and the Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) list requirements for AAC civilians.

13–40. Officer evaluation system

a. The Officer Evaluation System is the Army’s method of identifying those officers most qualified for advancement and assignment to positions of increased responsibility. The system includes assessments of officer performance and potential accomplished in the organizational duty environment; in an academic environment, both military and civilian; and at joint and departmental levels.

b. The potential assessment of an officer is a subjective judgment as to the officer’s capability to perform at a specified level of responsibility, authority, or sensitivity. Although potential is normally associated with the capability to perform at a higher grade, judgments are also made by DA on retention and increased responsibility within a specified grade. The assessment is based on three major factors: the Army’s officer requirements, the individual officer’s qualifications, and a summation of the individual officer’s performance.

c. The performance assessment by DA differs significantly from that accomplished in the organizational duty environment. Whereas the organizational duty assessment involves a personal knowledge of the situations surrounding a specific period of time, DA assessment is accomplished by an after-the-fact assessment of a series of reports on performance over a variety of duty positions and covering the officer’s entire career.

13–41. Officer evaluation reporting system

a. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System is a subsystem of the Officer Evaluation System. It includes the methods and procedures for organizational evaluation and assessment of an officer’s performance and an estimation of potential for future service based on the manner of that performance. The official documentation of these assessments is the OER and the AER.

b. The primary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to provide information from the organizational chain to be used by DA for officer personnel decisions. The information contained in the OER is correlated with
the Army’s needs and individual officer qualifications providing the basis for personnel actions such as promotion, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction in force, command designation, school selection, assignment, and functional category designation.

c. A secondary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to encourage the professional development of the officer corps. To enhance this, emphasis is placed on the responsibility of senior officers to counsel their subordinates. While this has always been a major aspect of leadership, continual reemphasis is necessary. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System contributes significantly by providing a natural impetus to continual two-way communication between senior and subordinate. It is through this communication that the rated officer is made aware of the specific nature of his or her duties and is provided an opportunity to participate in the process. The rater uses the communication to give direction to and develop his or her subordinates, to obtain information as to the status and progress of his or her organization, and to plan systematically for the accomplishment of the mission. The senior/subordinate communication process also facilitates the dissemination of career development information, advice, and guidance to the rated officer. This enables the rated officer to take advantage of the superior’s experience when making functional category or assignment-related decisions.

d. There have been nine OER systems since WWII. The first seven experienced a relatively rapid system turnover because inflation had gotten out of hand. The eighth (DA Form 67–8), which introduced the support form process and senior rater concept, was effective far longer (18 years, 1 month) than any previous system. The current OER, (DA Form 67–9), is an evolution of the 67–8.

13–42. Officer promotions
As of 15 September 1981, the DOPMA amended Title 10 for officer promotions. DOPMA, as implemented, is applicable to all officers on the Active Duty List (ADL). It does not apply to warrant officers. The act provides for a single promotion system for all officers (Regular Army and OTRA), thus eliminating the previous dual (AUS/RA or AUS/USAR) system of promotions. The intent is for promotions to be made within fairly uniform promotion timing and opportunity goals, as vacancies occur. Eligibility for consideration for promotions is based on minimum time in grade (TIG) and time in service (TIS) with the below-the-zone selection rate established at a maximum of 10 percent (or 15 percent when so authorized by SecDef) of the list for any grade above captain. DOPMA goals for promotion opportunity and phase point (i.e., TIS when most officers are promoted) are listed in Table 13–2. (Actual promotion percentages and TIG/TIS may vary considerably)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To grade</th>
<th>Promotion opportunity</th>
<th>DOPMA phase point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Fully Qualified</td>
<td>13 MOS TIS minimum TIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Not less than 2 years TIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10 +/-1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>16 +/-1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>22 +/-1 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Opportunity and TIS are set by policy. TIG for promotion to 1LT and CPT is set by law.

13–43. Officer quality management
a. The goal of the officer management program is to ensure that only those individuals demonstrating satisfactory performance and possessing acceptable moral and professional traits be allowed to serve on active duty, retain their commissions, and remain on DA promotion lists.

b. Commanders and DA agencies are continually striving to maintain the quality of the officer corps by identifying and processing for involuntary separation those officers whose performance or professional or moral traits are deficient. To this end, the records of officers are screened continually to identify those whose degree of efficiency and manner of performance and/or misconduct, moral or professional dereliction require separation.

c. Whenever an officer is identified to “show cause”, the officer is afforded the opportunity to resign in lieu of undergoing the entire process. Similarly, DA agencies are tasked to review promotion lists and CSLs to ensure that no officer is promoted or allowed to command who has become mentally, physically, morally, or professionally disqualified after being selected. The records of officers whose fitness for promotion or command has become suspect are referred to a DA Promotion/Command Review Board, which will recommend to the SA whether the officer should be retained on or removed from the promotion/CSL.

d. The promotion system also serves as a qualitative management tool through the mandatory separation from active duty of officers who fail to be selected for promotion to certain grade levels. However, an officer non-selected for
promotion may be selectively continued in his current rank upon recommendation by the DA promotion board that non-selected him for promotion.

e. No person has an inherent right to continue service as an officer. The privilege of service is his or hers only as long as he or she performs in a satisfactory manner. Responsibility for leadership and example requires officers accomplish their duties effectively and conduct themselves in an exemplary manner at all times.

13–44. Officer promotion management

When manpower reductions are not necessary, the Army has several programs that may be applied to reduce the number of officers on active duty. When possible, reductions are accomplished through normal attrition and voluntary release programs coupled with reduced officer accessions. Because Congress directed the Services to include senior as well as junior officers when implementing officer strength cuts, selective early retirement boards (SERBs) and reductions-in-force (RIFs) may be implemented when required. RIFs target mid-career officers by year while SERBs select a fixed number of retirement-eligible officers for involuntary early retirement. RIFs and SERBs are quantitative measures that are qualitatively administered.

13–45. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)

DOPMA evolved from the continued inability of the Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947, as changed by the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954, to meet the changing requirements for a modern and equitable officer management system for the active forces. The intent of DOPMA was to provide all Services with an equitable, effective, and efficient system to manage their officer corps below the brigadier general level.

a. The management objective is to provide consistent career and promotion opportunities across all Services in order to attract and retain high-caliber officers, and promote them at a point in service conducive to effective performance. The integration into a single promotion and grade authorization system of the old dual-track Regular Army/Reserve system mandated by OGLA and OPA provided a favorable environment in which to achieve this goal.

b. The provisions for selective continuation of captains and majors, combined with the capability to instruct promotion boards on skill needs, provides a mechanism through which specialty needs can be filled, while enhancing an officer’s opportunity to stay on active duty until retirement. Under DOPMA, a first lieutenant who twice fails to be selected for promotion to captain is involuntarily released from active duty. By law, captains and majors may be selectively continued to remain on active duty until 20 and 24 years respectively. DOPMA establishes uniform, general constructive provisions for all Services, thus recognizing that special skills acquired prior to service are essential for effective performance in special branches. This provision impacted most on AMEDD, Chaplain, and the JAG Corps accessed after the EDATE of the act.


The congressional goal of this act was to improve the performance of officers in joint duty positions by establishing management procedures for their selection, education, assignment, and promotion. Key provisions of the law are listed below.

a. Assignments. The qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments will be such that they are expected to meet certain specified promotion rates comparable to their Service headquarters and the overall board selection rate. Officers assigned to joint duty assignments will be assigned in anticipation that they will serve the prescribed tour length for their grade: two years for general officers and three years for others. Assignments for officers possessing critical occupational specialties, which for the Army are defined as the combat arms branches, may be curtailed to a minimum of 24 months under certain conditions. All graduates of professional joint education (e.g., National War College and ICAF) who are designated as joint specialty officers (JSO), and a high proportion (greater than 50 percent) of those graduates not designated as JSO, will be assigned to a joint duty assignment immediately following graduation.

b. Promotions. Selection boards considering officers serving in, or who have served in, joint duty assignments will include at least one officer designated by the CJCS who is currently serving in a joint duty assignment. The letter of instruction for selection boards includes the following guidance: “You will give appropriate consideration to the performance in joint duty assignments of officers who are serving in, or who have served in such assignments.” Prior to approval by the Secretary of the Military Department, the results of selection boards considering officers who are serving in, or who have served in, joint duty assignments will be forwarded by the Secretary to the CJCS. The CJCS will review the results to determine whether appropriate consideration was given to performance in joint duty assignments.

c. Reports. Each Secretary of a Military Department must provide periodic progress reports on their promotion rates in relation to the promotion objectives specified above.

d. General/flag officer actions. In the absence of a waiver (waiver authority was eliminated in the 2007 NDAA) by the SecDef, officers selected to the grade of O–7 subsequent to 1 January 1994 must have completed a full joint duty assignment before selection or their first assignment as a general/flag officer will be in a joint duty assignment. A
capstone military education course has been created and all newly promoted general/flag officers must attend this course within two years after selection, unless such attendance is waived by the SecDef.

Section VII
The sustainment function

13–47. Sustainment function overview

The sustainment function includes a broad range of activities that are focused on the well being of Soldiers, retirees, and their families. The range includes, but is not limited to, quality of life activities, awards and decorations, casualty and memorial affairs, housing, morale, recreation, personnel actions, and Soldier readiness.

13–48. Army continuing education system (ACES)

a. ACES is a critical element in the recruitment and retention of a quality force. ACES exist to ensure Soldiers have opportunities for personal and professional self-development. Education opportunities are offered through education centers and learning centers located worldwide. Educational programs include:

   (1) On-duty functional academic skills training, which provides job-related instruction in the academic areas of reading, mathematics, and English grammar at no cost to the Soldier.

   (2) High school completion programs for Soldiers without a high school diploma.

   (3) Undergraduate and graduate college courses and programs which provide financial assistance, such as the Tuition Assistance Program.

   (4) Foreign language programs for qualified Army linguists assigned overseas.

   (5) Skill development programs to prepare non-commissioned officers for NCOES training.

   (6) Counseling to establish challenging yet attainable short and long-term goals; academic testing through the Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (DANTES).

   (7) Army personnel testing; and training support services such as MOS reference libraries and language and computer laboratories.

b. In addition, the Service members Opportunity College Army degree system of college and university networks promoting credit transferability and the American Council on Education/Army Registry Transcript System documenting recommended credit for Soldier training and experience help Soldiers earn degrees despite frequent transfers and rotations. The ACES, focused on Soldiers, yet available to DA civilians and adult family members, represents a primary well-being program.

c. To further enable Soldiers to continue their education, the Army has implemented a web-based program so that they take college level courses wherever they are in the world. eArmy University (eArmyU.com) provides Soldiers maximum flexibility to continue to pursue degree producing programs.

13–49. Equal opportunity program

a. The Army Equal Opportunity Program is firmly embedded in fundamental American values and the basic philosophical tenet on which effective leadership and the exercise of command is built. Army equal opportunity is resonant in leadership that is rooted in taking care of Soldiers and is crucial to unit cohesion, readiness, and mission accomplishment. Ensuring Soldiers are treated with fairness, justice, and equity is central to an Army culture dedicated to the highest professional and personal standards, and to sustaining our most important resource-people. It is an underlying responsibility of leaders to ensure Soldiers and their families receive equal opportunity and treatment, without regard to race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, and are provided an environment free of sexual harassment.

b. Leaders are assisted in sustaining Army equal opportunity (EO) goals and objectives by an equal opportunity adviser (EOA) at brigade level and above, and EO representatives (EOR) at battalion and company level. The EOA is a specially trained officer or NCO whose role is technical adviser to the commander. EOA positions are filled by NCOs/ officers possessing the skills and knowledge characteristic of the units they will serve. EOAs are Soldiers who possess MOSs found in the brigade or installation to which they are assigned. Soldiers selected as EOAs receive 15 weeks of intensive training at Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), receive a SQI of “Q”, and then serve one special duty tour as an EOA, similar to that of a drill sergeant or recruiter. The EOA provides the commander a valuable subject matter resource for sustaining EO programs, training, and developing remedies to eliminate discriminatory practices or treatment.

13–50. The army casualty system

a. The Army casualty system includes casualty reporting, casualty notification, next of kin assistance, mortuary affairs, burial honors, escorts, disposition of remains and personal effects processing, line of duty determination, and missing persons act determinations. The reporting system records, reports, verify, and processes casualty information from unit level to HQDA. Casualty information flows up, across and down the command and medical reporting chains

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to help account for Soldiers and reportable civilians. Each management level in the casualty reporting chain verifies information as necessary to meet the 100 percent accuracy standard.

b. The Army Casualty Information Processing System (ACIPS) is the HQDA level management system designed to track the flow of casualty information and the status of required actions from the place of incident through final disposition. ACIPS is accessible to casualty area commands, personal effects depots, and port mortuaries. Units prepare and submit initial and supplemental casualty reports using ACIPS–Light, a field deployable software package, which allows units to produce casualty reports. Commanders, Soldiers, and deployed civilians must ensure that casualty information is processed only through official channels as for official use only information until notification of next of kin has been verified. The Army casualty system has developed linkages to DOD casualty systems (DCIPS), as more operations are joint and combined.

Section VIII
The transition function

13–51. Transition function overview
The transition function includes a broad range of activities focused on ensuring Soldiers and their families are treated with dignity and respect and assisted in every way possible as they transition from the AC to a RC and/or civilian status. Selected transition activities are described in greater detail below.

13–52. The army career and alumni program (ACAP)

a. The ACAP orchestrates a broad spectrum of programs and services designed to assist Soldiers in making critical career and transition decisions. ACAP provides transition services to Soldiers, DA civilians, and their family members. RC personnel are also eligible to receive ACAP services upon serving a minimum of 180 consecutive days of active duty immediately prior to separation.

b. ACAP is not a job placement service but instead a program through which a wide range of services are made available to users through a combination of DOD, Department of Labor, Department of Veteran Affairs, U.S. Army, and contractor provided services. Transition counseling and career planning are the cornerstone services that assist the user to properly focus on their career path and the value of their experience should they remain on active duty or transition to civilian life. Individuals using ACAP services have access to an abundance of reference materials and a wealth of information about benefits, civilian employment opportunities, career planning and services available through many Federal, State and local government agencies.

c. Participation in ACAP is mandatory for all active duty Soldiers who are separating or retiring. Individuals are encouraged to start using ACAP services 180 days before their separation date. Eligible individuals may continue to use ACAP for up to 90 days after separation. Referral to ACAP is mandatory for civilians who are departing because of force alignments, reductions in force or base closures. ACAP participation is optional for transition of family members and eligible RC Soldiers.

d. ACAP establishes a strong partnership between the Army and the private sector, creates a recruiting multiplier, improves employment prospects for transitioning personnel, reduces unemployment compensation costs to the Army and allows career Soldiers to concentrate on their mission. ACAP is an enduring program, institutionalized into the Army culture and life cycle functions.

13–53. Army retirement services program

a. The DA has a worldwide network of retirement services offices to assist retiring Soldiers and their families make a smooth and successful transition into retirement. Each major Army installation has a full-time, paid employee, called a retirement services officer (RSO), to administer this program. The program prepares Soldiers and family members for retirement by providing assistance and information on their benefits and entitlements. These services are available to the surviving spouses of retired Soldiers.

b. The RSO conducts a periodic pre-retirement briefing, which covers subjects from computation of retired pay to survivor benefits. Soldiers must attend a pre-retirement briefing between submission of their retirement application and no later than 120 days before retirement. Spouses are encouraged to attend. The RSO also provides mandatory Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) counseling to these individuals. By law, retired pay stops with a Soldier’s death unless the Soldier is enrolled in SBP. The Soldier makes the SBP decision before retirement.

c. The DA Retirement Services Office provides policy guidance to the installation RSOs and is also responsible for publishing “Army Echoes,” the quarterly newsletter sent (also available on-line) to all retirees and retirement eligible active duty personnel. He or she also administers the Chief of Staff’s Retiree Council and the SBP Program and monitors the operation of the Armed Forces Retirement Homes.

13–54. Separation
Separation includes voluntary and involuntary release from active duty, discharge, non-disability retirement, and physical disability retirement. Because the type of discharge and character of service are of such great significance to the service member, it must accurately reflect the nature of service performed. Eligibility for veterans’ benefits
provided by law, eligibility for reentry into service, and acceptability for employment in the civilian community may be affected by these determinations.

13–55. Enlisted separation

a. An enlisted Soldier may be separated upon ETS or prior to ETS by reason of physical disability (see below), sentence of general or special court-martial, or one of the administrative separation programs prescribed in AR 635–200. Both voluntary and involuntary administrative separation actions are outlined in AR 635–200.

b. Voluntary separations are initiated by the Soldier. Reasons include hardship/dependency, surviving family members, acceptance into an ROTC program, orders to active duty as an officer or warrant officer, defective enlistment, pregnancy, for the good of the service in lieu of trial by court-martial, and early separation when denied reenlistment. Soldiers who have tested positive for the HIV antibody may request discharge under Secretarial authority. Soldiers may also be allowed to separate early to further their education.

c. Commanders may initiate involuntary separation proceedings for parenthood, personality disorder, concealment of an arrest record, fraudulent or erroneous entry, alcohol or drug abuse rehabilitation failure, failure to meet body composition/weight control standards, entry-level performance and conduct, unsatisfactory performance, misconduct, or homosexual conduct. To separate a Soldier involuntarily, the unit commander must notify the Soldier in writing. Any involuntary separation action involving a Soldier with six or more years of total active and reserve military service entitles the Soldier to a hearing by an administrative separation board. If the Soldier has 18 or more years, the board is mandatory and cannot be waived. Administrative discharges of Soldiers with 18 or more years of AFS must be approved at the Army Secretariat level.

d. Discharge certificates are furnished only to Soldiers who are honorably discharged or discharged under honorable conditions. All Soldiers leaving active duty are issued a DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty. The DD Form 214 documents the characterization of service, except when a Soldier is separated while in an entry-level status. Entry-level separations normally have service described as “uncharacterized.” Honorable, general, and under other than honorable conditions characters of service are assigned administratively. Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges (see Para 20–9d) are issued upon conviction by a court-martial.

13–56. Enlisted non-disability retirement system

To qualify for voluntary retirement, an enlisted Soldier must be on active duty and have completed 20 or more years of Active Federal Service (AFS) on the retirement date. A Soldier who has completed 20 years, but less than 30 years AFS, and who has completed all required service obligations may be retired at his or her request. Enlisted Soldiers who have completed 30 years AFS have the vested right under law to retire and may not be denied unless other provisions of law are invoked (e.g. stop loss). DA policy requires that all service obligations incurred by promotion, schooling, or PCS be completed prior to approval of voluntary retirement of Soldiers with less than 30 years’ service. However, a Soldier may request waiver of a service obligation, and approval would depend upon whether the best interests of the Service are involved or whether a substantial hardship might exist should retirement be denied. Enlisted retirements are normally approved by field commanders of general officer rank. Enlisted Soldiers retire in the grade they hold on the date of retirement unless they have 10 years active commissioned service. Additionally, enlisted Soldiers who have completed 30 years combined active and retired list service may be eligible for advancement on the retired list to the highest grade held satisfactorily. Requests for grade determination are acted upon by HQDA.

13–57. Officer non-disability retirement system

a. There are two types of retirement - voluntary and mandatory. To qualify for voluntary retirement, officers must have completed at least 20 years AFS on their retirement date. All service obligations incurred must be completed unless waived by HQDA. Mandatory retirement dates are established by law and only in very rare cases are individuals retained on active duty beyond these dates. Lieutenant colonels and colonels may remain until 28 and 30 years of active federal commissioned service (AFCS) respectively, unless involuntarily retired through the SERB process.

b. While majors and below must have served six months in their grade to retire at that grade, lieutenant colonels and colonels must normally serve three years in grade to retire in that grade. Some programs like the Voluntary Early Release and Retirement Program (VERRP) can waive one year of the three-year obligation, subject to limitations and provisions imposed by Congress. Officers who are selected by SERB retain their grade regardless of time held.

13–58. Physical disability separation

The laws governing physical disability separation from a military Service provide for the retirement or separation with severance pay of a member who is determined to be unfit by reason of physical disability to perform the duties of his or her office, grade, rank, or rating. When a member, at the time of separation, is considered fit to perform his or her duties, he or she must be separated or retired under programs already discussed. It is possible to receive a non-disability separation and still have physical disabilities, which could affect potential for civilian employment. In this instance, one may qualify for compensation for those disabilities from the Department of Veteran Affairs.
Summary and references

13–59. Summary

a. The primary purpose of the MHRM system is to satisfy valid Army requirements and, insofar as practicable, accommodate the legitimate needs of its members. The system is a complex, dynamic, multifaceted mosaic of interacting subsystems, which interface in a variety of ways with all other major Army systems. Army Transformation will be a major series of events for the future, and the military HR system via Personnel Transformation will support that transformation. It must keep up with the rate of change occurring in the Army so that Soldiers are properly supported, and commanders have timely, relevant information on which to base operational decisions.

b. The processes designed to structure, acquire, train, educate, distribute, sustain, professionally develop, and separate Soldiers must be continuously evaluated and refined to ensure they support current and future Army requirements. The subsystems within these processes must have flexibility to meet the needs of the Army. Whether the Army is reducing or expanding, there are a few critical operating principles to guide decision makers as they choose between difficult, challenging options in either scenario: maintain force readiness at the prescribed levels; maintain quality in recruiting, retention, and development programs; make changes in a balanced and orderly way throughout all grades and specialties, both officer and enlisted; maintain current board selection functions to continue to build on the best; rely on RC; protect well being; and, finally, in order to reduce uncertainty, ensure there is an understandable, comprehensive plan.

c. This chapter was designed to provide a broad overview of major personnel management systems. During the next several years, the policies, functions, and processes within every one of the subsystems will be continuously challenged to ensure Army requirements are satisfied and to care for its most important resource-people.

d. The following web sites contain valuable current information on military HRM policy and programs:

- www.army.mil
- www.armyg1.army.mil/
- www.asamrs.army.pentagon.mil
- www.usarec.army.mil
- www.goarmy.com
- https://www.hrc.army.mil/

13–60. References


c. Army Regulation 614 - Series Publications, Assignments, Details, and Transfers.

d. Army Regulation 621 - Series Publications, Education.


g. Army Regulation 635 - Series Publications, Personnel Separations.


i. Field Manual 12–6, Personnel Doctrine
Chapter 14

Civilian Human Resource Management

Section I
Introduction

14–1. Chapter content

a. Civilians have been an important component of the Army since the Revolutionary War. They are an integral part of the force utilized to accomplish today’s multiple complex missions. On 19 June 2006 the Secretary of the Army established the “Army Civilian Corps” and the Army Civilian Corps Creed. This name unifies the Army civilian service and embodies the commitment of the dedicated individuals who serve as a fundamental part of the Army team. Army civilians serve in all theaters and are deployed worldwide to support the Army mission and the Overseas Contingency Operations. The purpose and role of the Army civilian is defined by the Army Civilian Corps Creed:

- I am an Army Civilian - a member of the Army Team
- I am dedicated to our Army, our Soldiers and Civilians
- I will always support the mission
- I provide stability and continuity during war and peace
- I support and defend the Constitution of the United States and consider it an honor to serve our Nation and our Army
- I live the Army values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage
- I am an Army Civilian

b. The Army Civilian Corps includes both Appropriated (APF) and Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) employees, as well as local national employees. See Figure 14–1 for details. These civilians are employed in over 550 different occupations with the highest concentrations in logistics, research and development, and base operations (BASOPS) functions. Civilians are excluded from positions that by law require military incumbents but are increasingly being used in combat service support functions as formerly military positions are being converted to civilian occupancy.

c. In order to better understand the management and administrative environment within which civilian personnel management systems operate an understanding of the types of employees and the rules and regulations that govern each of them is necessary. Because of different fund sources, laws, and regulations, personnel policies and practices differ for the various types of Army civilian employees.
### Categories of civilian personnel

1. **Appropriated Fund (APF) civilians.** The term “appropriated funds” refers to those funds provided by the Congress, normally in annual *Defense Appropriations Act* legislation. U.S. citizens and eligible U.S. aliens are paid from APFs and are managed within a structure of Federal civil service laws. APF employees are further divided into two categories based on the nature of work performed. Military-function civilians perform support duties associated directly with the Army’s National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives. Civil-function civilians perform duties associated with the Army’s Civil Works Program, administered by the Army Corps of Engineers. Civil works includes planning, design, construction, and operation and maintenance of projects that improve the nation’s water resource infrastructure (e.g., navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power, plus other civil functions prescribed by law). The laws governing APF employees are administered by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.

2. **Non-Appropriated fund (NAF) civilians.**

   1. NAF employees are paid from funds generated from sales, fees, and charges to authorized patrons. This category is comprised of U.S. civilians; foreign nationals, usually from the local labor market; and enlisted service personnel working part-time during off-duty hours. All compete for employment on the basis of merit.

   2. NAF employees play an important role in providing Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation (FMWR) services to military personnel and their family members. Army clubs, guest houses, child care centers, craft shops, bowling centers, swimming pools, gymnasiums, and many other NAF activities employ a considerable number of employees at most Army installations and contribute to the overall quality of life.
c. Local national civilians. The Army also employs local nationals in both APF and NAF positions in overseas areas. The status of forces agreement (SOFA) in effect with a given host country forms the basis of the employment systems for these employees. Within this framework, employee administration must be consistent with host country practice, U.S. law, and the management needs of the Army. In some cases the host government may reimburse the salary and associated personnel costs in whole or in part.

14–3. Army workforce mix

a. The environment has changed, causing the Army to transform. The number and scope of the missions that the Army must perform has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War. Since the post-Cold War drawdown ended in 1999, the number of Army civilian employees has increased modestly in most fiscal years. This growth is expected to continue due to continuing initiatives to convert military billets to civilian positions and “Grow the Army” budget initiatives such as increases for base support functions.

b. The Army is undergoing a fundamental change in how it defines its total manpower. The challenge is to achieve the right balance of civilian employees, contractors, and Soldiers in our Army.

14–4. Decentralized management

The systems for recruiting, utilizing, developing, and sustaining DA civilians are in large part decentralized. Decentralized management of civilians is very different from the centralized management of military personnel (Figure 14–2). Most authorities for the supervision and management of civilians have been delegated through the chain of command to the lowest practicable level. Certain civilian personnel functions, however, are performed on a regional, Command wide, or DA-wide basis when doing so results in more efficient operations (e.g., the Army Benefits Center-Civilian (ABC–C) at Fort Riley provides individual employees across the Army with counseling on their benefits and automated support for benefits changes) or when a managerial perspective above the local level is required to meet program objectives (e.g., HQDA manages the intake and training of interns in DA career programs). Management of Senior Executive Service (SES) employees is also centralized.
Section II
Organization for civilian personnel management

14–5. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)

a. OPM is the personnel agency of the executive branch charged with the mission to administer most Federal laws and Executive orders dealing with all aspects of civilian personnel management and administration in the Federal sector. Some laws and Executive orders place certain personnel management responsibilities directly on agency and department heads, subject to OPM policy and review. In other cases, OPM retains the authority to establish specific program standards and regulate and control the means of carrying out major aspects of agency or departmental personnel management operations.

b. OPM develops proposals for Federal personnel legislation and Executive orders and develops and publishes specific policies, procedures, and regulations implementing Federal personnel laws and Executive orders. It also provides testing, evaluation, and referral of job applicants to agencies; evaluates agency personnel management systems; and provides advice and assistance to agencies in developing effective personnel management programs. In addition, OPM develops standards by which jobs are classified (pay systems, title, job series, and grade); administers retirement, health, and life insurance programs; and adjudicates position classification appeals.

c. Merit is the primary principle guiding OPM, OSD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense), and the Army in policy development and operational standards within the personnel system. The following merit principles govern all personnel practices:

1. Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources in an endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of society, and selection and advancement should be determined solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge and skills, after fair and open competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity.

2. All employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping condition, and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights.

3. Equal pay should be provided for work of equal value, with appropriate consideration of both national and local rates paid by employers in the private sector, and appropriate incentives and recognition should be provided for excellence in performance.

4. All employees should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest.

5. The Federal work force should be used efficiently and effectively.

6. Employees should be retained on the basis of adequacy of their performance, inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be separated who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards.

7. Employees should be provided effective education and training in cases in which such education and training would result in better organizational and individual performance.

8. Employees should be Protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes, and prohibited from using their official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for election.

9. Employees should be protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information which the employees reasonably believe evidences—a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety In administering the provisions of this chapter.

d. In addition, twelve prohibited personnel practices, including reprisal for whistle blowing, are defined by law at § 2302(b) of title 5 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). A personnel action (such as an appointment, promotion, reassignment, or suspension) may need to be involved for a prohibited personnel practice to occur. Generally stated, § 2302(b) provides that a federal employee authorized to take, direct others to take, recommend or approve any personnel action may not:

1. discriminate against an employee or applicant based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicapping condition, marital status, or political affiliation;

2. Solicit or consider employment recommendations based on factors other than personal knowledge or records of job-related abilities or characteristics;

3. coerce the political activity of any person;

4. Deceive or willfully obstruct anyone from competing for employment;

5. influence anyone to withdraw from competition for any position so as to improve or injure the employment prospects of any other person;

6. give an unauthorized preference or advantage to anyone so as to improve or injure the employment prospects of any particular employee or applicant;
(7) Engage in nepotism (i.e., hire, promote, or advocate the hiring or promotion of relatives);

(8) engage in reprisal for whistle blowing - i.e., take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant because of any disclosure of information by the employee or applicant that he or she reasonably believes evidences a violation of a law, rule or regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety (if such disclosure is not barred by law and such information is not specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs - if so restricted by law or Executive Order, the disclosure is only protected if made to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General, or a comparable agency official);

(9) take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action against an employee or applicant for exercising an appeal, complaint, or grievance right; testifying for or assisting another in exercising such a right; cooperating with or disclosing information to the Special Counsel or to an Inspector General; or refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law;

(10) Discriminate based on personal conduct which is not adverse to the on-the-job performance of an employee, applicant, or others; or

(11) take or fail to take, recommend, approve a personnel action if taking or failing to take such an action would violate a veterans’ preference requirement; and

(12) take or fail to take a personnel action, if taking or failing to take action would violate any law, rule or regulation implementing or directly concerning merit system principles at 5 U.S.C. § 2301.

e. OPM executes, administers, and enforces civil service rules and regulations through audits, reviews and inspections. Failure on the part of agencies to observe the prescribed standards, requirements, and instructions may result in the withdrawal of personnel management authority delegated by OPM.

14–6. other agencies with federal government-wide authority

In addition to OPM controls and procedures, four separate, independent Federal agencies also provide oversight to ensure that the principles of merit, labor relations guarantees, and equal employment rights are adhered to:

a. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB monitors the civil service system and hears and decides appeals on adverse actions. It can order corrective and disciplinary actions against an agency or an employee when it finds abuse of the merit principles.

b. Office of Special Counsel. The Office of Special Counsel serves as an investigator and prosecutor before the MSPB for statutorily defined prohibited personnel practices. It also provides a secure channel to address allegations involving a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Allegations may be brought forward and investigated without fear of retaliation and without disclosure of identity. The Whistleblower Protection Act guarantees this provision.

c. Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA administers the Federal labor-management relations program. It resolves questions of union representation of employees; prosecutes and adjudicates allegations of unfair labor practices; adjudicates legal issues of what is or is not negotiable, resolves impasses during negotiations, and reviews certain kinds of arbitration decisions on appeal.

d. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC oversees the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program by issuing directives and guidelines setting forth the responsibilities of Federal agencies under federal EEO and civil rights laws. The Commission monitors agency actions and efforts to increase the representation of minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities in the workforce; develops policy and provides guidance on complaints; conducts hearings on complaints of discrimination; issues recommended decisions to agencies; and evaluates the effectiveness of agency EEO programs.

14–7. Department of Defense (DOD)

Under Executive Order (EO) 9830, the President has delegated authority to agency heads, including the Secretary of Defense, to act in civilian human resource matters in accordance with applicable policies, program requirements, standards, and instructions.

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Within OSD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) (DUSD (CPP)) have responsibility for DOD-wide Civilian Human Resources (CHR) policy. In coordination with the services, and within the framework established by Federal law, Executive orders and government-wide regulations, the DUSD (CPP) develops plans, policies, and programs to manage the DOD civilian workforce, including NAF and local national employees. Through its Civilian Personnel Management Service (CPMS), the DUSD (CPP) also provides certain civilian human resource services on a DOD-wide basis.

b. DOD Investigations and Resolutions Division (IRD). IRD investigates and recommends resolution options for EEO complaints and formal employee grievances not covered by negotiated grievance procedures and which have not been resolved through an informal process at the organizational or installation level. Upon request, IRD can also serve as a third party appellate review level for NAF employees in NAF EEO cases. In a complex formal grievance of a
NAF employee, or a formal grievance of an APF employee under the Administrative Grievance System, the deciding official may elect to retain the services of the IRD to review the facts and make recommendations.

14–8. Department of the Army (DA)

Authority for civilian personnel management is further delegated by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY). By Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), General Order 3, 9 July 2002, the SECARMY is assigned full responsibility for providing military and CHR policy, programming, and oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)), with the exception of Executive and Senior Professional management. In accordance with SECARMY memorandum, Subject: Executive and Senior Professional ESP Management, 5 January 2006, these resources are centrally managed by the Secretary of the Army. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 (DCS G–1), is the responsible official to the ASA (M&RA) in developing, coordinating, and implementing programs and policies directly associated with accession, development, distribution and sustainment of military and civilian personnel. The Assistant G–1 for Civilian Personnel (AG–1 CP) has responsibility for supervision of civilian personnel policy, management, and related civilian personnel functions. The Operations Division of the DCS G–1 has responsibility for policy and guidance pertaining to the use and deployment of Army civilians.

a. U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency (USACPEA). USACPEA is responsible for conducting civilian personnel management and administration surveys and special Army-wide reviews. The purpose of these surveys and special reviews is to fulfill the SECARMY oversight responsibility by assessing program effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance.

b. U.S. Army Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command (FMWRC). FMWRC is a subordinate command to Installation Management Command (IMCOM). FMWRC’s mission is to develop and administer systems and programs for the Army family and community activities under the general heading of MWR. The FMWRC administers a central referral program for specified MWR managerial jobs (both APF and NAF) and a benefits program for all Army NAF employees.

c. Intelligence Personnel Management Office (IPMO). The IPMO is a subordinate element of the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2, HQDA. It serves as the focal point in the Army for policy and management of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) and reports jointly to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G–2) and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G–1). It maintains liaison with the rest of Federal intelligence on civilian personnel management issues, develops policies and programs, and develops and provides training and guidance. The IPMO also provides personnel management advice and assistance to Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers (CPACs) that, in turn, provide civilian personnel management support to intelligence organizations or those with DCIPS employees.

Section III
CHR Service Delivery

14–9. Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC)

a. CPACs: Advisory functions requiring face-to-face interaction between personnel specialists and managers and employees typically reside at the CPAC (installation/activity level). Action processing, record keeping, and database management functions are centralized at regional processing centers.

b. The Army has established 7 geographically based regions, each with a regional processing center. The two CONUS (outside the Continental United States) regions and their regional processing center locations are: Europe Region-Seckenheim, Germany; and Korea Region-Taegu, Korea. Five regions are in the CONUS (Continental United States): Southwest Region-Fort Riley, Kansas; Northeast Region-Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; North Central Region-Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; South Central Region-Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and, the West Region-Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Within the regions are a total of 100 CPACs. Each CPAC is typically located at or near the installation(s) to which it provides advisory services.

c. The AG–1 (CP) (Assistant G–1 for Civilian Personnel) through CHRA (the Civilian Human Resources Agency) “acts for” commanders with delegated CHR resources and appointing authority to carry out Civilian Human Resources (CHR) administrative responsibilities. To illustrate the “act for” relationship, whenever the regional processing center approves and processes an official personnel action (such as the appointment of someone to a position), it is doing so on behalf of the commander of the serviced organization, exercising that commander’s personnel management authority. Regional and CPAC directors are directly responsible to each of the commanders they serve for the proper exercise of this authority.

d. Specific responsibilities are to—

(1) Provide the civilian personnel service and assistance necessary to obtain, compensate, develop, use, and retain an effective civilian work force.

(2) Promote equality of opportunity in the organizational units serviced.

(3) Coordinate personnel management requirements and needs of the organizations serviced.
(4) Provide information and staff assistance and guidance to managers and supervisors to assist them in obtaining the most effective use of civilians through improved management.

(5) Establish labor management relationships focused on supporting and enhancing the Army’s national security mission and creating and maintaining a high performance workplace that delivers the highest quality products and services at the lowest possible cost. Such relationships should be committed to pursuing solutions that promote increased quality and productivity, customer service, mission accomplishment, efficiency, quality of life, employee empowerment, organizational performance, and military readiness. Consensual means of resolving disputes, such as alternate dispute resolution and interest based bargaining, should be sought.

14–10. Automation Tools

a. The Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS) is an automation tool used throughout DOD. DCPDS contains the world’s largest relational database; housing and processing all of DOD’s civilian human resources (HR) data. The system is designed to support APF, NAF, and local national HR operations. It offers a comprehensive array of state-of-the-art personnel processing capabilities. Managers can access organizational, historical, and employee data through a variety of reports and individual screens. Human Resource Specialists can process personnel actions, automatically interface with APF payroll, and generate confirming documents that can print at the originating manager’s office printer. Along the way, the personnel action can be acted upon by those with the need and access, such as resource management for coding and budgetary data.

b. Automated tools have been developed to support remote processing and enable fewer human resource specialists to provide the same or better customer service. These tools include:

1) **PERMISS.** The Personnel Management Information and Support System (PERMISS) is an on-line supervisors’ and employees’ handbook. It contains over 800 articles providing general civilian personnel guidance and information, with links to source and reference documents (e.g. applicable laws and regulations). PERMISS may be accessed through the Army Civilian Personnel Online (CPOL) website on the Internet. Although PERMISS is not designed to answer questions pertaining to a specific individual’s entitlements or job status, it does provide access to many of the general concepts and logic involved in making personnel decisions. It is not a forum for raising situation-specific questions, which should be answered through the supervisory chain of command or by the servicing CPAC.

2) **Civilian Personnel Online (CPOL).** CPOL contains policy, and guidance documents on the management and administration of the Army civilian workforce, including newsletters, bulletins, operating manuals, directives, forms, per diem rates and salary schedules.

3) **RESUMIX.** This staffing support tool helps the HR specialist rate, rank and refers applicants, utilizing electronic formats. Applicants can submit resumes electronically for vacancies listed on the link on the CPOL website, or through OPM’s electronic job vacancy sites. Personnelists can create vacancy announcements electronically and electronically match resumes received to the skills identified by the manager and the position description.

4) **Résumé Builder.** Résumé Builder is an on-line program for applicants to use in creating and submitting resumes for consideration against vacancy announcements. It replaces a cumbersome paper application process and provides significant efficiencies to help the specialist quickly rate a large number of applications. RESUMIX and Résumé Builder also reduces the time it takes the specialist to provide a manager or commander with a referral list of candidates.

5) **ANSWER.** The Applicant Notification System Web-Enabled Response (ANSWER) tool is designed to allow users to check the status of the Resume, track application history, view Self-Nomination history and view current Resume and Supplemental Data listed in the Central Resumix Database. Users can toggle between the Resume Builder and ANSWER.

6) **FASCLASS.** The Fully Automated System for Classification (FASCLASS) delivers position classification and position description information to the customer’s desktop. It provides on-line access to active position descriptions and organizational information.

7) **ABC–C.** The Army Benefits Center-Civilian enables customers to access and change their civilian benefits, such as health and life insurance, over the telephone or on the Internet. ABC–C also processes employee retirements. ABC–C also provides counseling by skilled and knowledgeable operators.

8) **CHRTAS/ ATRRS.** The Civilian Human Resource Training Application System (CHRTAS) and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) provide a web-based training tool for supervisors, employees and training course managers. Capabilities include training registration and approval, Individual Development Plans, and Training History Management. Completed training is recorded in CHRTAS, ATRRS, and DCPDS. All three systems are utilized for training provided by CHRA, Regional HRD Divisions, as well as the Civilian Education System leadership courses managed by the Army Management Staff College. CHRTAS is evolving to become Army’s enterprise e-Learning Management System.
Section IV
Personnel management at installation/activity level

The responsibility for providing day-to-day leadership of Army civilians resides primarily at installation and activity
level with the supervisor, manager, and commander. The SECARMY has delegated personnel management authority,
except for management of Executive and Senior Professional (ESP) resources, to Commanders with authority to further
delegate to commanders of independent field activities. Thus, the actual management of Department of the Army (DA)
civilians, including professional development, incentive awards, discipline, evaluation, and almost all other life cycle
personnel functions is decentralized to installation and activity commanders and local managers and supervisors. The
CPAC assists the chain of command in exercising this responsibility. In the case of ESPs, centralized management is
the responsibility of the Army Civilian Senior Leader Management Office, with day-to-day oversight provided by the
Deputy Undersecretary of the Army.

14–12. Commander responsibilities
Installation commanders are responsible for leading and managing civilian employees and are held accountable for
effective utilization of their HR assets. Responsible commanders develop, empower, and utilize subordinate supervi-
sors, managers, and the CHR staff to establish a work environment for positive employee motivation and high
performance. Specific command responsibilities are to carry out civilian personnel management policies, procedures
and programs as stated forth in Title 5, United States Code - “Government Organizations and Employees;” Title 5, Code
other applicable laws and regulations, consistent with applicable negotiated agreements.

14–13. Supervisor responsibilities
   a. Commanders generally delegate authority for leading and managing civilian employees to subordinate managers
      and supervisors. This carries with it specific responsibilities to—
      • Maintain accurate position descriptions.
      • Recruit, select, assign, and set pay for employees.
      • Evaluate employee performance, and train and develop employees.
      • Administer award and incentive programs.
      • Maintain management-employee communications.
      • Communicate employee expectations, administer constructive discipline, and promptly address employee perform-
        ance deficiencies.
      • Maintain a positive labor-management relations program.
   b. Supervisor responsibilities in each of these areas and the functional systems established to assist in carrying out
      these responsibilities are described below.
   c. The Army has an informal civilian mentoring program for mentoring civilians. The Army Mentorship Program
      was created to reemphasize, reinvigorate and increase mentorship throughout the Army. The Army’s Mentorship
      Resource Center is located at http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/mentorship/default.asp
      (1) Supervisors should motivate employees to seek mentors through the Army’s Mentorship Resource Center.
      (2) DA PAM 690–46 “Mentoring for Civilian Members of the Force” provides further guidance.

14–14. Position Classification and Pay
      (1) Individual positions are classified by comparison with the appropriate classification standards or guides. These
          are developed by OPM or DOD based on comprehensive occupational studies of representative work found in the
          Federal service. Army regulations assign responsibility for maintaining accurate job descriptions to supervisors.
          Differences in pay must be attributed to differences in the difficulty, responsibility, and skill requirements of jobs.
      (2) Most positions are covered by the following pay systems: the General Schedule (GS); the National Security
          Personnel System (NSPS), which covers white-collar workers in professional, administrative, technical, clerical, and
          protective occupations; the Federal Wage System (FWS) which covers workers in trades, crafts, labor, and similar
          occupations. Salary rates for most GS positions, to include locality pay, are based on surveys of private sector salary
          rates conducted by the Department of Labor. FWS wage rates are established based on local surveys of private sector
          rates conducted by Federal agencies in accordance with OPM policies. Personnel demonstration projects authorized by
          the Defense Authorization Acts of FY95, 96, and 98, operate under broad pay band systems rather than the GS
          schedule.
      (3) Position Classification and pay for NSPS positions: The NSPS is a pay for performance system that uses pay
          bands for position classification and pay. Individual positions are classified by comparison of duties and responsibilities
          with the appropriate classification guides developed by DOD. Classification authority is a management responsibility
and is therefore delegated to appropriate management officials. The NSPS classification/pay system has four broad career groups (Standard, Scientific/Engineering, Medical, and Investigative/Protective Services). Each of these career groups consists of three to four pay schedules with varying numbers of pay bands. The majority of pay schedules have three pay bands, while some have only two or four pay bands. Pay bands allow managers flexibility in setting pay within a band. Salary rates for NSPS employees generally include local market supplements which are usually administered in the same manner as locality pay. Employees progress through pay bands, in part, by job performance. Management officials may also use recruitment and retention bonuses and other pay flexibilities, as discussed in the “recruitment” section below. NSPS employees may receive a targeted local market supplement based on the type of position, geographic location, and difficulty in filling certain occupations.

b. Position classification and pay for Non-Appropriated (NAF) positions.

(1) The DOD NAF uses a pay band system for position classification and pay. Pay banding involves the establishment of several broad salary bands and allows managers to set individual salaries within an established pay band. It is easier for managers to provide high performing NAF employees greater compensation short of a promotion action or performance award. The DOD pay band system includes all NAF clerical, administrative, sales, technical, managerial, executive, professional, and personal service positions, exclusive of child care giving and crafts and trades positions.

(2) There are six pay bands, referred to as pay levels and identified using codes NF–1 through NF–6. They have minimum and maximum pay rates that are overlapping. The minimum and maximum rates for the first two levels and minimum only for level NF–3 are determined by locality-based wage surveys of comparable private sector jobs. Conversely, the maximum rates for NF–3 and rates for NF–4 through NF–6 are related to the Federal schedule (GS) and Senior Executive Service (SES) pay range.

(3) Child care giving pay band positions are covered by a separate pay band system implemented in consonance with the DA Care giving Personnel Pay Program (CPPP). There are two pay bands, also referred to as pay levels, and they are distinctly identified through use of terms Pay Band I or Pay Band II. The range in pay for child care giving pay band positions is equal to the hourly rate of pay for a GS–2, Step 1, through GS–5, Step 10, and pay rates prescribed for GS child care giving positions also apply. The DA Child Personnel Pay Program (CPPP) was expanded in February 1999 to include positions in Youth Services that had similar duties and responsibilities. The program continues to follow the same guidelines that were established for the CPPP and is now known as the Child and Youth Personnel Pay Program (CYPPP).

(4) Crafts and trades positions are not affected by pay banding. Pay is determined through the prevailing rate system used for those positions covered under the Federal Wage System (FWS).

c. Position classification and pay for foreign national positions. These positions are generally not included in either of the pay systems described above. Employees in these positions are paid under local host-nation pay scales and conditions.

14–15. Recruitment, Selection, and Assignment

a. Management has the right to consider candidates from all appropriate sources, including but not limited to merit promotion, reinstatement and transfer eligibles, Veterans Employment Opportunity Act (VEOA) eligibles, individuals with severe physical or mental disabilities, family member eligibles under EO 12721, and those certified as eligible for appointment by OPM or under a delegated examining authority. In deciding which sources to tap, consideration should be given to those which are expected to produce candidates who will meet the agency’s mission requirements, contribute new ideas and viewpoints, and meet the agency’s affirmative action and special employment programs. Recruitment sources also encompass special employment programs, e.g. Student Temporary Employment (STEP) programs, Student Career Experience Program (SCEP), Federal Career Intern Program (FCIP), and the Presidential Management Fellows (PMF) program. Persons with statutory or priority placement rights to a vacancy must be given appropriate consideration before the normal recruitment process may proceed.

(1) STEP: Students who are pursuing an educational program may be appointed non-competitively to the Federal Government on a temporary, short-term basis. The nature of the duties does not have to be related to the academic goals. The appointment does not confer competitive status however the student may be converted to the SCEP program when the requirements are met and the Agency has an appropriate position.

(2) SCEP: This program allows the appointment of students to positions that are related to their academic field of study. Participants who meet all the requirements of the program may be noncompetitively converted to term, career, or career-conditional appointments.

(3) FCIP: This program is designed to help agencies recruit exceptional individuals into a variety of occupations at the GS–5, 7, and 9 or equivalent grade levels. Created under Executive Order 13162, this program allows individuals to be appointed to a 2-year internship that provides formal training and developmental assignments as established by the agency. Applicants do not have to be actively pursuing an academic degree. Applicants must be US Citizens, are subject to OPM qualification requirements, and apply directly to the Federal agencies. Upon successful completion of the program, the interns may be eligible for non-competitive permanent placement within the agency.

(4) PMF Program: The individual must have completed a graduate course of study at a qualifying college or university, received the nomination of the dean or academic director, successfully completed an OPM administered
assessment process, been selected as a finalist, and been appointed by an agency as a Presidential Management Fellow. Appointments are made at the GS–09 through the GS–13 or equivalent level.

b. All personnel selection decisions must be based solely on merit based and job-related reasons.

c. In recent years the DA, like other employers, has found the recruitment and retention of highly skilled employees a challenge, particularly for jobs in shortage occupations or in locations with an especially tight labor market. In the next several years, due to an anticipated wave of retirements, DA expects to have to fill many more vacancies in a highly competitive environment. It is important, therefore, that supervisors and managers be aware that special incentives are available for staffing positions with unusual recruitment and retention problems. These incentives may include recruitment bonuses, relocation bonuses, and retention allowances (each up to 25 percent of basic pay); superior qualifications appointment (appointment at a rate above the minimum for the GS grade because of superior qualifications or a special need for the candidate’s services); and special salary rates (minimum rates and rate ranges above those of the General Schedule). In filling an NSPS position, managers have more flexibility and options due to the construct of pay bands. In addition to the incentives for recruitment, relocation and retention, managers may set a new employee’s salary based on the employee’s qualifications and the market value of the position. NSPS employees may receive a targeted local market supplement based on the type of position, geographic location, and difficulty in filling certain occupations. In addition, activities may identify local shortage positions for purposes of paying first duty station and pre-employment interview travel expenses for permanent positions. Information about these and other incentives is available in Personnel Management Information and Support System (PERMISS). Army employment also offers attractive leave, insurance, and retirement benefits, and typically provides a family friendly environment, meaningful public service work and good opportunities for training and advancement based on merit, all of which can be important tools in marketing Army as an employer.

14–16. Evaluation of employee performance and administration of awards/incentives programs

a. Administration of the evaluation and performance incentive functions of civilian personnel management requires managers and supervisors to exercise both leadership and fiscal responsibilities. It also requires an appreciation of the work place environment and an understanding of individual needs for counsel, recognition, and reward. The civilian incentive awards program includes monetary and honorary awards. Civilian incentive award decorations and award approval authority is aligned with the military awards system. The following Army civilian performance management programs are detailed in regulations, pamphlets, and DOD and Army NSPS issuances listed in the reference section of this chapter:

(1) Performance planning and evaluation programs for SES, white-collar, blue-collar and NAF employees.

(2) Base pay adjustment policy and procedures for all civilian employees (ESP pay increase; GS and FWS within-grade increase; NAF pay increase; NSPS base pay increase).

(3) Cash and honorary award programs to recognize significant individual and group contributions (SES performance bonus; GS, NAF, and FWS performance award; GS quality step increase; NSPS performance bonus; time-off and honorary awards).

(4) Policy and procedures for dealing with employees who fail to meet performance expectations.

(5) Personnel demonstration projects, NSPS, and ESPs use systems that reward high performance or contributions to mission, and place less emphasis on longevity for pay and retention.

b. As with the military performance evaluation systems, the civilian evaluation process is designed to enhance supervisory/employee communications and day-to-day relationships to improve overall performance. At the beginning of each rating period, the rating supervisor and the employee determine job requirements and develop a performance plan for the year. The performance plan should reflect the organization’s mission and goals and the duties and responsibilities of the employee in concert with individual position descriptions. The performance plan may change during the year if the mission requires a re-ordering of responsibilities and priorities. At the end of the rating period, the rating official compares the individual’s contributions to the requirements in the performance plan and renders an overall summary rating. The summary rating is used to make promotion/pay increase and training decisions, document justification for performance-based cash awards and honorary awards, and give additional years of service credit for reduction-in-force seniority status. Under NSPS, the rating official recommends the ratings and the Pay Pool Manager approves the overall summary rating. The evaluation process is also used to assist employees who experience performance problems. The counseling component may be used to help them improve to an expected level or the evaluation can serve to document removal from the position if the employee fails to meet standards. The keys to successful performance management are frequent, two-way communication and timely, appropriate action to either recognize superior contributions or correct inferior performance.

14–17. Training and development of employees

Managers and supervisors, working with the CPAC, define organizational training requirements. Based on these requirements, Civilian Human Resources Agency (CHRA) and its Regional Human Resources Development Divisions develop and maintain training programs that involve all types of training activities in support of employee and organizational mission accomplishment. Training may include technical skill courses, human relations, transition (retirement) planning, leadership, and self-development (upward mobility) programs. Other training may focus on the
career development requirements for a given job series. The Regional Human Resources Development Divisions in coordination with the CPAC and management, also develops, coordinates, and administers training and development programs that have regional application. Training is an integral part of NSPS and incorporates required courses for managers and employees.

a. Training programs. Training categories cover a broad field from executive and management to adult basic education. Training is classified as either short- or long-term (more than 120 days). The actual training can be delivered through on-the-job training at local activities, Army schools, DOD schools, CHRA, interagency schools, formal schools, and a host of other government and non-government sources as well as online sources. Civilians can also compete for attendance in formal training programs such as Senior Service Colleges and other training opportunities. The AR 215-series establishes training requirements for both APF and NAF employees in MWR activities. This training is met largely through courses sponsored and/or conducted by the FMWRC at the MWR Academy.

b. Career management system.

(1) To establish basic policies and program requirements for the intake, assignment, training, and development of employees in designated occupations, the Army developed The Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) as outlined in AR 690–950, Career Management. These systems support supervisors in recruiting candidates for long-term career opportunities and ensure a steady flow of capable, fully qualified, and trained personnel for Army positions in 23 civilian career professional, technical, and administrative fields. The relative strength in these fields is shown in Figure 14–3.

(2) The career management system provides clear lines of progression to successively more responsible positions and a coordinated training and development program for occupational specialties, using both Army and outside facilities. Procedures are provided for counseling employees; planning individual development programs; and appraising employee competencies. New employees participate in planned work or rotational assignments designed to develop technical and leadership competencies to prepare for future managerial responsibilities. The ACTEDS is the DA-wide program by which these objectives are accomplished and funded.

(3) At the higher-grade levels/pay bands, typically for promotion to grades GS–13 through GS–15/pay band 3 or equivalent, candidates are considered on an Army-wide basis. Application procedures depend on the particular career program.

(4) The above procedures apply to APF personnel, including those working in MWR programs. NAF employees also benefit from a central referral program. FMWRC is the executive agent for NAF MWR career programs and maintains a central roster of NAF pay band employees eligible for level NF–4 and above positions. Outside applicants may also register in the program. The system provides selecting officials with names and information on employees who are interested in being considered for a given NAF position.

![Figure 14–3. Department of the Army Civilian Career Program strength as of September 30, 2008 (Data source: Workforce Analysis and Support System)](image-url)
14–18. Workers Compensation Program

Federal employees who are injured or ill as a direct result of their employment are entitled by the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) to medical care and also salary replacement (compensation) while they are not working. Additionally, employees are entitled to a lump sum if there is a permanent loss or impairment of a body part because of their employment. The Workers Compensation program is very expensive to the Army, both in dollars and in lost human potential. The majority of the cost stems from workers who never returned to Army employment and continue to draw salary replacement for their lifetime. Each installation is required to have a FECA Working Group, composed of the Injury Compensation Program Administrator (ICPA) and representatives of management, medical, safety, and investigative service staff. The FECA Working Group should meet at least quarterly to analyze trends and develop cost-containment initiatives. Installations have the obligation to ensure that all workplaces are as safe as possible, that employees are trained on safe work practices, issued appropriate safety equipment, and that safety standards are constantly enforced. All workplace injuries and illnesses should be investigated by the supervisor and by the safety office to ensure the cause is corrected. The ICPA, located in the CPAC, has the lead in operating the Workers Compensation program at the installation level. The ICPA has the dual responsibility of seeing that the injured or ill worker receives the medical care needed to recover and that the worker returns to employment, either to the date of injury position, light duty, or a new position if necessary. Every employee who is never returned to productive employment is entitled to salary replacement (compensation) for lifetime. The ICPA also is responsible for ensuring that all questionable claims of injury or illness are challenged so that Army is not charged for undue expenses. The ICPA should be in frequent contact with all injured employees, and ensure that each treating physician understands that Army is eager to offer light duty or modified employment. NAF employees are entitled to worker’s compensation benefits established under provisions of the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities (NAFI) Act of 1958 (5 USC 8171–8173), which extends the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA) (33 usc 901 et seq.) Worker’s compensation provides benefits to NAF employees who are disabled because of job-related illness or injury or to surviving spouse and dependents in cases of death from job-related causes. Benefits apply to employees of NAFIs/entities employed inside the continental United States; or employees of NAFIs/entities who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents of the U.S. or a territory or possession of the U.S. and employed outside the continental United States. Benefits will not apply to active duty military personnel employed by NAFIs/entities or local civilians employed by NAFIs/entities overseas. AR 215–3, Chapter 5 and AR 215–1; Chapter 19 outlines established processes and procedures related to Worker’s Compensation for NAF employees.

14–19. Communication, discipline, and labor-management relations.

Supervisors are responsible for striving to develop a cooperative labor-management relationship: administering labor-management agreements; communicating management objectives, decisions, and viewpoints to their subordinates; and communicating their subordinates’ views to higher-level management. Supervisors must analyze problems, develop solutions, and evaluate the results of decisions. The CPAC is responsible for assisting management in day-to-day business of employee performance, discipline, individual adverse actions, effective use of recognition and awards, labor-management-employee relations, administration of leave, hours of work, and monitoring of health and safety conditions.

a. If an employee believes that his or her rights have been denied, or that improper procedures have been followed, or that an action taken by management is unwarranted, he or she may utilize appropriate forums for relief. The MSPB (Merit Systems Protection Board) may be used for adverse actions (except a short suspension, that is, 14 days or less) and subsequently the courts may be used. Short suspensions and reprimands may be contested through the Administrative Grievance System or negotiated grievance procedures.

b. The grievance procedures, both in policy and negotiated agreement, set forth specific steps to be followed for resolving employee dissatisfaction with any aspect of working conditions, working relationships, or employment status. Army policy encourages timely resolution at the lowest level practical; however, grievances can escalate up the chain of command to a fact finder, or, if under a negotiated grievance procedure, to binding arbitration.

c. Negotiated grievance procedures are outlined in labor contracts which are jointly developed by management and the local labor union granted exclusive recognition to represent all bargaining member employees (whether the employees are union members or not). The legal basis for the labor-management relations program for Federal employees is Chapter 71, 5 USC. The law states that labor organizations (unions) and collective bargaining are in the public interest and establish the rights and obligations of employees, unions, and agency management. AR 215–3, Non-Appropriated Fund Personnel Policy, provides the framework for addressing labor-management relations for NAF employees.

d. Supervisors are obliged to maintain a willingness to bargain collectively with labor organizations. Despite earnest efforts, there may be a time when an impasse will result, and if both parties fail to resolve their differences, the law provides for a neutral third party to resolve the impasse. This is the job of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) and the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP). The FMCS assists the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement. Failing this, the FSIP may impose a settlement on the parties.

e. Management should strive to ensure that non-adversarial labor-management relationships are nurtured so mission accomplishment is enhanced rather than inhibited by the labor relations process. Management is also responsible for—

(1) Negotiating in good faith regarding conditions of employment (that is, personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions).

(2) Furnishing official time to union representatives for negotiating collective-bargaining agreements and for other representational purposes as provided for by negotiated agreement.

(3) Deducting union dues from the pay of eligible employees who authorize such deductions and allotting those deductions to recognized unions.

(4) Notifying recognized unions and giving them the opportunity to be present at formal discussions between management and one or more employees.

(5) Allowing the union the opportunity to be represented at any examination of an employee pursuant to an investigation if the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action and if the employee requests representation (Weingarten Right).

g. Certain ground rules are established to safeguard the basic intent of the law. The previously discussed FLRA is an independent, administrative agency presided over by three members appointed by the President. The FLRA is the central policymaking body of the Federal labor-management relations program. It decides representation questions (whether a union is eligible to represent certain groups of employees), adjudicates negotiability disputes (whether there is an obligation to negotiate on specific proposals), adjudicates unfair labor practices (ULPs) (a violation of the provisions of Title VII), and decides appeals to arbitrators’ awards.

h. Responsibilities of CPAC directors: The CPAC director is the designee of the installation/activity commander and, as head of the CPAC, is responsible for administering the civilian personnel program. Note that the commander retains overall responsibility for management and leadership of the civilian work force. The CPAC director has responsibility for implementation, maintenance, and evaluation of local personnel programs designed to assist supervisors with their personnel management responsibilities and achieve activity mission objectives. The CPAC Director interprets personnel policies and regulations and provides guidance and assistance in personnel matters in his or her assigned areas of responsibility. The CPAC Director must seek to ensure that management actions affecting civilian employees will enhance the Army’s reputation as a good and fair employer, ensure employee productivity, support EEO, and maintain effective community relations. The CPAC Director also has oversight of the local NAF personnel program. The CPAC director is assisted in the administration of the NAF discipline and labor relations programs by a NAF Human Relations Officer as well as the NAF personnel program in general.

Section V
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) in the Federal Government

14–20. Equal Employment Opportunity statutory requirements and Army implementation:


b. The authority to administer the Army’s EEO policy and program is delegated by the Secretary of the Army (SA) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army ASA (M&RA) and further delegated to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (DASA) for Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights (DASA (EEO/CR) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Army Review Boards Agency. The staff of the DASA (EEO/CR) is responsible for:

(1) Developing’ DA EEO policy on various issues and DA EEO Strategic Plan,

(2) Guidance on all aspects of the EEO program with the exception of complaints area,

(3) Guidance on Special Emphasis Programs (EEOC protected groups) including the Individuals with Disability Program strategic goals and initiatives,

(4) EEO program evaluation criteria,

(5) Mandatory EEO training (POSH/Anti-Harassment, No FEAR, etc.),

(6) Minority College Relations Program,
(7) EEO modernization program,

(8) Managing the affirmative employment programs for minorities, women and persons with disabilities in accordance with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Management Directive 715 (EEOC MD 715),

(9) The Disabled Veterans Affirmative Action Plan;

(10) Providing guidance to the field on new developments, be they regulatory, statutory, or trends in employment.

On the staff of the DASA Army Review Board is a distinct directorate for EEO Compliance and Complaints and Review. The Director is responsible for:

(a) Developing Army policy on Complaints processing,

(b) Rendering final agency decisions and actions on complaints of discrimination,

(c) Reviewing mediation/alternative dispute resolution program plans of Army commands,

(d) Ensuring compliance with EEOC directives,

(e) Providing guidance to the field on new developments, be they regulatory, statutory, or trends in case law.

c. Commanders are responsible for providing sufficient resources to the EEO program to ensure efficient and successful operations. Commanders are responsible and held accountable for an effective EEO program of affirmative action and employment programs for minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities and for the administration of the discrimination complaint system for all serviced and tenant organizations.

d. The EEO Officer and staff provide commanders advice and assistance on program implementation. The EEO office is responsible for developing “Model EEO Program” barrier analysis and initiatives to correct the barriers that were identified in accordance with guidance provided by EEOC, Office of Personnel Management, Department of Defense, and DA. The EEO staff takes the lead in the development of initiatives on all programs covered by MD 715 with input from all serviced senior leadership and tenant organizations. This includes the Individuals with Disability Program and the annual facility accessibility survey study.

e. Army activities are responsible for development of barrier analysis for minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities in accordance with guidance provided by the EEOC and DA. The EEO staff takes the lead to report to senior leaders identified barriers to policies and practices. EEO staff and senior leaders must co-jointly work to develop solutions and time frames to eliminate the identified barriers to policies and practices. The EEO Office is responsible for the management and implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities program in accordance with EEOC, OPM, DOD and DA.

14–21. The Equal Employment Opportunity complaint process

a. The right of every federal civilian employee to be free from discrimination on the basis of their race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, or retaliation for having engaged in prior EEO activity is guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (revised), along with the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. All Army civilian employees, applicants for employment, retirees, as well as certain contract employees, may file a complaint against the Army if they have suffered a tangible harm to a term or condition of their employment due to discriminatory actions based on one or more of these prohibited factors. Examples of employment actions which may give rise to a complaint include, but are not limited to, hiring and promotion decisions, performance evaluations, reassignments, disciplinary actions, and harassment.

b. Information directing individuals who may wish to file an EEO complaint should be readily and easily available at all Army work sites. Most Army civilians are serviced by a local garrison EEO Office, though some in remote locations or leased buildings may receive EEO services from an Office at another location. Certain Army EEO Offices may also have agreements with non-Army activities in their same geographical area to provide EEO services to their employees. Many commands require posters with photographs of local EEO personnel, phone and email contact information and the physical location of the EEO Office responsible for providing EEO services to the employees at that work site to be posted prominently in public places such as bulletin boards. Contact information for the local EEO Office can also be provided on a garrison or command’s website.

c. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set forth the basic steps of the EEO complaint process in Title 29, Part 1614 of the Code of Federal Regulations and in their Management Directive 110. Army-specific procedures and timeframes can be found in Army Regulation 690–600, Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints. If an individual believes they have been discriminated against they must contact EEO personnel within 45 calendar days (including weekends and holidays) from the date they knew of or should have known of the alleged discriminatory act. During their initial contact with EEO the individual may initiate a “pre-complaint” in which an EEO Counselor will be assigned to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the matter. The individual may be offered the opportunity to participate in an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process at this time. If the matter is not resolved to the individual’s satisfaction after the conclusion of the pre-complaint process a formal complaint may be filed. The EEO Officer will determine whether to accept or dismiss the formal complaint; if accepted, it will be referred to the Department of Defense, Investigations and Resolution Division (DOD IRD) for an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation the individual may request a final decision on the record from the Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review Directorate (EEOCCR) or a hearing before an
Administrative Judge (AJ) of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If a hearing is requested the AJ will issue a decision on whether or not discrimination has occurred, which will then be referred to EEOCCR (Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review) for implementation or an appeal. At the end of this process the individual may file an appeal with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) or pursue the matter in federal civil court.

d. Commanders should strive to create a command climate in which it is clear to all soldiers and civilians that discriminatory actions will not be tolerated. While commanders must always respect the right of an individual to pursue an EEO complaint through the entire process without reprisal or interference, commanders can promote ADR programs and encourage the managers and supervisors in their organization to participate in ADR sessions. Commanders should also ensure that their organizations cooperate with any request from a DOD IRD investigator for documentation or the testimony of a soldier or civilian named as a witness. If discrimination is found to have occurred EEOCCR will order the commander to take certain corrective actions to remedy the situation, which may include the payment of backpay, compensatory damages, or attorney’s fees, the hiring or promotion of the individual, the modification of a performance evaluation or a disciplinary action, and an examination of whether the responsible management officials should be disciplined for their actions.

e. This procedure does not apply to employees or applicants of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) or to non-U.S. citizens employed by DA outside the U.S. Specific procedures and time processing guidelines are described in AR 690–600, Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints.

Section VI
Senior Executive Service

14–22. Senior Executive Service Structure and Composition

a. The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established in 1979, and brought to fruition over 40 years of efforts to create a separate system for top civilian executives within the Federal civilian service. Members of the SES are not in the competitive service like most other civilians. SES positions are positions above the GS–15 level, and salaries are in the same general range as those for general officers. The SES was designed to ensure that professional civilian executive management of the government is responsive to the needs, policies, and goals of the nation.

b. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) establishes the regulations and allocations for SES positions. The Department of the Army requests allocations through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Army has 291 authorizations for FY 09. OPM, through this allocation system, limits the number of positions that may be filled at the SES level. The Army’s authorized SES positions include a broad range of occupational series. Forty percent are in the fields of engineering and science. Approximately half of the Army’s SES positions are located in the National Capital Region.

c. The Secretary of the Army centrally manages all senior executive resources through the Civilian Senior Leader Management Office (CSLMO). CSLMO reports directly to the Undersecretary of the Army, while day-to-day oversight of the office is the responsibility of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army. CSLMO establishes policy based on guidance from the SA, and designs and executes succession planning and talent pool management, as well as all aspects of staffing, performance management, and executive development.
14–23. Qualification of SES Members

a. There are five executive core qualifications that all potential SES members must possess:

(1) Leading Change: This core qualification involves the ability to bring about strategic change, both within and outside the organization, to meet organizational goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to establish an organizational vision and to implement it in a continuously changing environment.

(2) Leading People: This core qualification involves the ability to lead people toward meeting the organization’s vision, mission, and goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to provide an inclusive workplace that fosters the development of others, facilitates cooperation and teamwork, and supports constructive resolution of conflicts.

(3) Results Driven: This core qualification involves the ability to meet organizational goals and customer expectations. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to make decisions that produce high-quality results by applying technical knowledge, analyzing problems, and calculating risks.

(4) Business Acumen: This core qualification involves the ability to manage human, financial, and information resources strategically.

(5) Building Coalitions: This core qualification involves the ability to build coalitions internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals.

b. The executive development of employees in GS–14 and 15 grade levels or equivalent is an important command responsibility. SES members are expected to possess leadership competencies that parallel those of Army general officers. Therefore, attendance at a Senior Service College program is a highly desirable experience for civilians who aspire to SES positions. Appointment to the Career SES marks achievement of the highest nonpolitical civilian executive position. These positions are given protocol precedence equivalent to lieutenant general, major general, and brigadier general.

Section VII
Mobilization Planning

14–24. Designation of deployable and non-deployable civilian positions

a. DA civilians are an essential part of the total Army and contribute significantly to the Army’s efforts to accomplish its mission in peace and war. Some civilian positions are designated to reflect a required role in the event of future operations. The designation may require the incumbent to deploy or may identify a CONUS position that cannot be vacated.

b. Some important definitions falling under the heading of civilian preparedness are as follows.

(1) **Key position.** A position, normally in the Continental United States (CONUS), that cannot be vacated during war or national emergency without seriously impairing the capability of the parent organization to function effectively.
architectures are planned along with inter-community rotational and development programs. Common senior executive standards while protecting individual Service and agency prerogatives. Common employment and compensation legislation and supporting initiatives continually strive to achieve a broad common architecture of policies, systems and personnel management systems for intelligence components in DOD into one broad excepted service system. DCIPS known as the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS), and then evolving into DCIPS when a provision of the Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996, as well as DOD Authorization Act of 1997, known as the Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996, combined all civilian personnel management systems for intelligence components in DOD into one broad excepted service system. DCIPS legislation and supporting initiatives continually strive to achieve a broad common architecture of policies, systems and standards while protecting individual Service and agency prerogatives. Common employment and compensation architectures are planned along with inter-community rotational and development programs. Common senior executive

14–25. Civilian personnel mobilization planning

a. The Army includes mobilization planning as an essential element of the total civilian personnel program. In those operations involving civilians in overseas areas where the potential for hostilities exists, management’s planning includes identifying, training, equipping, deploying, utilizing, and redeploying emergency-essential personnel. Lessons learned from recent contingency operations have resulted in the establishment of civilian mobilization cells at the HQDA Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 and Human Resources Command to integrate policy, execution, and deployed civilian personnel accountability systems.

b. DODD 1404.10, DODD 1400.31, DODI 1400.32, AR 690–11, AR 215–3 and DA PAM 690–47 provide guidance for civilian personnel mobilization planning and management for APF and NAF personnel. Based on these regulations, commanders and managers, with the assistance of CPAC staffs, develop and maintain appropriate emergency plans, procedures, standby implementation documents, and the organizational and staffing arrangements required to plan for and manage the deployment of their civilian employees during contingencies, national emergencies, and war. One management responsibility that warrants particular mention is accountability for deployed personnel. Supervisors must assure that civilians who deploy (whether Army civilians or contract personnel) are familiar with the systems and procedures designed to track their whereabouts as they enter, move within, and depart from an area of operations. The Civilian Tracking System (CIVTRACKS) and the Deployed Theater Accountability Software (DTAS) have been implemented for this purpose. Additionally, Army has instituted a means of documenting all deployment of Army civilians in the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS).

Section VIII
Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System


a. DCIPS employees are U.S. citizens paid from APFs. Unlike most other APF civilians, they are managed through a statutorily based excepted personnel service administered by the OSD for the DOD Intelligence Community.

b. There are currently approximately 5,500 civilians in the Army under this personnel system. The Army has included in DCIPS all employees in series and specialties with clear ties to intelligence wherever they are found. Good examples are intelligence specialists in the 132 series and intelligence assistants in the 134 series regardless of function as well as security specialists in the 080 series and security assistants in the 086 series where 51 percent or more of their duties are intelligence related (not law enforcement related). DCIPS coverage by series/function has resulted in most major commands having at least some DCIPS employees. The Army has also included in DCIPS all employees (except local nationals) in commands that have a primary intelligence mission. Therefore you will find many of the administrative, technical and support series, and a few wage grade employees in DCIPS, as well as the Army’s intelligence and security professionals, in such commands as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

14–27. Relationship of DCIPS to the Army civilian personnel program

a. DCIPS is considered a part of the Army’s overall civilian personnel program and has tested innovative personnel management features for the Army and the DOD. As a statutory alternative personnel system, DCIPS is exempt from Title 5 job classification provisions and has adopted the use of the NSA’s classification system to better align grades with the rest of the intelligence community. It is also exempt from many OPM hiring provisions and can directly consider applications from non-government employees through its own merit system. DCIPS is presently being revised by DOD to encompass all of DOD’s intelligence community not just the military services. DCIPS will be a pay for performance and pay banded system similar but separate from the National Security Personnel System.

b. Within the Army, DCIPS utilizes the Total Army Personnel Evaluation System (TAPES). Civilian personnel servicing support for CONUS intelligence activities is being consolidated at the Regional Processing Center and the Fort Huachuca, AZ CPAC to improve HR understanding and system expertise and increase servicing effectiveness and efficiency.

c. DCIPS was implemented in FY90, first as a tri-service system known as the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS), and then evolving into DCIPS when a provision of the DOD Authorization Act of 1997, as well as the Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996, combined all civilian personnel management systems for intelligence components in DOD into one broad excepted service system. DCIPS legislation and supporting initiatives continually strive to achieve a broad common architecture of policies, systems and standards while protecting individual Service and agency prerogatives. Common employment and compensation architectures are planned along with inter-community rotational and development programs. Common senior executive
and leader programs have also been developed. These include the Defense Intelligence Executive Service (DISES) for intelligence executives and the Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) program for senior experts.

Section IX
Army personnel transformation

14–28. Current and transforming CHR administration
The current CHR force is vital to the Army’s mission. Each CPAC staff member is a strategic partner with serviced commands, managers and supervisors. Today, the Army faces significant challenges as it transforms to a more agile, and technology-based force. With both external and internal drivers such as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), Global Defense Posture Strategy (GDPS), Joint Basing, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) HR Lines of Business (LOB), and the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), the CHR force must also transform as it positions to be the premier HR provider for all DOD. The CHR community will utilize Lean Six Sigma methodology to redesign business processes and delivery of services and reinvest those savings into the organization to continue to provide world-class customer service.

14–29. Transforming CHR Administration
With the advent of NSPS, sweeping change has been and will continue to be the norm for the future. NSPS offers greater flexibilities for hiring, compensation and performance management. Commanders, managers, supervisors, and employees have a greater responsibility and accountability. These changes, as well as the challenges of maintaining multiple personnel systems simultaneously, are refocusing CHR professionals on their advisory roles and will ultimately result in a transformed CHR structure and workforce to meet future demands.

Section X
Summary and references

14–30. Summary
a. The purpose of the Army Civilian Personnel Management System is to provide a motivated and technically qualified work force to meet Army requirements. There is no doubt that the civilian work force is an integral part of the Army team. Army civilians play an important role in all our missions and share in the organization’s accomplishments. The Army employs civilians because they possess unique skills, ensure operational continuity, are economical, and permit military personnel to perform purely military duties. The civilian personnel management system and its supporting policy and service organizations contribute to the overall mission.

b. More than half of civilian positions are bargaining unit positions represented by labor unions. Army leaders, be they civilian or military, must accept their labor-management responsibilities. The efficiency of our operations cannot be allowed to fail due to an unhealthy labor climate where leaders did not accept obligations to advise, consult, and bargain, as the law requires.

c. As the force downsized and underwent initiatives to convert formerly military positions to civilian occupancy, more and more civilians have assumed key roles in headquarters and support activities, schools and training centers, and BASOPS. For many of these important positions it may not be possible to hire people with the necessary skills. Therefore, the Army must develop civilians from within the current ranks.

d. This chapter was designed to provide only a broad overview of the Civilian Personnel Management System in order to describe how the major processes are designed to support Army leaders. It is important to understand the legal basis for the Federal Civil Service, how the Army’s system works within the Federal system and also the regulatory basis and practices for the Army’s NAF Personnel System. Furthermore, commanders and managers at all levels must have a clear understanding of the nature of the civilian personnel structure, programs, and mission, as well as their responsibilities to provide effective leadership and management. DA civilians are part of an Army team comprised of a diverse workforce dedicated to doing the best job possible to ensure Army missions are accomplished effectively. The Army and DOD civilian personnel web sites contain a great deal of helpful information and may be accessed at www.cpol.army.mil and www.cpms.osd.mil, respectively. The CSLMO also has a secure website which may be accessed by anyone holding a CAC card registered with AKO at https://www.cslmo.army.mil.

14–31. References


c. Army Regulation 570–4, Manpower Management.


e. Army Regulation 600–7, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Programs and Activities Assisted or Conducted by the Department of the Army.

f. Army Regulation 672–20, Incentive Awards.


i. Army Regulation 690–13, Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) - Policies and Procedures.

j. Army Regulation 690–400, Chap. 432, Reduction in Grade and Removal Based on Unacceptable Performance.

k. Army Regulation 690–400, Chap. 4302, Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES).

l. Army Regulation 690–700, Chap. 751, Discipline.

m. Army Regulation 690–600, Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints.

n. Army Regulation 690–900, Chap. 920, Senior Executive Service (under revision).

o. Army Regulation 690–950, Career Management.


q. DA Pamphlet 690–11, Guide to Civilian Personnel Management

r. DA Pamphlet 690–30, Administering the Labor Agreement.

s. DA Pamphlet 690–46, Mentoring for Civilian Members of the Force.

t. DA Pamphlet 690–47, DA Civilian Employees Deployment Guide.


v. Title V United States Code.

w. DOD Manual 1400.25 Subchapter 920, Executive and Senior Professional Pay and Performance.

x. DOD Civilian Personnel Manual 1400.25–M, Chapter 1900.
RESERVED
Chapter 15

Army Training

The primary mission of the Army is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Conducting offensive and defensive operations has long been the Army’s core capability. However, the recent experience of operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, coupled with today’s operational environments, clearly indicates that the future will be an era of persistent conflict—one that will engage Army forces around the world to accomplish the Nation’s objectives. The Army, recognizing the need to adopt a new mindset for conducting operations, established doctrine to address the requirement to successfully conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, anytime, anywhere. This chapter incorporates the recently published FM 7-0. FM 7-0, TRAINING FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS, published December 2008, establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for training to meet challenges in this era of persistent conflict.

Section I
Introduction - Army Training Strategy

15–1. The Army Training and Leadership Development Strategy

a. Training and leader development are inextricably linked. Training builds Soldier and civilian confidence and competence, while providing essential skills and knowledge. Leader development is a deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process grounded in Army values. It develops Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action, mission accomplishment, and taking care of Soldiers, civilians, and their Families. All training and leader development actions occur within the Army culture - a culture that embraces values and ethics, the Warrior Ethos, standards, and enduring principles and imperatives.

b. The Army’s Training and Leader Development Strategy provides a capstone strategy for unit, institutional, and self-development training to help ensure the operational readiness of the current and future force. A key component of the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) is the development of an overarching strategy to guide our efforts to train the Army and grow agile leaders. This requirement is met through the Army Training and Leadership Development Strategy (AT&LDS), comprised of a vision statement, specific goals and objectives, and supporting training models, guidance and systems. Based on fundamental assumptions that we will be engaged in a decade or more of persistent conflict against networked, adaptive, asymmetrically capable and equipped adversaries; and that we are a combat-seasoned force that knows how to fight, the AT&LDS provides a common vision for all stakeholders and guides the allocation of resources across the Army. Figure 15–1 lists the major components, training models, and other supporting policy and systems that are derived from and support the AT&LDS.
c. Figure 15–2 (below) shows the nesting of AT&LDS goals within the ACP and the nesting from Army imperatives to campaign objectives to major objectives (required capabilities). Some of the AT&LDS goals stand alone against ACP major objectives, while others span multiple ACP-required capabilities. Army training and leader development is a multifaceted effort that supports many readiness aspects of Army imperatives to restore balance. This is especially true for leader development as leader development occurs across all training domains and is formed from a vast mix of institutional, operational, and self-developmental education, training, and experience.
d. The purpose of the AT&LD strategy is to describe the ends, ways and means required to adapt Army training and leader development programs to an era of persistent conflict, to prepare units and leaders to conduct Full Spectrum Operations and to rebuild strategic depth over the short-term (FY 09–11) and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years FY 12–17. To meet this central challenge we will have to maintain skills across the full spectrum of operations for both individuals and units. Regaining our balance will require that we think differently about how we train units and develop leaders.

e. To achieve the goals of this AT&LD strategy, we utilize the three core training domains of the Army Training System (ATS). They are the operational, institutional, and self-development training domains, which remain the same in concept but have evolved focus with new procedures and techniques to complement or replace familiar training systems. Together, these domains interact using feedback and assessment from various sources and methods to maximize full spectrum operations readiness. Each domain has specific, measurable actions that must occur to develop our Soldiers, leaders, and organizations. In effect, we use these domains to train, educate, and provide experience to the Force.

1. Institutional domain. The Institutional domain focuses on educating and training Soldiers and leaders on the key knowledge, skills, and attributes required to operate in any environment. It includes individual, unit and joint schools, and advanced education.

2. Self-development domain. Self-development is both structured and informal, focusing on taking those actions necessary to reduce or eliminate the gap between operational and institutional experiences. Throughout this lifelong learning and experience process, there is formal and informal assessment and feedback of performance to prepare leaders for their next level of responsibility. Assessment is the method used to determine the proficiency and potential of leaders against a known standard. Feedback must be clear, formative guidance directly related to the outcome of training events measured against standards.

3. Operational domain. The Operational Domain includes training conducted at home station, combat training center rotations, joint training exercises, and operational deployments. Each of these actions provides foundational experiences for Soldiers, leaders, and unit development.

f. To summarize the challenges faced by our Army in an era of persistent conflict, the fundamentals of training modular, expeditionary Army forces requires effective, selective training across the full spectrum of operations. Commanders must determine how to best train for full spectrum operations (core METL) with expected theater requirements (directed METL).
Chapter organization
This chapter examines Army training by systems. The discussion is presented in seven sections listed here. The chapter concludes with a summary and a list of pertinent references.

• Section I: Introduction - Army Training Strategy
• Section II: Army Training Overview.
• Section III: The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing Process.
• Section IV: TRADOC Organization and Training Development Systems.
• Section V: The Army School System (TASS).
• Section VI: Training in Units.
• Section VII: The Training Support System (TSS).
• Section VIII: Quality Assurance (QA) Program.
• Section IX: Summary and References.

Section II
Army training overview

15–3. Army training

a. Army Forces Generation “ARFORGEN”.

(1) The Army supports national policy by organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to the combatant commands. The force size and capabilities mix are driven by the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and combatant commanders’ requirements. The Army prepares and provides campaign capable, expeditionary forces through ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN applies to Regular Army and Reserve Component (Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) units. It is a process that progressively builds unit readiness over time during predictable periods of availability to provide trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployments. ARFORGEN takes each unit through a three-phased readiness cycle: reset, train/ready, and available.

(2) Brigade-based units have a unique training strategy described in CATS and ARFORGEN training templates that defines required capability levels by ARFORGEN Force Pool. These training strategies also describe the planned collective training events that enable units to achieve the required capability levels. Within the ARFORGEN cycle, the intent of Reset is to recover the unit’s personnel and equipment to a deployable level so they can effectively begin preparation for their next mission. There will be no HQDA-directed training, or tasking which would cause the unit or individuals to leave their installations or local areas during the Reset period.

(3) Upon completion of reset, units will begin CMETL training. Based on guidance from their ASCC Commander, the units will be directed to adjust training conditions to optimize readiness for a specific Operational Theme. When given, this direction will apply principally to maneuver forces. For instance, some Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will optimize for MCO. Other BCTs will optimize for Limited Intervention or Irregular Warfare.

(4) Upon assignment of a directed mission as part of a Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF) or Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF), the commander will analyze his mission and develop his directed mission METL, and then seek approval from his next higher commander for execution of his DMETL and training plan. Once approved, the basis for training adjusts to the unit’s DMETL, at the appropriate point in time as mutually determined by the unit and higher commander. Since a directed mission may be assigned at any point in the ARFORGEN cycle, training and training support systems must be capable of responsively adapting from a CMETL to a DMETL focus in order to effectively support training. In most cases the DMETL will be a refinement or narrower focus of training tasks than CMETL training. CMETL training and proficiency provide the foundation for narrowing training focus to accomplish a directed mission under predicted conditions for the specific operational environment.

(5) Units redeployed for less than 18 months (36 months for RC) will focus on training to achieve proficiency for their DMETL. Units redeployed for 18 months or more (36 months for RC) will devote time (approximately 90 days AC and approximately 180 days RC) to regain CMETL proficiency in addition to training to achieve DMETL proficiency. Units redeployed for 24 months or more (48 months or more for RC) will achieve proficiency in both CMETL and DMETL.

(6) Live, virtual, constructive, and gaming capabilities, delivered by the Army’s TSS, should be used to gain greater efficiency and effectiveness in training during the ARFORGEN cycle. During Reset, when manpower and equipment assets may be limited and units not fully formed, gaming and virtual simulators can support training of individual and small unit/team skills. Soldiers can re-qualify on individual weapons on live small arms ranges. During Train-Ready, units can progressively employ virtual, constructive and live training systems to support a crawl, walk, run training construct. As proficiency is achieved, more demanding conditions can be created. When the Live, Virtual, Constructive Integrated Training Environment (LVC–ITE) capability is eventually fielded, it will provide the BCT commander with the means to conduct a seamless home station BCT-level training event utilizing all three training environments simultaneously.

b. Leader development.
Leader development in support of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational operating environment is outlined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), and includes:

(a) Developing innovative and adaptive leaders down to the lowest levels.
(b) Developing joint commanders who are masters of operational art.
(c) Developing senior leaders who are experts not only in the operational employment of the joint force, but also in the development and execution of national strategy.

(2) The Army’s goal is to develop expeditionary leaders who are knowledgeable and experienced enough to be confident that they can conduct Full Spectrum Operations anywhere along the Spectrum of Conflict and under the conditions of any operational theme. This occurs through military and civilian education and experience gained during assignments in operational units, at institutions, and through self-development (the three core domains of the ATS). This strategy will produce a steady flow of agile leaders who are comfortable with risk and proficient in core leader and functional competencies across the Operational Themes.

(3) Leader competencies for full spectrum operations will expand to include cross-cultural communications, language, and the ability to enable economic development, governance, and conflict resolution through negotiations. These competencies must be incorporated into our leader development programs. Each of the three domains will work in concert to produce leaders at each level who are:

(a) Leaders of character
1. Values
2. Empathy
3. Warrior Ethos
(b) Leaders with presence
1. Military bearing
2. Physically fit
3. Composed, confident
4. Resilient
(c) Leaders with intellectual capacity
1. Mental agility
2. Sound judgment
3. Innovative
4. Interpersonal tact
5. Domain knowledge
(d) Leaders able to demonstrate core competencies
1. Lead others
2. Extend influence beyond the chain of command
3. Lead by example
4. Communicate
5. Create positive environment
6. Prepare self
7. Develop others
8. Get results
(e) Leaders with functional skills
1. Understand the operational environment
2. Effectively employ organizational assets
3. Able to operate across the spectrum of conflict
4. Able to operate in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment
5. Understand how to effectively use knowledge management tools within a unified action environment

The Army Training System is shown in Figure 15–3. The basic concepts, techniques of training, and methods of measuring and evaluating training have constantly evolved over the years and continue to do so today. FM 7–0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, and FM 7–1, *Battle Focused Training*, contain the Army’s standardized training doctrine applicable to all levels of leaders and organizations. They provide the necessary guidelines on how to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training at all levels. The manuals provide authoritative foundations for Soldier, leader, and collective training. Army Regulation 350–1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, prescribes how the Army will create efficient and effective education and training.
15–4. Combined Arms Training strategy (CATS)
   a. Overarching strategy. The Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) is the Army’s overarching strategy for planning, resourcing, and executing short- and long-range individual and collective training. The CATS is a flexible system that supports Commanders in designing their training programs by providing them with a menu of training tasks, events, and resources to plan and manage training. CATSs are digitized publications that provide commanders with a template for task-based, event-driven organizational training. They can be adapted to the unit’s requirements based on the commander’s assessment. CATSs state the purpose, outcome, execution guidance, and resource requirements for training events. Commanders can modify these to meet unit training objectives. Each CATS describes how a particular unit type can train to and sustain the Army standard. CATSs identify and quantify training resources required to execute long- and short-range collective training.

   (1) There are two types of CATSs: those that are unique to a unit type (unit CATS), and those that address a functional capability common to multiple units (functional CATS). Unit CATSs are based on the core capabilities described in a unit’s authorization document and doctrine. The unit CMETL is published in the CATS for that unit type. Functional CATSs are based on standard capabilities performed by most Army units, such as command and control, protection, and deployment.

   (2) Each CATS is a training management tool for commanders, leaders, and other unit trainers. A variety of links takes the user directly to applicable supporting individual and collective tasks. This automation capability decreases the need to sort through training materials used to develop training plans, schedules, and resource cost estimations (such as fuel and ammunition) and allows more time on designing challenging training. CATSs identify and group the supporting collective tasks into task groups for each mission-essential task. The discussion of each task group includes guidance for training the task group, resource requirements, and training support requirements for each proposed training event.

   (3) CATS support both short-term and long-term training development efforts. Short-term training is intended to allow for planning over a roughly 2 year cycle. It is task based and focused on the unit’s Army Training and Evaluation Plan Mission Training Plan. It describes one way of organizing task-based, multi-echelon training into a set of events that will achieve and maintain a high state of readiness in today’s environment of high personnel turbulence and leader turnover. Long-range planning is based on the third year and beyond. Its focus is on who (individuals and units) needs training, the type of training that is required and when/where training will take place.

   b. Training strategies development units. The development of training strategies is the first step in designing training. A training strategy describes the ways and means the commander intends to use to achieve and sustain training proficiency on mission-essential tasks. The strategy is based on the commander’s assessment and discussions with the higher commander. Training strategies include the following:
• Tasks to be trained.
• Training audience.
• Training objectives.
• Order in which the tasks are to be trained, given limited time and other resources.
• Frequency at which tasks are trained.
• Types of events used to create conditions for training tasks.
• Conditions under which the tasks are to be trained.
• Resources required to execute the training strategy.
• Alternative ways of training tasks.

1. There are both long and short-range individual and collective training strategies. Development of these strategies involves decisions on who (unit), what (job or task), where (site) when, why (higher guidance, commander’s assessment) and how (media, method) to attain and sustain critical task performance proficiency. They establish the need for training programs, courses, products, and materials. These decisions are identified in supporting plans/models.

2. A process overview would appear as follows:
   (a) Long-range Strategies (3–10 years after current year)
   (b) Short-range Strategies (current plus 2 years)
   (c) Program/product design (current year)

c. Long-range training strategies. Long-range training strategies are an initial determination of who (individuals or units) needs training, what type of training is needed, and where and when the training will take place. They cover the third year following the execution year and beyond. Training proponents add these requirements to appropriate plans/models to ensure resources are available for product development and/or training support. At the unit level, long-range plans identify the major training events for the unit along with the resources required to execute the training events. A long-range plan normally covers 12 months for Regular Army and mobilized Reserve Component units. It covers two years to an entire ARFORGEN cycle for other Reserve Component units.

d. Short-range or current training strategies. Short-range or current training strategies are based on task analysis data. They are the training design (plan) to attain and sustain the desired level of performance proficiency on each critical task contained in the unit METL. Units refine and expand on the appropriate portions of a long range plan, tying training events together with specific objectives, near term planning, done typically at battalion equivalent and below, refine this in detail, allocating resources and publishing detailed training schedules.

e. Self-development. Self-development strategies are part of a lifelong learning culture that enable Soldiers and DA civilian employees to supplement their professional growth in the skills and competencies they need as leaders and technical specialists. All individuals are responsible for acquiring and sustaining the skills, knowledge, and experience needed to successfully perform the duty position requirements of current and future assignments. Self-development is the individual’s responsibility. Self-development is a continuous process that takes place during institutional training and the operational assignments.

15–5. The Future of Army training

a. Overview. Army education and training is being changed from the traditional classroom, instructor presented lessons to a combination of resident, distributed learning (dL), and unit training. This approach leverages automation technologies to improve the efficiency of producing, distributing, and implementing instruction. This change affects individual and collective training. The automation network serves as the conduit for producing and distributing learning material to Soldiers, leaders, and units to meet their specific needs to train and prepare for a broad spectrum of global contingencies. The use of automation technologies doesn’t change performance standards expected of Soldiers and units. Reliance on traditional training methods will continue, but will be enhanced by the availability and communications power of the commercial World Wide Web, Internet, and other information transfer systems. To attain this vision the Army has initiated a number of projects to provide a solid education and training information foundation. Registration for formal Army education/training including dL courses will be accomplished in the ATRRS.

b. Distributed learning (dL). To meet the challenge of the future, the Army is in the process of implementing dL to deliver education and training to the Soldier when and where needed. Types of dL include Interactive Multimedia Instruction (individualized self-paced instruction), Video Teleconferencing, web-managed instruction, and simulations. dL does not fundamentally change the way the Army trains; it enhances the way it goes about training by using current and emerging technologies for management and delivery of training to the Soldier when and where it is needed. Exploiting these technologies takes the classroom to the unit, and the unit to the classroom, providing training in a worldwide virtual training environment. Soldiers in the field, at units, institutions, and at home will train by accessing the informational databases through the Army Knowledge Online website (AKO) (note: may become the Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) website). Units will select training options (resident and non-resident) based upon their need, time available to train, distance from the “on-site” training site, and other resource constraints. The Army dL Program documents and related materials are available on the Internet at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tadlp/index.htm.
c. The Army Learning Management System (ALMS). The ALMS is the heart of the Army’s Distributed Learning System. The ALMS streamlines, consolidates, and provides overall direction to the Army’s training processes. ALMS is a Web-based information system that delivers training to Soldiers, manages training information, provides training collaboration, scheduling, and career planning capabilities in both resident and non-resident training environments. Additionally, the ALMS assist Army trainers and training managers in conducting and managing the training of Soldiers and DA civilians throughout their Army careers. In addition to the training at Digital Training Facilities (DTFs), Army personnel can access training from anywhere they have access to a computer and the Internet with the development of the new ALMS, which is currently being fielded at TRADOC installations world-wide. From the office, home or DTF, Soldiers and Army civilians will be able to meet their distributed learning needs 24/7.

1) The Army is fielding Digital Training Facilities (DTFs). DTFs provide training access for the Army’s Soldiers and civilians at Active Army installations and Reserve Component (RC) training sites. DLS uses an integrated learning management support system, which automates student enrollment, scheduling, and training records. DLS delivers digital courseware to include real-time video teletraining (VTT), video and audio recordings, Web- and computer-based training materials, and simulations.

2) The Army Distributed Learning Program (TADLP) Classroom XXI (CR XXI) Capabilities: C. R XXI is a training environment in which the military and civilian personnel of the 21st century will train. Technology will transform current classrooms from an instructor-centered environment to a student-centered multimedia environment with worldwide access to approved training materials. Its capabilities include the following:

(a) Data/video projection system with audio for display of instructor-led computer training and video teletraining. VTT capability will be two-way video/audio.

(b) Classroom control panels allow instructors to operate equipment, electronically group students, and control and assist students at the desktop.

(c) Fully-networked classrooms provide internet access to worldwide sources of information as well as deliver multimedia to the user’s desktop.

(d) Foundation for collaborative training among branches and schools; alternative training strategies using governmental, educational, industrial, and commercial sources; and the platform to support the delivery of distance learning.

(e) Full-motion video-on-demand and digital video over the LAN, to include the Commander’s channel, CNN, or video teletraining one-way receive only to each user’s desktop. Users can view the same multimedia at the same time or each student can view different training courseware simultaneously.

(f) Instructor and students have multimedia computer workstations, giving both the capability to access IMI courseware, designed for student interaction and participation, from the DTAC, a centralized storage facility for proponent-approved courseware.

(g) Current training is designed and developed for individual, self-paced instruction.

3) Embedded training. Embedded training is an emerging technology that shows great promise and already has limited practical application. By adding simulation hardware and software to a combat vehicle, the crew would have training capability onboard their vehicle similar to that of the large simulators such as the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) or the Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS). By being embedded in the vehicle, the training would be available anytime, anywhere, and would deploy as an integral part of the vehicle. ES has application beyond training for testing, situational awareness, mission planning and rehearsal, and after action review and reporting.

Section III
The policy, requirements, and resourcing process

15–6. General
The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing Process for AC and RC is displayed in Figure 15–4. Input is provided by manpower programs (Chapter 5), force structure changes (Chapters 4, 6, and 7), and resourcing actions (Chapters 9, and 10). Training activities draw Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation funds from Budget Activity 3 (Training), and Budget Activity 2 (General Purpose Forces). Other contributing appropriations are National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA); Operations and Maintenance, ARNG (OMNG), Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA); and Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR).
15–7. Organization

The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–3/5/7 combines the functions of institutional and unit training and training support. The G–3/5/7 approves and manages Army military individual, collective, and modernization training and education programs. It provides the Army a single point of entry for all issues which have training impact. Other DA staff elements which have a direct or indirect impact on the training systems are:

a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)). ASA(M&RA) has a training division to assist in the development, implementation, and review of policies and programs related to achieving the Army goal of effective and efficient training and education for the Army.

b. The Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Installations and Environment) (ASA(I&E)). ASA(I&E) provides secretariat management for the formulation, execution, and review of policies, plans, and programs relating to the Range and Training Land Program (RTLP); environment, safety and occupational health; the National Environmental Policy Act; and Land Use Requirements Studies.

c. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)). ASA(ALT) manages the life cycle of materiel and non-materiel items used by individuals and units in mission performance (Chapter 11).

d. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) (ASA(FM)). ASA(FM) formulates the Army budget, issues manpower and dollar guidance, distributes funds to commands and agencies, and monitors obligation rates and reprogramming actions (Chapter 9).

e. DCS, G–1. The G–1 is responsible for linking personnel readiness and training, and manages the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), the system that supports the Army’s Program for Institutional Training (ARPRINT) management process. The G–1 manages execution year training program change requests driven by personnel readiness requirements through the Training Requirements Arbitration Panel (TRAP). The DCS, G–1 also manages the administration of the manpower requirements of the pre-commissioning programs for officers (USMA, ROTC, and OCS); and training for equal opportunity, and alcohol and drug abuse (Chapter 13 and 14).

f. U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAC). Objective is to obtain the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet Army requirements (Chapter 13).

g. Human Resource Command (HRC). Projects training requirements for the AC, both officer and enlisted, by FY. The DCS, G–3/5/7 allocates training spaces for AC officers and enlisted based on projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

h. Human Resources Command-Army Reserve (HRC St Louis). Commands and controls all individual ready reserve (IRR) members. Provides individual training management to the IRR, both officer and enlisted (Chapter 7). It is responsible for OPMS–USAR and EPMS–USAR, and projects training requirements for USAR, both officer and
enlisted, by FY. HRC St Louis allocates training spaces for USAR officers and enlisted based on projected training requirements.

i. Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. Provides policy and guidance for facility engineering programs and environmental compliance, restoration, pollution prevention, conservation, environmental program management, and real property master planning; and provide direction and assistance in land acquisition in support of the Range and Training Land Program. Provide utility and manpower infrastructure facility support for installation Training Support Centers (TSC) operations.

j. DCS, G–4. Responsible for logistics readiness of Army forces, to include supportability/maintainability of equipment (to include training assets) in troop units (Chapter 12).

k. DCS, G–2. Responsible for Opposing Force (OPFOR) program and assisting the DCS, G–3/5/7 on intelligence training policy.

l. The Army Chief of Information Operations (CIO)/G–6. Provides policy and procedural guidance for Army visual information and multimedia support. Manages the Information Management PEG which resources Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Direct Reporting Units (DRU) and installation visual information/training support center (VI/TSC) operations.

m. The Inspector General (IG). The IG will conduct Army-wide assessments of training development and training management to assess the implementation of training policy and impacts of training on readiness, sustainability, and units’ ability to fight and win. Assessments will focus on training resources and provide feedback to commanders in order to promote efficiency in training.

n. Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). Projects training requirements and allocates course spaces internal to AMEDD.

o. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The NGB promulgates training policy for ARNG units through National Guard Regulation 350–1. CNGB also programs the resources for NG training and allocates training spaces to the State. NG unit commanders are responsible for their units’ training. FORSCOM establishes training criteria and supervises training of ARNG units. Policy and guidance are contained in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350–2.

p. Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). The CAR programs training resources for the Army Reserve and monitors USAR training activities. The CAR manages professional development training for USAR officers, warrant officers, and senior NCO through HR St Louis (Chapter 7).

15–8. Requirements and resourcing

a. Training Program Execution Group (PEG). As one of the Army’s six Title X PEGs, the Training PEG programs Army resources each year. The PEG manages all aspects of training dollars within all components, individual through unit. The Training PEG has 260 Management Decision Packages (MDEP). The Training PEG is chaired by the Director of Training, ODCS, G–3/5/7 and the ASA (M&RA). MDEP managers articulate and defend resource requirements to the PEG during the building of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). MDEP managers use various costing models to determine requirements.

b. ATRRS. The Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS) is the Department of the Army Management Information System of record for managing student input to training. The on-line system integrates manpower requirements for individual training with the process by which the training base is resourced and training programs are executed. This automation support tool establishes training requirements, determines training programs, manages class schedules, allocates class quotas, makes seat reservations, and records student attendance. It supports numerous Department of the Army processes to include the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR). The product of the SMDR is the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT), the mission and resourcing document for the training base. ATRRS supports the Training Requirements Division of the Office of the Army G–1 in its army wide mission of integrating all phases of input to training management, during peacetime and mobilization. The system supports the planning, programming, budgeting, and program execution phases of the training process and is utilized by the agencies responsible for those phases.

15–9. Development of the Army individual training requirements

a. Development of individual training requirements. The development of individual training requirements (Figure 15–5) for the AA begins with the identification of force structure authorizations from the Personnel Management Authorizations Document (PMAD) and AA Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). PMAD is produced semiannually, usually in August and January. PMAD displays authorizations at the MOS and grade level. The AAMMP is produced monthly and contains manning data such as AA end strength, monthly recruiting requirements, and inputs to training for seven FYs.
b. **Military Occupational Specialty Level System (MOSLS).** Using the PMAD, the MOSLS process predicts AA (enlisted) skill requirements. MOSLS compares MOS and grade inventory, aged to the FY under consideration by applying gain, loss, and promotion factors. The difference between the authorizations and the aged (to the FY) inventory constitutes the number of trained Soldiers, by skill that must be produced from the training base (output). Applying training attrition rates at the skill level to the number provides the number required to begin training (input).

c. **Other training requirements.** Other training requirements are identified by HRC for officer and enlisted in-service personnel who require training to support professional development, reenlistment or reclassification programs, and mission requirements. Additionally, HRC solicits in-service training requirements from other ACOM, ASCC, DRUs, State adjutants general, and other Services and agencies via the Total Army Centralized Individual Training Solicitations (TACITS). The TACITS survey is conducted annually. The accession-driven, in-service, and other task based training requirements are combined as total raw training requirements within the ATRRS. The ATRRS’ automated databases include a list of Army task based training courses that includes length, capacity, frequency, and location. It also includes other Services’ courses attended by Army personnel. The task-based requirements are translated into course requirements and become the Army’s training requirements at the course level of detail by component and FY.

d. **Training program development for each MOS/AOC.** After the training requirements for courses are developed, the next major task in the process is the development of the training program for each MOS/AOC. The first step in establishing a training program is the SMDR, co-chaired by ODCS, G–1 and ODCS, G–3. It includes representatives from ODCS, G–1, ODCS, G–3/5/7, OTSG, TRADOC, AMC, AMEDD Center and School, HRC, FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR, USAREC, ODCS, G–4, OCE, other services, FMS, IMET, and the individual proponent school. The purpose of the SMDR (Figure 15–6) is to reach a consensus within the Army for the institutional training program for the first and second POM years and any major changes for the upcoming budget year. Additionally, the SMDR validates training requirements (Soldiers to be trained in formal education/training courses), compares training requirements with schoolhouse current resource capabilities (facilities, billeting, manpower), and adjusts training requirements or training resources to form recommended training programs. The SMDR is conducted annually in October. Individual training requirements are initially established for the third POM year, validated for the second POM year (the primary focus of the SMDR), and “fine tuned” for the first POM year.
The SMDR categorizes each course. The first category is composed of those courses where the total training requirement can be trained with available resources. The second category consists of courses where the requirements exceed the resourced capability of the training base. Either resources can be provided or the requirements reduced to the resourced level without significant impact on the manning program. The third category is those courses where the requirement exceeds the capacity, requires significant resources, and cannot be reduced without significant impact on the manning program. These courses are termed “constrained.” The results of the SMDR are briefed to a COC which attempts to confirm category two adjustments/resources and move as many courses as possible from category three to category two.

f. General officer steering committee (GOSC). All courses in categories two and three are then referred to a GOSC. At that meeting, the general officers take action on the recommendations of the COC. Each course remaining constrained is reviewed as to current authorizations, projected operating strength, training requirements, training capability, source of constraint, resources required to eliminate the constraint, availability of required resources, and a recommended course of action. That review results in a resourced training requirement that is called an approved training program for each course for that FY.

g. ARPRINT. After the GOSC is completed, both the training requirement and the training program are published by ODCS, G–1, Training Requirements Division, in the ARPRINT. The ARPRINT is a mission document for the training base as well as the Army in terms of recruitment and professional development education. The ARPRINT identifies, by FY, projected individual training requirements for established courses and for task-based courses, where new courses are required. Based on identified training requirements, subsequent actions are taken to provide resources (manpower, money, facilities, ammunition, and equipment) to train the required number of Soldiers. The desired flow of Soldiers into the schools and training centers aids in development of class schedules to support the ARPRINT for each course. The class schedules are entered into ATRRS. TRADOC reviews the class schedules to ensure that they support the ARPRINT requirement and TRADOC scheduling policy. More information on ARPRINT is found in Chapter 17.

h. Mobilization Planning System (MPS). MPS is a subsystem of ATRRS and is designed to give training managers, at or above installation level, prompt access to information necessary to plan for implementation of the mobilization of the Army training base. MPS is used to produce the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) which provides a projection of trainee and student inputs by task based course to satisfy post mobilization requirements for trained manpower as determined by Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN).

i. The Sustainable Range Program (SRP). SRP is the Army’s overall approach for improving the way in which it designs, manages, and uses its ranges to ensure long-term sustainability. SRP is defined by its two core programs, the
Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) Program and the Range and Training Land Program (RTLP), which focus on the doctrinal capability of the Army’s ranges and training land.

1) The Integrated training area management (ITAM). The ITAM program mission is a subset of the Army’s Sustainable Range Program, which has a goal of maximizing the capability, availability, and accessibility of ranges and training land by minimizing restrictions brought about by external factors. The Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) program provides the Army with the capabilities to manage and maintain training and testing lands by integrating mission requirements with environmental and land management practices. The objectives of the Army’s ITAM program are to:
   (a) Achieve optimal sustained use of lands for the execution of realistic training and testing by providing a sustainable core capability that balances usage, condition, and level of maintenance.
   (b) Implement a management and decision-making process that integrates Army training and other mission requirements for land use with sound natural resources management.
   (c) Advocate proactive conservation and land management practices by aligning Army training land management priorities with the Army training and readiness priorities.

2) RTLA. The Army’s Range and Training Land Program (RTLP) provides for the central management, programming, and policy for modernization of the Army’s ranges and their day-to-day operations. Objectives include:
   (a) Integrate mission support, environmental stewardship, and economic feasibility and define procedures for determining range projects and training land requirements to support live-fire and maneuver training.
   (b) Define the quality assurance and inspection milestones for range development projects and the standard operating procedures to safely operate military training, recreational, or approved civilian ranges under Army control and support Commanders Mission Essential Task List and Army training strategies.
   (c) Establish the procedures and means by which the Army range infrastructure is managed and maintained on a daily basis in support of the training mission.

Section IV
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) organization and training development systems.

15–10. Training in institutions-general
HQDA authorizes direct communication between ACOM, ASCC, DRUs and TRADOC; moreover, HQDA authorizes TRADOC to task non-TRADOC commands, schools, and agencies (except the Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S) and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS)) to provide specialized subject materials for instruction with the TASS. AMEDD provides training on medical tasks and JFKSWCS provides training on special operations tasks to TRADOC. The CG, TRADOC, administers training functions outlined in AR 350–1, AR 600–100, AR 140–1, and AR 10–87 and is responsible for developing training doctrine, policy and procedures for approval by HQDA. Most institutional training (proponent schools) is managed by TRADOC.

a. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). http://www-tradoc.army.mil/. TRADOC is the Army’s institutional base for education and training. TRADOC develops the Army’s Soldier and Civilian leaders and designs, develops and integrates capabilities, concepts and doctrine in order to build a campaign-capable expeditionary Army in support of joint warfighting commanders through Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). In FY08, TRADOC operated 32 schools and centers at 16 Army installations. TRADOC schools conducted 2,734 courses (81 directly in support of mobilization) and 373 language courses. HQ, TRADOC is located at Fort Monroe, VA. TRADOC has several major subordinate commands: U.S. Army Accessions Command, headquartered at Fort Monroe; Combined Arms Center, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, KA; and the Army Capabilities Integration Center, headquartered at Fort Monroe. The CGs of these commands also serves as TRADOC’s DCGs for initial military training, combined arms and futures, respectively. Other major parts of TRADOC are the Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, VA; TRADOC Analysis Center, Fort Leavenworth; the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth; and the 33 schools.

b. The TRADOC mission. Central to the TRADOC mission are the following tasks:
   (1) Recruiting and Training Soldiers. TRADOC builds the Army on a solid foundation of quality people by selecting recruits and transforming them into Soldiers, who are physically tough, mentally adaptive and live the Warrior Ethos. They are our ultimate asymmetric advantage and cannot be matched by our adversaries - current or future.
   (2) Developing Adaptive Leaders. TRADOC trains leaders for certainty and educates them for uncertainty. Leader development produces innovative, flexible, culturally astute professionals expert in the art and science of the profession of arms and able to quickly adapt to the wide-ranging conditions of full spectrum operations.
   (3) Designing today’s Army Modular Force and the Future Combat Force. TRADOC identifies and integrates comprehensive solutions for the Army Modular Force, both today and tomorrow.
   (4) Maximizing Institutional Learning and Adaptation. As an integral component of an innovative Generating Force, TRADOC shapes and links it seamlessly to the Operating Force to maximize Army Learning and Adaptation.
   c. G3/Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Training (DCSOPS&T). The single manager for training in TRADOC
is the G3/Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Training (DCSOPS&T). Within TRADOC, the DCSOPS&T interfaces with the G1/G4/Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Infrastructure and Logistics (DCSPI&L); Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments (DCSD); Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Concepts and Strategy (DCSDC&S); G8/Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM); G6/Deputy Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DCSC4); Deputy Chief of Staff for Simulation and Analysis (DCSSA); and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). The G3/DCSOPS&T coordinates with HRC for management of trainee accessions.

d. TRADOC directorates and activities. The DCSOPS&T has the following directorates and activities to manage the TRADOC training program:

1. Individual Training Directorate (ITD)
2. Training Development and Delivery Directorate (TDADD)
3. Leader Development and Education Directorate (LDD)
4. Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA)
5. Security Assistance Training Directorate (SATD)
6. Training Plans and Capabilities Review (TPCRD)
7. Training Program Analysis and Evaluation (TPA&E)
8. Personnel Proponency Directorate (PPD)
9. TASS Directorate (TASSD)
10. Operations, Mobilization and Readiness Directorate (OMRD)
11. Command Provost Marshal Directorate (CPMD)

e. Army Training Support Center (ATSC). The Army Training Support Center (ATSC), http://www.atsc.army.mil/tsaid/dtsf/, is a FOA under the DCSOPS&T. It manages plans, integrates, implements, and sustains specific Training Support System (TSS) programs, products, services, and facilities that support training across all training domains, TRADOC’s core missions, and the Army. It serves as the HQDA Executive Agent for:

1. Graphic Training Aids (GTA) Management.
2. Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS), including Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES).
3. Fielded Devices Inventory and Management.
4. Training Mission Area (TMA).
5. Sustainable Range Program, including the Range and Training Land Program and Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM).

f. U.S. Army Accession Command (USAAC). The U.S. Army Accession Command (USAAC), http://www.usaac.army.mil/, was established by general order on 15 February 2002. It is a subordinate command of TRADOC charged with providing integrated command and control of the recruiting and initial military training for the Army’s officer, warrant officer, and enlisted forces. Designed to meet the human resource needs of the Army from first handshake to first unit of assignment, the command transforms volunteers into soldiers and leaders for the Army.

g. Combined Arms Center (CAC). The Combined Arms Center (CAC), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/overview.asp, is engaged in the primary mission of preparing the Army and its leaders for war. At present, this mission is divided between preparing the Army for the Global War on Terrorism and transforming it to meet future threats. In order to accomplish these critical missions, CAC provides Army-wide leadership and supervision for leader development and professional military and civilian education; institutional and collective training; functional training; training support; battle command; doctrine; lessons learned; and other specified areas that the TRADOC Commander designates. All of these are focused toward making CAC a catalyst for change and to support the development of a relevant and ready ground force to support joint, interagency and multinational operations anywhere in the world.

h. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), http://www.arcic.army.mil/. ARCIC leads the development and integration of force capabilities across the DOTMLPF for the Army within a Joint and Multinational environment to support Joint Force Commanders. The ARCIC is the Army’s leader in the identification, design, development, and synchronization of capabilities into the Army current Modular Force and the future Modular Force, bringing together all the Army agencies as well as Joint, Multinational and other DOD agencies to manage rapid change. The ARCIC supports TRADOC in providing adaptive Soldiers, leaders and units by contributing to the development of doctrine, TTPs, and the collective training experience.

i. Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), http://www.cascom.lee.army.mil/default.asp. CASCOM provides training and leader development, and develops concepts, doctrine organizations, life-long learning, and materiel solutions, to provide the combat service support to sustain a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities.

j. U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), http://www.trac.army.mil. TRAC provides analysis to enable decisions and technical products. The TRAC program of operations research and analysis is forward-looking and addresses a wide range of military topics. TRAC leads TRADOC’s major studies of new warfighting operations and organization (O&O) concepts and requirements, as well as the Army’s analysis of Advanced Warfighting Experiments.
(AWEs), and the Army’s Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The analysis topics span doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier support. Scenarios are used by the U.S. Army for education, training and force development. TRAC develops scenarios of potential military operations set in the future for use in modeling and analysis. The family of scenarios undergoes continual review and change in anticipation of emerging threats and new operational environments around the world based on intelligence estimates.

k. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/about.asp. C. ALL collects and analyzes data from a variety of current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events, and produces lessons for military commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates these lessons and other related research materials through a variety of print and electronic media. Individuals requiring additional information, articles, publications, research material, etc., may request them at the CALL RFI site, located at this address: https://call-rfi.leavenworth.army.mil/rfisystem

l. The systems approach to training (SAT).

(1) Education and training is developed using the SAT model IAW AR 350–1, Appendix B. SAT is used to develop training and training courses, products, and materials, to include products to support new systems development, digital training, and experimental force development. It is a systematic decision-making approach to design individual, collective, and self-development training for the Army. The process is used to identify all requirements for training. It identifies what tasks, skills, and knowledge will be included in the training; who will receive the training; and how and where the training will be presented. It determines what training products will be required and the level of support resources required producing, distributing, implementing, and evaluating those products. The TRADOC serves as the Army’s proponent for training development policy and procedures.

(2) The approach, based on the model shown at Figure 15–7, helps users decide whether or not education/training is needed. Users then apply the approach (Table 15–1). The systems approach makes certain that critical performance requirements of the Army establish the content of training in the training base and in the fielded force. The SAT involves five training-related phases: evaluation, analysis, design, development, and implementation. Each builds upon the preceding phases.
### Table 15–1
SAT Phase Functions Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAT Phase</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation determines how well the training takes place, Army personnel / units perform, and products support training</td>
<td>Evaluation reports with identified deficiencies and corrective actions. Follow-up on identified deficiencies. Validated training courses/products. Accredited training institutions IAW accreditation schedule. Certified instructors; qualified evaluators and training developers. Validated evaluation instruments. Master Evaluation Plan and supporting TD Project Management Plans as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis identifies—**
- Need for training.
- Who gets the training.
- What tasks (collective and individual (including leader) tasks) and supporting skills and knowledge are critical.

*Note: A critical task is a collective or individual task a unit or individual must perform to accomplish their mission and duties and to survive on the battlefield and across the entire spectrum of military operations.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Identify—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Needs analysis</td>
<td>Training solutions to the performance deficiency (ies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission analysis</td>
<td>Recommendation(s) for non-training solutions to the performance deficiency (ies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective critical task analysis</td>
<td>The requirement to improve training efficiency and effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job analysis</td>
<td>TD requirement(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual critical task analysis</td>
<td>Mission list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical collective task list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting individual tasks (as appropriate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective task performance specifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual tasks performed as part of the critical collective task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command-approved critical task list for a specific job/special category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total task inventory by job: Individual task performance data; Statistical Analysis Report; Nominated critical task list; and, Collective-to-individual task matrix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual task performance specifications, including task performance standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task analysis report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soldier training publications (STP) task summary data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual-to-collective task matrix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual-to-skill/knowledge matrix.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Design determines—**
- When, where and how the training takes place.
- Training resource requirements (instructors, equipment, ammo, ranges, facilities)

| Establish unit, individual, and self-development long-range combined arms training strategies (CATS)/milestones. Establish short-range unit, individual, and self-development CATS /milestones. Design training media/TADSS. Design individual training courses. Produce student performance measurement documents, e.g., tests; exercises. Ensure all training courses and products have disclosure adjudication and application of appropriate restriction statements prior to release of training to foreign nationals. |
| Write the training material, e.g., lessons plans, TSPs. Produce training media/TADSS. Validate the training material, including tests. Prepare material for reproduction. Reproduce the training material. Acquire training resources. Train instructor, training management, staff, faculty, and cadre. Prepare facilities and equipment. |

**Development produces validated training/ training products.**

| Implementation executes— | |
| Standardized training at resident and unit training sites. Distribution of training products. Use of training products. | |
| Distribute the training material. Schedule the training. Train the students/Soldiers/units. Administer the tests/exercises. Counsel students/Soldiers. Conduct After-Action Reviews (AARs). Maintain student records. |
15–11. Education and training automation

The Army has created an automated system to assist in the production, distribution, implementation, evaluation, and management of Army education and training. The foundational piece is the Army Training Information Architecture (ATIA) system that fully integrates data and information produced or used by supporting programs. This integration of information across these supporting programs provides for real-time, sharing of doctrine and education/training information between the training proponents and supported Soldiers and units worldwide. These supporting programs assist in the development, distribution, management, and conduct of education/training and doctrine. Current programs include:

a. The Army Knowledge On Line (AKO). Soldiers and Department of Army Civilians (DACs) have individual accounts through which they can access education, training, doctrine and other data and information.

b. Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT)/Training and Doctrine Development Tool (TDDT). Provides the capability to produce education/training and doctrine products. TDDT is the next generation (web based) training developmental tool, which will replace the ASAT in all schoolhouses and other organizations producing Army education/training, i.e. contractors. This program will output standardized products like field manuals, mission training plans (MTP) (see Para 15–31), drill books, courses, and Soldier training publications (STP) as well as produces unlimited ad hoc outputs like task analysis matrices and Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) when fully programmed. This program provides an electronic staffing capability.

c. Digital Training Management System (DTMS). The Digital Training Management System is a web based Commercial off the shelf software application customized to implement FM 7–1 Battle Focused Training. Optimized for use at Brigade and below, DTMS provides the ability to plan, resource and manage unit and individual training at all levels. DTMS is used for Mission Essential Task List (METL) development and can track separate METL for a unit, the unit’s HHC, and unit staff. DTMS has the ability to develop AARs and commanders’ assessments of training events. It compiles and displays a unit roll-up of training conducted through a series of customizable tabs to track weapons qualification, APFT, Army Warrior Training, AR 350–1 common military training, MOS training, and deployment tasks from “Enlistment to Retirement”. DTMS is an unclassified FOUO system that requires both AKO logon and User Permissions (managed by units) to access training data.


e. Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS), https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?. The Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) supports the generation, application, management and exploitation of Army knowledge to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units in order to share expertise and experience; facilitate leader development and intuitive decision making; and support the development of organizations and teams. The objectives of BCKS are to:

   (1) Enhance Battle Command:

      (a) Support virtual collaboration to facilitate the timely exchange of Army, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational knowledge to enhance situational understanding, learning and decision making at all echelons.

      (b) Assist in units? Preparation for deployment by enabling SIPRNET virtual Right Seat Rides.

   (2) Enhance Professional Education: Oversee the integration of knowledge management practices and expertise to support the establishment of collaborative capabilities across the Operational and Institutional Army.

   (3) Facilitate Exchange of Knowledge: a. Facilitate the establishment and operation of online professional forums.

      b. Support the implementation of secure, standardized knowledge management practices.

   (4) Foster Leader Development: a. Provide collaborative professional forums in order to assist and support the Army’s training and education process to develop adaptive leaders. b. Enable sharing of experience and expertise to help develop intuitive decision making.

   (5) Support Doctrine Development: Enable collaborative doctrinal discussion capabilities.

   (6) Support Lessons Learned: Provide knowledge management expertise and best practices to assist the Center for Army Lessons Learned as it collects and shares Observations, Insights and Lessons Learned.

   (7) Support Training: Support the collaborative development of relevant online training scenarios based on current combat experiences.

   f. There are a large number of proponent school sites where one can go online to enhance their professional education. This link, https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp, provides a consolidated list of websites.

   g. Other training development and training resource support systems that leverage ATIA information include the:

      (1) Individual Training Resource Module (ITRM). Collects individual training implementation resource requirements for budgeting and POM submission. It uses ASAT/TDDT information.

      (2) TD2. Used to plan for the education/training and doctrine development. It calculates the training development manpower requirements by school for building TDA and POM submission.
(3) Training Resource Module (TRM). Collects resource data for unit training which is used to build the unit training budget and the POM.

Section V
The Army School System (TASS)

15–12. Overview of: The Army School System (TASS)

a. TASS is a composite school system made up of Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Active Army (AA) institutional training systems. TASS conducts initial military training, reclassification training, officer, warrant officer (WO), noncommissioned officer (NCO) and Department of the Army (DA) civilian professional development training and education and functional training. Training is accomplished through both standard resident and distributed-learning courses.

b. The Army training proponents provide the structure to establish, maintain, and operate the TASS education system from a common automated management system. The AA training proponents provide operational links to the RC instructor groups. This ensures quality assurance (QA), instructor certification; TASS courseware ensures that all Army Soldiers, regardless of component, receive the same lessons and program of instruction (POI), regardless of what component schools conduct the training.

c. TASS training missions are validated during the Structured Manning Decision Review (SMDR) process, reflected in the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT), and documented in Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). Training missions are fully resourced through a deliberate cross component (AA, ARNG and USAR) affiliation program.

15–13. The Army Training System (TATS)

A TATS course is a single course designed to train the same MOS/AOC skill level or additional skill identifier (ASI), language identifier code (LIC), and skill qualification identifier (SQI) within the Army (see Figure 15–8). It also includes MOS–T, (formerly known as reclassification), Army leadership, and functional and professional development courses. The TATS course structure (phases, modules, tracks, lessons, and tests) and media ensure standardization by training all Soldiers, regardless of component, on course critical tasks to task performance standard. Method of presentation and conditions may vary IAW TR 350–70.
15–14. Enlisted initial military training/Initial Entry Training (IET)

a. Initial Entry Training (IET). IET is the introductory training given to all personnel on initial entry into the Army and is governed by TRADOC Regulation 350–6 (MAY 07). The mission of enlisted IET is to transform volunteers into Soldiers who have demonstrated the requisite character and values, possess a warrior spirit, are competent and confident in their warfighting and technical skills, and who can successfully contribute to their first unit of assignment. IET transforms civilians into Soldiers. Transformation is the deliberate physical and psychological development/progression of a person with an uncertain set of values and level of commitment, discipline, and knowledge of the Army into a contributing member of this profession who demonstrates an appropriate level of commitment, discipline, task proficiency, and adherence to the Army values. It provides an orderly transition from civilian to military life, motivation to become a dedicated and productive member of the Army, be proficient in the warrior tasks and battle drills plus selected MOS-related technical skills, and understand, accept, and live by the Army values and Warrior Ethos. At DA, the DCS, G–3/5/7 exercises general staff supervision of initial entry-level training except for AMEDD personnel. The CG, TRADOC is responsible for conducting IET, and accomplishes that task through the CG, U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAAC)/Deputy Commanding General for Initial Entry Training (DCG, IET), the Commandants of the TRADOC schools and commanders of the U.S. Army Training Centers (USATCs). The CG, USAAC/DCG IET focus is to ensure that IET remains challenging, safe, relevant, realistic, and is executed to Army standards. The Army Medical Department Center and School performs this function for AMEDD personnel.

b. Basic combat training (BCT). The CG, BCT Center of Excellence, Fort Jackson is the proponent for BCT. BCT is ten weeks of training in basic military skills given to all newly enlisted personnel who have no or limited prior military service. BCT provides a logical progression of training to transition civilians into Soldiers who are well disciplined, motivated, physically fit, and proficient in basic combat survivability skills. All Soldiers receive TRADOC Pam 600–4 and Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21–1, Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, Warrior Skill Level. The two publications provide Soldiers with a pocket reference for subjects taught and tested in BCT/OSUT, along with Warrior Skills needed upon arrival at their first unit of assignment.

c. Advanced individual training (AIT). AIT occurs after completion of BCT. AIT builds on the soldier skills acquired in BCT while developing each Soldier to the level of proficiency required for the award of an MOS. Soldiers take one of two AIT paths:

- MOS training at a USATC.
- MOS training at a school.

d. One station unit training (OSUT). OSUT is conducted at one installation, in the same company-size unit, with the same cadre, and with one program of instruction. The OSUT model is used for most combat arms MOSs (except Air Defense and Aviation) and selected combat support MOSs. OSUT integrates common skill and MOS-specific training into a single program.

e. Split training option (STO). STO permits selected individuals to enlist in the ARNG or USAR and complete Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) in two phases separated by a period of not more than 12 months. The program is designed to attract students and seasonal workers to enlist in the ARNG or USAR by minimizing the lost time from education or employment.

15–15. Noncommissioned officer training

a. Institutional training is the primary source of the formal military training and education NCOs receive. It is here that NCOs train to perform critical tasks to standard and develop supporting skills and knowledge that are essential to high-quality leadership. The NCO must be trained earlier and continuously, which requires a train-ahead approach. Institutional training and education provides the foundation on which future leader development rests. Institutional training is the formal military training and education NCOs receive throughout a military career. The purpose of institutional training is to develop the values, attributes, critical warfighting skills, and actions that are essential to quality NCO leadership. When these same values, attributes, skills, and actions are tested, reinforced, and strengthened by follow-on operational assignments and meaningful self-development programs, NCOs attain and sustain competency and confidence in their profession of arms. The Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and certain other functional courses (for example, First Sergeant Course and Battle Staff Course) form the institutional training pillar of NCO leader development. The NCOES is designed to prepare NCOs to lead and train Soldiers who work and fight under their direct leadership, and to assist their assigned leaders to execute unit missions. The NCOES accomplishes this preparation through progressive and sequential training using small group instruction throughout four levels of schooling: primary, basic, advanced, and senior (Table 15–2). Functional courses are based on specific skills required for special assignments or duties. The Army uses resident and distance learning instruction to deliver institutional training.
### Table 15–2
#### Enlisted Training Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Skill Level</th>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>Training Level and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>SGM Course</td>
<td>SR (SGM Academy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG/1SG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1SG Course</td>
<td>SR (SGM Academy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>ANCOC</td>
<td>Advanced (NCOA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>BNCOC</td>
<td>Basic (NCOA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT/CPL/SPC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>WLC</td>
<td>Primary (NCOA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OSUT (CA) or BCT/AIT (CS/CSS)</td>
<td>Initial Military (ATC &amp; Service Schools)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. WLC, BNCOC, and ANCOC RC configured courses are taught at ARNG academies/schools and USARF

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**b.** The multi-skilled NCO must always lead by example, train from experience, maintain and enforce standards, take care of Soldiers, and adapt to a changing world. The Army has recognized that in today’s era of persistent conflict and full spectrum operations this is not enough. Our senior leadership have identified attributes, to include:

- critical and creative thinking
- warrior leader
- leader developer
- ambassador
- resource manager

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**Figure 15–9. The Multi-skilled NCO**

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**15–16. Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES)**

**a. Warrior Leaders Course (WLC).** WLC is the first leadership course Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) attend. It is a nonmilitary occupational specialty (MOS) specific, field-oriented leadership course built around warrior leader tasks. The WLC trains eligible Soldiers at NCO academies throughout the Army. The training focuses on values, attributes, skills, and actions needed for team leadership responsibilities at the rank of sergeant (SGT)

**b. Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC).** BNCOC is the branch basic level course of NCOES and it consists of two or more phases. Phase I is a standalone common core that uses the small group instruction process to teach the theories and principles of battle-focused common core training, leadership, and war fighting skills required to lead a squad-sized element in combat. Phase II is “hands-on,” performance-oriented, technical training that is specific to the MOS. The level of training received at BNCOC progressively and sequentially improves on the previous instruction received in the WLC and operational assignments.
c. Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). The branch advanced level course for NCOES is ANCOC. ANCOC is structured similar to BNCOC and prepares NCOs to assume duties and responsibilities needed to lead a platoon-sized element. It has proponent phases that include hands-on and performance-oriented training emphasizing war-fighting skills. As the Centers of Excellence have matured, ANCOC has started to provide common curriculum for multiple MOSs (i.e. Benning, as the Maneuver Center of Excellence provides Maneuver training to both Armor and Infantry NCOs attending their ANCOC).

d. U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course (USASMC). USASMC prepares selected master sergeants (MSG) to perform duties of a sergeant major (SGM) and a command sergeant major (CSM) in staff and troop assignments. The SMC is the pinnacle of NCOES and trains senior NCOs in full spectrum operations, the contemporary operational environment, and the Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational environment. It prepares selected sergeants major and master sergeants for both troop and staff assignments. SMC is a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant major and appointment to the duty position of command sergeant major. For both AC and RC NCOs, this senior-level training is obtained through a 9-month permanent change-of-station (PCS) resident course taught at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), Ft Bliss, TX, or through the two-year Nonresident Course (NRC). The NRC is the primary method for RC NCOs to receive the SMC of instruction.

15–17. Officer education system (OES)
The Army OES objective for leader development is the means for growing competent, confident, self-aware leaders who are prepared for the challenges of the future in combined arms, Joint, interagency, inter-Governmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations. Future force leaders must be multifunctional, capable of supporting the range of military operations within the JIIM environment, comfortable with ambiguity, information systems literate, and capable of intuitive assessments of situations for rapid conceptualization of friendly courses of action. Through the leader development process, the Army develops leaders with character and competence for today and tomorrow to be trainers, role models, and standard bearers. The Army’s leader development and education system trains, educates, and grows Army leaders that are the centerpiece of a campaign quality Army with a Joint expeditionary mindset. Leader development is accomplished with the three training domains: operational, institutional, and self-development. The Army intends to achieve this objective by improving and sustaining leader development through an experientially based education and training model enabled by increased leveraging of technological capabilities. The changes to the OES are based on the recommendations of The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) officer study published in May 2001. Additionally, the Warrant Officer Education System is a subset of OES. Due to lessons learned from ongoing conflicts, developments in equipment and training methodologies, and the natural evolution of our Army, our leadership has recognized that it must transform our education system in order to train and educate the leaders who will command and control the Future Force. The Army decided to implement changes in the institutional training and education programs for lieutenants, captains, and majors. The Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) which consists of three phases ensures a tough, standardized, small-unit leadership experience that flows progressively from pre-commissioning (BOLCI) to the initial entry field leadership experience (BOLCII), and then to branch technical/tactical training in BOLC III.

a. Warrant Officer (WO) Training. The ATLDP Warrant Officer Study recommended that the Army make a fuller integration of WOs into the larger officer corps. In recognition of expanding leadership roles for WOs in the future force, the study called for a single world-class leader development education system that would have distinct components for WO, company-grade, and field-grade officers. The study also called for combining WO, company grade and field grade officer training, as appropriate, wherever required common officer skills are taught. The goal of WO training and education within OES is to produce highly specialized expert officers, leaders, and trainers who are fully competent in technical, tactical, and leadership skills; creative problem solvers able to function in highly complex and dynamic environments and proficient operators, maintainers, administrators, and managers of the Army’s equipment, support activities, and technical systems. Warrant officer leader development is a continuous lifelong learning process beginning with pre-appointment training and education. OES prepares WOs to successfully perform in increasing levels of responsibility throughout an entire career. OES provides the pre-appointment, branch MOS-specific, and leader development training needed to produce technically and tactically competent WO leaders for assignment to platoon, detachment, company, battalion, and higher-level organizations. The Warrant Officer (WO) Education System (WOES) is configured as shown in Figure 15–10. The Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) located at Ft Rucker, AL, is the executive agent for all common WO training. The WOCC exercises command and control over the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) as well as the Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC) and Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC).

(1) Pre-appointment applicants. Pre-appointment training qualifies individuals to serve as officers. The purposes of pre-appointment training are to educate and train candidates, assess their readiness and potential for appointment to WO, and to prepare them for progressive and continuing development. All Active Army and USAR WO candidates must attend the resident Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) at Fort Rucker, AL. ARNG WO candidates can attend various states’ two-phased WOCS at Regional Training Institutes (RTIs) in lieu of WOCS at Fort Rucker. WOCS graduates are appointed to WO1. The appointment is contingent upon certification by the MOS proponent that the WO is technically and tactically qualified to serve in the authorized WO MOS.
(2) **Branch Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC).** Immediately following WOCS, newly appointed WOs attend their branch WOBC to be certified as MOS qualified. It is a branch-specific qualification course that ensures newly appointed WOs receive the MOS-specific training and technical certification needed to perform in the MOS at the platoon through brigade levels. Training is performance oriented and focuses on technical skills, leadership, effective communication, unit training, maintenance operations, security, property accountability, tactics, and developing subordinates.

(3) **Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC).** The WOAC focuses on advanced technical training and common leader development subjects designed to prepare officers for assignment in CW3 level positions. WOAC is a combination of common core and MOS proponent training that prepares the officer to serve in senior positions at the CW3 level. The WOAC includes two phases: a non-resident common core module and a resident phase, which includes a common core module and MOS specific module.

(a) **Prerequisite studies.** A nonresident phase administered by the WOCC. This phase includes training in common skills needed by all WOs regardless of MOS. It includes instruction in staff skills and roles, communicative arts, decision-making, quantitative skills, personnel Service support, staff leadership and management, training management, mobilization, and tactical sustainment. The course objective is to enhance and sharpen communicative and staff skills, which help prepare the officer for the resident WOAC and subsequent CW3 assignments. Army RC WOs will be scheduled for attendance shortly after promotion to CW2.

(b) **Resident course.** CW2s are eligible to attend their MOS WOAC. ADL WOs will attend the advanced course at their respective proponent school not later than one year after promotion to CW3. National Guard WOs complete this training prior to promotion to CW3. USAR WOs not on the ADL must complete this training prior to selection for CW3. The branch phase varies in length depending on the branch. Primary focus is directed toward leadership skill reinforcement, staff skills, and advanced MOS-specific training. The course consists of in-depth training in MOS specific and branch-immaterial tasks. Graduates of the WOAC receive the designation of MEL code 6.

(4) **Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC).** WOSC is a branch-immaterial resident course which focuses on staff officer and leadership skills needed to prepare them for duty in W4 grade technician and staff officer positions at battalion and higher levels. Instruction includes decision-making, staff roles and functions, organizational theory, structure of the Army, budget formation and execution, communication, training management, personnel management, the contemporary operational environment (COE), and special leadership issues. It is designed to produce officers with a Warrior Ethos who are grounded in warfighting doctrine and possess the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies to be successful at more senior levels.

(5) **Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC).** WOSSC is currently the capstone course for WO professional military education. It is a branch-immaterial resident course which provides master-level professional WOs with a broader Army level perspective required for assignment to WO5 grade level positions as technical, functional, and branch systems integrators, trainers, and leaders at the highest organizational levels.
b. Officer training and education. The Officer Education System (OES) is the progressive and sequential education and training process for officers in the Army that begins in the pre-commissioning phase and continues in schools at the basic entry level, captain level, intermediate command and staff level, and senior level. The varying schools and their objectives are as follows:

(1) Entry level officer training. To address shortcomings identified by the ATLDP (Officer) study, the Army implemented Basic officer Leader Course (BOLC). The objective of BOLC is to develop technically competent and confident platoon leaders, regardless of branch, who are grounded in leadership and basic technical and tactical skill proficiency, are physically and mentally strong, and embody the Warrior Ethos. To achieve this objective, BOLC capitalizes on experience-based training, logically structured to build upon and reinforce previous lessons. BOLC I is pre-commissioning training. Direct Commission Officers may attend BOLC–DCO, a BOLC II prep course for officers who did not have the benefit of participating in BOLC I pre-commissioning training. BOLC occurs in three phases.
(a) BOLC I is pre-commissioning training conducted by the traditional pre-commissioning sources. It provides the foundation of common core skills, knowledge, and attributes desired of all newly commissioned lieutenants. Length of training varies. For the USMA it is 48 months; ROTC is 24–28 months; OCS is 12 weeks; RC state OCS programs vary in length.

(b) BOLC II is seven weeks of common block of instruction designed to develop all new Army lieutenants into competent small unit leaders through tactical training and the Warrior Ethos. BOLC II is a rigorous, branch-immaterial course, physically and mentally challenging, with the majority of the training conducted via hands-on in a tactical or field environment. Focusing on training at the platoon level, a cadre of officers and NCOs will continuously evaluate each student’s performance in a series of leadership positions, under various conditions and situations. The student officers also participate in several peer reviews and self-assessments. The curriculum includes advanced land navigation training, rifle marksmanship, weapons familiarization, practical exercises in leadership, urban operations, convoy operations, and use of night vision equipment. It culminates in squad and platoon situational-training exercises using COE scenarios. Additionally, students must negotiate confidence courses that challenge them to overcome personal fears. Junior officers depart BOLC II with a confidence in their ability to lead small units, an appreciation for the branches of the combined arms team, and a clear understanding of their personal strengths and weaknesses. There is no Active Duty Service obligation for BOLC II attendance.

(c) BOLC III consists of branch specific technical and tactical training conducted at proponent school locations. It varies in length from 6 to 15+ weeks and it immerses the officer into their branch. They receive extensive leadership and digitization training.

(d) BOLC–Direct Commission Officers (DCO) is a course designed to give direct commission officers, who do not have the benefit of BOLC I pre-commissioning training, the necessary skills to achieve success at BOLC II.

(2) Captains’ Career Course (CCC).

(a) The branch CCC prepares company grade officers to command Soldiers at the company, troop, or battery level and to serve as staff officers at battalion and brigade levels. Active Army officers incur a one-year Active Duty Service obligation for attendance at a branch CCC upon completion or termination of the course. Officers attend CCC following selection for promotion to the grade of captain, normally before company level command. Select captains who have demonstrated superior performance in their basic branches may be selected to receive this training at other than their branch schools. (For example, a Field Artillery officer might attend the CCC for Armor officers.) This cross
training benefits officers of both branches. Officers seeking accession into Special Forces will normally attend the infantry CCC.

(b) The captains Professional Military Education (PME) centers on the technical, tactical and leadership competencies needed for success in follow-on assignments. The branch CCC prepares company grade officers to command and train at the company, battery, or troop level and to serve as staff officers at battalion and brigade levels. There is a 1-year Active Duty Service obligation for attendance at a branch CCC. Captains learn how to think critically and creatively; they learn how to think as opposed to merely being thought what to think. Instruction focuses around combined arms operations at company, battalion, and brigade levels within the COE. Students plan and conduct a variety of operations against an array of opposing forces. Training includes planning and executing offensive and defensive operations against conventionally trained, equipped, and structured threat as well stability and reconstructive operations against unconventional forces possessing a mixture of capabilities. The training scenarios present the student with constantly changing situations against a learning, cunning, and adaptive enemy.

(c) Instruction also includes an introduction to Joint, interagency, and multinational operations. Classes include an emphasis on urban operations and cultural awareness as an aspect of modern conflict. Captains also receive training on how to leverage learning technologies and the importance of lifelong learning and self-development. The instruction is a realistic, hands-on experience that stimulates effective recall in combat and training environments following graduation. The program of instruction (POI) aims to develop well rounded, multi-skilled officers who have the competencies and confidence to lead Soldiers in the COE. There are two ways RC captains may fulfill their PME requirements: Attend the Active Army version of CCC, or attend a CCC (RC) which consists of two, two-week ADTs spaced one year apart, plus up to 295 hours of advanced distributed learning.

(3) Intermediate Level Education (ILE). ILE is the Army’s formal education program for majors. It is a tailored resident education program designed to prepare new field-grade officers for their next 10 years of Service. It produces field-grade officers with a Warrior Ethos and Joint, expeditionary mindset, who are grounded in warfighting doctrine, and who have the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies to be successful at more senior levels in their respective branch or FA. ILE consists of a common core phase of operational instruction offered to all officers and tailored education phase (qualification course) tied to the technical requirements of the officer’s branch or FA.

(a) Select branch and Functional Area officers will receive the common core course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during the first 16 weeks of ILE and follow on attendance at AOWC for 24 weeks. The remaining officers who do not attend resident ILE at Fort Leavenworth will receive the common core course from CGSC instructors at one of the satellite campuses and as prescribed through ADL and the TASS. Following the common core FA officers attend individual qualification course ranging from two to 178 weeks in length. Qualification courses provide officers the technical preparation for assignments in their respective FAs. Completion of the ILE common core and the respective branch or FA qualification course qualifies the officers for award of MEL 4 and JPME I.

(b) Some officers may attend the Navy, Marine, or Air Command and Staff Colleges, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), or a foreign school that has been granted ILE equivalency. School selections result from a comparative appraisal of all eligible officers, including a careful review of these elements: the scope and variety of tasks performed and how well they were performed, the degree or level of responsibility, the trend of efficiency up or down, intelligence and independent judgment in implementing decisions, and an estimate of potential. Officers selected for attendance at other than the Army Intermediate Staff College may attend the ILE common core at a satellite site, TDY en route.

(c) The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP). AMSP is a yearlong resident course taught by the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The purpose of the AMSP is to provide the Army and the other services with specially educated officers for command and general staff positions at tactical and operational echelons. The program provides its graduates an advanced education in the military arts and sciences focused at the operational level. Additionally, the program provides training in the practical skills needed to plan and conduct battles, major operations, and campaigns and in adapting doctrine and techniques to the changing realities of war. Applicants must be ILE qualified or resident students in ILE or Sister Service resident programs. The focus of this school is on planning and executing full-spectrum operations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational contexts.

(4) Pre-Command Course (PCC)/Tactical Commander’s Development Program/Branch PCC (PCC/TCDP). AC and RC commanders selected for battalion and brigade command attend a 3 phase command preparation program that includes the PCC, TCDP, and branch/functional training prior to assuming their assignments. Officers attend Phase I, a one week branch immaterial course conducted at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Here, the command designees are introduced to Army policy as it affects their commands, self assessment tools to improve leadership, command team training for the commander, CSMs and spouses. Selected commanders are then enrolled in Phase II, a two-week Tactical Commanders’ Development Program, a course that focuses on command decision making, COE, and synchronization of combat power across the full spectrum of operations. Other selected designees are enrolled for additional training for TRADOC specific requirements Designees then attend Phase III branch or functional pre-command training that familiarizes future commanders with the technical / tactical / and procedures relating to their particular disciplines/ branches. Designees may also attend legal, logistics, and language training based on their specific requirements.

(5) Senior Service College (SSC). The SSCs are at the apex of the military schools system and award MEL 1 credit.
SSCs prepare officers for senior command and staff positions within the Army and DOD. These colleges include the AWC, the NWC, the ICAF, the Naval War College, the Air War College, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC); other accredited international senior military Service colleges, or any one of approximately 20 civilian and military fellowship programs.

(a) The SSC in accordance with National Defense Appropriation Act of 2005 teaches JPME II. The Army’s SSC, the AWC, prepares military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic leadership responsibilities in military or national security organizations. It educates students about employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, Joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy; researches operational and strategic issues; and conducts outreach programs that benefit the nation.

(b) The AWC Distance Education Course provides an alternate means of attaining MEL 1 schooling. Eligible officers who apply are compared against the most current promotion list to colonel and most current SSC Selection Board Order of Merit List (approximately 1,300 names) to determine the final slate. AR 350–1 describes the details of the selection and application processes. The course is the only nonresident program that results in the awarding of MEL 1 upon completion. Once officers have enrolled in the correspondence course, they are no longer eligible for resident SSC attendance.

(6) Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The JPME program is a Joint Chief of Staff approved body of principles and conditions that prescribe, at both the Intermediate Level Colleges (ILCs) and SSC levels, the educational requirements for Joint specialty officer nomination. The ILCs incorporate JPME Phase I into their curricula. The SSCs incorporate JPME II into their curricula. JPME I is awarded on completion of ILE common core and AOWC or the appropriate credentialing course. In the National Defense Appropriations Act of 2005, the AWC now teaches JPME II.

(7) General Officer training. General officer training has historically not been formalized. Preparation has been through varied assignments over the course of a career. General officer training now consists of various functional and assignment-specific courses. Initiatives to institutionalize training (some as a result of the Professional Development of Officers Study) include:

(a) The “CAPSTONE” seven-week course through the National Defense University, which includes visits to ACOM, ASCC, DRUs and Services to enhance understanding of key factors influencing planning for and employment of U.S. forces in joint and combined operations;
(b) Brigadier General transition (“charm school”), eight days;
(c) Army Force Management GO/SES Course;
(d) Leadership Development Program through several accredited civilian institutions;
(e) Division/Assistant Division Commander Course at Fort Leavenworth, one week;
(f) Joint Force Land Component Commander Course conducted by the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, one week;
(g) Joint Warfighting Course conducted jointly by the U.S. Army War College and Air War College at Maxwell AFB, two weeks, on campaign planning and employment of Services and joint forces.
15–18. Civilian education system (CES)

a. The Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) is a Department of the Army (DA) program. Its main purpose is to provide Army personnel with a roadmap for career development throughout their total career. ACTEDS is a systematic, competency-based approach to provide Army civilians the right kinds of training at the right points in their careers. It blends formal training, on-the-job training (OJT), developmental assignments, and self-development activities. Requirements in the CP26 ACTEDS plan are tailored to personnel in the Manpower and Force Management Career Program/Career Field (CP/CF–26) but also include prescribed civilian leader development.

b. CES linkage to Leader Development Domains and Model.

(1) CES provides the Army Civilian Corps self-development and institutional training (leader development) opportunities to develop leadership attributes through distance learning (DL) and resident training. CES includes the Action Officer Development Course (AODC), Supervisory Development Course (SDC), Management Development Course (MDC), Foundation Course (FC), Basic Course (BC), Intermediate Course (IC), Advanced Course (AC) and Senior Service College (SSC). Courses may be added as additional educational requirements are identified.

(2) Institutional training also includes training for technical or functional development and educational requirements for career programs. The Assistant G–1 for Civilian Personnel manages and develops policy for these areas of Institutional Training. The office also has responsibility for managing the operations (assignments and on-the-job) domain.

c. Civilian “Pentathlete”. The term Pentathlete resulted from the Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL) study conducted in FY06. (The final report dated November 2006 is available on AKO.) Figure 15–13 demonstrates the desired skills and attributes of civilian leaders. The complexities of the 21st century security environment require more of Army leaders at all levels. As we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Europe, across the Americas, and in peace enforcement operations around the world, the actions of leaders can have strategic consequences. To be effective today and tomorrow, we are growing a new breed of leader - one more akin to a pentathlete, who is able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease.
To prepare our civilian leaders for the rigors of service, as multi-skilled pentathletes among complexity and uncertainty, we must:

- Produce civilian leaders armed with the values, skills and mindset to serve as competent, resilient managers and supervisors.
- Reinforce our commitment to the Army Civilian Corps Creed among all of our Soldiers and civilians.
- Enhance our leader development, education and training programs across the Army.
- Leverage lessons learned from deployed Soldiers and civilians in support of operations such as: combat, countering insurgents, promoting stability, and supporting reconstruction.
- Continue to build the best capabilities possible - by providing the best possible service and support to our Soldiers.
- Expand cultural awareness in our education programs.

e. The Civilian Education System (CES) Structure (Figure 15–14). The CES courses are designed using leadership competencies derived from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) leadership competencies and competencies identified by the Center for Army Leadership in FM 6–22, Army Leadership. CES is a structured, progressive, sequential program which broadens the targeted civilian educational training base. It provides leader training and education that supports civilian leaders' career path requirements and professional development, and promotes lifelong learning and self development as integral parts of the civilian leader development program. CES provides leader development opportunities for Army civilians. Designated courses are required for interns, team leaders, supervisors and managers.
(1) Action Officer Development Course (AODC), Supervisory Development Course (SDC), and Management Development Course (MDC). These DL courses are available through the Army Reimer Library website. They are available as self-development to supplement other training opportunities and to increase employee’s knowledge and skill at any point in their career. Interns are required to complete the AODC before the completion of their intern program. SDC is required to be completed by individuals in supervisory and managerial positions before they complete their one-year probationary period. MDC provides self-development opportunities for all Army civilians and leaders.

(a) AODC. This course describes "staff work" as it is generally practiced Army-wide. The AODC covers organization and management; conducting completed staff work; managing time and priorities; conducting meetings and interviews; solving problems and making decisions; communications; writing to the Army standard; coordinating; conducting briefings; and ethics.

(b) SDC. SDC provides supervisors or managers with civilian personnel administration skills such as work management and basic supervision. It has two sub courses, both of which are required for successful completion of the course. SDC is a required course for employees in supervisory and managerial positions. They should complete the SDC before enrolling in any of the CES courses.

(c) MDC. MDC assists supervisors and managers with basic skills for managing work and leading people. MDC includes modules in organizational culture; time management; objectives and plans; problem solving and decision making; planning, programming and budgeting; manpower management; communications; information technology applications; the Army Environmental Program; equal employment opportunity; professional ethics; internal management control; and Army family team building.

(2) Foundation Course (FC). The FC is designed for employees to gain an understanding of the structure of the U.S. Army, the Army’s leadership doctrine, and the personnel system for Department of Army civilians. The course objectives are to understand U.S. Army leadership doctrine; increase self-awareness, as it relates to their profession; understand team building, group dynamics, and effective communication; assess individual values and how they relate to professional ethics; understand how to manage professional advancement and leverage career potential; and complete administrative requirements expected of DA civilians.

(3) Basic Course (BC). BC is designed for civilian leaders who exercise direct leadership to effectively lead and care for teams. Training focuses on basic education in leadership and counseling fundamentals, interpersonal skills and self-awareness. BC consists of a DL phase (pre-assessment determines individual length) and a two week resident
The mobilization-training base is tasked to ensure that Soldiers arrive in-theater ready to fight as teams or individual accelerated and broadened by specific, goal-oriented self-development actions. Soldier’s knowledge and perspective increases with experience, institutional training, and operational assignments. It is understand their strengths and weaknesses, determine their individual needs, and become more experienced. Each strengths, minimizing weaknesses, and achieving individual development goals.

progressively more complex and higher-level assignments. Self-development focuses on maximizing individual strengths, minimizing weaknesses, and achieving individual development goals.

(b) DLAMP is a comprehensive program of education and development. Participants are nominated by their respective Components and ratified for admission by the DLAMP Council. Once admitted, DOD centrally funds approved DLAMP activities. Most participants will complete all requirements in two to five years, depending on their prior education, career goals, and individual needs.

15–19. Self-development training
Learning is a lifelong process. Institutional, organizational, and operational training alone cannot provide the insight, intuition, imagination, and judgment needed in combat. The gravity of our profession requires comprehensive self-study and training. In no other profession is the cost of being unprepared so high. Soldiers and leaders at all levels continually study our profession in preparation to fight and win our Nation’s wars. This requires commanders at all levels to create an environment that encourages subordinates to establish personal and professional development goals. Further refinement of those interests should occur through personal mentoring by commanders and first line leaders. Applications of battle-focused officer and NCO professional development programs are essential to leader development. Exploiting reach-back, distributed learning, and continuing education technologies support these programs. Self-development is continuous and should be emphasized in both institutional and operational assignments. Successful self-development requires a team effort. Self-development starts with an assessment of individual strengths, weaknesses, potential, and developmental needs. Commanders and leaders provide feedback to enable subordinates to determine the reasons for their strengths and weaknesses. Together, they prioritize self-development goals and determine courses of action to improve performance. Self-development is—

a. A planned process involving the leader and the subordinate being developed. It enhances previously acquired skills, knowledge, behaviors, and experience; contributes to personal development; and highlights the potential for progressively more complex and higher-level assignments. Self-development focuses on maximizing individual strengths, minimizing weaknesses, and achieving individual development goals.

b. Initial self-development is very structured and generally narrow in focus. The focus broadens as individuals understand their strengths and weaknesses, determine their individual needs, and become more experienced. Each Soldier’s knowledge and perspective increases with experience, institutional training, and operational assignments. It is accelerated and broadened by specific, goal-oriented self-development actions.

15–20. Mobilization training base
The mobilization-training base is tasked to ensure that Soldiers arrive in-theater ready to fight as teams or individual
replacements. It must provide combat-ready Soldiers who are proficient in those skills that ensure their immediate contribution and survival as members of teams/crews/units in a theater of operations. A detailed process for the execution of the mobilization training base is discussed in Chapter 6 (Planning for Mobilization and Deployment).

a. Levels of mobilization. The training base will accomplish its task by planned expansion geared to varying levels of mobilization. During Presidential Reserve Call Up (PRC) and partial mobilization, existing USATCs and Service Schools are augmented by elements of USAR Divisions (institutional training). Reserve Reception Battalions are also activated during phased mobilization to augment reception stations. USAR assets scheduled to expand or augment the training base are under the peacetime control of USARC, but placed under the command of TRADOC during the establishment and execution of the mobilization training base. Primary planning emphasis for mobilization expansion of the training base is on partial mobilization, with pre-deployment MOS/AOC certification of mobilized IRR members the primary mission.

b. PRC and partial mobilization. During PRC and Partial Mobilization, all peacetime training programs continue, with the IRR in-processing certification training mission being added.

c. Mobilization planning guidance. Detailed planning guidance for mobilization is contained in the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) and TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (TMOPES). AMOPES provides a source document for issuing policies, procedures, guidance, and planning assumptions for the functional areas of training, exercises, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, expansion of forces beyond the approved force structure, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution of Army forces.

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**Figure 15–15. The forces training system**
Section VI
Training in units

15–21. General

a. The Army’s mission is to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders (COCOM) in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. The Army’s strategic goals are to remain relevant and ready by providing the Joint Force commander with essential capabilities to dominate across the full range of military operations. Army leaders and units must be ready to perform with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) team members in a contemporary operating environment against an adaptive enemy. A unit commander has two major training responsibilities: (1) develop Soldiers/leaders for future responsibilities and (2) prepare their unit to accomplish the assigned mission. In the absence of a directed mission, commanders must prepare their unit to perform those core missions for which the unit was doctrinally designed to execute across the full range of military operations. The Army’s training challenge is to optimize, synchronize, and support training in schools, training in units, and self-development to produce forces ready to respond across the full range of military operations.

b. The challenges of today’s operational environments require a change in the Army mindset. Army forces must be trained to conduct full spectrum operations under the conditions of any operational environment, anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. The Army must train, organize, and develop capabilities for stability operations with the same intensity and focus that it does for combat operations. Figure 15–16 displays the relationship of full spectrum operations to the spectrum of conflict and operational themes. The oval on the diagram-called the aim point-indicates that the focus of Army training and leader development must shift leftward from the right side of the spectrum of conflict-from training under conditions of general war to conditions midway between general war and insurgency. Doing this enables Army forces to sustain the proficiency in irregular warfare and limited intervention developed since 911 in response to threats while sustaining their capability for major combat operations.

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Accreditation Bars of Excellence

- **Level IV:** Learning Institution of Excellence (100% of standards met)
- **Level III:** Full Accreditation (80-99% of standards met)
- **Level II:** Conditional Accreditation - requires report (60-79% of standards met)
- **Level I:** Candidate for Accreditation - requires report (0-59% of standards met)

Figure 15–16. Aim Point for Army Training and Leader Development
c. The aim point concept is a major cultural change for Army leaders, Soldiers, and units. To be successful in future operations, the Army cannot look at operations today as temporary interruptions in preparing for major combat operations against a near-peer enemy. Nor can it afford to view operations dominated by the offense and defense and those dominated by stability as either/or propositions. Both usually occur simultaneously. Army forces must be well-trained and able to deploy rapidly to conduct and win engagements and wars while remaining ready to conduct sustained stability operations. Similarly, in operations dominated by stability they must remain prepared to conduct offensive and defensive operations. The predominate operation—offense, defense, or stability—is determined by the situation, objectives, or conditions to be achieved, desired end state, and level of violence. Commanders consider the simultaneous execution of these three elements of full spectrum operations in their mission analysis.

d. Leaders in Joint units (that is, Joint Task Forces, Joint Land Component Commands, and Combattant Command HQs) manage training using procedures in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Training Manual (CJCSM), CJCSM 3500.03. Leaders in Army units (for example, TDA units and modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) units within MACOMs and Army Service component commands) manage training using procedures in FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, which support and are consistent with Joint training management procedures. Training and readiness oversight/support is provided through the administrative control (ADCON) chain. Leaders in Army units will:

1. Use an Army-approved automated system, like the Digital Training Management System, to manage training.
2. Focus training on mission essential tasks and supporting critical tasks.
3. Plan and execute training events that enable the unit to build and sustain Soldier, leader, and unit proficiency in mission essential tasks. The CATS and STRAC strategies are the doctrinal templates of training events, frequency, and duration that a commander uses in developing unit training guidance, strategy, and calendars. The critical training events in CATS and STRAC are the common building blocks for the commander’s plan.
4. Minimize risk in training activities by conducting a composite risk assessment when planning all training events.
5. Manage activities so that training land is protected, rehabilitated, and maintained.
6. Given a directed mission, use available time to rehearse mission execution.
7. Assess performance in training and operations and provide feedback to unit personnel and Army lessons learned processes.

15–22. Organization for training in units

a. Troop units. FORSCOM; USAREUR; EUSA; USARSO; USASOC; and USARPAC. All are tasked to organize, equip, station, train, and maintain the readiness of assigned units.

b. U.S. AMC. AMC’s mission is to provide superior technology, acquisition support and logistics to ensure dominant land force capability for Soldiers, the United States and our allies. The training mission for AMC is directed toward specialized training of personnel in the materiel area, to include planning for and conducting NET in coordination with FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other commands. AMC is further tasked to assist TRADOC and FORSCOM on matters associated with supply and maintenance concepts, doctrine, training and individual and collective training products. The education and training products produced must be IAW TRADOC policy.

c. The U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM). USAMEDCOM’s mission is to provide, sustain, and enhance Soldier health. They are responsible to train, develop, and equip, the medical force supporting the Army and to then deliver leading edge health services. The AMEDD center and school is responsible for the execution of the training management function for the AMEDD. It provides training and education to all AMEDD personnel, on a worldwide basis and provides standardized TSPs on common medical tasks for use throughout the Army.

15–23. Training of Soldiers and leaders in units

a. There are 8 tenets to Army training.
1. Commanders are the unit’s primary training managers and primary trainers.
2. Commanders train their direct subordinate units and guide and evaluate training two echelons down.
3. A leader’s primary objective is to train subordinates and organizations for mission success.
4. Leaders motivate their subordinates toward excellence and encourage initiative and innovation.
5. Leaders place high priority on training and leader development.
6. Leaders ensure training is executed to standard.
7. Leaders continually assess individual and organizational proficiency.
8. Leaders enforce safety and manage risks.

b. There are 7 principles of training.
1. Commanders and other leaders are responsible for training.
2. Noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews, and small teams.
(3) Train as you will fight.
(4) Train to standard.
(5) Train to sustain.
(6) Conduct multi-echelon and concurrent training.
(7) Train to develop agile leaders and organizations.

c. Commanders are and other leaders are responsible for training. Commanders are ultimately responsible for the training, performance, and readiness of their Soldiers, Army civilians, and organizations. However, leaders across all echelons and throughout the operational Army and generating force are responsible for training their respective organizations. For example, a commander is responsible for training a unit, an operations officer for training the operations staff section, and a platoon leader and platoon sergeant for training a platoon. These leaders ensure their organizations are trained and mission-ready. Leaders fulfill this responsibility by actively engaging in all aspects of training and adhering to eight tenets. Responsibility for training and leader development includes developing staffs, which are as important to operational success as well-trained squads, platoons, and companies. To perform their responsibilities as the unit’s primary training manager and primary trainer, commanders:

(1) Use mission command in training as well as operations.
(2) Supervise the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of training that result in proficient leaders, individuals, and organizations.
(3) Ensure training supports the unit’s needs.
(4) Focus training on the unit’s METL.
(5) Provide and protect the required resources.
(6) Incorporate safety and composite risk management (CRM) into all aspects of training.
(7) Ensure training is conducted to standard.
(8) Assess subordinate leader and unit proficiency and provide feedback.
(9) Develop and communicate a clear vision for training.
(10) Ensure the training environment replicates the anticipated operational environment.
(11) Guide and evaluate two echelons down.
(12) Provide effective supervision, enforce standards, and apply composite risk management.

d. NCOs train individuals, crews, and small teams. NCOs and officers complement each other. This relationship can be characterized as direction from commanders (“top-down”) and subsequent input from subordinate officers and NCOs (“bottom-up”). NCOs abide by five tenets as they train individuals, crews, and small teams:

(1) Training is a primary duty of NCOs; NCOs turn guidance into action.
(2) NCOs identify Soldier, crew, and small-team tasks, and help identify unit collective tasks that support the unit’s mission-essential tasks.
(3) NCOs provide and enforce standards-based, performance-oriented, mission-focused training.
(4) NCOs focus on sustaining strengths and improving weaknesses.
(5) NCOs develop junior NCOs and help officers develop junior officers

e. Train as you will fight. “Fight” includes lethal and nonlethal skills. “Train as you fight” means training under the conditions of the expected operational environment. To train as they expect to fight, leaders adhere to the following eight tenets:

(1) Train for full spectrum operations and quick transitions between missions.
(2) Train for proficiency in combined arms operations and unified action.
(3) Train the fundamentals first.
(4) Make training performance-oriented, realistic, and mission-focused.
(5) Train for challenging, complex, ambiguous, and uncomfortable situations.
(6) Integrate safety and CRM throughout training.
(7) Determine and use the right mix of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training enablers to provide conditions for training events that replicate the anticipated operational environment.
(8) Train while deployed

f. Train to standard. Army training is performed to standard. Leaders prescribe tasks with their associated standards that ensure their organization is capable of accomplishing its doctrinal or directed mission. A standard is the minimum proficiency required to accomplish a task under a set of conditions. The goal in training is achieving mastery, not just proficiency. Leaders continually challenge individuals and organizations by varying training conditions to make achieving the standard more challenging. The following tenets focus on standards-based training:

(1) Leaders know and enforce standards.
(2) Leaders define success where standards have not been established.
(3) Leaders train to standard, not to time

g. Train to sustain. Units must be capable of operating continuously while deployed. Maintenance is essential for continuous operations and is, therefore, an integral part of training. Maintenance is more than maintaining equipment; it
includes maintaining and sustaining performance levels, personnel, equipment, and systems over extended periods. Leaders create training conditions that require units to do this. Leaders incorporate sustainment into individual and collective training by following these nine tenets:

1. Make maintenance of equipment, individuals, and the organization part of every training event.
2. Equipment maintenance is the cornerstone of sustainment.
3. Soldiers and civilians maintain entire systems.
4. Leaders train and retrain critical tasks to sustain proficiency.
5. Train to sustain core individual and collective skills and knowledge.
7. Train staffs routinely.
8. Leaders develop a sense of stewardship in subordinates.
9. Preventable loss is unacceptable.

h. Conduct multi-echelon and concurrent training.

1. Multi-echelon training is a training technique that allows for the simultaneous training of more than one echelon on different or complementary tasks. It is the most efficient way to train, especially with limited resources. It requires synchronized planning and coordination by commanders and other leaders at each affected echelon. Multi-echelon training optimizes the use of time and resources. This is important in an environment characterized by frequent deployments and limited resources. Multi-echelon training can occur when an entire unit trains on a single task or when different echelons of a unit simultaneously train on different tasks. Multi-echelon training allows individuals and leaders to see the effects of one echelon’s execution on another echelon.

2. Concurrent training occurs when a leader conducts training within another type of training. It complements the execution of primary training objectives by allowing leaders to make the most efficient use of available time. Concurrent training can occur during multi-echelon training.

i. Train to develop agile leaders and organizations. The Army trains and educates its members to develop agile leaders and organizations able to operate successfully in any operational environment. The Army develops leaders who can direct fires in a firefight one minute and calmly help a family evacuate a destroyed home the next. The Army trains leaders who accept prudent risks to create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. This agility requires educated, highly trained, and well-disciplined individuals. They must also be physically tough, mentally agile, and well-grounded in their core competencies and the Warrior Ethos. The Army needs people experienced and knowledgeable enough to successfully accomplish any mission along the spectrum of conflict and in any operational theme. Such individuals can adapt to any situation and operate successfully in any operational environment. These seven tenets underlie developing competent and agile leaders and organizations:

1. Train leaders in the art and science of battle command.
2. Train leaders who can execute mission command.
3. Develop an expeditionary mindset in Soldiers and Army civilians.
4. Educate leaders to think.
5. Train leaders and organizations to adapt to changing mission roles and responsibilities.
6. Create a “freedom to learn” environment.
7. Give subordinates feedback.

15–24. Soldier training publications (STP)
Training Publications (TPs) are Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program (ADTLP) publications that contain critical tasks and other training information used to train soldiers and serve to standardize individual training for the whole Army; provide information and guidance in conducting individual training in the unit; and aid the soldier, officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and commander in training critical tasks. STPs consist of Soldier’s Manuals (SMs) (common task and branch specific) and Soldier’s Manuals/Trainers Guides (SM/TGs). STP 21–1, Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT), Skill Level 1, is the only soldier’s manual projected to be printed under the ADTLP in the future. Training/Task (TD) Proponents may publish branch-specific STPs. All other STPs can be published in electronic form through the ADTLP.

a. STP. STPs support training of common, shared, and branch-specific individual critical tasks in the unit. Each task summary describes the minimum acceptable standard and the operational conditions under which the task must be performed, lists the references Soldiers need to master the task, and provides a guide to assess hands-on performance. Proponent schools develop branch-specific STPs that provide conditions, standards, and performance information to support training and evaluation of tasks at each skill level.

b. Training Guide (TG). The TG is a tool to guide the unit trainers and individual Soldiers in establishing an individual training plan. TGs give commanders and unit trainer’s information needed to plan and conduct soldier training and evaluations in the unit See Figure 15–12.
15–25. Collective training

a. Collective training requires interaction among individuals or organizations to perform tasks, actions, and activities that contribute to achieving mission-essential task proficiency. Collective training includes performing collective, individual, and leader tasks associated with each training objective, action, or activity. Unit training occurs at home station, maneuver CTCs, and mobilization training centers. It also takes place in joint training exercises and while operationally deployed. Unit training develops and sustains an organization’s readiness by achieving and sustaining proficiency in performing mission-essential tasks. Installations ensure units have access to the training enablers needed to enhance readiness. This training can be conducted in any or all of the live, virtual, constructive, or gaming environments.

b. Collective training refers to developing in a group of Soldiers those interdependencies and teamwork that go to make up team performance. The terms “collective training” and “unit training” cannot be used interchangeably. Unit training includes collective and individual training (the training of Soldiers and leaders). The primary features of collective training are that it is decentralized and performance-oriented. Performance-oriented collective training is training units to do the same tasks or missions that they will do in wartime, and to do them well enough to ensure success on the battlefield. The performance objective is the basis of the performance-oriented approach. Training is conducted to attain the objective. Included within the training objective are the tasks, conditions, and evaluation standards. The standards are used to determine the unit’s ability to accomplish the task and are measured in GO/NO GO terms. The evaluation is designed to be used to develop timely remedial training programs. The units are provided with training products to assist in this training. The primary products are: CATS, battle drills, exercises, Training Support Packages (TSPs), short-range unit training strategies, and training aides, devices, simulators, and simulations.

15–26. Composite Risk Management (CRM)

a. FM 5–19, CRM, defines CRM as the Army’s primary decision-making process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army missions, functions, operations, and activities.

b. Unidentified and unmanaged threats and risks impede successful Army missions, undermine readiness, decrease morale, and deplete resources. The holistic approach of CRM provides commanders a tool to recognize, evaluate, eliminate, and control all the diverse threats and risks to mission execution. The underlying principle of CRM is that a loss is a loss. The loss can be either one of the following:

1. Tactical (threat-based) loss.
2. An accidental (hazard-based) loss.
(3) A loss due to terrorism, suicide, homicide, illness, or even substance abuse.

c. The training mission cannot be considered fully successful if it is not accomplished with appropriate risk mitigation. The principles of integration and composite risk management have special relevance to the training situation. Commanders must integrate safety as a training management factor from the moment the mission is defined and the METL is developed. When safety is realistically integrated in training, the benefits extend to the garrison environment, off-duty activities, and most importantly, to the combat arena. The Mishap Risk Management Process is used to identify, evaluate, and manage risks to missions, personnel, equipment, and the environment during peacetime, contingency operations and wartime due to safety and occupational health factors, design and construction of equipment, and other mishap factors.

d. The Mishap Risk Management Process is the process of identifying and assessing hazards; determining their risk; developing, evaluating and selecting controls; making risk decisions; and implementing and managing those decisions to improve operational effectiveness and conserve Army resources. The process consists of the following five steps shown below and in figure 1–2:

1. Identify hazards.
2. Assess hazards to determine risk.
3. Develop possible countermeasures and make risk decisions.
4. Implement controls.
5. Supervise and evaluate.

e. The risk assessment consists of the first two steps of the risk management process. In Step 1, individuals identify the hazards that may be encountered in executing an activity. In Step 2, they determine the impact of each hazard on the activity. The risk assessment provides for enhanced situational awareness. This awareness builds confidence and allows Soldiers, units, civilians, and organizations to implement timely, efficient, and effective protective control measures.

f. Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to manage risk effectively. In these steps, leaders balance risk against costs and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During execution, leaders continuously assess the risk to the overall mission and to those involved in the task. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate the effectiveness of controls and provide lessons learned so that others may benefit from the experience.


15–27. Mission Training Plans (MTPs) and drills

There are MTPs for each type TOE platoon, company, battalion, combined arms task forces, and brigade, division, and corps staffs. The MTPs provide a clear description of “what” and “how” to train to achieve critical wartime mission proficiency for each unit echelon. Each MTP contains mission outlines, sample situational and field training exercises (STXs and FTXs), and comprehensive detailed training and evaluation outlines. MTPs provide other training management aids such as leader tasks, resource requirements, and evaluation methods. Included are matrices linking collective tasks to missions, references to collective tasks, drills/collective tasks to individual tasks, and STXs to missions. Each MTP is based on the training principles listed in FM 7–1, Battle Focused Training. The products are also available in digitized format in the digital library.

15–28. Combat Training Center (CTC) Program

a. Mission. The CTC program consists of the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA; the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany; and the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The Combat Training Center Program objectives are to: increase unit readiness; develop battlefield leadership; embed doctrine; provide feedback on unit tactical effectiveness to participants; and provide data to improve doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) input to the combat and training development processes. AR 350–50 establishes Army policies for the management of the CTC program. The CTC program provides realistic joint and combined arms training, according to Army and joint doctrine, approximating actual combat. They are integrated into operationally deploying unit training schedules and often serve as Mission Rehearsal Sites. The CTC Program:

1. Provides commanders, staffs, and Soldiers an operational experience focused on leader development.
2. Produces bold, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and operational exercises.
3. Increases unit readiness for deployment and war fighting.
4. Embeds doctrine throughout the Army.
5. Provides feedback to the Army and joint participants to improve war fighting.
6. Provides a data source for lessons learned to improve Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains to win in combat.

b. Rigor. During a CTC experience, commanders will fight with the equipment they would expect to take to war during their command tenure.
• Train to standard.
• Conduct doctrinally based AARs focused on performance, which enable Soldiers and leaders to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve weaknesses.
• Stress all BOSs in decisive ground combat operations.
• Provide a freethinking, opportunities-based, OPFOR with an equal chance to win.
• Develop tactical scenarios where the outcome is not assured.
• Ensure consequences of tactical decisions are fully played out.
• Retrain to underscore the unit’s adherence to standards and mastery of the task. (Retraining is not an indication of failure.)

(1) **Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).** BCTP, located at Ft Leavenworth, KS, is the Army’s capstone CTC. BCTP supports realistic, stressful training and leader development for Army Force/ASCCs and corps, division, and brigade commanders and their staffs to assist the Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA), in fulfilling his obligation to provide trained and ready units to win decisively on the modern battlefield and to conduct contingency operations worldwide. BCTP conducts computer-assisted command post exercises at the mid-to-high intensity level of combat. The BCTP also provides a vital source of experience-based information and data essential to DOTMLPF to improve the Army and supports contingency operations and deployed unit training.

(2) **Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).** JMRC, in a forward deployed environment at Hohenfels, Germany, provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing Soldiers, leaders, and units for success on current and future battlefields. JMRC trains up to a task organized brigade combat team and selected division maneuver assets across the entire spectrum of conflict from high-intensity combat to stability and support operations. It also provides DOTMLPF feedback to improve the Army.

(3) **Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).** JRTC, at Ft Polk, LA, provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing Soldiers, leaders, and units of our nation’s joint contingency forces for success on future battlefields. JRTC trains up to a task organized brigade, selected division maneuver assets, special operations forces, and selected multi-echeloned logistical support to conduct and rehearse combined arms operations across the full spectrum of conflict from mid-intensity to stability and support operations. Training occurs under tough, realistic, combat like conditions across a wide range of likely tactical operations and mission rehearsal exercises capable of full integration into higher level exercises and scenarios. It also provides DOTMLPF feedback to improve the Army.

(4) **National Training Center (NTC).** NTC, at Ft Irwin, CA, provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing Soldiers, leaders, and units of America’s Army for success on the 21st-century battlefield. The NTC trains up to a task-organized brigade and selected division maneuver assets to conduct and rehearse combined arms operations across the spectrum of conflict from high intensity combat to stability operations. It also provides DOTMLPF feedback to improve the Army.

c. **Centers of excellence.** Each CTC will be a center of excellence with a specific war fighting focus across the spectrum of conflict. BCTP concentrates at the major theater war level. CMTC and NTC concentrate between the major theater war and small-scale contingency. JRTC concentrates at the small-scale contingency level. Each CTC will have a degree of full-spectrum capability commensurate with its primary focus on the spectrum of conflict. Training will not be less rigorous or realistic as the Army moves to a contemporary operational environment (COE). The degree of difficulty will be calibrated based on entry-level skills. OPFOR will have full-spectrum capabilities that can be adjusted to satisfy METL-linked training objectives and blue force (BLUFOR) training outcomes.

d. **Goals for throughput.** AC corps and division commanders will execute a BCTP exercise during their first year in command. AC maneuver brigade and battalion commanders will execute a maneuver CTC rotation as early as possible in their command tenure. Maneuver brigades in Korea will receive battle command and battle staff training (BCBST) every 2 years. The goal for ANG eSB is to have a maneuver CTC experience every 7 to 8 years, BCBST experience every 2 years, and BCTP experience at division level when preparing for operational commitments. Participation in joint exercises is not a substitute for a BCTP requirement unless approved by the CSA. JSCP units receive priority for BCTP war fighters.

15–29. **Unit training management**

Effective training programs and exercises must be designed to get the most use from available resources. The central challenge for the next several years is to get the Army back in balance, where we are generating forces that are trained and ready for Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) at sustainable levels. To meet this objective we must re-establish our Major Combat Operations (MCO) skills without burning out our forces or losing our skills in Irregular Warfare (IW). Army training and leader development programs must prepare units and leaders to conduct FSO across the five operational themes of Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention Operations (LIO), Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare and Major Combat Operations. For the foreseeable future, all operations, to include Major Combat Operations, will be executed among the populace, with the populace as the ultimate objective. This requires a fundamentally different approach from how we trained to fight the Cold War, Desert Storm, and OIF1.

a. **Training management.** Training management is the process used by Army leaders to identify training requirements and subsequently plan, prepare, execute, and assess training. It identifies the related resources needed to conduct
and evaluate training. It involves all echelons and applies to every unit in the Army regardless of strength, mission, organization, or equipment. Training management must work in unison with other unit programs to achieve excellence in training. FM 7–0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, applies to all leaders at all organizational levels. Leaders include officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Army civilians in leadership positions. FM 7–0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. It has application for every type organization. FM 7–1, *Battle-Focused Training*, complements FM 7–0, *Training the Force*, on the importance of battle focus in training and applies to battalion and company Soldiers, leaders, and units. This FM provides practical “how to” guidelines for officers and NCOs, including techniques and procedures for planning, executing, and assessing training.

b. *Army training management publications.* The FM 7 series manuals, TRADOC Pam 350 series pamphlets, and AR 350–1, *Army Training and Leader Development* establishes the system and policy for Army unit training management. The manuals provide commanders with a management system they can use to plan training; take necessary resource actions; and evaluate Soldier and unit proficiency, training, and training management. They describe long-range, short-range, and near-term planning and the related resource actions. Execution of training, evaluation, and organizational assessment are also described. The methods and examples presented in these manuals have proved successful in units throughout the Army.

c. METL. Because sufficient resources are not available, units cannot train to standard on every task needed for all operations across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, commanders focus training on the most important tasks—those that help units prepare to conduct operations. They do this through mission focus and their mission-essential task list (METL). A mission-essential task list is a compilation of mission-essential tasks that an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission.

(1) Core METL (CMETL). To focus training and leader development in the operational training domain, HQDA establishes core mission-essential task lists (core METLs, or CMETLs) for 39 types of units at brigade and higher. They provide a mix of mission essential tasks that cover offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. There are two HQDA standardized components to CMETL.

(a) General Mission Essential Tasks (GMETs): Tasks that must be accomplished by all units, regardless of type, in full spectrum operations in support of ARFORGEN

(b) Core Capabilities Mission Essential Tasks (CMETs): Mission essential tasks that are specific to a type of unit which is designed and resourced according to its TO&E and doctrine.

(2) Units train on collective and individual tasks derived from and appropriately supporting those broad CMETL tasks. CMETL helps standardize Army capabilities by type unit and provides the basis for full spectrum capabilities. Units train on CMETL until they prepare for a directed mission by conducting Directed METL training—and only when they have sufficient dwell time to do so. Below brigade level, units will build and nest their METL based on the brigade’s CMETL. It is not realistic to build or sustain readiness for operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, across all operational themes, and under all conditions. Consequently, the conditions for CMETL-focused training are based on a segment of the spectrum of conflict—midway between Insurgency and General War—and will build proficiency across the Army for a combination of Major Combat Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Limited Intervention Operations. Standardized CMETL-focused training conditions support rapid assembly of force packages and minimize required additional training for the most probable directed missions.

d. *The Digital Training Management System (DTMS).* DTMS provides unit commanders with automation support to facilitate the execution of the training management process described in FM 7–0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, FM 7–1, *Battle-Focused Training*, FM 3–0 Operations, and other related documents. It integrates key management functions, which support developing the METL to determine training requirements, planning, resourcing, scheduling, and the assessment of training in units. It assists in the management of training from company through corps, and serves as the Army’s single, standard training management tool. Army organizations often provide Army forces within joint force formations. DTMS accomplishes this by enabling unit commanders to use their existing office and tactical automation systems to:

(1) *Access relevant training management documents and records,* such as CATS, STPs, drills.

(2) *Perform nearly all analyses inherent in the training management process,* such as ammunition forecasts and assessments.

(3) *Identify resource requirements for training activities.*

(4) *Prepare and print required schedules, calendars, and reports.*

e. *Automated Systems Approach to Training.* DTMS uses data created by the ASAT/TDDC software application. ASAT/TDDC is used by proponents developers to create task-based data and associated information necessary for units to effectively and efficiently conduct training. It compiles and displays a unit roll-up of training conducted through a series of customizable tools to track such things as weapons qualification, APFT scores, AR 350–1 mandated training, and deployment tasks from “enlistment to retirement”.

(1) *Battle focus.* DMTS supports the Battle Focus concept by providing CATS, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the Army Universal Task List (AUTL), core and directed METL, assignment of Battle Tasks, and supporting collective and individual tasks. It also provides for the development of non-documented local missions and tasks that
may not appear in a CATS. In addition it facilitates the cross walking of individual Soldier common and MOS tasks to each approved METL task along with other supporting collective tasks associated with the METL.

(2) **Planning.** Training strategies, long and short range plans, training calendars, coordination details, training schedules, and training resource projections are also developed based on proponent provided data and UTMC.

(3) **Execution/Assessment.** Training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) may be printed to assist in unit evaluations. Training Execution Matrices (TEM) can be exported to the Training Feedback Module (TFM), allowing evaluation of training either using paper T&EOs or the automated TFM. Evaluation results are then input back into the system. The commander’s subsequent assessment of task preparedness and the recording of the actual resource expenditures are then completed in DMTS.

(4) **TSP.** The TSP automatically extracts task, unit, and planning data from DMTS for the creation of a unit TSP to support all forms of training. TSPs developed with this module can be created at any level and shared with other units Army wide using this module. The TFM also extracts the same type of data for the purpose providing an automated observer/controller tool. The TFM will provide task evaluation and after-action reporting data back into DMTS for unit commander assessments, to the Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL) for archive and general information, and to the ASAT/TDDC for product improvement.

(5) **School.** DTMS has a schools management tool to resource and allocate seats for training events such as NET, digital systems training, safety courses, etc.

f. **Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS).** RCAS is an automated information system that supports the decision-making needs of all commanders, staffs, and functional managers responsible for RC forces. The RCAS uses state-of-the-art office automation, telecommunications, databases, and processing capability to provide timely and accurate information for planning, preparation, and execution of mobilization and to improve the accomplishment of routine administrative demands. It is a self-sufficient system capable of exchanging data with related information systems. The RCAS will link all Army Reserve Component (ARNG and USAR) units, mobilization stations, and ACOM, ASCC, DRUs. It will be able to interface with ATRRS.

15–30. **Army modernization training (AMT)**

AR 350–1, *Army Training and Leader Development,* provides policy and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the planning and execution of new systems training. The regulation provides a process for the expeditious integration of equipment into the force structure through new equipment training (NET), displaced equipment training (DET), doctrine and tactics training (DTT), and sustainment training (ST). New, improved, and displaced equipment is provided to Army units by planning, acquiring, and fielding a unit set (to include training capability) to a designated AA or RC unit (usually a Brigade Combat Team) during a single modernization window. Doing so synchronizes all DOTMPLF activities required to field and support the individual systems that comprise unit sets. To the extent possible, a system-of-systems approach is use for capabilities/requirements generation, materiel development and acquisition, manpower and personnel, funding, testing, fielding, transfer, training, sustainment, and support facilities. The Army Modernization Schedule, published biennially, identifies units being modernized and corresponding infrastructure and training base requirements. Unless exigencies require otherwise, lifecycle units are modernized when the unit reconstitutes, with training for operators provided previously in MOS producing schools and training for unit leaders exported to their home station.

a. **New Equipment Training (NET).** NET is designed to support force integration and modernization through identification of personnel, training, and training devices required to support new or improved equipment. The NET provides the initial transfer of knowledge on the operation and maintenance of this equipment from the materiel developer to the tester, trainer, supporter, and user. The NET will assist commanders achieve operational capability in the shortest time practical by training Soldiers/crews how to operate and maintain the new/improved equipment and by providing unit leaders with training support components needed to sustain proficiency of operators and maintainers on the new/improved equipment after NET. NET is tied to the System Acquisition Management Process (Chapter 11). The interface of NET and this process is shown in Figure 15–18.

b. **Displaced Equipment Training (DET).** DET applies to systems that are being replaced by new equipment, but remain in the inventory. Displaced equipment and its software, while not new to the Army, are new to the receiving unit. Because displaced equipment has established training base schools for operators and maintainers, units receiving displaced equipment may not need extensive training and may not need extensive formalized planning for that training. This determination will be made by the training developer, in coordination with the gaining command and the PM of the displaced system. Planning for and executing DET is similar to the process used in NET.

c. **Doctrine and Tactics Training (DTT).** DTT is conducted in conjunction with NET or DET. The requirement for DTT will be based on 2 determinations—does the new/improved system significantly change the unit’s how-to-fight doctrine, and does the unit need help learning how to employ the new/improved system to accomplish its wartime/design mission? DTT provides commanders, battle staffs, operators, and trainers with a doctrinal basis for employment of new or displaced materiel.

d. **Sustainment Training (ST).** The ST sustains the proficiency of operators and maintainers of the new/improved system achieved during NET/DET or during training-base schools and sustain any proficiency of unit leaders to employ
the new improved system achieved during DTT or training-base schools. Accordingly, it builds on the training and training support used for NET/DET and DTT. The training base shares the responsibility for ST by assuring that a pool of trained replacements is established to support the sustainment effort. The ultimate responsibility for ST, however, remains with the commander.

15–31. The security assistance training program (SATP)

a. SATP. SATP, covered under AR 12–15, Joint Security Assistance Training, consists of U.S. military training assistance to eligible countries. Security assistance includes all training of international military personnel conducted within DOD activities under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as amended. The components of the SATP are the following—

1. International Military Education and Training (IMET) (under the FAA) represent education and training provided for which the military departments are reimbursed from foreign assistance appropriations.

2. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (under AECA) covers the sale of defense articles, services, and training to eligible foreign governments and international organizations. These sales are reimbursed as required by law.

3. The Professional Military Exchange (PME) program, which is under the FAA, authorizes the exchange of U.S. and foreign personnel on a one-for-one basis at MILDEP command and staff and war colleges.

4. Unit Exchange, which is under the AECA, authorizes the provision of informal training and related support on a reciprocal basis.

b. HQDA executive agent. The CG, TRADOC, will serve as executive agent for development and implementation of the SATP. TRADOC is responsible for the central financial management and distribution of decentralized IMET and FMS training funds for all operating agencies as required by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). The CG, TRADOC, will oversee, through the commander, Combined Army Center (CAC), the operation of the U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). The CG, TRADOC, operates and administers the SATP through the Director, Security Assistance Training Directorate (SATD), who is dual-hatted as Director, Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA).

c. Objectives of the SATP. The objectives of the SATP are to:

1. Assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management and operation of its defense establishment.

2. Foster the foreign country’s development of its own professional and technical training capability.
(3) Promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of foreign countries to operate in peacekeeping missions and in coalition environments.

(4) Promote better understanding of the United States, its people, political system, institutions, and way of life.

(5) Increase the international military student’s (IMS) awareness of the U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

(6) Develop skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.

Section VII
The Training Support System

15–32. Training Support System (TSS)

a. The TSS provides the foundation on which the Army training system runs. As described in AR 350–1, FM 7–0, and FM 7–1, it is the system of systems that provides networked, integrated, interoperable training support capabilities that are necessary to enable operationally-relevant, full-spectrum, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) training for Soldiers, units, and DA civilians anytime, anywhere. The Army's TSS provides resources to support commanders’ training strategies on request. The training support system provides—

(1) Products—instrumentation and TADSS.

(2) Services—training support operations and manpower.

(3) Facilities—ranges, simulation centers, and training support centers.

b. Leaders use these products, services, and facilities to provide a training environment that replicates projected operational environments. The training support system provides tools to execute Soldier, leader, staff, and collective training at any location. The system also enables school programs of instruction and training strategies, such as CATSs and weapons training strategies. In addition, the system provides the operations staff for ranges, command and control training capabilities, training support centers, and training area management. These resources help leaders focus on the training rather than the training support requirements.

c. The Army is adapting installation training support system capabilities to enable CMETL and DMETL training. Range modernization supports new weapons systems, integrates command and control information systems, and allows units to conduct training using a variety of scenarios. Urban operations facilities and combined arms collective training facilities support training for urban operations. Battle command training centers support many types of training, among them, operator and leader training on command and control information systems, staff section training, command post exercises, and mission rehearsal exercises. The system model is at Figure 15–19.
15–33. Meeting training support needs


(1) Capabilities of the TSS will extend across the institutional, operational, and self-development training domains, and will support both the current and future Forces. The Army TSS is comprised of three major components: product lines, including training information infrastructures, training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations, training products, training services, and training facilities and land; architectures and standards; and management, evaluation, and resource processes. All three components work together as a system of systems to enhance training effectiveness.

(2) Training Support System (TSS) programs are adapting to support the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). Since late 2004, the Army has reviewed and adapted its TSS program requirements to ensure the Training Support System remains relevant with modular unit structure, full spectrum training requirements, new equipment fielding, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) readiness requirements, Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategies (IGPBS) and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). A new program management structure was instituted to align TSS products and services by functions and provide a more holistic capability to the field. Mission Essential Requirements (MER) and Use Cases for each TSS program were developed to help describe the TSS capabilities required at each installation to support the ACP implementation. Theater TSS In Process Reviews (IPRs) are conducted with each CONUS and OCONUS Command to assess current TSS capability against the ACP and adjust the MERs and Use Cases accordingly. Site visits are conducted at installations significantly impacted by BRAC and IGPBS. The results of these IPRs and site visits are used to realign fielding plans and revise basis of issue plans with the ACP implementation, and identify critical capability gaps to inform the POM build.

(3) Training support systems are adapting today to support an Army at war. They are responding to Commanders’ Operational Needs Statements (ONS), acquiring and fielding new live, virtual, and constructive training support systems to address OIE/OEF training capability gaps. The Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer (VCCT), Improvised Explosives Devices simulators (IEDS), Medical Simulations Training Centers (MSTC), Deployable Instrumentation Systems (DITS), Mobile MOUT, MATCH, and deployable targetry systems are just some of the systems fielded to support pre-deployment, RSOI, and deployed training in theater. TSS is adopting many of its simulations and simulators to better reflect the COE.


(1) ATSC serves as HQDA’s executive agent for the Training Support System. As such, ATSC manages for HQDA,
the conduct of the TSS Program Management Reviews (PMR). The PMRs are used to: review training program requirements/capabilities for modernization, operations and manpower, facilities, sustainment, and management support systems; reset / refresh Use Cases, doctrine MER and site-specific MERs; review and direct program execution by supporting PEOs/PMs; recommend program priorities; and, address program lead issues. PMRs receive guidance and input from the Training Support Working Group (TSWG) and domain Councils of Colonels (CoCs).

(2) ATSC also manages conduct of the TSWG which reviews and validates TSS program requirements recommended by the PMRs; reviews and validates doctrinal and site-specific MERs; approves program execute guidance to PEOs/PMs; reviews and finalizes TSS program priorities; and addresses TSS related issues across the programs. The TSWG provides input to and receives guidance from the Domain Council of Colonels (CoCs). The Domain CoCs inform and advise the TSWG on domain-specific training requirements, strategies, and priorities; review and recommend adjustments to TSS program MERs and priorities; assist in resolving TSS related issues; and recommend TSS issues to be elevated to the Training and Leader Development General Officer Steering Committee (TLGOSC).

15–34. Simulation Training Technologies

a. Simulations. OPTEMPO and ammunition costs are expected to continue to increase for the foreseeable future. This coupled with a decline in maneuver and range land will warrant the continued expansion and integration of simulations into the training base. Embedded or strap-on simulation systems in the future will provide the leaders and operators with realistic training within units by training on the actual equipment. Seamless simulation technologies can expand training horizons available beyond the confines of a unit. Simulations are cost effective tools for increased training of commander’s and staff without the need for unit participation and cost.

b. Gaming Strategy. The TRADOC Capability Manager Gaming is the Executive Agent for Army Gaming; the Army buys these games COTS and GOTS, meaning less upfront investment. Although integration of gaming is still in development stages, it makes use of geo-specific terrain where appropriate; it can be used for mission planning and mission rehearsal; and it will have an After Action Review capability. These games will have low overhead and are easily incorporated into Crawl-Walk-Run training. When used in conjunction with the Eight Step Training Model and the seven principles of training in FM 7.0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, games have the ability now to help close existing training gaps. Leaders can incorporate them early in the Reset-Train phase to practice small unit tactics, individual, and collective tasks. Leaders can hone their Battle Command skills of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. Leaders also can develop, practice and revise Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Battle Drills.

c. Distributed interactive simulation (DIS). The Army’s DIS program provides the lead for coordinating and integrating multi-Service, DARPA, and Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) activities toward advancing the underlying open architecture, standards, data bases, and general purpose designs necessary for achieving seamless synthetic environments. Through use of the DARPA established Defense Simulation Internet (DSI) as the backbone for computer communication services, a wide array of simulation and modeling capabilities located at multiple facilities can be linked to form synthetic environments ranging in scale and resolution suited for a variety of uses. This concept calls for the linking of all types of unit training into the same network. This capability would permit the wide-scale integration of various simulation systems and live training without regard to geographical constraints. Thus, an early-deploying RC unit could play the same scenario as its forward-deploying counterpart.

(1) The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Simulation, Readiness, and Prototyping defines simulation as "everything except combat" with three integral components—live [operations with real equipment in the field]; constructive [war games, models, analytical tools]; and virtual [systems and troops in simulators fighting on synthetic battlefields]. While the first two components are technically mature *but still improving*, the virtual component is significantly evolving. Virtual capability is improving through technology advances in high-performance computing, communication, artificial intelligence (AI), and synthetic environment realization.

(2) Simulation networking technology. One of the first steps taken toward achieving this concept was the development and fielding of Simulation Networking Technology. This proof of principle demonstration of technology was jointly developed and fielded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army and showed that large numbers of simulators could participate in a virtual battlefield.

(3) Soldier Training Support Program (STSP) provides enablers that facilitate Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS)-prescribed execution of individual and collective training for units and by Programs of Instruction at Army Schools. It synchronizes requirements and resources necessary for combat and materiel development of these training enablers. It also provides personnel, facilities, capabilities, and operational support for Soldier training, and identifies emerging requirements associated with modularity, transformation, and rebasing. The following are the major Programs of Record.

(a) Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000 is a unit/institutional, indoor, multipurpose, multi-lane, small arms, crew-served and individual anti-tank training simulation. EST 2000 provides the capability to build and sustain individual marksmanship, squad and team fire distribution and control, and judgmental use of force skills using computer-generated imagery. The Engagement Skills Trainer provides realistic marksmanship and combat scenario training for 12 of the most common small arms and crew -served weapons and individual anti-tank weapons in the Army inventory. It has the feel, weight, recoil, fit and sounds of the actual weapons, provides multilane individual marksmanship training from zero to qualification, and provides multilane individual and collective gunnery training for static

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dismounted individual, squad, team, or element levels. It contains realistic Shoot-Don’t Shoot Scenarios for both urban combat and guard/security tasks. The computer generates targets, terrain, and weapons effects in a real-time three-dimensional display that also includes OPFOR weapons and sounds. The EST 2000 provides the capability to build and sustain marksmanship skills for squad and team fire distribution. It also contains control and judgmental use of force training with computer-generated imagery. The system provides immediate feedback of hit/kill/miss for each firer that permits leaders to evaluate the effectiveness of their unit. It has been deployed into theater to sustain critical marksmanship and collective skills/proficiency for Soldiers and small units, especially when they are not able to conduct live-fire training.

(b) Common Gunnery Architecture (CGA) is an initiative that offers an integrated approach to meet common gunnery training requirements. CGA is an extension of the One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF) product line architecture and its software components. CGA will be with the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) Advanced Gunnery Training system. It provides a flexible and adaptive gunnery solution that permits realistic training in the COE, CGA will be more responsive to changes in doctrine and procedures than current systems, thus eliminating the duplication of training solutions and promoting sharing of capabilities. The Common Gunnery Architecture (CGA) initiative standardizes the capability of all virtual gunnery training systems by using common architecture and common software products. This will aid long-term growth potential in training capability and effectiveness and will reduce total lifecycle cost. CGA will not combine or collapse other systems into a single gunnery trainer. It retains system-/platform-specific hardware solutions (thereby continuing to replicate crew operating environments). CGA will standardize the use of software baselines to enable the training of crews across the full spectrum of operations, in urban and complex terrain, as well as more conventional environments (desert, woodland, etc.) using geo-typical and geo-specific terrain databases. The CGA eliminates the costs and developmental time lines associated with maintaining separate software baselines for each individual system.

(c) Common Driver Trainer (CDT) is a virtual reality and motion based simulator that is easily reconfigured for multiple vehicle cabs. It utilizes a large collection of terrain, weather, and hostile force models. CDT will be used as a training gate in driver or equipment operator’s initial and sustainment training. The ability for one simulator to model multiple vehicles reduces the inventory of real vehicles at institutions as well as the operating costs of those live vehicles that are used for driver training. The CDT provides business economies when compared to developing and fielding separate simulators by vehicle type or model. The first version of CDT is the Stryker family of vehicles being fielded in FY07. The CDT/ Stryker Variant (CDT/SV) consists of a simulated vehicle cab, instructor/operator station (IOS), After Action Review (AAR) station, visual system, motion system, and a computational system. Via the IOS, the instructor is capable of selecting a visual scene, viewing the scene, introducing malfunctions and emergency control situations, monitoring each trainee’s performance and providing recorded AAR feedback. The reconfigurable common platform will allow driver training for various U.S. Army tactical vehicles. Future variants are the tank, High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Bradley and tactical wheeled vehicle. The Stryker Driver Trainer is the baseline of a CDT architecture.

(4) Battle Command Training Support Program (BCTSP) Virtual Simulation Training is part of Battle Command Training Support and is conducted in a synthetic natural environment. Virtual simulations provide individuals, leaders, crews, and units with a realistic, immersive training environment that involves real people operating simulated systems using human in-the-loop simulations or embedded training capabilities. In the virtual environment, simulators and simulations operating on virtual geo-specific or non-geo-specific terrain take the place of real systems and can be linked with components of the Live, Virtual, and Constructive Integrated Architecture to provide a training environment that replicates the operational environment. Virtual training systems provide commanders with “walk-level” training, sustainment training, gated training events, leader development and mission rehearsal capabilities. Through frequent and repetitive use and an immediate and total replay AAR capability, virtual training systems assist commanders with the building and sustaining of training readiness. Virtual training also has the advantage of allowing Soldiers to perform highly dangerous or restrictive tasks too dangerous for the live environment (such as calling for artillery fires on or near an occupied friendly position), provides the capability for rapid changes for COE relevant scenarios, and facilitates retraining specific tasks until training objectives are met. Virtual simulations allow repetitive training under varying conditions to enable the individual or team to conduct live training at a higher state of readiness, potentially reducing OPTEMPO costs. The Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) represents the family of the virtual simulators.

(5) Synthetic Environment Core (SE Core) is the Army’s virtual component of the LVC–IA. It is a program that will integrate the various functions and components of virtual simulations and link the virtual environment to the LVC training environment (TE) to support DOD’s training transformation and the Army’s training strategy. SE Core will develop new, and integrate existing, hardware and software products creating the Army’s common virtual environment (CVE), linking system and non-system virtual simulations into a fully integrated training capability. SE Core requirements grouping includes:

(a) Objective OneSAF (OOS) integration as the common SAF;
(b) Virtual simulation architecture (VSA);
(c) Master terrain database design facilities;
(d) Common virtual components.
The CVE enables the Army to execute combined arms and joint training and mission planning and rehearsals at home station, en route and at deployed locations. SE Core is a key element in the Army’s training transformation plan and a complementary training system for the Future Combat Systems.

d. Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). CCTT is the ground maneuver component of the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) family of simulators, and is a system of computer-driven, combat vehicle simulators such as the M1 Abrams Tank, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, the Fire Support Team Vehicle, the HMMWV, and emulators that control other vehicle models and that work interactively, similar to the vehicles and functions they replicate. These simulators and emulators are connected via a local area network (LAN) and have the capability to be networked with multiple simulation facilities. The system’s computers create an immersive battlefield that creates the illusion of moving and fighting over actual terrain while operating or riding inside the actual vehicles, and employing the actual weapon systems mounted on each respective the vehicle variant. CCTT is fielded primarily in company/team sets to the Active Component and in mobile platoon sets to the Army National Guard. A Reconfigurable Vehicle Simulator (RVS) and Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer (RVTT) have been developed and will be used to support modular formations and a wider training audience. RVTT, as the objective convoy defense and wheeled-vehicle maneuver trainer provides leaders and Soldiers the ability to train highly perishable command and control skills, collective tasks and crew drills in a variety of vehicle types in simulated weather, urban operations and complex virtual terrain environments.

e. Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT). AVCATT is the aviation component of the CATT that provides a system for staff/crew collective and combined arms training, mission rehearsal and joint exercises. AV- CATT is fair-fight interoperable with Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), is capable of linking with other AVCATT systems via LAN or wide area network (WAN), can be networked to the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) workstations and will be interoperable with future CATT systems. It is a multifunctional aviation training system, tailor able to specific unit needs such as mission planning and rehearsal and combined arms collective training through use of Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) protocols and Tactical Simulation Interface Units (TSIUs). AVCATT incorporates current and future force aviation aircraft, including attack helicopters AH–64A Apache and AH–64D Apache Longbow, armed observation helicopters OH–58D Kiowa Warrior, utility helicopters UH–60A/L/M Black Hawk, cargo helicopters CH–47D/F Chinook, and future Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters. The AVCATT is a mobile system that can support unit collective training at multiple sites including home station, CTCs and National Guard training sites.

f. Non-rated Crewmember Trainer (NCMT). NCMT is a virtual training system that is reconfigurable (UH–60 and CH–47), self-contained, and transportable providing training for helicopter door gunners and non-rated crew members of cargo and utility helicopters in the conduct of door gunnery, sling-load operations, crew coordination, actions on contact, and sectoring and coordinating fires in a virtual environment.

g. Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer (VCCT). VCCT provides a critical training capability to support unit collective training in convoy defense and mounted maneuver operations. VCCT provides a capability for frequent, repetitive, standards-based training to build and sustain task proficiency on convoy operation tasks. It is a mobile, immersive virtual simulator allowing Soldiers, as part of a vehicle crew, to participate in a convoy of manned and unmanned computer-generated vehicles. Soldiers come under attack in a virtual training environment and must engage the enemy using realistic weapons and correct weapons engagement techniques. Soldiers encounter shoot/don’t shoot scenarios and are trained to develop judgment to know when to make the transition. VCCT enables training on the full spectrum of operations, in urban and complex terrain environments, as well as more conventional environments (desert, woodland, home stations), using geo-typical and geo-specific terrain databases. VCCT will eventually be replaced by a more capable simulator, RVTT. RVTT will be managed within the CCTT program, and provide training capabilities for light and medium and forces in a variety of high-density combat and combat support vehicles.

h. Embedded training. A function hosted in hardware and/or software, integrated into the overall equipment configuration. Embedded training supports training, assessment, and control of exercises on the operational equipment, with auxiliary equipment and data sources, as necessary. Embedded training, when activated, starts a training session, or overlays the system’s normal operational mode, to enter a training and assessment mode. Embedded training is a concept that involves a number of discrete technologies. It focuses on system-peculiar tasks. Hardware will be configured either as an integral part of the tactical system or as a strap-on. Embedded training will allow the weapon system to be used as an individual and crew trainer. Ultimately networking of embedded systems will permit crews to interact with other crews as required in an actual tactical scenario (as MILES does today). Embedded training, like distributed training, will dramatically change the way the Army is organized to train. From both a training and cost-effectiveness perspective, more training will shift to the unit, as tools like embedded training become the rule rather than the exception. Embedded Training will provide a fully integrated means to train in the live, virtual and constructive environments allowing both units and institutional environments to practice and interact in a cost effective manner.

(1) Virtual reality. Psychologists have long known that the sense of sight can dominate the other senses. Theme parks, such as Disney World, have capitalized on this dominance. For example, wide-screen, stereophonic presentations of roller coaster rides create the physical sensations of the actual rides. The same phenomenon is observable in high-fidelity flight simulations, which create sensations of nausea or vertigo especially in the novice. Until recently training
applications have been limited. Virtual reality is a new and emerging technology that melds the real world with a computer-generated world. It is an outgrowth of research and development efforts by NASA to simulate space conditions and to link human beings with robots so that complex repairs and maintenance can be performed without humans leaving the confines of the spacecraft. Virtual reality can be used to insert the individual into a world that is too hostile, too expensive, or too remote to duplicate in a training environment. Furthermore, the computer could simulate interaction with these images. Thus, the prospect of surrogate travel exists to permit a tank commander to perform in a virtual battlefield. For example, if tank crew members were wearing virtual reality helmet visor systems, computer imaging could turn an open field into a city, which the tank commander could drive through. This technology coupled with an embedded training system, which would allow the fighting of a realistic battle without ever leaving the motor pool.

(2) **Voice input/output.** Current hindrances associated with computer use in training and combat includes the primary reliance on either a keyboard or mouse to input commands. The rapidly maturing technology of voice recognition is beginning to allow hands free operation of computers as well as translation capabilities. Examples of voice input technology and software used during OEF and OIF include Rosetta Stone and Tactical Iraqi.

(3) **Artificial intelligence (AI).** As with the other technologies discussed, AI will greatly alter the way the Army currently trains, maintains, and fights on the battlefield. Industry has found that by utilizing AI technologies in diagnostic equipment they could reduce training time for a journeyman from three years to three months with improved on-the-job performance. Since AI will provide round-the-clock expertise to unit-level maintenance, it should cause a restructuring of the current maintenance echelon structure. This will add credence to shifting the training focus from predominantly service school to a unit orientation in the future. AI will also have a great impact in improving target acquisition, engagement, and command and control. It will minimize human interaction and the chance for human error during periods of combat stress. It will be the precursor of passive engagement systems that identify and engage targets automatically. As in maintenance training, these technologies will reduce training time associated with mastering gunnery/operator/maintainer MOS.

(4) **Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System (EMPRS).** Although still in the experimental phase, EMPRS will be a collaborative tool to allow army forces or JTF HQ’s to conduct planning and rehearsal against a scenario enroute to a mission. This system will be linked through C4ISR systems and allow distributed planning and rehearsal for the commander.

**Section VIII**

**Quality Assurance (QA) Program**

**15–35. Revitalized Quality Assurance (QA) Program**

a. **Background.** The Army has revitalized the education/training QA program. This revitalized program addresses the quality of the education and training provided to units, Soldiers, and DA civilians. QA involves evaluation, accreditation, validation, and quality control functions and provides for the development, conduct, and quality control of training for all TRADOC staff and faculty; such as instructors, evaluators, analysts, designers, developers, mid-level and senior supervisors / managers. QA provides the chain of command with the confidence that the TRADOC mission is being achieved while minimizing risk of error or failure. Proponent Schools have a QA office (QAO), which serves as the eyes and ears of the commander and provides needed autonomy and credibility. The value of the program was recognized by DA and on May 03, the CSA, approved HQ TRADOC as responsible agency for training and leader development process accreditation, to include non-TRADOC schools.

b. **Strategy.** The QA program is designed to take a “white hat - help improve how we do business” approach. The QAO is to also provide “white-hat” assistance in the critical operation of the TRADOC HQ, centers, and proponent schools. The revised QA program looks at the entire spectrum of factors that affect the quality of Army education and training. This revised program covers the training mission area but is the foundation for a higher-level mission area that includes the entire DOTMLPF. It includes:

1. Program management; training automation system capabilities and outputs; SMDR management; contract, personnel, and resource management oversight; organization structure and effectiveness; quality of life issues (staff & students); and program planning/ administration.

2. Internal and external training evaluation, instructor and training developer evaluations and training institution accreditation.

c. **Impact.** The QA Program is already making great in-roads in improving the quality of conduct of training, training support, and proponent functions. The impact of the QAO is being felt in identifying problems with product quality, timeliness of development, implementation of training/training products, organizational structures, and allocation of resources. The information generated by this program is being reported directly to the CGs of the schools and to TRADOC CG. The information is also being included in various higher headquarters reports such as the SRS, the Institutional Training Resource Model, and Program Objective Memorandums.

**15–36. QA Program Organization**

The QA Program was initiated by establishing independent Evaluation and QA Program Offices and supporting QA
Elements within the command group at TRADOC Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), centers, and each TRADOC school assigned and reporting directly to the organizations senior leadership. (See Figure 15–20) The QAO works with the members of the organizations, advises them on ways to improve their work, and reports directly to the Commander on the status of his/her organization.

**Program Organization Structure**

- **TRADOC QA Office (QAO).** Advisor to TRADOC CG, CofS, and DCSOPS&T. Provides Command program management oversight, program policy, accreditation standards, programming/allocation of resources, evaluator certification training, raises and tracks TRADOC and DA HHIs, and provides guidance/assistance to Major Support Commands (MSC), centers, and school QAOs.
- **Combined Arms Center (CAC) QAO.** Evaluates PME (every 3 years), Oversees proponent school (RC Tng Bns) & USASMA (NCOA common core) PME accreditations, and Submits and tracks HHIs (as appropriate).
- **USAAC QAO.** Evaluates IET (every 3 years), oversees Drill Sergeant Proponency Program accreditation of Drill Sergeant Schools, and submits and tracks HHIs (as appropriate).
- **Education/Training Institution QAO.** Conducts internal & external evaluations, conducts self-assessments, and accredits functionally aligned RC training battalions (every 3 years). They provide members to the IET and PME accreditation teams.

*Note.* Some Non-TRADOC schools have also stood up or modified their QAOs using TRADOC’s model. These included the AMEDD and JFKSWCS. Others will be stood up as funds are provided by DA.
15–37. QA Program Operation

The QA program essentially consists of three major activities centered on a set of performance standards. These activities are:

a. A self-assessment. The organization applies the standards to themselves and identifies strengths and weaknesses. This self-assessment has proved to be very beneficial and have provided the greatest payback in training development management, organization, and process improvements. The school must conduct a self-assessment prior to an accreditation visit and they must provide their resulting report to accrediting organization.

b. An assistance visit. This is a visit by an outside QA team from the accrediting agency that applies the standards to a school and helps them improve their operations. The school CG is provided a report.

c. An accreditation visit. The accrediting agency applies the standards, assigns an accreditation level, and sends a report to the TRADOC CG. Accreditation is a major function of the program.

(1) The TRADOC CG approved accreditation standards are organized in three groups: (1) Conduct of Training, (2) Training Support, and (3) Proponent Functions. There are a total of 24 standards. Each standard lists references, delineates criteria to be met, provides guidelines for application of the standard, identifies deficiencies that require mandatory comments, and lists documentation the organization being accredited must provide.

(2) HQ QAO coordinates the accreditation team visits. The accreditation team is primarily composed from HQ TRADOC staff, AAC (for IET), and CAC (for PME) for visits to TRADOC centers and schools. The HQ Staff members include the TRADOC QAO (lead; evaluate proponent TD functions), TASSD, DCSINT, DCSPIL, and the Command Safety Office. Only those staff members needed for a specific visit attends.

(3) After an accreditation visit the CAC and AAC QAOs provide their report to HQ TRADOC QAO for consolidation and presentation to the TRADOC CG. The report assigns a level of accreditation to the school (refer to Figure 15–21).

Figure 15–21. Accreditation bars of excellence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept for Reclass, PME, &amp; IMT Accreditation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allows for raising the bar!</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Level IV: Learning Institution of Excellence (100% of standards met)
Level III: Full Accreditation (80-99% of standards met)
Level II: Conditional Accreditation - requires report (60-79% of standards met)
Level I: Candidate for Accreditation - requires report (0-59% of standards met)
Section IX
Summary and references

15–38. Summary

a. **FM 7–0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations.** FM 7–0 states that because our threats and the Army’s operational concept have changed, thinking about Army missions and capabilities must also change. The Army cannot train for the last war. All overseas Army operations combine simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Operations within the United States and its territories simultaneously combine civil support, defense, and offense. Army forces must be not only capable of defeating the enemy’s armed forces but also able to work in concert with the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic (the “whole of government”)—to achieve national objectives. Army forces must be campaign capable as well. Once deployed, they may be required to operate for extended periods across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace through general war, until strategic objectives are achieved. This campaign capability is the ability to sustain operations for as long as necessary to conclude operations successfully.

b. **Training mission and focus.** As stated in FM 7–0, full spectrum operations require mentally agile leaders able to operate in any operational theme across the spectrum of conflict. Effective command and control focuses on commanders rather than staffs. Commanders, not staffs, drive effective decision-making. Commanders must be able to mass fires at decisive points and times and effects over time. Decentralized rather than centralized operations are the norm today and will likely remain so. All leaders, from the highest to the lowest levels, must understand both the art and the science of operations and battle command. The training focus is on the unit’s core and directed METL. Realistic, sustained, multi-echelon, integrated combined arms training must be continuously stressed at all levels. Every individual training and collective training program must be carefully planned, aggressively executed, and thoroughly assessed.

c. **Battle focus.** Battle focus is the concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Battle focus guides the planning, execution, and assessment of each organization’s training program to ensure its members train as they are going to fight. Battle focus is critical throughout the entire training process and is used by commanders to allocate resources for training based on wartime mission requirements. Core METL provides a shared start point for training and directed METL prepares units for their expected specific operational deployments.

d. **Five training systems.** This chapter discussed five training systems: policy, requirements, and resourcing; training development; training in schools; training in units; and training support. Training policy, requirements, and resourcing are the responsibility of HQDA, ODCS, G–3/5/7, specifically the Director of Training (DAMO–TR). Resourcing necessitates some interesting interfaces with other systems. The ARPRINT, for example, relies on input from ODCS, G–1 as well as DCS, G–3/5/7.

e. **TRADOC.** TRADOC is the center for establishing Army training standards worldwide and as such develops policy and procedures for creating, implementing, and evaluating training and provides ongoing resident/nonresident training to AA and RC alike. This influence impacts on all three training domains of institutional, operational, and self-development training conducted in the three training domains of institutional following the guidance set forth in FMs 7.0 and FM 7–1 plus the 350- series of regulations and pamphlets.

f. **Training support.** The provision of the materials, personnel, equipment, and facilities when and where needed to implement the training is the challenge of the training support system. It includes such functions as the reproduction and distribution of training products and materials, scheduling and resourcing training across all domains, and student record maintenance. Training support manages the distribution of training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs; as such, it provides for the ability of our Commanders and leaders to train their Soldiers.

g. **The future challenge.** More so than ever before, the challenge to commanders at all levels will be to provide efficient, effective education, training, and experience that ensures trained individuals and units are ready to meet the nation’s military requirements worldwide.

15–39. References

a. Army Regulation 5–13, Training Ammunition Management System, MAR 05.


c. Army Regulation 25–1, Army Knowledge Management And Information Technology, DEC 08.


e. Army Regulation 34–4, Army Standardization Policy, MAR 84.

f. Army Regulation 350–1, Army Training and Education, AUG 07.

g. Army Regulation 350–2, Opposing Force Program, APR 04

h. Army Regulation 350–10, Management of Army Individual Training Requirements and Resources, SEP 90

i. Army Regulation 350–19, The Army Sustainable Range Program, AUG 05
j. Army Regulation 350–38: Training Device Policies and Management, OCT 93
k. Army Regulation 350–50, Combat Training Center Program, JAN 03
l. Army Regulation 600–100, Army Leadership, MAR 07
m. Army Regulation 690–950, Career Management, DEC 01
n. Army Regulation 220–1, Unit Status Reporting, DEC 06
o. Army Regulation 600–8–19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions, MAR 08
p. Army Regulation 600–8–29, Officer Promotions, FEB 05
q. DA Pamphlet 350–38, Standards in Training Commission, JUL 08.
r. DA Pamphlet 600–3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, DEC 07
s. DA Pamphlet 600–25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide, JUL 08
t. Field Manual 7–0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, DEC 08.
u. Field Manual 7–1, Battle-Focused Training, OCT 03.
v. TRADOC Regulation 350–18, The Army School System (TASS), CH 1, DEC 07
w. TRADOC Regulation 350–70, Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products, MAR 99.

15–40. Training websites with links
   g. http://www.adtdl.army.mil/
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Chapter 16

Army Knowledge Management

Section I

Introduction

The Army Knowledge Vision - A transformed Army, with agile capabilities and adaptive processes, powered by world class network-centric (net-centric) access to knowledge, systems and services, interoperable with the Joint environment.

16–1. AKM Transformation Strategy

a. The Army is undergoing its most fundamental change in over a century while remaining fully dedicated to supporting the war-fighter. Army Transformation is about transitioning from information-based to knowledge-based operations. Achieving the Army Knowledge Vision will provide the ability to achieve decision superiority and take decisive action across the spectrum - including both deployed and generating forces.

b. A knowledge-based organization demands new organizational definitions, disciplines and structures to respond effectively to new challenges and opportunities. Leaders must communicate their vision and expectations throughout the Army and articulate clearly our strategic courses of action to achieve our future Army and CIO/G6 mission. This total Army transformation must embrace the principles of effective change management and focus on building a framework for knowledge management that has a strong human capital infrastructure in which knowledge is shared as well as transferred across the Army enterprise.

c. The AKM strategy will enable transformation to the Future Force and is based on a framework that includes the following: Infostructure: The IT (computers, software, architecture, security, communications, programs, and facilities) required to support the net-centric Army. Intellectual capital: The individual, team, and enterprise knowledge, systems, services, and strategies that are necessary to improve operations and decision-making. Change catalysts: The policies, resources, management, culture, processes, and education that are required to optimize an adaptive organization and an enterprise net-centric environment.

d. The Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G–6 continues to work toward the enterprise vision of a single Army network, one enterprise Army portal, and universal access to Army knowledge. AKO, the Army’s enterprise portal, has grown to over two million soldier and civilian registered users. Through its evolution to the Department of Defense (DOD)-wide portal, Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and AKO- Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) (AKO–S) will support users from across the entire Department of Defense (DOD) with joint access to enterprise services and content.

e. With the advice and consultation of the Army CIO Executive Board (EB), strong governance procedures for the enterprise control of our information technology (IT) budget have been institutionalized, information management organizations have been realigned, and the AKM strategy has been defined.

f. Army transformation is changing the way we acquire and employ IT assets and, ultimately, how we conduct daily business and operations. To remain relevant to the Future Force, the Army must adapt to the new culture as future military operations will be conducted in a different and changing operational environment, which will enhance decision dominance. The operational environment is characterized by the responsiveness, agility, and full spectrum capability to dominate unstable situations which requires the Army to focus its cultural thinking on the enterprise management of IT resources. This requirement means that organizational IT investments must support the Army’s enterprise-wide goals under AKM.

16–2. AKM Implementation

a. The successful implementation of AKM requires the following:

   1. The infrastructure must accommodate faster processing capabilities and dissemination of requirements;

   2. Enterprise-wide systems must be easily accessible with net-centric processes and services available through a single portal;

   3. The information that leads to knowledge must be well organized and structured through content management, metadata, and data hierarchies;

   4. The ability to generate knowledge requires the transfer and sharing of knowledge across the enterprise using such techniques as collaborative processes, virtual teams, and communities of practice; and

   5. We must recruit, train, and retain an interdisciplinary workforce (soldiers and civilians) empowered to share knowledge.

b. The CIO/G–6 supports the development of a knowledge-based workforce by leveraging intellectual assets and empowering the Army’s human resources through effective workforce planning, cutting-edge recruitment and retention initiatives, broad-based education and training, and cross-functional professional development opportunities.
Section II
CIO/G–6 Roles and Responsibilities

16–3. Office of the CIO/G–6

a. The Army CIO/G–6 exercises sole responsibility for the conduct of the information management (IM) function. The CIO sets the strategic direction, determines objectives for, and supervises DA command, control, communications, and computers (C4) and IT functions. The CIO reports to the SA and ensures that the CSA is provided such staff support as is necessary in performing CSA duties and responsibilities. The mission of the Army CIO/G–6 is to provide architecture, governance, portfolio management, strategy, IT acquisition oversight, and operational capabilities to enable joint expeditionary net-centric information dominance for the Army. Among the specific responsibilities of the CIO are—

b. Serving as the Army CIO.

c. Serving as the ARSTAF G–6 for information and signal operations, network and communications security, force structure, and the equipping and employment of signal forces, and in this capacity supporting the CSA in the exercise of his responsibilities as the senior military officer of the DA and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Providing policy, oversight, and program direction to the Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army) (NETCOM/9th SC(A)), a direct reporting unit, and ensuring that the IT infrastructure supports mission and business strategies.

e. Developing policy and guidance on information management and C4/IT (including automation, telecommunications, visual information, and related activities, services, and programs).

f. Planning, coordinating, and implementing AKM, the Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA), the total Army Enterprise Infrastructure and the Army enterprise portal.

g. Developing, coordinating, and implementing an IT portfolio management process and corresponding governance policies and structures

h. Developing, coordinating and implementing a C4/IM capital planning, and investment strategy for the enterprise (includes investment policies, oversight and control) and the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of all C4/IT resources.

i. Providing CIO validation of requirements for warfighting, base operations, and administrative and other mission-related processes associated with a C4/IT impact.

j. Recommending and advising the SA and the ASA(AL&T) on major resource allocations, investment, and acquisition strategies pertaining to IT and national security systems (NSS).

k. Providing CIO assessment of NSS and IT systems as defined in the Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) (U.S.C. Title 40, Subtitle III) and CIO certification of CCA compliance for all major automated information systems.

l. Ensuring intra-Army interoperability certification for all Army systems to achieve an integrated and interoperable warfighting capability in the joint environment.

m. Providing policy and guidance on and validation of business process initiatives and programs with a C4/IM impact.

n. Providing policy and oversight for the Information Technology Management Career Program and developing and implementing the C4/IM human capital strategy and programs.

  o. Developing policy for information assurance (IA) and providing oversight of the Army IA Program.

  p. Providing policy, guidance, and oversight of the public key infrastructure, the common access card, and other enabling technology programs.

  q. Developing policy and providing oversight of the Army Spectrum Management Program.

  r. Developing policy and providing oversight of multimedia/visual information.

  s. Ensuring that the Army’s military satellite communications usage conforms to joint military satellite program policies and standards.

  t. Developing policy and providing oversight and direction for programs in support of e-Government initiatives.

u. Serving as the Chair of the Army CIO EB, representing the DA on boards, committees, and other groups and representing the SA on matters outside the Department, in coordination with the ASA(AL&T) and ASA(FM&C), as required by the missions and functions prescribed herein.

16–4. CCA Implementation

a. The CCA directs that each executive agency appoint a CIO who reports directly to the head of the agency. The requirements of the CCA increase agencies’ responsibility, authority, and accountability for the use of IT in performing the agency’s missions, maximizing value, managing programs, and assessing risks of IT acquisitions.

b. The specific requirements of the CCA include:

  (1) Analyze the missions of the executive agency and based on the analysis, revise the executive agency’s mission-related processes and administrative processes, as appropriate, before making significant investments in IT to be used in support of those missions.
(2) Monitor the performance of IT programs of the agency, evaluate the performance of those programs on the basis of the applicable performance measurements, and advise the head of the agency regarding whether to continue, modify, or terminate a program or project.

(3) Ensure that information security policies, procedures, and practices are adequate.

(4) Assess requirements established for agency personnel regarding knowledge and skill in information resource management (IRM) and adequacy of such requirements for facilitating achievement of the IRM performance goals. Assess the extent to which the executive and management levels of the Army meet the IRM knowledge and skills requirements and develop strategies and specific plans for hiring, training and professional development in the areas of IRM and IT.

b. In addition to the CCA responsibilities described in paragraph 16–3j above for managing IT, DOD and military department CIOs are responsible for national security systems per Title 10, Section 2223.b. Accordingly, the Army CIO/G–6 has the following additional responsibilities: Reviewing budget requests for all IT and national security systems (IT/NSS), Ensuring that IT/NSS are in compliance with standards of the Government and the DOD; Ensuring that IT/NSS are interoperable with other relevant information technology and national security systems of the Government and the DOD; and Coordinating with the Joint Staff with respect to IT/NSS.

c. The provisions of the CCA apply to all Army Acquisition Category (ACAT) programs. Compliance certification is required at Milestones A, B, C, and at the Full Rate Production (FRP) decision.

16–5. Army CIO EB

a. The Army CIO EB was chartered in April 2001 and serves as an executive forum to advise the Army CIO on the full range of matters pertaining to IT in accordance with the CCA and other related legislation and Federal directives. The EB is currently composed of executive-level membership from the Headquarters, DA principal staff, Army Commands (ACs), Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units. The EB meets on a quarterly basis and also conducts its business between quarterly meetings using its private collaboration Web site located behind the AKO. The meeting minutes of the Army CIO EB are available within the AKO collaboration center at Army Communities/Army CIO/G–6/AMC/Army CIO Executive Board/CIO Exec BD (public)/previous meetings.

b. The purpose of the EB is to involve Army senior leadership from across functional areas in the implementation of the CCA and to identify and resolve enterprise level issues related to Army CIO responsibilities. The EB identifies opportunities, makes recommendations for, and sponsors cooperation in using information resources.

c. The EB functions are identified as follows:

1. Management oversight. Advise and make recommendations to the Army CIO on overall Army IT policy, processes, procedures, standards, priorities, and resources, as appropriate.

2. Alignment of IT and Army missions. Ensure that IT programs and systems are strategically aligned with enterprise-wide Army missions, strategic plans, and initiatives, such as the Army Transformation and the Quadrennial Defense Review.

3. Functional system integration. Advise and make recommendations to the Army CIO on policies and procedures that will enhance the Army CIO’s oversight and integration of IT programs and systems within and across functional areas to include the horizontal integration of technology. Identify enterprise level CIO challenges that cross-functional boundaries and make recommendations to the CIO regarding resolution of those challenges.

4. Resource allocation process. Recommend measures to strengthen integration of the IT capital planning and investment process with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. In addition, review IT funding and program issues and make recommendations on investment priorities and resource alignments in the context of the PPBE process.

5. Knowledge management. Promote and support knowledge management concepts and initiatives throughout the Army. Identify and resolve issues relating to enterprise knowledge management programs.

6. Acquisition process. Advise the Army CIO on program synchronization and standardization issues resulting from program and portfolio reviews. Recommend appropriate IT program and acquisition actions.

7. Interoperability, IA, and communications and computing infrastructure reviews. Advise and make recommendations to the Army CIO on issues of interoperability, IA, and communications and computing information systems infrastructures.

8. Human resources management. Recommend and support strategies for recruiting, retaining, and training IT personnel across the Army.

9. Architecture management. Assist the Army CIO in ensuring that processes are in place to enforce standardized use, management, and control of architectures.


11. Electronic business operations. Recommend measures that will promote, enhance, and safeguard the use of
electronic business techniques and technologies throughout the Army in such areas as biometrics, smart cards, and other secure electronic transactions devices.

(12) Other business. At the option of the Chair with advice of the Board, address any areas and issues not specified above.

d. The EB is supported by several working groups and committees which consider items of concern and conduct research, analyze processes, and recommend solutions to issues if interest. One of those working groups, the CIO Integration Governance Group (CIO IG2), provides a governance structure to coordinate the current working groups and committees and assist EB members in receiving timely updates on issues and recommend actions. The CIO IG2 is composed of the working group chairs and the coordinators for the EB members.

16–6. Information Technology Requirement Approval Process (IT RAP)
The purpose of this process is to define how the Army will approve new Technical Requirements in support of the LandWarNet and capture those technical solutions in the Army’s IT Portfolio in order to facilitate the standardization of IT throughout the Enterprise.

16–7. C4/IT Investment Strategy

a. The efficient and effective use of IT resources has a direct impact on the Army’s ability to perform its missions. The Army CIO/G–6 manages IT investments and develops a coordinated, consolidated investment strategy. The Capital Planning and Investment Management (CPIM) process develops the IT Investment Strategy, recommending a prioritized list of IT investments and/or whether to continue, modify, or terminate an IT program/project according to mandates from the CCA. The recommended prioritization listing is a reference and support tool within Program Evaluation Groups (PEG) throughout the PPBS and acquisition processes. The prioritization process addresses capability gaps, investment risks, IT interdependencies and timing issues across all areas of IT investments.

b. Governance drives the transformation and optimization of Army IT infrastructure to support Army Transformation. Through the Army IT Portfolio Management (PfM) Governance Structure (MA and Domain Leads, plus the Army Portfolio Review Committee (APRC)), develop, facilitate and oversee processes to identify and manage Army IT capabilities and investments.

c. Army Transformation drives Warfighter requirements for new and enhanced IT capabilities. Because resources for Army IT are limited, stove-piped, unnecessarily redundant, and non-compliant IT capabilities must be eliminated and funds reprogrammed to support higher-priority capability requirements. Secretary of the Army Memorandum AKM Guidance Memorandum - Capabilities-Based Information Technology (IT) Governance Memorandum dated 20 July 2005, directs that the elimination of these systems be accomplished through the establishment and execution of Army IT Portfolio Management (PfM) processes.

d. The AKM Memorandums and associated implementing guidance specify responsibilities of MA and Domain
leads for IT investment decisions. IT investments must support the Army’s strategic goals, missions, and interrelated strategies.

e. Management of the Army’s IT investments/capabilities as portfolios, capitalizing upon best practices, emerging technology, and common solutions is essential to the Army’s transformation efforts. As the Army transforms, it is imperative that IT investment portfolios support the Army’s mission, vision, and strategic goals; ensure an efficient delivery of capabilities to the Warfighter; and maximize return on investment to the enterprise. At the enterprise level, management of IT portfolios begins with MAs and Domains aligning functional requirements and capabilities with IT solutions. This will enable the Army to increase efficiency and effectiveness through the elimination and consolidation of redundant or outdated capabilities.

f. In line with the legislative direction of the CCA and Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the CPIM process, the strategy:

- Provides for the selection of IT investments, the management of the investments, and the evaluation of the results of such investments;
- Integrates the processes for making budget, financial, and program management decisions;
- Includes minimum criteria to be used in considering investment in information systems/IT, including criteria related to the quantitatively expressed projected net risk-adjusted return on investment and specific quantitative and qualitative criteria for comparing and prioritizing alternative information systems investment projects;
- Provides for identifying IT investments that would result in shared benefits or costs;
- Provides the means for senior management personnel to obtain timely information regarding the progress of investment in an information system, including milestones for measuring progress in terms of cost, capability of the system to meet specified requirements, timeliness, and quality.

g. The central piece in the development of the CPIM process is the formalization of an IT portfolio for the Army, wherein all IT-related investments are documented and reviewed in line with CCA mandates. The CPIM portfolio is structured to align with the DOD and Army governance structure identifying Mission Areas (MAs) and Domains (listed below) within which investments reside.

- Enterprise Information Environment (EIE) MA: IA Domain, Communications Domain, Computing Infrastructure Domain, Core Enterprise Services Domain

| Table 16–1 |

| Mission Areas |
| Business Mission Area |
| Army Lead: DUSA |
| Acquisition Army Lead: ASA(ALT) |
| Financial Management Army Lead: ASA(FM&C) |
| Human Resource Management Army Lead: ASA(M&RA) |
| Logistics Army Lead: ASA(ALT) ROS |

| Domains |
| Force Protection Army Lead: G–8 |
| Force Application Army Lead: G–8 |
| Battlespace Awareness Army Lead: G–2 |
| Focused Logistics Army Lead: G–4 |
| Warfighter Mission Area Army Lead: G–3/5/7 |
| Communications Army Lead: CIO/G–6 (AONS) |
| Computing Infrastructure Army Lead: CIO/G–6 (AONS) |
| Core Enterprise Services Army Lead: CIO/G–6 (GA&CKO) |
| Information Assurance Army Lead: CIO/G–6 (GA&CKO) |
| Enterprise Information Environment Mission Area Army Lead: CIO/G–6 |
| Defense Intelligence Mission Area Army Lead: G–2 |
| TBD |
| TBD |
| TBD |
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| TBD |
| TBD |
| TBD |
| TBD |
h. Structuring the portfolio in alignment with the MA and Domain strategy enables the analysis of funding requirements and recognizes interdependencies and fielding timelines in each area. This structure enables a complete portfolio analysis with the product being a funding prioritization list for IT investments.

i. The CPIM process requires executive level officials to monitor and approve the working group recommendations. The Army CIO/G–6 reviews, modifies and approves the CPIM prioritization recommendations in the development of the IT investment strategy. The CIO/G–6 collaborates with other key decision-makers in the budget process, advising them on the CPIM-developed investment strategy and making the best use of IT resources while building the Army enterprise.

j. The CIO Investment Strategy is developed through collaborative efforts of the Army’s multi-functional community of IT stakeholders, including Joint representation, to collectively determine the “best value” investment solutions for the Army’s most critical IT requirements. The process incorporates strategic reviews, performance measures, capability gap assessments, risk assessments, and interdependency assessments for the multitude of potential IT investments. The CIO/G–6 depends heavily upon subject matter experts (SMEs) within each MA and Domain for the critical analysis and review of proposed IT related investments. To ensure accuracy and completeness of all information presented, it is critical that MA and Domain representatives maintain close, cooperative relationships with key players in their respective communities, including:

- PEG Representatives and CIO/G–6 representatives to each PEG
- PMs and SMEs (as appropriate)
- Battlefield Operating Systems and Functional Representatives
- Army Budget Office, G–3, and G–8 leadership (as appropriate)
- Organization & RCIO representatives (as appropriate), including NETCOM/9th SC(A), Reserves, and Guard
- Representatives from other CIO/G–6 offices, as required

k. The CPIM process develops a decision making support product to facilitate the development of an IT resourcing strategy. The product is an integrated investment strategy to make the best use of resources in meeting the diverse IT-related requirements of the Army. The process is the long-term solution for the prioritization of the Army’s IT-related investments, while providing links to the DOD Portfolio Management Process.

Section III

Army Enterprise Management

16–8. Army Enterprise Management

The challenges presented by Army Transformation require that we manage the IT infrastructure across the spectrum of activity. Our networks, systems, and information need to be enterprise-based, accessible, seamless, reliable, secure, and deployable wherever the mission takes us.

16–9. Army Knowledge Online (AKO)

a. AKO is the Army’s integrated enterprise portal for accessing information, conducting business, and managing operations. Integral to Army transformation, AKO crosses the warfighting, business, and intelligence mission areas to support the Current and Future Force. As critical enablers for the execution of Army activities, AKO on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and AKO–S provide an array of enterprise services, including reach-back capabilities to our deployed forces; self-service information and personnel actions for soldiers (e.g., medical readiness, financial, etc.); single sign on (SSO) application support; and support to family support groups. In addition, AKO also provides the ability to create virtual teams, organizational sites, online communities, and other collaborative work sites that leverage AKO’s enterprise global file sharing, threaded discussions, instant messaging, e-mail, targeted announcements, calendaring, and polling services. Operating around the clock, AKO is globally accessible to support Army users, applications, and their underlying operational processes.

b. In accordance with Army directives, all soldiers (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) and DA civilians must have an AKO account. In addition, all web-enabled Army business applications must be integrated with AKO or AKO–S. Applications not in compliance must obtain a waiver from the CIO/G–6. Integration with AKO includes the use of the SSO capability for user authentication. The use of AKO SSO uses the Army’s enterprise security architecture and offers more protection to the operations security (OPSEC) environment. The CIO/G–6 is the functional proponent for AKO. As the functional proponent for AKO, the CIO/G–6 determines and integrates enterprise resources, plans and policy to ensure business and warfighting requirements are met. Key policies regarding the use of AKO include account management procedures, content management processes, the deployment of collaboration capabilities on AKO, access and security procedures, and implementation and IA.

c. AKO requirements are generated through multiple sources and serve as the basis for selecting and implementing upgrades to AKO. All requirements must be based on capabilities needed to support warfighting and business processes and missions and not on the specific services, tools or applications desired. The CIO/G–6 utilizes the AKO Configuration Control Board (AKO CCB) to aid in the validation and prioritization of new capabilities within AKO. The AKO
CCB is chartered as a sub-group of the CIO EB, and its members represent CIO EB members to ensure AKO capabilities support their evolving operational and institutional processes.

d. The CCA requires management, integration, and accountability for use of IT resources in performing Army missions and functions (reference paragraph 16–4 above). In the execution of these tasks, the CIO/G–6 employs an enterprise approach for maximizing IT resources. Operation of the Army enterprise portal provides for the widespread use of capabilities (services, tools, or applications) to facilitate end-to-end linkage of the Army’s operational and institutional processes. Using enterprise capabilities reduces the total cost of ownership and security risks related to using stove-piped or legacy solutions to meet individual staff and functional requirements.

e. AKO continues to comply with DOD and Joint requirements to support Joint and Expeditionary environments and has been identified as the best of breed portal in DOD. Using a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) with AKO as the model, a Joint DOD portal will be established and will be the interface for providing DOD users with the services needed to accomplish their mission. The portal will consist of a personalized, user-defined, web-based presentation that allows for secure access to enterprise services, applications and content. Once established, the portal will become DOD’s catalyst to achieve its goals of net-centricity, adaptability, interoperability, and cross-domain information sharing. The portal will provide Warfighters with the ability to access and display information and knowledge, from multiple data sources, in a Joint environment.

16–10. Enterprise Architecture

a. The Army uses the AEA and architectural views to analyze operational concepts and systems and to support new capabilities and requirements as required by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); the DOD 5000 series of acquisition documents; Information Support Plan (ISP) process; and other authorities. The AEA helps drive the Army’s investment strategy for IT by providing a mechanism for addressing capability gaps, investment risks, interdependencies, and alignment with key Army and Joint doctrine. The AEA supports Army transformation.

b. The AEA consists of the architectural views describing the Army’s warfighter and business missions and functions, Battle Command Architecture (BCA) and Army Business Enterprise Architecture (ABEA), respectively, and the enabling enterprise network, LandWarNet (LWN). These three integrated architectures are nested in Joint initiatives as detailed below:

- BCA is the Army’s alignment to Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) architecture. JBMC2 offers integrated capabilities to the operational warfighter.
- ABEA is the Army’s initiative that relates to DOD’s Business Enterprise Architecture and Business Management Modernization Program.
- LWN is the Army’s part of the DOD Global Information Grid (GIG) and consists of all globally interconnected end-to-end sets of Army information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to support warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.

c. Architecture Views. There are three major perspectives, or views, which logically combine to describe a single architecture. These three architecture views are the Operational View (OV), Systems View (SV), and Technical View (TV). The views provide different perspectives on the same architecture. The most useful architecture description is an integrated description—a description that consists of multiple views.

1) The OV describes the tasks and activities, operational nodes or elements, and information exchange requirements between nodes for each software block or unit in a given architecture. The OV defines the type of information, the frequency and timeliness of the information exchanges, and the tasks supported by these information exchanges that are needed for warfighting, support, or combat service support functions. An OV can also be described as the total aggregation of missions, functions, tasks, information requirements and business rules.

2) The SV is a physical implementation of the OV. The SV provides graphical and textual descriptions of the command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissances systems and interconnections used to satisfy operational needs. The SV identifies the physical connections and locations of key nodes, circuits, and networks and is constructed per standards defined in the technical view (see c(3) below).

3) The TV identifies services, interfaces, standards, and their relationships; and it provides the framework upon which engineering specifications are based, common building blocks are built, and product lines are developed.

d. AEA Architects.

1) The Training and Doctrine Command is the Army Operational Architect.

2) The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology is the Army Systems Architect, and is supported by the Program Executive Officers and Program Managers who develop the systems views.

3) The CIO/G–6 is the Army Technical Architect. The Technical Architect provides the technical framework for the evolving blueprint guiding the enterprise technology life cycle. The Technical Architect influences both technical management and engineering practices and focuses on enterprise-wide integration issues.
16–11. Information Assurance (IA)

a. CIO/G–6 is the Army proponent for IA, which supports Army Transformation by proactively protecting its networks and infrastructure, infusing and driving technology requirements, streamlining and improving operational processes, and training and educating the force. The CIO/G–6:

1. Manages the Army IA Program.
2. Establishes and issues Army IA policy and procedures for achieving acceptable levels of IA in engineering, implementation, operation, and maintenance for all IT connecting to or crossing any U.S. Army managed network.
3. Prioritizes and defends Army IA resource requirements in the planning, programming, and budgeting process.
4. Provides resources to Army units needed to implement IA policy where a resource gap exists, including software, hardware, personnel, and training.

b. IA ensures Army enterprise information services are available to authorized personnel and that public, private, and classified information is reliable for DOD data-centric operations and warfare, and Army mission accomplishment. IA is a critical enabler of and supports DOD’s vision of achieving a secure GIG through the robust implementation of DOD’s Defense-In-Depth Strategy and Five Strategic IA goals to:

• Protect information by safeguarding data as it is created, stored, used, modified, moved, or destroyed at all levels, for all users; whether in transit or at rest.
• Defend systems and networks by recognizing and responding to threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and deficiencies implemented or identified at physical or logical system, network, and enclave boundaries and by placing defense mechanisms into the design and implementation of these systems and networks.
• Provide integrated situational awareness by integrating many information operations and disciplines into an IA command and control capability that synchronizes the ability to defend systems and networks.
• Transform and enable technologies by rapidly evaluating and implementing emerging new technologies, standards, and capabilities that improve response time, reduce threat exposure, and increase the Army’s return on investment.
• Create an empowered workforce by training and equipping all information owners, protectors, and users with acceptable practices and emerging technologies to protect information, systems, and networks.

c. The Army IA Defense-in-Depth strategy implements DOD mandated IA initiatives to achieve positive control over systems and networks by:

• Developing, procuring, and sustaining IA technologies and techniques needed to ensure the protection of information and communications during enterprise-wide military operations.
• Integrating commercially available security technologies at military communications gateways and throughout the communications infrastructure to enhance system and network security force-wide; This includes wired and wireless technologies.
• Providing the capability to detect information system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare attacks in a measured and coordinated manner.
• Implementing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)/CAC and identity management.
• Automating key generation and distribution while supporting joint interoperability (Army Key Management System/ Electronic Key Management System Tier 1)
• Implementing vulnerability assessments of legacy and digitized force tactical systems and architectures that support the transformation of the Army.

d. Protecting the Army’s tactical and sustaining base networks is a commander’s responsibility. Because of implications associated with force protection and operational security, commanders at all levels must raise IA awareness in their commands in order to protect all Army networks from degradation, attack, and exploitation.

Section IV
CIO/G–6 Organization

16–12. Chief Integration Office

a. The Chief Integration Officer (CXO) is the integrator of Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Technical Officer (CTO), and Chief Knowledge Officer initiatives. The CXO incorporates vision, strategic planning, and elements of quality management into the full range of its functions, encouraging creative thinking and innovation; influencing others toward a spirit of service; and designing and implementing new or cutting-edge programs/processes.

b. The Director For Technology to the Chief Information Officer/G–6 is responsible for providing advice and guidance and contributing to the quality and responsiveness of systems and services within the information mission area (IMA) and related acquisition plans and programs. The Director of Technology participates in level planning, analysis, and decision-making relative to engineering and technical policies and programs. Major duties carried out in the Office of the Director of Technology include program planning, policy development, and technical leadership and supporting program management.
16–13. Information Resource Integration (IRI)

The CIO/G–6 is responsible for oversight of IT resources and assessment, and develops and coordinates investment decisions at the enterprise level for IT expenditures. Decision-making at the enterprise level transforms the workforce, processes and infrastructure by providing accountability, standardization and efficiencies to support AKM. Strategic resourcing decisions are made through the IT investment strategy process in coordination with NETCOM/9th SC(A), ACs, Combatant Commands, and Army Headquarters stakeholders. Army Command investment initiatives are reviewed and evaluated by the CIO/G–6, the Headquarters staff, and the Resource Review Working Group, before being forwarded to the Army CIO EB for approval. All allocations of IT resources undergo this review process for approval. The IRI Directorate represents the CIO/G–6 on the PPBE process. The IRI Directorate is responsible for resources expended for IT systems and programs that are not otherwise managed by an Army PEO. Specific oversight functions include compliance with CCA requirements, Army enterprise initiatives, and financial management guidelines. The IRI Directorate:

• Serves as focal point for CIO/G–6 on resource matters.
• Guides CIO/G–6 participation in the PPBE events.
• Serves as the CIO/G–6 contact office for requests for resource information for the Office of the President, the Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
• Coordinates the CIO/G–6 participation on PEG resourcing meetings.

16–14. Governance, Acquisition, and Chief Knowledge Office (GA&CKO)

a. Knowledge Management (KM). The KM Division is responsible for KM functions across the Army and establishes policy and procedures for the use of KM and collaborative tools for use in both the tactical and institutional Army. The KM Division is also the functional proponent for Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and is responsible for the coordination and prioritization of AKO functional requirements. For more information on AKO, reference paragraph 16–8 of this handbook.

b. Governance Division. Governance Division is responsible for leading this effort through the timely publication of IT PfM Guidance, oversight of IT PfM processes and periodic reviews of Army IT investments and, when necessary, enforcement of Army IT Portfolio management program guidance. Governance Division develops IT PfM management implementation guidance issued to the Army by the CIO/G–6 in accordance with Secretary of the Army directives. For more information on PfM and the governance role in it, reference paragraph 16–6 of this handbook.

c. Acquisition. The Acquisition Division supports the Army CIO/G–6 by meeting mandates set forth by the CCA, including:

(1) Providing advice and other assistance to the executive agency to ensure that information technology is acquired and information resources are managed in a manner consistent the priorities of the executive agency.

(2) Developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated information technology architecture for the executive agency.

(3) Promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of all major IRM processes for the executive agency, including improvements to work processes of the executive agency.

(4) The Acquisition division of the Army CIO/G–6 is responsible for Office of Acquisition Oversight and CCA certification.

d. Human Capital. The Human Capital Division supports the Army’s goals of attracting individuals with diverse backgrounds and promoting a highly qualified and flexible workforce. For more information on the human capital focus of the CIO/G–6, reference paragraph 16–2d of this handbook. A key to the success of a knowledge-based organization is the continuous learning and the transformation of the Army’s most valued asset - its human capital. Accordingly, education, training, mentoring, and professional development opportunities will provide soldiers and DA civilians with a global perspective; empower them to embrace and lead change; and make them adaptable to rapid changes taking place in the workplace.

e. CIO Policy. The CIO Policy Division serves as the Army focal point for all CIO/G6 policies and related Federal policy, standards, and initiatives as well serving as the CIO focal point for the management and integration of Federal, DOD and Army CIO EBs and other events.

(1) In relation to policy, the division:

(a) Formulates strategies and proposes priorities for institutional policy development, guidance, and dissemination for CIO-proponent responsibilities.

(b) Serves as Army proponent for the IM/IT capstone publications (AR 25–1 and DA Pamphlet 25–1–1) and other publications, as assigned.

(2) In relation to coordinating meetings and representing the Army CIO/G–6 at meetings, the division:

(a) Plans and coordinates the Army CIO Executive Board quarterly meetings. For a full description of the activities of the division in relation to the CIO EB, reference paragraph 16–5 of the handbook.
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(b) Serves as Army component coordinator for DOD CIO Executive Board meetings and conducts IPRs for the CIO/G–6 as the Army member for quarterly and other unscheduled DOD CIO meetings.

c) Serves as the Army focal point for the Federal CIO Council and CIO Council requests for comments on draft Federal regulatory/standards changes with the CIO staff and other Army stakeholders and provides consolidated response.

d) Informs and coordinates with CIO leadership concerning Council meetings, special events, and issues requiring their participation.

e) Serves as coordinator of the CIO Integrated Governance Group and coordinates with members via AKO and e-mail.

16–15. Architecture, Operations, Networks and Space
The CIO/G–6 provides functional management and oversight of the transformation of the Army’s tactical information infrastructure and strategic “reachback” enablers. The CIO/G–6 oversees, coordinates, and monitors IT systems and programs through their life cycle; formulates strategies; advocates base level systems and programs; and manages functional programs such as space and networks, C2 systems, combat service support systems, C2 Protect, and Visual Information. The CIO/G–6 supports Transformation Communications Architecture concept maturation and system development for strategic and tactical Satellite Communications (SATCOM) systems; provides management and technical expertise to ensure horizontal integration of SATCOM system elements (terminals, satellite and control) to meet current and future operational requirements; and manages the Army’s equities and investments in satellite communications to meet the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) requirements, Joint interoperability objectives, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks, Information and Integration net-centricity mandate.

16–16. Cyber Integration Office
The mission of the CIO/G–6 Cyber Integration Office is to provide the policies, plans, and leadership to enable information dominance for the Army. The vision of the cyber office is a secure information environment resistant to known and emerging cyber threats. We are a globally networked society increasingly dependent on the cyberspace domain, essential process controls in manufacturing, public utilities distribution, banking, communications, and national security have shifted to integrated networked systems. Our economy and national security are increasingly exposed to the associated risks; resources for conducting harmful attacks are widely available and inexpensive, creating a low cost of entry for any adversary. The Cyberspace can be defined as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. War-fighters rely upon cyberspace to command and control forces in the 21st century. Revolutionary technology has presented cyber capabilities, which can provide decisive effects traditionally achieved only through kinetic means. Mastery of cyberspace is essential to America’s national security. Controlling cyberspace is the prerequisite to effective operations across all strategic and operational domains-securing freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Some of the responsibilities of the Chief of Cyber Integration include:

• Identify, Track, and Coordination on Cyber Issues Development and Resolution within the CIO/G6 and across the Army Staff.
• Development, Implementation, and Execution of a Cyber Strategy for the Army Enterprise.
• Manage, Plan, Coordinate and Implement cyber technology for appropriateness and compliance to allow for a secure trusted computing environment to enable the Army to leverage IT and share information & data in support of its mission.

Section V
Other CIO/G–6 Organizations

16–17. NETCOM/9th SC(A)
a. NETCOM/9th SC(A), a direct reporting unit to the CIO/G–6, serves as the single authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend the Army Infostructure at the enterprise level. The mission of NETCOM/9th SC(A) is to deliver seamless enterprise level IT, common user services, and signal warfighting forces in support of the Army, its Army service component commanders (ASCCs), and the combatant commanders.

b. NETCOM/9th SC(A) executes its mission within an Army enterprise framework and the global command presence of subordinate theater signal commands and brigades. The senior signal commander in theater, who is linked to the Army enterprise through a command relationship with NETCOM/9th SC(A), is also dual-hatted as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) CIO/G–6 and is under the operational control of the ASCC Commander.
c. To ensure adherence to joint and enterprise standards, NETCOM/9th SC (A) exercises C4/IT and NetOps enterprise control over all Army Theater Signal Forces to include oversight (e.g., coordination) over planning and execution of Service Title 10 support affecting the day-to-day operation, control and defense of the LWN. In addition, to assure effective integration and global mission execution, NETCOM/9th SC(A) is assigned the responsibility for force structure, resource management, personnel management, training, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology sustainment, and equipping for the Army’s worldwide strategic and theater tactical signal forces.

d. NETCOM/9th SC(A) performs technical oversight of installation directors of information management (DOIMs). NETCOM/9th SC(A) executes these missions through an Army-wide regional/theater structure that includes Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSCs), regional directors/theater signal commanders (the staff position is known as the RCIO, and centralized direction from the NETCOM/9th SC(A) Army Global NOSC (A–GNOSC).

e. Enterprise Systems Technology Agency (ESTA). ESTA, an activity assigned to NETCOM/9th SC(A), develops, implements, and enforces Enterprise Systems Management (ESM) and NetOps processes and activities required to operate and manage Army infrastructure at the enterprise level. As the ESM functional proponent, ESTA develops, staffs, and manages service level agreements for the enterprise. Additionally, ESTA is responsible for conducting the operational engineering and architectural review of the enterprise to ensure new systems and enabling technologies or capabilities fielded within the Army infrastructure comply with enterprise-level standards, practices, and procedures.

f. Regional Chief Information Officers (RCIO).

   (1) CONUS. The director of each CONUS NETCOM/9th SC(A) region serves as the Regional Chief Information Officer (RCIO) and G–6 of the IMA region they support. RCIOs enforce C4 policies, standards, architectures, programs, plans, and budgets for all IT issues, and maintain staff supervision over the garrison DOIMs within their assigned region. The CONUS RCIOs and locations are:

   • U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, Northeast, Fort Monroe, VA
   • U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, Southeast, Fort McPherson, GA
   • U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, Northwest, Rock Island, IL
   • U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, Southwest, Fort Sam Houston, TX

   (2) OCONUS, the RCIO is dual-hatted from the NETCOM/9th SC(A) signal command/brigade assigned to the regional ASCC. They provide the OCONUS IMA region to which they are assigned the same type of support as the CONUS RCIOs. The OCONUS RCIOs and locations are:

   • RCIO–Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii
   • RCIO–Europe, Heidelberg, Germany
   • RCIO–Korea, Seoul, Korea

   g. A–GNOSC. The A–GNOSC, an operational unit assigned to NETCOM/9th SC(A), manages the Army Infrastructutre at the enterprise level providing decision makers a comprehensive, integrated, near real-time, situational awareness and operational reporting capability of the Army’s part of the DOD GIG. The A–GNOSC serves as the single Army-level NetOps authority for coordinating, directing, managing, sustaining, and defending the infrastructure. The A–GNOSC is under the operational control of Joint Task Force - Global Network Operations (JTF–GNO) for the execution of global NetOps. The A–GNOSC, responsible for the Army NetOps situational awareness and reporting, be co-located and integrated with the Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) to spearhead the defense of the Army’s networks. This enterprise focus has positioned the Army to operate and defend the network as a warfighting platform and enabled unprecedented levels of support.

16–18. Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS)

   a. The PEO EIS provides joint service and Army warfighters with information dominance by developing, acquiring, integrating, deploying and sustaining net-centric knowledge-based IT and business management systems, communications, and infrastructure solutions through leveraged commercial and enterprise capabilities. PEO EIS provides infrastructure and information management systems. PEO EIS develops, acquires and deploys tactical and non-tactical IT systems and communications

   b. PEO EIS reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and to the Army CIO/G–6.

   c. Two programs in which the PEO EIS is involved are:

   (1) Army Small Computer Program Office (ASCPO). The ASCPO, an activity reporting to PEO EIS, provides a full range of IT, IT infrastructures, and information systems (hardware, software, peripherals, networking, and infrastructure support services) to Army, DOD, foreign military, soldiers, and Federal agencies consistent with DOD and DA policy on standardization and interoperability.

   (2) AKO is the Army’s integrated enterprise portal for accessing information and is described in detail in paragraph 16–8.
Section VI
Future Force

16–19. AKM Transformation Strategy

a. Army Transformation changes the force from a discipline-specific, stove-piped, platform-centric organization designed for the linear fight to a net-centric, knowledge-enabled force optimized for full-spectrum operations. The Future Force is fully integrated vertically and horizontally with joint and coalition forces and interagency teams. This will allow unfettered movement of large and, most importantly, relevant volumes of data, information, and knowledge between the commander’s critical decision nodes. The clear purpose of the knowledge support schema is to enable commanders to achieve dominant battlespace understanding as a precondition for rapid, decisive action.

b. An example of the transformation to net-centric operations is the Battle Command network. This joint, integrated network shares information both vertically and horizontally across Battlefield Operating Systems, Service, agency, and national network boundaries and allows for the rapid transmission of data to those individuals who require it. The end result is to give the commander both information superiority and decision superiority in any situation.

16–20. Cultural Changes

a. A knowledge-based organization demands new organizational definitions, disciplines and structures to respond effectively to new challenges and opportunities. Leaders must communicate their vision and expectations throughout the Army and articulate clearly our strategic courses of action to achieve our future Army and CIO/G6 mission. This total Army transformation must embrace the principles of effective change management and focus on building a framework for knowledge management that has a strong human capital infrastructure in which knowledge is shared as well as transferred across the Army enterprise.

b. The AKM strategy will enable transformation to the Future Force and is based on a framework that includes the following: Infostructure: The IT (computers, software, architecture, security, communications, programs, and facilities) required to support the net-centric Army. Intellectual capital: The individual, team, and enterprise knowledge, systems, services, and strategies that are necessary to improve operations and decision-making. Change catalysts: The policies, resources, management, culture, processes, and education that are required to optimize an adaptive organization and an enterprise net-centric environment.

c. The Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G–6 continues to work toward the enterprise vision of a single Army network, one enterprise Army portal, and universal access to Army knowledge. AKO, the Army’s enterprise portal, has grown to over two million soldier and civilian registered users. Through its evolution to the Department of Defense (DOD)-wide portal, Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and AKO–Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) (AKO–S) will support users from across the entire Department of Defense (DOD) with joint access to enterprise services and content.

d. With the advice and consultation of the Army CIO Executive Board (EB), strong governance procedures for the enterprise control of our information technology (IT) budget have been institutionalized, information management organizations have been realigned, and the AKM strategy has been defined.

e. Army transformation is changing the way we acquire and employ IT assets and, ultimately, how we conduct daily business and operations. To remain relevant to the Future Force, the Army must adapt to the new culture as future military operations will be conducted in a different and changing operational environment, which will enhance decision dominance. The operational environment is characterized by the responsiveness, agility, and full spectrum capability to dominate unstable situations which requires the Army to focus its cultural thinking on the enterprise management of IT resources. This requirement means that organizational IT investments must support the Army’s enterprise-wide goals under AKM.

16–21. AKM Principles

a. The objective of AKM is to create a culture of collaboration and knowledge sharing in the Army where key information and knowledge is “pushed and pulled” within the global enterprise to meet mission objectives thereby creating an Army where good ideas are valued regardless of the source, knowledge sharing is recognized and rewarded and the knowledge base is accessible without technological or structural barriers. AKM enables the Army to be fully accessible and full spectrum force; organized, manned, equipped and trained to be strategically responsive, agile, deployable, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

b. On 23 July 2008, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army signed and issues the Army Knowledge Management Principles. This was the first step in a process to develop an enterprise approach to knowledge sharing in the Army from a cultural, process change and technical perspective. On 15 January 2009, the CIO/G–6 published the Memorandum Implementing the Army Knowledge Management Principles. The next step is for Army Component Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to develop strategic plans to implement the twelve principles.
Section VII
Summary and References

16–22. Summary

a. Army transformation will enhance the Service’s ability to conduct effects-based operations. The goal of the CIO/G–6 is to provide the AKM strategy to enable better and faster decisions than the opponent.

b. AKM provides for the integration and the interoperability of processing, storing, and transporting information over a seamless network, allowing access to universal and secure Army knowledge across the enterprise. In an effort to align with the AKM Strategy, current operational systems are examined relative to the results they achieve and benefits they provide to the Army’s. If they do not contribute to a world-class net-centric knowledge system, they will be eliminated or migrated to systems that do.

c. The CIO/G–6 is committed to meeting the challenges that transform the Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant. As such the CIO/G–6 is investing in today’s technology to stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational design, and leader training to improve the future force. Doing so will extend the Army’s technological overmatch.

16–23. References


b. Army Regulation 25–1, Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology Management, 4 December 2008.


d. Army Regulation 70–1, Army Acquisition Policy, 31 Dec 2003.


i. Department of the Army Memorandum, Implementing the Army Knowledge Management (AKM) Principles, 15 January 2009.


k. Department of the Army. FM 6–01.1: Knowledge Management Section. Ft. Monroe, VA: HQs, Department of the Army, 2008.
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Chapter 17

Installation Command and Management

IMCOM Vision – The Army’s Home – We provide a source of balance that ensures:

Section I
Introduction

17–1. Chapter content
This chapter describes how the Army manages installations. It includes—
   a. An overview of the Army’s installation environment.
   b. Installation Management Command mission and organization.
   c. A description of key installation management positions.
   d. Installation management professional development.
   e. Organization of installation staffs.
   g. Major installation management initiatives and programs.

17–2. The Army’s installation environment
   a. The United States Army today is an expeditionary and campaign quality Army capable of deploying rapidly into any operational environment, conducting operations with modular forces anywhere in the world, and sustaining operations as long as necessary to accomplish the mission. As stated in the 2008 Army Posture Statement, Installations are important because:
      (1) They sustain our Soldiers and Families through standardized services, access to quality health care, improved housing and installation facilities, schools and youth services, and education and employment opportunities.
      (2) They provide land and training ranges to support Soldiers and units preparing for current operations
      (3) They provide the services to revitalize our Soldiers and Families as they reset for future deployments; and
      (4) They are transforming to integrate Grow the Army initiatives, Base Realignment and Closure, and Global Defense Posture Realignment.
   b. What is an installation? In order to achieve consistency across the Army and comply with standardization within the DOD, the Army has modified its definition of installations. An installation is defined as an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous real property holdings commanded by a centrally-selected commander. Installations represent management organizations. An installation may be made of one or more sites.
   c. In addition, two types of “virtual” installations exist within the Army.
      (1) The Army National Guard has virtual installations, identified as each state commanded by the Adjutant General, under which are Readiness Centers or sites. Each Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command is, likewise, defined as a virtual installation under which Reserve Centers are identified as sites.
      (2) A site is a physically designed location which can be supported by a legal boundary survey which closes a polygon. It can be owned, leased, or otherwise possessed or used. A site may exist in one of three forms: land only; facility or facilities only; or land and all the facilities on it. A site is the sum of all real property at a specific location.
   d. Installations are the Army’s “face” to the nation and the world. Although the focus is on installations, the Senior and Garrison Commander play an important role interfacing with the civilian community. Garrison Commanders are often expected to be involved in community relations events and may represent the command in business and civic organizations, such as Chamber of Commerce, Rotary and Lions Clubs, etc. CONUS installations are the only Army installations most Americans see on a regular basis, while OCONUS installations provide a unique perspective of our culture to the international community. Most CONUS installations today are more than 50 years old while many are more than 100 years old. Most OCONUS installations were acquired directly after World War II and the Korean War in the European and Pacific theaters of operation for those conflicts. Installations are assigned to Army Commands (ACOM’s), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC’s), or Direct Reporting Units (DRU’s) based on the missions/functions of the units/activities located at the installations.
   e. To foster effective state and community partnerships with the Army in improving the quality of life for Active and Reserve Component Soldiers and their Families, the Secretary of the Army launched the Army Community Covenant (ACC). The ACC is tailored at the local level, with leaders at both local and state levels participating in covenant signings that started in April 2008. The covenant recognizes the strength of the Army, its Reserve Components, its Army Families, and the support of the Civilian community in which Soldiers and their Families live. To highlight community initiatives around the country focused on support for Soldiers and Families, selected initiatives known as best practices are featured from local, state, and national organizations. There are 1,537 best practices with 314 of these being identified as newly initiated in 2008. Installation Management Command (IMCOM), National Guard Bureau through each state headquarters, Army Reserve Ambassadors, and Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army
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identified and reported best practices to the ACC Task Force. The current list of best practices can be found at www.communitycovenant.army.mil

f. Installations are big business. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), HQDA, manages Defense and Army budget in excess of $15 billion. Approximately 75,000 persons, paid by military funds, appropriated funds (APF), and non-appropriated funds (NAF), perform installation management functions. Installations cover over 14 million acres of land, more than the combined acreage of the States of Maryland, Connecticut and Rhode Island. Installations maintain more than 130,000 buildings covering more than 900 million square feet. Army facilities represent a replacement value of more than $250 billion.

g. Installations are home to the force and home to the Army family - where the Army lives, works, trains, deploys, sustains and prepares to meet tomorrow’s challenges. Army posts and surrounding communities are home to well over one million service members and their families. Installations house half of Army families and nearly 200,000 single soldiers. Army posts are where a quarter of a million civilian employees and tens of thousands of contract employees come to work every day.

h. What is installation management? Installation management is defined as the process of directing and integrating the provision of all functions, to include base support, MILCON, and Army family housing, as well as the resources needed to operate the installation on a day-to-day, long-term, and strategic basis. During the 1980s and early 1990s a host of inspections, studies, and surveys determined that installations could be managed far more efficiently and effectively. As a result, the Army leadership in the mid-1990s took these major actions:

   (1) Establishment of the ACSIM in 1993.
   (2) Establishment of centrally selected garrison commanders in 1993.
   (3) Establishment of pre-command courses for both garrison and installation commanders in 1994.
   i. These actions were taken to improve integration of the widely varying, often competing, installation management functions to better train commanders for the increasingly complex and important work of running installations.

   j. On 1 October 2002, the Installation Management Agency (IMA) was activated to support the Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). The IMA was structured to provide efficient installation management worldwide through “best practice” management programs to establish quality installations and maintain the well-being of the entire Army family. The SECARMY’s intent for TIM was to:

   (1) Provide corporate structure focused on installation management.
   (2) Support and enable Mission Commanders.
   (3) Enable Army Command (formerly, Major Army Command (MACOM) Commanders to provide strategic guidance through the Installation Management Board of Directors (IMBOD).
   (4) Eliminate migration of Installation Support dollars (Base Operations (BASOPS) Environment, Family Programs, Base Communications, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM).
   (5) Achieve regional efficiencies.
   (6) Provide consistent and equitable services through established standards.
   (7) Integrate Reserve Components.
   (8) Enhance Army Transformation.
   (9) Support Information Technology (IT) and Contracting centralization efforts

   k. In October 2006 the Army reorganized its structure for managing installations with the activation of the Installation Management Command (IMCOM). The Army established IMCOM to improve its ability to provide critical support programs to Soldiers and their families while ensuring its installations are “flagships of readiness.” The IMCOM’s mission is to provide the Army with the installation capabilities and services to support expeditionary operations in a time of persistent conflict, and to provide a quality of life for Soldiers and Families commensurate with their service.

   l. IMCOM transformed the Army’s current installation management structure into an integrated command structure. This consolidation of the installation management structures of FMWRC and AEC under IMCOM sought to optimize resources, protect the environment and enhance well-being of the Army community. The IMCOM mission requires fast, efficient and agile support to commanders in the performance of their tactical, operational, and strategic missions. This initiative is part of the Army’s efforts to reorganize its commands and specified headquarters to obtain the most effective, efficient command and control structure for supporting the Modular Force. The new Modular Force structure identifies three types of headquarters; Army Commands (ACOM’s), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC’s) and Direct Reporting Units (DRU’s).

   m. As a DRU, IMCOM is accountable to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) for effective garrison support of mission activities, and serves as the Army’s single authority and primary provider of base support services. The Commanding General, IMCOM is dual-hatted as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), the principal military advisor to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army, for installation readiness. The primary objective of this reorganization and command activation was to create a more effective, efficient and capable organization to ensure that the world’s best Army is supported on the world’s best
installations. Additionally, CFSC was reflagged as the Family and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Command (FMWRC) and AEC as the Army Environmental Command. These commands, along with headquarters of IMCOM will move to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, as part of Army Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) no later than Sept. 15, 2011.

17–3. ACSIM mission and functions
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), as responsible official to the ASA (I&E), provides advice and assistance to the ASA (I&E) and other OASA (I&E) officials, in addition to responsibilities and authorities as ACSIM on the ARSTAF. Among the duties as responsible official to the ASA (I&E) are-Serving as the principal military advisor to the ASA (I&E) and providing independent professional military advice in the functional areas of installation management, military construction, housing and environmental protection, and sustainment.

a. Ensuring readiness through availability of efficient, effective base services and facilities, adequate and environmentally safe infrastructure, and enhanced soldier and family well-being.

b. Advising the ASA (I&E) on all matters relating to overall management and resourcing of Army installations worldwide.

c. Developing, coordinating, and implementing programs based on ASA(I&E) policies directly associated with installation services and management in a manner that will facilitate efficient and effective execution.

d. Developing, coordinating, and implementing programs and policies directly associated with military construction.

e. Ensuring the integration of installation management and environmental programs in all aspects of Army operations.

f. In coordination with the OASA(I&E), advising the Army leadership and others on planning development implementation and evaluation of comprehensive installation management resources, environment, facilities, housing and morale and family support programs to meet Army needs. Among the responsibilities of the ACSIM are:

1) Ensuring that approved policy, program, and budget initiatives developed by the ASA (I&E) are executed.

2) Executing plans, policies, programs, and procedures on matters relating to overall management and resourcing of Army installations and environmental programs worldwide.

3) Directing execution of Army programs and management concepts to ensure installation readiness to train, project, sustain, recover, reconstitute and protect forces and to provide high standards of environmental quality, public outreach, and quality of life for soldiers and their families.

4) Developing and directing planning, programming, and budget execution involving installation management and resourcing of installations for the Army.

5) Recommending standards for and evaluating the condition of installation facilities, environmental quality and base operations services.

6) Serving as the proponent for installation management doctrine, and professional development of installation and garrison commanders and staff, executing approved operational programs for the reorganization, realignment and closure of installations.

7) Ensuring consistent and equitable delivery of services among installations, tenants, and components.

8) Validating requirements for managing and resourcing Army installations.

9) Serving as the technical advisor for all environmental matters across the full spectrum of Army operations.

Section II
Installation Management Command (IMCOM) organization

17–4. General
a. Army installation “ownership” transferred from functional Major Army Commands (MACOMs) to the IMA effective 1 October 2002. On 24 October, 2006 the IMA was deactivated and its installation management role was assumed by the IMCOM, which was activated on the same day. IMCOM is commanded by a lieutenant general who also retains the position of ACSIM on the Army staff. Another leadership change designated the former IMA director position, a major general, as the IMCOM’s Deputy Commanding General (DCG). The deputy ACSIM remained a Senior Executive Service civilian. In activating the IMA and subsequently IMCOM, a HQ and Regional organizational structure was established to exercise management and supervision of Army installations.

b. Strategic direction from Army senior leadership is provided through the Soldier and Family Readiness Board of Directors (SFRBOD). The SFRBOD resulted from the merger of the Installation Management BOD and the Morale, Welfare and Recreation Board of Directors (MWRBOD). The SFRBOD is co-chaired by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The board includes Senior Army Executives, the Commanders of U.S. Army Forces Korea, Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Pacific, Army Materiel Command, the Chief of Army Reserves, Director of the Army National Guard, and the Sergeant Major of the Army.
17–5. HQ & Regions

a. The IMCOM HQ is currently located in Virginia, but will relocate in 2010 to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in accordance with requirements of the 2005 BRAC round. The DCG, IMCOM, will locate to Texas, while the Commander IMCOM and ACSIM functions remain at the Pentagon. There are seven geographically based regions. Three of them are overseas: Korea, Europe, and Pacific. The four CONUS regions are the Northeast, Southeast, West and the National Capital Region (NCR). The NCR was added in 2008 and includes Ft Meade, Ft Myer and Ft Belvoir which were taken out of the Northeast Region. All regions report to HQ IMCOM. Each is directed by a SES Region Director (RD), except Korea, whose Director is a O–7 Army officer.

b. IMCOM HQ accomplishes integrated program execution of installation management related policies, plans, and programs as developed and promulgated by the ACSIM. It directs and oversees regional program execution. IMCOM functions include: funding the garrisons; disseminating planning, programming and budgeting guidance as prepared by the ARSTAF; implementing operational plans & Army-wide standards; and seeking Army-wide installation management initiatives and standardizing implementation of those initiatives. IMCOM, in coordination with ACSIM and ASA (I&E), also provides liaison with Congress. The Region implements, directs, and oversees program and policy execution. The Region supports garrisons by being responsible for: enforcing Army-wide standards and ensuring equity among installations; adopting best business practices; identifying and tracking performance metrics; optimizing use of technology; identifying and implementing regional efficiencies and partnerships; and interfacing with ACOM’s, ASCC’s, DRU’s and other services/ agencies.

c. All installation management accountability and reporting is conducted through the IMCOM regions. Region directors are rated by the IMCOM DCG (formerly Director, IMA) and senior rated by the ACSIM/IMCOM Commander. Garrison Commanders (GC) are rated by Region Directors and senior rated by the designated Senior Commander (SC). This rating scheme keeps the SC linked to the base support process and optimizes mission support.

d. In addition to the BRAC directed relocation of the IMCOM HQ, the IMCOM will also consolidate/co-locate four United States-based IMCOM regions into two as required by Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (BRAC 2005). The Western Region was established in November 2006 at Fort Sam Houston, with consolidation of the previous Northwest and Southwest Regions and is now completed. The Northeast and Southeast Regions will relocate at Fort Eustis, Va., in 2010 establishing co-located Regions.

17–6. Installation management organization

Each Army installation has a garrison command reporting to its geographic region. Garrison commands support and enable mission commanders by providing the full range of installation and base support services to all local units, tenants and customers. Their mission is to command, control, and operate a garrison to support and enable missions and readiness of stationed units and care for people; conduct daily operations to provide installation support to mission commanders; maintain and improve installation services, infrastructure and environment; plan for and, on order, conduct contingency operations; maintain garrison operational and situational awareness and maintain liaison with mission commanders and leaders. Garrison commands are responsible for local program execution, implementing and managing to Army-wide standards, and maintaining real property.

Section III

Key installation management positions

17–7. IMCOM Garrisons

a. Senior Commanders and Garrison Commanders perform specific installation management missions. On the Installation, the leaders who have responsibilities for installation management services and operations include the SC and the GC. Each contributes to the delivery of installation management services and the quality of life on the installation.

b. The Senior Commander (SC) is normally, though not always, the senior general officer at the installation. The SCs mission is the care of Soldiers, Families, and Civilians and to enable unit readiness. While the delegation of Senior Command authority is direct from HQDA, the SC will routinely resolve installation issues with IMCOM and, as needed, the associated ACOM, ASCC, or DRU. The SC uses the Garrison as the primary organization to provide services and resources to customers in support of accomplishing this mission. All applicable commands support the SC in the execution of his responsibilities; therefore, the SC is the supported commander by the IMCOM Regional Director (RD), the garrison and tenants. The Senior Commander:

(1) Normally is a dual-hatted position. When this occurs the commander exercises discrete authorities as the SC and as a mission Commander. The SC responsibilities and authorities are installation focused; the responsibilities and authorities as the mission commander are mission focused.

(2) Can, in rare cases, be an HQDA-appointed Civil Servant, versus a uniformed Senior Commander, who will assume the Senior Commander roles and responsibilities with the exception of Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and command authority. In these instances, the individual will be referred to as the Senior Manager (SM). Prior to appointment of the SM, command and UCMJ authorities for the installation will be specified.

(3) Is responsible for synchronizing and integrating Army priorities and initiatives at the installation. On IMCOM
managed installations there is a requirement for a strong collaborative relationship between the SC and the IMCOM RD. The SC commands the installation but funding of almost all installation activities flows through the RD.

(4) Assumes the duties and responsibilities of the Installation Commander where that title is mentioned in US Code or DOD or Army Policies and Regulations.

(5) Assumes the duties and responsibilities of the Senior Mission Commander where that title is mentioned in Army Regulations except for regulations involving operational duties and responsibilities. Mission Commanders will retain operational duties and responsibilities.

(6) Unless prohibited by law or regulation, the SC may delegate, as necessary, assigned duties and responsibilities to the Garrison Commander (GC). Such delegation shall be made in writing and specifically state the duties and responsibilities so delegated and the termination date of the delegation.

(7) Establishes installation priorities among all resident and supported units.

(8) Prioritizes base operations (BASOPS) support consistent with HQDA priorities and approved Common Levels of Support (CLS) bands.

(9) Oversees the CLS services and capabilities provided to customers. Ensuring that those services are provided within the HQDA guidance, designated priorities, and approved CLS bands and coordinates with the IMCOM Regional Director (RD) to change HQDA approved CLS from green, amber or red.

(10) Approves and submits the installation master plan consistent with HQDA long range plans and goals through the ACOMS, ASCCs, or DRUs and IMCOM. For IMCOM installations, the SC collaborates with the IMCOM RD before the SC submits the installation master plan.

(11) Approves the Military Construction Army (MCA) and Military Construction Army Reserve (MCAR) project priority list at the installation level. For IMCOM installations the SC collaborates with the IMCOM RD before the SC approves the MCA and MCAR project priority list for the installation. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) executes MCA/MCAR projects for the Army.

(12) Reviews and approves the prioritization of Family and installation programs. For IMCOM installations the SC collaborates with the IMCOM RD before the SC approves Family and installation programs for the installation.

(13) Installation force protection is as follows:
(a) CONUS SC: as directed by US Army North (USARNORTH) and in coordination with installation management headquarters (IMCOM and Non-IMCOM), oversees force protection on the installation.
(b) OCONUS SC: in coordination with the ASCC and IMCOM is responsible for force protection oversight on the installation.

(14) Is normally designated as a General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA). GCMCA orders will specify the appellate and review channels for SC GCMCA actions.

(15) The appellate and review authority for administrative actions taken by the SC pertaining to individual soldiers and DA Civilians will flow through ACOM/ASCC/DRU channels unless otherwise specified in Army regulations. The terms “next superior authority”, “next higher authority”, “next higher command” and “next higher headquarters” as used in other Army regulations, mean ACOM, ASCC or DRU commander or headquarters.

(16) Serves as the senior Army representative to the surrounding community.

(17) Senior rates the GC.


a. The GC is a military officer, lieutenant colonel or colonel, selected by the Department of the Army. The GC commands the garrison, is the SC’s senior executive for installation activities, is rated by the IMCOM RD, and is senior rated by the SC. The Garrison commander is responsible for day-to-day operation and management of installations and base support services. The GC ensures that installation services and capabilities are provided in accordance with HQDA directed programs, SC guidance, CLS, and IMCOM guidance. The GC provides additional service support IAW HQDA directives and provides reimbursable services IAW Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement (MOU/ MOA). The GC is responsible to deliver Family and installation programs, coordinates and integrates the delivery of support from other service providers, and obtains SC approval of the installation master plan. The GC may be appointed as a Summary Courts-Martial Convening Authority or the Special Courts-Martial convening authority for the installation and its support area; in rare cases the GC may be appointed as GCMCA. In some cases, the senior official on an installation may be the Garrison manager. A Garrison manager (the civilian equivalent of a garrison commander) has the same responsibility and authority as the military counterpart with the exception of Uniform Code of Military Justice and command authority. Additionally the GC:

(1) Represents the Army and the installation in the surrounding community as directed by the SC.
(2) Approves and issues garrison policies in accordance with respective Army regulations, or installation level policies involving tenant units as directed by the SC.
(3) Approves and issues policies for IMCOM civilian workforce.
(4) Develops and implements the force protection program.
(5) Supports mobilization station requirements.
Section IV
Installation management professional development

17–9. Additional skill identifier (ASI) 6Y (Installation Management)
The complexity of installation management presents a challenge to the managerial expertise of military garrison staff officers. Officers having performed effectively in their BASOPS capacity may be recommended by their commander for ASI 6Y validation. The garrison commander is the certifying official for awarding of the 6Y skill identifier at the garrison level. This ASI identifies positions requiring personnel trained in installation functions such as resource management, engineering management, logistical management, contract management, plans and training management, and community and family support management. This personnel designation may lead to assignments as a garrison commander, other region or garrison principal staff officer or HQDA staff officer.

17–10. Garrison pre-command course (GPC)
The Army Management Staff College (AMSC) conducts this course, with a target population of lieutenant colonels and colonels centrally selected for garrison command. The course is also available to civilian deputies. It is an intensive 4-week curriculum of personnel, financial, facility engineering, environmental, anti-terrorism/force protection, FMWR practices and issues, as well as other related topics. It is taught in small group seminars that focus on real-world issues, problems, options and relationships. Hands-on experience is achieved through staff walks, roundtable discussions with current garrison commanders and a series of computer aided, crisis response simulations. In addition, presentations are made by the ACSIM or Deputy ACSIM and the DCG, IMCOM

17–11. General officer installation commander’s course (GOIC)
The Army’s Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command (formerly, Community and Family Support Center (CFSC)), in conjunction with the Army Management Staff College (AMSC) offers this 5 day course for general officer installation commanders which focuses on installation management and FMWR functions. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) has designated the course as mandatory for all installation commanders, deputy installation commanders, and ACOM’s, ASCC’s, or DRU’s staff principals with installation responsibilities. The course is conducted as a small group seminar and requires active participation by the attendees. Attendees are presented with computer-aided force protection/anti-terrorism/crisis management scenarios for discussion. The course utilizes group processes and case study techniques to challenge assumptions and provide important information and tools for the execution of BASOPS and FFMWR program responsibilities.

17–12. Garrison Command Sergeants Major course (GCSMC)
This 6-day course is conduct at AMSC and is designed for garrison command sergeants major. It is focused at the command group level and deals with the decisions that the garrison commander/commander sergeant major team will be asked to make on a daily basis, and on the information that they will need to make those decisions. The course encompasses fundamental installation management subject areas such as: financial management, civilian personnel management, energy, facilities and infrastructure management, environmental stewardship, and FMWR management, as well as current and emerging doctrine and policy. Employing panels, case studies, practical exercises and computer aided crisis response simulations; the program explores actual garrison situations, and the tools, techniques, and procedures in use by garrison commanders and command sergeants major to achieve mission requirements under conditions of limited resources. The course is conducted in an interactive, seminar format. Each GCSMC is conducted concurrently with a GPC so that there is interface between the participants of both programs. The course includes senior Army leaders and functional area experts as guest presenters, addressing current and future garrison issues.

Section V
Garrison Staff Organization

The Standard Garrison Organization (SGO) was approved by the Army G3 in 2004 and has been only slightly modified since then. SGO aligns installation management functions in a common organizational structure. SGO drives Army doctrine for installation management by standardizing management and organizational terminology, roles, responsibilities, position descriptions and terms of reference. Under the GC/Deputy/CSM office, SGO prescribes garrison staff
organization from Directorate level down only to Division level. It does not prescribe organizational level down to Branch level. There are different types of Directorates or Offices reporting to the GC:

**a. Garrison Management & Control Offices.**
2. Plans, Analysis & Integration Office (PAIO).
3. Admin Office.
4. HHC/HHD (selected installations).
5. Civilian Personnel Services (CPAC), Under operational control to the GC

**b. Installation Support Directorates.**
1. Human Resources (DHR).
4. Emergency Services (DES).
5. Logistics (DOL).
7. Information Management (DOIM)

**c. Installation Support Offices.**
1. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).
2. Public Affairs (PAO).
5. Safety
6. Internal Review (IRACO).
7. Contracting

### 17–14. Installation management personnel designations

AR 600–3, The Army Personnel Proponent System, reflects the following career designations for Army installation management proponency:

**a.** Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 6Y, Installation Management.

**b.** Career Field 29, Installation Management.

**c.** Career Field 27, Housing Management.

**d.** Career Field 51, Morale, Welfare and Recreation.

**e.** Career Field 18, Engineers and Scientists (Resources and Construction) (limited to facilities engineering and environmental management responsibilities).

### Section VI

#### Installation management strategy

### 17–15. Army Campaign Plan (ACP) - Transformation

**a.** The Army is pursuing the most comprehensive transformation of its forces since World War II. Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit the Nation’s advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world. Army transformation is an integral component of Defense transformation. The Army Campaign Plan (ACP) directs the planning, preparation, and execution of Army operations and Army transformation within the context of ongoing strategic commitments including the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The ACP provides direction for detailed planning, preparation, and execution of a full range of tasks necessary to create and sustain a campaign-capable joint and expeditionary Army.

**b.** The ACP has two levels of objectives, Campaign Objectives and Major Objectives. Campaign Objectives are clearly defined, measurable, decisive, and attainable goals, which enable the Army to achieve the strategic imperatives, identified within Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG). These strategic imperatives enable the Army to transform through four overarching and interrelated strategies:
1. Sustain the Army’s Soldiers, Families and Civilians.
2. Prepare Forces for Victory in the Current Conflict.
3. Reset Forces to Rebuild Readiness and for Future Deployments and Contingencies.
4. Transform to Meet the Demands of Persistent Conflict in the 21st Century Through major objectives, the ACP creates an active management system with senior Army leadership for synchronizing execution.

**c.** The Army is repositioning units and transforming posts in one of the greatest structural and basing changes in its long and distinguished history. This effort called “stationing” has created a requirement for over 1,800 individual unit
actions through the end of Fiscal Year 2013. The goal of this effort is to posture our forces, logistics activities, and power projection infrastructure to respond to current and future demands as efficiently and effectively as possible. The ACSIM, in coordination with HQDA, G–3 and G–8, support CG FORSCOM, CG USAREUR, and CG USARPAC in developing stationing options for Brigade Combat team (BCT) activations and unit stationing resulting from the 2003 Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) and the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) decisions. The ACSIM directs DCG, IMCOM to program requirements and provide sustainment, restoration and modernization, and other critical resources for installation support of stationing and basing of BCTs, support brigades, functional brigades, theater armies, and theater subordinate commands. In coordination with gaining ACOM’s, ASCC’s and DRU’s, IMCOM determines investment strategies, resources, and integrated processes to ensure facilities and installation infrastructure support stationing, basing, and deployment support decisions. ACSIM integrates, coordinates, and manages execution of all BRAC actions throughout the Army and expedites and monitors National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation as required for restationing.

Another important initiative shaping the Army Transformation is the Department of Defense is the Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) announced by the President in 2004. Following in the footsteps of the IGPBS, this initiative is a comprehensive review that scrutinizes all aspects of America’s global defense posture - including personnel, facilities, infrastructure, equipment, sourcing, and surge capabilities. The goal of this initiative is to ensure that U.S. military capabilities are configured to make them optimally deployable and best able to meet the challenges of the new global strategic environment. The GDPR also helped inform the decisions for BRAC 2005. Conversely, the BRAC process helps align the domestic infrastructure for forces that are returning to or departing from U.S. territory.

17–16. IMCOM Goals in support of Restoring Balance

a. As delineated in the Army Campaign Plan, the Army established four imperatives to guide the effort to restore balance to the force. IMCOM provides support to the Army across all four imperatives. IMCOM’s flexible and responsive support to an Expeditionary Army is helping to restore balance through installations, programs, and services that play a key role in all four Army Imperatives - Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform. IMCOM remains focused on the needs of the Operating and Generating forces and the accelerated growth of the Army. IMCOM’s goals are:
   1. Strengthen Soldier and Family Readiness to make the Army Family Covenant a reality (SUSTAIN).
   2. Maintain and improve facilities, services, infrastructure, environmental and energy sustainability (PREPARE).
   3. Provide Army standard, predictable support services that optimize available resources and support the Total Army (RESET).
   4. Adapt Army Installations, programs, and services to support an expeditionary Army and the Future "Army Community" (TRANSFORM).

b. As delineated in the Army’s 2006 Army Posture Statement, Army installations are an essential component in maintaining the premier army in the world and they also serve as flagships of readiness, supporting Soldiers where they live, work, train, mobilize and deploy. For the warfighter, installations are the platforms from which we project military power and which perform the following key missions:
   1. Provide effective training facilities.
   2. Rapidly mobilize and deploy the Force.
   3. Provide reach back capabilities.
   4. Sustain and reconstitute the Force.
   5. Care for our families.

17–17. IMCOM Core Competencies.
The following are the set of core competencies that IMCOM provides for the Army.

a. Command Garrisons
b. Evaluate; assess
c. Plan; develop
d. Decide; Prioritize; Communicate, Deliver
e. Coordinate; synchronize; integrate
f. Business Transformation
g. Liaise
h. Community Partnerships and outreach
i. Provide Commons Levels of Support
j. Provide Soldier and Family Programs and Services (Including geographically dispersed).
   2. Armed Forces Recreation Center.
   4. Education Services.
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(6) Housing, barracks.
(7) Religious Support
k. Provide Facility Services.
   (1) Public Works.
   (2) Real Property.
   (3) Land.
   (4) Buildings.
   (5) Utilities.
(6) Ranges & Training Facilities
l. Provide Installation Support
   (1) Human Resources.
   (2) Information Management.
   (3) Resource Management Office.
   (4) Emergency Services.
   (6) Logistics.
   (7) Public Affairs.
   (8) Safety.
   (9) Legal.
   (10) EEO.
m. Provide Environmental / Energy Sustainability.
   (1) Stewardship of natural resources.
   (2) Environmental Programs.
   (3) Environmental restoration (clean-up) program.
   (4) Environmental planning.
   (5) Energy Management.
   (6) Managing historic properties.

Section VII
Major installation management initiatives and programs

17–18. Strategic communications
   a. Strategic communications reflect installation management key themes of taking care of our Soldiers and their families, supporting SC’s and leading transformation. Strategic communications are aimed at external and internal audience segments, each with respective goals and elements. The communications goals for the external audience are to accurately and consistently define and promote installation management and its services with a focus on the organization’s contributions to freeing warfighters to fight while providing quality of life targeted to attract and retain the All Volunteer Force. The goal for communicating with internal audiences is to accurately and consistently inform employees and Garrison Commanders on how they impact the organization’s delivery of services to customers in support of Overseas Contingency Operations.
   b. ACSIM and DCG, IMCOM make every effort to keep garrison commanders and other members of the installation management community informed. ACSIM and IMCOM have established web sites on the Internet at www.hqda.army.mil/acsim and www.imcom.army.mil respectively that provide news of current initiatives, guidance from the ACSIM and DCG, IMCOM, and an on-line newsletter as well as links to ACSIM and IMCOM directorate sites, installation websites, and other installation management-related websites. The ACSIM and DCG, IMCOM also provide Garrison Commanders’ Notes-items of interest to region directors, garrison commanders, executive officers, and action officers-via email on an as-needed basis. These efforts have also been incorporated into Army Knowledge Online (AKO), where pertinent information can be found in the ACSIM and/or IMCOM sections.

17–19. Doctrine
The ACSIM established installation management doctrine with the publication of FM 100–22, Installation Management, on 11 October 1994. The doctrine describes how installations support the Army’s role in the National Military Strategy (NMS) and warfighting doctrine. It serves as the authoritative foundation for organizing, structuring and managing garrison operations. However, since FM 100–22 does not address Army Installation Management Transformation (AIMT), it is in the process of being revised. The principles for AIMT, however, are delineated in AR 5–3, published 01 October 2004.

17–20. Privatization and outsourcing
   a. Outsourcing is a powerful tool that the Army uses to re-engineer, streamline, become more business-oriented, and
ultimately to make better use of resources. Outsourcing is defined as the transfer of a function previously performed in-house by the activity to an outside provider. Privatization is a subset of outsourcing that involves the transfer or sale of government assets to the private sector that continues to provide the service to the installation.

b. Privatization and outsourcing provide opportunities to leverage technology and achieve cost savings. These management tools can assist in increasing the share of resources applied to other Army priorities such as modernization. The installations conducting studies and implementing initiatives related to these issues are key to the success or failure of the effort. Installations take the broadest possible view of outsourcing, one that explores innovative partnerships with both private enterprise and the public sector, i.e., state/local governments, other DOD/Federal entities, and non-profit agencies. If outsourcing is narrowly viewed as simply contracting out in-house functions, other opportunities for economies and efficiencies will be missed. As privatization and outsourcing opportunities continue to be examined, risks and capabilities must be assessed before taking action.

c. Private industry support is imbedded in many of the Army’s functions today. Army training, maintenance and other logistics functions, research and development, manufacturing, and base level services are all carried out with substantial industry support. The current Army outsourcing focus is on the DOD effort to address and implement the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommendations in the areas of depot maintenance, material management, housing, base commercial activities, education and training, data centers, and finance and accounting. The Army is researching and implementing solutions to problems through greater reliance on private industry in other areas as well. Specific initiatives are cited below. The 1996 Defense Authorization Bill, now Public Law 104–106, known as the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, provides the Services with alternative means for construction and improvement of military housing (family and unaccompanied personnel). Under these authorities, the Services can leverage appropriated housing construction funds and government-owned assets to attract private capital in an effort to improve the quality of life for our soldiers and their families. This legislation provides a way to maximize use of limited APFs, land, and existing facilities to encourage private sector investment. Under the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), whose purpose is to achieve the DOD/Army goal of eliminating all inadequate military family housing by 2007 using: (1) traditional MILCON, (2) Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) increases, and (3) privatization, the Army plans to establish long-term business relationships with private sector developers for the purpose of improving military family housing communities. The RCI program leverages appropriated funds and on-post housing assets to obtain private capital and expertise to build, renovate, operate, and maintain adequate family housing for the long term. The program conveys existing units, and leases the underlying ground, for a 50-year term, to a qualified development partner. The partner collects rent from tenants (military families), equal to the soldier’s basic allowance for housing. The Army may make an equity contribution when necessary to ensure adequate funds for the required scope of work. By 2010, over 98 percent of Army housing in the United States will have been privatized - over 86,000 units at 45 installations.

d. Owning and operating utilities are not Army core functions. Privatizing installation utilities frees the Army of ownership responsibilities and leverages the financial, technical and management capabilities of public and private utility organizations. The DOD has provided guidance to assist military services and defense agencies in privatizing nearly 1,600 utility systems located on military installations worldwide. The guidance will significantly enhance DOD efforts to privatize its roughly $50 billion inventory of electric, natural gas, water and sewage utility systems. As a key feature, the guidance requires the military services to use a DOD-approved cost analysis model, which will better evaluate the costs and benefits of privatization. The guidance also supports the DOD goal to upgrade all facilities by fiscal 2010.

e. The guidance and additional information may be found at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/irm/utilities/utilities.htm.

17–21. Competitive Sourcing

a. Competitive Sourcing is a process whose goal is to use competition to obtain the most cost effective commercial services the Army needs to accomplish its mission. The process is defined in OMB Circular A–76, Commercial Activities. Studies are conducted at the installation level, under the guidance of OMB Circular A–76. The circular provides for competition between the government and commercial sources and specifies how to conduct cost comparisons. Army Regulation 5–20 and DA Pamphlet 5–20 provide the Army’s policy and instructions for meeting the statutory and other regulatory guidelines. Commanders have access to a variety of lessons-learned and other documented experience, audit and inspection reports, and standard study and contracting documents that can help reduce the work of the study process so that efficiencies and economies can be achieved (See: http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsim_ca/).

b. In conducting an A–76 competition, installations:

1. Develop a Performance Work Statement.
2. Streamline the in-house organization into a most efficient organization (MEO) and develop an Agency Tender.
3. Solicit bids/proposals from the Agency being competed and private firms.
4. Select the lowest bid or best value proposal from the solicitation, and add 10 percent of the personnel-related in-house costs to account for intangible transition costs.
5. If the result is lower than the "in-house bid," convert to contract; if the result is higher, reorganize into the MEO.
c. The FY08 National Defense Appropriations Act brought about fundamental changes to Competitive Sourcing. Most significantly, it removed the requirement to recompete MEOs at the end of their period of performance (typically five years), and introduced new legislation that requires a review of contracted services to ensure that inappropriate personal services contracts and contracts that include inherently governmental functions are discontinued or in-sourced.

d. During FY08, OMB also renamed Competitive Sourcing to Commercial Services Management. The change reflects a broadening of this President Management Agenda initiative to recognize that Agencies can improve performance utilizing alternatives to A–76 competition such Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and High Performing Organization (HPO) development efforts. Under Commercial Services Management, the Army is now able to improve effectiveness and efficiency by strategically conducting BPR, HPO, and A–76 competition initiatives as appropriate.

17–22. Environmental cleanup strategy

a. The primary purpose of this Strategy is to identify common objectives for creating consistency and establishing accountability across the Army’s Cleanup Program. This Strategy supports the Army Environmental Program and Army Transformation, and it demonstrates the Army’s sustained commitment to addressing contamination resulting from past operations. Formerly, the Army managed its cleanup programs under the separate environmental “pillars” of compliance and restoration. This Strategy provides overarching guidance to all cleanup personnel—regardless of the program driver or funding source—indicating that cleanup to protect human health, public safety, and the environment is an integral element of supporting the Army mission. This cleanup strategy is in addition to, but separate and distinct from, the Army Strategy for the Environment, which includes other environmental programs such as conservation and pollution prevention. The IMCOM is the Program Manager (PM) responsible for executing compliance-related cleanup, which is funded through the OMA account, to include funds expended overseas. Beginning in FY09, compliance related cleanup projects at CONUS will become DERP eligible, thus funded by the Environmental Restoration, Army (ER,A) account. During requirements development, requirements pass from installations through the IMCOM using the Army Environmental database for Cleanup (AEBD–CC) process, but validation of requirements occurs at the ACSIM level. In addition, the IMCOM is the PM responsible for ensuring that mission or Army Working Capital Funds (ACWF) used for cleanup are executed in accordance with the strategy’s established objectives and targets.

b. Headquarters elements of the Army Secretariat and Army Staff develop a comprehensive Army Environmental Cleanup Strategy (AECS) encompassing all cleanup program areas under a unified vision and overarching objectives. Strategy development occurs in consultation with the program managers for each cleanup program area, and is used as Army input to the Defense Planning Guidance. This Strategic Plan presents a framework for AECS implementation that incorporates the ISO 14001 principles of continual improvement. The Army implements this AECS in alignment with its mission priorities using the ISO 14001 process. This process entails five steps that are described below:

1. Environmental Strategy Headquarters elements of the Army Secretariat and Army Staff develop a comprehensive Strategy (the AECS) encompassing all cleanup program areas under a unified vision and overarching objectives. Strategy development occurs in consultation with the program managers for each cleanup program area, and is used as Army input to the Defense Planning Guidance. This Strategic Plan presents a framework for AECS implementation that incorporates the ISO 14001 principles of continual improvement.

2. Planning Program managers for each cleanup program area establish guidance and procedures for implementing the Strategy within their respective program area in consultation with the Headquarters Army Staff and relevant installations or USACE Districts. Guidance and procedures include direction concerning MAP preparation for use by installations or USACE District project managers. Stakeholders may provide their input to Army project managers. Program managers also prepare input to the programming and budgeting process described earlier.

3. Implementation and Operation. Installations or USACE Districts execute cleanup in accordance with guidance and procedures for their respective program area and consult and coordinate with federal and state regulators through the cleanup process. Public members of Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs) provide advice concerning the cleanup process.

4. Checking and Corrective Action Program managers check cleanup execution to achieve targets and make corrections as necessary. For example, if targets are not being met, program managers may recommend resource management changes in the planning, programming, or budgeting portions of the cleanup budget process.

5. Management Review. The Army Secretariat and Headquarters Army Staff review cleanup progress and consider improvements to the AECS and the Strategic Plan, as well as any necessary resource management changes required.

17–23. Hazardous Material Management System (HMMS)

The Army utilizes the Hazardous Material Management System as the standard management information system supporting the business practices of the Army Hazardous Material Management Program (HMMP). It is designed to provide an accurate means of authorizing, ordering, receiving, distributing, and accounting for hazardous materials and their component chemicals, as well as the accumulation and disposition of hazardous wastes at a garrison or depot. HMMS maintains an inventory of all hazardous products, materials, and chemicals on the installation. It also produces data and reports that can assist garrison commanders and managers in reducing or even preventing pollution. HMMS
currently supports limited environmental report writing and will be upgraded in the future to produce all required federal, state and local environmental reports.

17–24. Toxics management program

a. The Toxics Substances Control Act (TSCA) sets regulations to control the development, commerce, testing, and use of certain potentially hazardous chemicals. Under the TSCA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate the entire life cycle of a chemical, from manufacture to disposal. The toxics management program addresses four key areas that impact the Army: asbestos, lead and lead-based paint, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs), and radon. In order to protect the public and the environment from these toxic substances, the Army has implemented management plans, which include:

1. Complying with legally applicable and appropriate federal, state, and local regulations on asbestos, lead, PCBs and radon.
2. Eliminating the use of potentially dangerous substances, such as lead-based paints containing above .06 percent lead by weight.
3. Recognizing potentially harmful situations in renovation and/or demolition projects.
4. Establishing contacts for health-related and exposure issues.
5. Certifying all persons performing activities that involve these substances.
6. Properly disposing of waste containing any potentially harmful substance.
7. Budgeting resources to identify, manage, and control exposure to various substances.
8. Assessing exposure and risk of each location containing a toxic substance.
9. Maintaining and updating records of assessments.

b. The Facilities Policy Division of the ACSIM has primary responsibility for most Army toxic management. The AEC assists them in managing environmental issues (disposal) as required. The TSCA management also includes exposure related health risk assessments where the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) has the lead in coordination with the Garrison Safety and Environmental Office. The Garrison DPW has the responsibility for resourcing most TSCA related removal actions through demolition, renovation or management in place.

17–25. Army Environmental Management Systems and Sustainability Planning

a. Army installations are required to maintain pollution prevention plans. These plans support the overall Army Pollution Prevention Strategy and focus on meeting all the pollution prevention measures of merit identified by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Primarily driven Army installations are required to implement Environmental Management Systems (EMS) and many have chosen to do strategic sustainability planning. Both initiatives started in the 2001 timeframe. EMS was driven by Executive Order (EO 13148) and Army policy. Sustainability planning was driven by concerns within the Army leadership that military readiness was negatively impacted by growing training restrictions at many installations. These restrictions were caused by aging infrastructure, urban/suburban encroachment, noise, endangered species, UXO, and other factors. The Army sustainability planning process was developed to reduce or eliminate these restrictions and ensure the viability of our installations for the long term. IMCOM now requires strategic sustainability planning at all IMCOM installations. Many IMCOM installations have recognized the complementary nature of EMS and Sustainability and have chosen to integrate the two into sustainability management systems. Some have also integrated these plans in their installation strategic plan.

b. Army policy and a new Executive Order (EO 13423), signed in January 2007, require all installations to implement an EMS by the end of CY2009. Army policy goes further and requires the EMS to focus on mission impacts and to conform to the ISO 14001 standard for environmental management systems. The ISO 14001 is a broadly recognized international standard that requires a commitment by senior leadership to continuous improvement, prevention of pollution and compliance. The ISO standard is based upon a Plan/Do/Check/Act model. Fundamental to this model is the process of evaluating all activities, products and services and identifying those with potential significant impacts to the environment. Much of the EMS then focuses on managing these impacts along with any environmental restrictions on mission. The ISO model includes standards for training, operational controls (e.g. shop procedures), setting objectives and targets, communication, and requires periodic review by senior leadership to ensure that the EMS is suitable adequate and effective.

c. Sustainability planning has similarities with EMS but typically has a broader and longer-term focus. Installation sustainability planning looks at the long-term ability of the installation to support its mission(s) and includes topic areas normally outside of the EMS, like community concerns, workforce, transportation, infrastructure, etc. Sustainability planning is normally done through workshops with diverse cross functional representation. These workshops first seek to identify challenges to the long term viability of the installation, then develop long term 25 year goals to overcome these challenges and finally develop action plans to meet targets on the path to the long term goal. The goals should be far reaching and will often require technologies that are not yet developed so the action plans will often look for cutting edge technologies. Many installations are adopting a sustainability management system that uses the EMS framework to manage their sustainability goals and action plans.

d. Installations should leverage existing management tools to meet EMS objectives and targets and to implement
action plans. Such tools include Lean Six Sigma, Integrated Training Area Management, prevention, the Installation Planning Board, and environmental management programs like integrated natural resources, storm water, hazardous waste, and others.

17–26. Recyling

a. Army installations must recycle to be in compliance with Executive Order 12873, *Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention*, 20 Oct 93; Executive Order 13101, *Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention*, 14 Sep 98; and DOD Instruction (DODI) 4715.4, *Pollution Prevention*, 18 Jun 96. The DODI requires installations to have, or be associated with, a Qualifying Recycling Program (QRP) which is available to all tenants. This recycling policy includes contractors and contractor facilities on installations. QRPs may sell their recyclable materials directly on the open market or through the local Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO). DRMO will return 100 percent of the proceeds from sales of recyclable materials, including firing range scrap (expended brass and mixed metal gleaned from firing range clearance) to installations with a QRP. Sales proceeds must first be used to reimburse installation-level costs incurred in the operation of the recycling program. The installation commander may then use up to 50 percent of the remaining proceeds for pollution abatement, energy conservation, and occupational safety and health projects. Finally, any remaining sale proceeds may be transferred to the non-appropriated FMWR account of the installation. Additional financial benefits of recycling, beyond the revenues generated, are reduction of current year solid waste handling and landfill costs, extension of landfill capacity, and avoidance/deferral of future landfill costs.

b. Installation reporting of recycling activities is captured in the Solid Waste Annual Reporting (SWAR), a data management system designed to facilitate tracking and reporting of solid waste and recycling data at DoD facilities. SWAR combines the tasks of day-to-day tracking and data management, with reporting required meeting DoD regulations. This eliminates the need for installation Solid Waste Managers to enter the same data into two separate systems. SWAR tracks solid waste collection, disposal, and recycling methods at the installation and Command/Headquarters levels. It provides local data management, upward reporting capabilities, and trend analysis. SWAR Web, a DoD web-based program, calculates diversion rate and economic benefits as required by the DoD Solid Waste Measures of Merit. SWAR Web provides remarkable flexibility in tracking recyclable and disposed materials, and solid waste program costs. Recyclables can be tracked to any degree of detail, by adding material types to a pre-loaded list of materials. Both recycling and disposal transactions can be entered in either weight or volume units. A portion of disposal transactions can be automatically credited to diversion for situations where separation of an installation’s solid waste stream is conducted off-site. SWAR Web can accommodate program costs ranging from one-time costs to those spanning multiple years. This program does not apply to Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) operations.

17–27. Army’s energy and water management program

a. The Army envisions providing secure, efficient, reliable, and sustainable energy and water services coupled with equitable, effective, and proficient management of commodities and site infrastructure to fully support the mission of installations and surrounding communities. Energy management on Army installations is focused on improving efficiency, eliminating waste, and enhancing the quality of life while meeting mission requirements. Accomplishing these objectives will reduce costs and ensure that the program goals are achieved. Executive Order 13423 established the facilities energy reduction goal of 30 percent by FY 2015, using FY 2003 as the baseline year.

b. The Army Energy Strategy for Installations emphasizes energy awareness; working with industry, community, and other stakeholders; investing in innovative technologies; maximizing the use of renewable energy to replace fossil-generated power; and investing in sustainable and energy-efficient facilities. The Strategy sets forth the Army’s energy goals for 25 years and the Army Energy and Water Campaign Plan defines the intermediate actions, approaches, initiatives and funding over the 25 years to ensure the Army successfully achieves long-range energy and water management goals. The Strategy sets the general direction for the Army in five major initiatives:

1. Eliminate energy waste in existing facilities. Eliminate and reduce energy inefficiencies that waste natural and financial resources, and do so in a manner that does not adversely impact comfort and quality of the facilities in which Soldiers, families, civilians and contractors work and live.

2. Increase energy efficiency in new construction and renovations. Increase the use of energy technologies that provide the greatest cost-effectiveness, energy efficiency and support environmental considerations.

3. Reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Increase the use of clean, renewable energy to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and to optimize environmental benefits and sustainability.

4. Conserve water resources. Reduce water use to conserve water resources for drinking and domestic purposes.

5. Improve energy security. Provide for the security and reliability of energy and water systems in order to provide dependable utility services.

c. The Army Energy and Water Campaign Plan for Installations is a detailed road map for achieving the Strategy. The Campaign Plan:

1. Provides the way ahead for developing initiatives, approaches and funding strategies to meet the Army energy and water goals.
(2) Identifies tools, technologies, policies, management and institutional requirements to achieve initiatives and approaches.

(3) Describes the desired "end state" for the goals and identifies the metrics of success.

(4) Provides a year-by-year resource requirement and investment plan that coordinates all Army energy/water users and policy components (e.g., security, privatization, procurement, technology, construction, and environment) into cohesive and measurable objectives designed to meet the initiatives.

d. The goals of the Army’s energy and water management program are to: be good stewards of energy and water resources; carry out the vision for the Army’s future potential; establish guiding principles of operation; meet the goals of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, EO 13423, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and other goals established by DOD and the Army; deliver the desired outcomes, by synchronizing management and technical support initiatives, and organize and implement strategies to achieve the goals.


a. Energy savings performance contracts (ESPC) are partnerships with private sector companies known as energy service companies (ESCOs). These contracts allow installations to improve their infrastructure and implement energy projects while paying for the measures with the guaranteed savings being generated by the project over time (up to 25 years). With the issuance of EO 13423 in 2007, the Army started a review of its use of ESPCs. In order to meet the new milestone of 30% energy reduction by 2015, the Army requires substantial contractor investment to improve Army facilities and reduce energy usage. The Army’s current processing rate of awards will not meet the reduction requirement. Perhaps more importantly, ESPCs give Army facility managers a solution to facility problems with minimal up-front cost. Applied with care and consideration, ESPCs can help facility managers:

(1) Reduce equipment breakdowns and emergency repair requests.
(2) Provide better, more productive living and working conditions for our people.
(3) Reduce costs.
(4) Meet environmental mandates such as CFC phase-out.
(5) Save energy and meet management goals.


17–29. Army environmental restoration program

a. The Army’s Installation Restoration Program (IRP) for active and excess installations has a goal to complete the cleanup of 1,080 installations by the end of FY14. Installation restoration is the Army’s environmental program that addresses the cleanup of contaminated Army property from past practices. The installation restoration mission is to perform appropriate, cost-effective cleanup so that the property is safe for use and to protect human health as well as the environment. Currently, the Army has achieved 90 percent of the goal at a cost of $4.9 billion. The IRP is part of the DOD Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) that was formally established by Congress in 1984 under Title 10 USC 2701–2707 and 2810. The IRP provides centralized management for cleanup of hazardous waste sites consistent with provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) and certain corrective actions required by the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA).

b. The IRP is funded by the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA), established by Section 211 of the SARA. The IRP complies with state, regional and local requirements applicable to the cleanup of HAZMATs substances released to the environment. Installations perform only essential studies necessary to ascertain the need for remedial action, identify the preferred remedial alternative, and implement the selected remedial action. The IRP has the following goals:

(1) Reduce risk to acceptable levels to protect the health and safety of installation personnel and the public.
(2) To restore the quality of the environment.

17–30. Army conservation program.

The Army’s conservation program, with overall guidelines detailed in AR 200–1, is focused on compliance with a wide variety of natural and cultural resource laws. The program’s goals outlined therein are to: manage installation natural resources to provide the optimum environment which sustains the military mission; develop, initiate, and maintain progressive programs for land management and utilization; and maintain, protect, and improve environmental quality, aesthetic values and ecological relationships. Major areas of conservation compliance fall within the Sikes Improvement Act of 1997, Endangered Species Act of 1973, Clean Water Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Archeological Resources Protection Act and the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide and Fungicide Act. The Army Conservation Program emphasizes the integration of compliance requirements into natural and cultural resources management plans. These required plans are designed for installation commanders to make informed decisions regarding the management of natural and cultural
resources to enable maximum short and long term availability of Army lands for mission use and ensure compliance with law.

17–31. Military construction army (MCA) program

a. MCA is the program by which Army facilities are planned, programmed, designed, budgeted, constructed, and disposed of during peacetime and under mobilization conditions. The program also includes the acquisition of real estate and other supporting activities. Installation commanders may see MCA projects completed and occupied on their installations that were initiated by a predecessor, or previous commanders. Normally an installation commander will plan and program projects that will not be completed during his/her assignment. The HQ DA and the ACOM’s, ASCC’s, or DRU’s issue programming guidance with the expectation of submittal of MCA projects in November/December timeframe. It will likely be more than 36 months from the project submittal date before construction of an MCA project would begin, and another 18 to 24 months for construction to be completed.

b. Because of the length of time involved in the process, and because of the competitiveness of the process, the installation commander must be farsighted and determined in programming MCA projects, especially in the current fiscal environment. He or she must be farsighted in order to envision, plan, and program years ahead of the projected requirement, and must be determined in order to fully justify and support a project through the planning and programming years.

17–32. Army facility reduction program

a. The Army Facility Reduction Program (AFRP) was established in fiscal year (FY) 92 by the Department of the Army. Its purpose is to reduce excess building square footage within the Army. Budget cuts have forced the Army to be more efficient with allocated fund. This has served as an incentive to identify and demolish excess buildings to allow the Army to focus maintenance and repair funding only on the buildings that have a longer useful life. This mandated program applies to all Army installations throughout the United States. As with the BRAC initiatives FRP seeks to realize a more efficient and cost-effective management and utilization of installation assets and infrastructure.

b. In May 1997, the OSD issued Management Reform Memorandum (MRM) #8 that endorsed the Army’s emphasis on the demolition of excess facilities. OSD required the services to submit a list of excess facilities and plan for disposal. OSD subsequently issued Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #36 in May 1998, which resulted in the disposal of 80 million square feet (MSF). OSD is continuing this initiative and has identified 9 MSF per year to be eliminated by the Army from FY 2008 through FY 2013. The Facility Reduction Program (FRP), managed by the Army Corps of Engineers Huntsville District, assists the DPW on Army installations in the removal of facilities, which are excess and no longer meet today’s standards. The FRP is responsible for the removal of facilities with Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds for the active and reserve components. One for one demolition is a requirement for MILCON projects. This requires one square foot of demolition for each square foot of new construction. If an installation does not have enough excess facilities on the installation to meet the one for one requirement they need to request the HQDA managed demolition bank to cover the requirement. Facilities within the footprint of the MILCON project should be included in the cost of the MILCON project. Also, if the MILCON is replacing a dilapidated facility then that facility’s demolition should be included in the MILCON project regardless of whether it is in the footprint or not.

c. The FRP’s responsibility for the removal of installation facilities includes the requirement of sharing information with installation decision-makers. Continuous evaluation of methodologies and practices, and cutting-edge studies and programs creates a growing body of “best practices” knowledge which is consolidated on the FRP Toolbox Web site: https://frptoolbox.erdc.usace.army.mil/frptoolbox. This compilation/sharing are part of the FRP’s mission directive. The information is also designed to provide guidance in calculating which method of demolition or deconstruction will best serve each individual removal situation.

17–33. Revitalization of housing

a. The Secretary of Defense directed the Services to eliminate all inadequate family housing by FY 2007. Later this goal was re-set to 2007 for U.S. and 2009 in foreign areas. The annual FY 2000 Military Construction Appropriations Act (Public Law 106–52) directed each Service to submit a Family Housing Master Plan (FHMP) to demonstrate how they will meet the Secretary’s goal. The Army’s FHMP provides a centralized plan for programming and execution required to eliminate inadequate housing. It encompasses the management of assets, the distribution of resources, and schedule for investment and privatization projects. The Army submitted their first FHMP to Congress in June 2000, which used a combination of traditional MILCON, operation and maintenance support, as well as increased reliance on privatization to reach the goal. Although an annual update was required, the most recent FHMP was completed in 2004. Since then, the Army has included metrics in each annual budget submission (i.e. PRESBUD) which substitutes for a stand-alone FHMP. The Army has sufficiently funded AFH to meet this goal of eliminating all inadequate family housing. When family housing at an installation is privatized, all units are removed from the Army inventory, both adequate and inadequate units. When stationing decisions create apparent shortfalls, the Army adjusts each annual plan. As of the end of FY 2008, almost 98 percent of the owned family housing in the fifty states had been privatized.

b. As for the barracks program, Public Law 105–621, the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 1999, requires the Secretary of Defense to provide an annual report to Congress on the Services’ plans, and estimated costs, to improve housing for unaccompanied members. The Army has plans to fund elimination of inadequate permanent party barracks by FY 2013, and to eliminate inadequate trainee barracks by FY 2015. For each goal, funding provides usable facilities on the ground (i.e., ‘beneficial occupancy’) two years after the funding year. Barracks are known more formally as Unaccompanied Personnel Housing (UPH), and include Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing (UEPH), and training barracks (both permanent party and trainee).

c. Revitalization gives new life to old facilities; it is the cornerstone of the Army’s vision to provide excellent facilities. For barracks complexes and infrastructure, the Army must revitalize systematically, so that the facilities are repaired, upgraded to modern standards, or replaced. The ACSIM has developed programs to focus scarce resources onto barracks revitalization so that the greatest benefit is achieved.

(1) Army Barracks Modernization Program. The Army’s Barracks Modernization program combines funding from Military Construction (MILCON) and Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) dollars to modernize all permanent party barracks to the current DOD standard—a standard configuration module of two bedrooms and a shared bath, with cooking area with appliances. The complex includes laundry facilities. To offset increased construction costs, the separate Soldier community building was eliminated. Started in FY 1994, the Army Barracks Modernization Program upgrades permanent party enlisted unaccompanied personnel housing through two programs: the Whole Barracks Renewal Program (WBRP) and the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP). The WBRP is a MILCON-funded program primarily for new construction. The BUP is a centrally funded Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Real Property Management (RPM) program predominantly for major renovations of earlier style barracks, like those from the Volunteer Army era, where they get their name ‘VOLAR.’ The Army renovates these older barracks to the DOD ‘1+1’ barracks standard where it is more cost effective than replacing the entire building. This ‘1+1’ standard module prescribes 11 square meters (118.4 square feet) of net floor area for living and sleeping quarters. Each module is composed of two individual living/sleeping rooms with closets, and they have a shared bath and kitchenette service area. Each module will normally house two Soldiers up to rank of Corporal or Specialist (pay grade E–4) or one Sergeant or Staff Sergeant (E–5 or E–6). The OSD has allowed each of the Services to alter their arrangement where missions, or overall conditions, dictate. The BUP has modernized more than 21,000 barracks spaces through FY 2008 at a cost of more than $900M.

(2) Training Barracks Modernization Program (TBMP). The Army’s TBMP has the goal to buyout all inadequate training barracks by FY 2015. This has a goal to rid the Army of all old ‘World War II wood’ barracks and operations buildings and A project for a basic training complex integrates buildings for barracks with those for operations, training, and dining. As a subset of this program, the Training Barracks Upgrade Program (TBUP) uses OMA funding to modernize existing barracks. In FY 2007 and FY 2008, The Army modernized more than 7,000 trainee spaces for less than $300M.

(3) The Training Barracks Improvement Program (TBIP). This TBIP is an extension to the Barracks Improvement Program to repair Initial Entry and Advanced Individual Training barracks, cadet barracks, and some Reserve Component barracks to correct health and safety issues using Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding. For example, in FY06 alone, more than $200M was provided to fix buildings at 19 sites.

(4) Whole neighborhood revitalization. Finally, for Family Housing the Whole Neighborhood Revitalization (WNR) initiative supports the Secretary of Defense three-prong initiative to improve Family Housing to: eliminate out-of-pocket housing expenses for Soldiers living in private housing in the United States, increase the use of housing privatization, and continue to rely on traditional MILCON when practical. Projects are based on life-cycle economic analyses and funded by AFH. In foreign areas, privatization is impractical, so WNR is the only alternative to replacing housing facilities, which is far more costly. Over the years, various requirements have been added to military housing (e.g., fire extinguishers, sprinklers, and hardening for ATFP). These added requirements make revitalizing the older buildings a far less economic alternative to replacing those existing buildings with new houses built to the new standards.

17–34. Installation status report (ISR)

a. The ISR Program assists the Army leadership in making informed and responsible decisions required to sustain or improve the management of the installation’s facilities, environmental programs, and services. The program provides HQDA, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units, and the leadership of reporting installations with executive level information focused on the installation’s real property assets, major environmental programs, and installation support services.

b. The ISR is comprised of three components:

1. ISR Infrastructure. The purpose of ISR infrastructure is to document and display an ISR reporting installation’s infrastructure status by assessing the quantity of facilities available for installation requirements and comparing the quality of installation facilities to established Army standards.

2. ISR Natural Infrastructure. ISR - NI will focus on three Program Areas: Mission Support, Sustainability, and Environmental Quality. It is designed to give a comprehensive overview of the current environmental compliance status of Army installations, and decision support information on the capacity and capability of the Army’s natural infrastructure assets (Land, Water, and Air) to support the current and future mission.
(3) ISR Services. This component focuses on evaluating quality, efficiency, and availability of services provided on an installation. Since July 1993, OACSIM has used Installation Status Report Services (ISR–S) performance and cost data as the basis for developing the Base Operations Support (BOS) requirements.

c. The ISR program provides an overall picture of an installation’s status and shows how deficiencies in installation condition affect the environment and mission performance. It provides information which links installation conditions, priorities and resources to readiness. While serving the needs of different customers—HQDA, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units, and installations—the ISR is also the installation commander’s opportunity to influence the Army’s Installation Management strategy. The ISR provides a common standard and language for the Army to speak with one voice. Details concerning the ISR are contained in AR 210–14, Installation Status Report Program. Additionally, ISR data supports HQDA decisions on funding for the Strategic Readiness System (SRS). The SRS is an integrated strategic management and measurement system developed by the Army G3. The system uses the Balanced Scorecard approach and the Army’s overall scorecard is the “pinnacle” of the system. The Army’s Scorecard or Mission Map was approved by the CSA on 13 March 2002. The objectives of the SRS are to:

(1) Communicate in a single document the Army’s Strategy, Vision, Priorities, and Focus.
(2) Evaluate the readiness of all Army elements against their ability to accomplish the strategy.
(3) Focus on results - reported against performance measures - to assist in making policy and resourcing decisions.
(4) Enable leaders to use leading indicators to plan policy and resource decisions.
(5) Link Strategy/Purpose/Mission to day-to-day activities throughout the Army.

17–35. Base realignment and closure (BRAC)

a. BRAC is the process used by DOD to resize and reorganize its installation infrastructure to more efficiently and effectively support its forces, increase operational readiness and facilitate innovative ways of doing business. BRAC also allows the Army to re-allocate resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority requirements. The FY 2002 Defense Authorization Act included the authority to conduct a fifth round of base closure and realignment actions—as Congress did four times from 1988 to 1995—which was concluded in 2005.

b. The Army’s BRAC 2005 strategy and process supported the development of recommendations that will enhance Military Value, streamline the Army, both Active and Reserve Components, rebalance these forces, contribute to Joint operations and Joint business functions, and reduce facilities cost of ownership. These recommendations maintain necessary surge capabilities in both the operational force and the industrial base, enhance homeland defense missions, and continue the transformation to a more relevant and ready Joint and Expeditionary Army.

c. The BRAC 2005 recommendations of the Secretary of Defense close, realign, or add functions at 76 of the 97 installations on the Army’s study list. The recommendations close 15 Army posts, 7 lease sites, 176 U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Centers, and enable State Governors to close 211 armories and readiness centers if they choose to move those units into one of the 125 local Armed Forces Readiness Centers which are also contained in the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, 36 Army installations are realigned under these recommendations.

17–36. Managing installations to standards

a. Managing to standards. Installation readiness is an important aspect of the Army Vision and the Army’s Transformation process, which is an integral part of the Army’s Campaign Plan. As Army Transformation evolves and progresses, we must:

(1) Focus investments to gain the most benefit from limited resources.
(2) Identify required infrastructure and support services necessary for the desired level of readiness.
(3) Make a dedicated effort to stop further deterioration of existing infrastructure and prevent erosion of services.
(4) Target limited modernization dollars to mission critical and well being requirements.

b. Army Base Operations (BASOPS). A viable standard process for determining Mission/Base Operations military construction projects is a fundamental condition for the success of managing installations to standards. The streamlined components of this process include the following actions:

(1) Garrison Commander forwards the Senior Commander’s (SC) prioritized listing of all projects to the IMCOM Region.
(2) Region prioritizes all BASOPS projects within their Region and forwards to HQ IMCOM.
(3) HQ IMCOM prioritizes all BASOPS projects and forwards to ACSIM.
(4) Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or Direct Reporting Units prioritize all their mission projects and forward prioritizations to ACSIM.
(5) Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or Direct Reporting Units may offer their suggested prioritization of BASOPS projects for installations where the SC reports to the Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or Direct Reporting Units. This suggested prioritization would be forwarded to ACSIM and IMCOM.
(6) Upon receipt of prioritized project listing from the Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands,
The military components have different service delivery expectations and standards. As a result, the service delivery is managed in a different manner. Those services that are considered standard by the Army are managed by the Army Baseline Standards (BASOPS) program. The BASOPS program is responsible for establishing performance metrics and implementing Army-wide standards for installation management and BASOPS.

(7) ACSIM forwards the corporate Army prioritized project listing through the Army G–3 to the VCSA for approval. This listing will contain the Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or Direct Reporting Units mission project prioritizations and their suggested prioritization of BASOPS projects. The IMCOM’s prioritization of BASOPS projects will also be included.

c. Establishing Standards. The Army’s installation long-range plan conveys direction for installation management during the next 20 plus years. The plan identifies efficiency programs, determines funding requirements, and describes the metrics used to measure success. The goal of the plan is to provide quality, cost-effective, and efficient mission-ready installations that are the right size, in the right place, and available when needed. Management planning for installations focuses on streamlining, realigning and standardizing services and the workforce, recapitalizing investments and reducing costs. For this purpose, ACSIM acts for and exercises authority of the CSA in dissemination of policy and integration of doctrine pertaining to the operation of Army installations. The ACSIM/IMCOM is responsible for establishing performance metrics and implementing Army-wide standards for installation management and BASOPS.

d. Common Output Level Standards (COLS):

(1) Common Output Level Standards (COLS) is a DOD initiative intended to create common language and toolsets for common delivery of installations support applicable across all U.S. military installations in a host-tenant relationship. The COLS framework is intended to assist DOD Components in apportioning and managing limited resources. The military components have different service delivery expectations and standards. As a result, the service delivery is measured by different metrics. OSD must evaluate and establish common service delivery standards for operations in a joint environment in order to meet each component’s mission specific and base support requirements. Common Output Level Standards (COLS) is a method of common delivery standards, metrics and costs for installation services. This framework articulates common standards for service delivery, metrics, cost of service delivery, and high-level host-tenant relationship in a joint military component environment. This support includes professional program management services, data collection, and data analysis.

(2) The Office of the Secretary of Defense is in the process of determining how best to deliver installation management services in situations where two or more military components are stationed together on the same installation. OSD is especially interested in examining how services common among the military components can be delivered more effectively and efficiently in this joint environment. OSD has established a working group made up of members from each of the military components to address this issue. This group has authored a draft DOD Directive that provides “DOD policy for the Common Delivery of Installations Support in order to enhance joint utilization of national infrastructure assets through the efficient delivery of common installation services in a consolidated manner.”

e. Common levels of support (CLS).

(1) CLS is a decision process that enables successful uniform delivery of the Army’s highest priority installation services, within available funds. The CLS process is based on a comprehensive understanding of the Army’s Base Operations Support (BOS) services, standards, and costs. CLS provides the Army with the ability to: o Provide definitive performance guidance to Garrisons for the execution of core services delivered to standard, based on available funding o Distribute available resources among installations to execute the guidance o Measure Garrison performance to make sure that expected performance is being achieved o Inform customers on the levels of support they can expect from Garrisons across the Army.

(2) CLS is built on the principle that IMCOM installations will provide non-reimbursable Base Operations Support (BOS) to Army customers across all its installations. This support will be standard but adaptable to local realities for the installation (e.g., requirements of mission, demography, or geography).

(3) Garrisons are required to deliver installation management support services IAW with the Army’s Installation Status Report (ISR) - Services program, which specifies content and pacing measures for each service component. The total dollar requirement for garrisons to deliver these services is calculated to fund the full scope of service as defined in the ISR. However, garrisons historically do not receive 100% of the required dollars for each service. Garrisons therefore cannot deliver the full scope of services, and must have some way of determining which service components can be delivered with the dollars available. CLS provides the approach for making this decision across the Army, in a way that will lead to quality, consistency, and predictability.

f. Army Baseline Standards. The effort to develop performance-based measures initially was focused on those ISR services where the quality of the service provided was felt to be key to the resourcing required, and potential performance measures could easily be identified. For these services, quality was expected to play a significant role and was needed to supplement the data from Army Service Based Costing (SBC) - a model to capture the cost of base operations at the service level - to facilitate development of good cost estimating relationships (CERs) for resource program development purposes. That effort resulted in performance measures and standards for almost all 95 standard services developed by the Army Baseline Standards Task Force appointed by the ACSIM in late FY03. The resulting standards have been developed into performance measures that are included in the ISR.

(2) Common levels of support (CLS).
Army installations. The Installation Design Standards (IDS) enables a roadmap for efficient, harmonious, secure and visually compatible physical environment conducive to attracting and retaining skilled and motivated personnel. They foster a culture of innovation through continuously improving living and working facilities and spaces by incorporating enhanced facilities standards and emerging technologies into everyday business practices. IDS improve predictability and quality of life for our Soldiers over the long term and contain Army Standards (mandatory facility functional criteria) and Army Standard Designs (notional layout and mandatory design items) for key facility types. These standards cover site planning, buildings, circulation (vehicle and pedestrian movement), landscaping, site elements (signage, lighting, etc.), and force protection. It is also designed to serve as a model from which Army installations, using the required Army standards and guidelines given throughout the document, can build their installation specific Installation Design Guide (IDG), as a tool for implementing the Army Installation Design Standards. The IDG, in conjunction with mission requirements and technical designs and specifications, defines the requirements for an installation’s maintenance, repair, and construction projects. When executed, these projects improve the functional and visual aspects of Army installations. Every installation will have an IDG governing the improvement of quality on an installation’s facilities and infrastructure. Quality is dependent upon the standards implemented, appearance of the layout, and physical components of the installation. The IDG is a comprehensive reference source providing standards for that quality. Use the IDG for design decisions on all new construction, renovation, maintenance and repair projects. The Army IDG template provides installations with a format, Army-wide standards, and examples to follow in preparation of their own IDG.

17–37. Institutional Adaptation.

a. Institutional Adaptation is the next stage in Army transformation. Its goals are to improve Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), adopt an enterprise approach to strategic decision-making and reform the requirements and resource processes. By organizing around the Army’s core process, ARFORGEN, Institutional Adaptation enhances the Army’s versatility in response to a complex strategic environment. It isn’t a change to organizational structure but is instead a drive to improve collaboration, synchronization and integration across the entire force. Improved cooperation will yield better decisions faster and lead to increased predictability and reduced turbulence for our Soldiers and families.

b. The Services & Infrastructure Core Enterprise (SICE) provides essential services, infrastructure, and operational support worldwide to enable an expeditionary Army and sustain Soldiers and their Families. SICE integrates Army services, infrastructure, and operational support functions and organizations to gain economies of scope and scale, increased efficiency, and improved effectiveness in support of ARFORGEN.

   (1) Leadership: ASA (I&E), VCSA and Commanding General, IMCOM.

   (2) Focused output: At the strategic level, the SICE develops and subsequently uses an Army Services and Infrastructure Strategy to advise the SA on services and infrastructure issues that sustain readiness and preserve the All Volunteer Force. At the operational level, SICE provides essential services, infrastructure, and operational support enabling an expeditionary Army to support ARFORGEN and sustain Soldiers and their Families.

   (3) Stakeholders in the SICE:

(a) US Army Reserve Command (Office of the Chief of the Army Reserves).
(b) US Army National Guard (Director, ARNG).
(c) U.S. Army Medical Command, (Office of the Surgeon General).
(d) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Office of the Chief of Engineers).
(e) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (G2).
(f) U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command (G6).
(g) US Army Criminal Investigation Command (Office of the Provost Marshal General).
(h) Army Corrections Command, (ACC).
(i) US Army Combat Readiness Center (Tentative).
(j) Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG).
(k) Finance Command (Tentative).
(l) EEO Civil Rights Office (Tentative).

17–38. IMCOM Transformation

a. The transformation and relocations of IMCOM’s Headquarters and Regions realigns IMCOM’s organizational structure, strengthens customer service focus on mission and requirements, and institutionalizes an enterprise mindset based on collaboration and communication with supported organizations. Key elements include:

(1) A transfer of functional capability from Regions to the Headquarters to create a series of dedicated, region-focused Functional Support Teams (FSTs), collocated with the Headquarters core staff. This transfer affords the Region Director and staff more time to focus on directing garrisons to best support the Senior Commanders’ priorities.

(2) Narrowing the span of control that exists today by employing RISTs to coordinate between the Region and a limited number of garrisons (typically three to six). The RIST to FST relationship will strengthen lines of communication by prioritizing the Region Director’s issues to the Headquarters and ensuring the Region receives the support
How The Army Runs

needed to respond to Senior Commanders’ requirements. Garrison structures and service delivery do not change, nor does the relationship among the Garrison Commander, the Senior Commander, and the IMCOM Region Director.

b. IMCOM at End State:

(1) Garrisons: Garrisons retain their current structure and functions, with manning levels determined by installation size and mission. The Garrison Commander’s role and relationship to the Senior Commander does not change. At each Region, dedicated groups of highly skilled professionals (RISTs) will represent garrisons. As the Region Directors’ representatives, the RISTs facilitate resolution of problems, advocate on behalf of assigned garrisons and help integrate work efforts. They are the garrison staff’s avenue to IMCOM Headquarters for issues requiring command intervention. Garrisons will gain a greater ability to deliver services through these Region enablers.

(2) Regions: Regions were originally set up as extensions of the IMCOM Headquarters; the transformed Regions will integrate a management structure used successfully by many Fortune 500 Companies. The five structurally identical Regions will consist of multiple RISTs that typically support three to six garrisons.

(3) In addition to the five standard Regions, IMCOM established the National Capital Region-District (NCR–D) to support the four primary NCR installations and the Military District of Washington. The NCR–D is smaller, reaching back directly to the Headquarters for support, due to the locally focused nature of its mission. Four of the five regions are directed by two-star equivalent civilian executives, while Korea Region and the NCR–D are directed by brigadier generals.

(4) The Region Director, supported by the Command Sergeant Major, provides the necessary leadership to ensure garrisons implement IMCOM’s strategic goals and objectives as well as the Senior Commander’s priorities. The Region Director and Region staff:

   (a) Collaborate with Senior Commanders, Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) and supported commands to mitigate risks, set priorities, and keep commanders informed.
   (b) Set purpose and direction necessary to sustain capabilities, services, and flexibility.
   (c) Resolve issues at the lowest effective level.
   (d) Maintain control over Region resources and champion garrison resource requirements.
   (e) Direct and evaluate garrison progress using appropriate metrics and tools.
   (f) Prescribe professional development for the Region workforce.

(5) The Region Director remains the Garrison Commander’s rater and the command’s principal connection with Senior Commanders. The revised structure reinforces the Region Director’s ability to represent supported commands while directing, coaching, teaching and mentoring Garrison Commanders and staff.

(6) The RIST is the garrison’s focal point of entry to the Region. RIST members integrate, coordinate and synchronize issues with Headquarters to obtain the right level of functional support to garrisons. RISTs receive guidance and direction from the Region Director. As the Region Director’s representatives, RIST members maintain lines of communication with key garrison leadership to define, track, route and monitor garrison actions, issues and concerns. Because they work closely and consistently with specific garrisons, RIST members leverage organizational knowledge and collaboration to drive best business practices and more effective outcomes.

c. IMCOM Headquarters: IMCOM Headquarters relocates to Fort Sam Houston, where it will house the majority of the command and staff, including its subordinate commands FMWR and AEC. In close coordination with the Regions and garrisons, FMWR and AEC continue to provide mission-specific support across the Army enterprise. Liaison Offices will relocate when the Army Commands they support (FORSCOM, TRADOC and AMC) move to their new BRAC locations.

d. The command’s functional experts, both Headquarters and forward-based, will support Regions and garrisons. Most existing Region functional workload will relocate to Fort Sam Houston to form the Functional Support Teams. Some FSTs will have elements forward stationed with their supported Region. FSTs will:

   (1) Be the focal point from which functional support flows from Headquarters to the Regions and garrisons.
   (2) Provide all functional subject matter expertise to support Regions and garrisons, to include serving on Region Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) teams and resolving “above garrison” functional issues.
   (3) In coordination with the Headquarters core staff, seek every opportunity to power down functional decision making authority to the lowest level possible, and maximize garrison level flexibility to respond to Senior Commanders and supported command requirements and priorities.
   (4) Provide functional expertise from a Region perspective to Headquarters core staff to facilitate enterprise-wide analysis and systemic problem resolution.
   (5) Process routine data calls, reports, and questions from garrisons.
   (6) If forward deployed, the FST member directly supports the Region and garrison, while communicating actions to the FST functional leader at the Headquarters.


a. The Army’s Business Transformation mission is to fundamentally change how the Army does business by applying proven business principles to the Army’s business processes in order to effectively and efficiently provide the
necessary capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of National Security and Defense strategies. The overall goal of Army Business Transformation is to streamline or eliminate redundant operations to free financial and human resources to redirect to the core warfighting mission. With that goal in mind, the objectives of Business Transformation Governance are:

(1) Identify the policies, business rules, roles and responsibilities through which Business Transformation will be governed.

(2) Establish and maintain alignment between Army strategic guidance and Business Transformation.

(3) Implement the decision processes, controls, and enforcement necessary for Business Transformation.

(4) Integrate Business Transformation Governance with existing OSD and Army decision processes, and where necessary modify existing Army processes.

(5) Establish performance management and measures, timelines and milestones to track Business Transformation progress.

(6) Define Enterprise Process Portfolios that enable Army capabilities, and make decisions to approve, continue, or terminate initiatives in the portfolios based on performance measures and risk analysis.

(7) Baselines, simplify, and ultimately optimize Enterprise Process Portfolios in support of Army capabilities.

(8) Enable the culture of innovation in the Army that challenges the status quo and seeks Continuous Process Improvement.

b. In keeping with the Army’s Business Transformation strategy, IMCOM is deploying Lean Six Sigma (LSS) to evaluate business processes and to increase productivity and reduce costs. These efforts will maintain or improve the quality of service offered by IMCOM to effectively respond to Soldiers, families and Army Civilians who live and work on Army installations. LSS is a business improvement methodology that maximizes shareholder value by achieving the fastest rate of improvement in customer satisfaction, cost, quality, process speed, and invested capital. LSS is a combination of two business improvement techniques, Lean and Six Sigma. Lean focuses on eliminating waste and constantly shortening the cycle time. On the other hand, Six Sigma has a focus on quality and variability reduction. The combination of the two, Lean Six Sigma, methodologies helps improve lead time, cost and quality. Lean Six Sigma is IMCOM’s primary method for business transformation to Improve effectiveness, increase productivity while maintaining quality to standard, improve customer satisfaction and enable a culture of continuous process improvement through Lean Six Sigma training and execution. IMCOM will rely on LSS to identify business processes for improvement and conduct LSS Projects/Business Improvement Events (BIE) based on current enterprise-wide business processes for delivering services to installation customers (Enterprise Implementation) and on local Opportunities for Improvement (OFI) for service delivery at the HQ IMCOM, Regions, and Garrison Local Implementation. IMCOM will utilize LSS and other productivity improvement tools and techniques to achieve cumulative efficiency goals including:

(1) Enterprise and Local LSS Business Improvement Events
(2) A–76/Competitive Sourcing • Strategic Sourcing
(3) BRAC and Global Deployment Posture Review GDPR
(4) Divestitures/Program Reductions

17–40. Army communities of excellence (ACOE)

a. The ACOE program is a commander’s self-assessment process that is broad enough to accommodate a variety of approaches that can be tailored to any organization, command or installation. Leaders and managers take advantage of the entrepreneurial genius of the people within the community to develop better ways of helping people and getting work done. It is a program that encourages ideas and initiatives to float upward.

b. ACOE now integrates Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award criteria in the Army Performance Improvement Criteria (APIC) for installation assessments. The APIC is used to guide the writing of the award. The Baldrige criteria are the standard for world-class quality. The Baldrige criteria are a comprehensive and integrated change management framework, allowing an organization to assess its approach, deployment, and results of its effort to change. All posts, regardless of size, are assessed against the criteria, not against each other. The Baldrige criteria focus on self-assessment to identify strengths/weaknesses in planning and execution with emphasis on customer satisfaction.

c. APIC has three important roles in strengthening mission performance:

(1) To help improve organizational performance practices, capabilities, and results.
(2) To facilitate communication and sharing of best practice information among organizations of all types.
(3) To serve as a working tool for understanding and managing performance and for guiding planning and opportunities for learning

d. The mission of the ACOE Program is to provide in a quality environment, excellent facilities and services. Continuing to strive for greater excellence in customer service and facilities will contribute significantly to the improvement of Army readiness.

e. The ACOE program is a multiyear/component program that spans the current year, prior year, and one out year. (1) HQ IMCOM is responsible for evaluating ACOE submissions and arranging and conducting the ACOE award
ceremony. (2) finally, out-year funding presents incentive award dollars to winning communities in the first quarter following the competition (October/November).

Section VIII
Summary and references

17–41. Summary
The IMCOM concept provides effective Army-wide installation management through use of best corporate business models, comprehensive adherence to Army standards, and partnership with ACOM’s, ASCC’s, or DRU’s and mission commanders, who receive focus on their unique issues, while geographic efficiencies are realized through economies of scale. IMCOM regions ensure mission commanders receive personalized support. The concept cares for people while ensuring readiness is not compromised; it positions installations for Army and DOD transformation initiatives and represents the Army’s commitment to improve installations, preserve the environment, enable well-being of Soldiers, civilians and Family members, and support mission readiness of all stakeholder units.

17–42. References

a. General Order Number 4, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army (as pertains to Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM)), 09 July 2002.


c. Army Regulation 1–1, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.

d. Army Regulation 5–1, Total Army Quality Management.

e. Army Regulation 5–9, Area Support Responsibilities.

f. Army Regulation 5–20, Competitive Sourcing Program.

g. Army Regulation 200–1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement.

h. Army Regulation 210–14, Installation Status Report Program.

i. Army Regulation 210–20, Master Planning for Army Installations.

j. Army Regulation 210–35, Civilian Inmate Labor Program.

k. Army Regulation 405–70, Utilization of Real Property.

l. Army Regulation 405–90, Disposal of Real Estate.

m. Army Regulation 420–1, Army Facilities Management.


o. Army Regulation 600–3, The Army Personnel Proponent System.


q. Useful Links:


(2) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations & Environment (ASA–I&E) http://www.asaie.army.mil/Public/IE/default.html.


Chapter 18

The Army Health Service Support System

“The U.S. Army Medical Command and the Office of the Surgeon General play a vital role in the Army’s conduct of protracted overseas contingency operations. The many professionals who fill the ranks of the Command - uniformed and civilian, officer and enlisted, drawn from eight professional corps - are a formidable team dedicated to promoting and maintaining the health of our warriors, sustaining their Families and restoring ill and injured Soldiers. The critical nature of our contributions has never been more clearly demonstrated in the 232-year history of the U.S. Army than now - from the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, to our casualty evacuation facilities in Europe, our medical centers, community hospitals, health centers and clinics in the Homeland and by the creativity of our bio-scientific and industrial enterprises. We cannot, and will not, fail in this complex and unremitting mission.” LTG Eric B. Schoomaker, Surgeon General, U. S. Army, 2007–Present

Section I

Introduction

18–1. The revolution in military medicine

Since 1775, innovations in technology, the development of new treatment modalities and the evolution of human goals have revolutionized the practice of military medicine. Military medicine has made a dedicated effort to keep pace with the constantly changing battlefield doctrine to meet the needs of both commanders and Soldiers. The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) is taking major steps to incorporate advanced technology into patient care. What was science fiction yesterday is in the laboratory today, and tomorrow will be put to use by combat medics and hospital staffs. The current military health service support system is based on the Joint Health Service Support Strategy that directly supports the NMS through Global Force Health Protection Programs that focus on: - Promoting and sustaining a healthy and fit force - Casualty Prevention - Casualty Care and management

18–2. Scope of the AMEDD

The AMEDD is one of the world’s largest health systems, with over eight million beneficiaries. The Army health service support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health care from the policy and decision-making level to the combat medic in the field. The Surgeon General (TSG) directs health services within the Army and commands AMEDD units and facilities within the U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM), a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU), and monitors and manages health services Army-wide through the Office of TSG (OTSG), the AMEDD element of the ARSTAF. Hand in hand with other Army management processes (TAA, PPBES), the AMEDD conducts various programs specifically designed to meet the force modernization, unit readiness, research and development, preventive medicine, and patient care missions for the armed forces. Through the Warrior Transition Command, the AMEDD is responsible for every aspect of the Army’s Warrior Care and Transition Program which provides a holistic patient and family centered approach to recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration of wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers.

18–3. The health service support system.

The health service support system and the Army Medical and dental benefits are an important element of overall military compensation. Providing comprehensive, quality health care to military personnel is required by law. Other eligible Army categories, such as retirees and family members, are entitled to medical and dental care subject to availability of space, facilities, and medical and dental staff as defined by Title 10, United States Code, and other regulatory requirements. Health services are essential to recruiting and retaining a quality force. Soldiers’ confidence on the battlefield is enhanced by the knowledge that they are supported by a superb medical evacuation and treatment system. A highly integrated and synchronized medical “system of systems” will be focused upon the health preservation and care for Soldiers - and their families - throughout their entire period of military service. This concept of complete Soldier “life cycle health management” will begin with accession and training and extend throughout the cycles of stationing and deployment/redeployment until ultimate transition from the Army rolls. The military health system embodies the concept that the Army cares for its own.

18–4. Medical support to the transforming Army.

The Soldier has always been and will continue to be the pacing item for the Army. Army Medicine will maintain its focus on the sustainment of that most precious asset. The Future Force Soldier will be protected from disease and other environmental and biological health threats and be supported by a highly capable and responsive medical system that instills confidence in Soldiers, their leaders, and their families. The joint doctrine of Global Force Health Protection will be achieved through operational and institutional medical capabilities that are linked and delivered seamlessly across Service and organizational boundaries and synchronized and coordinated by joint medical command and control.

a. Empower Soldiers with health knowledge and programs to prevent the onset of disease. Through the advancement
of vaccines, fitness and wellness studies, and a variety of predictive interventions Soldiers will avoid common health issues of today providing a healthy and fit force.

b. Enabled by advanced medical and information technologies, medical training, and organizational linkages that allow Army medicine to draw from the resources and capabilities of all military medical services as well as industry and partnerships with private and other federal health agencies. Global Force Health Protection will include the capability to rapidly project a multi-capable medical force that is tailored to the health threat, highly adaptable to emerging and changing missions, and superbly effective in providing health protection and treatment.

18–5. Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI)

a. In October 1993, the AMEDD initiated the redesign of combat health support. The initiative focused on split-based operations; improving tactical mobility; reducing footprint; fixing communications; exploiting IT; and flexibility, deployability, and tailorability. The resulting new design supports the tenets of The Army Transformation. It enhances the combat commander’s operational tempo; reduces the logistics burden; and, most importantly, reduces the morbidity and the mortality of wounded Soldiers. MRI will convert the entire echelons above division/echelons above corps (EAD/EAC) force of the AMEDD. MRI represents a reorganization of Force Health Protection (FHP) units, not merely equipment modernization (although equipment modernization will occur simultaneously).

b. MRI encompasses 326 (TAA08–13) medical units among all three Army components. This major Army initiative converted/activated 168 of the 326 (52%) medical units by the end of FY 06. MRI will provide full spectrum FHP to the Army in joint operations. The MRI will ensure that medical units can rapidly deploy with sufficient capability to meet the most demanding missions. The MRI design facilitates scalability through easily tailored capabilities-based packages and includes hooks for augmentation, to permit rapid integration of additional enabling capabilities.

c. Building on the MRI design, further structural refinement is now underway via the process of Modular Medical Force (MMF), which creates smaller deployable increments within each MRI medical unit. The end state will be modular medical units that are right-sized, require the least possible lift, and can provide optimal care to evolving troop concentrations.

Section II
AMEDD mission and support to commanders

18–6. Mission of the Army medical department

The mission of the AMEDD is to “maintain the health of members of the Army, to conserve the fighting strength, to provide health care for eligible personnel, and to prepare health support to members of the Army in time of war, international conflict, or natural disaster.” This mission has two facets, both relating directly to Army combat readiness:

a. Force Health Protection (FHP). The AMEDD is responsible for maintaining the clinical, technical, and combat readiness of medical units and personnel to support Army forces in the theater of operations.

(1) The deployable medical units of the Army carry out this task, with a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components (which constitute approximately 68 percent of the Army’s medical forces). These units are apportioned to combatant commands around the world.

(2) The fixed installation TDA medical units assigned to the AMEDD directly support tactical units across the installation relating to medical equipment and training of assigned medical personnel. The TDA AMEDD mission includes the delivery of medical care to Soldiers and family members at medical centers (MEDCEN), community hospitals, and medical clinics; dental clinics; veterinary services; medical research and development; education and training, combat developments, test, and evaluation; rehabilitative care and training; and health promotion and preventive medicine.

(3) The recruitment and retention of health care professionals and sustainment of their skills are central to the maintenance of a high quality; combat ready health service support force. Deploying the medical force is one of the AMEDD’s primary missions. Readiness to accomplish this essential function can only be ensured through the practice of medicine and its related disciplines in a patient care environment. In peacetime, the vast majority of health care professionals and technical support personnel who deploy with medical units are employed within the Army’s fixed hospitals, MEDCENs and other health care facilities. The day-to-day practice of health care professionals and their support staff in these environments is the basis for maintaining the clinical skills and teamwork necessary to care for sick and wounded Soldiers during combat operations.

b. Beneficiary Care and TRICARE. The second but equally important aspect of the AMEDD mission is to help maintain the personnel readiness of the entire Army by maintaining the health of individual Soldiers and their families.

(1) Quality health care for Soldiers, retirees and their families is an essential and valuable benefit. Physical readiness, good health and the knowledge that family members will be cared for contribute to the ability of each Soldier to deploy and perform his or her mission in the combat environment. Projecting a healthy and protected force and caring for Soldiers and their families are responsibilities of the Army Medical Command and its subordinate commands. These responsibilities are accomplished through the delivery of patient care, health promotion, preventive medicine activities, education and training, and medical research and development.
(2) To meet readiness requirements and serve Soldier and family health needs better, Congress directed the DOD to develop and implement a new model for military health care that would improve patients' access to health care, assure high quality of care, and control rising health care costs. The result, TRICARE, is now the medical program for active duty service members, their family members, retirees and their family members, and survivors of all uniformed service members. TRICARE relies on interservice and civilian-military sharing of medical resources to improve accessibility of care and achieve efficiencies. A DOD program under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)), it is managed by the military in partnership with civilian contractors. Each TRICARE region has an Army, Navy, or Air Force lead agent (usually the commander of a military treatment facility or Regional Medical Command) responsible for the program.

(3) TRICARE programs include:

(a) TRICARE Prime is a managed care option similar to a civilian health maintenance organization (HMO). Active duty service members are required to enroll in Prime. TRICARE Prime enrollees receive most of their care from military providers or from civilian providers who belong to the TRICARE Prime network. TRICARE Prime offers less out-of-pocket costs than any other TRICARE option. TRICARE Prime Remote is the program for service members and their families who are on a remote CONUS assignment, typically 50 miles from a military treatment facility. Prime is available for active duty and families overseas. The TRICARE Overseas Program delivers the Prime benefit to service members and families in the three overseas areas, Europe, the Pacific, and Latin America/Canada. The TRICARE Global Remote (TGRO) program delivers the Prime benefit to service members and families stationed in designated "remote" locations overseas.

(b) TRICARE Extra is an option that allows Standard beneficiaries to save money by making civilian doctors’ appointments with doctors (nurse practitioners, labs, clinics, etc.) who are "participating" TRICARE providers.

(c) TRICARE Standard is the basic TRICARE health care program, offering comprehensive coverage for beneficiaries not enrolled in Tricare Prime. Standard is a fee-for-service option in which beneficiaries can see an authorized TRICARE provider of their choice. Having this flexibility means that care generally costs more.

(d) TRICARE for Life and TRICARE Plus. When beneficiaries age 65 and over become eligible for Medicare Part A, they can use TRICARE For Life (TFL) if they purchase Medicare Part B. These beneficiaries are not eligible for TRICARE Prime but are eligible to use Medicare, network and non-network providers. Some military treatment facilities will have capacity to offer a primary care affiliation program called TRICARE Plus. Enrolled beneficiaries have priority access to care at military treatment facilities; however, beneficiaries who choose to use TRICARE Extra, TRICARE Standard or TRICARE For Life may also continue to receive care in a military treatment facility on a space available basis.

(e) Reserve Component. When on military duty, Reserve Component members are covered for any injury, illness or disease incurred or aggravated in the line of duty, including traveling to and from military duty, under line-of-duty procedures. Medical coverage (direct care at the Military Treatment Facilities) is available when the member is activated. When ordered to active duty for more than 30 consecutive days, Reserve Component members have comprehensive health care coverage under TRICARE Prime or use either of the other TRICARE options. Mobilized RC Soldiers are eligible for 180 days of TRICARE Transition Assistance Program Management (TAMP) benefits post-mobilization, thus allowing for continuing care for Soldiers with health issues incurred during mobilization.

(f) Depending on the status and category of beneficiary, TRICARE provides varying degrees of coverage for pharmacy, dental, and vision care.

18–7. AMEDD support to commanders

a. Commanders are responsible for the health and physical fitness of their Soldiers. The AMEDD supports commanders by acting as the proponent for medical doctrine, advising commanders in all health related matters, and executing command policy in the area of health service support. The AMEDD:

1. Advises the command of measures to assure the health, fitness, and vigor of all members of the Army.
2. As directed, acts as the proponent to provide those measures needed to assure health and fitness.
3. Develops, trains, and maintains forces necessary for medical FHP to the Army in a wartime environment.
4. Conducts routine Medical Surveillance to identify leading injury and disease trends affecting Soldier’s readiness and health.
5. Conducts field investigations of outbreaks of potential health threats from disease, environmental hazards and injuries.

b. The importance of the medical system on the battlefield is paramount. It supports the prevention of disease and non-battle injury to ensure maximum warfighting capability. When casualties occur, the medical system provides for rapid initial treatment, stabilization and evacuation to medical treatment facilities. The prompt evacuation of combat casualties is not only essential for the preservation of life, but also assists the combat commander in continuing the battle by clearing the battlefield of wounded Soldiers.
Section III
The Army medical department system

18–8. Key elements

a. The Surgeon General (TSG)/Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). TSG is responsible for development, doctrine, policy direction, organization, and overall management of an integrated Army-wide health service system, is the medical material developer for the Army, and is the SECARMY’s representative for diverse DOD joint medical training, research and health services Executive Agencies. OTSG is the ARSTAF element that develops doctrine, policy and regulations on health service support, health hazards assessment, the establishment of health standards, and medical materiel. TSG also has proponency for personnel management within the AMEDD.

b. Army Medical Department (AMEDD). The AMEDD is comprised of personnel, units, organizations, and facilities of the Army that are under the supervision and management of TSG. In addition to USAMEDCOM, these include the special officer branches: Medical Corps (MC), Dental Corps (DE), Veterinary Corps (VC), Medical Service Corps (MS), Army Nurse Corps (AN), and Army Medical Specialist Corps (SP). Also included within the AMEDD are military enlisted Soldiers in CMF 68 and DA civilians employed within AMEDD organizations and activities.

c. Health services. Health services are all services performed, provided, or arranged for (regardless of location) which promote, improve, conserve, or restore the physical or mental well-being of individuals or groups, and those services which contribute to the maintenance or restoration of a healthy environment. Health services include, but are not limited to, preventive, curative, and restorative health measures; medical doctrine; medical aspects of NBC defense; health promotion; assessment of medical threats and countermeasures; medical operations planning; medical intelligence; health professional education and training; health-related research; transportation of the sick and wounded; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; health care administration; medical logistics; medical equipment maintenance; medical facility life cycle management; and the delivery of medical, nursing, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optical, and other specialized services.

d. Programming and budgeting. Since 1991, military health care has been funded through the DOD Unified Medical Program and the Defense Health Program (DHP) Appropriation, rather than the services’ budgets. The ASD(HA) issues policy guidance and the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) manages and monitors Service execution of the DHP Appropriation and the DOD Unified Medical Program. The DHP appropriation supports worldwide medical and dental services to the active forces and other eligible beneficiaries, veterinary services, medical command headquarters, graduate medical education for the training of medical person nel and occupational and industrial health care. In FY 2003, the Department implemented the DOD Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, an accrual-type fund to pay for health care provided to Medicare eligible retirees, retiree family members and survivors.

(1) The OTSG/USAMEDCOM Staff (see “One Staff,” below) programs funds and manpower using both the DHP and Army appropriations. DHP funds provide for most peacetime health care operations in TDA units such as Army MEDCENs and community hospitals and for TRICARE Managed Care Support Contracts. The vast majority of AMEDD manpower is funded by the DHP. Army funding supports deployable medical TOE units and medical readiness missions.

(2) The OTSG/USAMEDCOM Staff programs for Army funds and provides its input to the Army’s POM. It programs for DHP funds and provides input to the DHP POM through the TMA. Military personnel costs are programmed by TMA in the DHP POM and the programmed total obligation authority (TOA) transfers to the MPA appropriation when the budget estimate submission is prepared. Civilian personnel costs are reimbursable from DHP Operations and Maintenance Defense funds during the year of execution. Authorizations for both military and civilian personnel are on Army manpower documents.

18–9. Staff relationships and responsibilities

a. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). The ASD(HA) has statutory responsibility for overall supervision of health affairs within DOD and is the principal staff assistant and adviser to Secretary of Defense for all DOD health policies, programs, and activities.

b. TRICARE Management Activity. The TMA is a DOD field activity of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) that operates under the authority, control, and direction of the ASD(HA). The mission of TMA is to administer and manage TRICARE and administer, manage, and monitor Service execution of the DHP appropriation and the DOD Unified Medical Program. TRICARE lead agents coordinate health care within each TRICARE region, ensuring cooperation among military treatment facilities of all Services and efficient management of the regional managed care support (MCS) contract. MCS contractors organize networks of civilian providers to augment the military direct care system, process health care claims, and provide other services for the region.

c. Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). OTSG has the following ARSTAF responsibilities:

(1) Assisting the SECARMY and the CSA in discharging Title 10 responsibility for health services for the Army and other agencies and organizations entitled to military health services.

(2) Representing the Army to the executive branch, Congress, DOD agencies, and other organizations on all health policies affecting the Army.
(3) DOD focal point for NATO Medical Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) actions. Provides U.S. Head of Delegation for the NATO CBRN Medical Working Group and General Medical Working Group.

(4) Manage all aspects of medical CBRN defense programs.

(5) Advising and assisting the SECARMY and CSA and other principal officials on all policy issues pertaining to health and military health service support to include:

(a) Policies and regulations concerning the health aspects of Army environmental programs.

(b) Health professional education and training for the Army, to include training programs for all medical, nursing, dental, and veterinary specialty areas.

(c) Research and development activities for nutrition and wholesomeness in support of the DOD Food Service.

(d) Medical materiel life-cycle management.

(e) Medical materiel concepts, requirements, validity and viability.

(f) Technical review and evaluation of medical and nonmedical materiel to determine the existence of possible health hazards.

(g) Program management for Army health care automation.

(h) Army execution of the Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC).

(i) Medical aspects of the Security Assistance Program.

(j) Program sponsor for Operations and Maintenance, Army - Program 84 (Medical).

(k) Executive agent of the SECARMY for all DOD veterinary services.

(l) Medical facility life cycle management.

(m) Field medical support concepts, doctrine, training and leader development programs and user test.

(n) Medical intelligence training.

(o) Medical mobilization training. Programs.

Section IV
Command and management

18–10. AMEDD Organization
In 1998, TSG directed the implementation of the One Staff concept, consolidating the staffs at OTSG and Headquarters, USAMEDCOM, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Personnel at both locations now function as a single staff with one set of leaders who coordinate ARSTAF functions and the MACOM functions (Figure 18–1). The One Staff reduced Manning requirements by 300 positions, a 40 percent reduction from the prior organizations.
18–11. U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM)

a. The major subordinate commands of USAMEDCOM include:
   (1) U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.
   (2) U.S. Army Dental Command.
   (3) U.S. Army Veterinary Command.
   (4) U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine.
   (5) U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School.
   (6) Warrior Transition Command
   (7) Six regional medical commands (RMC).

b. The consolidation of worldwide medical assets under the USAMEDCOM in 1996 greatly enhanced command and control efficiency to meet the health care needs of the Army of the 21st Century. Implementation of the One Staff concept to achieve the most efficient and effective command and control structure underscored the AMEDD’s commitment to continuous quality improvement and poised the AMEDD for its role in the Army Transformation.

c. The OTSG/USAMEDCOM Staff (“One Staff”) is responsible for AMEDD policy, planning, and operations worldwide, with a focus on strategic planning. Its mission is to:
   (1) Provide the vision, direction, and long-range planning for the AMEDD.
   (2) Develop and integrate doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and Soldier support for the Army health service system.
   (3) Allocate resources, analyze health services utilization, and conduct assessments of performance worldwide.
   (4) Coordinate and manage graduate medical education programs at the Army MEDCENs.

18–12. U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC)

USAMRMC is a complex and diverse organization with a mission to sustain the health and fighting ability of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines through its programs in medical research, medical materiel development, medical logistics and facility planning, medical information systems, and development of new technologies to improve military health care on the battlefield. USAMRMC is engaged in a broad spectrum of activity, from basic research in the laboratory, to innovative product acquisition, to the fielding and life-cycle management of medical equipment and supplies for deploying units. Mission responsibilities include:

a. Serving as materiel developer and logistician for medical materiel (Class VIII).

b. Conducting basic research, exploratory testing, engineering development and deployment development for medical materiel systems.

c. Performing research, development, testing, and evaluation under four critical Research Area Directorates (RADs) areas: - Military infectious disease research program. - Combat casualty care research program. - Military operational medicine research program. - Medical chemical and biological defense research program.

d. Functioning as the DOD executive agent’s representative for medical research and development in the areas of biological and chemical defense, infectious diseases, combat dentistry, nutrition, HIV research, global emerging infections, accession standards and research, Gulf War research, and investigational new drugs.

e. Planning and executing medical logistics mobilization support and management of the Medical War Reserves Materiel Program.

f. Operating the NMP for medical equipment.

g. Providing the Army Service Item Control Center for medical, dental, and veterinary equipment and supplies.

18–13. U.S. Army Dental Command

The mission of the Dental Command (DENCOM) is to ensure dental readiness and enhance wellness by providing dental care and promoting oral health for the Army by:

a. Serving as the proponent for meeting the dental health needs of the Army and eligible beneficiaries.

b. Providing command and control of the Army Dental Laboratory, Regional Dental Commands, Dental Activities, and Dental Clinic Commands worldwide.

c. Allocating resources, analyzing utilization trends, and assessing performance across the DENCOM.

d. Training and providing qualified dental personnel for contingency operations.

e. Supporting mobilization of the total force by integrating Reserve Components into the Command and expanding dental capacity, as required, to receive and treat dental casualties at all levels of care.

18–14. U.S. Army veterinary service

The Army is the DOD executive agent for veterinary services, and provides veterinary support to all the military services. The Army Surgeon General is responsible for providing DOD veterinary support and directs the DOD
Veterinary Service Activity, the U.S. Army Veterinary Command, and the veterinary assets in the Medical Research and Materiel Command. In addition, veterinary personnel are assigned to other Army commands and DOD activities, agencies, and organizations to accomplish the DOD mission. Army veterinarians and veterinary specialists support Army and DOD operations worldwide. Their missions include:

a. Prevention and control of animal diseases communicable to humans that may affect any aspect of military operations.

b. Complete veterinary care for government-owned animals. Provide emergency medical treatment of privately owned animals and medical care with emphasis on veterinary preventive medicine and diseases that present a community health threat.

c. Development of sanitary and food defense standards for commercial food plants providing products to DOD components.

d. Developing lists of subsistence suppliers approved for DOD procurement.

e. Inspection of food products for wholesomeness at all joint procurement and storage facilities or other facilities under control of the Departments of the Army and Navy.

f. Provision of laboratory support for diagnosis of animal disease and ensuring wholesomeness of subsistence.

g. Provision of professional support to training programs and research protocols involving animal models.

h. Provide for humane medical treatment, care, use, and handling of animals.

18–15. U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM)

a. The mission of USACHPPM is to provide health promotion and preventive medicine leadership and services to identify, assess and counter environmental, occupational, and disease threats to health, fitness, and readiness in support of the NMS. Mission responsibilities include but are not limited to:

(1) Disease & Injury prevention control.
(2) Health Promotion & Wellness.
(3) Environmental/Medical Surveillance.
(4) Occupational & Environmental Health Surveillance.
(5) Health Risk Communication.
(6) Health Threat Assessment & Countermeasures.
(7) Health Risk Assessments.
(8) Medical, Occupational, and Environmental Epidemiology.
(9) Population and Environmental Health Risk Assessments.
(10) Health Policy Development and Review.
(11) Graduate Medical Education.
(12) Continuing Medical Education.
(13) Disease outbreak investigation.

b. The Commander, USACHPPM is designated as the Army’s Functional Proponent for Preventive Medicine (FPPM). The Proponency Office for Preventive Medicine (POPM) is the staff element that supports the FPPM in all issues of preventive medicine policy and strategy development.

18–16. U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School

The mission of the AMEDD Center and School is to:

a. Develop, integrate, coordinate, implement, evaluate and sustain training and training products for active and reserve medical forces worldwide in accordance with AR 350–1.

b. Develop, integrate, analyze, test, validate, and evaluate concepts, emerging doctrine and medical systems, and doctrine and training literature.

c. Conduct all AMEDD officer, enlisted, and civilian proponency functions, personnel inventories, and life-cycle management of all career fields.

d. Develop concepts, systems, and force structure for combat health service support.

e. As the integration center for all doctrine and training requirements; systematically develop courses, training devices, manuals and sustainment materials for readiness.

f. Provide training, education, and evaluation of AMEDD personnel.

g. Test and evaluate new and replacement items of medical equipment.

h. Serve as proponent for Force Health Protection in theaters of operation.

i. Plan, program, perform, and publish complex, organized analytical assessments and evaluations in support of decision- and policy-making, management, and administration of Army medicine.

j. Provide statistical and analytical consultation to the AMEDD, with secondary support to subordinate organizations within the MEDCOM; provide decision support expertise to AMEDD senior leadership; promote data quality, integrity,
and standardization across the AMEDD; provide biometric database management and programming expertise to the AMEDD; provide the AMEDD with medical record coding guidance and training for medical records personnel.

k. Function as the DOD executive agent’s representative for joint training and pharmaceutical standardization in the areas of defense medical readiness training, joint medical executive skills, and the pharmacoeconomic center.

18–17. Warrior Transition Command
The mission of the Warrior Transition Command is to successfully transition Soldiers and their families back to the Army, or to civilian life, through a comprehensive program of medical care, rehabilitation, professional development, and personal goal-setting. The core competencies of the command include:

a. Serving as the proponent for the execution of the Army’s Warrior Care and Transition Program.

b. Providing command and control oversight to ensure full execution of the Army Wounded Warrior Program.

c. Coordinating with DA staff, other Services, other Departments of Government, and Congress.

d. Establishing and executing a program of standardization and evaluation to ensure optimization of compliance with established policy governing the operation of Warrior Transition Units and Community-Based Warrior Transition Units.

e. Assuming responsibility for the movement of Warriors in Transition between Military Treatment Facilities, Warrior Transition Units, Veterans Affairs Medical and Poly-Trauma Centers, Community-Based Warrior Transition Units, and civilian health care providers.

f. Ensure that all Warriors in Transition receive the same level and scope of care and support regardless of Component through enforcement of fair and comprehensive policy and capable Reserve Component management.

18–18. Regional Medical Commands (RMCs)

a. RMCs are the key operational element for the delivery of health care services for geographical regions within the MEDCOM. RMCs are major subordinate commands (MSCs) operating under the supervision of the commander. Figure 18–2 reflects regional boundaries for medical and dental commanders. Mission responsibilities include:

(1) Regional command and control of an affordable, multidisciplinary, customer-focused, quality military health service system.

(2) Supporting the readiness requirement of the Army.

(3) Developing and sustaining technical health care and leader skills in support of USAMEDCOM readiness goals.

(4) Allocating resources, analyzing utilization, and assessing performance across the RMC Figure 18–2. RMCs and Collocated Dental Commands.

b. As the primary integrator of medical readiness, the RMC is responsible for:

(1) Daily utilization of TOE/TDA medical assets, integrating Active and Reserve training, and development of mobilization requirements.

(2) Budgeting, defending, and allocating readiness costs and funding.

(3) Preplanning the medical treatment facility (MTF) professional backfill requirements during deployment by expanding network coverage, shifting RMC assets, and coordinating Reserve Component coverage.

(4) Ensuring that Army medical readiness requirements are fully integrated into the activities of DOD health care regions.

(5) Conducting training exercises in MTF mobilization, professional backfill activities, and deployment actions.

(6) Providing medical planning and preparation programs for worldwide contingency operations.

(7) Sponsoring readiness-based clinical research.
18–19. AMEDD role in combat service support units

a. In addition to its fixed health care facilities, the Army maintains medical units with a combat service support (CSS) mission within all deployable commands. These medical units work in concert with logistics and personnel units to form the CSS core for Army forces. The deployable medical assets consist of TOE units in both the Active and Reserve Components. Two deployable medical units, 18th and 30th Medical Command (Deployment Support) are assigned to USAMEDCOM. CONUS AC medical units are assigned to USFORSCom. OCONUS medical units are assigned to the Army Service Component Command. Deployable medical units range in size, scope of mission, and capacity from medical detachments to theater hospitals. Collectively they establish an integrated continuum of medical evacuation and treatment from point of injury on the battlefield, to the corps/COMMZ, and eventually to specialized treatment in CONUS.

b. In the event of mobilization, AMEDD Reserve Component medical units will often be among the earliest deploying forces. With approximately 68 percent of the medical force in the Reserve Components, the AMEDD truly exemplifies The Army. Well-trained and combat ready Reserve Component medical units are absolutely essential for ensuring that the FHP missions of the Army are accomplished during periods of mobilization. Under the Professional Officer Filler Information System (PROFIS) qualified Active Army personnel serving in TDA units are designated to fill FORSCOM early deploying MTOE units, USARPAC, USAREUR, and EUSA forward deployed units upon execution of an approved JCS OPLAN or upon execution of a contingency operation. Individuals pre-designated from fixed Army health care facilities will provide a large portion of the professional personnel to units deploying to and already stationed in the theater of operations.

c. A key operational enabler is the Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4). MC4 integrates a medical information management system for Army tactical medical forces, enabling a comprehensive, lifelike electronic medical record for all Service members, and enhancing medical situational awareness for operational commanders. MC4 integrates Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP); the Battlefield Medical Information-Theater (BMIS–T); the Composite Health Care System II - Theater (CHCSII–T); the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES); the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS); and the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS). MC4 fully integrates the global medical network with a fully integrated operational architecture and a Global Information Grid (GIG) infrastructure. MC4 will enable commanders to effectively synchronize medical care on any battlefield, worldwide.

18–20. Staff surgeons

a. The senior AMEDD officer present for duty with a headquarters (other than medical) will be officially titled: (1) The “Command Surgeon” of the ACOM and ASCC.
The “Surgeon” of the field command (e.g. corps, CONUSA).

The “Director of Health Services (DHS)” at the installation level.

b. The surgeon and DHS are responsible for the staff supervision of all health matters and policies, except dental and veterinary matters. The DHS and the director of dental services (DDS) will serve on the installation commander’s staff. Normally, the commander of the MEDCEN or medical department activity (MEDDAC) is the DHS, and the commander of the Army dental activity (DENTAC) is the DDS.

18–21. Health service logistics

a. Health service logistics is integral to Army health service support and is managed by the AMEDD as a core functional area of MHS. This gives the command surgeon the ability to influence and control the resources needed to save lives. TSG establishes medical logistics policies and procedures within the framework of the overall Army logistics system. Health service logistics includes the management, storage, and distribution of medical materiel (to include medical gases), blood and blood products, optical fabrication, and medical equipment maintenance which are inherent to the provision of health care. The medical commodity (Class VIII) has characteristics that make it distinctly different from other classes of supply. Medical materiel includes pharmaceuticals, narcotics, and blood products that are potency and shelf life (dated) that require special handling and security. Most items are subject to the regulations and standards of external agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, the EPA, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Medical logisticians have extensive knowledge of those requirements as they relate to health service support.

b. The Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM) mission designates a single organization or Service component to manage and provide health service logistics support to joint forces operating in the theater. Blood is the only medical material not directly under control of the SIMLM. Blood supplies are coordinated and managed by the Joint Blood Program Officer in each of the Combatant Unified Commands.

c. The Theater Lead Agent for Medical Materiel (TLAMM) provides a single theater medical materiel distribution and supply chain management, providing the intensive management required for the medical commodity in close concert with FHP operations and industry partners at the national level.

d. USAMEDCOM established Medical Equipment Reset operations for medical equipment and sets for re-deploying units and Theater Provided Equipment (TPE)-Medical. Redeploying units conduct field-level Reset operations at home station in coordination with the Regional Medical Commands and their Installation Medical Supply Activities. Sustainment Reset (Depot Level) activities occur at one of three depot locations: Hill AFB, UT; Tracy Army Depot, CA; and Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. TPE-Medical Reset is provided to units in theater in order to reduce equipping requirements for deploying units and to maintain continuity of care in support of operations. High utilization and harsh conditions result in increased maintenance requirements and accelerated wear-out rates. TPE-Medical is owned by theater and life-cycle managed by theater stakeholders in partnership with USAMEDCOM.

18–22. Secretary of the Army’s executive agent representative for DoD executive agencies (DOD EA)

a. Executive Agent representative: An Executive Agent is the Head of a DOD Component (SECARMY) to whom the Secretary of Defense or the DepSecDef has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DOD Components. The DOD Executive Agent may delegate, to a subordinate designee within that official’s Component (TSG), the authority to act on that official’s behalf for any or all of those Executive Agent responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by the Secretary of Defense or the DepSecDef.

b. In addition to the DOD EAs embedded in AMEDD Major Subordinate Commands, TSG serves as the Executive Agent’s representative for other essential joint medical agencies, to include:

(1) Accession Medical Standards Analysis and Research Activity
(2) Armed Forces Epidemiological Board
(3) Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
(4) Armed Forces Medical Library
(5) Armed Forces Pest Management Board
(6) Armed Services Blood Program
(7) Civilian Employee Occupational Health and Medical Services Program
(8) Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute
(9) DiLorenzo TRICARE Health Clinic
(10) DOD/Army Medical Surveillance System
(11) DOD Global Emerging Infections Systems
(12) DOD/VA Clinical Practice Guidelines Development
(13) DOD Pharmacoeconomic Center
(14) DOD Veterinary Services Activity
(15) DOD Serum Repository
Section V
Summary and references

18–23. Summary
This chapter has discussed the mission, organization, functions, and staff relationships of the AMEDD. The health service support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health care, from the policy and decision-making level to the combat medic in the field. Health services within the Army are directed and monitored by TSG through USAMEDCOM and the Office of TSG. TRICARE has markedly altered the peacetime military health system. MRI will transform the AMEDD’s TOE medical units to support The Army of the future.

18–24. References
a. DOD Directive 5136.1, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.
b. Army Regulation 10–5, Headquarters, Department of the Army.
c. Army Regulation 10–87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States.
d. DOD Directive 5100.88, DOD Executive Agencies
e. Army Regulation 40–1, Composition, Mission, and Functions of the Army Medical Department.
f. Army Regulation 40–4, Army Medical Department Facilities/Activities.
g. Army Regulation 40–61, Medical Logistics Policies and Procedures.
i. US Army Medical Command Regulation 10–1, Organization and Functions Policy.
l. Army Medicine White Paper, Transforming Medical Support to a Modular Army, 24 October 2004
Chapter 19
Management Of Legal Affairs

“I find it scarcely possible to get on without some legal person in the situation of Judge Advocate.” Duke of Wellington in letter to Earl of Bathurst, 1815

Section I
Introduction

19–1. Law and the commander
The Army provides legal advice to commanders and Soldiers, primarily through or under the supervision of Judge Advocates (JA) of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAGC). JAs are Soldier-lawyers who are commissioned officers of the Army and licensed attorneys. Close and full communication with legal advisors is an essential tool for command success. To use JAs and other legal resources effectively, commanders should understand the general organization and functions of the servicing Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) or Command Judge Advocate (CJA) office. This chapter surveys the core legal disciplines of judge advocates: administrative law, civil law (including contract, fiscal, and environmental law), claims, international law, legal assistance, and military justice and addresses the role of judge advocates in the practice of operational law. Operational law is that body of domestic, foreign, and international laws that directly affect the conduct of operations and may include all six of the above-named core legal disciplines.

19–2. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA)
An OSJA is organic to units commanded by a general court-martial convening authority. An organization with a general officer in command may also be assigned an OSJA, even if there is no general court-martial convening authority. The OSJA has sections or divisions within its office structure that may include one or more of the core legal disciplines. For example, an OSJA may commonly consist of five sections: military justice, administrative and civil law, claims, international law, and legal assistance. However divided with the office, the OSJA provides all legal services except those that must, by law be independent, such as judicial and defense counsel support. It is further noted that under the recent modular force design, two judge advocates and a senior paralegal noncommissioned officer are assigned and organic to each brigade combat team (BCT). The BCT legal section is responsible for the full spectrum of legal services required by the BCT or, where it is beyond its capabilities, for coordinating with the OSJA for the delivery of such legal services.

19–3. Staff Judge Advocate
The SJA is a member of the commander’s personal staff and, as such, communicates directly with the commander to provide legal advice for all matters affecting morale, good order, and discipline of the command. The SJA is also a member of the commander’s special staff. As such, the SJA serves under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, provides legal services to the staff, and coordinates with other staff members to provide responsive legal services throughout the organization.

Section II
Administrative and civil law

19–4. The Army as an administrative agency
The Army is an armed force, but it is also a large Federal administrative agency that encounters significant internal and external legal issues every day. Administrative and civil law is the body of law containing the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the establishment, functioning, and command of military organizations. The practice of administrative and civil law includes advice to commanders and litigation on behalf of the Army involving many specialized legal areas, including military personnel law, government information practices, investigations, relationships with private organizations, labor relations, civilian employment law, military installations, regulatory law, intellectual property law, government ethics, and environmental law. It is worth noting that legal assistance and claims (subsections 19–11 and 19–12 below) are major, co-equal legal disciplines with administrative and civil law.

19–5. Corrective administrative personnel actions
   a. Commanders and administrative law. Commanders spend an inordinate amount of their time on comparatively few Soldiers. Some of these Soldiers, for a variety of reasons, cannot or will not perform their duties. Some corrective administrative actions by the commander educate, train, rehabilitate, or correct without adverse consequences. Others are adverse and implicate important legal rights and responsibilities. The procedures in Army regulations governing the use of adverse actions protect the legal rights of Soldiers to ensure that commanders only impose adverse actions on Soldiers who deserve them, and do so in a fair and lawful manner.
   b. Corrective, adverse actions short of separation. In many instances, commanders want to motivate Soldiers to
improve duty performance or be more efficient, or to ensure mission accomplishment. A number of useful administrative actions are available to deal with problem Soldiers whose conduct or performance does not warrant action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or administrative separation. These include counseling, extra training, written or oral reprimands, bars to reenlistment, adverse-performance evaluation reports, relief for cause, suspension or revocation of security clearance, suspension or revocation of on-post driving and other privileges, MOS reclassification, administrative reduction for misconduct or for inefficiency, administrative reprimand, removal from promotion list, and suspension of favorable personnel actions (flagging).

c. Adverse administrative separations. The Army invests substantial assets in recruiting, training, equipping, and other resources when it transforms civilian men and women into Soldiers. Separation before the end of the enlistee’s obligated term of service wastes resources and requires expensive recruiting and training of a replacement. Moreover, the impact of adverse separations on Soldiers can be severe, as some separations can result in discharges under other than honorable conditions. Senior commanders must understand the fundamentals of the administrative separation system. AR 635–200, Enlisted Personnel, and AR 600–8–24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, are the Army regulations that govern administrative separations; and they specify the proper processes and provide substantive and procedural protections. Official roles in administrative separations vary; commanders may review the action and forward the file to the separation authority with recommendations; or, they make the decision. Commanders should advise and educate subordinates on the correction or separation of problem Soldiers. JAs are a resource available not only to advise the commander on corrective and administrative actions, but also to assist the commander in such leader development.

19–6. Improper relationships

a. Improper superior–subordinate relationships.

(1) This section highlights the various relationships subject to the punitive regulatory requirements of AR 600–20, Army Command Policy. Relationships between Soldiers of different ranks, as regulated conduct, is considerably broader than the specific UCMJ offense of fraternization. Furthermore, these provisions of AR 600–20 pertaining to improper relationships are punitive. Violations may be punished under Article 92, UCMJ.

(2) Relationships between Soldiers of different rank (without regard to the individuals’ sex) are prohibited if they compromise, or appear to compromise, the integrity of supervisory authority or the chain of command; cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness; involve, or appear to involve, the improper use of rank or position for personal gain; are, or are perceived to be, exploitative or coercive in nature; or, create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, morale, or the ability of the command to accomplish its mission.

(3) In addition, certain types of personal relationships between officers and enlisted personnel are prohibited. The policy applies to relationships between Soldiers and also between Soldiers and personnel of other military services. These prohibited relationships include:

(a) On-going business relationships between officers and enlisted personnel, with certain exceptions.

(b) Dating, shared living accommodations other than those directed by operational requirements, and intimate or sexual relationships between officers and enlisted personnel, except as specifically authorized pursuant to this regulation.

(c) Gambling between officers and enlisted personnel.

(4) These prohibitions are not intended to preclude normal team building associations that occur in the context of activities such as community organizations, religious activities, family gatherings, unit-based social functions, or athletic teams or events. In any relationship between Soldiers of different grades or ranks, however, the senior member is generally in the best position to terminate or limit the extent of the relationship. Nevertheless, all members may be held accountable for relationships that violate this policy.

(5) Commanders should seek to prevent inappropriate or unprofessional relationships through proper training and leadership by example.

b. Other prohibited relationships.

(1) Improper trainee and Soldier relationships. Any relationship between permanent-party personnel and trainees not required by the training mission is prohibited.

(2) Improper recruiter and recruit relationships. Any relationship between permanent-party personnel assigned or attached to the USAREC and potential prospects, applicants, members of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), or members of the Delayed Training Program (DTP) not required by the recruiting mission is prohibited.

(3) Fraternization, Article 134, UCMJ. Unlawful fraternization is a specific offense under the UCMJ, although most such cases will also involve violations of AR 600–20. Commanders should consult the SJA before acting on reports of this type of misconduct.

19–7. Standards of conduct

a. Ethical violations of standards of conduct impair the trust and confidence placed in officers by superiors and subordinates, and undermines the public’s respect for the Army.

b. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch went into effect in 1993. Published by the
Office of Government Ethics (OGE), these standards are reprinted in and supplemented in DOD Directive 5500.7–R, Joint Ethics Regulations (JER). The JER also reprints other OGE regulations that govern the conduct of DOD personnel, and provides additional guidance and regulations on ethical issues, such as acceptance of travel benefits from non-Federal sources.

c. Commanders are responsible for being familiar with the JER and its established standards of conduct. Commanders should ensure that all personnel are properly trained and fully aware of expected ethical conduct.

d. The Army General Counsel is the Army’s Designated Agency Ethics Official. The Chief, Army Standards of Conduct Office, is responsible for overseeing the Army’s ethics program and for ethics support for HQDA. Army commands, installations, and organizations should have an assigned ethics counselor, who usually is located within the OSJA.

e. Ethics counselors advise and assist with common ethics problems, such as gifts to superiors; acceptance of gratuities and benefits from outside sources; use of government facilities, property, and personnel for unofficial purposes; improper use of benefits received as a result of official travel; post-government employment restrictions; and commercial solicitations.

19–8. Legal basis of command

a. Who commands. Command is the responsibility of the senior, regularly assigned officer present for duty, unless that individual is ineligible for command by law, under Army regulations, or preempted by the authority of the President. The term "command" has two distinct meanings. It describes the authority of military officers over Soldiers in their charge; and legal aspects of the actions of an installation/garrison commander as a manager of real property and activities occurring upon that property.

b. Command authority.

1) Commanders are vested with the authority to command by virtue of their military office. Commanders are responsible for the welfare of their command mission success, and have the authority to demand obedience to lawful orders.

2) The U.S. Constitution, laws, and regulations by higher authority determine the lawfulness of orders. Courts have described a commander’s authority as "inherent" and "broad," and will defer to a commander’s decision in an appropriate exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, courts insist that decisions be reasonable and consistent with law and regulation, not arbitrary or capricious. A commander should seek the advice of a supporting JA should that commander have doubts as to the reasonableness and/or consistency of a pending decision.

c. Maintenance of law, order, and discipline on post. An installation commander may maintain law and order over civilians on post pursuant to his or her inherent authority and by enforcing the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 USC § 13, and the Federal Trespass Law, 18 USC § 1382.

1) Inherent authority. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, an installation commander has the inherent authority and responsibility to maintain law and order, security, and the discipline necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the installation.

2) Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA). The ACA provides that Federal authorities, including military commanders, may sometimes "assimilate," that is, apply state criminal law. This is a complex matter of law, policy, and civil-military relations; prudent commanders work closely with the SJA and other staff on these issues.

3) Trespass. Under the Federal Trespass Statute, a post commander may bar an individual, in writing, from the installation when that person has committed a crime or has violated a post regulation. If the individual violates the commander’s directives in the written bar not to enter the installation, then the individual may be criminally prosecuted for trespass in federal court. Upon conviction, The trespasser may be punished with a fine (as specified under 18 USC 3571) or not more than six months’ imprisonment, or both.

d. Free speech and dissent by civilians. Regulating speech on the installation is dependent on whether the installation, or a part of it, can be characterized as a “public forum.” Generally, military installations are not public forums for First Amendment statements. However, installations, or portions of them, can become public forums by allowing access to persons or groups who engage in statements not supportive of the military mission. The courts recognize the right of a commander to prohibit demonstrations and similar protests by civilians on military installations. Thus, the commander should know what such persons or groups are going to say and do before permitting access and should consult with the SJA to determine the limits of command authority in a given case.

e. Free speech and dissent by Soldiers. The courts apply a similar analysis when reviewing command authority over Soldiers’ exercise of free speech. The UCMJ prohibits certain speech, such as disrespectful words and gestures toward superiors. Regarding other aspects of expression, the courts have not adopted an “area” approach in determining the extent of a commander’s authority to limit a Soldier’s activities. They have insisted that any regulatory prohibitions specifically describe the prohibited activity. AR 600–20 prohibits Soldiers from participating in partisan or nonpartisan political meetings or rallies, picket lines or any other public demonstrations that may imply Army sanction of the cause.

f. Distribution of literature on the installation.

1) Unlike demonstrations and protest activities, Army installations are open forums for news publications, even
those critical of government policies or officials. The general rule is that literature is allowed on the installation, rather than kept off. Installation commanders may, however, require that distribution of printed media be made only through regularly established and approved distribution outlets, such as post exchanges. An exception is available if those seeking distribution obtain prior approval from the commander or authorized representative.

2. Commanders must weigh literature restrictions against the standard of “clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale.” The installation commander may delay distribution subject to review for final decision by HQDA.

g. The Commander’s regulatory authority. Commanders may publish regulations and policies necessary to the functioning of their commands, as long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. JAs can provide assistance to the commander in formulating regulations and policies that will withstand legal challenge.

19–9. Environmental law

a. The challenge. Environmental protection poses an increasing challenge to military leaders. Environmental laws control all sources of pollution, and protect many natural and cultural resources. Under most environmental statutes, the Army is as much a member of the regulated community as any corporation. Commanders must integrate Federal, state, and local environmental requirements within the defense mission. JAs are a vital resource in guiding the commander through environmental issues.

b. Environmental regulation of military installations.

1. Until about 1970, the Constitution insulated Federal entities from most State efforts to enforce State laws.

2. This isolation changed with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42 USC §4321, et seq. NEPA directed the DOD (and all other Federal agencies) to identify, quantify, and evaluate environmental impact before any Federal undertaking, and to consider alternative courses of action. Failure to properly address its requirements can expose a command to injunctions that can restrict or entirely halt military operations.

3. Congress enacted numerous environmental statutes after NEPA. A common component of each statute was the Federal Government’s ability to delegate the administration of the program to the individual State. The delegation of authority to the individual State and the waiver of sovereign immunity in some statutes potentially expose Federal agencies to lawsuits if they fail to implement State laws. For example, the Clean Air Act (Title 42, Chapter 85) requires all major sources of air pollutants within the United States, including most Army installations, to obtain a state-issued, facility-wide operating permit, or cease to operate without a presidential exemption. Army installations must submit detailed permit applications, which commanders must certify as true, accurate, and complete.

4. Almost all current Federal environmental statutes require the Army to comply with an extensive complex of Federal, state, and local laws in the:

   • Installation, operation, and maintenance of air- and water-pollution control technology.
   • Quantitative and qualitative limitations on air and water emissions.
   • Pollution monitoring, record keeping, and reporting requirements.
   • Operating permits for pollution sources and the payment of reasonable permit fees.
   • Handling, transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste.
   • Reporting and cleanup of spills.
   • Monitoring virtually all-underground storage tanks for leaks.
   • Cleanup of active and closed hazardous-waste disposal sites.
   • Conservation of endangered and threatened species and wetlands.

c. Compliance.

1. Army compliance with environmental laws and regulations was once largely voluntary, but no longer. The Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCA) of 1992 expanded the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 USC §6901, et seq. The Federal EPA and State regulators can now assess punitive fines against Federal agencies, including the Army, for violations of Federal, state, and local solid- and hazardous-waste laws and regulations. Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 USC §300f, make it the second major environmental statute to waive the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity to punitive fines. Army installations are required to maintain compliance at all times or face enforcement actions that may prevent mission-essential training and operations.

2. Current environmental laws affect many daily activities at military installations, and enforcement of the laws is strengthening. Federal environmental statutes specifically authorize individual citizens to act as private attorneys-general by initiating lawsuits to force compliance through injunctions and fines. Finally, Army leaders are not immune from the threat of personal criminal liability for environmental crimes. Again, JAs can be a valuable resource to Army leaders in avoiding personal liability.

3. The FFCA is silent on the source of payment of fines and penalties, but Presidential, DOD, and DA policies provide that installation or activity operational accounts of those most directly responsible for the violation will pay environmental fines.

4. Commanders must handle environmental matters skillfully or risk substantial disruption of crucial training and
other operations that may reduce combat readiness. Even relatively minor compliance problems can be costly to taxpayers, the Army, and local installations.

d. Pollution prevention and conservation.
   (1) Army leaders must also stress pollution prevention and hazardous-material minimization.
   (2) Commanders are increasingly required to ensure that mission activities conserve natural resources on Army installations. The Endangered Species Act (ESA). 16 USC §1531, et seq., requires all Federal agencies to carry out programs for the conservation of federally listed endangered and threatened species. Actions that may affect such species are subject to formal consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries. Commanders must also protect the quality and quantity of the installation water supply, conserve the water source, and seek to preserve wetlands that provide important habitat for fish and wildlife.

19–10. Federal labor relations and the role of the labor counselor

a. Unions.
   (1) Unions represent many Federal employees within DA. Federal labor law requires the Army to notify unions before implementing changes in working conditions including, but are not limited to, changes in office hours, changes in shifts, major task/objective changes for the division/directorate, and reassignment of personnel. Commanders should consult the installation labor-relations specialists and labor counselors on all matters concerning unions or employees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements to ensure compliance with the existing negotiated labor agreement and applicable laws and regulations. Commanders also should be careful not to make adverse comments regarding unions and/or their effectiveness or worth. The SJA can advise on the specifics of these restrictions.
   (2) The installation labor counselor, a JA or an Army civilian lawyer, is the primary adviser to the commander, supervisor, and the CPAC on legal aspects of civilian personnel and labor relations.
   (3) The labor counselor’s duties include review of proposed adverse civilian personnel actions and pending equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints; participating in contract negotiations with labor unions, particularly when opposing lawyers are involved; representing management in third-party proceedings, such as bargaining-unit determinations, unfair-labor-practice complaint proceedings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearings, Merit System Protection Board hearings, and arbitration hearings; advising activity negotiating committees; and advising on interpretation and application of negotiated labor agreements.

b. Discipline of civilian employees.
   (1) Commanders will likely supervise numerous Federal civilian employees or command those who do. DOD 1400.25M, Department of Defense Civilian Management System establishes two categories of disciplinary actions. The first is informal disciplinary action. This includes oral admonishments, oral counseling, and written warnings. The second category, formal disciplinary actions, includes letters of reprimand, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and removal. Similarly, employee conduct requiring discipline falls into two categories, corrective and punitive. Corrective discipline includes behavioral offenses for which progressive discipline, aimed at correcting the behavior is appropriate. Punitive measures are appropriate for more serious matters, such as fraud, waste, and abuse.
   (2) Informal discipline is appropriate for most minor unacceptable behavior. Supervisors take informal action on their own initiative, and should advise the employee that continued misbehavior might result in formal disciplinary action.
   (3) Formal disciplinary action is appropriate because of the severity of conduct or when informal discipline for minor misbehavior has not worked. The CPO and the labor counselor advise and assist supervisors concerning appropriate penalties and related concerns.
   (4) The severity of the imposed penalty and the status and union affiliation of an employee determine the appeal rights available to the disciplined employee. If the employee raises a discrimination claim in conjunction with the appealed action, the appeal rights may vary. The Army defends disciplinary and performance actions in administrative hearings and Federal court.
   (5) Civilian personnel laws and regulations also permit supervisors to take appropriate action against employees whose job performance is unacceptable. These include, but are not limited to, adverse appraisals, special appraisals, and extra training.

c. Equal employment opportunity allegations of discrimination. One of the labor counselor’s most important duties is advising the installation EEO officer and commander on equal employment opportunity. Civilian employees are protected by law, executive order, and regulation from discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, disability, and sexual orientation. They are also entitled to be free from sexual harassment. Finally, civilian employees have the right to complain about conduct they perceive to be discriminatory.

d. Deployment considerations. The civilian work force is vital to mission accomplishment. Civilian employees accompany Army units in exercises and operations worldwide. Commanders should thus include the many legal issues of civilian employee support, administration, and discipline in deployment planning.

19–11. Legal assistance
The legal assistance program is designed to meet the continuing legal needs of Soldiers and their families. Legal
assistance also helps to support military readiness, high morale, good discipline, recruiting, and retention of a quality force.

a. Mission. As stated in AR 27–3, The Army Legal Assistance Program, this program exists to assist Soldiers and their families with personal legal affairs. The first part of this mission is preventive: legal-assistance officers inform Soldiers and their families of legal pitfalls, issues, and services, so Soldiers may avoid difficulties and unnecessary expense in garrison, during field training, and when deployed. The second part of this mission is providing legal assistance directly to eligible clients.

b. Readiness. Senior leaders often overlook their own personal and legal affairs. Soldiers preoccupied with such matters may not be effective; leaders with similar problems affect unit readiness and mission accomplishment. Lessons learned from deployments and operations repeatedly highlight that leaders can do more to ensure that Soldiers have their personal legal affairs in order, e.g., wills and powers of attorney. Routine legal assistance appointments can satisfy most Soldiers’ legal needs well before deployment. Having accurate and needed wills and powers of attorney, for example, is a beneficial practice for all clients regardless of their deployment status, and the proper preparation of such documents requires adequate time for counseling, advising, preparing, and reviewing. Commanders should earnestly avoid delaying provision of this important legal assistance for themselves and their Soldiers until a Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) is administered immediately before deployment when time is limited. In sum, early SJA participation in the planning process and in the SRPs will enhance readiness.

c. Client eligibility. The authorization of personal legal assistance is subject to availability of legal resources. Generally, all Active Component (AC) and retired Soldiers and their families are entitled to legal assistance as are, with some restrictions, Reserve Components (RC) Soldiers and their families. In addition, Army civilian employees may be eligible for legal assistance if deploying, or in such matters as responding to reports of survey.

d. Client services.

(1) Army legal offices provide legal assistance on many issues, including family law, wills, leases, contracts, powers of attorney, disputes with creditors, veteran reemployment rights, torts, taxes, and appeals of adverse efficiency reports or reports of survey findings.

(2) Legal assistance may include notary services, legal counseling, telephone calls and letters on behalf of clients, preparation of some legal documents, and helping Soldiers prepare Federal and State income tax returns. Some legal offices help clients in local courts on uncontested or simple legal matters, such as adoptions, uncontested divorces, or small claims. Where offered, eligibility for in-court representation is generally limited to Soldiers in pay grades E–4 and below if they have substantial financial hardships.

(3) Soldiers do not pay for Army legal assistance. If the legal assistance office cannot solve a legal problem, it will ordinarily refer the client to the appropriate local bar association so that the client can get a civilian lawyer. Sometimes, referral may be to RC JAs or units that provide legal assistance for retirement points without cost to the Soldier. Furthermore, RC JA units and individuals often perform drill by supplementing legal assistance at AC legal offices.

e. Preventive law.

(1) Legal assistance offices accomplish preventive law, educating Soldiers and their families to avoid personal legal problems.

(2) Direct action against unscrupulous merchants is an effective method of solving widespread problems. The local Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board can recommend placing establishments off-limits for a variety of reasons, including business practices that have an adverse effect on command health, discipline, or morale.

19–12. Claims

a. Army Claims System. The Army Claims System investigates, processes, adjudicates, and settles claims on behalf of and against the United States world-wide under the authority conferred by statutes, regulations, international and interagency agreements, and DOD directives. Categories of claims include claims for property damage by Soldiers and other employees arising incident to service, torts alleged against Army or DOD personnel acting within the scope of employment, and claims by the United States against individuals who injure Army personnel or damage Army property. The Army’s implementing regulation is AR 27–20, Claims.

b. Supporting commanders. The Army Claims System supports commanders by preventing distractions to the operation from claimants, by promoting the morale of Army personnel by compensating them for property damage suffered incident to service, and by promoting good will with the local population by providing compensation for personal injury or property damage caused by Army or DOD personnel.

c. U.S. Army Claims Service. Under The Judge Advocate General’s (TJAG) supervision, the U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS) administers the Army Claims System and designates Army claims officers (ACOs), claims processing offices, and claims attorneys. SJAs or other supervisory JAs operate each command’s claims program and supervise the (ACO) or claims processing office (CPO) designated by USARCS for the command. ACOs and CPOs investigate, process, adjudicate, and settle claims against the United States; and identify, investigate, and assert claims on behalf of the United States.
**d. Soldier misconduct.** When the claim results from Soldier misconduct AR 27–20 permits deducting from the wrongdoer’s pay to compensate the victim.

**19–13. Command authority and judicial review of military activities**

**a. Federal courts.** Federal courts have consistently held that control and operation of the military establishment are functions of the executive and legislative branches, not the judicial. Judges do not try to command or interfere unduly with military operations. Notwithstanding this fundamental judicial and political philosophy, no individual or organization is above the law.

**b. Commander response.** Commanders should know what kinds of military decisions and activities Federal courts will review: the extent the courts recognize the unique requirements and conditions of command; how to respond to a court order; internal command procedures for proper handling of court orders and other legal process; and DA requirements when a command is sued.

**c. Scope of judicial review.**

1. Courts defer to the military.
   a. In the important military case, Parker v. Levy, the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that: “While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”
   b. When the Constitution clearly confers a function to the executive or legislative branch of government, the courts generally refrain from reviewing the merits of a controversy. Even where the Constitution is not specific, courts are reluctant to become involved in questions about the military. Most courts ask first whether the complaint alleges a violation of regulation, statute, or constitutional provision.

2. Failure to follow military regulations and statutes may result in judicial sanctions. Military officials may not legally ignore Army regulations in carrying out their mission. Courts will generally view violations of regulations written for the benefit of the Government as harmless but will overturn actions that violate regulations intended for the benefit of an individual.

3. Denial of Soldiers’ constitutional rights usually leads to judicial intervention. Army violations of Soldiers’ rights to a limited form of free speech or to due process in courts-martial and adverse administrative personnel actions have led to numerous lawsuits against commanders and other military officials.

4. Commanders may face individual liability for their acts.
   a. People usually sue the Government to force it to act or to reverse an action previously taken. Frequently, these lawsuits allege that the decision maker violated the person’s constitutional rights. A personal liability lawsuit seeks money damages from the individual governmental officer.
   b. The Department of Justice (DOJ) will represent most government defendants who are sued for acts within the scope of their assigned duties. Officers sued for alleged constitutional violations receive protections known as qualified immunity. In cases involving constitutional violations, qualified immunity results in the dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim if the officer acted in good faith and if constitutional guidelines are not clearly established or a reasonable person would not know that clearly established guidelines exist.

5. **Response to litigation.**
   1. There are strict requirements for complying with Federal court orders, notifying HQDA of lawsuits, and forwarding litigation reports from commands to the Army Litigation Division. JA advice should be sought and the OSJA notified immediately upon receipt of any written legal process to ensure proper response to such legal actions.
   2. The primary objectives of JAs in litigation are early dismissal of lawsuits, minimizing interference with command activities by ongoing lawsuits, and insulating official defendants against suits for money damages.

**Section III**

**Military Justice**

**19–14. Background**

**a. Military justice purpose.** Military justice is more than merely criminal law in battledress. The purpose of military criminal law is to promote justice, assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, and promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment.

**b. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).** From Bunker Hill to Bastogne, the Army administered military justice under the Articles of War. These Articles, which George Washington and others adopted from the British early in the Revolutionary War, traced their origins to Roman models that were refined during the Renaissance. The Articles worked well enough for our own small army for almost two centuries. Nevertheless, abuses noted during World War II led to calls for reform. In 1950, Congress passed the UCMJ to provide uniform rules for all services. The UCMJ is found at Title 10, United States Code, Sections 801–946, but the sections are commonly referred to as Articles 1 through 146 of the UCMJ. Pursuant to the constitutional authority as

**19–15. Providing military justice legal services**

- **a. TJAG responsibility.** TJAG is responsible for the overall supervision and administration of military justice within the Army. The commander is responsible for the administration of military justice in the unit, and must communicate directly with the SJA about military justice matters.

- **b. SJA responsibility.** The SJA is responsible for military justice advice and services to the command. The SJA advises commanders concerning the administration of justice, the disposition of alleged offenses, appeals of NJP, and action on court-martial findings and sentences. The SJA also supervises the administration and prosecution of courts-martial, preparation of records of trial, the victim-witness assistance program, and military justice training.

- **c. Trial Defense Service (TDS).** JAs of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service (TDS), under the supervision of the Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service, not the SJA, advise and represent Soldiers before courts-martial. TDS attorneys also represent Soldiers in adverse administrative hearings. Again, it is noteworthy that TDS JAs are not within the local chain of command.

- **d. Military Judges.** Military judges of the U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, who are not within the local chain of command or technical chain of the SJA, preside at general and special courts-martial, promulgate rules of court, maintain judicial independence and impartiality, conduct training sessions for trial and defense counsel, and perform or supervise military magistrate functions (review of pretrial confinement and issuance of search, seizure, or apprehension authorizations).

**19–16. Active Army jurisdiction**

As a result of the Supreme Court’s 1987 ruling in Solorio v. United States, jurisdiction of a court-martial depends solely on the accused’s duty status as a member of the armed forces, and not on whether the offense is service-connected. The Solorio ruling means that both the military and civilian authorities may have jurisdiction over a Soldier who commits an offense off post. This is commonly referred to as concurrent jurisdiction. Army policy is not to prosecute Soldiers for offenses if civilian authorities are prosecuting the same Soldiers for similar or like offenses.

**19–17. Jurisdiction over reservists**

- **a. Military Justice Amendments of 1986.** As a part of the Military Justice Amendments of 1986, Congress amended the UCMJ to extend jurisdiction over members of the RC during both active duty and Inactive Duty for Training (IDT). In short, RC Soldiers are subject to the UCMJ for misconduct committed during training periods. One significant change allows the military more flexibility to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over reservists who commit crimes during weekend drill, IDT, and over members of the National Guard of the United States when in Federal service.

- **b. Continuing jurisdiction.** Recognizing that IDT periods are brief, usually lasting only one weekend per month, the amendments provide for continuing jurisdiction during the entire period of IDT, including those short periods when the Soldier is not physically present at the IDT site. Additionally, the Government can involuntarily order to active duty (for Article 32 investigations, courts-martial, and NJP) RC Soldiers accused of violating the UCMJ during a training period.

- **c. Trial.** AC convening authorities should be familiar with changes in RC jurisdiction, because all general and special courts-martial are tried at the active duty post that supports the RC unit (including ARNG units when federalized). In addition, only the AC General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) can authorize involuntary recall of an RC Soldier to active duty for UCMJ action. The SECARMY must give prior approval for the involuntary recall if pretrial restraint will be imposed or if there is possibility of confinement as the result of a court-martial sentence.

**19–18. The commander’s role**

- **a. The commander’s prosecutorial discretion.**

  (1) One of the commander’s greatest powers in the administration of military justice is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, for example, deciding whether a case will be resolved administratively, or if referred to a trial, determining what level of court-martial is appropriate, or what the charge will be. Although commanders should seek advice from the SJA and review available investigative reports, the commander alone must ultimately decide. Commanders should resolve cases at the lowest level appropriate for the offense and the offender, a fundamental theme of military justice.

  (2) A variety of administrative alternatives exist, including:

  - Counseling.
  - Written or oral reprimands and admonitions.
  - Withdrawal of pass privileges.
• Extra training.
• Withdrawal or limitation of privileges (commissary, PX, on-post driving, etc.).
• Alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs.
• Administrative separations.
• Officer and NCO evaluations.
• MOS reclassification.
• Reduction for inefficiency.
• Bar to reenlistment.
• Reassignment or transfer.

(3) The decision to refer offenses to a court-martial is often difficult and there may be pressure on a commander to “do something” in serious cases. A case should not be referred to trial unless the convening authority finds: reasonable grounds to believe that an offense triable by court-martial has been committed, reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed the offense(s), the specification alleges an offense, and a court-martial is warranted (Rules for Courts-Martial 601(d)(1)). If the crime is minor, NJP or administrative alternatives are generally a first consideration.

(4) The standard for referral does not conflict with the lawful presumption of innocence surrounding the accused at a court-martial. The perceptive commander will find occasions when the accused’s conduct satisfies the legal elements of a crime, but for reasons of compassion, interests of justice, or other considerations, punitive action is not required. Similarly, commanders must resist the temptation to avoid use of the military justice system in order to create a misleading statistical picture of morale and discipline. Serious crime should be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

b. The commander and the defense function. Commanders should understand that our Constitution, laws, regulations, and ethical codes require defense counsel to represent their clients. Representation does not mean halfway measures, but zealous advocacy within the bounds of ethics and the law. Any suggestion by a commander that defense counsel do less is improper, and may lead to loss of authority to convene courts-martial and to other adverse action. The defense counsel who does not fully and vigorously represent a client is professionally derelict under the UCMJ, and liable to punishment, as well as sanctions under AR 27–26, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, and discipline by the State licensing bar association.

19–19. Options available to the commander
This section discusses the various measures for dealing with an accused before trial, and examines the various forums and administrative measures a commander may use.

a. Pretrial restraint. Soldiers pending military justice action, including trial by court-martial, should ordinarily continue to perform duty (AR 27–10, para. 5–13a). If required to ensure the Soldier’s presence at trial or to prevent further serious criminal misconduct, the MCM allows pretrial restraint. Because there is no military bail system, such restraint may not be more restrictive than necessary under the circumstances.

b. Nonjudicial punishment (Art. 15, UCMJ). One of the most valuable disciplinary tools available to the commander is NJP. This option is proper in cases of minor offenses for which administrative measures are considered inadequate or inappropriate, unless it is clear that NJP is not sufficient to meet the ends of justice. There are three levels of NJP, each with increasing severity of punishment: Summarized, Formal Company Grade, and Formal Field Grade. Maximum punishments are listed in Table 3–1, AR 27–10. A Soldier may demand trial by court-martial at any time before the commander imposes punishment. Commanders may find the details in the UCMJ, MCM, and AR 27–10. Soldiers who accept an Article 15 and do not demand trial by court-martial are not admitting guilt, but are merely agreeing to NJP procedures.

c. General considerations in referring charges to a court-martial.
(1) Be objective. A court will consider the case objectively on its merits; commanders should do the same.

(2) Act promptly. Commanders and subordinates should act rapidly on reports of misconduct. Unexplained delays in the administrative processing of charges may result in the dismissal of charges for lack of speedy trial. Generally, the Government should bring an accused to trial within 120 days of preferral of charges, or imposition of pretrial restraint, which may require bringing the Soldier to trial even more quickly.

(3) Ensure evidence supports charges. No matter how convinced a commander may be of an individual’s guilt, there will be no conviction if there is insufficient competent evidence. Trial counsels assist commanders in evaluating evidence to ensure that trial is warranted.

(4) Consider the individual. Commanders should select the option that fits the Soldier and the offense, considering the background of the accused and the effect on the unit.

d. Types of courts-martial.
(1) Summary Court-Martial (SCM).

(a) The SCM is the lowest level trial court in the military justice system, and is designed to dispose of minor offenses under simple procedures. It is composed of one commissioned officer, ordinarily of field grade.

(b) SCM convening authority is generally vested in battalion-level and higher commanders. SCM can only try
enlisted Soldiers, and is sometimes used after an accused has been offered and refused NJP for the offense. An accused may also decline trial by SCM. The punishment powers of the SCM are listed in Table 19–1.

(2) Special Court-Martial (SPCM).
   (a) The SPCM is the intermediate military court. The SPCM convening authority is usually a brigade-level commander. Table 19–1 depicts the punishment powers of the SPCM.
   (b) SPCM membership normally consists of at least three members and a military judge, or solely of a military judge, if the accused so requests. If an enlisted accused so requests, at least one-third of the court members must be enlisted.
   (c) SPCMs also have trial counsel (prosecutor) and defense counsel. The trial counsel need not be a lawyer. The accused, however, has a regulatory right to representation at trial by an appointed military lawyer certified by The Judge Advocate General. As a matter of practice, both trial and defense counsel are usually qualified lawyers. At all courts-martial, the accused is entitled to representation by civilian counsel at no expense to the Government and may retain detailed military counsel in addition to a retained civilian attorney.

(3) Bad Conduct Discharge (“BCD”) Special Court-Martial. The “BCD” SPCM is the same type of court as the “regular” SPCM, except that this court-martial has the additional power to impose a bad-conduct discharge (BCD) as part of the sentence. In addition to detail of a qualified defense counsel and a military judge, a verbatim record of the trial must be made. In the Army only a GCMCA may convene a “BCD” SPCM. Table 19–1 depicts the punishment powers of the “BCD” SPCM.

(4) General Court-Martial (GCM).
   (a) The GCM is the highest trial court in the military justice system and deals with the more serious crimes. Only a GCMCA, usually a commander at division-level or above, may convene a GCM, and then only upon the written pretrial recommendation of the SJA. GCM punishment is limited only by the maximum punishments for each offense found in Part IV of the MCM. Table 19–1 depicts the punishment powers of the GCM. A GCM may sentence Soldiers to death, life imprisonment, a term of imprisonment, or dishonorable discharge (DD). Any officer requiring trial by court-martial is also ordinarily tried by GCM, as only that court may sentence a convicted officer to confinement or dismissal.
   (b) A GCM may consist of a military judge and not fewer than five members, or a military judge alone, if the accused so requests. The accused may elect trial by judge alone in all cases except those referred to trial as capital (with potential for the death penalty). A military judge is detailed to the court in all cases. As with SPCM and BCD–SPCM, an enlisted Soldier is also entitled, on request, to trial before a court-martial panel that includes at least one-third enlisted members.
   (c) Trial and defense counsel, lawyers certified by The Judge Advocate General, represent the parties at all GCM.
   (d) Unless the accused waives the right, Article 32, UCMJ, requires that a GCM can only try charges that a field grade officer or an officer with legal training and experience has thoroughly and impartially investigated. The purposes of the investigation are to inquire into the truth of the charges, determine the correctness of the form of the charges, and to get information to decide the proper disposition of the case.
   (e) The accused and counsel are present during the investigation’s hearings. The Article 32 investigating officer’s recommendations are advisory only, and not binding upon the convening authority.
   e. Administrative elimination in lieu of court-martial. Not all misconduct warrants trial. Administrative elimination instead of court-martial may sometimes serve the interests of justice. Chapter 10, AR 635–200, Enlisted Personnel, provides that enlisted Soldiers charged with an offense punishable by a BCD or DD may submit a request for discharge for the good of the service in lieu of trial by court-martial. The GCMCA is normally the approval authority for these requests.
   f. Pretrial agreements. The accused and the convening authority may agree that in return for the accused pleading guilty, the convening authority will either drop certain charges or limit the sentence the accused will serve. The agreement must be in writing, so that all parties and reviewing authorities know exactly what was agreed.
Table 19–1
Court Martial maximum punishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Confine</th>
<th>Forfeiture</th>
<th>Reduction (^1)</th>
<th>Punitive Discharge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>1 MO(^2)</td>
<td>2/3 Pay per MO (1 Month)</td>
<td>E–5 One Grade &lt;E–4 to E–1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>1 YR(^3,4)</td>
<td>2/3 Pay per MO (1 Year) 4</td>
<td>To E–1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCD SP(^4)</td>
<td>1 YR(^3,4)</td>
<td>2/3 Pay per MO (1 Year) 4</td>
<td>To E–1</td>
<td>BCD Enlisted Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>See Part IV, MCM</td>
<td>All Pay and Allowances</td>
<td>To E–1</td>
<td>BCD (Enlisted) DD (Enlisted &amp; Warrant Off) Dismissal (Comm Off)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 Only enlisted Soldiers may be reduced by CM.
2 A summary CM may impose confinement and hard labor without confinement only on Soldiers in grade of E–4 and below.
3 A special CM may impose confinement only on enlisted Soldiers.
4 A BCD, confinement for more than 6 months, and forfeiture for more than 6 months may only be imposed if the member is defended by qualified counsel and tried by a military judge.

19–20. Unlawful command influence

Article 37, UCMJ, makes it unlawful for a convening authority to attempt to influence counsel, the military judge, or the members of a court-martial as to the outcome of the trial. Commanders must exercise great care that their actions not constitute or be construed as unlawful command influence.

\(a.\) Pretrial stage.

1. Commanders may personally investigate allegations, but in more serious cases, should rely on the reports of law enforcement professionals such as the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) or military police investigators (MPI).

2. When taking punitive action, the commander acts in a judicial capacity and must make an independent determination that punishment is appropriate. For example, if a field-grade commander believes that a Soldier’s misconduct, if proven, deserves company-grade punishment, that commander can either impose the appropriate punishment personally or send the case to the company commander for disposition. The higher commander may not, however, send the case to the company commander with instructions to administer a company-grade Article 15 or impose a specific type of punishment, because that would prevent the subordinate commander from exercising independent discretion.

3. Commanders who believe that a case demands a more serious disposition than can be administered at their level may forward the case to a higher authority with a disposition recommendation. An accused is entitled to a fair and independent recommendation as to disposition at each level of command. A commander cannot have a fixed, inflexible policy regarding level of disposition, and cannot establish guidelines suggesting an “appropriate punishment” for any category of case or offenses.

4. Although commanders may not direct subordinate commanders to impose designated punishments or to refer cases to courts-martial, they may exercise authority to dispose of certain cases in any lawful manner. For example, a senior commander may direct subordinates to forward all cases of alleged officer misconduct or all illegal drug cases together with recommendations for disposition.

\(b.\) Trial stage.

1. Once trial begins, commanders usually are not actively involved beyond authorizing administrative support. GCMCs can grant immunity to witnesses to facilitate their testifying, but subordinate commanders should scrupulously avoid statements of favorable treatment or negotiating “deals” with witnesses or accused under circumstances that could be construed as involving a promise, express or implied, of immunity.

2. The most rare but egregious incidents of unlawful command influence are those that impact directly on the trial process by pressuring court members to convict or punish contrary to their actual conscience. It is criminal to subvert justice by putting command pressure on court members or witnesses.

3. The more common problem is actual or perceived discrimination against Soldiers who participate as witnesses at a court-martial. Some subordinates, eager to obey their commanders, may read more into their superior’s remarks than the superior intended. If subordinates reasonably misunderstand or misinterpret the superior commander’s actions or statements in a manner that deprives an accused of a fair trial, unlawful command influence exists.

\(c.\) Post-Trial stage.

1. After trial, the commander has the opportunity to review the results of the trial, to approve or disapprove findings, and to approve, suspend, reduce, or defer the adjudged sentence. The SJA provides a written recommendation in all GCM and BCD–SPCM cases regarding their disposition before the convening authority acts.

2. Article 37 prohibits commanders from censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing any court-martial member,
military judge, or counsel about the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or about any other exercise of judicial duties. It also prohibits giving unfavorable evaluations or ratings to court members because of court-martial participation.

Section IV
International/Operational Law

19–21. International law

a. International law is the application of international agreements, international customary practices, and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations to military operations and activities. Within the Army, the practice of international law also includes foreign law, comparative law, martial law, and domestic law affecting overseas, intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil-assistance activities.

b. The SJA’s international law responsibilities include:

• implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, including Law of War training, advice concerning the application of the law of war to military operations, and supervision of war crime investigations and trials;
• assistance with international legal issues relating to U.S. Forces overseas, including the legal basis for conducting operations, SOFAs, and the impact of foreign law on Army activities and personnel;
• monitoring of foreign trials and confinement of Army personnel and their dependents;
• assistance with legal issues in intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil assistance activities;
• advice to the command concerning the development of international agreements; and,
• legal liaison with host or allied/coalition nation legal authorities.

19–22. Operational law (OPLAW)

a. OPLAW is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly affects the conduct of military operations. OPLAW tasks support the military decision-making process, command and control, and sustainment of military operations. OPLAW encompasses the law of war and international stationing arrangements, but goes beyond these traditional international law concerns to incorporate all relevant aspects of military law that affect the conduct of operations. JAs provide operational law support in all operations. A comprehensive resource is The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Operational Law Handbook; but it should be kept in mind that this resource does not negate the imperative to consult with the SJA/OPLAW JA before conducting operations to ensure the legality of those operations.

b. The OPLAW JA supports the commander’s military decision-making process by performing mission-analysis, preparing legal estimates, designing the operational legal support architecture, war-gaming, writing legal annexes, assisting in the development and training of Rules of Engagement (ROE), and reviewing plans and orders. The OPLAW JA supports command and control by advising and assisting with targeting, ROE implementation, and information operations, and by facilitating the delivery of legal support in the core legal disciplines.

c. The Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) is a resource organization for land-based operational lawyers. CLAMO examines legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and devises training and resource strategies to address those issues.

d. A more specialized area of OPLAW is AC and RC involvement in Homeland Defense. The SecDef has established the overarching principles and policies to promote and support management of the Reserve Components as an operational force (DOD Directive 1200.17), More specific to the issue of domestic operations is DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), which is the base document for domestic operations in support of civil authorities (Garden Plot). With the current concern with international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, it should be anticipated that AC and RC units will plan for and participate in domestic operations in support of Homeland Defense. The OPLAW JA can provide current guidance on legal considerations during such operations, and more specifically regarding the operation to be undertaken.


a. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). A SOFA is an international agreement that defines the privileges and obligations of U.S. Forces deployed or stationed overseas. Members of the command must be thoroughly familiar with the SOFA and any supplements to that agreement. Key terms to be addressed and defined in any SOFA include the forces, the civilian component, and dependents.

b. Military justice.

(1) Jurisdiction is the key consideration in military justice. The SOFA must specify whether the sending state (United States) or the receiving state (host nation) possesses the authority to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. Ideally, the U.S. will have the exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the U.S. Forces, but host nations are usually reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction over more serious offenses. Typically, the host nation will retain the prerogative to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed against its property or citizens.
(2) Furthermore, although SOFAs generally do not address this issue, U.S. law generally does not permit trial by court-martial, in peacetime, of U.S. members of the civilian component, contractors, or dependents. However, Congress has enacted provisions (18 USC §§ 3261–3267) that give jurisdiction over civilians to U.S. District Courts. Procedures to implement these provisions are found in DOD Instruction 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members. Also, Article 2(10), UCMJ, provides for court-martial jurisdiction over civilians serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field in time of declared war or contingency operations. The SJA should be consulted regarding the use of these provisions.

(3) Other areas of concern are double jeopardy, production of witnesses for courts-martial, search and seizure, and host-nation confinement of members of the U.S. Forces.

(4) If jurisdiction is assumed by the host nation over U.S. Forces personnel, the Army will hire competent local counsel to represent the accused military member. The SJA will monitor the trial.

(5) SOFAs should also address administrative law, for example, provisions in the SOFA establish entry and exit requirements; specify the facilities to be provided U.S. Forces; establish requirements for the payment of customs, duties, and taxes; and indicate whether local labor laws will apply to civilians who are employed by the U.S. Forces; Overseas procurement (e.g., ensure that the stationing agreement stipulates that U.S. and not host-country law will govern U.S. acquisitions); and Payment of claims (the Foreign Claims Act will apply to determine whether the foreign claim may be paid).

c. Legal assistance. SOFAs generally do not address domestic-relations issues and consumer matters. The law of the receiving state or U.S. law will ordinarily apply. However, language barriers and unfamiliarity with the legal remedies and procedural rules may limit effective recourse in foreign courts.

d. NATO. Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement. In 1995, the North Atlantic Council approved the Partnership for Peace (PFP) SOFA, which was thereafter ratified by the United States. The provisions of this agreement are essentially those of the NATO SOFA, with minor modifications. With the admission into NATO of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1995, as well as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic in 2002, Albania and Macedonia remain members of the PFP. The PFP SOFA remains effective for exercises conducted by U.S. Forces in those two countries.

19–24. Deployment for conventional combat missions

The SJA is responsible for providing legal advice to the commander concerning the broad range of legal issues associated with the preparation for and deployment of U.S. Forces on combat missions.

a. International agreements. Members of the command must be familiar with international agreements, if any, in effect between the U.S. and that country to which U.S. Forces are deploying and any countries with which the U.S. has over flight, transit, staging, or other arrangements. Consideration should be given, time permitting, to requesting the SJA to provide appropriate briefings regarding such agreements.

b. Case Act. The Case Act (1 USC § 112b) limits the ability of members of the executive branch to negotiate agreements with foreign governments. The Case Act also requires that the Secretary of State transmit the text of written international agreements to Congress.

c. International agreements and Combatant Command (COCOM) authority. DOD Directive 5530.3, International Agreements, delegates authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements to the SECARMY and the CJCS. The CICS has delegated this authority to the COCOM Commanders.

d. Authority and responsibility for negotiating, concluding, forwarding and depositing of international agreements. AR 550–51, International Agreements, implements the Case Act and DOD Directive 5530.3 for the Army and delegates, subject to certain restrictions, authority to negotiate and conclude agreements to the heads of staff agencies and ACOM/ASCC/DRUs.

e. Legal bases for U.S. intervention. The commander should be aware of the legal bases for the use of U.S. Forces abroad. These bases define, and possibly restrict, the objectives and execution of military operations. An operation to protect U.S. nationals, for example, could not be used to justify other military objectives. The legal bases for use of force or forces overseas include:

(1) Protection of U.S. nationals.
(2) Collective self-defense, by treaty or request, assisting a state in resisting armed attack/aggression, to include externally-supported insurgent activity within a state.
(3) Unilateral self-defense against armed attack undertaken against U.S. forces or property overseas.
(4) Participation in properly authorized enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
(5) Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

f. War Powers Resolution (WPR). Absent a declaration of war or specific congressional approval for use of U.S. Forces abroad, the WPR imposes consultation and reporting requirements and time constraints upon the President when U.S. Forces are introduced into actual or potential hostilities. Generally, Congress must approve deployments falling within the purview of the WPR which last more than 90 days.

g. Review of OPLANS. Operational lawyers should review every operations plan, CONPLAN, contingency plan, and
operations order during each step of the planning process. SJAs must focus on assisting commanders in developing plans that will enable them to accomplish the mission within the limits of the law. The following documents set forth the operational lawyer’s role in the planning process.

1. The DOD Law of War Program. DOD Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program, requires that all services ensure that their military operations comply with the law of war and designates the SECARMY as the executive agent for implementing the program. JCS Memorandum (MICS) 59–8 provides that legal advisers should attend planning conferences for joint and combined operations and exercises involving ROE and related topics. The memorandum further provides that all plans, ROE policies, and directives should be consistent with the DOD Law of War Program. The joint command legal adviser should review these throughout their preparation.

2. Legal operations. FM 27–100, Legal Support to Operations, provides valuable additional guidance concerning operational law issues and legal support during war and small-scale contingencies.

h. Rules of engagement (ROE). ROE is a self-defining term, but the longer, official definition is that ROE are directives that a government may establish to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own military forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces. (Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Each command will establish ROE consistent with guidance from higher headquarters. In the absence of superseding ROE, this guidance may be found in JCS standing ROE. See CJCS Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces.

i. Rules of deadly force. Broader than standing ROE addressed above, the rules of deadly force policies are grounded in DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, and DOD Directive 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. Overseas, they apply primarily as a matter of force protection and are triggered by the mere presence of U.S. Forces, whether conducting operations, exercises, transit, or leave in theater. DOD Directive 2000.12 has been further supplemented by the regional commands. Nevertheless, commanders must know the consequences of using force, particularly in a host nation that retains criminal jurisdiction and may regard the U.S. application of force as criminal. Accordingly, legal review and advice should be obtained prior to implementing local rules of deadly force.

j. Law of war. Commanders must be sensitive to law of war issues and must plan for providing instruction to the members of the command concerning the essential provisions of The Hague and Geneva Conventions, as well as other conventions and treaties. The following discussion highlights the areas of the law of war most critical to commanders.

(1) Regulation of hostilities.

(a) Three general principles form the foundation for this area of the law of war:

1. Military Necessity. This principle justifies those actions not forbidden by international law that are indispensable for securing complete submission of the enemy in the shortest period of time. This enables commanders to act in furtherance of the military mission (Para. 3, FM 27–10).

2. Prevention of Unnecessary Suffering. Military necessity does not allow the commander to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering (Para. 34, FM 27–10).

3. Proportionality. The loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained (Para. 41, FM 27–10).

(b) In addition to the three principles stated above, commanders must be aware of the lawfulness of certain weapons, targets, stratagems, and reprisals (Para. 497, FM 27–10). The commander must be aware of the U.S. policies toward nuclear weapons (Para. 35, FM 27–10), biological, and chemical weapons (Executive Order No. 11850, 40 FR 16187 (1975)) and (Para. 38, FM 27–10)), including limitations on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in combat (Para. 38c, FM 27–10) (Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993, and additional Protocols I & II).

(2) Geneva Conventions. The 1949 Geneva conventions prescribe how commanders must treat prisoners of war (Chapter 3, FM 27–10), and sick and wounded on the battlefield and at sea (Chapter 4, FM 27–10). Commanders also have legal obligations to civilians in the area of operations. At division and above, commanders have an assistant chief of staff, G–5 (CA) to coordinate the political, social, cultural, and economics aspects of military operations in foreign areas. During deployments, organic assets may be augmented by CA units, drawn mainly from the Reserve Components [see FM 3–05.40 (FM 41–10), Civil Affairs Operations].

3. War crimes. Commanders have an affirmative obligation to investigate and report war crimes, and to discipline those who commit such crimes (FM 27–10). Further, under certain circumstances, commanders may be criminally liable for war crimes committed by their subordinates (FM 27–10).

k. Post-conflict governance—the law of occupation. Belligerent occupation is the military occupation of enemy territory. Two familiar examples are post-war Germany and Japan, and more recently Iraq.

(1) Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. A state of occupation exists when two conditions are satisfied: first, the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority; and second, the invader has successfully substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate government. Military occupation does not transfer sovereignty to the occupant, and the occupant’s powers are provisional only; the occupant may take only those measures necessary for the maintenance of law and order and proper administration of the occupied territory. The Hague and Geneva Conventions address criteria for the occupying
power such as authority of the occupant, administration of occupied territory, rights of the occupied population, property, services of occupied population, finance, and security of the occupant.

(2) No proclamation of occupation is legally necessary, but the fact of military occupation should be made known [FM 27–10, &para; 357]. In post-WWII Germany, General Eisenhower issued Proclamation Number 1. In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, L. Paul Bremer, civilian administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 on 16 May 2003.

(3) Termination. Occupation does not end upon cessation of hostilities, but continues until full sovereignty of the occupied area is returned to the displaced sovereign, or until sovereignty is assumed by another state. However, with restoration of sovereignty, U.S. Forces may remain and operate within the country under authority of a SOFA (19–23 above).

19–25. Security assistance missions

a. Missions responsibility.

(1) Security assistance consists of those statutory programs and authorities under which the U.S. may provide or regulate forms of assistance and sales to foreign governments (and international organizations) for the purpose of enhancing U.S./mutual security.

(2) These programs are designed to assist allies and friendly countries in meeting their security threats.

(3) The NSC establishes overall strategic planning and goals. Security assistance programs, as one means of accomplishing these goals, are managed by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. The Under Secretary is responsible for coordinating security assistance plans and programs normally conducted by the U.S. military; the Under Secretary also chairs the Arms Transfer Management Group (ATMG), which provides policy planning and reviews security assistance matters.

(4) Under direction of the U.S. Ambassador, coordination is accomplished in a given nation by the U.S. country team, consisting of representatives of all in-country U.S. Government departments, including a military officer who normally is in charge of the security assistance organization.

(5) Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal point of contact and policy spokesman for security assistance matters. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for the day-to-day management, control, and implementation of approved and funded security assistance programs.

(6) The JCS develop plans and systematically review ongoing security assistance programs for specific countries and geographical regions in order to ensure their compatibility with U.S. global security interests and to confirm that military assistance resources are being utilized in ways that promote U.S. strategic objectives.

(7) The military departments develop, negotiate, and execute agreements pertaining to security assistance programs. They also provide logistical advice and resources and administrative support necessary to move assets to a recipient country.

(8) COCOM Commanders exercise authority, direction, and control over U.S. Forces within a particular country that are assigned or attached. COCOM Commanders are responsible for ensuring that all security assistance programs within their geographical areas of responsibility are coordinated, integrated, and in consonance with regional U.S. defense plans. COCOM Commanders also identify and apply the security assistance resources required to achieve U.S. strategic goals at the regional level.

(9) Component commands of COCOMs participate in the planning and execution of security assistance programs.

b. Role of the operational lawyer. Operational lawyers are prepared to advise commanders concerning the various security assistance and arms transfer programs. They can advise on applicable legislative and regulatory requirements and interpretations of law, in order to avoid legal difficulties and actual or perceived abuses of security assistance aims.

c. Security assistance programs. Congress appropriates security assistance funds to the State Department, which then coordinates security assistance programs. The State Department then oversees the implementation of these programs.

(1) The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 USC § 2151 et seq.), Part I. This act provides economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and other forms of assistance to various countries. Part II of the FAA authorizes the U.S. to furnish security assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, upon request and after Congressional approval.

(2) Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). The purpose of FMFP is to enable U.S. allies and friends to enhance their self-defense capabilities through the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training. The high cost of modern weapon systems means that FMFP is primarily a grant program. FMFP is the primary component of military assistance to other nations under the security assistance policy.

(3) International Military Education and Training (IMET) (22 USC § 2347). IMET authorizes the President specific dollar amounts each FY to furnish military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. This education and training may be provided in both the U.S. and abroad.

(4) Expanded IMET (22 USC § 2347). Expanded IMET permits the President to train foreign civilian officials with
defense oversight responsibility and their military forces about human rights, the role of the military in a democracy, and effective military-justice systems, as well as counter-narcotics.

(5) Antiterrorism assistance (22 USC § 2349aa, et seq.). This program authorizes the President specific dollar amounts each FY to assist foreign countries in order to improve the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist activities.

(6) Economic Support Fund (ESF) (22 USC § 2346, et seq.). This program authorizes the President to provide, when U.S. national interests dictate, economic support in certain amounts to specified countries. ESF is designed to promote economic or political stability in recipient countries, although ESF may not be used for military or paramilitary purposes.

(7) Peacekeeping Operations (22 USC § 2348, et seq.). This program authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations. This authority may be used to provide financial resources, equipment and supplies, or services.

(8) Police training prohibition (Section 660, FAA, 22 USC § 2420). The Army cannot use FAA funds to provide training, advice, or financial support to police, prisons, or other law-enforcement forces of a foreign government or for any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of a foreign government. Longtime democracies, with no standing armed forces and which do not violate human rights, are exempt from Section 660 prohibitions. Other countries may also enjoy specific legislative exemption. There are also narrow exceptions for training foreign police personnel who primarily engage in counter-drug activities.

(9) Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 USC § 2751 et seq.).

(a) The AECA provides for the transfer of arms and other military equipment, as well as various defense services, through government-to-government agreements. AECA establishes the FMS Program. Under this program, DOD purchases military equipment or services from U.S. firms or takes equipment from U.S. stocks (under limited conditions) and sells the equipment or services to a foreign government or international organization. The services of DOD personnel, such as training or management advice, may also be sold. Authority is provided for the leasing of defense articles in DOD stocks to eligible recipients. The AECA authorizes the President to finance sales of defense articles and services or to guarantee financing to friendly foreign countries or international organizations. Note that the FMS program established under the AECA is not a grant program. Defense articles and services may not be provided to countries, under the AECA, on a nonreimbursable basis.

(b) The AECA is subject to revision on an annual basis and contains complex and sensitive legislative requirements, prohibitions, and limitations. A principal example of this is Section 2761 (c)(1), which prohibits personnel performing defense services under the AECA from any duties of a “combatant nature.” This provision effectively bars U.S. military trainers or advisers from accompanying units from AECA-recipient countries engaged in combat activities.

(c) The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is a document used to affect transfers under the AECA and details the status of DOD personnel providing defense services to a particular country. Such personnel are usually given certain administrative and technical privileges and immunities (P&I). In other words, they receive limited diplomatic immunity.

d. Other legislation. Commanders should also be aware of country and issue-specific security assistance legislation. Examples of the latter include provisions that:

(1) Limit or prohibit the provision of assistance to countries that violate human rights (22 USC § 2304, Human Rights and Security Assistance).

(2) Prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries that illegally expropriate U.S. property.

(3) Prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries that deliver nuclear enrichment or nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to any other country, or receive such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country. The United States also denies security assistance to countries that transfer nuclear explosive devices to non-nuclear states. Non-nuclear weapon states that receive or detonate nuclear explosive devices likewise may not receive security assistance funds. These prohibitions are subject to limited exceptions that require the President to certify that termination of assistance to such a country would be detrimental to the national security of the U.S.

(4) Completely stop foreign assistance to any country more than six months in arrears on payment of accrued debts to the U.S.

19–26. Deployment for overseas exercises

a. Potential legal issues. Before overseas exercise deployments, the SJA must consider every aspect of the operation to ensure that planning addresses all potential legal issues. This process will closely parallel that required for deployment for conventional combat missions.

b. Overseas training exercises. The expanded use of overseas training exercises requires the commander to be aware of legislation concerning construction activities, training activities, and exercise-related civic and humanitarian assistance undertaken in conjunction with overseas exercises.

c. Construction in support of training exercises.

(1) Congress has passed legislation (10 USC § 2805, Unspecified Minor Construction), concerning the funding of
exercise-related construction and unspecified minor military projects coordinated or directed by the JCS outside the U.S during any FY.

(2) Congress has also established certain guidelines for determining the cost of projects constructed in support of military training exercises:

(a) Transportation costs of materials, supplies, and government-furnished equipment are excluded.
(b) Travel and per diem costs applicable to troop labor and costs of material, supplies, services, and fuel furnished by sources outside of DOD on a non-reimbursable basis are excluded.

(3) Congress has also reaffirmed a Comptroller General determination that the structures of a minor and temporary nature (such as tent platforms, field latrines, range targets, and installed relocatable structures) completely removed at the termination of an exercise may be funded through Operations and Maintenance (O&M) exercise accounts.

(4) Given the evolving law and regulations applicable to exercise-related construction, theater operators and planners should consult with the COCOM’s legal adviser before planning exercise construction.

2. Training activities. Units deployed on overseas exercises may familiarize host-nation forces with U.S. equipment for interoperability and safety purposes. The Army must meet security assistance requirements when the instruction before a combined exercise rises to a level of formal training comparable to that normally provided through security assistance. 10 USC § 2011, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces, permits U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct training missions with friendly foreign forces, provided the missions are designed primarily to train U.S. special operations forces.

3. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) (10 USC § 401).

(1) The SJA is prepared to provide advice to commanders concerning the scope and nature of HCA that may be provided to nationals of a host country. DOD Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, and DOD Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program, implement the HCA program and give detailed procedures.

(2) HCA activities are designed to promote foreign policy, the national security interests of the U.S. and the country where the HCA is carried out, and the specific operational readiness skills of the U.S. Armed Forces that participate in the activity. HCA consists of:

(a) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas.
(b) Construction of rudimentary roads and bridges.
(c) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
(d) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
(e) Detection and clearance of landmines, including the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance related to such.

(3) HCA may be provided only to those countries that are specifically approved by the Secretary of State acting upon DOD request.

(4) Except for “minimal” expenditures, only funds specifically appropriated for HCA may be used for that purpose. O&M funds may be used for the minimal expenditures.

19–27. Smaller-scale contingencies (SSC)

SSC often occur within the context of one of three levels of conflict discussed below. The U.S. response to a given situation is based upon the level of the conflict and applicable international law. The SJA must advise commanders of the legal basis for U.S. responses to situations and the legal issues associated with security assistance programs and exercises conducted by the U.S. in conjunction with such responses. Examples of SSC include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation operations, show of force demonstrations, strikes, raids, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, counterdrug, nation assistance, disaster relief, and civil support. (See Joint Pub 3–0, Joint Operations, for a detailed discussion of these missions.)

a. Levels of conflict. It is useful to categorize conflict into three levels:

(1) Level I—Disruptive actions against a constituted government.

(a) This level of conflict involves actions committed by individuals and small, loosely organized groups. They foment discontent through propaganda, protests, and demonstrations. They also engage in subversive, violent, and nonviolent acts of sabotage and/or terrorism.

(b) The domestic law of the state applies to these individuals and groups. The state may treat them as common criminals, as their activities have no international legal status.

(c) Third-party states may not aid those engaged in such activities. These states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used as a base of operations by those engaged in disruptive activities.

(d) U.S. actions with the recognized government generally consist of security assistance, arms transfer programs, and combined training exercises.

(2) Level II—Insurgency.

(a) Insurgencies are characterized by organized military operations against the constituted government. Insurgents
may exercise de facto control over portions of a state’s territory and portions of the population and may engage in all forms of disruptive activity against the constituted government.

(b) Insurgents must be treated in accordance with the law of the state. They are, however, protected by the provisions of common Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

(c) Third-party states may not aid the insurgents, but may recognize that the insurgents exercise control over portions of the territory and population. The legality of third-party state assistance to the constituted government may be largely dependent upon whether insurgent activity is externally supported or controlled. Assistance to the constituted government may be viewed as illegal intervention in some cases. Just as in Level I, third-party states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used as insurgent bases of operations.

(d) Assuming the U.S. intervention is not illegal, it may employ and exercise the full range of security assistance activities in support of the constituted government, and the use of U.S. combat support forces on a unilateral or regionally collective basis may be required.

(3) Level III—Belligerency.

(a) A conflict rises to the level of a belligerency when the insurgents have governmental and military organizations of their own, their military operations are conducted in accordance with the law of war, they have a determinate percentage of territory and population under effective control, and the conflict becomes conventional in nature.

(b) The law of armed conflict applies to belligerencies, which have similar status under international law as wars between sovereign states. Any assistance afforded to either belligerent by a third-party state constitutes an act of war against the other. Further, participation in the conflict by third-party states gives the conflict an international character requiring application of the international law norms of neutrality.

(c) U.S. response may consist of appropriate unilateral or regional military actions. The U.S. may also participate in peacekeeping operations following a cease-fire in the conflict. FM 3–07 (FM 100–20), Stability Operations and Support Operations, and Joint Pub 3–07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping, describe categories of such operations and missions.

b. Special Operations. Special operations missions are legally and politically sensitive, particularly in the absence of international armed conflict. The commander must consider not only traditional law of war issues, but also the requirements of domestic United States law (such as fiscal, security assistance, and intelligence oversight laws or DOD Directives relating to PSYOP) and broader international law requirements (such as those in mutual defense treaties and host nation support agreements (FM 27–100). JAs assigned to special operations units must actively participate in all phases of mission planning and execution to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. law and policy.

Section V
Contract/Fiscal Law

19–28. Overview

a. Contract law is the application of domestic and international law to the acquisition of goods, services, and construction. Fiscal law is the application of domestic statutes and regulations to the funding of military operations. The practice of contract and fiscal law includes battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, bid protests and contract dispute litigation, procurement fraud oversight, economy act transfers, commercial activities, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, and support to non-Federal agencies and organizations.

b. The SJA’s contract and fiscal law responsibilities include furnishing legal advice and assistance to procurement officials during all phases of the contracting process, to include advice on the labor, environmental, intellectual property, and tax law applicable to contractors; determining the proper use and expenditure of funds; overseeing an effective procurement fraud abatement program; and providing legal advice to the command concerning battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, LOGCAP, the commercial activities program, interagency agreements for logistics support, overseas real estate and construction, FMS cases, and support to non-Federal agencies and organizations.

19–29. Contract legal review

a. Commanders should ensure that their contracting officers work closely with legal support. DA policy requires that legal counsel:

(1) Participate fully in the entire acquisition process.

(2) Participate as a member of the contracting officer’s team, and advise as to the legal sufficiency of actions taken.

b. Legal counsel shall inform the contracting officer whether the proposed action is legally sufficient, the details of any insufficiency, and a recommended course of action to overcome the insufficiency. The head of contracting activities (HCA), ordinarily at ACOM/ASCC/DRU level and higher, decides differences between the contracting officer and the legal counsel as to legal sufficiency that cannot be resolved at the contracting-office level. Other acquisition areas in which legal counsel may assist the commander include:

(1) Bid protests by disappointed bidders.

(2) Contract performance problems.

(3) Contractor requests for equitable adjustment or contract modification.
(4) Contract litigation pursuant to the “Disputes Clause” of a contract or pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 USC §§ 601–613).

(5) Issues relating to the Commercial Activities Program.

(6) Issues relating to NAF contracting.

(7) Issues relating to funding of Government contracts.

19–30. Fiscal law

a. Fiscal limitations. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to raise revenues, borrow funds, and appropriate money for Federal agencies. Under these express constitutional powers, Congress strictly limits the obligation and expenditure of public funds by the executive branch. Congress regulates virtually all executive branch programs and activities through the appropriations process. Violating congressionally enacted fiscal procedures subjects the offender to potential serious adverse personnel actions or even criminal penalties. There are three major fiscal limitations:

(1) An agency may only obligate and expend appropriations for a proper purpose.

(2) An agency must obligate within the time limits applicable to the appropriation (for example, O&M funds are available for obligation for one FY).

(3) The obligation must be within the amounts established by Congress.

b. Availability as to purpose.

(1) The “purpose statute,” 31 USC § 1301(a), provides that appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made, except as otherwise provided by law. DOD has discretion in determining how to accomplish the purpose of an appropriation. A particular expenditure not specified in the statute must be either reasonably necessary in carrying out an authorized function or contribute materially to the effective accomplishment of the function.

(2) By regulation, DOD has assigned most types of expenditures to a specific appropriation. These separate appropriations include O&M for day-to-day operations, contingency funds, MILCON, and more specifically military family housing. There are specific rules and requirements for each of these “purposes.” Close coordination with the SJA is strongly encouraged.

(3) Finally, money spent on general officer quarters is closely scrutinized. Many general officer quarters are older and larger than the vast majority of family housing units. Many are also historic and architecturally significant. These factors tend to make these units the most expensive to operate and maintain. Chapter 3, Section XIII, AR 420–1, Army Facilities Management, establishes detailed procedures for spending money on general officer quarters and must be consulted regularly. General officers are responsible for knowing how much money is spent to maintain their quarters, and must be familiar with cost limitations and approval authority levels. Accidental or intentional abuse may lead to allegations and embarrassing and expensive investigations.

c. Availability as to time.

(1) Appropriations are available for limited periods. An agency must incur a legal obligation to pay money within the period of availability. If funds are not obligated before they expire, they are no longer available.

(2) The “bona fide needs” statute, 31 USC § 1502(a), provides that the balance of an appropriation or fund limited for obligation to a definite period is available only for payment of expenses properly incurred during the period of availability or to complete contracts properly made within that period of availability.

(a) Supplies.

1. Supplies are bona fide needs of the period in which they are needed. Thus, supplies needed for operations during a given FY are bona fide needs of that year.

2. Supplies ordered in one fiscal period that will not be required until subsequent fiscal periods are bona fide needs of the first period under two circumstances:

- The Inventory Exception. A bona fide need for supplies exists when there is a present requirement for supply items to meet an authorized stockage level (replenishment of operating stock levels, safety levels, mobilization requirements, authorized backup stocks, etc.); and

- The Lead-Time Exception. If goods or materials will not be obtainable on the open market at the time needed for use because the time required to order, produce, fabricate, and deliver them requires that they be purchased in a prior FY, such supplies are a bona fide need of the first year.

(b) Services. As a general rule, services are presumed to be bona fide needs of the FY in which they are performed. There is a statutory exception to the general rule (see 10 USC § 2410a). Defense agencies may enter into a contract for procurement of severable services for a period that begins in one FY and ends in the next FY if (without regard to any option to extend the period of the contract) the contract period does not exceed one year. Funds made available for a FY may be obligated for the total amount of an action entered into under this authority.

d. Availability as to amount.

(1) Apportionment. The OMB apportions appropriations to agencies for obligation over their period of availability. Agencies subdivide these funds among their activities. In the Army, the operating agency/ACOM/ASCC/DRU is the
lowest command level at which the formal administrative subdivisions of funds required by 31 USC § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures, are maintained. Below the ACOM/ASCC/DRU level, subdivisions are informal targets or allowances.

(2) Prohibitions. The Antideficiency Act, 31 USC §§ 1341, 1342, 1349, et seq., and 1517 et seq., prohibits any government officer or employee from:

(a) Making or authorizing an expenditure or obligation in excess of the amount available in an appropriation.

(b) Incurring an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless authorized by law.

(c) Making or authorizing expenditures or incurring obligations in excess of formal subdivisions of funds; or more than amounts permitted by regulations prescribed under 31 USC § 1514(a).

(d) Accepting unauthorized voluntary services from government employees or contractors (31 USC §1342).

(3) Commander responsibilities. Commanders who become aware of possible violations of the Antideficiency Act must investigate and report them promptly. If substantiated, the violation must be reported to the DOD, Congress, and the President.

e. Government operations during funding gaps and continuing resolutions. During a continuing resolution, the Army is generally not allowed to initiate or increase the scope of existing programs, projects, and activities. Operations continue at the rate of funds available during the previous FY, or at some specified lower amount. Army activities can expect to receive guidance from OMB and the Army Comptroller addressing what activities the Army can continue during the absence of appropriations. While certain employees and activities are exempt from Government suspension or shutdown during a funding gap, the Army must suspend other activities and may not accept voluntary performance of non-exempt services by non-exempt employees.

Section VI
Summary and references

19–31. Summary
This chapter is intended as a guide to the various legal issues that Commanders and others may encounter in carrying out their duties. As law and regulations are ever changing, this chapter is useful as a reference, but it should be kept in mind that servicing Army Judge Advocates and Army civilian lawyers are the most current resource for given situations. Army JAs and civilian lawyers stand ready to advise commanders on myriad and complex legal issues that confront Army leaders every day. Commanders should form close professional relationships with the command legal adviser. SJAs can do much more than advise on the legality of an action. They can assist commanders in accomplishing legitimate command objectives, and can provide sound advice and judgment to commanders and their staffs.

19–32. References

a. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
b. DOD Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.
c. DOD 1400.25M, Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Management System.
f. DOD Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.
g. DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).
h. DOD Directive 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties.

i. DOD Directive 5530.3, International Agreements.
l. DOD Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program.
m. DOD Instruction 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members.

n. Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
o. Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations.
q. CICS Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces.
r. Army Regulation 27–3, The Army Legal Assistance Program.
s. Army Regulation 27–10, Military Justice.
t. Army Regulation 27–20, Claims.
v. Army Regulation 420–1, Army Facilities Management.
w. Army Regulation 550–51, International Agreements.
x. Army Regulation 600–8–24, Officer Transfers and Discharges.
y. Army Regulation 600–20, Army Command Policy.
z. Army Regulation 635–200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations.

ad. Field Manual 27–100, Legal Support to Operations.

ae. The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook.
af. Office of Government Ethics (OGE), Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.
Chapter 20

Civil Functions of the Department of The Army

I am firmly convinced that but for the existence of the Corps of Engineers peacetime organization and its resources of men, methods, training and supply and its close association with the military through the years, the history of the Pacific area in World War II would have been written more in blood than in achievement. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Testimony before House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 3830, 1947

Section I
Introduction

20–1. Civil functions defined
A number of activities traditionally carried out by the Department of the Army (DA) are commonly referred to as civil functions. The most extensive of these functions is the Civil Works Program managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE, or “the Corps”). The Civil Works Program focuses on responsible development, protection and restoration of the Nation’s water and related land resources. Civil Works projects are implemented and operated for commercial navigation, flood risk management, environmental restoration, hydroelectric power, recreation, municipal and industrial water supply, and allied purposes. Civil functions also include USACE engineering and construction support to non-Defense-related activities of the Federal Government, State and local agencies; and USACE foreign activities not exclusively in support of U.S. forces overseas. Arlington National Cemetery and the Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home National Cemetery complete the list of civil functions.

20–2. Authorization, congressional oversight and funding for civil functions
Financial and personnel resources associated with the Civil Works Program are principally authorized under Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs) and funded by the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts - not the Defense appropriation. Program funding under these acts is generally $5 to $6 billion a year. Additional funds may be provided through Supplemental Appropriation Acts; one for FY 2009 provided over $5.7 billion for reconstruction and improvement of flood protection works in the New Orleans area, bringing the total estimated program for that year to above $11 billion. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 and subsequent WRDAs require cost-sharing contributions from State and local government project sponsors for most Civil Works activities. USACE support activities for other, non-Defense agencies are reimbursed by those agencies - to include emergency response activities funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Congressional committees like the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (for the Civil Works Program) and the Subcommittee on Benefits of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs (for Arlington National Cemetery) provide legislative oversight. Although they differ from other Army programs in financing and oversight, the civil functions are an integral part of the overall mission of the Army and the service it provides to the Nation.

20–3. Relationship to warfighting competencies
The civil functions complement and augment the Army’s warfighting competencies, providing the capability to respond to a variety of situations across the spectrum of conflict. They provide a valuable tool with which to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) by maintaining a trained and ready engineer force at virtually no additional expense to the DOD military budget and at minimum expense to personnel allocations. More than 3,000 Corps of Engineers employees in jobs funded by the Civil Works program have deployed for short tours in Iraq, Afghanistan and other overseas areas, many of them multiple times. Engineering expertise resident in the Civil Works program is also made available to combatant commanders through USACE’s “Reachback” programs.

20–4. Leadership and organization
a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). Through specific statutory provisions, General Orders from the SECARMY (SA), and internal DA regulation, the Assistant SECARMY (Civil Works) ((ASA(CW)) has been assigned responsibilities for civil functions. The ASA(CW) reports directly to the SA. Congress established the position of the ASA(CW) in Section 211 of the Flood Control Act of 1970, Public Law (PL) 91–611, and reaffirmed it in Section 501 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99–433. The Goldwater-Nichols Act specifies that the Assistant Secretary’s duties include overall supervision of the functions of the Department of Army relating to programs for conservation and development of water resources, including flood risk management, navigation, environmental restoration and stewardship, and related purposes.

b. USACE. Most of the Army’s civil functions are executed by the USACE, a Direct Reporting Unit consisting of about 600 military and 33,000 civilians, which also: 1) provides real estate services; 2) conducts research & development; 3) conducts planning & engineering studies; and 4) designs and builds military facilities for the Army, Air Force, other Federal agencies, and foreign governments. Approximately 300 military personnel and 23,500 civilian employees
in the USACE are involved in civil functions. The Chief of Engineers, who holds positions as both a principal HQDA Staff officer and a commander, commands the USACE. The Chief of Engineers and the Corps’ Deputy CG for Civil and Emergency Operations report to the ASA(CW) on the Civil Works Program. Under the Chief’s command are nine divisions, eight of which have Civil Works missions. Also part of the USACE are the Engineer Research and Development Center, two engineer centers, and one MTOE battalion—the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power).

The Civil Works Program within the CONUS generally follow watersheds and drainage basins, as shown in Figure 21–1. These delineations reflect the water resources mission of the Corps of Engineers. (Military Construction (MILCON) districts generally follow State boundaries.) The Corps also includes a number of overseas offices with missions in construction in support of U.S. Forces, assistance to other countries and international organizations, and support to other U.S. agencies. The Pacific Ocean Division, headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, includes subordinated districts in Hawaii, Alaska, Japan, and Korea. The North Atlantic Division includes the Europe District as well as five state恻ides. In January 2004, the USACE stood up the Gulf Region Division, with headquarters in Baghdad and three subordinate districts in Iraq. The USACE also stood up an independent district for work in Afghanistan. Several CONUS-based districts also carry out overseas missions, such as Mobile District’s support of USSOUTHCOM. One of the engineer centers, the Transatlantic Programs Center, in Winchester, Virginia, oversees most Corps activities in Africa, and the Middle East (other than Iraq and Afghanistan). The other center, the Huntsville Engineering and Support Center, has a worldwide mission of providing engineering and technical services, including programs such as chemical demilitarization, and Cooperative Threat Reduction.

c. The role of the private sector. The private sector is an essential element of the Engineer team. Private construction firms carry out practically all of its construction work, employing about 300,000 people at a time on Corps activities. The Corps also employs private architectural, engineering and construction firms for over half of its design and all of its construction work. In FY 2008, the USACE let over $5 billion in contracts for Civil Works activities. Of this amount, $2.35 billion (46.7%) went to small businesses, including $737 million (14.6%) to small disadvantaged firms. The partnership between the USACE and the private sector represents a force multiplier of several hundred thousand architects, engineers, and builders, ready to support the Nation in times of emergency.

Section II
Civil works program

20–5. Civil works program activities

a. The program. The Civil Works Program provides for nationwide development and management of water and related land resources, including the planning, design, construction, rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of flood risk management, navigation, ecosystem and other environmental restoration, and multiple-purpose water resource projects. The Civil Works Planning function is the foundation of the overall Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program in the development and authorization of new water resources construction projects. Completed Corps projects may include hydroelectric power, water supply, recreation, and natural and cultural resource management. Collectively, they include approximately 12 million acres of land and water. In addition to this direct Federal investment program, the Civil Works Program includes an important regulatory mission in which the Corps regulates construction in navigable waters under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The Corps also regulates the deposition of dredged and fill material in waters of the United States, including wetlands, under the Clean Water Act of 1972. In addition, the Civil Works Program includes emergency flood fighting, recovery operations, and repair and restoration of flood control works — all performed under the USACE’s own authority as specified in PL 84–99. USACE also carries out DOD’s responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP) (see Chapter 23) as the lead planning and operating agent for public works and engineering (Emergency Support Function #3) (see Chapter 23), in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal agencies.

b. Funding sources. The Civil Works Program receives its principal funding through the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, which include funds from the Inland Waterways and Harbor Maintenance Trust Funds as well as general revenues. The program also receives funding from non-Federal project sponsors who share in feasibility study and construction costs according to formulas established by Congress in PL 99–662, the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, and subsequent water project authorization acts. The Civil Works Program funding in FY 2008 totaled $9.469 billion. Of this amount, $5.592 billion was appropriated by Congress in the regular appropriation, $3.383 billion in Supplemental Appropriations - mostly for hurricane recovery; about $400 million by non-Federal project sponsors, $85 million from the Coastal Wetlands Trust Fund for work in Coastal Louisiana, and $9 million from license and use fees. This figure does not include $1.9 billion in reimbursable support to other agencies.

c. Economic infrastructure. (1)The USACE has been the Nation’s major contributor to the development, construction, and maintenance of a sound water resources infrastructure. Commercial navigation and flood risk management are long-standing missions of the Civil Works Program. The navigation function includes improvement and maintenance of harbors handling all of the Nation’s seaborne commerce and that of the Great Lakes. With funds from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, the Corps maintains navigability in 190 harbors handling more than 250,000 tons of cargo per year, and 736 smaller harbors. With more than 15 million American jobs dependent on U.S. import and export trade,
the Nation’s commercial ports are vital to the economic security of the United States. The Corps has built an intracoastal and inland commercial waterway network of 12,000 miles and over 241 locks and dams at 195 sites. Major segments of this network include the 1) Lower Mississippi River (1,015 miles); 2) Upper Mississippi River (936 miles); 3) Ohio River (981 miles); 4) Tennessee River (785 miles); 5) Missouri River (735 miles); 6) Arkansas and White Rivers (706 miles); 7) Columbia-Snake River System (468 miles); 8) South Atlantic Coast (1,111 miles); 9) Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW)-West (1,501 miles); and 10) GIWW–East (431 miles). Major improvements to inland waterway facilities are financed in part by the Inland Waterway Trust Fund. More than 600 million tons of commerce is moved every year on these waterways. Maintaining the system of ports and inland waterways involves removing more than 200 million cubic yards of dredged material each year USACE shares with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), both the expertise and mandate to address the nation’s vulnerabilities to flood related disasters and damages. Since passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936 established a federal role in flood management, the Corps’ authorized responsibilities have expanded to include developing structural and non structural solutions to managing flood risks, inspecting the condition of existing flood management infrastructure, providing technical and planning support to states and communities, conducting advance emergency measures to alleviate impending flooding, and rehabilitating levees and other flood management infrastructure damaged by flooding. The Nation’s $126 billion investment in flood control (currently termed flood risk management) (1928 through 2004, adjusted to 2004 dollars) has prevented over $801 billion in flood damages (again adjusted for inflation to 2004 dollars) - a return of more than six dollars in flood damage reduction for each dollar invested. Civil works projects seek to reduce flood-related damages with structural measures such as reservoirs, levees, improved channels, and floodwalls. Nonstructural measures, such as advice and encouragement for local zoning regulations, flood proofing of individual homes, and setting aside land in the floodplain as open space also contribute to this mission. Flood risk management efforts range from small, local protection projects to large lakes and dams. Today, 383 dams and reservoirs are maintained and operated by the Corps for the purpose of flood damage prevention. Since passage of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, most of these projects have been constructed as joint ventures between the Federal Government and non-Federal sponsors. These projects, once built, are operated and maintained by the sponsor.(2)The Corps can provide flood management technical or emergency assistance through a wide variety of authorities and programs. For example, through its Flood Plain Management Services Program (FPMS), the Corps can provide information, technical assistance and planning guidance (paid for by the federal government) to states and local communities to help them address flood management issues. Typical focus areas are flood hazard evaluation, dam break analysis, flood warning preparedness, flood plain management and much more. In cases where flooding is imminent in a specific area, the Corps is authorized to take immediate advance measures to protect life and property, such as constructing temporary flow restriction structures and removing log debris blockages. The responsibility for managing the Nation’s flood risks does not lie exclusively with Federal agencies, such as the Corps and FEMA. Rather, it is shared across multiple federal, state, and local government agencies with a complex set of programs and authorities, including private citizens and private enterprises such as banking and insurance industries, as well as developers. Both the Corps and FEMA have programs to assist states and communities reduce flood damages and promote sound flood risk management. However, the authority to determine how land is used within floodplains and enforce flood-wise requirements is entirely the responsibility of state and local government. Floodplain management choices made by state and local officials can impact the maximum effectiveness of federal programs to mitigate flood risk and the performance of federal flood damage reduction. However, the federal investment is protected by the execution of agreements between the federal and non-federal partners. (3)In November 2007, the Corps established a Levee Safety Program, an important step forward to ensure the public is aware of the risks associated with levees in Corps programs. The mission of the program is to assess the integrity and viability of levee systems and recommend actions to ensure these systems do not pose unacceptable risks. The main objectives are to hold public safety paramount, reduce adverse economic impacts, and develop reliable and accurate information. Within the program, a National Levee Database has been created to serve as a national source of information to facilitate and link activities, which include flood risk communication, levee certification, levee inspection, floodplain management, and risk assessments. The database presently includes levees within a Corps program or FEMA’s NFIP. WRDA 2007 extended the Corps authority and allows the inclusion of all nonfederal levees on a voluntary basis. Also, a methodology for performing technical risk assessments of existing levee infrastructure is under development to serve as a consistent risk based framework to evaluate levees nationally. Additional activities within this program include the creation of national teams to focus on developing new policies in other areas concerning levee safety, such as inspections of existing levee systems, verification or establishment of existing geodetic control, minimum standards for new levee systems and interim risk reduction measures. Key policy issues in which close collaboration between the Corps, FEMA, and other stakeholders is necessary relate directly to the Levee Safety Program. Specifically, these areas include levee inventory, mapping the flood hazard, inspection and assessment of levees, operation and maintenance of levees, and emergency response and evacuations. The Corps operates 75 power plants, which represent almost one fourth of the Nation’s hydroelectric capacity or three percent of the Nation’s total power generating capacity. Dams built by the USACE provide water storage for drinking water, irrigation, and fish and wildlife habitat. Additionally, 423 of the projects mentioned above (mostly lakes) are developed for recreational use. These projects accommodate nearly 372 million visits a year. The Corps estimates that one in 10 Americans visit a civil works project at least once a year. Visitors to
these recreation areas generate 350,000 private and public sector jobs. USACE is the Federal government’s largest provider of outdoor recreation, hosting 20% of visits to Federal recreation areas on 2% of Federal land. (4) The transportation infrastructure developed in the Civil Works Program plays a role in national defense. Ports and waterways serve as vital logistics links when large volumes of materiel and personnel must be moved around the country and around the world. The USACE works with the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and local port authorities to ensure that ports are ready to support movement of military equipment and supplies when needed. This partnership was especially effective in moving nearly all the Army’s equipment and supplies necessary for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Waterways built and operated and maintained by the USACE similarly have direct military uses for strategic mobility. Units of the Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas National Guard have conducted successful movements over the Arkansas, Mississippi, and Illinois Rivers to their summer training sites, and the 101st Air Assault Division has conducted movements by waterway from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky to Louisiana. The USACE flood control projects also contribute to force projection by protecting important highway and railway links. Thus, through activities as diverse as facilitating the movement of materiel to protecting vital infrastructure, the Civil Works Program contributes to National security.

d. The environment.

(1) Project activities and regulatory programs. The Civil Works Program makes important contributions toward meeting the Nation’s environmental goals by constructing projects for restoration and protection of ecosystem and other environmental functions and values. Much of this work proceeds in partnership with other Federal and State agencies or recognized American Indian Tribes, Alaska Natives, and local communities. In 2002, the Corps entered into a partnership with The Nature Conservancy to improve the management of U.S. rivers for restoration purposes while maintaining the projects’ economic services. In addition, the Corps has agreements with the National Fish and Wildlife Federation and Ducks Unlimited to advance restoration of important ecological resources.

(2) Project authorities.

(a) Legislation passed in 1990 established environmental restoration and protection as one of the primary missions in the planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of water resources projects - equivalent to navigation and flood risk management. This new direction stimulated the Corps and its non-Federal project sponsors to plan and implement new projects with environmental restoration as a primary project purpose.

(b) Like other major Corps projects, Congress must authorize large restoration projects. In one of the largest environmental restoration and protection projects ever undertaken, the Departments of the Army and the Interior have been cooperating with the State of Florida to restore the hydrologic regime of the Everglades in South Florida. Congress approved the Corps’ Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan as a planning framework as well in Title VI of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000, PL 106–541. The first feasibility study for a component of this project requiring specific authorization was completed in 2002.

(c) The Corps and the State of Louisiana are working together to restore and protect that State’s shrinking coastal wetlands and stem an ongoing loss of 25 to 35 square miles per year. This ecosystem is vital to the Nation’s environmental health for naturally filtering out water pollution and for providing critical winter habitat for 70% of the Nation’s waterfowl. This ecosystem is also vital to the Nation’s economy as the home of a major seafood industry. The wetlands and barrier islands also protect inland urban, industrial, and agricultural areas from hurricanes and coastal storms - including New Orleans and dozens of other communities that are home to a culture unique in America. Work in Coastal Louisiana took on added urgency after Hurricane Katrina focused national attention on the role of coastal wetlands in attenuating storm surge and wave action.

(d) In addition to specifically authorized projects such as the Everglades and Coastal Louisiana restoration projects described above, environmental restoration is accomplished through three programmatic authorities for small projects. Under Section 1135 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, PL 99–662, the USACE is authorized to modify projects it constructed earlier in the interest of making them “greener.” Section 1135 also authorizes the USACE to accomplish environmental restoration when the original Corps project contributed to environmental loss. Section 204 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1992 provided authority for beneficial uses of dredged material. This authority allows the USACE to use material from the dredging of navigation projects for environmental restoration. The third authority is Section 206 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1996. This provision established a program for Aquatic Ecosystem Restoration under which small projects may be constructed and no link to an existing Corps’ project is required. Working toward a national goal of “no net loss of wetlands,” the Civil Works Program is undertaking projects to restore existing wetlands and to create new ones.

(3) Regulatory program.

(a) The USACE’s regulatory program has a long history of protecting the Nation’s waters. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 authorizes the USACE to regulate, by permit, dredging, construction, and similar activities in navigable waters of the United States. A principal objective of this program is to ensure that waterways are improved and maintained for commercial and recreational users. Over time, the Corps’ “public interest review” has become an important part of the decision process used by Corps district commanders in granting, modifying or denying permit applications.

(b) The 1972 Clean Water Act authorized USACE to regulate, by permit, dredging and fill material discharge
activities in waters of the United States, including wetlands. This Act expanded the Corps’ regulatory responsibilities beyond those contemplated in the *Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899*. Also, other environmental laws that were enacted at about the same time require Federal decision makers to consider and take responsibility for the environmental consequences of their actions. Section 103 of the *Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972*, as amended, authorizes the SECARMY to issue permits for the transportation of dredged material for ocean disposal. In its determination, the Corps ensures that the dumping will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological system, or economic potentialities. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the USACE regulatory jurisdiction does not extend to all wetlands. Its *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County* decision in 2001 excluded wetlands wholly within one state and not connected to a navigable waterway, while the *Rapanos* and *Carabell* rulings of 2006 required a “significant nexus” to a navigable waterway for the Corps to assert jurisdiction.

(c) Today the regulatory program consolidates the public interest and environmental consequence reviews into a comprehensive evaluation process for decision-making. The evaluation process promotes the balancing of environmental protection with responsible economic growth. In FY 2007, the Corps granted permission for nearly 53,500 activities in the Nation’s waterways and wetlands. Of these, about 48,500 were permitted under blanket nationwide or regional permits for certain types of work; the rest required individual permits. The Corps required modifications at 2,500 of these projects, denied 406 applications, and saw another nearly 6,000 withdrawn by the applicant. The Corps regulatory program provides the public a valuable service - protection of the Nation’s waters and wetlands.

(4) *Stewardship.* The Corps is steward for about 12 million acres of land and water in 42 States. Conservation of forests, range wildlife habitat, fisheries, and soils involves multiple use of resources and sound ecosystem management principles. The USACE accomplishes this through a mix of its own management capabilities, partnerships with State and local governments, volunteers, and working agreements with a wide range of interest groups.

(5) *Compliance.* The Corps conducts compliance assessments at all of its projects on a five-year cycle through the environmental compliance assessment program. The Environmental Review Guide for Operations (ERGO), the tool used to conduct assessments, is a checklist containing Federal and State environmental statutes and Corps requirements. Project and facility managers, as well as external organizations, use ERGO to systematically locate and correct environmental deficiencies.

(6) *Civil environmental activities’ relationship to Army missions.* Environmental activities in the Civil Works Program are essential elements of the Army’s Environmental Strategy for the 21st Century. People who learn their specialties in civil missions that concern natural and cultural resources, water quality, flood plain management or hazardous waste management help the Army go “beyond compliance” to take on a leadership role in natural resources stewardship. Civil works expertise helped the Army develop such tools as the Environmental Compliance Assessment System (ECAS) and Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM). The Civil Works Program is responsible for about half the Army’s land holdings, and is familiar with balancing preservation of the natural environment with human use - a major issue facing the Army. This program is also the Army’s reservoir of cultural resources expertise, which the Army has used on several priority missions.

(7) *Nonstructural Flood Risk Management.* In recent years the Corps has placed an increasing emphasis on nonstructural approaches to flood management. Nonstructural alternatives focus on efforts and measures to reduce flood damages in an area by addressing the development in the floodplain. Alternatives include such measures as floodplain zoning, participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), developing and implementing flood warning systems (coordinated with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) flood warning program) and emergency evacuation plans, and flood proofing individual structures as well as removing structures from the extreme flood hazard areas.

(8) *Environmental Operating Principles.* In 2002, the Chief of Engineers announced a set of Environmental Operating Principles to guide all the Corps’ activities. The essence of these principles is that environmental concerns are integral to all Corps missions, decision-making, programs, and projects. They illuminate ways these missions integrate with environmental laws, values, and sound environmental practices, and serve as a roadmap for all USACE functional areas to follow in ensuring that the effects of their activities upon the environment are included in the decision process at the earliest possible juncture.

e. *Emergency preparedness and disaster response.*

(1) The USACE responds to the Nation’s needs in case of natural or man-made disasters and emergencies. The USACE programs provide a wide variety of assistance to protect human life and improved property, reduce human suffering, help communities recover from the effects of disasters, and mitigate damage and future threats. Response and recovery activities supplement State and local efforts.

(2) Under PL 84–99, the USACE undertakes planning and preparedness activities for all types of natural disasters, and provides response and recovery activities necessitated by floods and coastal storms. The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE) appropriation funds all PL 84–99 activities. Included in these preparedness and response efforts are: 1) disaster preparedness measures; 2) advance measures to alleviate high potential flood threats; 3) flood fighting activities; 4) preservation of threatened Federally-constructed shore protection projects; and 5) life-saving rescue operations. Recovery and mitigation measures include repair and rehabilitation of damaged flood control works and shore protection projects or nonstructural projects in place of structural rehabilitation. PL 84–99 also authorizes the
USACE to provide emergency supplies of clean water to localities whose water source has been contaminated and to drought-affected areas. In addition, the USACE is authorized to provide essential services and restore essential public infrastructure for a period of up to 10 days in any area victimized by a natural disaster for which the Governor of a State has requested Federal assistance under the Stafford Act authority.

(3) Under The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5121 et seq.) (88 Stat.143) (The Stafford Act), the USACE uses its engineering expertise and its response and recovery capabilities to carry out DOD’s responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP) as the lead planning and operating agency for the Public Works and Engineering Emergency Support Function in responding to disasters and emergencies of all kinds. Under authority of the Stafford Act, the FEMA, now part of the Department of Homeland Security, has developed the NRP, which coordinates the execution of response and recovery operations of the 28 Federal signatory departments and agencies. Under the NRP, DoD has delegated its responsibility for Emergency Response Function (ESF) Number 3, Public Works and Engineering, to the USACE.

(4) As the lead DOD (and Federal) agency for ESF #3, the USACE has a number of standing missions, to include provision of water, ice, emergency power, debris removal, temporary housing, and temporary roofing. Other missions in the Public Works and Engineering area are assigned by the FEMA to the USACE, as needed. All of these missions are tailored to the needs of, and coordinated with the impacted State. FEMA funds all of these missions. Each mission assignment is based on the capabilities of the USACE, including its significant and responsive contracting capability. The Joint Staff, J–3, Joint Directorate of Military Support (JDOMS), coordinates DoD requirements not in the realm of ESF #3 missions.

(5) In response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Corps emergency management personnel were on the scene within hours: providing structural engineers to monitor unstable buildings; supporting urban search and rescue work; providing a mobile command center and teams to support the New York Fire Department; and developing a debris management plan. Corps expertise was crucial in providing urban search & rescue, conducting structural assessments to determine when buildings were safe enough for rescuers and, later, determining when buildings were safe for occupancy. The 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) provided the electric power that got the New York financial district back in business while Corps contractors removed 1.7 million tons of debris from the World Trade Center site and transported it by barge to the landfill in Staten Island. However, this work was similar to what the Corps does every year to support FEMA, State, and local authorities in natural disasters.

(6) In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, the USACE received over $4 billion in taskings from FEMA for recovery activities. A major success was the removal of nearly all floodwater from New Orleans and vicinity within 60 days - a task that many experts said would take well into 2006. Another major undertaking was the removal of 56 million cubic yards of debris - a figure eclipsing the record of 42 million cubic yards removed after Hurricane Andrew in 1992.

f. Homeland Security. The Corps has developed in-depth anti-terrorism/force protection expertise, including many skilled engineers with experience on Khobar Towers, in Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and other sites. It leverages that expertise to protect critical water resources infrastructure from terrorists. Over past few years the Corps has been working with other agencies, including the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Energy, TVA, EPA, and FBI to develop comprehensive security assessment processes to identify risks to critical facilities such as locks, dams and hydropower facilities. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the Corps instituted increased protection measures at its projects. It restricted public access, increased standoff distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities and contract guard support, and increased coordination with local law enforcement.

20–6. Research and development (R&D)

a. The Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program pursues an R&D effort to take advantage of rapidly developing technologies and techniques that will promote significant monetary savings and greater reliability, safety, enhanced efficiency and environmental sustainability of its assigned civil works activities. The R&D program is formulated to support each of the assigned Civil Works missions and their supporting core of technical competencies, environmental restoration and stewardship, economics and decision support, cold regions engineering and dredged sediments management. Technology infusion is pursued, in conjunction with the Regional Business Centers and established Centers of Expertise as part of the Corps’ overall efforts to maintain a trained and ready engineering force capable of responding to a wide range of contingency situations.

b. The Corps conducts Civil Works-related R&D through its U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) and its Institute for Water Resources (IWR). The ERDC is headquartered at the Waterways Experiment Station facility, Vicksburg, MS. It consists of seven individual research laboratories:

(1) Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory, Vicksburg, MS
(2) Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, Hanover, NH
(3) Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, Champaign, IL
(4) Environmental Laboratory, Vicksburg, MS
(5) Geotechnical and Structures laboratory, Vicksburg, MS
Section III
Support to Other Government Agencies

20–7. Overview of Support to Other Government Agencies
The USACE provides engineering and construction support to about 70 non-DOD Federal agencies, plus numerous State, local, tribal and foreign governments under the Interagency and International Services Program. Funds for this program are provided by the agencies receiving support. The USACE support of other entities’ infrastructure programs includes support to the Department of Homeland Security by managing the design and construction of border control and detention facilities for the Customs and Border Protection Agency and emergency management assistance to the Federal Emergency Management Assistance Agency, construction of facilities in Iraq for the State Department, and renovation of health care facilities for the Department of Veterans Affairs. The USACE also supports programs and projects of other Federal agencies designed to meet important national environmental objectives. These include the Superfund Program of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Formerly Used Sites Remedial Action Program for the Department of Energy (USACE receives direct Congressional funding for this program). Since September 11, 2001, the Corps infrastructure security support to others has increased.

20–8. Value of Support Activities
In FY 2008, the value of the engineering and construction effort managed by USACE was approximately $1.9 billion. Non-DOD entities having Corps support costing more than $40,000,000 in FY 2008 are listed in Table 21–1.

Table 20–1
Construction Support for Non-DoD Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Agency Customer</th>
<th>Value of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of State (mostly Iraq construction)</td>
<td>$622,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security - Border &amp; Transportation Security (includes Border Fence)</td>
<td>$610,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
<td>$238,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Interior</td>
<td>61,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>46,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section IV
National Cemeteries

20–9. Overview of national cemeteries
Since its founding in 1864, Arlington National Cemetery (ANC) has served as a place of honor and recognition for the men and women who have served in the Nation’s Armed Forces. In addition to its principal function as a national cemetery, ANC is the site of approximately 3,200 non-funeral ceremonies each year and has approximately four million visitors annually. The Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home National Cemetery, located in Washington, D.C., also provides a final resting place for those with military service. The Army takes pride in exercising its assigned responsibilities for operation, maintenance, and improvement of these cemeteries. The ASA(CW) formulates the program and budget, including memorials and monuments. The Assistant SECARMY (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is responsible for burial policy. The Military District of Washington (MDW) coordinates official ceremonies and provides military honors for private memorial services and ceremonial support. The ANC Superintendent oversees day-to-day execution (including administration, operation, and maintenance) and is responsible for private ceremonies and public ceremonies other than those official ceremonies assigned to the MDW. The COE supports ANC by providing planning, engineering, construction management real estate, and environmental and cultural resources assistance for cemetery property and facilities.

20–10. Funding
The Army receives funds to operate, maintain and improve these cemeteries in the Cemeterial Expenses, Army, appropriations account. These funds are included in the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The $36.73 million appropriated by Congress for FY 2009 provides for a continuation of the high standards expected for these two important national cemeteries.

20–11. Long-term capital planning for Arlington National Cemetery
The development and improvement of the infrastructure at ANC is based on a 1998 master plan. This plan provides a vision of the cemetery’s priorities and needs. The master plan identified projects and policies to respond to the challenges confronting ANC. These challenges include an aging infrastructure, declining availability of space for initial interment, and preserving the dignity and serenity of ANC while accommodating its many visitors. A ten-year Capital Investment Plan has been developed based on the master plan outline. The Capital Investment Plan, which is updated
periodically by an Army-ANC management team, guides investment planning and budgeting for construction and major maintenance projects at the cemetery as well as its operation and maintenance needs.

Section V
Engineer Overseas Activities

20–12. Overview of engineer overseas activities
The USACE conducts a broad range of foreign activities. Many are exclusively in support of U.S. forces overseas. All others are considered part of the civil functions of the Army. In coordination with the Director of Strategy, Plans, & Policy (Army G3/5/7), the ASA(CW) provides program direction to the foreign activities of the Corps, except those which are exclusively in support of U.S. military forces overseas. In FY 2006, the Engineers supported U.S. foreign policy in about 90 countries. The largest Corps overseas program is in Iraq, where, in addition to providing support to U.S. and coalition forces, the USACE is involved in restoring: Iraq’s oil, electricity and other infrastructure; carrying out environmental work performing construction management for the U.S. State Department and the Agency for International Development (USAID); and providing advisors to ministries in the new Iraqi government. In Afghanistan, the USACE is involved in construction of roads and other civilian infrastructure as well as facilities for the new Afghan Army. The USACE support overseas includes constructing humanitarian assistance projects (schools, clinics, water wells, etc.) for the Combatant Commands, assisting the Millennium Challenge Corporation with major infrastructure projects and support to the US Agency for International Development. The USACE is also supporting US objectives by using its water resources expertise for capacity development for developing nations such as technical advice and consensus building for the Mekong River Commission and strategic water resources engagement with the Brazilian Army Engineers.

20–13. Foreign military sales (FMS)
As the DoD Construction Agent in many parts of the world, the Corps provides international security assistance to eligible foreign nations as an instrument of the NSS and DoD Policy. Under the authorities of the FMS Program, the Corps provides reimbursable design and construction services for defense infrastructure to eligible foreign nations as approved by the Deputy Assistant SECARMY for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA–DEC) and authorized by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). FMS assistance provided in FY08 to various countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Regions had value of approximately $1 billion

20–14. Cooperative threat reduction
Working for the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Corps is supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs in Russia. The work includes design and construction assistance for a nuclear storage facility. The current program is valued at approximately $600 million.

20–15. Partnership for peace
This program is an annual series of initiatives with Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, focusing U.S. emergency management information know-how and the PfP Information Management System (PIMS) for use by evolving civil protection and civil defense structures of selected nations and their neighbors. Simultaneously, Civil-Military Emergency Planning (CMEP) facilitates the understanding of U.S. concepts and doctrine of military support to civilian authorities in an inter-ministerial and trans-boundary information-sharing environment. CMEP develops, through real time and tabletop exercises, co-operation at the provincial level for assistance in technological and natural disasters. CMEP establishes regional cooperation among emergency planners, creates common data bases for uses in catastrophes, acquaints high level decision makers with decision support tools, creates joint operational systems for national reaction centers and develops information exchange on legal and response procedures for large catastrophes with international implications.

20–16. Support for U.S. agencies
The Corps is also called upon to provide support for U.S. agencies overseas. For example, the Corps:

- Supports the United States Agency for International Development following natural and man-made disasters.
- Builds border facilities for the Republic of Georgia Border Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
- Provided hydrologic modeling training for Ethiopia and Kenya for Task Force Horn of Africa, technical.
- Performs government due diligence for major infrastructure projects funded by the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Section VI
Support To Unified Combatant Commanders

20–17. Benefits to warfighting capabilities
The Civil Works Program provides the USACE with a unique capability in DOD. The USACE’s extensive professional staff of engineers, scientists, economists, etc; provide the critical teamwork necessary to plan engineer infrastructure improvements and institution building at the national level. The training and experience gained from the Civil Works program is leveraged by the USACE’s Field Force Engineering (FFE) capabilities to provide support to unified combatant commanders and their Army Component Commands. The infrastructure the engineers build provides the facilities and enablers for operations in the future. An excellent example is the infrastructure built by the USACE for the Government of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s.

20–18. Overview of support to unified combatant commanders
Expertise in water resource development, flood risk management, waterway operations, dredging, coastal engineering, environmental stewardship, and disaster response supplement the skills maintained through the Army’s MILCON and installation support programs. These expert capabilities are routinely called upon by the warfighting Combatant Commanders and other DOD agencies. USACE supplies this expertise on a reimbursable basis. When the Army goes to war, USACE personnel use the experience they have gained in the Civil Works and military programs to provide timely analysis and solutions to the war fighters. The USACE’s knowledge of beach dynamics including the Sea State Prediction Models developed at the Engineer Research & Development Center’s Coastal & Hydraulics Laboratory, Vicksburg, Mississippi, helps determine the sites for shore landings. When combined with its terrain mobility models, the USACE can provide command with the most effective plan for logistics-over-the-shore sites in combination with the inland road network to optimize reception, staging, and onward movement in the area of operations. Corps expertise in soil mechanics determines the best routes for armored vehicles. Often roads are built using technologies developed in the Civil Works Program. Corps experience gained from work on winter navigation helps the Army to cross frozen rivers. Commanders at all levels make use of geospatial products and satellite-based navigation systems developed at the Topographic Engineering Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

20–19. Examples of support to unified combatant commanders
The USACE is supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in USCENTCOM on several fronts. The 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power), a unique strategic asset, provided stable electric power to U.S. and coalition forces on a daily basis in several austere locations in the area of operations. The USACE military and civilian personnel have deployed and provided technical assistance, and facility and camp designs for the warfighters. Corps teams in the USCENTCOM area of operations have supported the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions as well as non-combat units such as the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force. Equipped with “TeleEngineering” kits, engineers anywhere on the battlefield were able to communicate real time to Corps experts through a secure, satellite-linked system. Their missions included runway repair analysis, structural evaluations, airfield lighting, and base camp design. Also noteworthy are the Contingency Real Estate Support Teams (CRESTs), who can deploy within 24 hours to acquire the troop housing, workspace, and covered storage areas the entering force will need. Corps real estate teams executed leases at various locations in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. USACE also supports the Combatant Command by performing exercise related and humanitarian assistance (HA) construction. For example, the Pacific Ocean Division is implementing 60 HA projects in the countries of Bangladesh, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Laos.

Section VII
Summary and References

20–20. Summary
The Army, through its civil functions, provides valuable services in maintaining and enhancing the economic and environmental health of the Nation. Civil functions also continue to prove invaluable in furthering national security objectives, both directly and indirectly. The financial and personnel resources associated with these functions are principally authorized and funded under the biennial Water Resources Development Acts and annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, respectively. Consequently, civil functions activities, as well as the significant training of the USACE personnel they provide, are at virtually no cost to the DoD’s military budget.

20–21. References
a. Public Law 84–99, Amendment of Flood Control Act of August 18, 1941 (Emergency Flood Control Work)
c. Public Law 93–288, Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (also known as the Stafford Act).
d. Public Law 99–433, DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act)
g. Public Law 105–277, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999  
h. Public Law 106–541, Water Resources Development Act, 2000  
j. HQDA General Orders No. 3, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army, 9 July 2002
RESERVED
Chapter 21

Public Affairs

The information-communication aspects must be considered in every significant decision and action a military leader makes: how the results of those actions would resonate with local, national and international audiences, how it would resonate with internal audiences - with Soldiers and their families. It impacts recruiting. It impacts the health of our families. It impacts public support of our military. It impacts congressional support. And most importantly, as we remember our number one priority, it impacts the troops in the field, and it impacts the enemies who stand against them. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren in remarks made to the Sergeants Major Academy, Ft. Bliss Jan. 7, 2008

Section I

Introduction

21–1. Chapter content

a. Army commanders and senior officials have a legal and moral responsibility to the elected leadership and American public to account for resources entrusted to their care. These resources include fiscal accounts, equipment, real property, and most importantly, the individuals who are the Army - the sons and daughters of America. Army Public Affairs is a fundamental tool of competent leadership, a critical element of effective battle command, and an essential part of successful mission accomplishment. The perception of America’s Army and how it conducts its operations can be as important to the Army’s success as actual combat. This chapter is designed to give senior commanders and civilian officials an insight into the functions and systems involved in the prosecution of the commander’s responsibility to communicate the Army’s story. This requires direct and indirect communication through the mass media to the American public. The commander must also keep the internal Army audience informed via information tools at their disposal.

b. Public affairs (PA) is a command function and responsibility. The commander can communicate through a command spokesperson, but the success or failure of that spokesperson and the commander’s public affairs program hinges on his or her support and direct involvement. No matter how good the public affairs officer (PAO) or NCO is, they can never fully substitute for the commander in either the public’s or the Soldier’s eyes.

c. The commander’s staff cannot substitute for him or her; however, they can provide specialized advice and counsel and assist in the execution of assigned missions. The PA professional is no exception and serves as the commander’s primary advisor with regard to communicating the command’s messages to its internal and external publics. By integrating public affairs into the decision-making process, and considering public affairs in the assessment of the situation and development of the courses of actions, the PA staff can assist the commander into making the best possible decision and translating this decision into effective PA strategy and operations.

21–2. Specialized and specific terms used in public affairs

a. Public affairs. Those public information, command information and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the DoD (Joint Pub 3–61).

b. Public information. A general term describing processes used to provide information to external audiences through public media (FM 46–1).

c. Command information. Communication by a military organization with Service members, civilian employees, retirees and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization’s goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and keeps them informed about what is going on in the organization. Also called internal information (Joint Pub 3–61).

d. Community relations. Those public affairs programs that address issues of interest to the general public, business, academia, veterans, Service organizations, military-related associations, and other non-news media entities. These programs are usually associated with the interaction between U.S. military installations and their surrounding or nearby civilian communities. Interaction with overseas non-news media civilians in an operational area is handled by civil-military operations with public affairs support as required (Joint Pub 3–61).

e. Global information environment (GIE). All individuals, organizations or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or National Command Authorities that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences (FM–46–1).

f. Public affairs guidance (PAG). A package of information that supports public discussion of defense issues and operations. Such guidance can range from a telephonic response to a specific question to a more comprehensive package. Included could be an approved public affairs policy, news statements, answers to anticipated media questions and community relations guidance. Public affairs guidance also addresses the method(s) timing, location and other details governing the release of information to the public (FM–46–1).
Section II
Public affairs principles

21–3. Public affairs strategic goals
FM 46–1 is the keystone doctrinal manual for U.S. Army public affairs operations. The manual is the basis for Public Affairs force design and materiel acquisition. It supports the doctrinal requirements of the Concept Based Requirements System and is the authoritative foundation for the integration of Public Affairs into Army doctrine, individual and unit training, leader development, force design and materiel acquisition initiatives. Conducting operations in the GIE requires an understanding of basic public affairs principles. Army leaders at all levels need to understand the fundamental concepts which underlie the development of public affairs strategies and guide the planning and execution of public affairs operations.

a. Soldiers and families come first. Internal audiences include Soldiers, civilian employees, retirees and all affiliated family members throughout the Army’s active and reserve components. These audiences must be thoroughly and appropriately informed to ensure maximum effectiveness and the highest sustainable morale. The information needs of Soldiers, families, civilian employees, retirees and employers of reservists must be considered first.

b. Truth is paramount. Trust and confidence in America’s Army and its conduct of operations result when external and internal audiences understand the Army and the reasons for its actions, decisions and policies. It involves teaching them about the Army’s culture. The quickest way to destroy credibility is to misrepresent the truth.

c. If news is out, it’s out. The GIE makes more information easier to disseminate and more accessible to wide audiences. As the value of information continues to increase, the ability to limit or restrict its flow continues to decrease.

d. Not all news is good news. In the GIE, the presentation of information about the Army and its operations will be both positive and negative. PAOs cannot control media coverage or guarantee positive media products. DoD policy is that information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment. Information can only be withheld when its disclosure would adversely affect national and operations security or threaten the safety or privacy of members of the military community.

e. Telling our story is good for the Army. In stability and support operations in particular, but also in war, providing accurate and timely information about the force and its operations will contribute to mission accomplishment.

f. Public affairs must be deployed early. During deployments an Army commander’s first contact will often be with a news reporter. Reporters and journalists will be present in the area of operations before Army forces arrive and will often be well established, with a fully functional logistical framework and long-standing coordination and liaison arrangements. Media interest will be particularly intense at the outset of operations and early deployment of the PAO can significantly reduce distractions to the mission created by the media.

g. Media are not the enemy. While military professionals and journalists both serve the American people, their philosophies, values and basic outlook don’t always correspond. Good reporters will thoroughly investigate issues, and ask tough, challenging questions. Soldiers may need to educate them on military operations and help them understand the significance of the events on which they report.

h. Practice security at the source. The characteristics of the military and global information environments essentially render field censorship impractical in its traditional sense, as well as impossible. All individuals must be responsible for sensitive information. The standard must be to practice security at the source by not sharing information which policy has determined to be inappropriate for release.

21–4. Public affairs vision
The Public Affairs Vision presented in FM 46–1 also defines the critical parameters that the PA functional area must meet if it is to achieve the strategic goals and accomplish the mission in the evolving communication environment. “Our vision is to build a trained, readily deployable force of Public Affairs professionals, resourced, capable, and organized to conduct operations in peace, conflict and war, and to maintain a timely flow of accurate, balanced information to the American people.”

Section III
Public affairs doctrine and processes

21–5. The Constitution and First Amendment
There is no mention of the press in the Constitution as originally drafted. The First Amendment reads only that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” As the First Amendment has been variously interpreted in the courts, the media today enjoys significant freedom to pursue their mission of keeping the American public informed. The requirement for the Army to conduct public affairs derives from Title 10, U.S. Code which states the Secretary of the Army is responsible for public affairs. Implicit in the government is the right for people to know about the activities of the government and the government has an obligation to inform people about its activities. One of the most significant conduits through which information is passed to the people is the free press
guaranteed by the Constitution. Since the nation’s founding, the Army has communicated information to the American people through the media.

21–6. Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows anyone, including foreign citizens, to query the U.S. Government in writing for specifically described records in its possession. DoD policy regarding media requests for information known to be releasable under FOIA is to provide requesting media representatives with the information requested through PA channels without requiring them to submit a FOIA request.

21–7. Privacy Act
The Privacy Act is designed to balance the individual’s right to privacy with the public’s right to know. Items generally releasable concerning a Soldier, and any living person under the Privacy Act includes: name, age, rank, and duty address. The Soldier’s name and duty address is not routinely releasable if the unit is sensitive, routinely deployable or stationed in a foreign territory. Also releasable is a Soldier’s hometown (not street address but city and state), education, marital status and dependents, awards, duty status, the results of judicial actions, board (e.g., promotion board) results and their official photo. Items generally not releasable under the Privacy Act include the Soldier’s social security number, race, religion, investigative findings or the results of nonjudicial/administrative boards or actions.

21–8. DoD principles of information
a. DoD Directive (DoDD) 5122.05 serves as the cornerstone for DoD policy with regard to providing information to the media. The policy requires support provided by Army public affairs.

b. It is DoD policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out that DoD policy, the following principles of information shall apply:
   (1) Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with the statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classifications. The provisions of the “Freedom of Information Act” will be supported in both letter and spirit.
   (2) A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.
   (3) Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.
   (4) Information shall be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security, threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces, or if otherwise authorized by statute or regulation.
   (5) The DoD’s obligation to provide the public with information on DoD major programs may require detailed Public Affairs planning and coordination within the DoD and with the other Government Agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DoD public affairs programs.

21–9. Guidelines for coverage of DoD combat operations
In the aftermath of Desert Storm, representatives from the military and the media developed nine principles that have served since then to define the media’s role in covering DoD operations. The principles that are published in DoDD 5122.05 are—

a. Open and independent reporting shall be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

b. Media pools (limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organizations for news gatherings and sharing of material during a specified activity), are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. However, they sometimes may provide the only means of early access to a military operation. In this case, media pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (in 24–36 hours, when possible). The arrival of early-access media pools shall not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

c. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be applicable for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

d. Journalists in a combat zone shall be credentialed by the U.S. military and shall be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. Armed Forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules may result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations shall make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

e. Journalists shall be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

f. Military PA officers should act as liaisons, but should not interfere with the reporting process.
g. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft when possible. The military shall be responsible for the transportation of pools.

h. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PA officers with facilities to enable timely, secure, and compatible transmission of pool material and shall make those facilities available, when possible, for filing independent coverage. If government facilities are unavailable, journalists, as always, shall file by any other means available. The military shall not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

i. These principles listed in paragraph h. above shall apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.

21–10. Operational security
The media’s desire to publish timely information and the military’s desire to safeguard information that could compromise an operation could place the two entities at odds. It therefore becomes incumbent on the military to practice “security at the source” in dealing with the media and to establish clear, concise, intuitively understandable ground rules that the media can easily follow and abide by with regard to the protection of information that could have operational security considerations. The PAO will clear all information with possible operational security concerns with the operations staff prior to release. Should a journalist inadvertently gain access to information considered operationally sensitive, he or she should be so informed of the reasons why the information is considered sensitive and asked to observe an embargo on the information until such time as it would no longer be considered sensitive.

21–11. Core processes
Within the framework of the three broad public affairs functional areas, the core processes allow Army public affairs to meet the challenges of supporting Army XXI in the Information Age. The public affairs core processes are—

a. Public affairs planning. Public affairs planning is an integral element of the decision-making process at every level and across the continuum of operations. Done in concert with operational planning, it enhances the commander’s range of options. Public affairs planning begins with the receipt of a mission. PAOs prepare the public affairs estimate, and advise the commander and other staff personnel on GIE issues (such as expected media interest) which might impact on the mission. They provide input during the development of possible courses of action and the war gaming of those potential courses of action. They identify critical public affairs risk factors, consider branches and sequels, judge the impact on internal audiences and external community relations, develop a public affairs strategy, prepare the Public Affairs Annex to the Operation Plan/Operation Order and publish Public Affairs Guidance.

b. Execute information strategies.
(1) The proliferation of personal computers, the World Wide Web, the Internet, on-line services, fax machines, e-mail, cable television, direct broadcast satellites, copying machines, cellular communication, wireless communication and many other information technologies have created an endless stream of data and information that flows into a world filled with images, symbols, words, and sounds. Much of this information is a strategic asset, capable of altering high-level decisions by the National Command Authority, and senior civilian and military leaders.

(2) To deal effectively with this barrage of information, public affairs professionals must be skilled at informing their publics, both internal (command information) and external (public information). Information strategies are synchronized plans for using all available and appropriate methods of communication to achieve specific goals of informing target audiences. The process includes acquisition, production, distribution and protection.

c. Media facilitation. The commercial news media are major players in the GIE. Fewer than 150 reporters covered the 1944 D-Day invasion of Europe. More than 800 covered Operation Just Cause in 1990, and more than 1500 journalists from around the world covered the Persian Gulf War in 1991. There is no question that the news media will continue to cover current and future military operations, and in most cases will be on the ground before American forces arrive. Images of events as they happen, in real-time, from both sides of the conflict will be transmitted to the world. It is the commander’s task, through the public affairs officer and staff, to develop a well-resourced and responsive infrastructure to facilitate media operations. Media facilitation includes—

(1) Assisting media entry into the area.
(2) Registering media representatives.
(3) Orienting them on ground rules for coverage.
(4) Ensuring they understand security policies.
(5) Arranging interviews and briefings.
(6) Coordinating unit visits and escorts.
(7) Providing thorough and timely responses to media queries.
(8) Embedding media in operational units.

d. Public affairs training.
(1) The underlying principle of Army training is to train in peacetime in a way that replicates expected wartime conditions. Public affairs training includes—

(a) Training for public affairs Soldiers.
(b) Media interaction training for non-public affairs Soldiers, civilian employees and family members.

(2) The goal of public affairs training is to prepare Soldiers to interact with and operate under the scrutiny of the press. It teaches Soldiers that journalists are not adversaries, and focuses on providing accurate, balanced coverage. It helps soldiers understand that the media is a communication channel to the American public as well as to audiences worldwide.

(3) Training for public affairs personnel expands on Soldier and leader training. It stresses individual as well as collective tasks with an aim of developing units fully prepared to accomplish the range of public affairs missions. It integrates public affairs into the battle staff. It ensures public affairs is involved in mission assessment, planning and execution.

(4) Public affairs training can also be conducted for journalists. They should be educated on the rights and responsibilities of military community members, as well as the roles and missions of particular units and the Army.

i. Community relations.

1) The active Army relies on communities and regions surrounding its installations for direct and indirect support of both the Army and its people. The U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard are equally integral parts of their hometown communities. Maintaining effective community relations not only contributes to the morale of Soldiers and their families, but also enhances the projection and sustainment capabilities of Army posts and hometown support, directly affecting the combat power potential of mobilized or deployed Army forces. Communities can provide the Army access to resources needed to train and maintain readiness and also can extend support to the families of deployed Soldiers. Public Affairs helps commanders build and sustain the community relationships that in turn generate support for America’s Army.

2) Overseas, host nation civilians are often employed as media and community relations specialists. They advise public affairs officers and commanders of host nation sensitivities, local political issues and press reaction to American activities.

3) The objectives of Army community relations programs are to—

(a) Increase public awareness of the Army’s mission, policies and programs.

(b) Inspire patriotism.

(c) Foster good relations with the various publics with which the Army comes into contact at home and abroad.

(d) Maintain the Army’s reputation as a respected professional organization responsible for national security.

(e) Support the Army’s recruiting and personnel procurement mission.

Section IV
Army public affairs organizations

21–12. The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA), Department of the Army

a. The OCPA is established by Title 10, USC, section 3014, and is designated by the Secretary of the Army the responsibility to conduct public affairs operations across the U.S. Army. The Chief of Public Affairs (CPA) formulates, manages, conducts and evaluates public affairs policies, plans and programs for the active and reserve components of the U.S. Army. The CPA is responsible to the Secretary of the Army and is responsive to the Chief of Staff, Army.

b. Among the responsibilities of the CPA:

1) Preparing, coordinating and monitoring the worldwide implementation of Army Public Affairs plans, strategies, policies and programs for internal and external information.

2) Developing public affairs plans and programs to support other Army plans and programs.

3) Managing the review and clearance of information for release outside DoD by the Army Secretariat (OSA) and the Army Staff (ARSTAFF).

4) Managing the Army’s Public Information Security Review Program.

5) Operational control of the U.S. Army Field Band.

6) Serving as the proponent for all public affairs issues across doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and Soldier and civilian support.

21–13. ACOM, ASCC, DRU and installation public affairs

The ACOM, ASCC, DRU and installation PAO is responsible for:

a. Advising commanders regarding the PA needs of the command.

b. Assisting in the formulation and release of command messages.

c. Developing PA plans.

d. Serving as liaison between the command and the next higher headquarters PAO.

e. Supervising the preparation, production, and distribution of printed and electronic PA information.

f. Assisting in the development and acquisition of print and visual information products in support of PA programs used on installation command channels by the authorized cable television franchise.
g. Advising the commander on audience attitudes about and perceptions of policies, programs, and information needs.

h. Conducting regular assistance visits to command units to assess their PA programs and determine unit commanders’ needs for support.

i. Assisting in the coordination of on-post distribution of non-DoD commercial publications.

j. Developing materials and products to meet the command’s special PA needs.

21–14. Organic public affairs sections

Public affairs sections are embedded in the headquarters of separate Army brigades, divisions and echelons above division. These sections provide PA support to the command and serve as the commander’s principal advisor on public affairs issues. Ranging from a single senior noncommissioned officer to a colonel with a small staff these sections conduct public affairs planning and limited operations. Personnel and materiel constraints require that these organic PA sections be augmented by separate PA TOE units for most operations.

21–15. Theater Army Public Affairs Section

A Theater Army PAO is a colonel serving on the commanding general’s personal/special staff. The PAO is responsible to the Theater Army commander and to units assigned or aligned to the Army, training for, mobilized or deployed in support of combined or joint operations. The Army PA section has personnel and equipment: for developing information strategies and campaigns; to conduct PA planning and analysis; to provide services and facilities, when augmented by a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, for media representatives; to support higher echelon PA requirements for information, media facilitation, planning and training; to tactically communicate to other PA units at echelons above and below corps and all supported units; and to provide limited ground transportation for personnel, equipment, media in and around the area of operation. When deployed, the Army Headquarters public affairs staff will be augmented by a mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD) and will assume all the missions and capabilities of that organization.

21–16. Corps and Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) PA Sections

A Corps PAO is a lieutenant colonel or a colonel serving on the personal/special staff of the Corps commander. A TAACOM PAO is a lieutenant colonel serving on the personal/special staff of the TAACOM commander. When the Corps or TAACOM commander is deployed the PA section will be augmented by a public affairs operations center (PAOC) and up to three MPADs. The Corps is augmented by one MPAD for every three combat brigades in the task force.

21–17. Division and Corps Support Command (COSCOM) Public Affairs Sections

A Division PAO is a major or a lieutenant colonel serving on the personal/special staff of the Division commander. A COSCOM PAO is a major serving on the personal/special staff of the COSCOM commander. When deployed the COSCOM PA section is augmented by an MPAD; when the Division is deployed, the section is augmented by one MPAD per three combat brigades and one public affairs detachment (PAD).

21–18. U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard component public affairs

The vast majority of public affairs assets are in the Reserve and National Guard components, more than 65 percent of the total public affairs force and 85 percent of the deployable TOE unit structures. These Reserve and Army National Guard units and personnel must be seamlessly integrated with the active component and focused on supporting the overall Army goals and objectives. The four types of TOE PA organizations, predominately positioned in the Guard and Reserve, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

21–19. Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC)

The PAOC is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and is modularly organized, staffed, trained and equipped to rapidly deploy in support of military operations. The PAOC is capable of performing all core public affairs processes and has transportation and audio-visual equipment sufficient to produce radio, television and print products for an internal audience as well as resources to credential, brief, escort and support visiting media. When deployed in support of Army operations a Broadcast Operations Division (BOD) and one MPAD will augment the PAOC. The PAOC is further augmented by one MPAD per three brigade-sized units in the operation when those units do not have separate PA support.

21–20. Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)

The MPAD is commanded by a major and can be task organized into two or three teams and is assigned to the theater, corps or Joint Task Force headquarters under the operational and tactical control of the senior public affairs officer or PAOC commander. It is staffed, trained and equipped to rapidly deploy in support of brigade, division or corps-size task force operations. Its equipment and capabilities are similar to a PAD (see description below) but more robust. MPADS are assigned at a ratio of one per three brigade-sized elements.
The BOD is commanded by a major and consists of a command element, two broadcast teams and a maintenance team. It has transportation assets and audio-visual equipment sufficient for the BOD to establish and operate field radio and television broadcast facilities in support of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service operations or merges with other independent facilities to form a theater of operations network.

21–22. Public Affairs Detachment (PAD)
A PAD is commanded by a captain and comes with its own transportation and sufficient still and video equipment to produce print, radio and television products for internal audiences. The PAD typically supports division or brigade-sized task force operations.

Section V
Joint and combined public affairs organizations

21–23. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA))
As established by DoD Directive 5122.05, the ASD (PA) is the principal staff advisor and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DoD news media relations, public liaison, internal communications, community relations, public affairs, visual information training, and audiovisual matters. The ASD (PA) is charged with developing communications policies, plans and programs in support of DoD objectives and operations and with ensuring a free flow of information to the news media, the general public, the internal audiences of the Department of Defense and other applicable forums limited only by national security restraints in DoDD 5200.1 and any other applicable statutory mandates or exemptions. The ASD(PA) reports directly to the SecDef and acts as the sole spokesperson and the release authority for DoD information and audiovisual materials to news media representatives. The ASD(PA), or his or her designated representative, conducts news media conferences in the Pentagon with the Pentagon Press Corps.

21–24. Joint Information Bureau (JIB)
A JIB is a facility established by the joint force commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of joint operations. A JIB varies in size and composition in accordance with the requirements of the mission and the degree to which the different Services are involved. At a minimum, the Army element will staff an Army cell within the JIB. More likely, however, will be PA Soldiers serving in all sections of the JIB, including planning, media facilitation, and internal information cells.

21–25. Combined Information Bureau (CIB)
A CIB is similar to the JIB in organization and functions except it is operated in support of multinational operations. It can also be called an Allied Press Information Center. These multinational information bureaus allow various allies or coalitions to collectively “speak with one voice” as well as explain the roles of the individual nations.

21–26. Pentagon correspondents
There have been media representatives at the Pentagon since the establishment of the DoD in 1947. Some 20–25 journalists keep rent-free offices in the Pentagon, courtesy of the DoD, paying for their own furniture, telephones and office supplies. These 20–25 resident journalists as well as 75 others representing major wire services, newspapers, weekly news magazines, trade journals and radio and television networks are issued regular DoD Pentagon building passes that allow unescorted access to unrestricted areas inside the Pentagon. The practice benefits both the media and the military in that information about DoD of interest to the public can be readily disseminated to correspondents who are already familiar with and reasonably well educated regarding DoD’s mission, operations and structure. These correspondents are regular attendees at the ASD(PA) media conferences conducted at the Pentagon.

21–27. DoD National Media Pool
The DoD National Media Pool is a limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organizations for news gathering and sharing of material during a specified activity. Pooling is typically used when news media support resources cannot accommodate a large number of journalists. The DoD National Media Pool is available for coverage of the earliest stages of a contingency. Additionally, the combatant commanders may also find it necessary to form limited local pools to report on specific missions. Approximately 16 media representatives from various national news organizations comprise the pool. Supported commanders are responsible for providing operational support to the DoD National Media Pool. At a minimum, the pool members require: daily, comprehensive and unclassified operational news briefings; access to ongoing combat operations; reasonable access to key personnel; an escort - usually a lieutenant colonel or colonel - to coordinate pool support and access; transportation and itinerary planning and coordination. As soon as open access to the operational area can be allowed, the DoD National Media Pool should be disbanded.
21–28. Joint combat camera
Joint combat camera provides the joint force commander a sophisticated capability to enhance both operational and public affairs missions. The still and video images obtained provide a balance of useful operational information and, once cleared for OPSEC, products are available for distribution to news media representatives and military public affairs organizations. Combat camera teams often have access to events and areas unavailable to news media representatives and military journalists. They bring with them a technological capability allowing for the timely transmission of images from the military information environment. Since deployed COMCAM teams support the entire spectrum of an operation, it is essential that public affairs imagery requirements be identified and prioritized throughout the planning cycle.

Section VI
Information mediums

21–29. News media
The specific medium, through which the news media present their work, creates different needs and expectations on the part of media representatives in their dealings with the military. As in just about any military operation, timing is everything, and a basic analysis of media deadlines, requirements and abilities to reach the American public with the command’s story can assist the commander’s public affairs program as well as serve to better satisfy the media. Advances in communications technology today enable virtually simultaneous reporting worldwide from anywhere in a satellite footprint. News media coverage will be highly competitive, with a tendency to seek access to the operational area and report events as they happen.

21–30. Television
Television news broadcasts are typically pegged to specific times of the day. While a television station can interrupt programming for special announcements, such reporting is more akin to radio than television in that the voice is most likely the primary medium. Television thrives on video pictures, a script written to what the camera has seen and some carefully chosen 5–8 second “sound bites” from interviews conducted on camera with witnesses to the event, experts or participants whose words fit the video the cameraman has taken of the event. Long answers from commanders and staff officers rarely make it to the screen, so PAOs will recommend the use of talking points to assist commanders and interviewees in getting the command’s message out in a format television will be most likely to use.

21–31. Television “news magazines”
In recent years there has been a steady growth in the number of television news programs that entertain as much or more than they inform. The command’s messages can be transmitted through a variety of media, and dealing with the entertainment media will require some imaginative work. While the commander should not deny access (thereby creating a story in and of itself), he or she should be prepared to prioritize his or her effort in supporting the media and has every right to pursue getting his or her command message out through the media to reach the American public.

21–32. Radio
Radio is an immediate medium. Live radio news broadcasts are easily changed even in progress. “Hot” stories can easily be inserted into normal programming. The voice is the only medium, and details from commanders or their spokespeople will get more airtime than on television because the voice and words alone must paint the picture for the audience. A radio news desk is only as far away as a communications line, and the story can be on the air within minutes.

21–33. Print
Newspapers tend to follow strict deadlines to get their product to American breakfast or dinner tables. Reporters may be able to spend hours, even days, with a unit before having to file their stories. The unit will likely garner more “space” in the articles by virtue of the attention the print journalist can give the story. The longer a reporter stays with the unit, the more attached he or she becomes to the unit. Daily newspapers differ from weekly publications in terms of immediacy and pictorial requirements. Weeklies tend to want lots of colored pictures and will focus on more analytical, more timeless aspects of the mission, whereas daily newspapers focus on what has happened since their last deadline and will settle for a good black and white photograph transmitted electronically. A reporter for a specific newspaper gives the commander access to one newspaper, whereas wire services such as Associated Press offer the commander and his or her PAO greater access to the American public because many newspapers subscribe to the services and therefore the story may run in numerous newspapers.

21–34. Motion picture industry support
The Office of the Chief of Army Public Affairs maintains branch offices in Los Angeles and New York primarily to interface with the entertainment industry and networks headquartered in those areas. The offices assist radio, television and film professionals in all matters relating to the U.S. Army. They serve as a local, authoritative source of
information about the Army and provide authentication, verification and limited research for producers, writers, property masters, wardrobe supervisors, film editors, etc. They also provide assistance and advice to scriptwriters, including reviewing rough drafts and suggestions for changes prior to script finalization. Army support of a project is contingent on scripts realistically portraying the Army and its personnel. These offices can also arrange for and coordinate use of Army equipment and supplies not commercially available, coordinate requests for Army’s stock footage, arrange for and coordinate with Army installations or properties for location filming and arrange for Soldier volunteers to participate in the project if requested.

21–35. Internet
One of the most dynamic news sources has become the Internet. The Army now uses the Internet for recruiting and informational purposes, since it is one of the most powerful mediums available at relatively low costs. The Internet has evolved from being a news delivery mechanism to an important force in breaking news. The downside in publishing news on the Internet is the weakness of editorial review. The immediacy of information is more important than validating factual accuracy. Email is another important news mechanism to inform Soldiers, their families, civilians and contractors. The command needs to establish a single source of internal information on the web and the public affairs office, in accordance with DoD policy, should have responsibility for the content of the command’s web site. The Internet can be a powerful and effective means to provide information to a wide audience and to allow for two-way communication and for use in providing accurate, timely information to the public.

Section VII
Summary and references

21–36. Summary

a. The GIE has made possible virtually simultaneous transmission of breaking news into the American living room bridging the gap between strategic and tactical levels of operations. Technology has made news organizations such as CNN possible. This has decreased the dominance of traditional news organizations and increased competition for news and the attention of the American public. The elements of what makes news, however, have remained constant and the American public is, as it always has been, interested in what happens to its sons and daughters in uniform, especially when they are executing an operational mission. The increasing number, variety and complexity of real-world operations in which the U.S. Army has been involved has attracted considerable public and media interest and will continue to do so in the future.

b. The need for operational security will always be of concern to the military; however, it should not prevent the Army from communicating in real time with the American public. With media able to transmit words, voice or pictures via satellites in future conflicts, the most viable solution to assure operational security will include the practice of security at the source, a clear set of ground rules accepted and understood by the media and honest interaction between the military and the media covering the operation. Maintaining OPSEC in this environment also implies that Soldiers and their leaders are trained to deal with the media before the next conflict.

c. Gone are the days when the commander could expect to provide information separately to his or her troops, the American public and the enemy. Information operations involve civil affairs, psychological operations and public affairs messages that by definition overlap and that are picked up simultaneously by Soldiers, the media and the enemy. The importance of consistency and truth in the message has never been more paramount. The GIE environment and continually evolving information technologies make it imperative that information and messages be consistent at all levels.

d. It is conceivable that a commander could win the battle and lose the information war by excluding or attempting to exclude the media from his or her operations. What is worse is that excluding the media from an operation or creating ill will with the media during the operation means the Army’s story goes untold or misrepresented, and the American public is allowed or even encouraged to lose sight of why they have an Army in the first place. As long as the U.S. Army believes it has a role to play in the National Military Strategy of the United States, it owes the American public a look at how it is accomplishing the missions assigned it in the pursuit of that strategy’s objectives.

21–37. References

a. DOD Directive 5105.74, Defense Media Activity.
c. DOD Directive 5122.05, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
d. DOD Directive 5122.11, Stars and Stripes Newspapers and Business Operations.
e. DOD Directive 5400.4, Provision of Information to Congress.
f. DOD Directive 5400.07, DOD Freedom of Information Act Program.
g. DOD Directive 5400.11, DOD Privacy Program.
h. DOD Directive 5410.18, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy.
i. DOD Instruction 5040.04, Joint Combat Camera Program.
j. DOD Instruction 5120.4, DOD Newspapers, Magazines and Civilian Enterprise Publications.
k. DOD Instruction 5200.01, DOD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive Compartmentalized Information.
l. DOD Instruction 5400.13, Public Affairs Operations.
m. DOD Instruction 5400.14, Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations.
n. DOD Instruction 5405.3, Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance.
o. DOD Instruction 5410.15, DOD Public Affairs Assistance to Non-Government, Non-Entertainment-Oriented Print and Electronic Media.
p. DOD Instruction 5410.16, DOD Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-Oriented Motion Picture, Television, and Video Productions.
q. DOD Instruction 5410.19, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy Implementation.
r. DOD Instruction 8910.01, Information Collection and Reporting.
v. Army Regulation 360–1, The Army Public Affairs Programs.
y. Field Manual 46–1, Public Affairs Operations.
Chapter 22
Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Section I
Introduction

22–1. DSCA Overview
   a. The U.S. military primarily organizes itself, trains, equips forces, plans and conducts combat and stability operations. However, when requested by civil authority or directed by the President, it also has enormous capability to rapidly respond and provide support to a wide variety of domestic emergencies and disasters. The Department of Defense (DoD) conducts these operations under civilian control and in accordance with the fundamental tenet of its professional ethos – subordination to civilian authority. Federal military forces normally respond in support of another federal agency, often after a Presidential declaration to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments. Based on our form of government, and consistent with our historic experience, the military should not lead the federal response for any but perhaps the most severe domestic emergency or disaster.
   b. The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005) defines Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) as, “DoD support, including federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.” It notes that DSCA is also often referred to as Civil Support.
   c. DSCA is a critically important mission for the Armed Forces; at one time, FM–1 identified Support of Civil Authority as an Army core competency. Within existing processes and procedures, the Armed Forces have a well-defined basis for participation in domestic emergencies and disasters. They perform specific and appropriate roles and are postured to refine those roles in response to evolving threats and domestic needs.

22–2. Constitutional and Policy Basis for DSCA
   a. Use of the military to support civil authorities stems from our core national values as expressed in the Constitution which anticipates the use of Federal military forces within U.S. borders. Article I, Section 8 states, “Congress shall have power... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.” Article II, Section 3 states the President, “…shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The 10th Amendment provides the basis that Federal government assistance, including DoD, is provided in support of State and local authorities. It reads in part, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it, are reserved to the States respectively...”
   b. The National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies key national interests such as protecting the lives and safety of Americans, maintaining the sovereignty of the United States and providing for the prosperity of the nation and its people. The National Strategy for Homeland Security further focuses on securing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks and calls for the military to support civil authorities during emergencies. In June 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) published its first Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. All these strategies recognize that America’s military may respond to a variety of national needs other than waging war and that DSCA contributes significantly to satisfying America’s national security requirements.

22–3. Historic Context for Domestic Military Support
   a. From our nation’s inception, the Army has supported civil authorities in times of need. Floods, riots, hurricanes, earthquakes, and forest fires are all examples of situations that have caused states to deploy the National Guard and occasionally request the assistance of federal armed forces. Achieving national goals with regard to terrorism, WMD and illegal drug trafficking have also led to supplementing civilian efforts with military forces. DSCA law and policy evolved as our nation grew and responded to repeated crisis and disaster.
   b. When our founding fathers met to draft the U.S. Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787, Shay’s Rebellion was a recent memory and insurrection a concern. To protect the viability of government, they created mechanisms to suppress rebellions or insurrections and enforce the law. The 1794 Whiskey Rebellion led to the fundamental precept, codified in current law that the military is in support of civil authority. A taxpayer revolt and increasing violence led to a Presidential response and deployment of federalized militia. Throughout this threat to federal governance, President Washington’s guidance was that the military was to support local magistrates, not pre-empt them, and this principle remains the foundation of DSCA law, policy and processes.
   c. After the Whiskey Rebellion, the military established a long history of assisting civil authorities enforce the nation’s laws. Significant with regard to current law and policy is the April 1995 domestic terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City. In the wake of that attack, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62 that clarified the roles and missions of various federal agencies with regard to countering and combating terrorism. These documents defined terms such as: Crisis Response (CrM), Consequence Management
How The Army Runs

22–4. DOD Role in Homeland Security (HS) Today

a. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) defined HS as “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many observers expected the next NSHS to expand the definition of Homeland Security to include natural and other manmade disasters. However recognizing the unprecedented threat to our national security posed by Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the 2007 NSHS definition was unchanged, remaining focused on terrorism. As DOD continues to contribute through its military missions overseas and homeland security efforts, this clear and present threat to our homeland is resulting in dramatic change to DOD’s Homeland Security culture and capabilities, particularly the Civil Support or DSCA mission.

b. The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005) identifies two broad mission areas: Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS) or Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The DOD Strategy uses a lead, support or enable construct to categorize DOD’s activities to secure the U.S. from direct attack. DOD has lead responsibility for HD and is the primary federal agency for this mission. HD is DOD’s primary responsibility and is defined as “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.” This chapter does not deal with HD, only DSCA.

c. DOD has had a past reluctance to take on the civil support mission, considering it a mission to accept when we could or had the resources available to assist. Perhaps the most significant change for DOD today is that with the unprecedented threat to the U.S. homeland, DOD must be able to conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management (CM) as an integrated part of our national security efforts. For the first time, the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed DOD to budget monies against this mission and this chapter will also provide examples of how DOD is expanding its Civil Support role.

d. Also associated with DOD’s homeland security construct is Mission Assurance (MA) which includes activities to ensure DOD support of the President and Secretary of Defense during a national security emergency. MA has traditionally been described as providing a foundation for both HD and DSCA by supporting national continuity of government (COG) and continuity of operations (COOP) programs designed to ensure Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG). At the federal level, COG is a coordinated effort within each branch of government to ensure capability to continue minimum essential functions in a crisis; COOP are internal efforts within various governmental department, agencies and organizations to ensure capability to continue operations in support COG and ECG.

22–5. DSCA Principles

a. DOD almost always provides DSCA when requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense. We can also provide support when directed by the President or the SECDEF, or when authorized under separate established authorities.

b. DOD remains in support of civil authority and generally in support of a primary federal agency.

c. The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005) reaffirms that protecting the U.S. homeland from attack is DOD’s highest priority. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), on-going military or homeland defense missions have priority over DSCA missions.

d. DOD provides DSCA in accordance with applicable laws, Presidential Directives, Executive Orders and DOD policy with absolute, public accountability of officials involved in the oversight of DSCA processes and while maintaining our constitutional principles and civil liberties.

e. As a general rule, civil resources should be used first and DSCA should generally be provided only when...
requirements exceed the capabilities of civil authority as determined by FEMA or another federal agency with primary responsibility. DSCA should emphasize DOD’s unique skills and structures, and should be limited in scope and duration.

f. DOD usually provides DSCA through designated federal agencies using established agreements and plans, guided by civilian law and the principle that the federal government assists state agencies, except in terrorism and other incidents where the federal government has primary jurisdiction.

g. DoD Components shall not procure or maintain supplies, materiel or equipment exclusively for providing DSCA unless set forth in law or directed by the Secretary of Defense.

h. Military forces remain under military command and control and the authority of the DoD Executive Agent at all times.

i. DOD components shall not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary and then only on a temporary basis.

j. While there are exceptions, DSCA should be provided on a cost reimbursable basis, primarily through the Stafford Act for presidentially declared disasters or the Economy Act for other situations. Only the SECDEF or the President is authorized to grant a reimbursement waiver.

22–6. DSCA Mission Sets

a. As this version of HTAR goes to print, the current DOD Directives, Instructions and Manuals in this field are obsolete. Many pre-dating September 2001. Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) has replaced Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). The term Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) has been replaced by Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO). While Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) is still used by the National Guards of many states, it is no longer a federal term. The reader should be cautioned about documents that still use the term MACA as an overarching construct that included three subordinate mission sets: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), and Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA).

b. The DSCA environment is so complex and dynamic that it is difficult and perhaps impossible to clearly and consistently create simple categories of missions. The categories used by Joint Publication 3–28 (Civil Support) follow but the reader should understand that these categories overlap and may be in effect simultaneously. For example, a special event could develop in a presidential declaration becoming a declared emergency. Sections ##–## goes into these categories more deeply and describes many but not all of the various mission sets DOD could be called on to support.

(1) Disasters and declared emergencies will likely be presidentially declared, but may not be. In fact, most instances of local commanders invoking Immediate Response authority are in this category. Disasters and emergencies can be natural or manmade. Examples include: natural disasters (flood, blizzard, earthquake, etc.); wild land fire suppression; CBRNE consequence management and more.

(2) Restoring public health and services and civil order includes civil disturbance operations and support in the event of strikes or work stoppage by public service employees (e.g., 1970 postal strike and 1981 air traffic controller strike). It also includes presidentially directed critical infrastructure protection. If not a declared emergency, this category could also include mass immigration emergencies, border security, animal disease eradication and more.

(3) Special events encompass any special event, usually categorized by the DHS Special Events Working Group that warrants defense support. Examples include: Boy Scout Jamboree, Olympics, Super Bowl, World Series and many more. National Special Security Events (NSSEs) are sub-category of such magnitude or importance that the Secretary of Homeland Security designates them an NSSE. The U.S. Secret Service assumes responsibility for the security planning and execution. Recent examples include Presidential Inaugurations, Democratic and Republican National Conventions and State Funerals.

(4) Periodic planned support is a wide ranging category of support to civil authorities that routinely takes place to enhance civil-military relations and meet the needs of local communities, states and even other federal agencies.

Section II
Domestic Emergency Management Environment


a. Tiered Response. One of the most important concepts for those new to the DSCA arena to understand is that our country has traditionally utilized a “bottom-up” as opposed to a “top-down” approach to emergency management with three tiers of support: local, state and federal as shown in Figure 22–1. Primary responsibility for responding to domestic disasters and emergencies rests with the lowest level of government able to effectively deal with the incident. If a situation exceeds local capability, local authorities are generally expected to seek assistance from neighboring jurisdictions under a mutual aid agreement before requesting state assistance. Similarly, if a state’s capability proves insufficient, state authorities ask for assistance, to include non-federalized National Guard, from other states under
existing agreements and compacts before requesting Federal assistance. In the event of a very large or catastrophic event, federal aid may be provided while mutual aid agreements and compacts are still being coordinated. Defense resources are provided when circumstances warrant; military support can be provided at state (National Guard forces under state control) and federal level. Not a designated tier of support or a level of elected authority, regional response both within a state and among states is increasingly important.

Figure 22–1. Tiered disaster/emergency response

b. Key National Response Documents: In combination with each other, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF) provide a single, comprehensive, nation-wide approach to incident management. The NIMS provides an action template for incident management. The NRF provides the policy structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management and can be considered a framework for integrating Federal support into state and local government efforts.

(1) The National Incident Management System (NIMS) establishes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient and collaborative incident management at all levels of government. Responding agencies retain all their jurisdictional authorities and responsibilities, and they maintain operational control of their functions. Thus, another critical concept for those new to DSCA is that domestic emergency management operations are much more about unity of effort than about unity of command with which most service members are familiar. Some additional NIMS facts:

(a) HSPD–5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer the NIMS. HSPD–5 requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and makes adoption by State and local governments a condition for Federal preparedness assistance.

(b) The NIMS objective is to provide a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, local and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size or complexity.

(2) The National Response Framework (NRF) specifies an all-discipline, all-hazards approach for the Federal government to prepare and respond to incidents in a national unity of effort sort of way. It establishes a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. The NRF, utilizing NIMS, is the core operational framework for national incident management.
(a) The NRF applies to all incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response in concert with State, local, tribal, private-sector and nongovernmental entities. The NRF is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies that participate in a coordinated Federal response. The NRF also applies to the nongovernment responders such as the American Red Cross and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD).

(b) The NRF is always in effect although the selective implementation of various elements allows flexibility to meet the unique requirements of any situation. It enables effective interaction among Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector, and other nongovernmental entities.

(c) There are two broad categories of federal assistance for disasters and emergencies. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act provides the authority for coordinating federal responses to most disasters; Figure 22–2 provides a schematic of initial federal involvement under the Stafford Act. Figure 22–3 provides a diagrammatic overview of federal-to-federal support in non-Stafford Act situations.

(d) The Catastrophic Incident Annex is a stand-alone supporting document to the NRF that is particularly noteworthy. It establishes an overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an “accelerated, proactive response” to a catastrophic event.
22–8. Local Response

a. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, local responders will arrive first on the scene. First responders normally include law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and HAZMAT teams. At the incident site, local authorities organize the various responders under the Incident Command System (ICS), a major component of the NIMS. Military forces executing DSCA will interface with an ICS structure.

b. Incident Command System NIMS establishes ICS as the standardized organizational structure for the management of all domestic incidents, yet ICS provides more than just structure. ICS characteristics taught by DHS include: common terminology; modular organization; management by objective; reliance on an incident action plan manageable span of control; and integrated communications. Within the ICS, there are five major functional areas: command, operations, logistics, planning, and finance. Traditionally, information and intelligence functions are located in the Planning Section but if the situation warrants, NIMS ICS can break intelligence out and add a sixth functional area. An ICS hallmark is flexibility to accommodate all circumstances including floods, hazardous material accidents, aircraft crashes, earthquakes – it is an all-hazard system. Flexible enough to manage catastrophic incidents involving thousands of response personnel, several levels of command are possible:

(1) A single command structure provides one commander a reasonable span of control. The incident commander is normally the senior responder of the organization with the responsibility for the event, e.g., fire chief or police chief. There is only one incident commander; he establishes an incident command post to direct operations.

(2) Unified Command ICS has the flexibility for one or more agencies to coordinate and combine independent efforts should the situation dictate. ICS can transition from a single Incident Commander (IC) to a unified command structure to enable agencies with different legal, geographic and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan and interact effectively. In a UC structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities jointly determine objectives, plans, and priorities and work together to execute them. UC as used by NIMS ICS is where the aforementioned unity of effort is manifested as all responding agencies and organizations work to support the IC without giving up individual agency authorities, responsibilities or accountability. An incident large enough to require DOD support will almost certainly be multi-jurisdictional UC.

(3) Area Command is established either to oversee the management of multiple incidents being handled by separate
ICS organizations or to oversee the management of a very large incident that involves multiple ICS organizations. Area Command is activated only if necessary, depending on the complexity of the incident and span-of-control considerations. Area Command does not have operational responsibilities. Functions include: setting priorities; allocating resources according to established priorities; ensuring effective communications; ensuring that incident management objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with policy.

c. To supplement their capabilities, local governments establish mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities. They are usually activated before local authorities request state assistance.

22–9. State Support

a. State Governors are empowered by the U.S. Constitution and their state constitutions to execute the laws of their states. They are the Commanders in Chiefs of the state National Guard when serving in state status. Similar authorities are given to the governors of U.S. territories and possessions. Once a disaster occurs, the Governor decides whether to honor a local government request for assistance and if appropriate, declares a state of emergency, activates the state response plan and call up the National Guard under state orders. The Governor informs the FEMA regional director of his actions and when state resources are insufficient, requests federal assistance.

b. State office of emergency services (OES) in all states have an agency that coordinates and conducts emergency preparedness planning, training and exercises, and serves as the coordinating agency for the Governor in an emergency. The titles of these offices vary from state to state (e.g.: Emergency Management Agency, Department of Public Safety, State Emergency Management Office, Office of Emergency Preparedness). The OES is generally organized as a standalone office under the Governor, or aligned under The Adjutant General (TAG) or state police. The senior official in charge of OES varies by state. Some states have a separate Director of Emergency Services and Director of Homeland Security. Some states combine the positions and some states dual-hat their TAG as the Director of Emergency Services. Previous editions of HTAR attempted to identify those states where TAG was dual-hatted but they change so often we no longer do so.

c. State National Guard forces are particularly well suited to provide military support to local and state agencies. The National Guard in state status is the primary military responder during most natural or man-made disasters and emergencies. It is familiar with local conditions and geography, and acting as a state militia, is not constrained by limitations on federal troops, principally the Posse Comitatus Act.

1. The National Guard operates under one of three statuses. State status (state funding and state control); Title 32 status (Federal funding and State control) or Title 10 status (Federal funding and Federal control). State Civil Support missions are authorized by executive order of the Governor who reimburses the Federal government for utilization of federal equipment and facilities. Employment of National Guard assets by the Governor will be in accordance with State laws and constitutions.

2. State National Guard Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) organizes, trains, plans, and coordinates the mobilization of National Guard units and elements for state and federal missions. Deployment and employment of the state National Guard is directed through the JFHQ.

d. In times of emergency, states often call on other states for help through standing agreements or emergency assistance compacts.

1. The largest and best known is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The EMAC expedites the employment of interstate emergency response assets and may involve all types of support to include National Guard forces. Assets provided by another state are under control of the Governor of the requesting state while assistance is being provided.

2. Since approved by Congress in 1996 as Public Law 104–321, EMAC has been ratified by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and two territories (Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands). Requests for EMAC assistance are legally binding, contractual arrangements and states that ask for help are responsible for reimbursing out-of-state costs for out-of-state personnel. FEMA recognizes cross-state support under EMAC as reimbursable. States are not required to assist each other unless they are able.

Section III
Federal Role in the National Response Process

22–10. Primary Federal Departments and Agencies

a. Secretary of Homeland Security; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) & FEMA:. Pursuant to HSPD–5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. Acting through FEMA, the Secretary has responsibility to effectively manage Federal response and recovery efforts. FEMA also initiates proactive mitigation activities, trains first responders, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA Headquarters is in Washington, DC and there are ten regional offices, three logistics centers, two training centers and other special purpose sites.

b. Attorney General of the United States; Department of Justice (DOJ) & FBI:. Pursuant to HSPD–5, the Attorney
General has responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or threats inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States. He is also responsible for related intelligence collection within the U.S. subject to the National Security Act of 1947, other applicable law and Executive Order 12333. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies, also coordinates the activities of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States.

d. Department of Defense (DOD): Understanding that DOD has significant resources that might be available to support Federal domestic incident management efforts, HSPD-5 states, “The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support.”

d. Other Primary Departments and Agencies: There is insufficient space in this section to cover the long list of Federal organizations that have primary responsibility for various emergencies and other activities for which DOD could provide support. There are a tremendous number of directives, memorandums of agreement/understanding, laws and other arrangements involving DOD. Many but not all primary Federal agencies DOD could support are codified in the NRP’s Emergency Support Function (ESF) framework (Table 23–1). Others are identified throughout this chapter.


This section describes significant organizations and key personnel that are involved with implementing the National Response Framework.

d. Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) located in each of the ten FEMA regions, the RRCC is a standing facility operated by DHS/FEMA that coordinates regional response efforts, establishes Federal priorities and when disaster strikes, coordinates Federal support until a Joint Field Office (JFO) is established. The RRCC establishes communications with affected State Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and the DHS National Operations Center (NOC). FEMA and interagency representatives staff the RRCC as needed.

b. Joint Field Office (JFO) is a temporary Federal facility established in a disaster area to provide a central point for Federal, State and local executives to coordinate their actions. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure and adapts to the magnitude of the situation, it does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, it focuses on providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend beyond the incident site. When incidents impact multiple States or localities, multiple JFOs may be established. Utilizing NIMS ICS principles of Unified Command, JFO activities are directed by a JFO Coordination Group which may include the following officials:

(1) Principal Federal Official (PFO) is personally designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as her representative locally to oversee, coordinate and execute the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities. The NRF states the PFO does not replace the incident command structure and does not have directive authority over the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO). It is most likely that the Secretary will designate a PFO only for complex, high-visibility catastrophic disasters, terrorist events or complex emergencies with significant national impact.

(2) Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) manages and coordinates the overall Federal response and recovery activities for Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is head of the JFO and works in partnership with the SCO to determine and satisfy State and local support requirements. He/she coordinates and tasks Federal departments and agencies as required.

(3) In non-Stafford Act situations when a Federal department or agency acting under its own authority requests DHS assistance to obtain support from other Federal Departments and agencies, DHS designates a Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC) instead of an FCO. In these situations, the FRC coordinates support through interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding.

(4) Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO) is the senior law enforcement official from the agency with primary jurisdictional responsibility. He directs intelligence and investigative law enforcement operations and supports the law enforcement component of the Unified Command on scene. In the event of a terrorist incident, this official will normally be the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC).

(5) Officials representing other Federal departments or agencies with primary statutory responsibility for certain aspects of incident management are Senior Federal Officials (SFOs). SFOs employ existing authorities, expertise and capabilities in coordination with the PFO, FCO, SFLEO and other members of the JFO Coordination Group.

(6) The State Coordinating Officer (SCO) manages the State’s incident management activities; he is counterpart to the FCO. Another important official is the Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR). The JFO Coordination Group may also include tribal/local area representatives with primary statutory authority for incident management.

(7) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) represents DOD as the single point of contact, except for ESF #3, Public Works & Engineering, in the JFO. In this capacity, his reporting chain remains through NORTHCOM but he responds to the FCO. The DCO is responsible for validating all requests for DOD support from the FCO or his representative. The Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) functions as the DCO’s staff.
The NRF organizes emergency response into 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) according to the capabilities and resources most likely to be requested by State officials. ESFs are the primary means through which the Federal government provides assistance during a disaster or emergency. They are shown in Table 22–1, along with coordinating or primary agency. Some departments and agencies are most involved with the early response to an event, while others are more prominent in the recovery phase. DOD is more active in response as opposed to recovery.

(1) During an emergency, some or all of the ESF may be activated based on the nature and scope of the event and the level of federal resources required.

(2) DOD is the Primary Coordinating Agency for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), with the USACE as the DOD lead. DOD is considered a support agency to all ESFs.

22–12. Emergency Support Function (ESF) – 3 (Public Works and Engineering)

a. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)’s long history of providing civil support for flood control, water quality, and hazard mitigation under Public Law 84–99 make it the logical organization to serve as primary agency for ESF–3, Public Works and Engineering. The geographically dispersed location of USACE offices facilitates timely response to disasters in almost any area. The USACE is divided by watershed drainage basins into regional divisions that are subdivided by smaller drainage basins into districts. Personnel are also assigned to various field offices throughout each district. During disasters, USACE personnel quickly mobilize to assist in response and recovery.

b. Each USACE division and district has an emergency operations manager and each office develops plans based on hazards unique to its area, coordinates with appropriate agencies, and identifies response teams to support the assigned missions in the NRF. Types of assistance provided by USACE under ESF #3 include: technical advice and evaluations; engineering services; construction management and inspection; emergency contracting; emergency repair of wastewater and solid waste facilities; real estate support. Some ESF–3 activities include emergency debris clearance; restoration of critical public services and facilities, including supply of adequate amounts office and potable water; temporary restoration of water supply systems; technical assistance; structural evaluation of buildings; and damage assessment. By law, USACE assistance is limited to the preservation of life and protection of residential and commercial developments, to include public and private facilities that provide public services. Exclusive assistance to individual homeowners and businesses, including agricultural businesses, is not authorized. However, during periods of extreme drought, such assistance may be provided to farmers and ranchers under some circumstances.

### Table 22–1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Functions</th>
<th>ESF Coordinator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESF 1: Transportation</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 2: Communications</td>
<td>DHS, National Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering</td>
<td>DOD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 4: Fire Fighting</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 5: Emergency Management</td>
<td>DHS, FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing &amp; Human Services</td>
<td>DHS, FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 7: Logistics Management &amp; Resource Support</td>
<td>General Services Administration (GSA) and DHS, FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 8: Public Health &amp; Medical Services</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 9: Search and Rescue</td>
<td>DHS, FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 10: Oil &amp; Hazardous Materials Response</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 11: Agriculture &amp; Natural Resources</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 12: Energy</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 22–1  
Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Functions—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>ESF Coordinator</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESF 13: Public Safety &amp; Security</td>
<td>Provide non-investigative/non-criminal law enforcement, safety and security capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 14: Long Term Community Recovery</td>
<td>Provides a framework for Federal support to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of Incidents of National Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 15: External Affairs</td>
<td>Provide public affairs, community relations, Congressional affairs, state &amp; local coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Each FEMA regional office is responsible for maintaining an Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT) and developing appropriate procedures for its notification and deployment. Composed of staff from FEMA and other agencies, it provides administrative, logistical, and operational support to the regional response activities in the field. Likely the first Federal response element to arrive in a disaster area, the IMAT can form the core of the Joint Field Office (JFO) once it is established. It also provides support for the dissemination of information to the media, Congress, and the public.

d. There are numerous other Federal special teams available to support incident management and domestic response and recovery to include:

1. Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT).
3. DHS Situational Awareness Team (DSAT).
4. Damage assessment teams.
6. Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT).
7. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs).
8. HHS Secretary’s Emergency Response Team.
9. DOL/OSHA’s Specialized Response Teams.
10. Veterinarian Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs).
11. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs).
14. Donation Coordination Teams.
15. Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) task forces.
16. Federal Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Management Teams.
17. Domestic Emergency Support Team.


a. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) may delegate approval of most requests for support by civil authorities to the Executive Agent, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs. The SECDEF generally retains approval authority for civil disturbance support, response to CBRNE events and for situations with potential for lethality.

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (ASD (HD & ASA)) is the DOD Domestic Crisis Manager and Executive Agent for homeland security activities under the authority, direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). Regarding DSCA matters, ASD(HD & ASA) serves as the primary interagency point of contact for DoD coordination and assists the SECDEF, through the CICS as appropriate, in providing DoD policy direction and supervision.

2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal staff advisor to the SECDEF and USD(P) for special operations and crisis management support to FBI matters and supports planning by the DoD Domestic Crisis Manager for the contingent use of U.S. counterterrorism forces in response to domestic terrorist incidents.

3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) provides recommendations, guidance and support for domestic crisis situations or emergencies that may require health or medical related DSCA, including situations involving the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

4. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)) develops DOD policy and provides oversight for reserve component involvement with domestic emergency situations.
(5) The Joint Staff J–34, Director of Military Support (JDOMS) is the DoD Action Agent. JDOMS has responsibility for communicating and coordinating policy guidance and for the execution of DSCA missions. JDOMS conducts planning and prepares warning and execution orders that task DOD resources. Essentially, JDOMS ensures DSCA planning and execution.

b. Combatant commands serve as the DOD principal planning agents and supported organizations for geographic areas designated in the Unified Command Plan. They validate requests for military assistance in their areas of responsibility (AOR) and provide DSCA. There are two Combatant Commands with responsibility for parts of the U.S. homeland.

(1) U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for planning, organizing, and executing all aspects of homeland defense and performing civil support or DSCA missions within the continental United States, Alaska and territorial waters. The 17 December 2008 Unified Command Plan also puts Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands back in the NORTHCOM AOR. NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces but will have combatant command authority over forces necessary to execute missions directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Selected NORTHCOM subordinate commands:

(2) Army Forces North (ARNORTH), Fifth United States Army, located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas provides NORTHCOM with a dedicated Army Service Component Command for homeland defense and civil support. A multi-component organization (active, guard and reserve), ARNORTH also became a standing Joint Force Land Component Command in 2008.

(a) There are ten Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) permanently assigned to ARNORTH; paragraph 22–11.c described their deployed role. When not deployed, these Army Colonels are assigned to ARNORTH with duty in one of the ten FEMA Regions; there is some discussion about assigning future DCOs from the other services.
(b) JTF–Civil Support (JTF–CS) is subordinate to ARNORTH and is a standing JTF with the mission to plan and integrate DOD domestic CBRNE consequence management support. When deployed, JTF–CS establishes command and control of designated DOD forces at the incident site and provides DSCA.
(c) JTF–North (JTF–N) is subordinate to ARNORTH and is a standing JTF tasked to detect, monitor and support the interdiction of suspected counter-drug and transnational threats within the approaches to the continental United States. JTF–N fuses and disseminates intelligence, contributing to an interagency common operational picture; coordinates support to primary Federal agencies; and supports security cooperation initiatives to enhance regional security.

(3) CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) is a joint, multi-component organization that provides a Federal military CBRNE response. There will eventually be three CCMRFs of about 4,500 troops each. Three brigades form the core of each CCMRF: maneuver, medical and aviation brigades, augmented with other capabilities required for a CBRNE incident. As this version of HTAR goes to print, one CCMRF has been certified and on 1 October 2008 was assigned to NORTHCOM.

(4) Directly subordinate to USNORTHCOM, JFHQ–NCR plans, coordinates, maintains situational awareness and employs forces as directed in the National Capital Region to safeguard the nation’s capital.

(5) SJFHQ–N is a standing joint force headquarters element embedded within the NORTHCOM commander’s staff that provides a C2 capability that is trained, equipped and organized to conduct planning and develop situation awareness. SJFHQ–N can deploy on little notice to rapidly stand-up a JTF headquarters.

(6) U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) has DSCA responsibility for Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions and freely associate states in its assigned AOR.

(7) U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is the force provider for supported combatant commanders. JFCOM is also responsible for coordinating and scheduling joint exercises for assigned forces, as well as de-conflicting the participation of forces in worldwide exercises, training events, and operational missions.

c. Each state, territory, and FEMA region has assigned Reserve officers from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines who are trained in disaster preparedness and military support matters. These Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs), State EPLOs (SEPLOs) or Headquarters EPLOs (HEPLOs) have a comprehensive knowledge of their service facilities and capabilities within their assigned area. EPLOs assist in determining what DOD resources exists within the state, territory, or region. EPLOs may be placed OPCON/TACON to the DCO once appointed. DODD 3025.16 governs the EPLO program.

Section IV
Defense support process
This section describes the general process that applies to all DSCA categories; subsequent sections provide significant and unique aspects of each category.

22–14. Planning Considerations
Paragraph 22–5 described DOD’s Philosophic DSCA Principles and these principles become the basis for planning and executing DSCA missions; some additional considerations follow:

• National Guard forces serving on state active duty status have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local authorities in emergencies. Assuming National Guard forces will not be federalized and that
Federal forces will not be placed under a National Guard commander, DSCA planning and execution must foster a close and continuous coordination with the National Guard to ensure unity of effort.

- Reserve forces have extensive capability beyond the EPLO program. USAR personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty after the President has declared a national emergency. IAW 10 USC 12304, they may not be involuntarily ordered to active duty in response to a domestic emergency except for authorized response to a WMD event. Despite several attempts to change this statutory constraint, as this version of HTAR goes to print, it remains the law.

- Military support will generally be of short-duration (generally not exceeding 30 days) to assist civil agencies with establishing essential safety and security.

- The termination of DSCA and disengagement of DOD resources is a sensitive topic that requires planning consideration from the beginning. The lack of an agreed upon “end state” can lead to over dependence on defense support.

- Rules of the Use of Force (RUF) serve essentially the same purpose for domestic operations that Rules of Engagement (ROE) serve overseas. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B provides standing RUF. These RUF do not apply to National Guard forces in State status.

- Military intelligence assets are prohibited from engaging in intelligence collection activities against U.S. persons (with very limited exceptions clearly specified in law and Executive Order 12333). While there are legal provisions allowing for the use of defense intelligence collection resources in support of domestic incident management, DSCA planners need to be particularly sensitive to statutory limitations on the use of such resources.

22–15. DSCA Request and Approval Process

a. A primary Federal agency usually initiates a request for defense support and submits that request to the DoD Executive Secretary. The ExecSec assesses and processes the request by sending it simultaneously to ASD(HD & ASA) and the Joint Staff, JDOMS. Under the principle of civilian control, the Executive Agent (Office of the Secretary of Defense) approves the order while the Action Agent (Joint Staff) coordinates with the appropriate Combatant Command and prepares and processes appropriate orders. Once the Executive Agent approves the order, JDOMS issues an execute order designating the supported Combatant Commander to conduct DSCA. Figure 22–4 depicts the approval process for an initial request for DOD assistance.

b. Request Review & Validation: Before acting on a request for DOD support, consideration is given to the operational, legal, and policy aspects of the response. Operational review ensures that providing support will not unduly impact operational readiness; legal review ensures DOD support is consistent with regulatory guidance and approved by the appropriate authorities; and policy review ensures that such support is in the best interests of DOD. To assist decision makers, DOD policy establishes six criteria against which each request for support is assessed: legality (compliance with laws), lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), risk (safety of DOD forces), cost, appropriateness (includes consideration of the impact if the request is denied), and readiness. These six criteria are used to review Requests for Assistance at all levels from a deployed DCO in the field to JDOMS and ASD(HD & ASA) in the Pentagon.
c. Once the initial request has been approved and a DCO deployed, requests for DOD assistance are processed through the DCO. If local and state resources, to include those available through mutual aid agreements and compacts are insufficient, the State Coordinating Officer will pass a request for assistance to FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer. The FCO will validate the requirement and query the Joint Field Office ESFs to determine whether support is available. If not, he may pass the request to the DCO. If the DCO validates the requirement and can fill it with capability already deployed, then he will do so. If he validates the requirement but cannot meet it with capability already deployed, he forwards the RFA through his reporting channels to NORTHCOM who in turn sends it to JDOMS for processing and approval similar to the process for the initial request.

22–16. Immediate response
Unique circumstances allow commanders to respond immediately, without requesting approval, to imminently serious conditions that are beyond the capability of local authorities. Local commanders can respond on their own authority to requests for assistance to save lives, to prevent human suffering, and to mitigate great property damage. Once initiated, the commander must inform the DoD Executive Agent through command channels as soon as possible but no less than three hours; this notification is not a request for approval. Associated costs should be recorded for potential reimbursement later. Immediate response is normally of short duration, DOD policy suggests no longer than 72 hours after which formal approval should be obtained if continued support is required.

22–17. Media Considerations
a. During DSCA operations, the news media provide invaluable service that can benefit both responding organizations and the public. When considering what information can and should be released to the media, leadership should consider the need to get accurate and timely information to the public; sensitivity of the information; the possibility of causing public panic; building confidence and hope within the affected communities; correction of false information caused by rumors and distorted reporting. Leadership should strive to ensure the media get as complete and accurate a
story as possible, while ensuring that their activities do not adversely affect public safety or compromise the response activities.

b. Normally, a joint information center (JIC) is established to deal with the media. While DOD representatives are usually represented, it is generally in the nation’s interest that, whenever possible, there is a local or state spokesman engaging the media as opposed to a Federal, including active duty military, spokesman.

c. For major incidents, DOD will publish public affairs guidelines applicable to all participating DOD organizations. The guidance will outline any constraints and the policies for media interaction. Two common themes will usually be addressed: civilian authorities are in charge, and military forces are supporting the nation in time of need.

Section V
DSCA Mission Category: Disasters and Declared Emergencies

22–18. DoD NRF Response Process

a. When a disaster occurs and local and state resources are inadequate, the President invokes the Stafford Act with a Presidential disaster declaration, thereby releasing Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) monies. While DOD will often take risk with regard to reimbursement and execute some pre-declaration actions, DOD involvement formally begins after the declaration. FEMA activates the NRF and requests DOD support as already described in paragraph 22–15. The JDOMS execute order (EXORD) designating the supported Combatant Commander will also designate supporting DOD agencies and direct the Combatant Commander appoint a DCO.

b. The DCO activates the DCE and deploys to the JFO to coordinate DOD support for the disaster. Once the DCO deploys to the disaster site, State and regional EPLO work for the DCO and co-locate with the DCE. Designated federal forces respond to taskings for support validated by the DCO. The DCO has OPCON of all DOD personnel (less ESF #3) deployed in support of the disaster unless a JTF is established. The DCO will receive requests for assistance from the FCO as already described.

c. Tiered Command and Control Options: Based on the type and magnitude of an emergency or disaster, NORTHCOM will establish command and control relationships based on a flexible, tiered construct.

- Small Scale Events can be handled by a DCO, his DCE and EPLOs.
- Medium Scale Events require deployment of a command and control headquarters such as JTF–CS or one of ARNORTH’s two Operational Command Posts. While there could be exceptions, a medium scale Joint Task Force (JTF) is likely to be commanded by a two star flag officer. The NRF directs that if a JTF is established, its command and control element will be collocated with the PFO at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort.
- Large Scale Events, usually employing multiple JTFs, require an overarching JTF or functional component command. While there could be exceptions, these headquarters will most likely be commanded by a three star flag officer.
- Any level headquarters can be augmented with special expertise such as JTF–CS’s Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC)

d. Dual-Status Command Option: One command and control option to further the Unity of Effort between National Guard and federal forces is a Dual Status Command whereby a JTF Commander serves in both a Title 10 status in command of Federal forces while simultaneously serving in a Title 32 status in command of State National Guard forces. Only the commander holds dual-status, not his staff(s) and the forces under his command retain their Federal and State chains of command. The dual status commander must therefore exercise his authority in a mutually exclusive manner, respecting the often different laws and policies, as well as commanders in chief, applicable for both types of forces under his command. A Memorandum of Agreement must be signed by both the Governor and President and recent experience indicates that this dual-status C2 structure may work best for events where there is an extensive amount of time available for advance coordination and development of the MOA. Either party can terminate the agreement at any time. Designed to allow a National Guard officer to command federal forces, 32 USC 315 authorizes an active duty commander to assume dual-status command if a governor would commission him/her in the State National Guard.

e. The supported Combatant Commander will designate a Base Support Installation (BSI), generally at least one for each disaster. A BSI is a military installation designated to provide joint administrative and logistical support to DOD forces. Selection is based on geographic proximity to an operation, functional capability, and coordination with service regional planning agents.

22–19. Improving DoD Incident Response:

a. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, DOD recognized the need to respond more quickly during severe or catastrophic incidents, all the while maintaining respect for the jurisdictional authorities and the political responsibilities of elected officials. To that end, the GEN Renuart added the word anticipate to the NORTHCOM mission statement reflecting an attitude of “leaning forward” and being prepared to be more responsive upon receipt of a
request for Civil Support. DOD and NORTHCOM have also implemented several specific measures to improve responsiveness to civil requirements:

b. Standing Execute Orders (EXORD) empowers the combatant commander to more rapidly respond in support of a primary Federal agency. There are Standing EXORDs for natural or manmade disasters short of terrorist attack and a separate EXORD for a CBRNE incident. The 2008 DSCA Standing EXORD specifies four distinct categories of combatant commander authorizations from assigned forces (Category 1) to those forces required for large-scale response (Category 4).

c. Pre-scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) assist with ensuring support is delivered as rapidly as possible. As of this writing, there are some twenty-six “fill-in-the-blank” templates for the most likely capabilities DOD is likely to receive.

d. Request For Forces (RFF): As an exception to the usual RFA process, NORTHCOM has recently authorized DCOs to more quickly respond to anticipated requirements by using the RFF process, anticipating reimbursement by including a cost estimate.

e. Some but not all of NORTHCOM’s DSCA related plans:

- CONPLAN 2501 (Defense Support of Civil Authorities)
- FUNCTION 2505 (Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Plan)
- CONPLAN 2591 (Pandemic Influenza)
- CONPLAN 0500–02 (CBRNE Consequence Management)
- CONPLAN 2707 (Caribbean Mass Migration)
- CONPLAN 2502 (Civil Disturbance Operations)
- CONPLAN 2400 (Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region)

f. Joint Publication 3–28 (Civil Support) provides commanders and staffs overarching doctrine for conducting Civil Support operations. It specifies five phases which can be conducted simultaneously:

- Phase I: Shaping
- Phase II: Staging
- Phase III: Deployment
- Phase IV: Civil Support Operations
- Phase V: Transition (and Redeployment)

g. Task Force for Emergency Readiness: As this version of HTAR goes to print, DOD is entering into a pilot project with five states to address a crucial challenge to effective response planning. Since there are thousands of State, County and city plans that DOD could be called upon to support and since DOD is supporting other primary Federal agencies and every disaster or emergency is different, it is difficult to accurately anticipate requirements and requests. The TFRs are intended to develop state tailored plans to the 15 DHS Planning Scenarios. They will be civilian led at the State level, funded by DHS and have NORTHCOM involvement.

22–20. Unique CBRNE Response Considerations:

a. CBRNE versus WMD: CBRNE is defined as a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive situation or incident including industrial accidents, acts of nature, war or terrorism. A WMD is a CBRNE device designed to produce casualties or terror. The most likely CBRNE threat is a high-yield explosive; the most dangerous are nuclear weapons. The greatest threat in the sense of a combined most likely/most dangerous combination would be a contagious biological pathogen.

b. CBRNE Planning Considerations: Unique considerations for CBRNE planning include the fact that incidents may not be recognized as CBRNE until there are multiple casualties. Once identified as a CBRNE event, an incident location will probably be treated as a crime scene. Responders will be at a higher risk of becoming casualties and the effects may contaminate critical facilities and infrastructure in the area. The public reaction will have to be managed as fear and panic are likely to set in. Planners must anticipate mass casualty and mortuary affairs support; “worried well” are likely to be a problem. In addition to expecting state and local capabilities to be overwhelmed, planners must remain ready for multiple attacks. It is worth noting that of the fifteen DHS National Planning Scenarios for use in preparedness activities and exercises, twelve are CBRNE events.

c. State National Guard CBRNE Structure: In October 1998, to enhance the national capability to deal with CBRNE consequence management, Congress authorized and funded the first ten National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams that the SECDEF renamed WMD–Civil Support Teams (CST) in January 2000.

(1) WMD–CSTs are comprised of full-time Title 32 National Guard experts, highly trained in a cross-discipline of functional areas. Their mission is to deploy; assess a situation; advise local, State, and Federal response elements and facilitate sound public safety decisions. CSTs are unique, in that they are one of a few DOD units authorized by Congress to conduct CBRNE response within CONUS. CSTs are a national resource and can move across state lines and provide support to another state.

(2) CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP): Designed to rapidly deploy in less than 96 hours, the
two National Guard CERFP teams provide a regional response capability to augment the CSTs. They can locate and extract victims from a CBRNE incident site, perform mass casualty decontamination, medical triage and stabilization. CERFPs are comprised of mobilization day soldiers and are task organized from existing units.

d. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail Federal CBRNE response assets but the reader should know that significant Federal capabilities exist and have an appreciation for the roles and missions of organizations DOD might encounter or support. These resources are listed before the section on DOD capabilities to reinforce the idea that defense resources are employed only after the capacity of civilian resources at all levels of government has been exceeded.

1. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Support Teams (NEST) provide specialized response to the technical aspects of an unresolved incident involving nuclear or radiological devices. Capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of render safe procedures and packaging for transport to final disposal.

2. Environmental Protection Agency Environmental Response Teams (EPAERT) and Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) deal with the human health and environmental impact of terrorist attacks. The EPA’s research laboratories offer field monitoring and technical support to quality-assurance programs for air, water, wastewater and solid waste. Some of these laboratories are capable of deploying mobile units to a contaminated site.

3. The FBI Hazardous-Materials Response Unit (HRMU) has specialized sampling, detection and identification capabilities of NBC agents. Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) provide crime-scene documentation and evidence collection in support of criminal investigations.

4. USCG National Strike Force is trained and equipped to assist in responding to major oil or hazardous material spills, particularly in a maritime environment.

5. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) coordinates the National Medical Response Teams for WMD that deal with the medical consequences of incidents involving CBRNE. In addition, HHS’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has special responsibilities in the event of terrorism involving infectious agents.

e. DOD has many organizations that can assist with the response to a CBRNE event.

1. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) exists to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from WMD (CBRNE) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate and counter the threat and mitigate the effects.


3. USMC Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) responds to CBRNE incidents to assist local, State or Federal agencies and designated Combatant Commanders with consequence management operations. CBIRF capabilities include agent detection and identification, casualty search and rescue, personnel decontamination and emergency medical care to stabilize contaminated victims.

4. CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) was addressed in paragraph 22–14.b.(1)(a)4.

5. U.S. Army 20th Support Command (CBRNE) integrates, coordinates, deploys and provides trained and ready forces. It is also prepared to command and control CBRNE operations. The 20th Support Command provides training and readiness oversight of Army CBRNE assets (active, guard and reserve) to include the 22nd Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort) and 52nd Ordnance Group. The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) provides no-notice capability to conduct field sampling, identification and verification, monitoring, dismantlement, recovery, decontamination, escort and mitigation of hazards associated with chemical and biological materials.

6. The services have a wide variety of other CBRNE assets too numerous to explain in detail. All the services have Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units; the Army has chemical brigades, battalions and companies; the Army also has Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) companies. Much of the Army capability is resident in the US Army Reserve. The Edgewood Chemical Biological Center is the principal research and development center for chemical and biological defense technology.

7. U.S. Army Medical Command also provides a variety of CBRNE support. The USA Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) and USA Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) not only conduct research but provide teams to advise and assist with the medical aspects of incidents. USAMEDCOM also provides operational Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams (SMART) to provide emergency medical response and a variety of other related services in support of a terrorist attack. These teams can also respond to a non-CBRNE natural disaster.

Section VI
DSCA Mission Category: Restore Public Health and Services and Civil Order

22–21. Support to Law Enforcement:

a. The use of military force to enforce U.S. laws inside the homeland is an appropriately sensitive topic and restrictions apply to such use. When armed and so used, military forces, will adhere to the standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) unless the Secretary of Defense has approved mission-specific RUF.

1. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA), subsequent amendments and policy decisions prohibits the use of
federal military forces (to include Reserve forces) to perform internal police functions. PCA thus restricts the type of support DOD can provide domestic law enforcement organizations.

2. There are a wide variety of exceptions to the PCA and we teach at the US Army War College that the law essentially gives the President all the authority he needs to employ DOD forces inside the U.S. although there may appropriately be political consequence that would inhibit such employment. The PCA law itself makes provision for the President’s Article II Constitutional authority. The Act does not pertain to the National Guard when in State status, nor does it apply to the U.S. Coast Guard. There are also a variety of statutory exceptions such as the Protection of Nuclear Materials Act (18 USC 831), Chemical-Biological Terrorism (10 USC 382) and Secret Service Assistance (10 USC 3056). The most renowned statutory exception is The Insurrection Act (10 USC 331–334) that were modified used primarily for civil disturbances.

b. The President is authorized by the Constitution and Title 10 (10 USC 331–334) to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence by using Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO). After issuing a Cease and Desist Order, the President issues an executive order that directs the Attorney General and the SECDEF to take appropriate steps to disperse insurgents and restore law and order. The Attorney General is then responsible to coordinate the federal response to domestic civil disturbances. The restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act no longer apply to federal troops executing the orders of the President to quell the disturbance in accordance with Rules of the Use of Force (RUF) approved by the DoD General Counsel and the Attorney General.

1. USNORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 2502 (Civil Disturbance Operations), is the plan for supporting state and local authorities during civil disturbances. This plan serves as the foundation for any CDO operation and standardizes most activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force.

2. The JTF commander, a general officer, coordinates all DOD support with the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG), see Figure 22–5. DOD will usually establish a JTF headquarters near where the Attorney General’s local representative is based.

c. Combating terrorism is predominantly a civilian law enforcement function, DOJ and specifically the FBI has primary Federal responsibility for combating and countering terrorism. Responsibilities include measures to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

1. The FBI continually assesses intelligence and reports of terrorist activity. When there is a credible threat, the FBI is responsible to disrupt it and prevent an attack. Should there be an incident, the FBI is responsible to neutralize any on-scene threat and for criminal investigation. The FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) supervises the law enforcement activities at the incident scene. The FBI will establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to orchestrate the interagency law enforcement and investigative efforts. The NRF directs the JOC be located with the Joint Field Office (JFO). Other FBI actions can include deploying a domestic emergency support team (DEST), a rapidly deployable
special interagency team that provides advice to the FBI on-scene coordinator. The SAC may also request the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT).

(2) If necessary, the FBI may request specialized DOD support that could include a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The FBI on-scene coordinator notifies the FBI Director and the Attorney General. The FBI also informs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) of the pending request and provides details of the incident. The ASD (SO/LIC) advises the SECDEF and the Attorney General confers with SECCDEF on the deployment request. They, in turn, confer with the President. The President must approve all requests that may potentially lead to DOD use of lethal force in support of law enforcement.

(3) After Presidential approval of DOD support, the SECDEF personally approves deployment orders. Normally DOD provides a JSOTF and special mission units (SMU) with unique capabilities, such as those to render safe WMD. The JSOTF deploys to the site and coordinates proposed actions with the FBI SAC. At the appropriate time, the FBI employs the JSOTF to execute those operations approved by the President. DOD assets deployed in support of law enforcement operations do not normally remain to support response and recovery.

d. Public Law 97–86, passed in 1982, amended the Posse Comitatus Act to authorize indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information in Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities.

(1) Indirect support must be incidental to the military mission, or provide substantially equivalent military training. Further, it cannot degrade combat readiness or the capacity of the DOD to fulfill its defense mission.

(2) Federal, state, and local LEA originate requests for DOD counterdrug operational support in CONUS and submit them to Joint Task Force-North located at Fort Bliss, Texas and charged with the responsibility of validating such requests. The approval process for the use of forces is retained at the highest level. Defense support to Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DEA) can include: ground reconnaissance; detection monitoring; communications; aerial reconnaissance; counterdrug related training of LEA personnel; nonherbicidal cannabis eradication; linguist support; aerial and ground transportation; intelligence analysis; tunnel detection; engineering support; maintenance support and much more. Non-operational support can include facilities, formal military school training opportunities, equipment loans, and more.

22–22. Other types of Public Health and Services DSCA:

a. In the event of a work stoppage or disaster leading to disruption of mail service, DOD may be required to provide support to the United States Postal Service (USPS) to safeguard process and deliver the mail to areas in which service has been impaired.

b. DOD would provide the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) assistance for emergencies requiring the containment and eradication of plant or animal diseases.

c. DOD medical support would generally be provided to Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) using the mechanisms of NRP ESF#8 (Health and Medical Services) and the Catastrophic Incident Annex. There has also been significant and recent interagency effort to develop and exercise specific Pandemic Influenza plans. An important aspect of the ESF#8 process is the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a public, private sector partnership involving DHS, DHHS, DOD, and Department of Veteran Affairs. NDMS provides a nationwide medical response system to supplement state and local medical resources during domestic disasters and emergencies, and provides backup medical support to DOD and the VA medical care systems during overseas conflicts.

d. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DHS–U.S. Coast Guard have responsibilities for oil and hazardous substance spills.

e. The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), a joint Department of Agriculture and Department of Interior organization is responsible for coordinating the Federal response to wild fires, DOD provides resources for the containment, control and extinguishing of wild fires on lands owned by the Federal government.

f. Mass immigration emergencies could result in DOD providing other Federal agencies with support such as installations and services associated with housing migrants while the Immigration and Naturalization Service resolves the administrative requirements for migrants to enter the U.S.

Section VII
DSCA Mission Categories: Special Events & Planned Periodic Support

22–23. DSCA Mission Category: Special Events

a. Pursuant to HSPD–7, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council, is responsible for designating events a National Special Security Event (NSSE). These special events of national significance can be political, economic or international sporting events. They all present a lucrative target for terrorists. A large number of people or a limited number may attend it; they may encompass a wide geographical area or be restricted to a specific site. When an event is designated a NSSE, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as lead for security planning and DOD supports the USSS. Examples of military assets that may be deployed include EOD, technical escort unit teams and CBRNE assets. If an incident occurs at an NSSE, the FBI leads the law enforcement
and criminal investigation efforts, and FEMA leads response and recovery efforts. Most events are not designated NSSEs, may still receive DOD support.

b. JDOMS plans, coordinates, and monitors execution of approved DOD support to other special events as categorized by the DHS Special Events Working Group. Events of a lesser significance are designated Special Events for Homeland Security (SEHS) levels 1 to 4, SEHS Level 4 being the lowest priority. DOD focuses on support related to public safety and security, including but not limited to, physical security, aviation, logistics, communications, joint operations and command centers, and explosive ordnance disposal support. DOD support for events may be reimbursable or non-reimbursable depending on the type of support provided and the nature of the event.

c. DOD is authorized under Title 10, USC 2554 to provide support to international sporting competitions (SISC) if the Attorney General certifies that support is essential to the safety and security of the event. Congress has established a revolving fund to cover SISC operational expenditures.

d. DOD supports other special events as demonstrated by the many State Designated Special Events that National Guard forces support while on state status under a governor’s control.

22–24. DSCA Mission Category: Periodic Planned Support

a. This category enhancing civil-military relations includes DOD laboratory support; specialized and mobile training programs; participation in local, state and federal emergency management exercises; support provided to the Secret Service under 18 USC 112; and provision of military bands or honorary fly-over at civic events. It includes Military community affairs programs and community relations programs administered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

b. Installation commanders are authorized under the Installation Mutual Aid Agreements, USC Title 42, Section 1856a-c to enter into limited mutual aid agreements with local communities, usually for fire, emergency medical or hazardous material response. It should be noted that while such memorandums may improve understanding about what resources DOD may be able to provide, they do not constitute preapproved support. Requests must be approved or be provided under some established authority such as Immediate Response authority.

c. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) is governed by DODD 4500.9 that authorizes medical helicopter units to provide emergency assistance if local resources are not available or are not sufficient to respond to emergencies. Under this directive, there is no reimbursement, units may not relocate to provide service and they must operate within their allocated training hour program.

Section VIII
Summary and references

22–25. Summary

a. Our nation has a time-tested tradition of civilian control over the military and of limiting military activity within the United States. Balancing that valued tradition with the need for military support in response to disaster and acts or threats of terrorism within the United States requires approval by the most senior civilian officials within our government.

b. The military has available a unique blend of skilled personnel and equipment capable of rapid and effective responses in support of appropriate civil authority. By policy, requests for military resources are only approved when the capacity or resources of other federal, state, and local agencies is exceeded and the crisis remains unresolved.

c. While DSCA normally involves military units performing tasks related to their wartime missions, the commitment of those units detracts from their ability to respond to possible combat missions and usually adversely affects readiness. DOD leaders must be very judicious in determining when and how to provide support to civil authorities, scrupulously adhere to approval and employment rules, and be mindful that DOD resources are always in a support role. Existing local, state, and national response systems provide a solid framework within which DOD can provide support.

d. The military continues to provide reliable and responsive DSCA. Moreover, The Army’s extensive experience in supporting civil authorities during peacetime disasters, national security emergencies, and special events enhances HS and has kept The U.S. Army in the forefront of domestic disaster response. The military’s force projection capability, designed to respond quickly and decisively to global requirements, also allows its rapid response to domestic incidents that occur within the United States, its territories and possessions. The judicious use of military forces in support of civil requirements complements the military’s war fighting and force projection capabilities, while insuring the American people get maximum return from their military investment.

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