



STUDYING SOFT POWER AT THE WAR COLLEGE (EISENHOWER SERIES)

By Ron Hawkins, Abdul Sami, Kate Sanborn, and Ron Granieri, June 2, 2021
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Ron Granieri: Welcome to A Better Peace the War Room podcast. I'm **Ron Granieri** Professor of History at the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and Podcast Editor of the War Room. It's a pleasure to have you with us. For 50 years, the U.S. Army War College's Eisenhower Series College Program, or ESCP, has been designed to encourage dialogue on national security and other policy issues between the War College students and the broader public. In pursuit of dialogue, War College students travel across the country speaking to college classes, voluntary organizations, think tanks and other public forums in our age of Corona and social distancing. However, the ESCP has unfortunately had to scale back the travels of our students. Here at A Better Peace, however, we aim to pick up the slack by giving Eisenhower program participants a chance to share their expertise and insights. Today's podcast is the first in a planned series. Today's topic is soft power. What is it and how can it be deployed by the United States and by its potential rivals? Ever since its invention by Harvard's Joseph Nye in the early 1990s, the term soft power has been used to describe a range of policies and actions that rely less on force and more on attraction. Nye developed the term to counter charges that the United States in a post-Cold War World was doomed to decline as its relative hard power advantages diminished. Ironically, contemporary commentators used the term to warn that Washington has become too fixated on hard power and is in danger of falling behind its rivals, especially in Beijing. Our guests today to talk about soft power are three members of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2021. **Brigadier General Abdul Sami of Pakistan** has held various command staff and instructional appointments in infantry and engineer formations across Pakistan, including the Pak-Afghan border fencing project. Before attending the U.S. Army War College, he was chief of staff of an army corps in Karachi. **Lieutenant Colonel Kate Sanborn** is an engineer in the U.S. Army with 19 years of service. She graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 2002 and holds a PhD in civil engineering from Georgia Tech. Lieutenant Colonel Sanborn's assignments include deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and before attending the U.S. Army War College Lieutenant Colonel Sanborn commanded the Honolulu District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Finally, **Mr. Ron Hawkins** in more than two decades at the State Department has been a public affairs officer, a PAO, at the U.S. Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, Bucharest, Romania, and

Khartoum, Sudan. Before that he had assignments in Washington D.C., Sarajevo, Reykjavik and Algiers. Welcome to A Better Peace colleagues.

Kate Sanborn: Thanks, Ron.

Abdul Sami: Thank you.

Ron Hawkins: Thank you.

RG: Thank you. General Sami, I want to start with you. As part of the Eisenhower program, students have prepared speeches and I wanted to give each of you a chance to summarize what you would have talked about if we were in a large auditorium with hundreds of people.

AS: Right. Thank you, Ron, again. Good morning everyone. It's such a pleasure to be here and to join you and share a perspective from Pakistan on China's Belt and Road initiative called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPAC for short. I will briefly mention Pakistan's involvement in the Global War on Terror that caused infrastructural gaps to open up in the country, how Pakistan is partnering with China and other countries to address these gaps and in the end, I will briefly comment on the environmental and debt sustainability aspects of some of these projects. Now, Pakistan is geographically located in an interesting neighborhood. We have China towards North India towards East Afghanistan and Iran towards West and the North Arabian Sea to our South. The security situation in the region has largely remained turbulent for much of the last four decades. First, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and then the Global War on Terror from 2001 until this day. Over the last two decades of the Global War on Terror, Pakistan has paid a very heavy cost for the peace that exists there today. More than 75,000 people died, including more than 8,500 brave men and women of the law enforcement agencies. The infrastructure took a major hit too. To give you an idea, by 2014 Pakistan's power sector had a capacity shortfall of around 7,000 megawatts. The implication was that the country had to experience an average of 4 to 6 hours of daily power outages. It was adversely affecting the industrial productivity and the economy. One estimate in fact, put annual losses up to as much as 3% of the GDP. Now to get out of this downward spiral, you would imagine that an emergent intervention was needed. So, in April 2015, Pakistan signed a series of memoranda of understanding with China for investments in power, road, rail and other infrastructures. Some areas were also identified for development of special economic zones. The idea was to address the power sector crisis on fast track and simultaneously develop the other sectors. Five years on after completion of many power projects, today, Pakistan has substantial surplus power generation capacity. The industrial sector is now working better and the economy appears to be on the mend. There have been two major concerns on these projects though: environmental sustainability and debt sustainability. So I'll quickly cover the environment part first. CPAC included eight coal power projects. There were three major reasons for that. One, it's the quickest

to bring power online and given the state of economy at that time, it was kind of a compulsion. Two, coal was almost missing from Pakistan's power generation mix at only 3%. And three, Pakistan sat on world's second largest lignite coal reserve completely untapped. That had potential. Even after completion of CPAC coal power projects, coal still accounts for only 16% of Pakistan's energy mix, as compared to 58% and 56% in the large neighboring economies of China and India respectively. Despite that Pakistan has announced a no new coal power plants policy in December last year and is pushing for renewable energy technologies. As for the debt sustainability however, cumulative Chinese loan represents only 6% of Pakistan public debt portfolio. The rest comes from other foreign and domestic sources. So we have parliamentary oversight and consultation with partners like the IMF and World Bank that kind of ensures that only the financially viable projects are approved as part of the CPAC. The focus these days is to seek foreign investment in special economic zones for export-oriented industries that can leverage Pakistan's abundant raw materials and cheaper labor force. Work on two of these special economic zones is in an advanced stage and these are attracting investments from many countries due to lucrative incentives that these offer. If I were to sum up Ron, I would quickly say that Pakistan's long involvement in the Global War on Terror has caused large gaps to open up in infrastructure, particularly the power, road, rail and industrial sectors. China has invested in a few of these projects. There are plenty that need to be done. Pakistan has recently taken steps to move away from coal power plants towards more renewable energy projects and the Chinese debt still forms a small proportion of Pakistan public debt. Call it Soft Power or geoeconomics, I sincerely hope that the United States and other partners take a collaborative approach towards it as the infrastructural and developmental needs in Asia are too huge to be covered by the Belt and Road Initiative alone. Thank you, Ron, for your time and I am looking forward to the discussion and any specific questions. So it's over to you.

RG: Thank you, Sami. That was a great start and questions are already coming to mind. But I want to hear from your colleagues first. So let's go to you Lieutenant Colonel Kate Sanborn.

KS: Thanks, Ron and again appreciate the time. So my talk is about soft power in the Pacific Islands and specifically with competition to China. That's based on my experience as the commander for the Corps of Engineers, where one of my responsibilities was to coordinate and oversee many U.S. federally funded engineering projects in Pacific Island countries and specifically those compact island countries. What I experienced, what I saw, was that if the United States wants to compete with China's use of soft power in those countries, then there's really three hurdles that we need to try to overcome. The first is the perception of China's head start. Despite being in compact agreements with these countries, the actions and the volume of trade and the volume of financial aid provided currently by China seems to overshadow what some of the U.S. efforts have been. The second hurdle is the tactics that China is using which appear to center on infrastructure development, which is uncoordinated with the needs of the island which sometimes appears to have dual purposes and is always built with foreign labor and

material so no benefit to the local economy and in the long run, limited benefit to the islands. This is also combined with alleged attempts to bribe government officials, which did happen unfortunately when I was out on a visit in one of those islands. The third and probably the most difficult hurdle is the challenge of developing an integrated and synchronized effort by U.S. federal agencies to fulfill the needs of our island partners and optimize the full potential of our national power using all of our instruments. In conclusion, it's really a challenge. These islands are logistically challenging, they have a lot of needs and there's definitely China out there in a big way doing some big projects that if the United States doesn't look at our approach to it... we have a lot of ability to counter this in the soft power realm and we can, we can do that and support the actual needs of those Pacific Island countries and make sure that the investment isn't short lived on impact. I like to call it the paper tiger of soft power when you have just a short-lived impact. My concern is, if we don't address it and we don't work to overcome these hurdles that we will start to see the first steps of losing the great power competition in these tiny islands in the Pacific. I look forward to your questions and the discussion that will follow. Thanks.

RG: Great. Thank you, Kate. And Ron Hawkins, the perspective of the State Department or a member of the State Department, though none of us is speaking for our particular institutions.

RH: Well, good morning, everybody and thank you very much for allowing me to be a part of this. What I wanted to talk about was the use of soft power in engaging with a foreign audience. As mentioned, I'm a foreign service officer so I'm with the State Department and overseas, we look for creative ways to engage the public to convey either American culture, American history, American values, American ideals. One way that we did this was working with our military colleagues overseas to play baseball. So sports in general and baseball in particular are excellent conduits through which we convey powerful messages regarding American democratic values with our foreign audience. Firstly, it's a game with rules and everybody must follow the same rules so we showcase rule of law. Secondly, it doesn't matter if you're rich or poor, black or white, gay or straight, Christian or Muslim, anyone can play so it's very inclusive and in playing, all try to the best of their abilities and any team can win, not just the one with the best uniform or the fanciest equipment so it's very democratic. Additionally, and very significantly, we have a stellar example from the game of baseball of an individual who contributed significantly to making America a better place. I'm thinking of Jackie Robinson and on April 15th. 1947, Jackie was the first African American to play Major League Baseball when he took to then Ebbets Field for the Brooklyn Dodgers. Throughout his first year with the team, he underwent terrible verbal abuse trials and tribulations, including threats to him and his family. But his response to this and everything was nonviolent. Now you might be asking yourself why you choose a person from so long ago to complement our sports initiative when modern athletes today continue to raise questions about racial inequality in America. Well, I wanted someone who was historical who was not politically charged in today's context and his legacy has endured. We can point to the effects that Jackie had on baseball and on America and we were able to tap into them and tap

into his family to help us share that legacy. We did a couple of programs one in Romania. So we did clinics with kids, we brought out retired Major League Baseball players and we brought out Sharon Robinson, Jackie's daughter to help engage the public, discuss these American values and showcase them. In Uganda we did the same thing. We had clinics with kids across the country and David Robinson, Jackie's son actually lives in nearby Tanzania and he came up for some events, so it really helped him make it real for these kids and it was a much better way to engage than just sort of holding a lecture series on non-violence or the biography of Jackie Robinson. It was a way to engage. So for us baseball became a very powerful public diplomacy tool sharing American democratic values with foreign audiences. Moreover, the U.S. government overseas through its embassy was seen in a different light. Audiences viewed us as championing diversity, inclusion and nonviolence through sports and for providing skills training. Local communities welcomed us warmly because we were not there to lecture but to engage and to educate, and as with a healthy democracy, sports are vigorously rooted in inclusion. The players accept the rules and the results of the game are met with nonviolence. Baseball and Jackie Robinson is the best example of all that. Recently, when talking about the United States, President Biden said we lead not by the example of our power, but by the power of our example. So let's play ball. Thank you very much and I look forward to our discussion.

RG: Thank you, Ron. That was terrific and thanks to the three of you. I'm delighted that in your presentations you got at something that I tried to mention in the intro, but that gets me whenever there's a discussion of soft power and that is when we try to think about soft power, obviously we are contrasting it with hard power, but to try to figure out what that actually means. Certainly in the initial writings of Joe Nye, the idea of soft power was something that you do almost indirectly and Ron, when you talk about the power of an example is simply offering the example and letting the audience draw conclusions from it is different from telling people what the example is going to be. And yet what General Sami was talking about and also what Lieutenant Colonel Sanborn was talking about are both examples of policy questions. There are policy decisions that have to be made and economics is not hard power in the sense of military power, but economics can be pretty hard and can be pretty direct. And so I want to start with you, Ron, and I want to ask how conscious are the policy discussions when you come up with a program like this program about baseball and Jackie Robinson? And also, how determinedly, does one avoid pushing too hard... so you want to use soft power to attract rather than to pressure people? So how conscious were you of this need to be soft while presenting this? I'm going to ask you first Ron and then I have a question for General Sami and for Lieutenant Colonel Sanborn.

RH: Sure. And actually, it's a great question and it's actually a broad one and historical so let me let me try to chop it down a little bit. As you and probably a lot of others are aware, we had the United States Information Agency that was absorbed, combined with the State Department around 1997 and some people lament that loss. I actually think it was a very smart move because what had happened previously was USIA was basically an institution for sharing American

culture with the world, which is a terrific thing in and of itself. But what they found was that by combining it with the State Department as one single agency, it became public diplomacy within the Department. And so what public diplomacy actually means is now directly engaging the public on these issues. So no longer were we doing culture for culture's sake, it was now using that culture to target or using that culture to address issues. And so when we're developing programs, etc., those programs are directly related to the integrated country strategies that each embassy has overseas, and these integrated country strategies devolve from the national security strategy. So in other words, we have the national security strategy more broadly, what the U.S. wants to do and then at a local level, at an embassy level, we have what we want to achieve in that country or what the U.S. embassy wants to achieve in that country. And so from there, we then develop public engagements. We use all the tools that we have to engage the public, to advocate for these policies, to highlight these policies. So the example that I gave of baseball was one to again, talk about inclusion, diversity, primarily nonviolence, as opposed to just sort of saying we're now going to have a lecture on this, or who wants me to come to their university and talk about this. Nobody would want that. People would be bored, but by playing baseball, it's a lot of fun and we can talk about those things. And what was great about it was in both of these countries, we actually combined our teams—Embassy and DoD, we made up Team USA. We challenged the national teams of baseball in each of the respective countries that we did this. We lost because they were such great teams, but the messaging got out there and that's what's the important the message is.

RG: Sure. And I will say that it doesn't hurt relations to lose. One random question that I wanted to ask you though Ron was: did you know that David Robinson lived in Tanzania when you were in Uganda or was that purely coincidental?

RH: I did actually, primarily from his sister because of having worked with Sharon in Romania previously and we had talked about that. Plus, I had read a little bit about the history of the Robinson family. And so then when I moved to Uganda, I thought, oh well, wait a minute, here's a great opportunity. So we reached out to David and invited him up to Uganda and he came up and it was really a pretty good program. He actually, just as an aside, if I can just add, he actually is a coffee farmer, and so while he was there, he also discussed things about coffee.

RG: Now that's interesting because I also know that Jackie Robinson became an executive with Chock full o' Nuts coffee when he stopped playing baseball for the Dodgers, which I'm sure David already knew. There's an interesting history in there someplace. Well thanks, Ron. General Sami, I want to build off of what Ron was just talking about and that is when you talk about Chinese investment in Pakistan or foreign investment generally in Pakistan, how do Pakistanis relate the reality of the investment to any kind of attitude towards the foreign countries that are doing the investing. Is there a more positive attitude towards China because of

these investments they're making in the economic, in the energy field and how aware are people of the self-interest of the foreign investment that is trying to improve relations?

AS: Right. I think what people appreciate in Pakistan and perhaps all over the world is that... every country has a need and those needs are to be met through partnerships with different countries and China is one of the countries that we've partnered with and so do many other countries. Impression or the Chinese... should I say the kind of impression people have about China after the BRI investments is positive to be sure, and people think that these investments have been made to help Pakistan in a time when Pakistan really needed investments in infrastructure. Now what is there for China in it? Of course, there is a good business because the returns are good in the power sector of course. And also, the diplomacy and the soft power element that we talked about earlier. But should we say that any other country that China partners with has different opinions about China? Perhaps. I think the BRI has 80 partners around the world, including ones in Europe, Africa and many other countries in the world across the entire globe actually. So I think people have different opinions. There have been opinions that it's a debt trap diplomacy going on and many others. Our experience hasn't been in line with the debt trap diplomacy experience so far. So I think our experience so far has been better and I think the people of Pakistan view it quite positively. But is this it? I think not. Again, because we need more investment in the infrastructure, and we have partnered with many other countries as well. USAID has done some great work in the past. Asian Development Bank has done some work, continues to do some more. World Bank does a lot of work and that too generates a lot of goodwill for the U.S. there. There is certainly more space for making it more inclusive and a larger cooperation with the U.S., but I think when the time comes, I think it will only be win-win for both Pakistan and U.S.

RG: Thank you, General. And so, Lieutenant Colonel Sanborn. This gets at something that I think fits very well with what you were talking about. You were describing the projects in the Islands in a competitive way and thinking about how does the United States and China, how are they competing with each other? How should the United States compete with China? If soft power is in part a kind of thing that you do without trying to draw too much attention to the fact that you're doing it, sort of hoping that the locals will feel good about you for doing it without you having to talk about it too much. How do we do this in a way that is both appropriately soft if you will, but is also explicitly in competition with somebody else?

KS: So I think it's a great question, Ron, and I think specifically in these islands, what we do is sort of that old teach a man to fish or fish for him type of situation. And in the case of what does the United States do in these islands? What we were looking to do was enhance their technical capacity and capability and enable them to plan and contract and manage these projects themselves for the long term. Then they didn't need assistance of the United States potentially. So I think there is that element of, show them best practices, things that we the Corps of

Engineers had learned along the way, help them when they get stuck, help them recognize some of the challenges that might not be obvious in terms of long-term costs for these projects, in terms of maintenance and operations because those costs can really add up, especially in those islands. They're so remote just the shipping costs and logistics of getting air conditioning filters, for example. If they can only come from certain places and those places know that they have that monopoly with you, they can make those filters very, very expensive and add on the shipping costs and that can really be cost prohibitive for continuing maintenance. So I think the efforts went to providing them with what they needed and the United States is focused on healthcare facilities, education facilities and then basic infrastructure, so roads and power and communications networks and those type of things, really focusing on those basic needs, so that then the returns are evident in the communities.

RG: And so this is all from your experience when you were the commander of the district there. So your office was in Hawaii. How many thousands of miles away did your responsibilities go from Hawaii to Wake to Guam too where else?

KS: Yes. So the Honolulu district is very unique. It's the largest geographic district out of the forty-three districts for the Corps of Engineers. Most of that's ocean, but I don't let that hold us back. So yes, it included all the islands in the Pacific. So the territories, American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth of Northern Marianas and Guam, and the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas did see Chinese influence trying to come in there, specifically with things like casinos and resort construction those types of assets as well as the compact states, specifically. So the Republic of Palau, the Republic of Marshall Islands, which has the Garrison on Kwajalein as well as the Federated States of Micronesia, which is where I really saw first-hand one, the government bribe attempt and two, the project first-hand, this giant road that was being built that went to nowhere. That kind of made you scratch your head like what is this road for and why are they building it so large? You could maybe land an aircraft on it.

RG: I guess the reason why the Compact states are especially complicated is because they are not U.S. territories, they are sovereign states and so therefore they were in a better position to strike deals with the Chinese than say other places.

KS: Absolutely, and I don't know that the United States necessarily wants to try to prevent that. I mean to General Sami's point, there's more than enough aid needed that it would be great if there could be cooperation between the United States and China versus more adversarial... But the other aspect of the Compact states is those compacts are coming up for renewal in 2023 and 2024 and so when you look at the investment that China is making, increasing almost 30% annually over the past five years, promises of millions and millions of dollars that are equal to nearly their total investment over the last three decades, it makes you have questions about why now, especially with respect to those compacts. And those islands, not a lot of people know

about those islands. They are almost 4,000 miles away from Hawaii, so they are really far away from the continental United States and very few people have the opportunity to go out to these amazing tropical beautiful islands, but they are strategically located for both the Chinese and U.S. perspective. They're in that second island chain and I think that we definitely have to keep those partners in mind. We've been strong partners with them in agreement with the compacts since the end of World War II and where do we go from here in order to make the investment to

RG: It's very true and actually just when you mentioned a place like Kwajalein, I'm thinking these are islands whose names resonate with some very difficult battles in the 1940s and there was a reason why they were strategically important in the Pacific War with Japan and there is a reason why they're important today.

KS: Absolutely. It's amazing to travel around and see the bunkers and see some of the old weapons and everything that are still there. You're traveling through battlegrounds, living history, right there, and I can't imagine being a marine trying to take some of those islands. It's just unfathomable.

RG: We are just about out of time for this short conversation to get us going talking about soft power, but I wanted to give each of you a chance for a final comment and what I'm curious about from each of you is your perspective on what is it like talking about soft power at an institution that is devoted to training people to use hard power? If we think about the military as generally a hard power operation. So I want to start with you, General Sami. What's it like to talk about soft power? Do you think that there are better ways we can encourage the military to think about soft power?

AS: I think it's a brilliant question, but I think the hard and soft power go hand in hand because when a military goes in for any operation around the world, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, any other country in the world, it has to have a soft component. How else would people be able to relate with the force that has come in, that it means good for that nation. So from a U.S. perspective and from Pakistan's perspective, when we were doing operations in the federally administered tribal areas towards our Western borders with Afghanistan, it's a very difficult and mountainous terrain—I think quite a nightmare for any military operation—but over the time that those military operations were going on, a lot of effort was being made to carry out the stability operations to invest into the infrastructure, to invest into the roads, health, education sector so that people and their businesses too could relate that this army means good for them and the army actually wishes that this area should be developed and the nation actually wishes that area to be developed and a lot of partners actually came together including USAID and many other partners from the Western World and the development that took place in that FATA region made it possible in 2018 for it to be subsumed in the adjoining province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and that means a very big thing for Pakistan. That is a historical achievement and I think a lot of soft

power was used by both Pakistan as well as with the partner nations. I think that did the trick. Thank you for the question. I think hard and soft power go hand in hand.

RG: Thank you, General Sami. So Ron Hawkins, for you the question of how do you talk about soft power at a military institution like the U.S. Army War College? I realize this even an extra challenge for someone who is coming from the State Department talking about soft power in a hard power world. How do you see the better ways or how do you communicate the importance of soft power within this military context? And how do you see that kind of cooperation going forward?

RH: It is a very good question because especially at a place like the Army War College where people's careers have been based on solely focusing on hard power, to take a step back and to look at soft power and why it's important. What I have learned here at the War College and in discussions with just individual military folks in my individual seminars, of course, no one wants to use the full force of hard power. No one wants to go to war, and so you're trying to do everything you can not to go to work, and soft power is a great way to have this attractiveness, to engage foreign audiences in discussions about sometimes very difficult topics. And so in that way, it's an option, it's an instrument of power under diplomacy to engage the foreign audience to discuss things, and to find other avenues to come up with solutions. And in a place like the War College, I think it's sort of a refreshing topic because people have not thought about it as much here. They have not focused on it and what they realize is there are so many tremendous ways that the Department of State, being a practitioner and the Department of Defense, also being a practitioner, how we can work together on these things. And a lot of it is branding, is harnessing the brand of the U.S. military which in and of itself is very attractive. People are very curious about the military and so, for example, whenever a ship visit occurs overseas, that was always something that I delighted in because people were fascinated to go see a U.S. naval ship and to talk about those things, so it was a great way for us to look open, transparent, magnanimous by inviting people to tour the ship because they probably have never even toured their own navy's ships. And so it's a way to be attractive, to invite conversation. And then like I said, here at the War College, I think it's definitely a topic that could be talked about more and we could explore more ways and how we can cooperate together. So thank you, thank you for having this podcast and it being a vehicle in and of itself to discuss.

RG: That's great, thank you. And so over to you, Kate Sanborn, this the same question to you, especially as the one U.S. Army officer in the room here. As someone who is dealing with the Corps of Engineers, the number of civilian related projects that one is involved with. How do you see encouraging the dialogue about soft power in a hard power institution like the military?

KS: Absolutely Ron. I do think it's a great question and it's something that at the Army War College, it sounds kind of counter intuitive to talk about something like soft power, but as we

have progressed through the course material and what we've learned—and maybe what we've reframed some of our experiences in the military—is that hard power is almost a last resort of sorts Ron was talking about, we hope to not have to get to that point. We know how to use it. We're masters of our craft in being able to execute hard power. Soft power though is it's really what it takes to integrate those instruments of national power. And there is a role for the military, and it's how we integrate and how we have synergy across the economic, the information and the diplomatic instruments as well to try to further our national interest, to try to achieve our goals, to try to aid our partners before we get to the place where hard power is maybe necessary. So I think it's a good conversation for us as strategic thinkers, as future senior leaders for a lot of folks in the military to think about where do we fit in with all the instruments of power? And where does the military look to use soft power as well because we do security cooperation exercises, we do a lot of public affairs and like Ron was talking about, tours of the ships, etc., and those are small examples of where the military can integrate with those other instruments to provide that soft power.

RG: Well, that's great and that is a perfect place to end this conversation in the hope that the bigger conversation about the relationship between hard and soft power can continue. I want to really thank General Sami, Lieutenant Colonel Sanborn, Mr. Hawkins. Thank all of you for joining us today to talk about soft power here on A Better Peace.

KS: Thank you.

AS: Thank you.

RH: Thanks.

RG: And thanks to all of you for listening in. Please send us your comments on this program and all the programs, and subscribe to A Better Peace if you have not subscribed to A Better Peace already on the podcatcher of your choice and after you have subscribed, please rate and review this podcast because that is how other people can find out more about us and we are always interested in hearing from you. We are always interested in building this community for these types of conversations. So even though this conversation is over, we look forward to welcoming you to the next one and until next time, from the War Room, I'm Ron Granieri.