Middle States Accreditation
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE), 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19104, (267) 284-5000. MSCHE is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. Initial accreditation was granted in 2004 and most recently renewed in 2019.

Throughout this publication, Joint Doctrine and official instructions are printed in Courier New / Purple text. Emerging concepts, draft guidance Revised reads: Emerging concepts, draft guidance, and US-AWC best practices are in Arial/black text.

On charts, USAWC “best practice” additives are in blue / italics. Reconciling between formats (e.g., a JP 5-0 chart is missing something found in JP 5-0 text) is in Green / Underline.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: National Strategic Direction and Guidance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic Direction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National-Level Strategic Documents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DoD/Joint Staff-Level Documents</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Theater-Level Documents</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CCDR dialogue with National Leaders (Military Options, COAs and Planning)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FDOs/FROs</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: Joint Planning</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Globally Integrated and Coordinated</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-National Planning</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unified Action</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Planning</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Management and Review of Plans</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Strategy and Planning Continuum</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conceptual to Detailed Planning</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Global Campaigns</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Campaign Planning versus Contingency Planning</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Detailed Planning</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Risk</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: Operational Design</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Purpose</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Spectrum of Design</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint and Army Design</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overarching Elements of Operational Design</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key Planning Factors for the Operational Environment</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Time</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forces and Functions</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Balancing</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Divergence and Convergence</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conducting Operational Design</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organizing for Operational Design Work</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Link between Operational Design, Planning, Execution and Assessment</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reframing</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4: Joint Planning Process</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning Initiation</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct Mission Analysis</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop Courses of Action</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• COA Analysis and Wargaming</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Courses of Action Comparison</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Approve a Course of Action .............................................................................. 147
• Plan or Order Development .............................................................................. 152

CHAPTER 5: Development of Theater Strategy and Campaign Plans................. 164
• Introduction ....................................................................................................... 164
• Sources of Guidance and Direction for Theater Strategy ............................... 166
• Components of Theater Strategy ................................................................. 167
• Using Operational Design for Building a Theater Strategy ............................ 172
• The Combatant Command Campaign Plan ................................................. 178
• Components of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan ............................... 182

Appendix A – Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans .... 192
Appendix B – Combined / Joint Task Force Headquarters ................................ 195
Appendix C – PMESII Systems Construct ............................................................ 199
Appendix D – OPORD Format with Staff Estimate Information ....................... 223
Appendix E – Commander’s Estimate Format .................................................. 228
Appendix F – Reference Times ........................................................................... 231
Appendix G – Operation Assessment ................................................................. 232
Appendix H - Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) ............................................. 237
Appendix I – Authorities .................................................................................... 245

The most current doctrinal publications and CJCS guidance can be found at The CJCS
www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP 5-0</td>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
<td>1-Dec-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI 3100.01E</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
<td>21-May-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-0</td>
<td>Joint Campaigns and Operations</td>
<td>18-Jun-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP 5-0.1</td>
<td>Army Design Methodology</td>
<td>1-Jul-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM 3105.01A</td>
<td>Joint Risk Analysis Methodology</td>
<td>12-Oct-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP 5-0.3</td>
<td>Operation Assessment</td>
<td>1-Feb-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS J7 Focus Paper</td>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>1-Oct-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly JP 1-02</td>
<td>DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</td>
<td>1-May-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact Sheet</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact Sheet</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DoD Women Peace and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan</td>
<td>1-Jun-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

1-1 Strategic Direction ................................................................................................ 4
1-2 Continuum of Strategic Direction .......................................................................... 5
1-3 National Defense Strategy Themes .......................................................................... 8
1-4 National Military Strategy Framework.................................................................... 9
1-5 Joint Strategic Planning System ......................................................................... 11
1-6 Global Integration Model .................................................................................... 12
1-7 JSPS Products Translating Strategy to Outcomes ............................................. 13
1-8 Assignment, Apportionment, Allocation, and Directed Readiness ...................... 15
1-9 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan ........................................................................... 23
1-10 Coordinating Authority ........................................................................................ 24
1-11 Options and Courses of Action ........................................................................... 28
1-12 Elements of Military Options .............................................................................. 29
1-13 Planning in the Strategic Arena (Policy Option Dialogue) ................................ 30
1-14 Examples of Requested Flexible Deterrent Options ........................................ 34
1-15 Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines ................................................ 35
1-16 Flexible Response Option Scalability .................................................................. 36
2-1 Unified Action ........................................................................................................ 37
2-2 Joint Planning and Execution Community .......................................................... 41
2-3 Continuum of Plans ............................................................................................ 43
2-4 Joint Design and Planning .................................................................................. 44
2-5 Joint Planning Process and Operational Design ................................................. 45
2-6 Joint Planning Overview ..................................................................................... 46
2-7 Campaign Planning and Execution ..................................................................... 52
2-8 Joint Risk Framework ......................................................................................... 56
3-1 Elements of Operational Design ......................................................................... 58
3-2 Divergence and Convergence in Planning and Execution .................................. 62
3-3 The Four Frames of Operational Design ............................................................ 64
3-4 Holistic View of the Operational Environment (OE) ........................................... 69
3-5 Understanding the OE ........................................................................................ 70
3-6 Tensions that Describe the Problem .................................................................... 73
3-7 Develop an Operational Approach ...................................................................... 74
3-8 End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks .................................................................. 81
3-9 Sample Lines of Operations ............................................................................... 83
3-10 Sample Lines of Effort ...................................................................................... 84
3-11 Direct and Indirect Approach .......................................................................... 87
3-12 Brainstorming .................................................................................................... 102
3-13 Mind Mapping .................................................................................................. 103
4-1 The Joint Planning Process (JPP) ....................................................................... 106
4-2 Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design Methodology ................. 107
4-3 JPP Step 1: Initiate Planning .............................................................................. 108
4-4 JPP Step 2: Conduct Mission Analysis ............................................................... 110
4-5 Potential COA Evaluation Criteria ...................................................................... 117
Introduction

The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students during the Military Strategy and Campaigning (MSC) course. It also serves to assist commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint task forces (JTF), and Service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders (JFCs). It portrays a way to apply draft doctrine awaiting signature, published doctrine, and emerging concepts, all at the higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command level.

Throughout history, leaders have developed military strategies and planned campaigns to synchronize efforts and sequence several related operations to achieve national security objectives. General George Washington planned the Campaign of 1781 to coordinate the actions of a French fleet, a French expeditionary army, and his “main army” to defeat the British forces at Yorktown. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant planned simultaneous offensives by his subordinate commands against the Confederacy for the 1864 Campaign.

During World War II, campaign planning became essential to coordinate the actions of joint and combined forces in all Allied theaters. In the Pacific Theater of War, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued his Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, DOWNFALL, in May 1945. In this 25-page document, MacArthur explained how the plan “...visualizes attainment of the assigned objectives by two (2) successive operations (OLYMPIC and CORONET).” The cover letter described this plan as a “general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination, both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in the detailed development of their final plans of operation.”

In the wake of the 2018 and now the 2022 National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy, campaign planning has received renewed attention within the Department of Defense. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders and subordinate commanders develop a comprehensive set of nested strategies and plans that must address global priorities while incorporating regional or functional strategies and campaign objectives which are supported by other specific plans like theater security cooperation, contingency, and posture plans. All of these are developed in a dynamic strategic environment characterized by ongoing operations and variable national guidance.

While Joint and Service doctrine remain authoritative sources for planning, this handbook provides ideas and insights for those charged with developing theater strategies and campaign plans, whether as a coordinating authority or as a collaborator. This handbook focuses at the combatant-command and subordinate-joint-force-command levels. In some cases, where there are apparent differences between joint and Service doctrine, the handbook reconciles the differences where possible and focuses on “best practices” for theater commanders.
CHAPTER 1: NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE

1. Strategic Direction. Strategic direction is covered in CH II of JP 5-0. This chapter will summarize some elements of JP 5-0, and attempt to explain some complicated structures. Strategic direction is captured in strategic guidance documents.

   a. Definitions.

   (1) **Strategic Direction.** The strategy and intent of the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in pursuit of national interests. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p. GL-13)

   (2) **Strategic Guidance.** The written products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p. GL-13)

   b. Implementation. The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests within legal and constitutional limitations. They generally communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents but may communicate by any means available. Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-1)

   The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide strategic direction by communicating broad objectives and issue-specific guidance to DOD. It provides the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the JS, CCMDs, Services, joint forces, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. Strategic direction identifies a desired military objective or end state, national-level planning assumptions, and national-level limitations. In addition to previously mentioned documents, additional strategic direction will emerge as orders or as part of the iterative plans dialogue. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p. II-5)
Providing for the Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces of the United States

The Joint Strategic Planning System is the method by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fulfills his statutory responsibilities, maintains a global perspective, and develops military advice.

Figure 1-1: Strategic Direction (From JP 5-0 Figure II-1)
c. **Continuum of Strategic Direction.** With the Chairman’s Title 10, U.S. Code functions as the statutory foundation, the Chairman uses JSPS to provide strategic direction to the Joint Force across three-time horizons corresponding to how the Joint Force employs, adapts, and innovates to meet the requirements of national policy and the defense strategy. These three-time horizons are: Force Employment (0-3 years), Force Development (2-7 years), and Force Design (5-15 years). Activities across the three horizons enable the Chairman to provide advice to the SecDef and President. Figure 1-2 presents the JSPS through the lens of the Continuum of Strategic Direction. (CJCSI 3100.01E Joint Strategic Planning System [JSPS], p. A-4)

![Figure 1-2 Continuum of Strategic Direction (Figure 2 CJCSI 3100.01E)](image)

2. **National-Level Strategic Guidance Documents.** Listed per Figure 1-1.

   a. **National Security Strategy (NSS).** The NSS is required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by DoD relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting documents (e.g., the NDS and NMS). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-3)

   b. **Unified Command Plan (UCP).** The UCP, signed by the President, establishes CCMDs and responsibilities and missions of the CCDRs.
The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as required to accommodate evolving US national security needs. Title 10, USC, Section 161, tasks the CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP “not less often than every two years” and submit recommended changes to the President through SecDef. This document provides broad guidance from which CCDRs and planners can derive tasks and missions during CCMD plan development and modification. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-4)

c. Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG, signed by the President, fulfills the statutory requirement in Title 10, USC, Section 113. SecDef, with the approval of the President, and with advice from the CJCS, provides written policy guidance on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, P. II-5)

d. Presidential Directives (PD). Presidents often issue formal guidance on various security topics between updates to the NSS. Each administration typically publishes a directive on how the National Security Council will be organized to support their decision-making style. These directives have had different names under different administrations: National Security Directives (NSDs) under G. W. Bush; Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) under Barack Obama; National Security Presidential Memorandums (NSPMs) by President Donald Trump; and National Security Memorandums (NSMs) under the Biden Administration.

e. Summary of Conclusions (NSC SOC). (Classified except on rare occasions) Following National Security Council meetings (when POTUS is present), Principals Committees (PCs), and Deputies Committees (DCs) the NSC Staff often produces a SOC which reviews the meeting and publishes any conclusions reached. SOCs at the DC level and above can reflect authoritative strategic direction. These documents are often used as guidance that CCDRs use to formulate strategies and plans. Lower-level interagency meetings convened by the National Security Council Staff (Interagency Policy Committees or Policy Coordination Committees (IPC/PCC) depending on the Administration) produce SOCs, as well, which can inform on the interagency discussion on an issue, but the lowest level of decision making in the interagency process is at the Deputies Level.

f. Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) [Dept of State and USAID]. The Dept of State and USAID develop the four-year joint strategic plan (e.g., Joint Strategic Plan FY [2018-2022]) as their primary strategy, to set forth the direction and priorities to implement US foreign policy and development assistance for the coming years. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-4)

g. Joint Regional Strategies (JRS) [Dept of State and USAID]. A joint regional strategy is a four-year regional strategy developed jointly by the regional bureaus of DOS and USAID. It articulates the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within the region. Joint regional strategies also provide a flexible framework within which regional bureaus and missions prioritize desired objectives and military end states, identify supporting resources, and respond to unanticipated
events. Where an end state is not feasible or attainable, for example when conducting long-term counter weapons of mass destruction or combating terrorism activities and operations, intermediate objectives may be used instead. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-4)

h. **Joint Functional Strategies [Dept of State]**. A joint functional strategy is a three-year functional (e.g., countering violent extremism) strategy developed by a functional bureau of DOS (sometimes in conjunction with elements of USAID). It identifies the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within a function or problem set. Joint functional strategies provide a forward-looking and flexible framework within which bureaus and missions prioritize desired end states, supporting resources, and response to unanticipated events within world-wide issues.

i. **Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) [Dept of State]**. An integrated country strategy is a four-year, whole-of-government strategy developed by a US country team for a particular country. It articulates a common set of USG priorities and goals by setting the mission goals and objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort. It provides the basis for the development of annual mission resource requests for DOS and USAID, as well as all USG security sector assistance. The chief of mission leads the development process and has final approval authority. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-4)

j. **Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) [USAID]**. A country development cooperation strategy, typically a five-year strategy, defines a mission’s chosen approach in a country, articulates the self-reliance trajectory, and details expected results. The country development cooperation strategy provides a road map for how USAID will design and implement projects and activities. It is used to inform dialogue with Congress and engage host nation (HN) partners and other stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-4)

k. **Mission Resourcing Request (MRR)**. This document is an ambassador’s request for Department of State resources. It “operationalizes” all preceding Dept of State strategies by requesting the money and people needed to turn the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) into reality.

3. **DoD/Joint Staff Level Documents and processes**.

a. **National Defense Strategy (NDS)**. Congress mandated that the SECDEF write an NDS every four years. Although a classified document, an unclassified summary provides the essence of the strategy. For a snapshot of the current NDS see Figure 1-3.

b. **Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)**. (classified document) – This document is focused on force development. It provides direction to the Services on what capabilities to prioritize, guidance to the CCMDs on which Services will “own” which bases within their AOR, and guidance to the planning community on resource prioritization (e.g., budget, personnel, etc.). This document informs the GFMIG, GFMAP, TPPs, and TDPs.
c. National Military Strategy (NMS). (classified document) The NMS is the CJCS’s central strategy document. Title 10, USC, Section 153, directs the CJCS to determine for each even-numbered year whether to prepare a new NMS or update an existing strategy.

(1) The NMS provides the CJCS’s amplifying guidance for planning, force employment, posture, and future force development. It provides the strategic framework to prioritize planning, resource allocation, and risk management. As such, this classified military strategy serves as the starting point for all other JSPS actions and constitutes the CJCS’s military advice to SecDef and the President.

(2) The NMS defines the national military objectives (ends) and how to achieve these objectives (ways) and addresses the military capabilities (means) required to execute the strategy. The national military objectives may often be the same as the national defense objectives identified in the NDS. The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service chiefs and CCDRs identify required capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk. The NMS also looks beyond the near-term to identify long-range operational requirements and provides guidance in other areas within the CJCS’s statutory requirements, such as joint force development and joint capability development. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p II-7)
The 2022 NMS (Figure 1-4), consistent with the Joint Strategic Planning System (next section), is the way CJCS executes the NDS. It describes the threat, new trends in the strategic environment, and how the Joint Force will implement its contribution to Integrated Deterrence. The Joint Force’s contribution to Integrated Deterrence is combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Through the NMS’ theory of success, the Joint Force contributes to Integrated Deterrence to reduce an adversary’s perceived benefit and increase the adversary’s perceived cost of aggression, incentivizing restraint as a result. The NMS seeks to solve the central military problem within the framework of the NDS through an informed theory of success that enables disciplined decision-making by framing risk and assessing progress toward strategic objectives. The NMS Theory of Success is to exercise Strategic Discipline to continuously calibrate Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning and rapidly building warfighting advantage to deter now and reduce future risk.

Strategic Discipline is the ruthless prioritization and calibration of Joint Force operations, activities, and investments, consistent with policy guidance and strategic aims, between the Joint Force strategic ways of campaigning and building warfighting advantage. Strategic Discipline is enabled by a robust understanding of the strategic environment, including a deep awareness of our adversaries and ourselves, ally and partner equities, and the future character of warfare. This understanding is enhanced by strategic assessments that enable risk decisions to bias toward decreasing future risk. This approach provides the Joint Force with the agility to focus on enduring priorities and generate military options for emergent changes.

Campaigning is how the DoD sequences day-to-day defense initiatives and develops advantageous conditions to deter conflict, accomplish strategic objectives, and prevail against adversaries across the spectrum of conflict, to include the Gray-Zone.
Building Warfighting Advantage requires deliberate investment to develop leaders, concepts, and capabilities through materiel and non-materiel solutions in order to achieve strategic objectives in the future.

To implement the NMS effectively, the Joint Force must take a globally integrated approach to risk while thinking across multiple time horizons. Decisionmakers must consider transferring risk away from priority threats/theaters and be more risk tolerant in the present to reduce risk in the future.

Joint assessments guide the Chairman’s military advice and the balance of resource decisions between future modernization and current requirements. These assessments guide iterative adjustments to implement NDS Defense Priorities and Joint Force Strategic Objectives.

In the 2022 NMS the ten Joint Force Tasks are:

1. **Strengthen Homeland Defense.** Modernize and integrate to protect our way of life.
2. **Enhance Deterrence.** Develop capabilities that deter adversaries from advancing their goals, employing their military strengths, or attacking U.S. interests.
3. **Prepare to Win.** Ensure a properly trained and resourced combat force capable of defeating our adversaries abroad.
4. **Integrate Joint and Combined Efforts.** Synchronize actions with allies, partners, and the interagency to address trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges and continuously advance national security objectives.
5. **Leverage Opportunities in Campaigning.** Proactively identify and leverage opportunities to frustrate adversaries’ strengths, exploit vulnerabilities, and expand U.S. partnerships, access, and basing.
6. **Reinforce Diplomacy.** Support diplomatic efforts to preserve the rules-based international order and provide credible military options that enable leaders to interact from a position of strength.
7. **Strengthen Relationships with Allies and Partners.** Seek opportunities to collaborate and improve interoperability with allies and partners to confront enduring and emerging challenges. Foster strong relationships now — because we cannot surge trust in crisis.
8. **Prioritize Concepts and Resources.** Refocus our current warfighting ideas, systems, and practices to improve combat effectiveness.
9. **Build a Resilient Joint Force.** Harness robust and effective combat capabilities that can resist degradation and quickly reconstitute in future combat.
10. **Integrate Capabilities Rapidly.** Timely integrate advanced capabilities to amplify existing warfighting advantages.

The 2022 NMS Joint Force Strategic Objectives are:

- **Defend the U.S. Homeland** against all-domain threats, prioritizing the PRC.
- **Deter strategic attacks** and other aggression against the United States, allies, and partners.
- Ensure the Joint Force possesses the combat-credible capabilities necessary to **prevail in conflict** against the PRC in the Indo-Pacific, then Russia in Europe.
• **Focus technical and non-technical modernization** into a resilient Joint Force and maintain the ability to respond to crises.

d. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Section 153 of Title 10, U.S. Code requires the Chairman to perform six primary functions to assist the President and the SecDef with planning, advice, and policy formulation: (1) provide strategic direction for the Armed Forces; (2) conduct strategic and contingency planning; (3) assess comprehensive joint readiness; (4) foster joint capability development; (5) manage Joint Force development; and (6) advise on global military integration. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. 1)

The JSPS is the primary method by which the Chairman fulfills CJCS Title 10, U.S. Code responsibilities, maintains a global perspective, leverages strategic opportunities, translates strategy into outcomes, and provides military advice to the SecDef and the President. **Figure 1-5** presents one view of the JSPS oriented on the Chairman’s six primary functions identified in Section 153 of Title 10, U.S. Code. With the exception of the NMS, products prepared by the Joint Staff for the Chairman to provide to the SecDef as formal military advice are depicted in Figure 1 as elements of global military integration. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-2)

![Figure 1-5: Joint Strategic Planning System (Figure 1 CJCSI 3100.01E)](image)

(1) Global Military Integration. Global military integration is generally shortened to “global integration” and will be referred to in this document as well as most joint documents
as global integration. CJCS, through his/her advising responsibilities on global integration guides coordination across CCMD and Service seams to ensure the Joint Force is postured to face transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threats. CJCS uses the JSPS as the primary process to meet the statutory requirement of advising on global military integration. Figure 1-6 provides a conceptual model of how global integration is achieved through the integration of planning, force management, force development, and force design—all undergirded by assessments—to enable senior leader decision making to translate strategy to outcomes. The challenging global operating environment requires the Chairman and the Joint Staff to employ an integrated global perspective and provide strategic direction for Joint operations across all domains and regions to identify efficiencies and synergies, and to champion integration with allies, partners, and the interagency at the national–strategic level. To that end, the 2018 NMS defined global integration as the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional challenges. Global integration is a top-down framework and iterative process aligned against three-time horizons—Force Employment, Force Development, and Force Design. The objective of global integration is to integrate operations and resources globally and highlight force planning capabilities and tradeoffs to enable senior leader decision making in support of NDS objectives. In accordance with authoritative strategic guidance, global integration provides an organizing framework for all JSPS products and processes. See CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3051.01, Execution and Oversight of Global Integration, for a detailed discussion of the deliberate, synchronized Joint Staff Battle Rhythm that supports this process. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, pp. A-1 and G-1)
In accordance with the Strategic Direction Continuum (Figure 1-2), force employment (0-3 years) is intended to create and maintain a sufficient readiness level across the joint force for contingency operations including large scale combat, while providing the required day-to-day operations, activities, and investments necessary to shape the strategic environment. The 2022 NMS highlights the centrality of strengthening relationships with allies and partners to achieve common goals. Another facet of force employment is the exercise program that serves to sharpen U.S. joint and multinational force capability and capacities across all domains.

Force Development (2-7 years) and Force Design (5-15 years) are directed by the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) which is published every four years. This is the overarching framework that will ultimately drive the required investment in material and personnel to achieve and maintain competitive military advantage over time across the globe and across all domains. The following section is focused on the products CJCS uses to advise on global integration matters. Figure 1-7 shows further details of JSPS products that translate strategy to outcomes towards achieving global integration.

**Figure 1-7 JSPS Products Translating Strategy to Outcomes (Figure 4 CJCSI 3100.01E)**

**(2) Force Employment (0-3 years).** Force employment involves planning, force management, and decision making. The Joint Force employs a joint combined arms approach (defined as the conduct of operational art through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains) in its plans to apply a global perspective to strategy, campaigning, and operations across all domains in multiple regions.

**(a) Force Management.** For force management, the Joint Force implements the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) construct, as well as
traditional employment as directed in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) and Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), to fulfill the defense objectives of the NDS and U.S. national interests in the National Security Strategy (NSS). For decision making, the Joint Force leverages intelligence, exercises, and wargames to build mutual trust and habituate effective communication that enables rapid decision making in times of crisis. CJCSM 3051.01 provides additional guidance for crisis response by defining the critical path for execution and oversight of global integration during the force employment phase. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-5)

1) **Global Force Management.** GFM is the process by which the SecDef (advised by the CJCS) identifies specific forces and establishes how they flow to combatant commanders for employment (See Figure 1-8). GFM is a series of processes that weigh the Services’ capacity to generate forces against CCDR requirements while building readiness and a credible deterrent force. This is accomplished via five related processes: directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment. Directed readiness supports force planning and contains SecDef direction prescribing the force capacity, availability, and readiness to achieve strategic objectives. The assignment and allocation processes provide SecDef the C2 mechanisms to distribute forces to CCDRs. Apportionment provides an estimate of quantities of force types reasonably expected to be available over general timelines for planning purposes. These processes provide data to conduct assessments of risks to operations and to the force. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. D-1)

Within the GFM process:

- **SecDef directs** readiness by specifying the force that must be ready and available to execute the NDS.
- **SecDef assigns** forces to CCDRs to meet UCP missions and other responsibilities.
- **SecDef allocates** forces to CCDRs to meet current operational requirements.
- **CJCS apportions** quantities of force capabilities to CCDRs for planning. This is not an allocation of forces, nor does it establish a command relationship.
- **CJCS assesses** force readiness and composition to identify imbalances among Services' force/capability supply and demand
Figure 1-8: Assignment, Apportionment, Allocation, and Directed Readiness

a) **Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) (classified document).** The GFMIG, approved by SecDef, integrates complementary policy and guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment into a single authoritative GFM document in support of the DOD strategic guidance. …These processes are applied within the force management and force planning constructs to better support resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically employed, while allowing senior decision makers to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. …It provides SecDef guidance and assigns responsibilities for performing all aspects of GFM. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, pp. II-8 and D-4) Besides the aforementioned guidance, the GFMIG has two components that are of significant interest to CCDRs. Those are the Directed Readiness Tables (DRTs) and The Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum (“Forces For”). These two components are described below.

(i) **Directed Readiness Tables (DRTs).** DRTs present the supply and demand for forces based upon enumerated demand within campaign and contingency plans. DRT accuracy requires CCMD utilization of the Joint Staff and Services for planning and resourcing. The Joint Staff provides oversight and a global strategic outlook for global integration and force employment. The Service Secretaries and
Chiefs, in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, provide their own input into resourcing ability along with the Services’ position on the plans’ feasibility. The SecDef-endorsed DRT presents resource-informed capacity and availability of force elements that planners must use to develop resource-informed plans, which state risk due to shortfalls. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. G-3)

(ii) The Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum (“Forces For”). The “Forces For” memorandum and its associated tables document the SecDef’s direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to assign forces to CCDRs and the U.S. Element North American Aerospace Defense Command, as well as direction to retain certain forces within the Services. “Forces For” Assignment Tables are published annually and establish Combatant Command Authority (COCOM) relationships between CCDR and unit(s) assigned to the CCMD to accomplish missions. The command relationship established with assignment is enduring until the SecDef changes the assignment. COCOM of assigned forces fulfills the SecDef’s responsibility in section 164(c)(2) of Title 10, U.S Code to “ensure that a commander of a combatant command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command over those commands and forces.” (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. G-4)

b) Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) (classified document). SecDef’s decision to allocate forces is implemented through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The [Joint Staff] J-3, is responsible for developing, staffing, reviewing, and preparing the annual GFMAP for the Chairman’s review and the SecDef’s approval. The GFMAP is the annual deployment order for the Joint Force and is modified, as necessary, to meet emerging or crisis-based requirements. The GFMAP is informed by the GFMIG and DRT, AJA Survey, GCP assessments, and [Consolidated Strategic Opportunities Decision] (CSOD) process. The GFMAP is developed through a series of GFMBs. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. G-4) For more on GFM, see JP 5-0, Appendix D (Global Force Management).

(i) Strategic Opportunities (SOs). SOs are foreseeable, strategically significant events that can be leveraged through long-term deliberate planning in order to shape the strategic environment. SOs are deliberately planned for as CSOs in the FY E2 (FY of Execution +2) and incorporated in the GFMB process for inclusion in the GFMAP. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. G-4)

(ii) Dynamic Force Employment Strategic Opportunities (DFE SOs). DFE SOs are unforeseen SOs requiring near-term, proactive operations to shape the strategic environment, demanding agile and timely Joint Force actions that require adjustments to the GFMAP. Sourced through DFE, a construct that uses flexible ready forces to proactively shape the strategic environment while maintaining readiness, these changes
are captured and transmitted through the SDOB. (CJCSI 3100.01E JSPS, p. G-4)

(iii) Dynamic Force Employment. A DFE activity is executed in support of a Dynamic Force Employment Strategic Opportunity (DFESOs) in support of a GCP linked to changes in the operational environment. DFE is focused on competition activities below the level of armed conflict and presenting global all-domain challenges to an adversary. The CJCS is responsible for coordinating DFE activities linked to a GCP while CCDRs decide when and where to employ DFEs within their geographic area of responsibility in support of the GCP. DFE requires forces assigned or allocated to execute missions that may not specifically be listed in the GFMIG/GFMAP, and a DFE may require additional forces that are not assigned or allocated to the executing CCDR in which case an emergent RFF will be submitted to CJCS for inclusion in the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB).

(iv) CCDR DFE SO Considerations. CCDRs determine opportunities to advance campaign objectives, reinforce narratives, and gain or maintain relative advantage through agile campaigning. In the initial formulation of dynamic force employment, CCDRs should ask these questions:

- Why is this circumstance an opportunity (cost/benefit)?
- How will exploiting it reinforce narratives and advance objectives?
- Will exploiting this opportunity improve US strategic or operational leverage?
- Potential intelligence loss/gain? What conceal/reveal constraints are required?
- What are the (opportunity) risks in doing/not doing it?

(v) CCDRs then consider military options (Also see military options in Chapter 2) in context with other instruments of national power. They identify ways/means to exploit the opportunity (COAs). Then CCDRS determine if a dynamic force employment operation is the optimal choice. CCDRs should decide how the dynamic force employment nests in their campaign, by explaining the implications to the overall campaign strategy. Next, they determine the forces, capabilities, authorities, and support required for execution, collection, and assessment. CCDRs identify what forces are required beyond currently assigned and allocated forces and what support is required. Then CCDRs choose the best COA. On many occasions, CCDRs request force augmentation as required. In refining the request, CCDRs should ask these questions:

- How long does the commander need the force to create the effect?
- How will the CCMD employ the force?
- What are the key indicators and collection
requirements?

• How will the CCDR know that the dynamic force employment did or did not work? (Metrics to assess success.)
• What are the anticipated adversary reactions/responses?
• What are the options to modify or reinforce the Dynamic Force Employment?

(vi) Upon approval, the CCDR makes the necessary preparations to employ the force and implement appropriate messaging. During execution of the dynamic force employment opportunity, CCDRs ensure all necessary mechanisms are in place and aligned. Once in transition, the CCDRs continue to observe the “new” environment. They determine what has changed due to the action in the context of what the CCDR anticipated. Next, CCDRs determine if the operation was successful (MOPs/MEOs), Finally, CCDRs decide how to follow through on the dynamic force employment’s impact on the OE. (JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, Ch 4 p. IV-7)

(3) Force Development (2-7 years). While the force development time horizon mostly aligns with the statutory function of Joint Force Capability, this process is critical to global and theater planning as it connects force employment with force design. Force development products influence current campaign and contingency plans. The DPG and Service/United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Program Objective Memorandums are key documents within the force development process (See Figure 1-7). The Joint Force adapts functions, capabilities, and concepts to improve the current force. Force development enables the Joint Force to improve warfighting capabilities through the development of concepts validated by rigorous assessment and lessons learned from current operations. Force development serves as a bridge between the present day and the future and provides a mechanism for incorporating emergent innovations that enhance performance across the force and shape the design of tomorrow’s Joint Force in accordance with NDS prioritization. As explained in paragraph 6.b., the time horizon of Force Development is not the same as the Title 10 function of managing Joint Force Development. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-5)

(4) Force Design (5-15 years). While the force design time horizon mostly aligns with the statutory function of Joint Force Development, this product still influences global and theater planning because experimentation combined with rapid technological developments can rapidly shift from future employment to current employment. Service concepts, doctrine, and education are key documents produced within the force design process (See Figure 1-7). The Joint Force constantly innovates to discover new ways of operating, and to integrate revolutionary capabilities that maintain and expand the competitive space in accordance with NDS prioritization. The Joint Force innovates to retain and expand competitive advantage against any adversary. Bold new warfighting concepts and leap ahead technologies—those which enable rapid
improvements over incremental change—are tested by experimentation and serve as catalysts for force development to enable the Joint Force to operate differently. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-5)

(5) Planning and Development in Parallel and in Series. Concurrent planning is common within military planning as it is within the JSPS. The interconnectedness of all the documents produced in support of global integration require constant coordination and crosswalks through both informal coordination among various entities with the JSPS and formal boards, bureaus, centers, cells and working groups (B2C2WG). The JSPS requires the Joint Staff and the Joint Force to plan and develop key products both in parallel and in series (sequence). Although the relationships between documents are frequently described in this instruction as “Document A directs or informs Document B,” it is common for Documents A and B, in practice, to be developed by staff elements coordinating in parallel (with the publication of B sometimes even preceding the publication of A). For example, the NDS and NMS may be best developed in parallel and then released in quick succession. Similarly, the development of products at the end of the “JSPS production line,” such as the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) or GFMAP, should be informed by drafts of forthcoming guidance documents, such as the NMS and JSCP. It is worth highlighting this dynamic to remind all elements of the Joint Staff and Joint Force that close collaboration and situational awareness across elements is required to rapidly translate new strategic direction into every aspect of Joint activity. This collaboration and situational awareness are aided by the JSPS management mechanisms. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-5)

(a) JSPS Management and B2C2WG. The [Joint Staff] J-5 Deputy Director for Joint Strategic Planning (DD-JSP) assists in active management of the JSPS by providing oversight to a series of integrating forums that operate at different levels within the Joint Staff and across the Joint Force. The Joint Staff Strategy Integration Group (JSSIG) and Strategy Integration Board (SIB) conduct JSPS management within the Joint Staff. The Joint Strategy Working Group (JSWG) and Joint Worldwide Planners Seminar (JWPS) include the Joint Force and other elements of the Department, as applicable, in the management of the JSPS. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-6) The CPH does not provide details of every part of the B2C2WG used to manage the JSPS. Details on primary B2C2WG elements that support JSPS can be found in CJCSI 2100.01E JSPS as well as other CJCSIs. A list of key B2C2WG elements with limited explanation is below.

1) Joint Staff and Strategy Integration Group (JSSIG). The JSSIG is an action officer and branch chief-level body that conducts continuous coordination and collaboration across the Joint Staff in support of the JSPS for the Chairman. The J-5 Strategy Development Division (SDD) Chief oversees the JSSIG, which convenes regularly to discuss cross-cutting issues and areas for collaboration in the development of various JSPS products and as required, establishes sub-working
groups. These sub-groups may include, but are not limited to, a JSPS Revision Working Group, Annual Joint Assessment (AJA) Survey Working Group, Joint Staff Independent Risk Assessment (JSIRA) Working Group, and Integrated Priority List (IPL) Assignment Working Group. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-6)

a) **JSPS Revision Group.** This working group reviews the CJCSI 3100.01 Series and recommends changes to the SIB and the DD-JSP. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-6)

b) **AJA Working Group.** This working group develops and reviews the AJA Survey structure and survey questions. The AJA Survey is a formal, comprehensive data collection and analytical mechanism for garnering CCMD, Service, and NGB perspectives on the strategic environment, threats, challenges, opportunities, and risks. Enclosure D includes a discussion of the AJA Survey. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-6)

c) **JSIRA Working Group.** The JSIRA is an assessment of risk developed by representatives from each Joint Staff directorate based on independent input from the Intelligence Community (IC). The JSIRA is one of two primary inputs to the CRA (AJA Survey responses provide the other primary input). The JSIRA is conducted through a series of JSIRA Working Group meetings conducted prior to [Chairman’s Risk Assessment] CRA development. [CJCSI 3100.01E] Enclosure G includes a discussion of the CRA. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-6)

d) **IPL Assignment Working Group.** This working group reviews the AJA Survey Integrated Priority List (IPL) submissions that are not assigned to the JROC and assigns them to the appropriate Joint Staff directorate for review and action. The Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, [Joint Staff] J-8, provides direct support to this working group. The IPL working group recommendations are forwarded to the J-8 Deputy Director for Requirement and Capability Development. [CJCSI 3100.01E] Enclosure D includes a discussion of IPLs. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-6)

2) **Strategy Integration Board (SIB).** The SIB is a division chief-level forum chaired by the J-5 SDD Chief. It convenes as needed with representatives from all Joint Staff directorates. The SIB addresses difficult JointStaff issues and JSPS management challenges, and also reviews and forwards recommendations from the JSSIG and sub-working groups to the DDJSP. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-7)

3) **Joint Strategy Working Group (JSWG).** The JSWG brings together action officers and O-6/GS-15-level strategic and operational planners and assessors from the CCMDs, Services, NGB, and other relevant U.S. government departments and agencies. As a JSPS management mechanism, the JSWG facilitates Joint Force shared
understanding and collaboration in the development of JSPS products
to translate strategy to outcomes. The JSWG convenes at least twice
per year and is chaired by the SDD Chief on behalf of the [Joint
Staff J5,] DD-JSP. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-7)

4) Joint Worldwide Planners Seminar (JWPS). The JWPS brings together
general officer flag officer (GO/FO) and Senior Executive Service
(SES)-level strategic leaders from the CCMDs, Services, NGB, and
other relevant U.S. government departments and agencies to discuss
strategic and operational planning, execution, and assessment
issues. The JWPS addresses difficult Joint Force issues and JSPS
management challenges, and also reviews and forwards recommendations
from the JSWG to the Director, J-5. The JWPS convenes as needed and
is chaired by the DD-JSP on behalf of the Director, J-5. (CJCSI
3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-7)

5) Consolidated Strategic Opportunities Development Working Group
(CSODWG). The CSODWG is an annual action officer forum led by the J-
5 Global Integration Division. Using the results from the AJA Survey
GCP assessments and strategic opportunities (SOs) nominated by the
Services and CCMDs, this working group builds a prioritized list of
Fiscal Year Execution +2 (FY E2) executable Consolidated Strategic
Opportunities (CSO) to present at the Strategic Opportunities
Decision Board (SODB). (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-8)

6) Multinational Strategy and Operations Group (MSOG). The MSOG
provides a unique senior-leader multinational forum to understand
and address contemporary strategic and operational challenges and
risks to enable more effective and aligned strategic approaches. The
MSOG member nations consist of 13 like-minded nations that comprise
the Military Framework. The CSOD process flows through the MSOG as
the primary venue for collaboration and synchronization with
Framework Member Nations. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-8)

7) Strategic Opportunities Decision Board (SODB). The SODB is a GO/FO
final review of CSOs identified through the CSOD process prior to
the Chairman’s endorsement via the Strategic Integration Tank, which
is then provided to the SecDef for review and approval. SecDef-
approved CSOs inform the GFM process. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-
8)

8) Global Force Management Board (GFMB). The GFMB is a GO/FO level
body organized by the Joint Staff and chaired by the Director of the
Joint Staff (DJS) to provide senior DoD leadership the means to
assess the effects of force management decisions and provide guidance
for planning and execution. Informed by the SecDef-approved CSOs,
the GFMB convenes periodically to address specific recurring tasks
and as required, to address emergent issues. The annual GFMAP is an
output of the GFMB and, among other functions, directs the execution
of CSOs. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. A-8)

e. Strategic and Contingency Planning:

(1) Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) (classified documents). GCPs are SECDEF signed/approved. The Chairman recommends which challenges require GCPs based on the SecDef’s priorities in the NDS. The SecDef will review GCPs annually. The GCPs address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains. GCPs are global in scope and focus on integrating activities oriented against specific problems. They are primarily designed to achieve unity of effort for day-to-day activities within and between the CCMDs, Services, NGB, and the Joint Staff. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. C-3)

(2) Global Integrated Frameworks (GIFs) (classified documents). GIFs are SecDef signed/approved. GIFs provide strategic frameworks to enable a coordinated Joint Force response to crisis or conflict associated with a priority challenge. The Chairman recommends which challenges require GIFs based on the SecDef’s priorities in the NDS. GIFs are strategic frameworks that enable the Chairman’s advice and the SecDef’s decisions on strategic risks and trade-offs across and within campaigns and contingencies during crisis or conflict with a priority challenge. GIFs provide a global look at crisis and conflict with one of the priority challenges beyond the scope of a single CCMD. GIFs are informed by GCPs and existing contingency plans. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. C-5)

(3) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (classified document). The JSCP is CJCS signed/approved. The JSCP implements the CPG and Operationalizes the NMS. It is the Chairman’s primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of Joint Force campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP provides CJCS strategic guidance as the execution document to implement strategic guidance from the President and SecDef. The JSCP provides measurable intermediate objectives and guidance for CCMDs, Services, and CSAs focused on planning and employing the joint force at current resource levels. The JSCP fulfills the CJCS’s Title 10, USC, requirement for the preparation of a strategic framework and strategic plans; providing for the preparation of contingency plans; and the relationship between strategy and the GCPs, CCPs, other campaign and contingency plans, and operations. (CJCSI 3100.01E JSPS, p. I-1/JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p. D-4)

The JSCP is a five-year global strategic plan (reviewed every two years). The JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles and responsibilities to integrate the Joint Force’s global operations, activities, and investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies. The JSCP provides the GCPs and
directs Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs), Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs), and Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs). (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, 20 pp. C-1 & C-2) (See Figure 1-9)

Figure 1-9: Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

(4) Coordinating Authority (CA). Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component commanders), and may include USG departments and agencies and partner nations (e.g., as part of security cooperation planning). To fulfill the requirements of global integration, CJCS may advise the SECDEF to designate individuals as a coordinating authority. In this context, a coordinating authority is generally a CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for developing plans in support of a GCP and associated contingencies, but who does not receive additional command authority or authority to compel agreement beyond that already assigned in the UCP. Coordinating authorities convene collaborative forums to perform three functions: planning, assessing, and recommending changes to plans. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-11)

A CA performs three key functions: planning, assessing, and recommending (reference e). CAs may establish collaborative forums
to integrate these functions. CAs have overall responsibility for assessing and recommending changes to the GCP annually or more often, if necessary. CAs also lead any related lower-level planning required to integrate campaign or contingency planning and may request the development of a support plan by collaborators. A collaborator is a Joint Force organization assigned in the JSCP to support integrated GCP planning. The collaborator works with the CA to implement and assess these globally integrated plans. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. C-4) See Figure 1-10.

Coordinating Authority: Responsibilities

- **Leads Problem Set Plans Development**: designated expert when representing problem set to OSD/Joint Staff (planning, resourcing, synchronization, transition to contingency).
- **Authority to Convene**: convenes meetings as required to plan, synchronize, and assess.
- **Recommendations**: recommends changes in the plan and resourcing.
- **Assessments**: Integrates the assessments of CCMDs, CSAs, and Services; emphasizing or deemphasizing areas based on the broader campaign needs.
- **Prioritization**: sets priorities of all tasks/objectives in the plan.
- **Risk**: Assesses risk and mitigation for all tasks/objectives.
- **Compels Integrated Support Plans**: compels support plans from planning collaborators IAW JSCP assignment
- **Global Integration Activities**: nominates strategic objectives, leads planning to synchronize campaign activities across CCMDs, CSAs, and Services.
- **Transition to Contingency**: defines decision support templates and aligns campaign resources to support Integrated Contingency Plans

**Figure 1-10: Coordinating Authority**

(5) **Cross-Functional Teams.** Global integration requires information from across functions, domains, regions, and processes. To assist with global integration and execution of the NMS and JSCP, the Chairman employs CFTs to facilitate shared understanding and support the development of military advice. Priority Challenge CFTs consist of Joint Staff functional and regional experts, as well as representatives from CCMDs, OSD, and other U.S. government departments and agencies, as required. CFTs might also include gender, cultural, and climate change experts. These CFTs support globally integrated planning and lead the writing and management of GCPs, in coordination with CCMDs and OSD. In accordance with DoDI 3000.15, CFTs will coordinate with OUSD(P) the sharing of GCP planning and plans related information with interagency partners. During a crisis or contingency, the CFTs may assist in developing a shared understanding of the strategic environment. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, 20 p. C-4)
(6) **Collaborator.** A Joint Force organization assigned in the JSCP to support integrated GCP planning. The collaborator works with the CA to implement and assess these globally integrated plans. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, p. C-4)

(7) **Global Defense Posture Report (GDRP).** The GDRP is SECDEF signed/approved and produced annually. It describes the Joint Force’s integrated approach to requirements and risk associated with posture (forces, footprints, and agreements). A key consideration of GCP and plan reviews is global defense posture. Posture is the fundamental enabler of Joint Force activities. From a posture perspective, GCPs foster an integrated approach to Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) and Continental United States (CONUS) requirements, trade-offs, and risk across three interdependent posture elements: forces, footprints, and agreements. The Director, J-5, is the Joint Staff lead for posture issues. In that role, the J-5 coordinates closely with the J-3, J-4, and J-8 on global defense posture issues, such as force management and prepositioned equipment. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities and DJS will normally delegate routine Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC) process management to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Posture and the J-5 DD-JSP. Delegation to the DD-JSP will be through the Director, J-5. The GPEC proposes recommendations for the SecDef’s consideration on global posture initiatives introduced by CCMDs and Military Departments. As needed, posture issues and recommendations may be reviewed by the Operations Deputies Tank, the primary Joint forum for such issues. As required, the Operations Deputies may elevate posture issues and recommendations for consideration in a JCS Tank. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, C-6)

4. **Theater Level Documents.**

   a. **Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs) (classified document).** Regional planning guidance addresses regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple CCMDs. Generally, issues that require RCPs are not as significant a threat to US interests as GCPs but require attention to ensure they do not devolve into a more significant crisis. If necessary, SecDef, through the CJCS, could direct a RCP with a designated coordinating authority. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p.I-9) RCPs are not often directed at the department/joint staff level and have therefore been removed from CJCSI 3100.01E JSPS. RCPs are more often directed at the CCMD level. For example, the Commander of USAFRICOM may direct a Northwest Africa or East Africa Campaign Plan, or the Commander USINDOPACOM may direct a Southwest Asia or East Asia Campaign Plan. See Chapter 5 of the CPH for more on RCPs as well as subordinate campaign plans and support plans.

   b. **Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs) (classified document).** FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordination across multiple CCMDs. (JP5-0,
c. **Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP)**. CCPs are the centerpiece of the CCMDs’ planning construct and operationalize CCMD strategies. CCPs incorporate intermediate objectives and tasks assigned to the CCMD from the GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs within their geographic AOR or functional area. They link support and contingency plans; set priorities and identify risks in requirements placed on the CCMD. CCPs focus the command’s day-to-day activities, which include ongoing operations and military engagement, including security cooperation, exercises, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. CCPs organize and align operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theater or functional areas. CCDRs identify the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMDs, prioritize objectives, and commit those resources to shape the OE and support the national strategic objectives. CCDRs evaluate the commitment of resources and make recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts associated with executing the command’s missions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-9)

d. **Integrated Contingency Plans (ICP) (classified document)**. The JSCP directs contingency planning consistent with the CPG. It expands on the CPG with specific objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP directs the development of Integrated Contingency Plans (ICP) and Global Integration Frameworks (GIF), formerly known as Globally Integrated Base Plans. (CJCSI 3100.01E, JSPS, C-2)

An integrated contingency plan coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time and space to respond to a single contingency that spans CCMD geographic boundaries or functional responsibilities. Designated coordinating authorities lead planning and assessments across CCMDs and provide recommendations to the CJCS for specific problem sets or missions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-10)

Note – See Chapter 5 of this document for more details on problem sets that are grouped together into an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP). ICPs are directly related to GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs. When threats emerge, crises occur, or escalation warrants, a GCP, RCP, or FCP will transition into a contingency plan for execution.

e. **CCMD Strategy (Theater or Functional)**. CCDRs use strategic guidance and direction to prepare command strategies focused on their command’s specific capabilities and missions to link national strategic guidance to theater or functional strategies and joint operations. The command strategy, like national strategy, identifies the command’s broad, long-range objectives that contribute to national security. The command strategy provides the link between national strategic guidance and joint planning. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-10)
The CCMD Strategy is an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. Combatant commanders develop theater/functional strategies. Unlike their CCMD campaign plans, these strategies are not tasked by national leadership. Rather, they are descriptions of theater or function area challenges and opportunities with aspirational descriptions of how the combatant command intends to respond. CCMD strategies are a valuable tool for the CCDR to provide vision, purpose, and priorities to a wide audience. These strategies can be classified or unclassified. If classified, an unclassified version is desirable as a strategic communication vehicle. See Chapter 5 of the CPH for more details.

f. Country Specific and Regional Security Cooperation Plans (CSCS). As needed or directed, CCDRs prepare CSCSs within their campaign plans for each country where the CCMD intends to apply significant time, money, and/or effort. CCDRs may also prepare separate regional plans. These are useful to identify and call out activities directed toward specific regional or country objectives and provide focus for the command. Regional-specific security cooperation plans and country-specific security cooperation plans can also serve to better harmonize activities and investments with other agencies. By isolating the desired objectives, planners can more easily identify supporting efforts and specific assessment measures toward achieving US objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-14) See Chapter 5 of this document for more details.

5. CCDR Dialogue with National Leaders (Military Options, COAs, and Planning).

a. Military Options. A major responsibility of the CCDR is to assist the CJCS in advising the President and SecDef on the use of military power to achieve national objectives. Civilian leaders often ask for military options to help them visualize “the art of the possible” during the development of policy objectives, and CCDRs often discuss military options to help map out the policy boundaries that inform planning. These dialogues play out along a spectrum from the conceptual to the detailed. Civilian and military actors use various terms to describe similar types of advice, and terms are often used dissimilarly by different actors. The United States Army War College attempts to align its lexicon with concepts found in JP 5-0, such that:

- Conceptual discussions most often lead to “Military Options,” while detailed discussions most often lead to “Courses of Action (COAs).” (Figure 1-11)
- “Options” often produce multiple potential mission statements, while COAs all develop from one mission statement.
Option or Course of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>COA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Possibly different assumptions</td>
<td>• Common assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scenario-driven</td>
<td>• Single scenario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Possibly different termination criteria</td>
<td>• Common termination criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Each option might lead to a different CCMD mission</strong></td>
<td>• <strong>Common mission statement for all COAs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Different military objectives</td>
<td>• Common military objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May be expressed in relationship of M to other elements of power (DI&amp;E)</td>
<td>• Expressed as how to apply MICW DI&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• &quot;Branch planning up front&quot; leads to different mission statement</td>
<td>• Will have branches to deal with different assumptions, but same mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1-11: Options and COAs

(1) **Options identify different ways, generally broadly defined in scope, to support differing end states in support of the objective. COAs are subsets of options that identify specific military operations to attain the end state described in an option. The purpose of options is to provide senior decision makers, usually SecDef or the President, the opportunity to better integrate the military within policy decisions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-32)**

(2) To provide the proper political context, it is reasonable to add the policy goals (or outcomes) that the military options would achieve. In addition, stating termination criteria implies more than just the military end state desired, and leads to wider political, societal, regional, or developmental conditions. Importantly, a complete military option is a product of essential dialogue between policy makers, military commanders, and the political leadership. The creators of military options can validate policy goal assumptions and political leaders can communicate expectations of military actions or activities (See Figure 1-12).
(3) The most common tension between civilian and military leaders is in the risks associated with Adequacy (focused on ends), Acceptability (focused on ways), and Feasibility (focused on means). Low fidelity options/COAs make for quicker and more robust civ-mil discussions but may equate to higher risk to force and policy/mission. Higher fidelity options/COAs lower the risk in some areas but increase the risk that proposed solutions are too late and retard the civ-mil dialogue. Strategic planners must quickly determine where best to place risk to ensure robust, but effective, dialogue between the CCDR and civilian leaders during strategy development and planning development.

(4) The plans-centric construct for developing options is appealing to military leaders operating within their familiar decision-making process, with efforts to ensure their options/COAs pass the FAA-DC (Feasible, Acceptable, Adequate, Distinguishable, and Complete) test. However, this is often not helpful for civilian leaders who are unfamiliar with the military process and who use a different model for making decisions. Civilian leaders are often frustrated by military options that they view as overly difficult or time consuming, that inadequately address their broader political considerations, or that are merely variations of a single concept that do not offer a real choice.

(5) Although not prescribed in joint doctrine, military planners should anticipate that political leaders want to discuss military options early in the decision-making process before they issue clear policy and planning guidance and before planners have been able to conduct detailed FAA-DC analysis. This turns out to be like answering the question “which came first the chicken or the egg?” Determining “which comes first, policy or options?” can lead to friction and miscommunication between civilian and military leaders. Strategic planners must be able to describe a range of possible actions and outcomes before policy makers have committed to the objective they seek. (See Figure 1-13)
Most importantly, the friction between civilian and military leaders can be reduced by adjusting the military’s development of options to better accommodate civilian expectations. Participants’ experiences, engrained heuristics, and the nature of the particular national security issue influence every dialogue that takes place between civilian and military leaders. Strategic planners must develop an appreciation for these realities and provide military options which can meet civilian policymakers’ unique requirements. Developing military options to address national security requirements is the ultimate expression of military judgment and therefore no process, procedure, or template is guaranteed to be successful in every context.

The purpose of initial military options is to inform policy decision-making by increasing civilian leaders’ understanding about which objectives the military could enable. On a continuum of actions from “do nothing” on one end, to “do everything” on the other, civilian leaders might start with a general idea of what policy responses they are comfortable with. Conversely, they may initially approach a problem with a range of possible objectives to pursue. The best approaches are informed by a thorough understanding of how each instrument of national power enables the attainment of proposed objectives. Therefore, military options should initially include a range of military activity that supports a broad range of potential policy objectives providing civilian leaders the opportunity to refine what they expect the military to achieve.
(8) The task for military leaders is to explain the complexity of the military instrument in a manner such that civilian leaders can be comfortable with their decision to use it. An iterative dialogue allows civilians to achieve a working knowledge of how a military operation will unfold, on what timeline, with which forces, and the associated level and nature of risk. Commanders and senior advisors facilitate this level of understanding when they clearly articulate the logic underpinning the theory of victory. Or, short of victory, how each option delivers an acceptable outcome in light of the challenge addressed by the presented options. Although civilians may not agree with the logic, they will ideally understand the military perspective which will allow them to make informed decisions about the utility of the military instrument.

(9) Using traditional planning frameworks and the requirement for detailed feasibility analysis, military leaders cannot provide the multitude of options that civilian leaders desire in a short amount of time. Adapting and planning are intrinsically at odds; planning seeks to constrain the future within a desired path while adaptability seeks the best path as the future unfolds. Binding detail, though desired for feasibility, is the graveyard of adaptability.

(10) Options should rely less on a staff-centric, excessively detailed decision-making process and more on a conceptual design methodology fueled by senior military leaders' operational art and experience. Military options provided to civilian decision makers during policy development should be more similar to the conceptual operational approach produced by the design methodology than the detailed COAs produced by in-depth joint planning and analysis.

(11) Senior military leaders must communicate options in a format and language that is easily understood by civilian leaders and policy makers. Though there is no standard format for an option, each one should contain the following elements:

- Scenario and assumptions upon which the option is based
- Desired outcomes and associated policy aims
- A description of the concept with emphasis on the use of military actions in the context of the use of other instruments of power
- A general description of the resources required
- A general timeline for how the option would play out
- An explanation of the causal logic that links the recommended actions to the desired outcomes
- The strategic and operational risks entailed in this option

b. Example.

(1) Problem: Hurricane Ellis is bearing down on Haiti.

(2) Strategic Options: 1) Do nothing, 2) Prevent catastrophe, 3) Mitigate consequences and assist recovery, 4) Prevent catastrophe and rebuild the country.

(3) Military Options:

(a) Option 1. Do Nothing
1) Assumptions. Do nothing does not equal abandon U.S. Military personnel, does equal Non-Mil AMCITs are on their own, U.S. will not support international efforts.

2) End states. No U.S. end states (other than protect U.S. military)

3) Ways available:
   - Pull all U.S. military forces from the area (3 days to finish)
     - COA 1 Airlift focus
     - COA 2 Sea-based focus
     - COA 3 Use commercial transport

4) Ties into Whole-of-Government Plan. Prepared to support evacuating DOS personnel, if necessary.

5) Risks. AMCIT casualties. International response forces respond late, and we are caught on our heels.

(b) Option 2. Prevent Catastrophe

1) Assumptions. Haitian government can handle many of the expected challenges. Policy focus is to prevent catastrophe vice mitigate disaster.

2) End states. Haitian government fully capable of protecting critical infrastructure and lives.

3) Ways available:
   - Shoring up critical infrastructure
     - COA 1 - Send an engineer organization to support (lowend – takes 48 hours)
     - COA 2 – Contract LOGCAP from local bases (TBD timeline)
   - Guide local leaders, shore up infrastructure, and assist in recovery with a CA and Eng focused Org (high end – IOC in 24hours, FOC in 1 week)
     - COA 1 – Engage early & heavily by deploying a JTF
     - COA 2 – Engage slowly. VTC w/ leaders from USACE, contract infrastructure prep work and send in CA Army Unit from ARFORSOUTH after event

4) Ties into WOG Plan. U.S. Mil is in support of USAID DART.

5) Risks. Small risk to force. Expectation that U.S. will “save” Haiti forces mission creep later. If Haitian government fails, the response force would enable follow on forces, but would have to transition to consequence management vice prevention.

(c) Option 3. (Initial Narrative) Mitigate consequences and assist recovery. Since Haiti is extremely fragile, due to repeated hurricanes over the past few years, we assume it is ripe for significant damage from Hurricane Ellis. We could also assume that they will not want help up front due to national pride and a poor understanding, by senior Haitian leadership, of how vulnerable they truly are. If we believe those assumptions, then we may want to aim for post-event support – which has been our traditional response in the past.
A quick response could mitigate consequences (save lives and reduce suffering) and assist a quicker, more robust recovery. We could do this by our traditional naval/air focused response packages (ESGs, CSGs, C-5/C-17 flow, etc.) in support of USAID or, if we act fast enough, we could pre-stage ground assets via commercial and MPF ships in a temporary ground base. The ground staging idea risks damage to force but can respond quicker (as soon as the winds die down). The ship/aviation focused choices respond slower but have lower risk to force...and we know how to do it. We, DOD, will support USAID’s DARTs no matter what we decide, and we recommend clearance to start planning with them now in order to ensure feasibility and acceptability of our potential COAs. We think we need to act within the next 48 hours to flow a viable ground force package. The ship/air flow decision can wait for 96 hours (or more). Option 3 may require a naval force that includes an aviation capability to support ground forces. Lessons learned from humanitarian crisis have demonstrated the need for a gender perspective when planning and preparing options.

(d) **Option 4. Additional options as required...**

6. **Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) & Flexible Response Options (FROs).** FDOs and FROs are a specific type of military option. FDOs and FROs are executed on order and provide scalable options to respond to a crisis. Commanders include FDOs and FROs as part of their plans to provide adaptive military options for SecDef or the President to deter or respond to a crisis. Both provide the ability to scale up (escalate) or de-escalate based on continuous assessment of an adversary’s actions and reaction. While FDOs are primarily intended to prevent the crisis from worsening and allow for de-escalation, FROs are generally punitive in nature. A planning outline for FDOs and FROs is included in CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

   a. **FDO.** FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions tailored to signal to and influence an adversary’s actions. They are established to deter actions before or during a crisis. If necessary, FDOs may be used to prepare for future operations, recognizing they may well create a deterrent effect.

   (1) **FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—but they are most effective when combined across the instruments of national power.** FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths.

   (2) **FDOs provide options for decision makers during emerging crises to allow for gradual increase in pressure to avoid unintentionally provoking full-scale combat and to enable them to develop the situation and gain a better understanding of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions.** FDOs are elements of contingency plans executed to increase deterrence in addition to, but outside the scope of, the ongoing operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. E-1)
(3) Annex E of JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, provides examples of FDOs for each instrument of power. The military FDO example is provided in Figure 1-14. FDOs are implemented in concert with the other instruments of power in order to achieve policy goals/objectives without escalating to armed conflict. FDOs may require the cooperation from U.S. allies and/or partners. FDOs should be implemented as part of the overarching contingency campaign. Once implemented, it is crucial that the operational environment is continually monitored to determine if the FDO was effective and if any unanticipated consequences occurred. As assessment occurs, FDOs can be adjusted or terminated in concert with the contingency campaign.

![Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options](image)

**Figure 1-14 Examples of Requested Military FDOs (Figure E-4 JP 5-0)**

b. **FRO.** An FRO is an operational to strategic-level concept of operation that is easily scalable, provides military options, and facilitates rapid decision making by national leaders in response to heightened threats or attacks against the US homeland or US interests. *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning p. E-4)*

(1) FROs are used to address both specific, transregional threats and nonspecific, heightened threats. FROs are operations that are first and foremost designed to preempt enemy attacks, but also provide DOD the necessary planning framework to fast-track requisite authorities and approvals necessary to address dynamic and evolving threats.

(2) FROs are developed as directed by the CJCS and maintained by the CCMDs to address the entire range of possible threats. FROs should support both long-term regional and national security policy objectives. Initially, FROs are developed pre-crisis by CCMDs, based on intelligence collection and analysis and critical factors
analysis, and then modified and/or refined or developed real-time.

(3) FROs should not be limited to current authorities or approvals; rather, planning should be based on DOD’s capabilities (overt, low visibility, clandestine, and covert) to achieve objectives, independent of risk. While entirely unconstrained planning is not realistic or prudent, the intent of FROs is to provide national leaders a full range of military options to include those prohibited in the current OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. E-4)

![Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines](Image)

**Figure 1-15 FRO Content Guidelines (Figure E-5 JP 5-0)**

(4) While FROs are generally intended to address terrorist threats, they can be used against any adversary. FROs involve decisive direct military action but may also include indirect actions. FROs have specific content guidelines that include but are not limited to those found in Figure 1-15. Further details of FROs can be found in Annex E of JP 5-0 Joint Planning.

(5) FROs are employed by POTUS/SecDef to interdict an adversary (e.g., terrorist or proxy organizations), interdict an adversary’s critical networks and deny an adversary sanctuary/support bases. As all military options, FROs are scalable. An example of FRO scalability is found in Figure 1-16.
### Flexible Response Option Scalability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rapid Response</th>
<th>Limited Response</th>
<th>Decisive Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrate Resolve</td>
<td>Target Those Directly Responsible</td>
<td>Defeat Violent Extremist Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority of Effort:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Priority of Effort:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Priority of Effort:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Speed</td>
<td>- Legitimacy via attribution</td>
<td>- Direct attack on enemy center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advantages:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advantages:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advantages:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Demonstrate resolve</td>
<td>- Response aimed directly at those responsible</td>
<td>- Proactive vice reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Least impact of current operations</td>
<td>- Demonstrates restraint</td>
<td>- Targets critical enemy vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disadvantages:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disadvantages:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited strategic effect</td>
<td>- Uncertain timeline</td>
<td>- Potential to destabilize region of focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- More likely lethal in nature</td>
<td>- Persistent operation may require reallocation of resources</td>
<td>- Perception of US overreaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Probable negative international reaction</td>
<td>- United States remains vulnerable to other extremist organization elements</td>
<td>- Higher risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- More likely unilateral action</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unintended consequences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1-16 FRO Scalability (Figure E-6 JP 5-0)*
CHAPTER 2: JOINT PLANNING

1. Globally Integrated and Coordinated. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMDs to enable the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. It should produce a shared understanding across the joint force of the threat environment, required decisions, resource prioritization, and risk. Integrated planning increases collaboration through robust JPEC coordination and across the whole-of-government to address the challenges facing the United States. Integrated planning recognizes the necessity to inform strategy that spans the competition continuum, requiring alignment of campaign and contingency planning. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-5)

![Unified Action](image)

**Figure 2-1: Unified Action (Army War College)**

a. The integrated context (see Figure 2-1) includes all of the relevant actors in the national security environment (including, but not limited to, the ones below). **Unified Action** synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations.
with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Each layer of planning has a somewhat distinctive title to enable planners to understand which layer of planning they are working in.

(1) The joint community [JOINT PLANNING]

(2) Whole of Government [OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES]

(3) Multinational partners [COALITION, ALLIED, or MULTI-NATIONAL]

(4) International Organizations (e.g., the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States) [NATO Planning, or UN Planning, etc. – planning and operations usually assumes the name of the organization leading the effort.]

(5) Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g., Oxfam, Médicins Sans Frontières [Doctors without Borders], the Afghan Women’s Network) [No specific title exists]

(6) Relevant non-state actors (e.g., financial institutions, shadow governments, multinational corporations, terrorist organizations, empowered academics and consultants) [No specific title exists]

b. Complicating the planning endeavor is the fact that different actors have different outcomes, different timelines, different processes, and different decision structures. Some examples are:

(1) DOS may have different priorities in Nation X that affect the ways and means DOD may use to accomplish tasks in adjacent Nation Y.

(2) A classified DOD plan may not be shared with other U.S. governmental organizations until late in planning.

(3) A coalition nation may be unable to discuss a sensitive topic until its elections are complete.

(4) Nation 1 may not want Nation 2 to know that it is participating in some activities and operations. This would warrant bilateral planning that is synchronized outside the normal coalition planning channels.

(5) NGO A may wish to synchronize with some elements of the plan, but not wish to know about other elements of the plan.

2. Multi-National Planning. As it is unlikely that the United States will operate alone in future conflicts, comprehensive planning must be conducted with a multinational perspective, rather than as an add-on to U.S. planning. U.S. forces may operate as part of a coalition or an alliance, work through unity of effort between nations of similar aim, or work toward an end state that supports U.S. partner nations’ objectives as well as U.S. national objectives. Commanders and staffs must consider interests, equities, contributions, and
limitations posed by the multinational environment. Some considerations for planners and operators during multinational operations:

- National objectives of the various partners
- Building and maintaining a multinational force
- Differences in language, culture, gender dynamics, and national sovereignty
- Legal considerations by the participants (international law and law of war)
- Doctrine, training, and resources
- Differences in force protection and rules of engagement (ROE)
- Limits to sharing intelligence and information
- Communications and spectrum management
- Logistics and host nation support
- Differing standards for health service support
- Nuanced perspectives on media relations

3. Unified Action. Unified Action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Coordination of inter-organizational and multinational plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions. It also identifies common objectives and how military and civilian capabilities best complement each other to achieve these objectives...Strategic objectives are achieved through unified action built on unity of effort. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-24)

a. To prevent internal conflicts and assist with Unified Action, DOS, USAID, and DOD (as the three foundational pillars for promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad) have established “Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning.” 3D Planning is an ongoing initiative to build understanding and synchronize plans to improve collaboration, coordination, and unity of effort among these organizations.

b. Military power is most effectively used in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies interact with non-DOD agencies and organizations to build mutual understanding of the OE, requirements, capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions, as well as the understanding of the desired objectives and, if applicable, military end state. They also identify how military and civilian capabilities best complement each other. The National Security Council (NSC) integrates the instruments of national power by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation and overseeing interagency planning efforts. Further, military and civilian organizations share information, cooperate, and strive together to make unity of effort possible. JFCs seek cooperation and build consensus to achieve unity of effort. Interagency and
multinational consensus building is a key element to unity of effort. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-24) Note: For more information on Promote Cooperation events, see CJCSM 3130.01, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities.

4. **Joint Planning.** Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the **ways**) to use military capabilities (the **means**) in time and space to achieve objectives (the **ends**) while considering the associated **risks**. Ideally, planning begins with specified national strategic objectives and military end states to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused... In the process, joint planning frames the problem; aligns ends, ways, and means; develops operational approaches; accounts for risk; and gives leaders decision space with proposed military options. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) may propose objectives for the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) consideration before beginning detailed planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, may offer military advice on the proposed objectives and global prioritization. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-1)

Joint planning serves two critical purposes:

a. At the strategic level, joint planning provides the President and SecDef with options and advice to achieve the National Security Strategy of the United States of America [short title: NSS] objectives through the employment of the joint force. Planning supports decision making by identifying courses of actions (COAs) available along with probable outcomes, costs, and risks. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, I-2)

b. At the operational level, joint planning translates national level guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives and attaining the military end state as directed in the (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018 [short title: NMS], the 2018-2020 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) [short title: CPG], and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) [short title: JSCP]. Joint planning ties the training, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities of joint forces to achieve military objectives in the service of enduring national interests. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-2)

5. **Management and Review of Plans.** Commanders continually assess plans. At the CCMD-level, the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) and senior DOD leadership share this task. Assessments continuously measure the effectiveness of military operations and project the
expected effectiveness of plans against contingencies as the OE changes. Assessments support decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a military end state. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) synchronizes plans in the USG through ongoing civil-military dialogue. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. xiv-xv, p. I-3)

a. JPEC. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning or committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the JPEC. JPEC synchronizes plans in the USG through ongoing civil-military dialogue. Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the stakeholders shown in Figure [2-2]. The President, with the advice and assistance of the NSC and CJCS, issues policy and strategic direction to guide the planning efforts of DOD and other USG departments and agencies that represent all of the instruments of national power. SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, organizes the JPEC for joint planning by establishing appropriate command relationships among the CCOs and by establishing appropriate support relationships between the CCOs and the Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) for that portion of their missions involving support for operating forces. A supported commander is identified for specific planning tasks, and other JPEC stakeholders are designated as appropriate. This process provides for increased unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. I-3, II-10 I-12) See Figure 2-2.

The Joint Planning & Execution Community (JPEC)

DEA, FBI, etc

Intelligence Community

Congress

Partners/Allies

Subordinate Commands

Subordinate Unified Commands

Service and Functional Components

Joint Task Forces

Joint Staff Directorates

National Guard Bureau

Department of Defense Agencies

Services

Service Major Commands

Supporting Combatant Commands

USAID

Ambassadors

DOS Bureaus

Countries (In Theater)

UN

Supporting Combatant Commands

Figure 2-2: Joint Planning and Execution Community (Figure II-2 in JP 5-0)
b. This process is intended to coordinate integrated, flexible plans with fully integrated databases to enable rapid build of executable joint plans. This flexible planning system is intended to facilitate the adaptive planning principles:

- Clear strategic guidance and iterative dialogue
- Early interagency and coalition coordination and planning
- Integrated intelligence planning
- Embedded options
- “Living” plans
- Parallel planning in a network-centric, collaborative environment

6. **The Strategy and Planning Continuum.** While plans are generally divided into either campaign or contingency plans, the various types of joint plans derived from national level strategy are numerous and complex. Joint planning encompasses the preparation of a number of planning and execution related products. While the planning process is generally the same for campaign, contingency, or crisis planning, the output or products may differ. Campaign and contingency planning encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations with a timeline generally not driven by external events. Crisis planning uses the same process but is typically driven by external events and is almost always time constrained. CCPs provide the means to translate strategic guidance into activities executable by CCMDs. CCPs link current operations to contingency plans. The planner needs to know the type of plan and the detail required. **The two basic types of plans are campaign and contingency plans.** Both can have four levels of detail: commander’s estimate, base plan (BPLAN), concept plan (CONPLAN), and operation plan (OPLAN). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-8)

The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) directs the number and types of documents that CCDRs produce as they turn strategic challenges into actionable operations and activities. JSPS provides the planning construct to bring a global perspective to threats that were previously stove-piped within Combat Command structures.

JSCP directed strategic and contingency planning consists of all planning efforts, relationships, authorities, roles, and responsibilities designed to integrate the planning of problem sets requiring coordinated action by the Joint Staff, OSD, CCMDs, Combat Support Agencies, Services, other government agencies, and foreign partners. This planning seeks to increase collaboration across the whole of government and increase unity of effort to address increase unit of effort to address the complexity of the Operational Environment with the available resources.

The Strategy and Planning Continuum construct shown in Figure 2-3 shows the various types of strategy and plans ranging from the strategic to operational level. Figure 2-3 shows how the various types of plans are nested with national and theater level strategies.
a. **CJCS.** The CJCS is tasked by Title 10, Section 153, of US Code with preparing and reviewing strategic campaign and contingency plans. The Chairman is responsible for operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of the Joint Force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to the SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities.

b. **CA.** In order to integrate CCMD planning and day-to-day campaigning, the CJCS assigns a CA to develop integrated plans. (See Chapter 1 for more on the CA.)

c. **CFT.** A CFT, comprised of members of the Joint Staff, develops guidance for CJCS and supports globally integrated planning for GCPs and GIFs. (See Chapter 1 for more on CFTs.)

d. **Collaborator.** A Joint Force organization assigned by the CJCS (via the JSCP) to support integrated planning for a problem. (See Chapter 1 for more on collaborators.)

e. **Assignment of Planning Responsibilities.** The CJCS will assign GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs to Coordinating Authorities. Those CAs will work with collaborators to develop campaign plans (written and updated by the CA) and supporting plans (written by collaborators).

f. **CCPs CPs.** CCDRs will integrate relevant elements of the GCP/RCPs/FCPs and their own CSPs into their CCP. CCPs serve as the 5-year resourced base plan that support day-to-day operations, actions, and activities. CPs are considered to be branch plans of the CCP. **For more on CPs see the Campaigning section of Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.**

7. **Conceptual to Detailed Planning.** Joint Planning integrates four functions and two
interconnected processes. The first process is oriented toward the conceptual and artistic side of ‘planning’ and is titled “Operational Design.” Its counterpart is oriented more towards the detailed and scientific sides of planning and is titled the “Joint Planning Process.” Both processes support Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Assessment – the difference is in the degree to which each is used. While listed as two distinct processes, they are better described as sides of a continuum from conceptual to detailed planning. (See Figure 2-4 and 2-5)

Planning has a conceptual component and a detailed component. Conceptual planning involves understanding operational environments and problems, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach to attain that end state. Conceptual planning corresponds to the art of command and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed planning translates the commander’s operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the science of control including synchronizing forces in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of the force toward the desired end state. (ATP 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology, p. 1-3)
a. **Strategy.** Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives. Strategy is also the art and science of determining a future state or condition (ends), conveying this to an audience, determining the possible approaches (ways), and identifying the authorities and resources (e.g., time, forces, equipment, and money–means) to achieve the intended objective, all while managing the associated risk. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. I-3)

Figure 2-6 provides a joint planning overview that includes the Joint Planning Process (JPP). **JPP Is covered in detail in Chapter 3.** CCMD Strategies are developed through conceptual planning via operational design/methodology. A CCMD design team captures the conceptual design process in a strategic estimate that is a running document used to inform strategy adjustments. The strategic/operational approach forms the foundation for the CCMD Strategy and for the CCP. The CCDR’s strategy is written using the strategic estimate along with a two-way dialogue that includes the CCDR, CCMD staff, and subordinate commanders/staffs. The CCMD strategy is the foundational document for which the CCP and CPs are developed. **For CCMD strategies see Chapter 5.**
b. **Strategic art.** Strategic Art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests. Practitioners evaluate the competing interests and objectives of state and non-state actors in the OE, organize joint forces to implement policy, and sense when revision is prudent. Strategies should provide a coherent narrative to bridge the present
to the future. Enduring, effective strategy provides the conceptual basis for an integrated military operation or campaign. Visualization and conceptualization of strategic success achieved or supported by military means is the foundation of operational art and operational design. The essence of strategic art is distillation—organizing and articulating the complex interrelationship between national interests, policy, strategic ends, and practice, in clear terms. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-3)

c. **Operational art.** Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks. In planning, many activities are done through a scientific methodology. These include identifying strengths and weaknesses of the opponent, validating requirements through checklists, and comparing the outcomes of analysis. However, planning for conflict and war is best based on operational art and the broad knowledge of commanders and planners that are not easily categorized. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-3)

d. **Operational design and JPP.** Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system. Commanders must understand the audience and political environment to give the best military advice to civilian decision makers. Planners must consider how they will translate often-times confusing military jargon and concepts into a universally understood language; interagency partners are critical to this discussion. Operational design is interwoven with the planning process to fill in gaps in guidance and information and provide a framework which to plan, enabling planners to address the complexity of the OE, support mission analysis and COA development, and develop CONOPS with the highest likelihood of success. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning p. IV-1)

(1) Operational design and JPP are complementary tools of the overall planning process. Operational design provides an iterative process that enables the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends—ways—means—risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations in a dynamic OE. The commander, supported by the staff, gains an understanding of the OE, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of operational design during the initiation step of JPP. Commanders communicate their operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and multi-national/nongovernmental entities as required in their initial planning...
guidance so that their approach can be translated into executable plans. As JPP is applied, commanders may receive updated guidance, learn more about the OE and the problem, and refine their operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide detailed planning. This iterative process facilitates the continuing development and refinement of possible COAs into a selected COA with an associated initial CONOPS and eventually into a resource-informed executable plan or order.

(2) The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and JPP continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of JPP, the command can monitor the dynamics of the mission and OE while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed. By combining these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility and do so proactively (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-4) See Figures 2-5 and 2-6.

e. Operational planning. Operational planning translates strategy into executable activities, operations, and campaigns, within resource and policy limitations to achieve objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-4)

8. Global Campaigns.

a. The joint force campaigns across the competition continuum. GCPs and CCPs encompass concurrent and related operations, activities, and investments to achieve operational-level objectives that support achievement of strategic objectives. In concert with other instruments of national power, these actions not only maintain or achieve strategic objectives but also anticipate a future beyond those objectives. The actions include many Service component operations, joint operations, and continual alignment of military actions with interorganizational and multinational partners.

b. Policy drives campaigning to pursue strategic objectives that are broad, transregional, and global, requiring many more parallel actions and substantially more diverse operational-level objectives. Campaigning is the result of strategic discussion, policy, and operational-level planning and execution. An effective and continual civilian-military dialogue guides the process, ensuring integration between military operations within DOD and alignment with other USG departments and agencies. Campaigning in pursuit of GCP and CCP objectives occurs over many years. The President and SecDef determine when GCPs or CCPs require revision.

c. Across the competition continuum, cooperation can require the
employment of numerous smaller military and nonmilitary efforts implemented and adjusted over long durations. For competition, success can require efforts to accomplish an array of diverse activities across numerous OAs to gain influence, advantage, and leverage.

d. For global campaigning, success may be measured in the prevention of armed conflict. However, success in armed conflict may require an overlapping series of campaigns characterized with multiple iterations of enemy and friendly offensives, counteroffensives, and transitions. Throughout armed conflict, commanders have to confront and endure surprise and failure. In the aftermath of armed conflict, senior military and civilian officials may direct joint forces to enforce the resulting military success through a continued occupation of seized territory. JFCs continue supporting efforts to ensure enemy compliance and maintain the strategic objectives after the transition of an area to civil authority. (JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, p. IV-9)

e. Campaigning. The persistent conduct of related operations, activities, and investments that align military actions with the other instruments of national power, supporting global integration across the competition continuum in pursuit of strategic objectives. (JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, p. GL-8)

f. Joint Operations. Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, p. GL-12)

g. While campaigns are executed over a given period of time and space, campaigning is continuous. The art and science of campaigning is the most difficult thing for any large organization to accomplish. Success in campaigning requires that all elements and members of a command or organization understand the campaign and in turn sequence the appropriate amount of military activity in a unified action to achieve specific objectives. Additionally, a command or organization must appropriately organize to execute the campaign. One of the biggest errors by military organizations at the operational and strategic level is to assume that the existing command and control structure and internal staff structure will be effective in executing the campaign. All parts of the command must row together towards campaign objectives. Any staff actions or command activities that do not contribute to success in the campaign should not be executed. Additionally, any part of the organization or unit within the organizational structure that does not contribute to accomplishing campaign objectives should be considered for elimination.

h. Campaigning has traditionally reflected the operational level of war; that is, the linkage of tactical operations to achieve strategic objectives. In many cases, the Joint Force will be in a situation which is complex enough that it cannot achieve the desired ends through the execution of a single operation. There are various reasons that this may be the case. Insufficient forces may be available to defeat the enemy in a single operation (consider the
U.S. Civil War in 1861-65). Physical, mobility, human factors or political limitations may force sequential operations (consider DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the defeat of Japan in WWII, or Cuba, 1898). The enemy’s center of gravity may be so well protected that it must be attacked indirectly (consider the defeat of Nazi Germany).

i. Among other responsibilities, Joint Force Commanders plan and execute campaigns. Generally, Service forces not assigned as a joint force conduct operations rather than campaigns, but they may have a supporting plan to the joint campaign plan that links multiple operations to accomplish specific missions.

j. Not all military objectives require campaigning. A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), for example, may be executable in a single operation. A punitive strike may also achieve the strategic objective in a single operation. However, the theater commander must usually achieve strategic objectives in a more complex environment, requiring multiple operations and the synchronization of those multiple operations to achieve military objectives and support achievement of the national objectives.


a. Similarities between campaign and contingency planning. The art and science used to develop campaigns and contingencies are the same. All the processes discussed in the CPH, and joint doctrine are used for both types of plans. Operational design/design methodology, JPP, operational art, and others are used for plan development, modification, and assessment. For details on CCPs and CPs (as branches to CCPs), see Chapter 5.

b. Differences between campaign and contingency planning.

(1) Campaign Planning. Campaigns seek to shape the OE and achieve national objectives. They establish operations, activities, and investments the command undertakes to achieve specific objectives (set conditions) in support of national policy and objectives. CCMD campaigns are proactive and rarely feature a single measure of military success implying victory in a traditional sense and may include operations across the competition continuum to include ongoing combat operations. In the event a contingency operation is executed, that operation is subsumed into the campaign and becomes an element the CCDR considers when identifying the impact of US operations on the OE, the opportunities to favorably affect the OE to achieve national-level and theater-level objectives and examining MOEs that may impact the campaign’s intermediate objectives. Campaigns seek to capitalize on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized operations, activities, and investments that cannot be accomplished by a single major operation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning p. V-3)

(2) Contingency Planning. Contingency plans identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis or the inability to achieve objectives. CPs specifically seek to favorably resolve a crisis that either was not or could not be deterred or avoided by directing
operations toward achieving specified objectives. They have specified end states that seek to reestablish conditions favorable to the United States. They react to conditions beyond the scope of the CCP. Having achieved their military objectives or attaining the military end state, operations transition back to campaigning through competition under new conditions, possibly with new objectives. These actions are executed on order of the President or SecDef and generally entail specific orders for their execution and require additional resources allocated through the GFM process. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-4)

(3) Resource-Informed Planning and Execution (Capability Assignment, Apportionment, Allocation) JSCP-directed campaigns, unlike contingency plans, are not just plans, they are campaigns in execution. They are constrained by the readiness and availability of resources and authorities and forecast future requirements based on projected results of current on-going operations and activities. CCDRs plan, assess, and execute their JSCP-directed campaign plans. The CCMDs, however, receive limited budgeting and rely on the Services and the CCMD component commands to budget for and execute campaign activities. As such, the components, JS, and FPs must be involved during the planning process to identify resources and tools that are likely to be made available to ensure the campaign plan is executable. The component commands can also identify options and activities of which the CCMD might not be aware. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-9) See Figure 2-7.

10. Detailed Planning. Plans are developed to different levels of detail depending on risk, need, troop-to-task, etc. The JSCP directs that CCDRs develop assigned plans to a specified level. Similarly, the CCDR may direct preparation of internally-directed plans to a particular level of detail.

a. Level 1 Planning Detail—Commander’s Estimate. This level of planning has the least detail. It produces multiple COAs to address contingencies. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum with a proposed force list. The commander’s estimate provides SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the commander’s analysis of the various COAs and recommends a COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-11)
b. **Level 2 Planning Detail—BPLAN.** A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including FDOs and FROs, to provide multiple options to address contingencies as they develop, or to shape the developing situation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-11)

c. **Level 3 Planning Detail—CONPLAN.** A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format. It may require considerable expansion or alteration to be converted into a complete and detailed level 4 OPLAN or an OPORD. It includes a plan summary, a BPLAN, and usually includes the following annexes: A (Task Organization), B (Intelligence), C (Operations), D (Logistics), J (Command
d. Level 4 Planning Detail—OPLAN. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources to execute the plan. It contains a full description of the CONOPS, all applicable annexes, a time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD as well as analysis of the impact of a potentially contested environment on the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE). A TPFDD phases unit requirements into the theater of operations to support the CONOPS and provide closure estimates. A CCMD may request a NISP be developed for level 4 OPLANS. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

(1) The contingency threatens national security and requires detailed prior planning.

(2) The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.

(3) Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

(4) Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements; identify resources to fill requirements; and validate shortfalls. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-12)

11. Risk.

a. Central to planning and execution at any level is the concept of risk. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines risk as “the possibility that something bad or unpleasant (such as injury or loss) will happen.” CJCSM 3105.01 Joint Risk Analysis defines risk as “probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued.” In most cases, military professionals first experience the concept of risk with the operational risk management process when risks are identified and controlled by educating subordinates and establishing measures to avoid or reduce the probability of negative outcomes. At the lowest level, the holiday safety briefing to subordinates is perhaps the most well-known. Range safety briefings are other examples. The definitions above and the operational risk management
process are necessary but not sufficient to advise senior leaders on conducting strategic and operational planning.

b. There are several considerations for examining strategic and operational risk. The general strategy model of ends, ways, and means, risk results from the imbalance of these three components. The concept of risk resides firmly in the realm of decision making. Risk has meaning when leaders weigh options to achieve desired objectives and assess the likelihood and magnitude of adverse outcomes. Those who write about risk often reside in academia or the business world where risks must be quantified to be useful. The discipline holds that risks can be accepted, avoided, mitigated, or transferred (offset). A whole industry – insurance – deals with offsetting (or transferring) risk.

c. As described in CJCSM 3105.01A Joint Risk Analysis the two types of risk are Strategic Risk (risk to national interests) and Military Risk (risk to military objectives and to the Joint Force).

(1) Strategic Risk. Strategic risk is the potential impact upon the United States - including the U.S. population, territory, civil society, critical infrastructure, and interests - of current and contingency events given their estimated consequences and probabilities (e.g., the security of the United States and its citizens).

(2) Military Risk. Military risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the Joint Force’s projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission), while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to-force). In the context of the CRA, military objectives come from the NMS.

(a) Risk-to-Mission. Risk to mission is defined by operational risk and future challenges risk.

1) Operational Risk (Risk-to-Mission). Reflects the current force’s ability to attain current military objectives called for by the current NMS, within acceptable human, material, and financial costs. A function of the probability and consequence of failure to achieve mission objectives while protecting the force from unacceptable losses. The time horizon is 0-2 years.

2) Future Challenges Risk (Risk-to-Mission). Reflects the future force’s ability to achieve future mission objectives over the near and mid-term (0-7 years) and considers the future force’s capabilities and capacity to deter or defeat emerging or anticipated threats.

(b) Risk-to-Force. Risk to force defined by force management risk and institutional risk.

1) Force Management Risk (Risk-to-Force). Reflects a Service and/or Joint Force Provider’s ability to generate trained and ready forces within established rotation ratios and surge capacities to meet current campaign and contingency mission requirements; force management risk is a function of the probability and consequence of not maintaining the appropriate force generation balance (“breaking the force”). Near-to mid-term (0-7 years).
2) Institutional Risk (Risk-to-Force). Reflects the ability of organization, command, management, and force development processes and infrastructure to plan for, enable, and improve national defense. All three-time horizons: Near Term (0-2 yrs), Mid-term (3-7 yrs), and Far Term (8-20 yrs)

d. At the strategic level, senior national security professionals must have the ability to articulate risk to senior decision makers at the national level who may not have a military or national security background. Therefore, campaign planners must expand the conventional categories of risk to encompass others that are relevant to people making strategic decisions. The risk categories below are not intended to be prescriptive, since each planning situation is unique; there may be others not listed that should be considered and assessed.

(1) Mission. Achieving campaign objectives

(2) Forces. Joint and coalition forces assigned, allocated, or apportioned

(3) Time Expected duration of the campaign

(4) Coalition. Maintaining external political and material support

(5) Commitment. Maintaining domestic political and popular support

(6) Escalation. Adversary reactions that may require more resources

(7) Resources. Money, time, and interagency and intergovernmental participation

(8) Inaction. Likely or foreseeable trends that may lead to undesirable developments

e. Once the staff develops categories of risk that are relevant to the campaign, risks can be assessed and managed using a logical framework, such as in Figure 2-6.
f. **Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM)**. JRAM, represented by the Joint Risk Framework, seeks first to increase an individual’s understanding of risk and then to implement and monitor risk-based decisions. It provides a consistent, standardized way to assess risk and recommend risk mitigation measures. Joint doctrine mandates a risk assessment (specifically, risk-to-mission) as part of the mission analysis phase of the Joint Operation Planning Process. It also directs that risk be addressed during in-progress reviews (IPR). In addition to the probability and consequences of any particular source of risk, another dimension that should be considered is the immediacy of the risk, or how rapidly the risk may arise and impact operations. Another variable here is the ability of any organization to recognize the risk or its precursors. Immediacy affects the leader’s ability to take timely mitigating activities to address the risk. Another important source of guidance regarding risk is in the commander’s intent for the campaign or operation. Purpose, end state, and operational risk are the essential elements of intent. An explicit statement of where, when, and what kinds of risk will be accepted or rejected provides a way to prioritize effort in the absence of resources and allows subordinate commanders to better execute mission command. For a full description of the JRAM see CJSM 3105.01A, 12 Oct 2021.

**Figure 2-8: Joint Risk Framework (Figure 3 in CJCSM 3105.01A, Joint Risk Analysis)**
CHAPTER 3: OPERATIONAL DESIGN

1. Purpose. **Operational design** is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system. Commanders must understand the audience and political environment to give the best military advice to civilian decisionmakers. Planners must consider how they will translate often times confusing military jargon and concepts into a universally understood language; interagency partners are critical to this discussion. Operational design is interwoven with the planning process to fill in gaps in guidance and information and provide a framework in which to plan, enabling planners to address the complexity of the OE, support mission analysis and COA development, and develop CONOPS with the highest likelihood of success. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-1)

Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff understand the broad solutions for mission accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in a complex OE. The process is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, during, and for follow-on joint operations. Additionally, it supports ongoing civil-military dialogue concerning the nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-2)

2. Spectrum of Design. All decision making involves a blend of art (envisioning something new) and science (creating something real). Each decision-making tool, by design, leans toward enabling creativity (art) or enabling efficiency (science). Operational Design was introduced to overcome perceived weaknesses in other planning tools – namely, that they were not creative or adaptive enough to deal with strategic and operational complexity. Of course, there are strengths and weaknesses in each decision-making tool and any can be used incorrectly if misapplied to the situation at hand. The argument over what tool(s) (Op Design, JPP, MDMP, MCPP, etc.) provide the correct mix continues among planners, planning communities, Services, and U.S. Government departments. There are even camps among those that use Op Design – those that lean towards less process in an effort to boost creativity, and those that lean towards more process to ensure the time used produces an effective and efficient product.

Joint Planning uses two processes that attempt to span the spectrum of art/creativity and science/efficiency: Operational Design (Op Design) and the Joint Planning Process (JPP). This chapter will describe Op Design and Chapter 4 will describe the JPP, but they should not be viewed as two separate and disconnected processes. They are symbiotic and interconnected.

3. Joint and Army Design. Note that there are some differences in terminology between the Army’s description of the “Army Design Methodology” in ADP 5-0, The Operations Process,
and ATP 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology*, and the joint description of “Operational Design” in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. Though most of the differences are superficial, they are explainable largely by the purposes of the publications. ADP 5-0 was intended to provide an approach to deal with any complex situation not just joint operations; from that perspective it has broader applicability. In slight contrast, JP 5-0 was intended for situations in which joint warfighters may find themselves; it is more narrowly focused on the requirements of joint operations. Thus, “operational design” can be thought of as a subset of the “Army design methodology.” Both methods use the same logic and seek similar outcomes. While this campaign planning handbook remains consistent with joint doctrine in that it uses operational design terminology and logic, it incorporates some of the underlying thinking behind the Army design methodology so that operational design can be applied beyond the realm of joint warfare.

The two definitions highlight these distinctions: Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). Operational design is a tool, not dogma. The process described can be modified to support the specific operation or mission, based on the planner’s analysis. Not all elements of operational design are required for all plans. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. IV-2)

The critical and creative thinking that underpin operational design are not new. The great captains of history, from Sun Tzu to General U.S. Grant to Field Marshall Rommel, have all used this thinking. Hence, operational design is not a discovery, but instead is a reminder within a methodology for use by contemporary military and national security professionals to deal with an incredibly nuanced and complex global environment. The goal of operational design is deeper and broader understanding, not closure. The JPP works with operational design to provide the needed closure that will drive orders and action

4. **Overarching Elements of Operational Design.** While Chapter III of JP 5-0 still lists all of the Elements of Operational Design in a single grouping (See Figure 3-1), Chapter IV of JP 5-0 further refines categories of the Elements of Operational Design.

![Elements of Operational Design](image-url)

**Figure 3-1 Elements of Operational Design (Fig. III-23 JP 5-0)**
The Overarching Elements are:

a. **Objective.** The objective is the single most important element of operational design. Objectives may be broad or defined by a military end state as directed or informed by policy and strategy. An objective is clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. Joint planning integrates military actions and capabilities with other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose to provide unity of effort to achieve the JFC’s military objectives, which contributes to strategic national objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-19 and IV-21)

b. **Military End State.** A military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-21)

c. **Center of Gravity (COG).** The COG is the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-22)

d. **Effects.** An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective and an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-27)

e. **Culmination.** Culmination is that point in time and/or space when the operation can no longer maintain momentum. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-29)

5. **Key Planning Factors for the Operational Environment (OE).**

a. **Lines of Operation (LOO) and Lines of Effort (LOE).** LOOs describe and connect a series of decisive actions that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. An LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational-level objectives that can lead to strategic objectives. Although decisive points usually are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. IV-29 & IV-30)

b. **Decisive Points.** A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables a commander to
gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-32)

c. **Direct and Indirect Approach.** The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s COG by applying combat power against critical vulnerabilities that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

d. **Operational Reach.** Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-34)

6. **Time.** Examined through the lenses of:

   a. **Arranging Operations.** Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, phasing, depth, timing, and tempo. Many plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. IV-35, IV-36, and IV-38) Branches are contingency plans designed to be executed if one or more key assumptions about the operational environment prove to be invalid and are linked to the primary campaign or mission. Sequels are subsequent plans or operations executed after the accomplishment of the primary campaign or mission. Commanders may also incorporate an operational pause into a campaign. Operational pauses may be required when a major operation is reaching the end of its sustainability. Operational pauses can provide a safety valve to avoid potential culmination while the JFC retains the initiative in other ways. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38)

   b. **Anticipation.** Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for indicators of forecasted events. A shared, common understanding of the OE aids commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39 and IV-40)

7. **Forces and Functions.**

   a. **Forces.** An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 85)
b. Functions. The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 90)

c. Design/Planning Considerations. Commanders and planners can plan campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy or adversary Forces, Functions, or a combination of both. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

d. Force Employment Mechanisms. Force employment mechanisms provide a useful tool for describing how a JFC intends to achieve an operational or strategic objective and ensure understanding of the commander’s intent by establishing common references for force employment. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

(1) Defeat Mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms are the methods used by friendly forces in combat operations against an enemy force. Defeating an enemy means creating the conditions necessary to impose the desired strategic outcome on the enemy against the enemy’s will to oppose or resist that outcome. These aim at defeating armed enemies through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture. The three basic defeat mechanisms are: destruction, attrition, and exhaustion. Other defeat mechanisms may include: Destroy, Dislocate, Disintegrate, Isolate, Disrupt, Degrade, Deny, Neutralize. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41) NOTE: For definitions of the defeat mechanisms see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(2) Stabilization Mechanisms. Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor requiring aligning USG efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. Stabilization mechanisms include: Compel, Control, Influence, Support, and Competition Mechanisms. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42) NOTE: For definitions of the stabilization mechanisms see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

8. Balancing. The operational commander must understand the operational factors and their inter-relationships within the command. Commanders will rarely have all the resources or time desired for an operation. By understanding the relationship between the elements of operational design, commanders and planners can balance different factors to maximize the likelihood of success in the most efficient manner. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-44)

Note: For a detailed discussion of the Elements of Operational Design – see STEP 6 Develop Operational Approaches, pp. 66-87 in this handbook and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, Chapter IV, pp. IV-19-46. This changed approach to the Elements of
Operational Design incorporates much of the language and many of the concepts found in the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC).

9. Divergence and Convergence. Another way to describe the ebb and flow of Operational Design and JPP is the idea of ‘Divergence’ and ‘Convergence’. Figure 3-2 shows a way to graphically represent an operational design approach to strategy formulation and campaigning. Note that this figure shows that taking action (via convergent thinking, coming to closure, and issuing orders that drive this action) will likely change the operational environment, recursively requiring divergent thinking and possibly reframing of the environment.

Operational Design through Planning and Execution

Operational Design allows the organization to learn through action by maintaining divergent thinking while also converging to develop and execute detailed plans that enable action.

The commander and staff develop a better understanding of the environment and of the problem as the campaign is executed, and adapt the operational approach based on that increasing understanding.

Figure 3-2: Divergence and Convergence in Planning and Execution

Operational Design enables a staff to diverge its thinking, gaining a broader understanding of context before beginning to creatively converge on a conceptual operational approach to a problem. The JPP then analyzes that conceptual approach, diverges from the identified mission to find multiple Courses of Action (COAs), and then converges again to settle on one Concept of Operation (CONOP). As the situation develops, the commander and staff then diverge their thinking again to understand and adapt. Deciding between divergence and convergence is one of the first challenges designers/planners face.

Some questions you may ask to determine if you should spend time developing the
conceptual framework through the use of operational design might be:

- Do we know enough about the situation to move forward in a meaningful way? Is a course of action clear and evident?
- Are actions we are taking having unexpected and/or surprising effects?
- Is the problem so familiar that we already know the solution?
  - What to do (a heuristic, or standard operating procedure)?
  - Do we know what end state conditions we are trying to achieve, or are the desired end state conditions unclear?
- Are actions and techniques that were originally effective now falling short of achieving the desired impact?
- Have we considered the risk of not including a cultured or gendered perspective?

10. **Conducting Operational Design.** The details of the methodology described below combine elements of the Army design methodology (as described in ADP 5-0), operational design (as described in JP 5-0), and some of the techniques for conducting the Army design methodology from the Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1 into one that works for the JFC.

The commander and his operational planning team should use a set of interconnected cognitive activities to help build their understanding of the situation and visualization of the campaign. These iterative activities constitute a methodology for the commander and his team to learn about the answers to four broad questions:

- What do our national leaders want to solve?
- What is the context in which the campaign will be conducted?
- What problem is the campaign intended to solve?
- What broad, general approach for the campaign could solve the problem?

The deliberation on these four questions is iterative and recursive—that is, as one question is answered, new questions will be generated, and questions already asked may be asked again to gain deeper understanding. The purpose of the dialogue is to develop an operational approach that can be turned into an executable campaign plan, or into modifications to an existing plan, and can be continued throughout the campaign to help determine when adaptation to the plan is appropriate.

Those conducting operational design collaborate extensively with all parties who are interested in the problem or have knowledge about the problem that may help enlighten the operational approach. Inclusion of interagency and coalition partners, as well as the whole range of those with unique expertise or broadening perspectives, is absolutely critical. Not only will the analysis be richer, but such collaboration might also enable broader “buy-in” by other agencies early on, and then continuously. Dialogue between echelons of command is also critical to gain the best understanding possible.

a. **Methodology.** *JP 5-0 lays out a nine-step methodology* for conducting design. It has abandoned any reference to frames and framing. Nonetheless, the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations (DMSPO) considers it a useful model to think about the design process that reinforces the notion that Operational Design is not linear in nature, rather it is an ongoing process that requires constant thought about how a change in one frame
might have an effect on another frame. (See Figure 3-3)

![The Operational Design Framework](image)

**The Operational Design Framework**

**Figure 3-3: The Four Frames of Operational Design (Army War College)**

Iteration and reexamination of earlier work is essential to identify how later decisions affect earlier assumptions and to fill in gaps identified during the process. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3).

The 9-Step Operational Design process found in JP 5-0 is as follows:

1. **Understand the strategic direction and guidance.** (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-2)
2. **Understand the strategic environment** (e.g., policies, diplomacy, and politics) and the related contested environments. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-2)
3. **Understand the OE and relevant and contested environments.** (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)
4. **Define the problem** (create shared understanding; planning with uncertainty). (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)
5. **Identify assumptions needed to continue planning** (strategic and operational assumptions). (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)
(6) Develop options (the operational approach). (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)

(7) Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization). (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)

(8) Refine the operational approach(es). (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)

(9) Develop planning and assessment guidance. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p.IV-3)

b. STEP 1: Understand the Strategic Direction and Guidance. This begins with asking, “What are we trying to accomplish? What does the guidance we’re receiving mean in the context of previous guidance? What objectives do the various leaders envision? Why are we being asked to do this now? Planning usually starts with the assignment of a planning task through a directive, order, or cyclical strategic guidance, depending on how a situation develops. The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. These sources include written documents such as the CPG and JSCP, written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other organizations that are interested in the situation, communication synchronization guidance, and higher headquarters’ orders or estimates. Direction from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or conflicting... commanders and staff must read the directives and synthesize the contents into a concise statement... the JFC and staff should obtain clear, updated direction through routine and sustained civilian-military dialogue throughout the planning process. When clarification does not occur, planners and commanders identify those areas as elements of risk. It should define what constitutes victory or success (ends) and identify available forces, resources, and authorities (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the objectives (ends) is for the supported JFC to develop and propose, although policy or national positions may limit options available to the commander. Based on the ongoing civilian-military dialogue, the CCDR will determine the military end state and military objectives, which define the role of military forces. These objectives are the basis for operational design.

Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in sharing their perspective with their higher headquarters, and both should resolve differences at the earliest opportunity. (JP 5–0, Joint Planning, p. IV-3)

c. STEP 2: Understand the Strategic Environment. The strategic environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect national interests beyond the OE and may impact the composition
of alliances, establish competing requirements or priorities, and/or affect deployment and distribution operations (e.g., degrade or disrupt force flow) executed across the JDDE. This forms boundaries within which the operational approach must fit. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-4)

(1) Some considerations are:

(a) What actions or planning assumptions will be acceptable given the current US policies and the diplomatic and political environment? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-5)

(b) What impact will US activities have on third parties (focus on military impacts but identify possible political, economic or commercial ramifications that may impact third-party willingness to support US activities including, but not limited to, access, basing, and overflight decisions)? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-5)

(c) What are the current national strategic objectives of the USG? Are the objectives expected to be long-lasting, or short-term only? Could they result in unintended consequences (e.g., is there sufficient time to develop strong controls so that weapons provided to a nation will not be used for unintended purposes)? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-5)

(2) Strategic Level Considerations.

(a) Military activities are undertaken to support achievement of national strategic objectives, which in turn advance or defend national interests. Fundamentally, all military activities must be evaluated against that strategy—does the activity, on the whole, contribute positively to national objectives and advance or defend national interests? CCPs do this through reasoned sequencing of military operations, definition of limits, and assessment of benefits, costs, and risks for the use of military forces and capabilities. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p. IV-5)

(b) Within the OE, strategic-level considerations may include global factors. Strategic-level considerations of the OE are analyzed in terms of geopolitical regions and nations rather than local considerations. (JP 5-0 Joint Planning, p. IV-5)

(c) Nonmilitary aspects of the OE assume increased importance at the strategic level. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process analyzes relevant aspects of the OE. This analysis should also consider possible intervention by third parties. The main JIPOE focus is to provide intelligence that helps the JFC discern the enemy’s or adversary’s capabilities,
probable intent, and most likely and most dangerous COAs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-5)

d. STEP 3: Understand the Operational Environment. The commander and his operational planning team analyze the current environmental conditions and determine what the desired future environment should look like. The environmental frame should also describe the alternative future environments that other relevant actors may desire (or that which might exist if the team takes no action at all), so they can consider this in developing an operational approach that will not only meet our end state, but also preclude the undesirable aspects of opposing end states. The team will compare the current environment to the friendly desired end state and identify those conditions that need to be different to enable end state achievement, while also considering the natural tendency of those conditions to move to a particular state in the absence of our activity. This natural tendency is critical, as it is the basis on which the team must act to achieve their desired conditions. **Commanders can ask questions such as:**

- What's going on?
- Why has this situation developed?
- What is causing conflict among the actors?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant actors?
- What does it mean?
- Why is the situation (or the projected future situation) undesirable?
- What's the real story?
- What conditions need to exist for success?
- What are indicators that we are on the path to success?
- What are indicators that we are going in the wrong direction?
- What second and third order effects might occur due to host nation social tensions towards International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law?
- What are the early warning indicators of potential increase in instability?

As with Strategic Guidance, there is more information available than any team can handle. The commander and staff must attempt to understand the environment well enough to decide what parts of the environmental system they will work with and what is outside the scope of the current challenge. Deciding what to include when describing the OE scopes the challenge, the relevant actors, etc. It does not negate other parts of a CCDR’s environment; it simply determines what is relevant at the time (again, think logical “Area of Operation”), what is just outside the frame but matters (think logical Area of Influence) and what is outside the frame, and while interesting, is not relevant (think logical Area of Interest). Determining and communicating the CCMD’s “Environmental Frame” ensures all relevant actors know which parts of the systems-of-systems the CCMD will focus on. For example, if a CCDR decides to frame the planning team’s environment to Korea, it doesn’t negate the South China Sea challenges and how they might impact Korea…but it does put it out of the planning team’s focused efforts.

(1) Understand the OE.

(a) The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances,
and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains, and the information environment (which includes cyberspace) and the electromagnetic spectrum. The OE includes not only the immediate OA, but also all factors outside the OA that are impacting or will likely impact the JFC’s objectives. Included within these areas are the enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutrals that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the OE helps the JFC to better identify the problem, anticipate potential outcomes, and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, enemy, and neutral actions and how these actions affect attaining the military end state. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-6)

(b) One way of viewing these interrelated challenges for most military operational situations is from a systems perspective. In doing so, it is critical to consider the relationships between key elements of the system in order to understand causation. That is, an understanding of what is causing the environment to trend in an unfavorable direction and what would be required to cause it to trend in a more favorable one. Understanding causation requires an understanding of the adversarial, environmental, and friendly systems. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the adversaries, on ourselves, and on relevant neutral or other interested parties by collecting and analyzing a wide array of data.

(c) Describe the Current OE. The JIPOE process is a comprehensive analytic tool to describe all aspects of the OE relevant to the operation or campaign. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-6) JIPOE is an intelligence-based process that uses a PMESII construct for analyzing/framing the environment. It is important to recognize that while the J-2 contributes to understanding/describing the environment via the JIPOE process, the J-2 is not solely responsible. The JFC and his/her design team or planning team in coordination with subject matter experts are responsible for attempting to understand a constantly changing complex environment. Additionally, there are other analysis frameworks such as RAFT (Relationships, Actors, Functions, and Tensions) and the Joint Functions that can be used to analyze and describe the current operational environment.

(d) Operational Level Considerations. In analyzing the current and future OE, the staff can use a PMESII analytical framework to determine relationships and interdependencies relevant to the specific operation or campaign. JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-6)

(e) Analysis must ensure that the creation of PMESII lists moves beyond mere categorization of information (See Figure 3-4) and determines the relevant and critical relationships between the various actors and aspects of the environment in order to understand causation. PMESII is useful in this process, however, the planning team must be careful not to stovepipe the analysis. The most important analysis leads to an understanding of the dynamics of the relationships between the various parts of the environment that are categorized in the PMESII lists. This analysis produces a holistic view of the relevant enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly systems as a complex whole, within a larger system that
includes many external influences. While identifying the nodes and links within a system may be useful in describing important aspects of the OE, more important is describing the **relevant relationships** within and between the various systems that directly or indirectly affect the problem at hand. Commanders and staffs must understand that relationships, especially those dealing with human interaction, are extremely dynamic. These dynamic relationships often make it difficult to determine clear causality, which makes it difficult to know if actions taken in the context of the operational approach will ultimately be effective. This reinforces the importance of the iterative nature of operational design and learning while doing, referred to by Donald Schon as “reflection-in-action.” To learn more, refer to his work *The Reflective Practitioner* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

**Note:** Appendix C provides some points to consider and questions to ask during analysis. Appendix H includes a sample gendered lens using PMESII-PT for considering the dynamic relationships within the human dimension that can be fused with other factors for furthering a holistic understanding of the operating environment.

---

**Figure: 3-4: Holistic View of the Operational Environment (Figure IV-2 in JP 5-0)**

- An example of a national strategic end state:
  - An economically-viable and stable Country X, without the capability to coerce its neighbors.
- An example of a military end state is:
  - *Country X is unable to project military power against its neighbors.*

- Some examples of termination criteria are:
  - *Country Y’s borders are secure.*
  - *Country Y’s national army is sufficient to prevent internal rebellion.*
  - *Country X no longer poses an offensive capability robust enough to defeat countries within the region.*

**Operational Design:**
**Understanding the Operational Environment**

**Key Inputs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical and information factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis (opposing, neutral, friendly)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- PMESII
- ASCOPE
- METT-T

Tools / models to support analysis

Network analysis of military and nonmilitary (friendly, neutral, and threat networks)

**Key Outputs**

- Description of the current operational environment
  - Systems perspective of the operational environment
  - Impacts of physical and information factors on the operational environment
  - Friendly/enemy COGs

- Description of the desired operational environment
  - Military end state
  - Termination criteria

- Description of the opposing end states

**NOTE:**

1. Supports the joint planning process step 1 (Planning Initiation).
2. All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance.
3. Commanders and planners are cautioned against trying to definitively describe the environment. It is inherently complex and eludes definition. Time spent on analysis must be balanced with the rest of the planning process.

ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

METT-T: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available

COG: center of gravity

PMESII: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information

**Figure: 3-5: Understanding the OE (Figure IV-1 in JP 5-0)**

(f) **Tendencies and Potentials.** In developing an understanding of interactions and relationships in the OE, commanders and staffs consider observed tendencies and potentials in their analyses. Tendencies reflect the inclination to think or behave in a certain
manner. Tendencies are not considered deterministic but rather model thoughts or behaviors. Tendencies help identify the range of possibilities that may develop with or without external influence. Planners must describe the key conditions that must exist in the future OE to achieve the objectives. Planners should put a temporal aspect to this set of conditions to be able to conduct feasibility and acceptability analyses. Determine the relevant actor’s objectives that affect the OE. Each participant will have different sets of conditions for achieving their respective objectives. Relevant actors who oppose US and partner nations’ objectives can be expected to take actions to thwart those objectives. Others, whether neutral or friendly, may not have an opposing mindset, but may have desired conditions (including their unintended consequences) that jeopardize achievement of the JFC’s objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-10)

e. STEP 4: Define the Problem. As the JFC’s understanding of the environment matures, tensions and problems come into sharper focus. The commander tries to understand key factors causing the system the way it does vice functioning in the manner desired. Though the root causes of the problem may be identifiable, they may not be solvable. The planning team is trying to find the problem(s) that can be mitigated or managed which will ultimately help achieve the conditions of the desired environment. This includes seeking a clear understanding of which of the resulting tensions must be addressed to achieve the desired environment, as well as where there are opportunities presented by the convergence with other actors’ desired conditions. Once again, a decent analogy is that the problem the CCMD decides to address is its logical AO, the problems just outside the frame that will influence the problem is the logical Area of Influence, and the parts of the problem that must be monitored but not acted upon is the logical Area of Interest. Commanders may ask questions like:

- What needs to change?
- What doesn’t need to change?
- What are the opportunities and threats?
- How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired conditions?
- What tensions exist between the current and desired conditions?
- What tensions exist between our desired conditions and our adversaries’ desired conditions?
- What are the risks in going to the desired conditions?

(1) Define the problem. Defining the problem is essential to addressing the problem. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue that are the essence of a complex, ill-defined problem. Defining the problem begins with a review of the tendencies and potentials of the relevant actors and identifying the relationships and interactions among their respective desired conditions and objectives. The problem statement articulates how the operational variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation of
current conditions and how inertia in the OE can be leveraged to enable the desired conditions to achieve the objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-11)

(a) The problem statement identifies the areas that when successfully acted upon, will help transform the existing condition into the desired condition. It identifies areas of tension, competition, and contested environments—as well as opportunities and challenges—that commanders must address to transform current or anticipated conditions to achieve the desired objective (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-11).

(b) Tension is the resistance or friction among and between participants. The commander and staff identify the tension by analyzing tendencies and potentials within the OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-12).

(c) Critical to defining the problem is determining what needs to be acted up to reconcile the differences between existing and desired conditions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-12).

(d) The JFC and staff must identify and articulate: the tension between the current OE and the desired conditions at the objective or military end state; decide what must change within the OE and what may remain the same to arrive at the objective or military end state; the threats and opportunities that may help or hinder attainment of the objective or military end state; and the operational limitations. A clear, concise, and precise problem statement is essential to provide definitive focus for development of a plan. The problem statement is the planner’s answer to the question “what’s going on here?” In other words, what situation or condition is threatening or presenting an opportunity, for which interests, and how. The problem statement considers how tension and competition affect the OE by identifying pathways to transform current conditions in new, more desirable conditions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-13).

(e) An example problem statement follows:

- *The inability of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to defeat insurgent and jihadist forces within Afghanistan, despite access to external financing and resources, threatens the U.S. objective of withdrawing its combat formations within the next two years.*

(f) Alternatively, a problem narrative may be used (two examples below):

- Insurgent and jihadist forces still hold the security of Afghanistan at risk. The ANSF is not yet ready to assume full security responsibilities from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and it is not clear that they will be able to sustain security after transition, even with enough financial and resource support from outside entities. Within the next two years, the
ANSF must complete the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF and be capable of providing security within Afghanistan. The ANSF will need continuing and residual assistance to reach these conditions.

- The United States desires a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ where all states are secure in their sovereignty and territorial integrity, enjoy freedom, peace, and prosperity, and respect the rights of other nations, and follow established norms of international behavior. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a malign actor in the region and has made extraterritorial claims in the East and South China Seas, militarized these areas, has used tactics of coercive gradualism, flaunted the accepted rules of international behavior, and has developed advanced weapons systems. The U.S. Joint Force is now in a hypercompetitive security environment where changes in force capability, presence, posture, international relations and partnerships, threats to access, and international, intra-regional, and domestic public opinion are constant.

![Figure 3-6: Tensions that Describe the Problem](image)

**PROBLEM: What is preventing us from reaching our desired conditions?**

- What problems should be addressed and what must be acted upon?
- What needs to change?
- What does not need to change?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the actors?
- What are the opportunities and threats?
- What conditions need to exist to achieve our desired OE?

Though it is important to understand the root causes of the divergence of the OE from the desired end state conditions, the planning team may not be able to, or even need to, address the root causes to achieve the desired conditions. Instead, they should be interested in identifying their problem(s) – and what they must do to achieve their desired conditions. For example, if the planning team is in a combatant command, the operational approach will be to apply military power in coordination with other instruments of national power to achieve desired military conditions. Operational design might reveal several
problems well beyond the remit of the JFC. In these cases, multinational partners, other governmental, or non-governmental agencies should take the lead to resolve or manage them.

f. **STEP 5: Identify Assumptions.** This is a new step added to Operational Design in JP 5-0. Where there is insufficient information or guidance, the commander and staff identify assumptions to assist in framing solutions. At this stage, assumptions address strategic and operational gaps that enable the commander to develop the operational approach... Assumptions should be phrased in terms of will or will not (rather than using “should” or “may”) to establish specific conditions that enable planning to continue. Assumptions should: be kept to a minimum; only address gaps in information or guidance essential to the plan’s success; address key and critical decisions required by senior leaders to continue planning; not assume away likely hostile COA or a friendly inability to execute or sustain the plan in a manner that might cause it to fail. Commanders and staff should review strategic guidance and direction to see if any assumptions are imposed on the planning process. They should also regularly discuss planning assumptions with supporting CCDRs, OSD, and DOD leadership to see if there are changes in the strategic environment, OE, global requirements, policy, or guidance that affect the planning assumptions (examples could be basing or access permissions, allied or multinational contributions, alert and warning decision timelines, or anticipated threat actions and reactions). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-13)

g. **STEP 6: Develop Operational Approaches.** The conceptualization of this operational approach (See Figure 3-7) results from a synthesis of the understanding gained up to that of the strategic guidance and Operational Environment (OE). The purpose of developing the operational approach is threefold. It provides the foundation of the commander’s planning guidance; it provides the model for execution of the campaign or operation and development of associated assessments; and it enables better understanding of the OE and the problem.
Figure: 3-7: Develop an Operational Approach (Figure IV-5 JP 5-0)

(1) The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force can take to achieve an objective in support of the national objective or attain a military end state. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the problem facing the JFC (see Figure 3-6). A discussion of operational approaches within and between options forms the basis of the IPRs between the CCDR and SecDef and staff (to ensure consistency with US policy and national objectives). Once SecDef approves the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach as policy, the OE, end states, or the problem change. This requires frequent and continuing dialogue at all levels of command. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-14)

(2) Having gained an appreciation for the OE and defined the problem, Commanders develop their broad operational approach for transforming current conditions into desired conditions. The operational approach will underpin the operation and the detailed planning that follows. The JFC and staff continually refine the operational approach as detailed planning occurs. The operational approach is refined as operations are conducted and understanding of the problem, the OE, and how joint force actions impact them increases. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-16)

(3) Elements of Operational Design. The elements of operational design are considered in four broad categories: overarching, space (OE), time, and forces. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-19) Whereas JP 5-0 does not specifically address the Elements of Operational Design while defining the development of the Operational Approach, it is during this stage of the Op Design methodology where the elements stand out the most. JP 5-0 divides the Elements of Operational Design into four broad categories: overarching, the space of the OE, time, and forces. The Elements of Operational Design should be integrated with the joint functions and principles of joint operations. Army Design Methodology uses ten of these elements as “elements of operational art”: end state and conditions, center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations and lines of effort, operational reach, basing, tempo, phasing and transitions, culmination, and risk (ATP 5-0.1, p. 1-5).

(4) Overarching Elements of Operational Design. Elements of operational design are those that drive the operation. Some, such as the objective or military end state, may be provided in higher level guidance. Others, such as the COG, effects, and culmination, must be determined from planners’ analysis of the OE and other considerations such as available forces and time. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-19)

(a) Objective. The objective is the single most important element of operational design. The objective is why the mission is being
conducted and should be determined first. Objectives may be broad or defined by a military end state as directed or informed by policy and strategy.

1) Military missions are conducted to achieve objectives and are linked to national objectives.

2) **An objective is clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.** Joint planning integrates military actions and capabilities with other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose to provide unity of effort to achieve the JFC’s military objectives; which contributes to strategic national objectives. In JSCP-directed campaign plans, objectives (and their subordinate conditions or effects) rather than an end state, define the path of the command’s actions in contributing to national objectives.

3) A clear and concise end state enables planners to better examine objectives that must be achieved to attain the desired end state.

4) Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the military end state.

5) There are four primary considerations for an objective:
   a) An objective establishes a single result.
   b) An objective (and its associated conditions/effects) should link directly or indirectly to higher-level objectives (and their associated conditions/effects) or to the end state (nested). Planners need to know the higher-level objective and should be able to identify how their objective supports the next higher-level objective.
   c) An objective is specific and unambiguous.
   d) An objective does not imply ways and/or means—it is not written as a task. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. IV-21)
   e) Examples of military objectives might be:
      - *Pre-hostility borders between Country X and Country Y restored.*
      - *Country X’s offensive military capabilities reduced to a level that prevents it from attacking neighboring countries.*
      - *Country X no longer supports regional insurgent and/or terrorist groups that threaten stability in neighboring countries.*
      - *Country X possesses only defensive capabilities and is integrated into regional cooperative defense arrangements.*
(b) **Military End State.** A military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. Once the objective is identified, planners have to define the military-related conditions that, once accomplished, lead to achievement of the objective. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-21)*

1) Clearly defining the military end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation.

2) Commanders and their staffs think through the conditions and behaviors that must exist to conclude military-led operations on terms favorable to the United States and its partners. A hasty or ill-defined end to the operation may bring with it the possibility an enemy will renew hostilities or third parties may interfere and potentially renew hostilities.

3) Military end state should account for a wide variety of operational tasks the joint force may need to accomplish, to include disengagement, force protection, and appropriate transition to competition.

4) Military end states are briefed to SecDef as part of the IPR process to ensure the military end states support policy objectives. Once approved, however, the criteria may change... *Any change could result in modifications to the military endstate as well as the commander’s operational approach.* *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-22)*

(c) **Center of Gravity (COG).** COG should be reviewed in its entirety in JP 5-0 given then extensive discussion associated with this concept. The COG is the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure.

1) COGs are determined by their impact on the military end state. Success requires protecting the friendly COG while defeating the enemy COG.

2) COGs can exist at different levels. *At the strategic level,* a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. *At the operational level,* a COG is often associated with the threat’s military capabilities.
3) COGs may change in time as the strategic environment or OE changes. COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and physical strengths. COGs do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum; they are formed out of the relationships between adversaries and enemies.

4) Commanders, therefore, must not only consider their threat’s COG, but they must also identify and protect their own.

5) The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help commanders analyze friendly and adversary or enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. Planners in all sections on the joint force staff conduct similar analysis to identify friendly COGs and their strengths and weaknesses.

6) Once COGs have been approved, JFCs and their staffs determine how to attack enemy COGs while protecting friendly COGs.

7) A CCP may have multiple COGs if it includes operations along multiple, independent LOEs. Without a well-defined threat there will often be no enemy or adversary COG.

8) Identifying a COG.

a) Critical factors analysis is a framework to assist in analyzing and identifying a COG and to aid operational planning against threat networks within the OE.

b) The analysis should identify the threat’s critical strengths. Critical strengths are capabilities considered essential for achieving a given or assumed military objective.

c) The analysis of networks considers both tangible and intangible factors.

d) Commanders and planners must also envision how friendly forces and actions appear from the threat’s viewpoints. Otherwise, the JFC and the staff may fall into the trap of ascribing to the threat attitudes, values, and reactions that mirror their own. A rational decision in the threat’s perspective may appear irrational from the friendly perspective.

e) Once planners have identified the likely threat COG, they need to identify the best method to attack or weaken it (see Figure IV-8 in JP 5-0). This process forms the core of COA development and assists with the identification of missions and tasks.
In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power or other relevant capabilities to take advantage of an enemy’s critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an enemy.

a) Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of the mission.

b) Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability.

c) Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack.

Identification of COGs, while important to the planning process, must be paired with continuous evaluation because COGs and critical vulnerabilities may change during the campaign due to the interactive nature of warfare and changes in the objectives of either combatant.

Planners should consider:

a) Will the joint force achieve its objectives if the threat COG is destroyed?

b) Does accomplishment of this mission lead to the achievement of the objective?

c) If the COG is destroyed, what gaps, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or vacuums will it create that may create unforeseen consequences (second- and third-order effects)?

d) Is a direct attack on the COG feasible or desirable?

The COG may be too difficult to attack or influence due to insufficient forces, complexity, or enemy or adversary defenses. In this case, an indirect approach may be more feasible than a direct attack.

Just because you can, doesn’t mean you should. Consideration must be placed on whether total collapse of the enemy or system is commensurate with the objectives and end state. Striking a COG could lead to escalation or fracturing of the system that might leave the commander and planning staffs with multiple unforeseen consequences resulting in the complexity and risk of the mission increasing. Even if the commander and planning staffs identify a COG
critical to an enemy, it may not be advantageous to strike it if the commander wants to avoid second- and third-order effects or the overall objective is to ensure stability within the system.

14) Planners may recommend affecting smaller elements of the whole enabling continued balance until the entire problem is reduced to manageable parts or the COG changes.

15) Planners must take into consideration that as the system changes, the COG may change in relation to the remaining whole.

16) COG analysis may require operations to strengthen or protect the friendly COG, such as building interoperability with allies and partners. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning) pp. IV-22 through 27)

NOTE: For more information on COGs and the systems perspective, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(d) Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective and an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-27) See Figure 3-8 for diagram of linkages/nesting of end state, objectives, effects, and tasks.

1) There are four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement:

   a) Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

   b) The effect should be measurable. However, cognitive effects are not easily measured, and planners must identify indicators to enable assessment of these effects. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

   c) The statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

   d) The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)
2) Partners, particularly local relevant actors, can provide additional information and perspective that can help mitigate surprise from hard-to-predict effects or avoid unintended consequences. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

3) The use of effects in planning can help commanders determine the tasks required to achieve objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

4) Effects also enable a more intentional linking with higher level objectives’ required effects. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

5) Monitoring progress toward creating desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

(e) Culmination. Culmination is that point in time and/or space when the operation can no longer maintain momentum.

1) In the offense, the culminating point is when effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible, and the force must
consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause...Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

2) A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-28)

3) During stabilization efforts, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or a political resolution. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-29)

4) Three-letter acronyms—EBO and MDO—accompanied by buzzwords such as, “information-dominance, decisive maneuver, and shock and awe” do not change the fact that the OE remains governed by Newtonian physics. The JFC must ensure forces arrive at the appropriate times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources are available in the later stages of the campaign. Integration and synchronization of sustainment with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve military strategic and operational objectives before reaching their culminating points. If commanders cannot generate these resources, they should revise their CONOPS. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-29)

(5) Operational Environment. The OE includes tangible and intangible factors that affect combat and support operations. Tangible factors include, but are not limited to, physical size, weather/climate, and geography (including lines of communication, distances, interior/exterior lines). Intangible factors include culture (including gender considerations), the information environment (including cyberspace), and population. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV 29)

(a) Lines of Operation (LOO) and Lines of Effort (LOE). Planners...identify the method of organizing the operation to achieve the objective. The two primary methods are LOOs and LOEs.

1) LOOs. A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the adversary COG that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). LOOs describe and connect a series of decisive actions
that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective (see Figure 3-9). Combat operations are typically planned using LOOs. Commanders synchronize activities along complementary LOOs to attain the military end state. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-29)

a) A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. Interior lines usually represent central position where a friendly force can reinforce or concentrate its elements faster than the enemy force can reposition. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to one another. Interior lines enable an isolated force to mass combat power against a specific portion of an enemy force by shifting capabilities more rapidly than the enemy can react. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-29)

b) A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Operations on exterior lines offer opportunities to encircle and annihilate an enemy force. However, these operations typically require a force stronger or more mobile than the enemy. The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the time and distance relationship between the opposing forces. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-29)

![Sample Line of Operation](image)

**Figure 3-9: Sample Line of Operation (Figure IV-10 JP 5-0)**

2) LOEs. A LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational-level objectives that can lead to strategic objectives. (See Figure 3-10) (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-30)

a) LOEs provide utility to operational design when positional references to an adversary or enemy have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency operations or stability activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-31)

b) In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, they may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the de-
sired end state (see Figure IV-11 in JP 5-0). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-31)

c) LOEs and mission areas are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-31)

d) Commanders typically visualize stability activities along LOEs. For stability activities, commanders may consider linking primary stability tasks to their corresponding DOS post-conflict technical sectors. These stability tasks link military actions with the broader interagency effort across the levels of warfare. A full array of LOEs might include offensive and defensive lines, a line for public affairs and other information activities, and a line for counter-threat finance. All typically produce effects across multiple LOEs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-31)

![Sample Lines of Effort](image)

Figure 3-10: Sample Lines of Effort (Figure IV-11 in JP 5-0)
e) Planners should focus LOEs for military plans on what the military does even though many LOEs require more than one instrument of national power to effectively achieve the desired objective. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-31)

f) LOEs should include awareness of, and support for, other instruments of national power when relevant, especially when those instruments are more likely to attain the strategic ends the military is supporting. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-32)

g) Planners should remain aware that other departments and agencies lack the military’s capacity and therefore need to actively seek participation from other organizations on overarching issues and critical specifics at the right time. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-32)

3) Combining LOOs and LOEs. Commanders may use both LOOs and LOEs to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability tasks necessary to attain the end state into their operational approach and allows commanders to consider the less tangible aspects of the OE, where the other instruments of national power or nontraditional military activities may dominate. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-32)

(b) Decisive Points. A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables a commander to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-32)

1) Decisive points can be terrain features such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, or a geosynchronous orbit.

2) Decisive points can be specific things like a weapons of mass destruction material cache or facility, an air base, but they could also include other elements such as command posts, a satellite downlink station, or an undersea cable.

3) Key events may also be decisive points, such as achievement of air, space, or maritime superiority.

4) When dealing with an irregular threat, commanders and their staffs should consider how actions against decisive points affect not only the threat, but also the relevant population’s perception of threat and friendly forces. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-32)

5) The most important decisive points can be determined from an analysis of critical factors. Understanding the relationship
between a COG’s critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to the COG. It is likely most of these critical factors are decisive points and should be addressed further in the planning process. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

6) There may often be cases where the JFC’s combat power and other capabilities are insufficient to affect the enemy’s or adversary’s COGs rapidly with a single action. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

   a) The supported JFC must selectively focus a series of actions against the enemy’s or adversary’s critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects of these actions lead to mission success. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

   b) The indirect approach may offer the most effective method to exploit enemy and adversary critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive points. Although decisive points usually are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

7) At times, the planning team may not be able to find a vulnerability associated with a critical capability, and instead may have to attack its strength to uncover or create a vulnerability that can be exploited. Exploitation of one vulnerability in one area may well expose vulnerabilities in other areas. For example, disruption of a cellular phone network may cause the enemy to increase use of couriers. This traffic could uncover a key transit route for forces or supplies, which can then be monitored and attacked at the appropriate times.

8) The team must determine and prioritize which vulnerabilities, capabilities, or key events offer the best opportunity to achieve the effects on the OE that will lead to accomplishing our objectives. Some potential DPs may be:

   a) In-theater ports, airfields, rail lines, or roads needed for deployment/operational movement.

   b) Maritime or land choke points at canals, straits, or mountain passes.

   c) Training infrastructure for host-nation security forces.

   d) Country Z begins conducting effective counterinsurgency operations.

   e) Credible national and local elections ensure equal freedom of movement and safety for women. For more information on the meaningful participation of women, see Appendix H.

9) DPs as Intermediate Objectives. Decisive points can and should often be converted into intermediate objectives on a LOO or LOE. Using the first example DP above,
an intermediate objective might be secure in-theater ports, airfields, rail lines, and roads needed for deployment/operational movement. DPs or the resultant intermediate objectives can be organized and placed into LOOs or LOEs to provide a framework for the commander to describe his visualization of a campaign. They enable the command to organize the coordination and synchronization of joint, combined, and interagency action.

(c) Direct and Indirect Approach. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, COGs are generally well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually choose an indirect approach. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s COG by applying combat power against critical vulnerabilities that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

1) Direct attacks against adversary or enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction provide the most direct path to victory. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-33)

2) Commanders normally attack COGs directly when they have superior forces, a qualitative advantage in leadership, and/or technological superiority over enemy weapon systems.

3) When direct attack is not a reasonable solution... indirect approach[es] offer a means to set conditions that permit successful direct attacks (See Figure 3-11).

4) At the strategic level, indirect methods of defeating the enemy’s or adversary’s COG could include depriving them of allies or friends, emplacing sanctions, weakening the national will to fight by undermining the public support, and breaking up cohesion of the threat alliances or coalitions.
5) At the operational level, the most common indirect method of defeating an enemy’s COGs is to conduct a series of attacks against selected aspects of the enemy’s combat power.

6) Indirect methods of attacking the enemy’s COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the enemy’s operational reach, isolating the force from its C2, and destroying or suppressing key protection functions such as air defense. Additionally, in irregular warfare, a persistent indirect approach helps enable a legitimate and capable local partner to address the conflict’s causes and to provide security, good governance, and economic development. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p.IV-33-34).

(d) Operational Reach. **Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-34)

1) Reach may be constrained by the geography, threats, and environmental conditions in and around the OA.

2) Reach may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, using information activities, increasing the range and effectiveness of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and contracted support, and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture.
3) Operational reach can be unintended. Joint force messages and images may reach outside of the OA to unintended audiences creating effects that are contrary to the JFC’s objectives. This type of operational reach can be mitigated with properly synchronized communication and proper execution of operations security procedures.

4) Operational reach is inextricably tied to the construct of LOOs. The geography surrounding and separating our threats influences operational reach. Locating forces, reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipment sets, and logistics forward extends operational reach.

5) Operational reach affected by increasing the range of weapons and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput capability. Given the appropriate level of superiority, some forces, such as air, space, and cyberspace, maintain a responsive global capability that significantly extends operational reach.

6) For any given campaign or major operation, there is a finite range beyond which predominant elements of the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.

7) Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art, since it is tied to the construct of LOOs and directly affects operational reach. Basing directly affects the combat power and other capabilities a joint force can generate.

8) The arrangement and positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy and adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric attacks.

9) Bases are typically selected to be within operational reach of enemies and adversaries.

   a) They require: sufficient infrastructure, including ports and airfields, and diplomatic support… some degree of security from attack.

   b) Enemies and adversaries will likely try to develop anti-access or area denial capabilities to prevent the buildup and sustainment of forces. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-34)

NOTE: See JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, for additional considerations in organizing the OA for joint operations.
(6) Time, Elements of Operational Design.

(a) Arranging Operations.

1) Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to attain the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose. Planners consider simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging operations. Phases, branches and sequels, operational pauses, and the development of a notional TPFDD all improve the ability of the planner to arrange, manage, and execute complex operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-35)

   a) **Simultaneity** refers to the simultaneous application of integrated military and nonmilitary power against an enemy’s or adversary’s key capabilities and sources of strength.

   b) **Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.** Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of warfare, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon. Commanders at all levels must understand how their actions contribute to the military end state.

   c) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and time that maximizes the effectiveness of friendly capabilities and inhibits enemies and adversaries.

   d) The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-36) Commanders modulate the tempo of operations in the OE to their advantage.

2) Several tools are available to planners to assist with arranging operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37)

   (b) **Phases.** Phasing is a way to organize and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The phases are unique for each operation or campaign as a tool to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing C2 to improve flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Phases in a contingency plan are sequential, but during execution there are often some simultaneous and overlapping activities between the phases. In a campaign, a phase can consist of one or more operations in varying scope, scale, and
geographic location; while within an operation, a phase normally consists of several subordinate tasks, or a series of related activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37)

1) A phase can be characterized by the focus that is placed on it. Phases are distinct in time, terrain, or purpose, but must be planned in mutual support and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Each phase should have starting conditions and ending conditions. The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37)

2) Phases are linked and gain significance in the larger context of the campaign. As such, it is imperative that the campaign not be broken down into numerous arbitrary components that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental approach. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not achievable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provisions for related phases that may or may not be executed. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37)

3) Although phases do not overlap, activities from one phase may continue into subsequent phases...Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign or operation’s intermediate objectives...a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37)

4) Phasing should be conceived in condition-driven rather than time-driven terms. However, resource availability depends in large part on time-constrained activities and factors—such as sustainment or deployment rates—rather than the events associated with the operation...planners reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the condition-driven phasing of operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37)

5) Effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culminating point. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38)

6) Commanders determine the number and purpose of phases used during a campaign or operation. Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38)

7) During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another
and plans sequels and branches for contingencies. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38)

8) Transitions between phases are planned as distinct shifts in focus by the joint force and may be accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38)

9) Branches and Sequels. Branches and sequels are planned to enhance the commander’s flexibility to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. They are primarily used for changing deployments or direction of movement and accepting or declining combat. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38)

a) Branches. Branches are planned contingencies that provide a range of alternatives often built into the basic plan. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-38) Branch plans are directly linked to assumptions. A true planning assumption (vice a planning fact/description of the environment) that is required to write a plan must be validated. Invalidated assumptions require branch plans. Failure to conduct branch planning linked to invalidated assumptions increases the level of risk for the JFC.

b) Sequels. Sequels anticipate and plan for subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39)

c) Decision Points. Planned Branches and Sequels have decision points that enable the commander to decide to execute a branch or sequel. Branch plan decision points are linked to assumptions about the operational environment (e.g., an adversary, weather conditions, resourcing, etc.) while sequel decision points are linked to achievement of initial operational objectives as well as anticipated policy guidance. Such decision points capture in space or time decisions a commander must make. To aid the commander, planners develop synchronization matrices as well as a Decision Support Matrix (DSM) to link those decision points with the earliest and latest timing of the decision, the appropriate PIR (things the commander must know about the adversary, enemy, and the OE to make the decision), and FFIRs (things the commander must know about friendly forces to make the decision). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39)

(c) Operational Pause. Joint forces conduct aggressive operations to maintain the initiative, however, there may be certain circumstances when this is not feasible due to logistic constraints or force shortfalls. Operational pauses may be required when a major operation is reaching the end of its sustainability. Executed properly, the enemy or adversary will lack sufficient combat power to threaten the joint force or regain the initiative during the pause. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. IV-39)
1) **Operational pauses are useful tools for obtaining the proper synchronization of sustainment and operations.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39)

2) **When properly planned and sequenced, operational pauses ensure the JFC has sufficient forces to achieve strategic or operational objectives.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39)

3) **Operational pauses can also be utilized to support strategic decisions such as opportunities for de-escalation or negotiation.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39)

4) **The primary drawback to operational pauses is the risk of forfeiting strategic or operational initiative.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-39)

(b) **Anticipation.** Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for indicators of forecasted events. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and be prepared to exploit opportunities. JFCs continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with higher headquarters, subordinates, partner nations, and other organizations in the OA...Thorough wargaming assists JFCs in understanding and planning for the effects of operations as well as the effects they have on the enemy, adversary, interagency and multinational partners, and civilian population. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

1) **A shared, common understanding of the OE aids commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

2) **Anticipation is critical to the decision-making process.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

3) **Anticipation is not without risk.** If a commander plans for an anticipated action from the enemy or adversary, the commander could be susceptible to deception efforts or having forces out of position should opportunities or threats appear in other places...Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information should be employed to reduce risk in the decision-making process. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

(7) **Forces, Elements of Operational Design.**

(a) **Forces.** Commanders and planners can plan campaigns and
operations that focus on defeating either enemy or adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

1) Commanders and planners must know the technical capability of the enemy’s or adversary’s forces as well as their own. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

2) Commanders should also use available resources to understand the intangible aspects of the threat, such as their doctrine, leadership, and morale. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-40)

3) JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy or adversary functions such as C2, sustainment, and protection. Attacking an enemy’s or adversary’s functions normally intends to destroy their balance; thereby creating vulnerabilities for exploitation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

4) When determining whether functional attack should be the principal operational approach, JFCs should evaluate several variables within the context of anticipated events such as time required to cripple the enemy’s or adversary’s critical functions, time available to the JFC, the enemy’s or adversary’s current actions, and likely responses to such actions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

(b) Force Employment Mechanisms. Force employment mechanisms complement COG analysis. These mechanisms suggest ways to solve it [problems]. They provide a useful tool for describing how a JFC intends to achieve an operational or strategic objective and ensure understanding of the commander’s intent by establishing common references for force employment. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

1) Defeat Mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms are the methods used by friendly forces in combat operations against an enemy force. Defeating an enemy means creating the conditions necessary to impose the desired strategic outcome on the enemy against the enemy’s will to oppose or resist that outcome. These aim at defeating armed enemies through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture. The three basic defeat mechanisms are: destruction, attrition, and exhaustion. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

a) Destruction aims to eliminate the ability of an enemy’s armed forces to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

b) Attrition aims to disrupt, degrade, or neutralize an
enemy’s armed forces or war-making capabilities by applying combat power over time to have a cumulative operational or strategic impact, destroys the adversary’s war-making capabilities over time. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

c) Exhaustion aims to impose unacceptable costs that erode the will of an enemy to continue fighting, even if that enemy is achieving tactical or even operational military success. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

d) Defeat mechanisms may include:

i) Destroy. Eliminate enemy forces and capabilities by applying combat power over time or a single, decisive attack. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

ii) Dislocate. Compel the enemy or adversary to expose forces by reacting to a specific action. This mechanism forces enemy or adversary commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-41)

iii) Disintegrate. Exploit the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence. This mechanism typically follows destruction and dislocation, coupled with the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

iv) Isolate. Limit the enemy or adversary’s ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the adversary’s ability to influence events. This mechanism exposes the adversary to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat mechanisms. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

v) Disrupt. Interrupt or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy’s or adversary’s operations and activities without significantly degrading their ability to conduct future operations and activities. This mechanism is appropriate when policy, resource, or risk limitations prevent friendly forces from inflicting greater costs on an enemy or adversary. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

vi) Degrade. Reduce an enemy’s ability and/or will to conduct future operations and activities. This mechanism imposes greater costs on the enemy than disruption when policy, resource, or risk limitations prevent friendly forces from defeating an enemy militarily. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

vii) Deny. Prevent an enemy or adversary from achieving
strategic objectives without significantly increasing resources or accepting higher risk. This mechanism is appropriate in competition, IW, or in a traditional economy of force operation when policy, resource, or risk limitations prevent friendly forces from defeating an enemy militarily. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p.IV-42)

viii) **Neutralize.** Render an enemy’s ability to conduct operations or activities ineffective without necessarily destroying or degrading the enemy’s capabilities. To achieve this, planners should consider employing nonlethal weapons as an intermediate force capability for both counter personnel and counter material applications. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

2) **Stabilization Mechanisms.** Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor requiring aligning USG efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. To the extent authorized by law, DOD plans and conducts stabilization in support of mission partners to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains in support of strategic objectives. If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DOD leads USG stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies. Stabilization mechanisms may include compel, control, influence, and support. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

a) **Compel.** The threat or use of lethal or nonlethal force to establish control and dominance; affect behavioral change; enable USG or international stabilization efforts; or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other political arrangements. Legitimacy and compliance are interrelated. While legitimacy is vital to achieving and sustaining the compliance of local populations, compliance also depends on how the local populace perceives the joint or collation force’s ability to secure the OA and protect them from threats. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in stabilization activities; it closely ties to the perceived legitimacy of the joint force and supported local government. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of the mission or the joint or MNF conducting the mission. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-42)

b) **Control.** Establish public order and safety; secure
borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; physically occupy key terrain and facilities; and provide for the immediate needs of the population. DOD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing forces in support of these missions. As a stabilization mechanism, control closely relates to the primary stabilization task: establish civil control. However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security. When combined with the stabilization mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that comprise disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as broader security sector reform programs. Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—including efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts across the OA. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-43)

c) Influence. To alter the opinions and attitudes of targeted populations. DOD considers how US or partner military forces promulgate a coherent narrative consistent with USG objectives to counter adversaries and affirm effective and legitimate local governance. DOD uses civil-military teams to integrate key instruments of national power that complement indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and private entities to achieve stabilization objectives. Influence applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms. Influence also aims to effect behavioral change through nonlethal means. Results are more a product of public perception than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of forces to operate successfully among the people of the HN, interacting with them consistently and positively while accomplishing the mission in support of advancing integrated USG stabilization efforts. Here, consistency of actions, words, and deeds is vital. Influence requires legitimacy, a thorough cultural understanding, and assessment of conflict to including intelligence collection and related activities to improve understanding of and ability to influence stability. Military forces must earn the trust and confidence of the people through the constructive activities. It contributes to success across the LOEs and engenders support among the people. Once achieved, influence is best maintained by consistently exhibiting respect for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local populace. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-43)

d) Support. To establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively. DOS is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts; the US Agency for International Development
is the lead implementing agency for non-security US stabilization assistance; and DOD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. When required to achieve US objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DOD reinforces and complements civilian-led stabilization efforts, including providing logistical support, services, and other enabling capabilities to other USG departments and agencies. DOD solicits participation from mission-critical USG departments and agencies to plan, exercise, and war-game stabilization aspects of military plans, including transition from combat operations. As such, this mechanism requires coordinating and cooperating closely with HN civilian agencies and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. The joint force brings unique expeditionary capabilities that can quickly address the immediateneeds of the HN and local populace. This is typically achieved by combining a number of stabilization activities in collaboration with the interagency partners such as establishing civil security, providing access to dispute resolution, and delivering targeted basic services, and establishing a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development. Improperly used, support has the potential to destabilize a situation by disrupting local power structures. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-43)

**e) Competition Mechanisms.** When military forces are employed in operations that do not rise to the level of armed conflict, in either supporting or supported roles, planners should identify competition mechanisms for use during periods of competition below the level of armed conflict. These mechanisms are ways to maintain or establish favorable conditions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-44)

**h. STEP 7: Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization).** During planning, commanders inform leadership of the decisions that will need to be made, when they will have to be made, and the uncertainty and risk accompanying decisions and delay. This provides military and civilian leaders a template and warning for decisions in advance and helps facilitate collaboration with interagency partners and allies to develop alternatives and exploit opportunities short of escalation. The decision matrix also identifies the expected indicators needed in support of operation assessment and intelligence requirements and collection plans. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-16)

(1) Decision points are the latest point in space and time when a commander can make a key decision concerning a specific COA. Initiating a decision is the point at which the commander and staff anticipate initiating actions that will result in a key decision. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-16)
(2) Commanders ensure senior leaders understand the risk and timelines associated with the decision points and the possible impacts on the mission of delayed decisions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-17)

i. **STEP 8: Refine the operational approach(es).** Throughout the planning processes, commanders and their staffs conduct formal and informal discussions at all levels of the chain of command, supporting CCDRs, and subordinate commands. These discussions:

(1) Help refine assumptions, limitations, and decision points that could affect the operational approach and ensure the plan remains feasible, acceptable, and suitable. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-17)

(2) Allow the commander to adjust the operational approach based on feedback from the formal and informal discussions at all levels of command and other information. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-17)

j. **STEP 9: Prepare Planning Guidance.** Develop Commander’s Planning Guidance. The commander provides a summary of the OE and the problem, along with a visualization of the operational approach, to the staff and to other partners through commander’s planning guidance. As time permits, the commander may have been able to apply operational design to think through the campaign or operation before the staff begins JPP. The format for the commander’s planning guidance varies based on the personality of the commander and the level of command but should adequately describe the logic to the commander’s understanding of the OE, the methodology for reaching the understanding of the problem, and a coherent description of the operational approach. It may include the following elements: (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-17)

(1) **Describe the Strategic Environment.** Some combination of graphics showing key relationships and tensions and a narrative describing the strategic environment will help convey the commander’s understanding to the staff and other partners. The description of the strategic environment must include assessed/anticipated enemy, adversary or other relevant actor actions that extend beyond the OA, particularly those that may impact deployment, distribution, and other critical strategic capabilities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-17)

(2) **Describe the OE.** Some combination of graphics showing key relationships and tensions, and a narrative describing the OE, will help convey the commander’s understanding to the staff and other partners. The description of the OE must include assessed and
anticipated adversary, enemy, and other relevant actor action that could degrade, disrupt, or deny successful accomplishment of the unit’s mission and achievement of assigned objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-17)

(3) Define the problem to be solved. A narrative problem statement that includes a timeframe to solve the problem will best convey the commander’s understanding of the problem. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-18)

(4) Describe the operational approach. A combination of a narrative describing objectives, decisive points, and potential mission areas, LOEs, and LOOs, with a summary of limitations (constraints and restraints) and risk (what can be accepted and what cannot be accepted) will help describe the operational approach. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-18)

(5) Provide the commander’s initial intent. The commander should also include the initial intent in planning guidance. The commander’s initial intent describes the purpose of the operations, desired national strategic objective, military end state, operational risks associated with the campaign or operation and describes the desired conditions in terms of behaviors needed to support enduring outcomes. It also includes where the commander will and will not accept risk during the operation...Chapter I, “Joint Planning,” discusses purpose, end state, and risk in more detail. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-18)

(a) The intent may also include operational objectives, method, and effects guidance. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-19)

(b) The commander may provide additional planning guidance, such as information management, resources, or specific effects that must be created or avoided. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-19)

11. Organizing for Operational Design Work. Key to success in using an operational design approach is a climate that encourages open dialogue and exchange of ideas. This exchange is not only internal to the organization, but also vertically with higher and lower echelons and horizontally with other relevant partners. It is through such interchange that a shared understanding and common vision can be achieved. While leaders and staffs at higher echelons may have a clear strategic understanding of the problem, those at lower levels are likely to have a better understanding of the realities of the local circumstances. Merging these perspectives is crucial to achieving a common vision or synthesis, which can enable unity of effort. For this reason, operational design is especially appealing in interagency and coalition efforts.

There are many ways to organize to do operational design work. The way that works for your organization depends on several aspects: the organizational climate; the degree to which the commander will be involved in the operational design work; the size, experience,
and training of the staff; the amount of time available; and the degree of complexity of the
problem. The team should be large enough to enable a range of diversity of perspective, but
not so large as to preclude achieving some consensus on issues to keep the process moving
forward. The team should seek diversity of perspective and should solicit subject matter
expertise as needed to inform and broaden the discourse. Generally, higher level
headquarters will have more staff and more time available and will deal with greater levels of
complexity than lower-level headquarters. This suggests a larger team with more diverse
representation.

While “Designers” and “Planners” are closely linked (and may even be the same people),
their roles are very different. “Designers” focus on broadening their aperture, better
understanding the context, making causal connections, and seeking new paradigms if
necessary. They are focused on exploring and the art of decision making. “Planners” are
focused on building the plan and the science of decision making. Both roles are required, but
planners can solve the wrong problems if designers fail, and great solutions won’t be
implemented if planners fail.

a. Designer Roles. To enable the proper balance between broad discourse and progress
(after all, the goal is to produce a usable concept), the planning team leader may assign
roles to team members:

- Someone to record the discussion and key results.
- Someone to capture ideas in graphical form (pens and whiteboards work well for this, especially when framing the environment).
- Someone to think about and develop metrics to test insights.
- Someone to facilitate the team discussion.
- Someone to play devil’s advocate to question assumptions (though all members must keep this in mind).
- Someone who ensures the feasibility of concepts discussed (again, this is the responsibility of all planning team members).

b. Challenges. An operational planning team will face several innate challenges, some of which will lessen as the team works together:

- Getting the dialog going and moving in a meaningful direction.
- Developing effective open-ended questions to stimulate thinking.
- Ensuring all planners contribute their thinking despite the differences in rank among the team members.
- Helping people “break free” of their conceptual anchors and preconceived ideas.
- Guiding the dialog without limiting it; avoiding rambling but still staying open to new perspectives.
- Recognizing when the team is unnecessarily “in the weeds” (worried about details) and getting out of those weeds.
- Managing team members who are disruptive, dismissive, or domineering.
- Balancing input across the team.
- Helping the team to converge eventually to a decision.
c. Some tips for leaders of operational design groups:

- The commander should be directly involved.
- Dedicate time and limit interruptions.
- Avoid jumping directly to the solutions without exploring the environment and problem frames.
- Just dialogue for a while before you write anything down.
- Carefully manage your own information/ideas to encourage participation.
- Refrain from advocating a position if you are the group leader.
- Ask open-ended and probing questions that elicit assessment/reasoning.
- The leader can initially play the role of devil’s advocate to encourage a climate of productive/respectful openness (but then pass on this role).

d. Tools and Techniques. The following are tools and techniques from ATP 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology, 1 July 2015, and represent ways in which commanders, planners, and other leaders can actually use operational design.

(1) Brainstorming and mind mapping. (See Figures 3-12, 3-13). Brainstorming is a group creative thinking technique that uses the different perspectives of individuals in a group to develop and build on ideas. Used effectively, it will generate a large quantity of ideas while avoiding the immediate judgment of the relative value of each. A technique for brainstorming involves a divergent thinking phase where the planning team attempt to answer key “focal questions” about the environment or problem followed by a convergent phase where the group then culls the different answers or thoughts into categories which can then generate further dialog and/or mind mapping. Outliers are carefully considered by the group for much greater investigation or are possibly irrelevant and discarded. The use of sticky notes and a white board are ideal for this.

![Figure 3-12: Brainstorming](image-url)
Mind mapping is a technique for discerning and depicting the relationships of relevant phenomena, variables, and actors in an operational environment or complex problem. A technique for mind mapping begins with a single idea, actor, or topic represented in the center of a white board or paper (for example insurgent recruitment). The planning team then writes out secondary and connected ideas, phenomena, actors, or words associated with insurgent recruitment using lines, symbols, pictures, and colors to show relationships. As the planning team builds and expands the mind map on the white board, it continues dialog to broaden and deepen the members’ understanding of the growing mind map. At some point, the team should refine the “map” and develop an accompanying narrative that captures the members’ synthesized understanding of the environment and/or problems. This synthesized understanding will help shape the operational approach portion of operational design. (See Figure 3-13).

Figure 3-13: Mind mapping

(2) Meta-questioning and four ways of seeing. These techniques are individual and group thinking techniques that can be used by the planning team while conducting mind-mapping or other operational design activities. Meta-questioning is a critical thinking skill that enables a more complete understanding of a topic by asking higher order questions. A way to understand the concept of meta-questioning is by thinking of the different views one gets from different levels of a ladder. An individual’s view is somewhat restricted when standing next to a ladder. However, as the individual takes a few steps up the rungs of the ladder, the view becomes broader. This is true of meta-questions. As individuals or groups ask and answer successively higher order questions, their understandings should become broader and more comprehensive. **Examples of meta-questions include:**

- Why did it happen?
- Why was it true?
- How does X relate to Y?
• All reasoning depends on the idea that X is the source of conflict. Why is reasoning based on X instead of Y?
• Are there other possibilities?

In the four ways of seeing technique, the planning team seeks to broaden and deepen its understanding of the environment or problem specifically by looking at them through the eyes of the adversary (ies) or other actors. For example, the planning team can answer the following about actors X and Y:
• How does X view itself?
• How does Y view itself?
• How does X view Y?
• How does Y view X?

Of course, there are many more possible questions about how X and Y above relate to the environment and/or problem that the planning team should ask when conducting operational design. These four are just a start. Finally, the techniques above are not necessarily stand-alone events that must be chosen at the exclusion of others. Indeed, the planning team should conduct many of them simultaneously or nearly so. It is ultimately up to the planning team and its leadership to determine which are used, for how long, and for what part of the design methodology. Ultimately, and when used in an iterative manner, they will contribute to a deeper and broader understanding of the environment and help shape a sound operational approach.

12. Link Between Operational Design, Planning, Execution, and Assessment.

a. Operational design is done before planning, throughout planning, during preparation, and throughout execution—the operational design effort never ceases in a dynamic environment. The commander and staff may begin operational design before planning is initiated to provide the staff, subordinates, and other associated partners some initial planning guidance based on understanding of the situation. In peacetime deliberate planning, this is likely the result of an ongoing analysis by the combatant command of its AOR, with greater emphasis given to those situations or locations designated as areas of potential crisis and instability within the theater campaign plan.

b. It is important to note the complementary nature of operational design and the planning process. By necessity, the planning process must be convergent, in order to yield executable plans and orders. Operational design enables a balance between this required convergence and the divergence needed to remain open to numerous stimuli to better understand the operational environment and better define unfamiliar or ill-structured problems. While the continuous dialogue of operational design enables the command to keep its “thinking aperture” as wide as possible to always question the mission’s continuing relevance and suitability, the structured process of the JPP allows us to quickly build a plan that will enable the organization to execute the commander’s current vision. By integrating both of these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility and do so in a proactive (instead of reactive) manner.

c. Operational design provides the vision and logic of the campaign, which can then be turned into flexible, adaptable courses of action. Through detailed analysis and planning,
those courses of action are developed into plans for future synchronized execution.

d. The commander’s operational approach is a hypothesis for action. In a complex situation it is difficult to know up front how the environment will react to any given action, but it is possible to know more about the environment as planning teams assess its reaction to an action; thus, learning becomes the driver for operational initiative. While those working to execute the plan may see one reaction, those looking outside the plan may see an altogether-different reaction, possibly one that causes the commander to reframe the problem. The commander must know when his understanding of the problem and potentially his visualization of the campaign have changed to such an extent that he must redirect the command’s campaign approach. Thus, through execution, operational design must be challenged and validated to ensure it yields the desired objectives and end state, and most critically, that the objectives and end state that drive the campaign are the right ones. This does not suggest that during execution the staff should not be keen to changes in the environment, the problem, or the operational approach. It does suggest, however, that the commander may be in a better position to “see” and “synthesize” the components of operational design as the environment changes during execution.

e. Assessments are a critical part of the design approach to campaigning and operations. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically has a wider scope than at the tactical level and focuses on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment using Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) help the JFC and his component commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the right things” to achieve its objectives. Tactical-level assessment typically uses Measures of Performance (MOP) to evaluate task accomplishment. These measures let commanders determine if their force is “doing things right.” [See also Appendix G, Operation Assessments.]

13. Reframing. Reframing is no longer recognized by Joint doctrine as a term associated with Operational Design, yet it remains an important concept. It is the iterative or recurring conduct of operational design in the event that the commander’s understanding of the operational environment (OE) or of the problem have changed to such a degree that a different operational approach is warranted. Essentially, reframing is required when the hypothesis of the current problem and/or operational approach may no longer be valid. As he updates his understanding and visualization of the environment and its tensions, the commander may determine that changes to the operational approach could range from minor modifications to a completely new campaign plan. Reframing may cause the commander to direct the command to shift the campaign’s approach.

Reframing may be as important in the wake of success as in the case of apparent failure. Success transforms the environment and affects its tendencies, potentials, and tensions. Any action in or on the environment could cause changes that generate new problems. Organizations are strongly motivated to reflect and reframe following failure, but they tend to neglect reflection and reframing following successful actions.
CHAPTER 4: JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

1. Introduction. Commanders and their staffs develop plans for campaigns through a combination of art and science. The art of operational design enables us to continuously understand the environment of the campaign, visualize the problem that the campaign must address, and develop a “running hypothesis” for an operational approach to solve the problem. Commanders must transmit their vision, to include their view of the operational approach, to their staff, subordinates, partner commands, agencies, and multinational/non-governmental entities so that their vision can be translated into executable plans. The science of planning facilitates this translation by applying the rigor of coordination and synchronization of all aspects of a concept to produce a workable plan.

The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and JPP continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of JPP, the command can monitor the dynamics of the mission and OE while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed. By combining these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility and do so proactively. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-4)

Operational Design does not end with the beginning of the JPP. Instead JPP feeds refinement steps taken during Operational Design (See Figure 4-2). As JPP is applied, commanders may receive updated guidance, learn more about the OE and the problem, and refine their operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide detailed planning. This iterative process facilitates the continuing
development and refinement of possible COAs into a selected COA with an associated initial CONOPS and eventually into a resource-informed executable plan or order. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-4)

Figure 4-2: Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design Methodology (Figure III-2 JP 5-0)

JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution.
is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive...In a crisis, the steps of JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD. In these cases, once mission analysis begins it continues until the operation is complete. Moreover, steps 4-7 are repeated as often as necessary to integrate new requirements (missions) into the development of the plan. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-11)

Planning for campaign plans is different from contingency plans in that contingency planning focuses on the anticipation of future events, while campaign planning assesses the current state of the OE and identifies how the command can shape the OE to deter crisis and support strategic objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-12)

2. Planning Initiation (Step 1). Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-11). This authority may be higher headquarters or the CCDR.

The commander will likely form a Joint Planning Group (called an Operational Planning Group or Operational Planning Team in some commands) to focus on the mission.

**JPP Step 1 – Planning Initiation**

*A plan may be initiated by higher headquarters directive or by the commander’s initiative in seeing a need*

1. Analyze initiating direction/guidance to determine:
   - Time available until mission execution
   - Current status of staff estimates
   - Current status of intelligence products (to include JIPOE)
   - Other relevant factors relevant to the specific planning situation.

2. Commander provides initial guidance (may include):
   - Initial understanding of the Operational Environment (OE)
   - Initial understanding of the problem(s) for the Cmd
   - Initial operational approach (if developed)
   - **Initial intent (purpose, endstate, risk, perhaps method—if developed)**
   - Additional guidance concerning initial coordinating requirements, time constraints, authorization to move key capabilities, etcetera.

*Italics / Blue = additive to JP 5-0*

**Figure 4-3: JPP Step 1 – Planning Initiation**
The staff must conduct some preliminary actions (including internally and externally focused analyses) before they can begin planning (See Figure 4-3 above. See Appendix H for real world samples across the staff functions in applying a gender perspective). They must determine:

- What do they know? – Pull together staff products (including intelligence) that already exist that provide information necessary for planning. Staff Estimates are a likely source of this information.
- What do they NOT know? – Holes in information must be identified quickly so that the staff can determine how best to deal with unknowns.
- Who else needs to know? – Building the planning roster is one of the first steps in “Planning to Plan.” The staff must think through what agencies, organizations, and staff sections should be present for planning and how best to incorporate them (VTC, invitations to planning meetings, etc.). Some organizations are key to planning, some important but not vital, and others must at least achieve buy-in.
- What timeline are we on? – The second most important document in the “Plan to Plan” is the timeline. Commander availability required updates to HHQ, subordinate planner considerations, and potential enemy timelines must all be considered and built into a realistic schedule.

*Operational design, if not already done by the commander and his staff, may occur at the start of step 1 of the JPP.*

3. Conduct Mission Analysis (Step 2). The staff analyzes the mission to: 1) provide a recommended mission statement to the commander, and 2) to better inform the commander's initial analysis of the environment and the problem. This helps commanders refine their operational approach(es). As the staff presents analysis on both the requirements and potential points of focus for the campaign, they enable the commander to develop his vision further to use synchronized, integrated military operations as a part of unified action. He can then provide detailed planning guidance to his staff and share his vision with his counterparts to enable unity of effort in application of all of the instruments of power across the U.S. government and our international partners. Concurrently, the J-2 leads the initial steps of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) to describe the potential effects of the OE on operations, analyze the strengths of the enemy/adversary, and describe his potential courses of action. See Figure 4-4 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved.

a. Preparation for Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. When the commander receives a mission tasking, analysis begins with the following questions: (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-12)

(1) What is the purpose of the mission received? (What problem is the commander being asked to solve or what change to the OE is
(2) What tasks must my command do for the mission to be accomplished? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-13)

(3) Will the mission achieve the desired results? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-13)

(4) What limitations have been placed on my own forces’ actions? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-13)

(5) What forces/assets are needed to support my operation? For example, do I have the requisite number of gender appropriate (mixed) engagement teams?

(6) How will I know when the mission is accomplished successfully? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-13)

(7) How will friendly, neutral, and threat networks affect the accomplishment of the mission?

Figure 4-4: JPP, Mission Analysis (Figure III-5 JP 5-0)
(7) The primary inputs to mission analysis are strategic guidance; the higher headquarters’ planning directive; and the commander’s initial planning guidance, which may include a description of the OE, a definition of the problem, the operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE. In addition to the aforementioned, CCMD’s and CJTF’s should have a running strategic estimate or an initial strategic estimate as a product of operational design. The primary outputs of mission analysis are the identified essential, specified, and implied tasks; friendly and threat centers of gravity (COGs) and their critical vulnerabilities; staff estimates; the mission statement; a refined operational approach; the commander’s intent statement; updated planning guidance; and initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-13)

b. Update staff estimates. Each staff section should maintain a staff estimate that is a running assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable from the perspective of that staff section’s function. The estimate focuses on supportability of the potential mission from that staff section’s functional view. This estimate helps the staff provide recommendations to the commander on the best COA to accomplish the mission. The staff estimate also provides continuity among the various members of the staff section. If the staff has not already begun a staff estimate by this point, it should do so now.

The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although the staff can delay documenting the estimates until after the preparation of the commander’s estimate, they should send them to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans. These estimates are inputs to mission analysis and updated again as an output of mission analysis as well as the other steps in JPP.

c. Analyze higher headquarters planning directives and strategic guidance. Much of the work of this step is done in the commander’s framing work as he looks at the operational design of the campaign. The staff must start with the commander’s understanding of the environment and the framing of the problem, while reviewing guidance received from higher headquarters and other relevant actors. The staff will first focus on the end state and objectives. The military end state describes conditions that define mission success. It also describes how reaching the JFC’s military end state supports higher headquarters’ national objectives. The military end state normally represents a period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining national objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. I-19) Objectives normally answer the question “What needs to be done to achieve the military end state?” The commander and staff must also understand the desired conditions and objectives described in strategic guidance so that they can understand what their campaign must achieve. See a description of the relationship between end state and objectives in Chapter 3.

Answering the “why” and “how” questions of the higher headquarters is different at the strategic level when compared to the operational and tactical levels. Often, there is no clear, definitive guidance collected in one location. There is no “higher order” from which a planner can simply “cut and paste” the pieces into the emerging plan’s OPORD. Instead, much of the
CCDR’s strategic guidance is less clearly defined.

Since partners within integrated planning may have different guidance, if time permits the staff should look for overlaps, gaps, and friction points that may exist between U.S. Government strategic guidance and that of other nations/organizations who are also interested in the problem.

d. Review the commander’s initial planning guidance. The commander should develop his initial understanding of the environment and of the problem, and an initial vision of the campaign or operation by using operational design as early as possible in campaign development. The staff should recognize that this is initial guidance, which will mature as the staff provides detailed analysis to the commander to inform his operational design.

e. Determine facts and assumptions. Facts are the major pieces of information known to be true and that are pertinent to the planning effort. First, understand and summarize the geostrategic factors derived from analysis of the OE that will influence the strategic end state. This synopsis is no mere laundry list of factors, but a synthesis of the key factors in the OE that will enhance mission analysis. To answer this question, consider the long- and short-term political causes of conflict, domestic influences (including public will), competing demands for resources, economic realities, legal and moral implications, international interests, positions of international organizations, and the impact of information.

The JPG should leverage the strategic estimate (See Chapter 5 for Strategic Estimate Format) as a useful means to organize and consider geostrategic factors in an attempt to gain a better understanding of their impact and interrelationships. This analysis includes not only the PMESII analysis, but also the physical characteristics (topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and demographics) and temporal characteristics (the effect of timing aspects on the OE and on the campaign). The key is to determine potential effects of these physical and temporal aspects on possible operations of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy military forces and other instruments of power. Additionally, the planners should assess factors such as adversary organization, communications, technology, industrial base, manpower and mobilization capacity, and transportation.

The staff develops assumptions to continue the planning process in the absence of facts. Assumptions are placeholders to fill knowledge gaps, but they play a crucial role in planning and must be held to a minimum throughout planning. These assumptions require constant revalidation and reassessment. Facts should replace them as more information becomes available.

Valid assumptions have three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for planning to continue. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume unrealistic friendly capabilities will be available. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge critical for the planning process to continue. All assumptions are continually reviewed to ensure their validity and challenged if unrealistic, including those provided in strategic guidance or from higher headquarters. Subordinate commanders do not develop assumptions that contradict valid higher headquarters assumptions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-17)

(1) Commanders and staffs should anticipate changes to the plan if an assumption proves to be incorrect. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-17)
During wargaming or red teaming, planners should review both the positive and negative aspect of all assumptions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-17)

Assumptions made in contingency planning should be addressed in the plan. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18)

Plans may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a crisis develops. As a crisis develops, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18) This includes developing CCIR focused on providing facts to replace assumptions.

Planners work to limit assumptions to only those necessary for continued planning. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18)

All assumptions should be identified in the plan or decision matrix to ensure they are reviewed and validated prior to execution. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18)

The JPG should develop branches for assumptions to the basic plan that, if untrue, would derail the plan. Examples of theater-level assumptions are:

- **Political:**
  - Countries A & B will allow over-flight, basing and host nation support.
  - Countries C & D will remain neutral.
  - Country E will support Country X with air and naval forces only.

- **Forces:**
  - APS 3 and MPS 1 & 2 will be available for employment at C+10.
  - A CSG and a MEU/ARG are forward deployed in theater.
  - There are enough personnel to conduct gender appropriate engagements.

- **Timeline:**
  - Major deployments begin upon unambiguous warning of enemy attack.
  - There will be X days unambiguous warning prior to enemy attack.

- **Enemy:**
  - Country X’s forces can sustain an offensive for seven days before culmination.
  - Country X will use chemical weapons once coalition forces cross the border.
  - Country X will use vulnerable civilians as human shields or suicide bombers.

**f. Determine and analyze operational limitations.** Limitations are the restrictions placed on the commander’s freedom of action. They may be part of strategic direction or stem from regional or international considerations or relationships. Limiting factors are generally categorized as constraints or restraints.

**1. Constraints.** A constraint is a requirement, “must do,” placed on
the command by a higher command that **dictates an action**, thus restricting freedom of action (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18), e.g., defend a specific site, include Country Y in the coalition with its caveats, meet a time suspense, or eliminate a specific enemy force.

(2) **Restraints**. A restraint is a requirement, “cannot do,” placed on the command by a higher command that **prohibits an action**, thus restricting freedom of action. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18), e.g., do not conduct preemptive or cross-border operations before declared hostilities, do not approach the enemy coast closer than 30 nautical miles, or do not decisively commit forces. Restraints are “must not do” actions.

(3) Many operational limitations transition to ROE/RUF … Other operational limitations may arise from laws or authorities, such as the use of specific types of funds or training events. Commanders are responsible for ensuring they have the authority to execute operations and activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-18)

g. **Determine specified and implied tasks and develop essential tasks**. Analyze strategic direction to determine the strategic tasks specified or implied as a part of the given strategic end state and objectives. These tasks focus on achieving the end state and are extracted from guidance from higher echelons. They are broad tasks that may require integrating many instruments of national power and the action of several elements of the joint force. Finally, they do not specify actions by components or forces.

(1) **Specified Tasks**. Specified tasks are those that have been assigned to a commander in a planning directive. These are tasks the commander wants the subordinate commander to accomplish, usually because they are important to the higher command’s mission and/or objectives. One or more specified tasks often become essential tasks for the subordinate commander. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-19)

Examples of **specified** tasks to a combatant command might be:

- *Deter Country X from coercing its neighbors.*
- *Stop Country X’s aggression against its neighbors.*
- *Reduce Country X’s WMD inventory, production, & delivery means.*
- *Reduce Country X’s coercive use of human shields as suicide bombers against coalition forces.*
- *Remove Country X’s regime.*

(2) **Implied Tasks**. Implied tasks are additional tasks the commander must accomplish, typically to accomplish the specified tasks, support another command, or otherwise accomplish activities relevant to the operation or achieving the objective. In addition to the higher headquarters’ planning directive, the commander and staff will review other sources of guidance for implied tasks, such as multinational planning documents and the CCP, enemy and friendly COG analysis products, JIPOE products, relevant doctrinal publications,
interviews with subject matter experts, and the commander’s operational approach. The commander can also deduce implied tasks from knowledge of the OE, such as the enemy situation and political conditions in the assigned OA. However, implied tasks do not include routine tasks or standard operating procedures inherent for most operations, such as conducting reconnaissance and protecting a flank. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. III-19)

After identifying specified tasks, the staff identifies additional, major tasks necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. These additional, major tasks are implied tasks—the joint force must do to accomplish specified tasks. Tasks that are inherent responsibilities, such as deploy, conduct reconnaissance, sustain, are not implied tasks unless successful execution requires coordination with or support of other commanders. Examples of implied tasks are:

- Build and maintain a coalition.
- Conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.
- Destroy Country X’s armored corps.
- Provide military government in the wake of regime removal.

(3) Essential tasks. Essential tasks are those that the command must execute successfully to attain the desired end state defined in the planning directive. The commander and staff determine essential tasks from the lists of both specified and implied tasks. Depending on the scope of the operation and its purpose, the commander may synthesize certain specified and implied task statements into an essential task statement. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-20)

h. Develop the initial mission statement. After identifying the essential tasks, and with the context of the relationship of those tasks to the achievement of the national end state and military end state, the staff normally develops a derived mission statement using the format of who, what, when, where, and why. This statement should be a direct, brief, and effective articulation of the essential tasks and purpose for military operations.

Since mission statements are primarily intended to focus the staff, military subordinates, and supporting commands, translation of the wording of tasks into doctrinal terms for completion is important. Mission statement refinement during the entire plan development process, and, in fact, throughout execution of the campaign, is important to ensure that it meets the needs of the commander and the national leadership. A mission statement might look like this:

When directed, USORANGE COM employs joint forces in concert with coalition partners to deter Country X from coercing its neighbors and proliferating WMD. If deterrence fails, the coalition will defeat X’s Armed Forces; destroy known WMD production, storage, and delivery capabilities; destroy its ability to project offensive force across its borders; stabilize the theater, and transition monitoring to a UN peacekeeping force.

i. Conduct initial force and resource analysis.
(1) Initial Force Analysis. Periodically, the SecDef issues the GFMIG. For campaign and contingency planning, planners must review the GFMIG and GFMAP. In a crisis, assigned and allocated forces currently deployed to the geographic CCMD’s AOR may be the most responsive during the early stages of an emergent crisis. Planners may consider assigned forces as likely to be available to conduct activities unless allocated to a higher priority. Re-missioning previously allocated forces may require SecDef approval and should be coordinated through the JS using procedures outlined in CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures. Plans should only use forces/capabilities available in the joint force inventory during the development of the plan. Plans that incorporate unfielded capabilities are unlikely to achieve the commander’s objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p.III-21)

It is necessary to enable the command to identify significant force and capability shortfalls early in the planning process to 1) alert higher headquarters that additional forces and capabilities will be required; and 2) develop feasible COAs.

(2) Identify Non-Force Resources Available for Planning. In many types of operations, the commander (and planners) may have access to non-force resources, such as commander’s initiative funds, other funding sources (such as train and equip funding, support to foreign security forces funding, etc.), or can work with other security assistance programs (foreign military sales, excess defense article transfers, etc.). Planners and commanders can weave together resources and authorities from several different programs to create successful operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-21)

j. Develop Military Objectives. Military objectives describe in broad terms what the JFC wants to achieve within each line of the operational approach. Each military objective establishes a clear goal toward which all the actions and effects of a LOO or LOE are redirected. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22)

(1) Military objectives are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which a military operation is directed. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22)

(2) Military objectives are used to develop a line of operation (LOO) or line of effort (LOE) during formulation of the operational approach. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22)

(3) Military objectives are not friendly tasks. Each objective should be broad enough to describe the net outcome of multiple subordinate actions. In this way, the military objectives serve as a bridge between end states and friendly tasks. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22)
Military objectives serve as a focal point for joint, multinational, and interagency partners by contextualizing military action in relation to other instruments of national power and explaining the military’s contributions to unity of effort. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22)

Military objectives should be discussed during IPRs to ensure they are consistent with the next higher headquarters’ vision of mission accomplishment. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22)

k. Develop COA Evaluation Criteria. Evaluation criteria are standards the commander and staff will later use to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs. Developing these criteria during mission analysis or as part of commander’s planning guidance helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-22) Evaluation are usually environmental factors that impact the ability to achieve the mission linked to long term accomplished of desired environment with a campaign. See Figure 4-5.

![Figure 4-5 Potential COA Evaluation Criteria (Figure III-7 JP 5-0)](image)

l. Conduct preliminary Risk Assessment. Planners conducting a preliminary risk assessment must identify the obstacles or actions that may preclude mission accomplishment and then assess the impact of these impediments to the mission. Once planners identify the obstacles or
actions, they assess the probability of achieving objectives and severity of loss linked to an obstacle or action and characterize the military risk. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-24)


- Very Likely (81-100%)
- Probable (51-80%)
- Improbable (21-50%)
- Highly Unlikely (0-20%)

(2) Consequence Levels (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-24):

- Extreme harm to something of value
- Major harm to something of value
- Moderate harm to something of value
- Minor harm to something of value

(3) During decision briefs, risks must be explained using standard terms that support the decision-making process, such as mission success (which missions will and which will not be accomplished), time (how much longer will a mission take to achieve success), and forces (casualties, future readiness, etc.), and political implications. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. III-25) Some examples of risk articulation are:

- The viability of the coalition will be threatened by a prolonged campaign.
- Pressure from Country M may cause Country Z to limit the use of its seaports by the U.S. military in the campaign.
- If friendly military operations in Country X cause collateral damage to infrastructure and personnel from Country M who are working in Country X, then Country M may deploy protective military forces to Country X, risking escalation of the conflict.
- The lack of cultural or gender subject matter experts results in the inability to evaluate local tensions, conduct effective engagements, and report on those engagements.

m. Identify initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). CCIRs are elements of information the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making. CCIRs help focus information management and help the commander assess the OE, validate (or refute) assumptions, identify accomplishment of intermediate objectives, and identify decision points during operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. They are situation-dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-sensitive, and always established by an order or plan. The CCIR list is normally short so that the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-25)
Doctrine lists two types of CCIR: Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR).

(1) PIRs. PIRs focus on the adversary and the OE and are tied to commander’s decision points. They drive the collection of information by all elements of a command, requests for national-level intelligence support, and requirements for additional intelligence capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential PIRs they believe meet the commander’s guidance. However, the joint force J-2 has overall staff responsibility for consolidating PIR nominations and for providing the staff recommendation to the commander. Commander-approved PIRs are automatically CCIRs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-26)

(2) FFIRs. FFIRs focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential FFIRs they believe meet the commander’s guidance. Commander-approved FFIRs are automatically CCIRs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-27)

Figure 4-6 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (Figure III-1 JP 5-0)

(3) PIRs are often expressed in terms of the elements of PMESII while FFIRs are often expressed in terms of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. All are developed to support specific decisions the commander must make. (See Figure 4-6)
n. Update staff estimates **AGAIN**. Once again, staff officers should update their estimates with their analysis of the mission now that they have a better idea of what the functional requirements may be.

o. **Prepare and deliver the mission analysis brief.** The purpose of the mission analysis brief is to provide to the commander and the staff, as well as other key partners, the results of the staff’s analysis. See Figure 4-7 for a possible briefing agenda. The commander has likely been continuing his own analysis in parallel so this brief should be an opportunity to dialogue about the mission. At the conclusion of the brief, the commander should not only approve or modify the command’s mission, but also provide his understanding and vision of the campaign or operation through commander’s intent and planning guidance. Depending on how much time the commander has had to think about the situation, he may update his initial intent and guidance that he discerned through his operational design.

**Mission Analysis Brief (Example)**

- Introduction
- **Purpose**
- Review Cmdr’s Initial Planning Guidance
- Situation Overview
  - Key Aspects of the Operational Environment (including IOA) and Threat Overview (incl. Assessment)
  - PMESII Strengths and Weaknesses
  - Enemy (including COG) and Objectives
- Higher Guidance
  - Higher commander’s objectives/mission/guidance
  - Command Relationships
  - United States Government interagency objectives
  - Other Nations, IGOs, NGOs objectives and guidance
- Objectives and effects
  - Initial Commander’s Guidance (Including Op Approach)
  - Key Problems (Refined)
  - Facts and Assumptions
  - Limitations (including authorities/permissions/legal considerations)
- Tasks (Specified, Implied & Essential)
- Communications Synchronization
- Termination Criteria (MIL Endstates, Obj, etc)
- Centers of Gravity Analysis (including Decisive Points)
- Force & Resource (Capabilities) Allocation Review and identified Shortfalls
- Mission Success Criteria
- Risks (Including Op Reach and Culmination)
  - Initial analysis of Mitigation
  - Operational Approach review & recommended refinement
- Proposed Mission Statement
- Proposed Commander’s Intent
- COA Evaluation Criteria
- Staff Estimates & Supporting Concepts (e.g. C2)
- Proposed CCIR (PIR / FFIR, HNIR?)
- COA Dev Guidance (recommendations?)
- Initial Organizing Construct ideas? (LOE, LOO, Phases, etc.)

*Italicics / Blue = additive to JP 5-0*  
Order of items changed from JP 5-0

**Figure 4-7: Sample Mission Analysis Brief Agenda**

p. **Publish Commander’s Refined Planning Guidance.** The commander now uses the understanding he has gained through his operational design, informed additionally through the mission analysis process, along with his experience, education, and wisdom, to update his vision for the campaign. This vision is the commander’s personal insight on how he will employ military operations, in conjunction with interagency and multinational efforts to
apply all instruments of power, to achieve success. This vision, provided through commander’s intent and planning guidance, will facilitate military course of action development, as well as proposed actions among the interagency that he believes will accomplish the desired national strategic end state and objectives.

(1) One will not find the creation of the commander’s intent addressed in JPP process. What follows is considered a best practice, or a way to organize one’s thoughts. In fact, JP 5-0 describes the contents of the Commander’s Intent three different ways depending on the example being used in the text. The commander’s intent is a concise narrative describing the key aspects of his understanding of the environment and the problem and his visualization (Purpose, Method, End state) of how the campaign must progress to achieve the desired military end state. Commanders use operational design to build their intent, enriching both his understanding and visualization through interaction with the staff as it progresses through the planning process. The purpose of commander’s intent is to focus the staff and assist subordinates and supporting commanders in taking actions to achieve the desired end state, even when operations donot unfold as planned. Given the complexities of the OE at any joint level, the commander must empower subordinates to make decisions within an overall vision for success in the campaign. Using mission command, the commander leaves much of the detailed planning and execution of joint warfighting to subordinate commanders and requires them to use initiative and judgment to accomplish the mission.

At the strategic level, commander’s intent will be much broader than at the tactical level. It must provide an overall vision for the campaign that helps the staff and subordinate commanders, as well as other non-U.S. and non-military partners, to understand the intent to integrate all instruments of national power and achieve unified action. The commander must envision and articulate how joint operations will dominate the adversary and support other actions by interagency partners and allies to achieve strategic success. Through his intent, the commander identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign, the points and events where operations must dominate the enemy and control conditions in the OE, and where other instruments of national power will play a central role. He links national strategic objectives to military objectives and lays the foundation for the desired conditions of the military/theater end state. Essential elements of commander’s intent follow:

(a) Purpose. Purpose clearly answers the question, “Why are we conducting this campaign?” This explanation may look a lot like the national strategic end state. However, it must state to subordinate and supporting commanders why the use of the military instrument of national power is essential to achieve U.S. policy and the strategic end state. This articulation is essential not only to achieve a unity of purpose among subordinate commands but is also crucial to provide a purpose around which military commanders may build consensus with interagency and multinational partners. Thus, this statement is vital to build the unity of purpose amongst key shareholders that precedes unity of effort in planning and execution.

(b) End state. End state specifies the desired military end state. Along with higher guidance, the commander uses the military end state developed during his operational design and mission analysis as a basis to articulate this statement of military success. Additionally, since military forces may have to support other instruments of national power, the commander also explains how and when these supporting efforts will conclude at the termination of violence.
(c) **Operational Risk.** Operational risk focuses on mission accomplishment. The commander defines the portions of the campaign in which he will accept risk in slower or partial mission accomplishment, including a range of acceptable risk and how assuming risk in these areas may or may not impact overall outcome of the mission.

(2) **Commander’s intent may also include other items,** which assist the staff, subordinate commands, and coalition partners to share more fully the commander’s vision for unified action. Other possible elements of commander’s intent are:

(a) **Objectives.** Objectives provide clear statements of goals of the campaign that, in combination, will lead to achievement of the military end state. The commander may also relate the campaign objectives to the national strategic objectives to enable the staff to better develop COAs that will ensure proper nesting, and better enable planning interaction of all instruments of power.

(b) **Effects Guidance.** Effects guidance provides a vision of the conditions and behaviors in the OE that must be in place at the successful conclusion of the campaign. This guidance enables the staff to better link the objectives as visualized by the commander with concept of operation that may result in tasks to achieve those objectives.

(c) **Method.** Method provides a visualization for subordinates on arrangement and synchronization of the major operations to develop future options for action. While method will focus on how the commander envisions operations to achieve the military end state, it should also explain how to support policy aims as the command becomes a supporting effort to the final achievement of the U.S. strategic ends at conflict termination. Method does not describe the specific conduct of these operations; it enhances concept of operation development and understanding by others but does not describe those details. The commander generally should not give detailed guidance on the method so as to allow maximum flexibility to the JPG in developing COAs.

(3) Once the commander has given his intent for the upcoming campaign, he will normally provide the JPG/staff and subordinate commanders with **updated planning guidance** that provides additional clarity and detail essential to facilitate timely and effective COA development. The commander will have built this planning guidance through his own operational design approach, as enriched by the staff’s analysis. Planning guidance should enable the staff and components to understand the major themes and guiding principles for the campaign and develop detailed COAs for action. However, guidance should not be so specific as to limit the staff from investigating a full range of options for the commander. Planning guidance will provide a framework, the “left and right limits,” to develop options to integrate the use of military and non-military power. The content of planning guidance is at the discretion of the commander and depends on the situation and time available. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed.

The commander may provide guidance in a variety of ways and formats, based on his preference. He may provide it to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as dictated by geography, security, and type and volume of information. Additionally, the commander can give guidance in written or verbal form. The key challenge is to ensure universal understanding of this
guidance across all elements of the command, a wide range of supporting commands, and enabling agencies. The commander may issue updated planning guidance throughout the decision-making process. Because the COA development process will continue to analyze the OE and examine effects on enemy, neutral, and friendly elements, the commander may participate in the COA development process as the JPG examine issues, challenges, and limitations. This engagement may also cause the commander to revisit his operational design for the campaign. Consequently, there is no limitation as to the number of times the commander may refine and reissue his planning guidance.

q. Operational Design Implications. At this time, the commander should determine whether multiple options are required. Options identify different ways, generally broadly defined in scope, to support differing end states in support of the objective. COAs are subsets of options that identify specific military operations to attain the end state described in an option. The purpose of options are to provide senior decision makers, usually SecDef or the President, the opportunity to better integrate the military within policy decisions. Mission analysis usually concludes with the commander providing refined planning guidance, to include the option for which COAs should be developed. (JP 5-0, Joint Implications, p. III-32)

4. Develop Courses of Action (Step 3). The commander and staff will work together to refine and develop the commander’s initial vision and intent for the campaign into a specific, well-developed concept to accomplish unified action. See Figure 4-8 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved. The staff supports the commander through in-depth analysis and presentation of a range of options for future military and non-military actions that will accomplish the desired strategic and military ends. One-way staffs help commanders refine their visualization is to develop alternative Courses of Action (COA) to execute the commander’s envisioned operational approach and achieve the objectives.

a. A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish the assigned mission. Staffs develop multiple COAs to provide commanders with options to attain the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. All COAs must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable and complete. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-32)

b. Figure 4-8 shows the key inputs and outputs of COA development. The products of mission analysis drive COA development. Since the operational approach contains the JFC’s broad approach to solve the problem at hand, each COA will expand this concept with the additional details that describe who will take the action, what type of military action will occur, when the action will begin, where the action will occur, why the action is required (purpose), and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces). Likewise, the
essential tasks identified during mission analysis (and embedded in the draft mission statement) must be common to all potential COAs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-32)

**Joint Planning Process Step 3: Course of Action Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Inputs</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff estimates</td>
<td>Revised staff estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission statement</td>
<td>COA alternatives with concept narrative and sketch including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s refined operational approach (from operational design) including: - Joint force commander’s (JFC’s) intent statement - JFC’s updated planning guidance</td>
<td>• Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s critical information requirements</td>
<td>• Key tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>• Major capabilities required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network analysis</td>
<td>• Timeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy most likely COA</td>
<td>• Task organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy most dangerous COA</td>
<td>• Main and supporting efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4-8: JPP Step 3 – Develop Courses of Action (Figure III-13 JP 5-0)**

c. **COA Development Considerations.** The products of COA development are potential COAs, with a sketch for each if possible. Each COA describes, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done throughout the campaign or operation, including consolidation, stabilization, and transition from combat operations; operations in and across the physical domains, the information environment (which includes
cyberspace), and the electromagnetic spectrum; the size of forces deemed necessary; time in which joint force capabilities need to be brought to bear; and the risks associated with the COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-33)

(1) Review information. Ensure understanding of the mission, tasks, and commander’s intent among the staff.

(2) Determine opposing courses of action. Before developing possible COAs, the staff must gain an appreciation of what other actors may do to shape the future environment to their desired end state. They can use the JIPOE process to help them gain such an appreciation, though they must consider not only enemy and adversary actions, but also neutral and friendly actions that may (unintentionally) impede achievement of their desired end state.

The staff determines how other relevant actors will attempt to accomplish their strategic goals by identifying their likely objectives and desired end states, potential strategic and military capabilities, and estimate how the opposition leader may apply his instruments of power in the future – the opposing courses of action (OCOAs). They must also consider aspects of other adversarial and even neutral actors’ courses of action as they may either support or limit achievement of our desired end state.

The staff’s analysis should identify all known factors affecting the opposition’s actions, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of military forces, as well as other key factors that may oppose achievement of our desired conditions. The analysis of military capabilities should look across the air, space, maritime, land, and cyberspace domains. [Cyberspace planning tips can be found in https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/USACSL/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace_Operations_Guide.pdf]

(3) Developing OCOAs requires the commander and his staff to think as the opponent thinks. From that perspective, they postulate possible adversary objectives first and then visualize specific actions within the capabilities of adversary forces to achieve these objectives. Potential adversary actions relating to specific, physical objectives normally must be combined to form course of action statements. **Below are the key elements of an OCOA, which may be in the form of a sketch, or a narrative, or a combination:**

- Adversary objectives.
- Adversary force posture at the outset of the conflict.
- How the adversary will employ his instruments of power to accomplish objectives.
- Adversary posture when the conflict is over.
- Aspects of the desired OE opposed by neutral or friendly actors.
- Posture of relevant neutral actors at the outset of conflict.
- Likely actions taken by neutral or friendly actors that may impede, or assist, achievement of our desired conditions.

The staff will identify for the commander both the most-dangerous OCOA, as well as the most-likely OCOA, based upon the situation anticipated and/or at hand. Often, the most-likely and most-dangerous OCOAs are not the same, so there must be a conscious
decision for the baseline assumption OCOA for friendly planning. Usually, commanders consider the most-likely OCOA as their baseline for friendly action unless the consequences of not focusing on the most-dangerous OCOA preclude doing otherwise.

A thinking and adaptive adversary will change perspectives and OCOAs to maximize his chances for success based on how his opponent (the American JFC) succeeds in changing the OE. Regardless of which OCOA supports the baseline planning effort, staffs must develop branches for the others, as time permits. After OCOA selection to support baseline planning, the staff develops a listing of associated adversary vulnerabilities for friendly-force exploitation and neutral/friendly potential actions that need to be mitigated. This list will aid in analysis of friendly COAs against the selected baseline OCOA and assist with determination of the advantages and disadvantages of friendly COAs during JPP Step 5 **COA comparison**.

Finally, this analysis will not only influence the JPG's development of COAs but will also form the basis to focus and develop PIR and those FFIR related to potentially unhelpful friendly and neutral actions. Based upon the commander's guidance, PIR serve as the focus to develop collection-and-analysis efforts and forwarding requests for information (RFI) to supporting agencies. The staff can focus efforts to collect, process, produce, and disseminate the required intelligence and other information.

(4) **Determine the COA Development Technique.** The first decision in COA development is whether to conduct simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is potential time savings... The disadvantage of this approach is that the synergy of the JPG may be disrupted by breaking up the team. The approach is manpower-intensive ... and there is an increased likelihood the COAs will lack distinctiveness ... The simultaneous COA development approach can work, but its inherent disadvantages must be addressed and some risk accepted up front. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-35)

(5) **Review objectives and tasks and develop ways to accomplish tasks.** Planners must review and refine objectives from the initial work done during the development of the operational approach. These objectives establish the conditions necessary to help achieve the national strategic objectives. Tasks are shaped by the CONOPS—intended sequencing and integration of air, land, maritime, special operations, cyberspace, and space forces. Tasks are prioritized while considering the enemy’s objectives and the need to gain advantage. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-36)

(a) [All COAs] should plan to accomplish the higher commander’s intent by understanding its essential task(s) and purpose and the intended contribution to the higher commander’s mission success and fulfill the command mission and the purpose of the operation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-36)

(b) With a visualization of COA alternatives, the staff should best synchronize (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the action of all the
elements of the force estimate the anticipated duration of the operation. Phasing assists the commander and staff to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

(c) Planners should then integrate and synchronize these requirements by using the joint functions of C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. At a minimum, planners should make certain the synchronized actions answer the following questions: (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

1) How does land, maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces integrate across the joint functions to accomplish their assigned tasks? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

2) How does the joint force leverage the informational aspects of military activities to create relevant actor perceptions and drive relevant actors to behave in ways that support achieving the JFC’s objectives?

3) The COAs should focus on COGs and decisive points. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

(6) Identify the sequencing. Identify the sequencing (simultaneous, sequential, or a combination) of the actions for each COA. Understand which resources become available, and when, during the operation or campaign. Resource availability will significantly affect sequencing operations and activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

(7) Identify main and supporting efforts by phase. The purposes of these efforts, and key supporting/supported relationships within phases. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

(8) Identify decision points and assessment process. The commander will need to know when a critical decision has to be made and how to know specific objectives have been achieved. This requires integration of decision points and assessment criteria into the COA, as these processes anticipate a potential need for decisions from outside the command (SecDef, the President, or other command). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)

(9) Identify component-level missions/tasks. Tasks (who, what, and where) that will accomplish the stated purposes of main and supporting efforts. Think of component tasks in terms of the joint functions. Display them with graphic control measures as much as possible. A designated LOO or LOE will help identify these tasks. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-37)
(10) **Task Organization.** The staff should develop an outline task organization to execute the COA ... determine appropriate command relationships and appropriate missions and tasks. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

(a) **Determine command relationships and organizational options.** Joint force organization and command relationships are based on the operation or campaign CONOPS, complexity, and degree of control required. Establishing command relationships includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

(b) Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies the intent of the commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

(c) **Regardless of the command relationships selected, it is the JFC’s responsibility to ensure these relationships are understood and clear to all subordinate, adjacent, and supporting headquarters.** The following are considerations for establishing joint force organizations:

1) Joint forces will normally be organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

2) Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

3) Commanders may establish support relationships between components to facilitate operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

4) Commanders define the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders, based on the strategic CONOPS. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-38)

5) Commanders must balance the need for centralized direction with decentralized execution. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-39)

6) Major changes in the joint force organization are normally conducted at phase changes. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-39)

(d) During each of the periods, analyze how military and non-military actions will
accomplish the required changes in the operational environment. It is not important yet to identify which subordinate organization will accomplish each of the actions, which are the tasks. It is, however, important to identify suitable tasks for or requests to our interagency partners (DOS, Dept. of Treasury, etc.), coalition and international organizations (UN, NATO, regional organizations like the European Union, etc.), and other non-governmental partners (International Committee of the Red Cross, etc.).

Focus on the effects to achieve or to avoid and consider how to employ joint forces (via the joint functions) in conjunction with other instruments of power. **Considerations for tasks include:**

- Tasks required by the main effort.
- Tasks required by the supporting efforts.
- Tasks to build report with the local population.
- Initial entry into theater: basing, access, and overflight.
- Deployment and reception of the force (JRSOI).
- Protection of forces and host-nation points of entry.
- Building and maintaining a coalition force.
- C2 with joint, host-nation, and coalition forces.
- Achieving the desired effects. What are the environmental conditions necessary to achieve the military end state?
- Preventing undesired effects/events. What are the behaviors and conditions in the OE that we must avoid during the campaign? For example, crimes on humanity or inappropriate behavior by any U.S., allied or partner nation defense and security forces within the host nation population reduces trust and report with the coalition; creation of a humanitarian crisis.
- Tasks required to support the use of other instruments of power.
- Tasks to protect the force from cyber-attack or exploit the use of cyber-attack.
- Sustaining the joint force, and additional support required to enable and maintain host-nation and coalition participation.
- Post-hostilities conditions, and how the joint force will maintain military gains and transform them into long-term strategic success.

(e) Determine if the forces and capabilities allocated are sufficient to meet the task requirements. Note any deficiencies. Sketch a troop-to-task analysis to help with determining the appropriate command structure.

(f) At this point, identify the basics of how you will organize, by components any JTFs requirements, and how the joint force will control or coordinate its efforts with the host nation, multinational forces, and interagency elements as necessary. Again, this structure is an initial organization around which to continue COA development and may change when tested in wargaming. **Some considerations:**

- Geometry – how to allocate the battle space (e.g., joint operations area, joint special operations area, or joint security area).
- Organization (functional components, service components).
- Interagency considerations (coordination mechanisms).
- Multinational considerations (initial coalition command/coordinating structure).

(11) **Sustainment Concept.** No COA is complete without a proper **sustainment plan** ... It entails identifying the requirements for all classes of supply and services and creating distribution, transportation, OCS, and disposition plans to support the commander’s execution. Sustainment concepts also organize capabilities and resources into an overall campaign or operation sustainment concept. It concentrates forces and material resources strategically so the right force is available at the designated times and places to conduct decisive operations. It requires thinking through a cohesive sustainment for joint, single-Service, and supporting forces relationships in conjunction with CSAs, multinational, interagency, nongovernmental, private-sector, or international organizations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-39)

(12) **Deployment Concept.** There is no way to determine the feasibility of the COA without including the deployment concept and how the force will respond to a contested environment with enemy attacks on force flow ... the concept must be described in the COA to visualize force buildup, sustainment requirements, and military-political considerations. The concept should account for how cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose will address transregional, all-domain, multi-functional challenges. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-39)

(13) **Nuclear Planning.** COA development includes nuclear planning, as required. Nuclear planning guidance is provided in Presidential policy documents and further clarified in other DOD documents, such as the nuclear supplement to the JSCP. Guidance issued to the CCDR is based on national-level considerations and supports the achievement of US objectives. USSTRATCOM is the lead organization for nuclear planning and coordination with appropriate allied commanders. Due to the strategic and diplomatic consequences associated with nuclear operations and plans, only the President has the authority to direct the planning and employment of nuclear weapons. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-39)

(14) **Define the Operational Area.** The OA must be precisely defined, because the specific geographic area will impact planning factors such as access, basing, overflight, and sustainment. OAs include but are not limited to: (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-40)

(a) AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-40)
(b) CCDRs, with assigned AORs and their subordinate JFCs, designate smaller OAs on a temporary basis. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-40)

(c) OAs have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-40)

(15) Develop Initial COA Sketches and Statements. Each COA should answer the following questions: See Figure 4-9 for elements that should be included.

- Who (type of forces) will execute the tasks? (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-40)
- What are the tasks? (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-40)

Course of Action Development – Narrative and Sketches

For each COA, develop a narrative and sketch that provides the following:

- Operational Environment (OE)
- Objectives
- Operational Concept
  - Key tasks and purpose
  - Lines of Effort / Lines of Operation
- Forces and capabilities required
  - To include anticipated interagency roles, action and supporting tasks.
- Task Organization
  - To include Main and Supporting efforts
  - Identification of reserve (if appropriate)
- Communication Synchronization (including integration of Information Related Capabilities)
- Integrated Timeline
  - To include Required decisions, decisions timelines (e.g. mobilization, DEPORD), and DPs
- Command relationships, battlespace geometry, and organizational options
  - By Phase if necessary
- Tasks to Components and other Organizations
- Sustainment concept (incl Logistics Estimates and Feasibility)
- Deployment concept
- Risk
- Synchronization Matrix

Order of items changed from JP 5-0

Underlined / Green = additive (from JP 5-0 COA Dev Briefing Example)
Italics / Blue = additive to JP 5-0

Figure 4-9: COA Development Element for the Narrative/Sketch

- Where will the tasks occur? (Start adding graphic control measures, e.g., areas of operation, amphibious objective areas). (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-40)
- When will the tasks begin?
• What are key/critical decision points?
• How (but do not usurp the components’ prerogatives) the commander should provide “operational direction” so the components can accomplish “tactical actions.”
• Why (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?
• How will the commander identify successful accomplishment of the mission?
• Develop an initial intelligence support concept. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-40)

(16) Test the Validity of Each COA. All COAs selected for analysis must be valid, and the staff should reject COA alternatives that do not meet all five of the following validity criteria: (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-41)

(a) Suitable. Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s guidance. This test focuses on ends. Preliminary tests include: (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-41)

• Does it accomplish the mission?
• Does it meet the commander’s intent?
• Does it accomplish all the essential tasks?
• Does it meet the conditions for the relevant end state?
• Does it take into consideration the enemy and friendly COGs?
• Are security objectives informed by the gender dynamics of the local population? (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-41)

(b) Feasible. Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations. This test focuses on means and risk.

1) Does the commander have the force structure, posture, transportation, and logistics (e.g., munitions) (means) to execute it? The COA is feasible if it can be executed with the forces, support, and technology available within the constraints of the OE and against expected enemy opposition. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-41)

2) Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible (for example, resources are obviously insufficient). However, it may be possible to fill short falls by requesting support from the commander or other means. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-41)

(c) Acceptable. Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained. This test focuses on ways and risk.
1) Does it contain unacceptable risks? (Is it worth the possible cost?) A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results justify the risks. The basis of this test consists of an estimation of friendly losses in forces, time, position, and opportunity. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-41)

2) Does it take into account the limitations placed on the commander (must do, cannot do, other physical or authority limitations)? (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-42)

3) Are COAs reconciled with external constraints, particularly ROE? This requires visualization of execution of the COA against each enemy capability. (JP 5-0. Joint Planning, p. III-42)

4) Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates the commander’s definition of acceptable risk. Acceptability is considered from the perspective of the commander by reviewing the strategic objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-42)

   (d) Distinguishable. Must be sufficiently different from other COAs in the following:

   • The focus or direction of main effort.
   • The scheme of maneuver.
   • Sequential versus simultaneous maneuvers.
   • The primary mechanism for mission accomplishment.
   • Task organization.
   • The use of reserves. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-42)

   (e) Complete. Does it answer the questions who, what, where, when, how, and why? The COA must incorporate:

   • Objectives, desired effects to be created, and tasks to be performed. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-42)
   • Major forces and capabilities required, to include [those] of international partners. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-42)
   • Concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment.
   • Time estimates for achieving objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-42)
   • Military end state and mission success criteria (including the assessment: how the commander will know they have achieved success). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-42)

(17) Conduct COA Development Brief to Commander. Figure 4-10 provides an
example of COA development brief content. Each JFC will have different needs in order to provide COA guidance needed for further planning, so planners and senior leaders should ensure they do their best to understand the JFC’s decision-making process prior to delivery of the COA development brief.

**COA Development Brief Example**

- **Context/background (i.e., road to war)**
- **Initiation—review guidance for initiation**
- **Strategic guidance—planning tasks assigned to supported commander, forces/resources apportioned, planning guidance, updates, defense agreements, theater campaign plan(s), Guidance for Employment of the Force/Joint Strategic Campaign Plan**
- **Forces allocated/assigned**
- **JFPOE**
- **Enemy Objectives**
- **Enemy COAs—most dangerous, most likely, strengths and weaknesses.**
- **Update facts and assumptions**
- **Mission statement**
- **Commander’s intent (purpose, method, end state)**
  - End state: political/military
  - Termination criteria
- **Center of gravity analysis results: critical factors; strategic/operational**
- **Joint operations area/theater of operations/communications zone sketch**
- **Shaping activities recommended (for current theater campaign plan)**
- **Flexible deterrent options with desired effect**

For each COA, sketch and statement by phase:
- **Operational Environment (OE)**
- **Objectives**
- **Operational Concept**
  - Key tasks and purpose
  - Lines of Effort/Lines of Operation
- **Forces and capabilities required**
  - To include anticipated interagency roles, action and supporting tasks.
- **Task Organization**
  - To include Main and Supporting efforts
  - Identification of reserve if appropriate
- **Communication Synchronization (including integration of Information Related Capabilities)**
- **Integrated Timeline**
  - To include Required decisions, decisions timelines (e.g., mobilization, DEPORD, and DPs)
  - Command relationships, battlefield space, and organizational options
  - By Phase if necessary
  - Tasks to Components and other Organizations
  - Sustainment concept (incl logistics, Estimates and Feasibility)
  - Deployment concept
  - Risk
  - Synchronization Matrix

- **COA summarized distinctions**
- **COA priority for analysis**
- **Commander’s Guidance**

**Figure 4-10: COA DEV Brief Example Format**

18. **JFC Provides Guidance on COAs.**

   (a) **Review and approve COA(s) for further analysis.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44)

   (b) **Direct revisions to COA(s), combinations of COAs, or development of additional COA(s).** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44)

   (c) **Direct priority for which enemy COA(s) will be used during wargaming of friendly COA(s).** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44)

19. **Continue the Staff Estimate Process.** The staff must continue to conduct their staff estimates of supportability for each COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44)

   Staff directorates analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. A
The purpose of the staff estimate is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the commander the best possible information from which to select a COA. Each staff section analyzes each COA, its supportability, and which COA is most supportable from their particular, functional perspective.

(20) **Conduct Vertical and Horizontal Parallel Planning.**

(a) Discuss the planning status of staff counterparts with both commander’s and JFC components’ staffs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44)

(b) Coordinate planning with staff counterparts from other functional areas. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44) This includes subject matter experts in gender and cultural issues.

(c) Permit adjustments in planning as additional details are learned from higher and adjacent echelons and permit lower echelons to begin planning efforts and generate questions (e.g., requests for information). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-44)

(21) **The Planning Directive.** The planning directive identifies planning responsibilities for developing joint force plans. It provides guidance and requirements to the staff and subordinate commands concerning coordinated planning actions for plan development ... Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for planning for the CCMD campaign and contingencies, and the J-3 coordinates staff action in a crisis situation.

The JFC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is an opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the JFC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. III-44)

5. **COA Analysis and Wargaming (Step 4).**

   a. The JPG analyzes in detail each COA that survived Step 3. The objective of this step is to analyze each COA critically, independently, and according to the commander’s guidance in an effort to determine the advantages and disadvantages associated with each COA. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander’s guidance. COA analysis is a valuable use of time that ensures COAs are valid. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-45).

   See Figure 4-11 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved. Wargaming is a “Garbage in – Garbage out” phenomenon. A poorly developed COA will produce wargame(s) that waste time and do not satisfyingly uncover the information necessary to improve COAs.
and COA concept alternatives as well as further plan development. Doctrinal war games are cumbersome, man-power intensive, and are usually spread across multiple days. Detailed preparation is key and getting the right people to include the JFC in the room during the war game is paramount.

COA Analysis and Wargaming also helps the commander and staff to:

1. Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage in combat or maximize the effect of available resources toward achieving CCMD and national objectives in noncombat operations and campaigns. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

---

### JPP Step 4 – COA Analysis and Wargaming

**Primary Inputs:** revised staff estimates, COA alternatives, opposing COAs, synchronization matrices, Evaluation criteria

1. Develop COA Analysis Considerations
   - Evaluation Criteria
   - Critical Events
2. Wargame Analysis Decisions
   - Type of Wargame
   - Prioritize enemy COAs, or Partner capabilities
3. Conduct Wargame (review COAs independently)
4. Evaluate Results
5. Prepare Products
6. Adjust COA to mitigate risk/better achieve objectives
7. Revise staff estimates

**Primary outputs:** Potential decision points, Potential branches and sequels, Refined COAs, Revisied staff estimates, Synchronization Matrices

- Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and sequels identified. Information on commander’s evaluation criteria. Initial task organization. Critical events and decision points. Newly identified resource shortfalls. Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix. Initial DST/DSM. Assessment plan and criteria.

Italics / Blue = additive to JP 5-0  Underlined / Green = additive (from JP 5-0 COA War gaming text)

---

**Figure 4-11: JPP Step 4--COA Analysis and Wargaming**

2. Have as near an identical visualization of the operation as possible. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

3. Anticipate events in the OE and potential reaction options. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

4. Determine conditions and resources required for success while also identifying gaps and seams. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)
Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

Plan for and coordinate authorities to integrate IRCs early. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

Focus intelligence collection requirements. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

Determine the most flexible COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

Identify potential decision points. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

Determine task organization options. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-47)

Develop data for use in a synchronization matrix or related tool. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Identify potential plan branches and sequels. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Identify high-value targets. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Assess risk. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Determine COA advantages and disadvantages. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Recommend CCIRs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Validate end states and objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

Identify contradictions between friendly COAs and expected enemy end states. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

b. It is critical that the analysis first looks at each COA independently from the other COAs; a comparison will come later. At this point, the staff is looking for best answers to the following questions (not inclusive):

- Will the tasks identified achieve the desired effects in a way that will achieve the desired conditions, and avoid generating unintended effects?
- How will military operations change the adversary and the operational environment
over the course of the campaign?

- What are the points at which COAs don’t offer enough flexibility to oppose adversary actions, and where might branches/sequels be required?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of each COA, and how well does each COA meet the commander’s vision for success? How well do they hold up under the rigor of a realistic opposing force or situation (for an HA mission, the enemy might not be an armed force).
- What are potential decision points where the commander must make a key decision, and the critical information requirements (CCIR) for the commander to make such a decision?
- Which aspects of the COA may introduce strategic challenges that must be resolved?

c. **Wargaming** is a primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargames are representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions. COA wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-45)

It is a conscious effort to visualize the flow of a plan, within an OE, using joint forces, while integrating the other instruments of power as appropriate, and confronting a realistic, thinking, and adaptive adversary. Wargaming assists joint-force planners to identify the strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. While joint doctrine refers to visualizing the flow of a military operation as the key element in wargaming, the commander and staff must also consider the application of all instruments of national power (DIME).

d. **COA Analysis Considerations.** Evaluation criteria and known critical events are two of the many important considerations as COA analysis begins. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-48)

(1) Develop evaluation criteria. Determining the initial evaluation criteria is a critical requirement that begins before COA analysis. The commander may specify some of these criteria, but the JPG normally develops most of them. The commander is the final approval authority for the criteria, regardless of who develops them. The insights available from Mission Analysis, and from the commander’s intent and planning guidance, may suggest appropriate evaluation criteria. Through the wargaming process, some additional evaluation criteria may emerge for use later in COA comparison.

(2) **List Known Critical Events.** These are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (such as the series of component tasks to be performed on D-day). Decision points are most likely linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of the reserve force). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-49)

e. **Wargaming Analysis Decisions.** There are two key decisions to make
before COA analysis begins. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-50)

(1) The first decision is to decide what type of wargame will be used. This decision should be based on commander’s guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models.

(2) The second decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs or the partner capabilities, partner and US objectives for noncombat operations, and the wargame that it is to be analyzed against. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-50) This decision includes choosing sequencing priorities and objectives. The JPG prioritizes to ensure key concerns are addressed before available time runs out. For example, it may decide to prioritize war gaming against the enemy’s most dangerous COA before the most likely COA, or vice versa. Similarly, it may decide to wargame a specific COA early in the process because there is concern over partner capabilities that needs to be looked at closely.

f. War game each COA independently. The COAs must be evaluated through the other actors’ eyes, given their political and cultural perspectives and biases, to determine if the proposed actions will change the intended behaviors in the manner that friendly planners believe -- a key aspect to achieve desired, rather than undesired, effects. Keep in mind that, in addition to actions by adversaries, actions by neutral or even friendly actors may need to be considered as “opposing” actions, as the goal is to achieve our desired operational environment. **While wargame COA analysis should focus on the application of military power, consider all available instruments of power.** While the commander may not be able to control the D, I, and E actions, he can coordinate these instruments with other actors who may be able to influence their application.

---

### Sample Wargaming Steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Prepare for the wargame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Gather Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• List and review friendly forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• List and review opposing forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• List known critical events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Determine participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Determine opposing alternative end states and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Determine enemy COA to oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Select wargaming method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– manual or computer-assisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Select a method to record and display wargaming results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– sketch and note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– wargame worksheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– synchronization matrix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Conduct the wargame and assess results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Purpose of wargame (identify gaps, visualization, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Basic methodology (e.g. action, reaction, counteraction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Record results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Output of wargaming:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Results of the wargame brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– potential decision points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– governing factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– potential branches and sequels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Revised staff estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refined COAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• TPFDD Refinement and Transportation feasibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Feedback through the COA decision brief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
g. **Conducting the wargame.** The primary steps are: prepare for the wargame, conduct the wargame, evaluate the results, and prepare products. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-50) The JPG will conduct the wargame by assembling information, marshalling and assembling the proper tools and teams for analysis, and following a well-ordered process for systemic analysis of the proposed COAs. See Figure 4-12 for sample steps that can be conducted.

(1) **Wargame Preparation.**

(a) **Type of Wargame.** The two forms of wargames are manual and computer assisted. **Manual war games include the following three methods:** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-50)

- **Deliberate timeline analysis.** Consider actions day by day or major periods construct. e.g., Pre-Hostilities, Hostilities, and Post-Hostilities.
- **Critical events sequencing, decisive points, or essential tasks.** An example of this method is to incorporate an action-reaction-counteraction format between “Blue” and “Red” teams. A possible framework to guide the flow is to use the Lines of Operation or Lines of Effort sequentially to work through the campaign. The supervisor of the war game directs the questioning and ensures that war game time is not wasted. Blue, Red, and, if appropriate, Green (neutral actors) teams who THINK and speak for their forces when directed by the supervisor are critical to the process. The supervisor should identify a separate recorder to document the results in a useful format and to record any issues that cannot be resolved quickly.
- **Phasing.** Identify significant actions by phase. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-50)

(b) **Determining wargame participants and structure.** The JFC provides guidance on size and scope of wargame to include guidance on participation from organizations both internal and external to the joint force. The JFC chooses a wargame facilitator who orchestrates the conduct of the wargame and enables the JPG leader to adjudicate and capture wargame outcomes. In addition to standard participants that include the staffs of CCMD, CJTFs, Components, Major Subordinate Commands, Multinational Partners, and Interagency Partners, the wargame may include cells that enable the holistic execution of the cell. These cells include a red cell (vice a red team), white cell, blue cell, and green cell. Not all wargames will include all of the aforementioned. If possible, these cells should be a part of the entire JPP. Further information is provided below.

1) **Red Cell.**

a) **The J-2 staff, augmented by supporting CCMD J-2 personnel, will provide a red cell to role-play and model the enemies and others in the OE during planning and specifically during wargaming.** (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-51)
b) A robust, well-trained, imaginative, and skilled red cell that aggressively pursues the enemy’s point of view during wargaming is essential. By accurately portraying the full range of realistic capabilities and options available to the enemy (to include all aspects of operations in the information environment, which includes cyberspace and some electromagnetic and counter-space capabilities), they help the staff address friendly responses for each enemy COA. For campaign and noncombat operation planning, the red cell provides expected responses to US actions, based on their knowledge and analysis of the OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-52)

2) White Cell. A small cell of arbitrators normally composed of senior individuals familiar with the plan is a smart investment to ensure the wargame does not get bogged down in unnecessary disagreement or arguing. The white cell will provide overall oversight to the wargame and any adjudication required between participants. The white cell may also include the facilitator and/or highly qualified experts as required. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-52)

3) Green Cell. The green cell assists the JFC, staff and the JPG in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both the joint force and the threat. The cell includes subject matter experts that understand societal and cultural factors of the civil environment. The cell may represent transnational groups, multinational organizations and non-governmental organizations.

4) Blue Cell. The JFC through the JPG lead and wargame facilitator may choose to organize major subordinate commands and key elements of the joint force into a combined blue cell that enables ease of wargame execution.

(2) Wargame Execution.

(a) Key Considerations. As the JPG and white cell conduct the war game, they interpret the results of analysis to ensure each COA remains valid. If a COA is unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable, they must discard or modify that COA. The JPG may also find that it needs to combine aspects of COAs to develop new ones. Throughout the analysis and wargaming process, it easy to get lost in minutia, therefore the JPG must remain focused on the following areas:

- Wargame Objectives
- Balance between creativity and the realities of the OE.
- Key elements of operational design and operational design inputs to the planning process.
- Policy Goals and Operational Objectives
- Joint functions.

(b) Record the wargame. Proceedings of the war game can be recorded by a variety
of means. Whichever method of recording the war game is used, it is important to capture the decision points, CCIRs, COA adjustments, potential branches and sequels, and potential undesired effects. In most cases most cases are a combination of the following methods are used for recording the wargame:

1) **Narrative.** Narrative describing the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used.

2) **Sketch.** Sketch-note which uses a narrative but adds operational sketches to paint a clear picture.

3) **Synchronization matrix.** Synchronization matrices can be organized by time or major events as columns, with functional and other major activity areas as rows. If used as a recording tool, this would form the beginning of the synchronization matrix that will provide the commander and staff a visualization tool for the campaign. It can be refined throughout planning and should be updated throughout the campaign. The synchronization matrix helps staff officers build the detailed functional plans that support the campaign plan. 

   **Synchronization Matrix Key results that should be recorded include:**

   *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-53)*

   - Decision points, potential evaluation criteria, CCIRs, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels.
   - Refined event template.
   - Initial Decision Support Template (DST).
   - Decision Points and associated CCIRs. *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p.III-53)*

(c) **Evaluate the Results during Execution.** The analysis of COAs as a result of the war game should occur throughout the wargame while ensuring that the wargame meets all objectives. Because wargames are work intensive and emotional events there is a tendency to save analysis and evaluation for Step 5 of the JPP (COA Comparison). However, evaluation should occur regularly which will enable product preparation. **Evaluation should include but is not limited to the following areas.**

   - Propensity to achieve the desired operational environment. Will the COA achieve the objectives? How long will it take?
   - Advantages and disadvantages. What are the major elements of this COA that may present distinct advantages or disadvantages to the command?
   - Critical events, decision points, and CCIR. What are the critical events that will determine whether objectives are achieved? What may happen that will require a commander decision to change the plan? What information does the commander need to make that decision? What elements of assessment must be added to the plan?
   - Potential branches and sequels. What branches to the plan may be required to deal with possible deviations from the expected campaign? What branches or sequels may be required in the event of more rapid than expected success?
• Risks of undesirable effects. What is the potential second order effects of our actions (or of other actors’ actions) that may have to be mitigated?
• Strategic challenges that must be resolved. What strategic issues emerged that must be brought to the attention of higher commands or civil authorities or partners? What are some possible mitigation strategies to these challenges?

(3) Prepare Products. After the war game is complete, there should be sufficient visualization of the campaign to solidify the tasks required. Some of these tasks will be related directly to achieving effects that will enable objectives to be met, while others will be supporting tasks (such as building bases, establishing logistics stocks and resupply routes, conducting JRSOI). Visualization and decision-making tools that should come out of the evaluation include:

• Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and sequels identified.
• Information on commander’s evaluation criteria.
• Initial task organization.
• Critical events and decision points.
• Newly identified resource shortfalls.
• Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix.
• Initial DST/DSM.
• Refined synchronization matrix.
• Refined staff estimates.
• Assessment plan and criteria. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-54)

h. Other Post Wargame Actions.

(1) Wargame Results and Recommendations Brief to the JFC. While the JFC should and often does observe and participate in the wargame, an outbrief to the JFC is a good idea. The brief can include highlights of key wargame outputs especially those that require the JFC’s approval. For instance, refinement of CCIRs requires approval from the JFC. Another example is significant COA refinement that may mitigate risk and enable it to better achieve objectives. It is a good idea to reaffirm the approved COA Comparison criteria prior to entering step 5 of the JPP.

6. Course of Action Comparison (Step 5).

a. COA Comparison Overview.

(1) COA comparison is both a subjective and objective process whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The objective is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of accomplishing the mission and is acceptable. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-55).

(2) After rigorous independent analysis of each COA, the JPG compares the COAs
using a common set of criteria.

(3) **COA comparison facilitates the commander’s decision-making process by balancing the ends, means, ways, and risk of each COA.** … **COA comparison helps the commander answer the following questions:**

- What are the differences between each COA?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- What are the risks? (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-56)

(4) During the comparison process (See Figure 4-13 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved), the JPG focuses on evaluating the value of each COA through the commander’s eyes using his visualization of the campaign as the standard. The purpose of the comparison is to determine which COA is the best fit for his intent, with least cost and risk, and greatest chance of success. Using COA evaluation criteria that should have been approved prior to the COA Wargame and derived mostly from his intent and guidance, the staff evaluates the COAs against the evaluation criteria — not against one another — to identify the one that best meets the commander’s needs.

b. **Prepare for COA Comparison.** The commander and staff use the evaluation criteria **developed during mission analysis** to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. III-57) Even if the JFC chooses not to approve COA evaluation criteria during mission analysis, efforts should be made to develop the criteria and get those criteria approved prior to the COA Wargame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JPP Step 5 – Compare Courses of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary inputs:</strong> Refined COAs, Advantages and disadvantages, wargaming results, evaluation criteria, revised staff estimates,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Determine/define comparison/evaluation criteria (add/delete)
2. Define and determine the standards for each criterion.
3. Compare COAs using objective evaluation criteria
4. **ID the COA that performs best (within criteria) against enemy’s most likely and most dangerous COAs.**
   a) **ID advantages and disadvantages**
   b) **ID Risks**

| **Primary outputs:** Evaluated COAs, Recommended COA, COA selection rationale, Revised staff estimates, refined CCIR, Synchronization Matrices |

Figure 4-13: JPP Step 5 — Compare Courses of Action
(1) **Update/Refine comparison/evaluation criteria.** Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-57)

(a) Review commander’s guidance for relevant criteria. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-57)

(b) Identify implicit significant factors relating to the operation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-57)

(c) Each staff identifies criteria relating to that staff function. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-57)

(d) Other criteria might include:

- Political, social, and safety constraints; requirements for coordination with embassy/interagency personnel
- Fundamentals of joint warfare
- Elements of operational design
- Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation being conducted.
- Mission accomplishment
- Risks
- Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security)
- Costs
- Time.
- Force protection
- Casualties or collateral damage
- Use of Flexible Deterrent Options
- Impact on coalition interests

(c) **Determine the comparison method and record.** Actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the commander making the best decision. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. Examples of several decision matrices can be found in Appendix F, “Course of Action Comparison.” (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. 58)

(d) COA comparison **is subjective and should not be turned into a strictly mathematical process.** The key is to inform the commander why one COA is preferred over the others in terms of the evaluation criteria and the risk. If the COAs are developed for significantly different options, a side-by-side comparison for selection may not be appropriate, as they have differing end states. However, this provides the commander the ability to show senior leaders the costs and risks of differing options rather than just different COAs within a single option to support strategic decision making. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-58)
(1) As previously noted, the COAs are compared using the evaluation criteria that was established prior to the wargaming (and probably augmented as a result of wargaming). The inputs to COA comparison are the independent staff estimates and war game results. The JPG leader directs the comparison discussion. Staff planners normally conduct the comparison in isolation from the commander and may include the subordinate component staffs.

(2) The staff should remain as objective as possible when comparing the COAs and avoid manipulating criteria to promote a “favorite COA.” Weighting evaluation criteria is a frequent and often helpful technique to identify the most-critical criteria. Weighting, like evaluation criteria selection, should come prior to formal COA comparison to avoid assigned weight manipulation.

e. JPG process for COA selection recommendation to the JFC. After the comparison analysis, the staff must select the COA that they will recommend to the commander. This selection must consider not only the JPG analysis, but also each staff section’s functional analysis of the COAs. COA comparison is ultimately a subjective process that uses collective staff judgment and should not become a purely mathematical exercise, though using “+,-, 0” or 1, 2, 3 as expressions of relative value may be appropriate. The key element in this process is the ability to articulate to the commander why one COA is preferred over another in terms of how well the COA meets the evaluation criteria. Using some type of decision matrix may help but be careful to keep it as objective as possible. In essence, the staff is trying to use a measure of objectivity to evaluate and differentiate subjectivity. See Figure 4-14 and 4-15 for examples.

(1) One type of COA comparison matrix uses weighted numerical comparisons. In this method, each criterion is given a comparative weight based on its importance. This weight likely would be derived from commander’s intent and guidance. Because the COAs are compared to the evaluation criteria, rather than to each other, there is no need to identify the 1st, 2nd, 3rd “place” COAs for each criterion. If “+,-, 0” is used, “+” means it does well in meeting the criteria, “-” means it does not do as well, and “0” means it is balanced. If 1-3 is used as a scale, lower is better, so 1 means that the COA meets the evaluation criteria well, 3 means not well, and 2 is in the middle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>COA #1 Score</th>
<th>COA #1 Weighted</th>
<th>COA #2 Score</th>
<th>COA #2 Weighted</th>
<th>COA #3 Score</th>
<th>COA #3 Weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to Alliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-14: Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Weighted Numerical)

(2) Some commanders are less comfortable with numerical ways to present the comparison. Another type of comparison matrix is below. Each COA is described in terms of advantage or disadvantage against the evaluation criteria.
7. Approve a Course of Action (Step 6). In this JPP step, the staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. The staff determines the preferred COA to recommend to the Commander. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-58). See Figure 4-16 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved in COA Approval. The aim is to obtain his decision on which COA to develop into the concept of operations (CONOPS) of the campaign. This enables the commander to refine his visualization of the campaign and provide further guidance to the staff on how to proceed with CONOPS development.

   a. Prepare and Present the COA Decision Briefing. The staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison, COA analysis, and wargaming results. The briefing should include a review of important supporting information such as the current status of the joint force, the current JIPOE, and assumptions used in COA development. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COA #1</td>
<td>•Rapid Delivery</td>
<td>•Rough integration of forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Meets Critical Needs</td>
<td>•Rough transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•Complex organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•Not flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•Marginally adequate force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COA #2</strong></td>
<td>•Rapid Delivery</td>
<td>•Complex organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Meets critical needs</td>
<td>•Marginally flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Smooth integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Smooth transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Adequate Force Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA #3</td>
<td>•Smooth integration</td>
<td>•Slower delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Smooth transition</td>
<td>•Does not meet all critical needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Simple organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Adequate force protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-15: Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Descriptive)
JPP Step 6 – Course of Action Approval

Primary inputs: Refined COAs, recommended COA, Cmdr’s personal analysis, **COA selection rationale, refined CCIR, revised staff estimates**

1. Prepare the COA Comparison/Decision Brief
2. **Recommend COA to Cdr**
3. Commander Selects/Modifies the COA
4. **Receive Cdr guidance for plan development**
5. **Confirm refined Commander’s Intent**
6. Refine Selected COA
7. **Update staff estimates**
8. Prepare the ‘Commander’s Estimate’ if required.
9. **CJCS Estimate Review**

Primary outputs: Commander’s COA selection with modifications, Refined Commander’s Intent, Commander’s Estimate (if required), **Guidance for plan development**

---

b. Recommend COA to the commander. During the brief (see Figure 4-17 for an example agenda), it is important that dissenting views be heard so that the commander can understand all aspects of the analysis. Staff officers should be encouraged to expound on issues in their functional areas if needed. Subordinate commands should be present or linked via video-teleconference. Other partners also should be invited to the brief, to include other government agencies and key multinational partners, to the extent possible or appropriate. Staff officers from those organizations are probably part of the JPG, so there should be no surprises.
COA Decision Brief

1. Purpose of the briefing
2. Update the Opposing Situation – Strength, Composition, Location, Disposition, Reinforcements, Logistics, Time, Space, Combat Efficiency
3. Update the understanding of the operational environment
4. Update the understanding of the problem
5. Update the friendly situation (military forces and other relevant elements of power)
6. Mission statement & Commander’s Intent
7. Present each COA
   - Updates to Assumptions, Limitations, COGs, Phasing, LOO/LOE
   - Narrative and/or sketch
   - COA Architecture – Task Org, Command Relationships, OA Org
   - Major differences between each COA
   - Advantages/disadvantages/risks
   - Needed branches, changes, resources
   - Summary of the COA
8. COAs Analysis
   - Review of War gaming efforts
   - Added considerations (based off staff/Cmdr’s experience)
9. COA Comparison
   - Description of Evaluation/Comparison Criteria & methodology
   - Comparison using evaluation criteria
10. COA Recommendations
    - Staff & Components

**Figure 4-17: Sample COA Decision Brief Agenda**

c. Commander Selects/Modifies the COA. The commander, upon receiving the staff’s recommendation, combines personal analysis with the staff recommendation, resulting in a selected COA. It gives the staff a concise statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for planning and plan development. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. III-59) **The commander may:**

- Concur with staff/component recommendations, as presented.
- Concur with recommended COAs, but with modifications.
- Select a different COA from the staff/component recommendation.
- Combine COAs to create a new COA.
- Reject all and start over with COA development or mission analysis.
- Defer the decision and consult with selected staff/commanders prior to making a final decision. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-59)

d. Receive commander’s guidance for concept development. As part of the COA decision brief, or following it, the commander will likely provide additional guidance that will guide the development of the approved COA into the concept of operations (CONOPS).

e. Confirm updated commander’s intent. Upon hearing the analysis of the COAs, the
commander is likely to understand the environment and the problem(s) better. This may cause commanders to adapt their intent/guidance. This is an opportunity for the commander to transmit any updates to the staff and other relevant planning parties.

f. **Refine the Selected COA.** Once the commander selects a COA, the staff will begin the refinement process of that COA into a clear decision statement to be used in the commander’s estimate. At the same time, the staff will apply a final “acceptability” check. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (1) Staff refines commander’s COA selection into clear decision statement.

   (a) Develop a brief statement that **clearly and concisely** sets forth the COA selected and provides whatever info is necessary to develop a plan for the operation (no defined format). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (b) Describe what the force is to do as a whole, and as much of the elements of when, where, and how as may be appropriate. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (c) Express decision in terms of what is to be accomplished, if possible. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (d) Use simple language so the meaning is unmistakable. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (e) Include statement of what is acceptable risk. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (f) Realize that many simulations are unable to capture qualitative data within the information environment, which must be taken into account when assessing results from wargames. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   (2) Apply final “acceptability” check.

      (a) Apply experience and an understanding of situation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

      (b) Consider factors of acceptable risk versus desired objectives consistent with higher commander’s intent ... Determine if gains are worth expenditures. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61)

   g. **Update staff estimates.** Once the commander makes a decision on a COA, provides any additional guidance, and updates his intent, staff officers record this new information and refine their estimates of the campaign’s supportability from their functional viewpoint.
h. Prepare the Commander’s Estimate. The commander’s estimate provides a **concise narrative statement** of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and contingency plan development. Further, it responds to the establishing authority’s requirement to develop a plan for execution. The commander’s estimate provides a continuously updated source of information from the perspective of the commander. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-61).

The Commander’s Estimate also provides the necessary focus for continued campaign planning and for developing an OPLAN/ OPORD. (See Figure 4-18 for a potential outline for this estimate).

With appropriate horizontal and vertical coordination, the commander’s COA selection may be briefed to and approved by SecDef. The commander’s estimate then becomes a matter of formal record keeping and guidance for component and supporting forces. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-62)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander’s Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Purpose of the Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Description of Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Situation and Courses of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Comparison of Friendly Courses of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recommendation (or Decision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remarks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Remarks – cite plan identification number of the file where detailed requirements have been loaded into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (or Adaptive Planning and Execution System)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-18: Commander’s Estimate Outline** (Example format is in Appendix E)

i. Conduct CJCS Estimate Review and possible IPR. During this Review and IPR, the CJCS and SecDef (or his representative) will consider the CCDR’s analysis and approve (or modify) the CONOPS for further development. The estimate review determines whether
the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission, determines whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available resources in the timeframes contemplated by the plan, and ensures the plan is proportional and worth the expected costs. As planning is approved by SecDef (or designated representative) during an IPR, the commander’s estimate informs the refinement of the initial CONOPS for the plan. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-62)

8. Plan or Order Development (Step 7). After the commander has approved a course of action and provided additional guidance to the staff for development of the CONOPS and the full plan (with updates as required after any IPRs for combatant commands), the staff develops the CONOPS into an operations plan or operations order. See Figure 4-19 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved. The CONOPS must be developed to provide the detail required for the staff to build the base plan and prepare supporting annexes, and supporting and subordinate organizations to build supporting functional plans.

![JPP Step 7 - Plan or Order Development](image)

Figure 4-19: JPP Step 7 — Develop the Plan

a. The CONOPS:

(1) States the commander’s intent. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-62)
(2) Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)

(3) Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations as appropriate). (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)

(4) Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to conduct operations and give or refuse battle, if required. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)


(6) Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)

(7) Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)

(8) Relates the joint force’s objectives and desired effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)

(9) Planning results in a plan that is documented in the format of a plan or an order. If execution is imminent or in progress, the plan is typically documented in the format of an order. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed plan or OPORD by refining the initial CONOPS associated with the approved COA. The CONOPS is the centerpiece of the plan or OPORD. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-63)

(10) If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrants execution via a series of related operations, then the staff outlines the CONOPS as a campaign. They develop the preliminary part of the operational campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander’s concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. III-64)

b. Format of Military Plans and Orders. Plans and orders can come in many varieties from very detailed campaign plans and contingency plans to simple verbal orders. They may also include orders and directives such
as OPORDs, WARNORDs, PLANORDs, ALERTORDs, EXORDs, FRAGORDs, PTDOs, and DEPORDs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-64)

c. JS and CCMD Plans.

(1) For most plans and orders, the CJCS monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported commander’s plan for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with policy and joint doctrine. When required, the commander will conduct one or more IPRs with SecDef (or designated representative) to confirm the plan’s strategic guidance, assumptions (including timing and national-level decisions required), any limitations (restrictions and constraints), the mission statement, the operational approach, key capability shortfalls, areas of risk, acceptable levels of risk, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. During the IPRs, the CJCS and the USD(P) will separately address issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review (e.g., key risks, decision points). Commanders should show how the plan supports the objectives identified in the NDS, CPG, NMS, or JSCP and identify the links to other plans, both within the AOR (or functional area) and with those of other CCMDs. The result of an IPR should include an endorsement of the planning to date or acknowledgement of friction points and guidance to shape continued planning. All four operational activities (situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment) continue in a complementary and iterative process. CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, provides further details on the IPR process. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-64)

(2) The JFC guides plan development by issuing a PLANORD or similar planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. A number of activities are associated with plan development (See Figure 4-20). These planning activities typically will be accomplished in a concurrent, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than sequentially, depending largely on the planning time available. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and eliminate shortfalls and conflicts within their command and with the other CCMDs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. III-65)
d. Plan or Order Development. The 9 activities shown in Figure 4-18 are covered in detail in JP 5-0. While this section of the CPH provides an overview of executing these activities, one can reference Chapter III for further details of each of the 9 activities. The potential steps below lay out a way to conduct these activities. While it makes sense to conduct them sequentially, in reality many occur simultaneously and are adjusted as necessary when significant changes happen within other activities (e.g., the Force Planners will begin building the TPFDD and make adjustments as the support planning adjusts what and when units are needed).

(1) Review planning guidance. The staff should review the commander’s guidance as updated throughout the planning process and as modified as a result of the IPR and associated discussions by the commander.

(2) Update the commander’s intent. The commander should republish his intent, with any changes to it that may result from his increased understanding of the OE and the problem, and his vision for the campaign.

(3) Phase the concept. Refine the phasing of the operation or campaign. Each phase is designed to nest with the intent for the overall campaign and sequenced to achieve an end state that will set conditions for commencement of the next phase. The commander will declare his intent for each phase that supports his overall intent for the operation or campaign. Each phase must have a specified set of conditions for both the beginning and intended end state. Leaders should recognize that lines of operation or effort are likely to run throughout the phases to provide the logical framework for the entire operation or campaign. Each operation or campaign is unique, and the phasing must make sense.
for the campaign. While phases should ideally be flexibly event-oriented, the staff must also consider the time-oriented resourcing requirements for the activities of each phase.

In the past, Joint doctrine prescribed six standard phases—shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority—but the doctrinal rigidity was problematic in describing operations that were not predominately military. While it worked well for operations such as Desert Storm, it was not useful for long term campaigns and competition activities that occur below the level of armed conflict (e.g., U.S. actions toward Russian Ukraine). Joint doctrine still calls for the use of phasing to organize and conduct complex joint operations in manageable parts... phasing should help the commander and staff understand the sequence of actions forces must execute to be successful (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. IV-37). Phases should be adapted to the environment, the problem, and the operational approach—not vice versa.

For each phase, the campaign’s CONOPS should describe the following elements.

(a) Intent and schemes of movement and maneuver. The commander’s intent for the phase must be clear. Describe the purpose, end state, and the operational risk to the campaign during this phase. The schemes of movement and maneuver may be narratives of the various lines of operation and effort as they are executed during this particular phase. The flow of forces and capability into theater are broadly described as are subsequent joint force maneuver schemes to achieve the various operational objectives. In campaigns where LOEs are used (as opposed to LOOs) and/or where positional advantage may not be consistently critical to success, the scheme of maneuver uses the logic of purpose and may describe how and when certain objectives within each LOE must be achieved, especially in relation to the objectives on the other LOEs of the campaign.

(b) Objectives and effects (desired and undesired). Describe the objectives for each phase, and the major effects that must be achieved to realize those objectives. Describe how the force’s objectives are related to those of the next higher organization and to other organizations (especially if the military is a supporting effort).

(c) Tasks to subordinate and supporting commands and agencies. The commander assigns tasks to subordinate commanders, along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on that specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domain (air, land, sea, or space) or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Include identification of requests for support to organizations outside of DOD.

(d) Command and control organization and geometry of the area of operations. Note any changes to the command and control structure or to the geometry of the area of responsibility (for combatant commands) or joint operations area (for subordinate joint forces) or area of operations (for subordinate non-joint forces).

(e) Assessment methodology. Identify the basic methodology for assessing accomplishment of objectives. Include assessments to help gauge if the objectives actually support achievement of the end state.
(f) Risk mitigation. Identify the areas of risk concern to the commander and outline how the risk may be mitigated.

(g) CCIR and associated decision points.

(h) Transition to the next phase. Describe how the joint force will move to the next phase. Describe the end state conditions for the phase, which should tie directly to the initiation conditions for the next phase. Include a description of transition of control from the joint force to other parties for aspects of the overall campaign.

(4) Develop supporting functional concepts. Once the general CONOPS is built, supporting concepts are built to ensure supportability and coordination among all of the functions. Some of the key functional concepts are for logistics support, force projection, information operations, joint fires, force protection, and command, control, and communications. The staff will review the functional concepts to ensure coordination.

(5) Synchronization. Synchronization of the plan takes place once all of the supporting concepts have been developed. Synchronization is the art of arranging all activities (military and otherwise) in the right sequence and place, with the right purpose, to produce maximum effect at the decisive points. Synchronization will continue after development of the plan, through brief-backs, rehearsals, and execution. A synchronized and fully integrated CONOPS becomes the Base Plan. For Level 2 plans, this is the end of plan development, other than coordination.

(6) Expand the CONOPS into a Base Plan with annexes. “Management and Review of campaign and Contingency Plans” (CJCSI 3141.01F) provides specific guidance and procedures on the activities for organizations to prepare required plans and concepts. It directs the typical activities that other organizations will accomplish as they plan for joint operations. For example, a combatant command which is preparing a crisis-related OPORD at the President’s direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification.

(a) The staff and supporting commands focus on developing a cohesive and detailed plan for how to employ forces and capabilities throughout the campaign to realize the commander’s vision. As the CONOPS develops into a fully detailed plan, a number of activities coincide in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than in a sequential and time-consuming manner. Time is always a factor; conducting simultaneous, synchronized development activities at all levels will be critical to shorten the planning cycle and make best use of the limited time available.

(b) Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, shortfall identification, revised JIPOE, changes to strategic guidance, or changes to the commander’s guidance resulting from his continuous operational design of the campaign. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with changes typically transmitted in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGO) rather than revised copies of the plan or order.
(7) **Support planning.** Support planning is conducted concurrently with force planning to determine and sequence logistics and personnel support in accordance with the plan CONOPS. Support planning includes all core logistics functions: deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistic services, OCS, health services, and engineering. ([JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-68](https://www.dtic.mil)). It encompasses such essential factors as:

- Concept of Logistics Support which should at a minimum include the below:
  - Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)
  - Lead Service (if necessary)
  - Base Operating Support-Integrator
  - Partner Nation Support and HNS

- Responsibilities
- Logistics Support Analysis (LSAs)
- Transportation Refinement
- Airfield operations
- Management of non-unit replacements
- Health service support
- Personnel management
- Financial management
- Handling of prisoners of war and detainees
- Theater civil engineering policy
- Logistics-related environmental considerations
- Support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations
- Executive agent identification

(a) Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service Component Commanders who identify and update support requirements in coordination with the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and USTRANSCOM. They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items, determine host-nation support (HNS) availability, develop plans for total asset visibility, and establish phased delivery plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the concept. They develop battle damage repair programs, repairable retrograde plans, container management plans, force and line-of-communications protection plans, supporting phased transportation and support plans aligned to the strategic concept, and report movement support requirements. Service Component Commanders continue to refine their sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements. The requirements and transportation planning must be integrated and coordinated by the CCDR to ensure synchronization with the concept of operations, to reduce redundancies and manage risk, and to integrate transportation requirements with the force flow.

(8) **Force planning.** The primary purposes of force planning are to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CONOPS, accounting for attrition and capability decrements resulting from contested environments, and effectively phase the forces into the OA. Force
planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force requirements review, major force phasing, integration planning, and force list refinement ... Proper force planning allows the identification of preferred forces to be selected for planning and included in the supported commander’s CONOPS by operation phase, mission, and mission priority. Service components and supporting CCDRs then collaboratively determine the specific decision points that enable deployment and sustainment capabilities required in accordance with the CONOPS. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-66)

Force planning begins early during concept development but must be refined and finalized during detailed planning. There must be a balance between the flexibility provided by the plan and the requirements to identify forces, recalling that inclusion in a plan implies a level of preparation requirement for units. The commander determines force requirements, develops a letter of instruction for time phasing and force planning, and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in accordance with the concept under development. Major forces and elements initially come from those apportioned or allocated for planning by operational phase, mission, and mission priority. Service components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the specific combat and supporting capabilities required. The commands should not be constrained by the apportioned forces but must be able to provide clear rationale for capabilities required that are not apportioned. The commander typically describes force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances.

After sourcing the actual forces, the CCDR’s staff refines the force plan to ensure it supports the concept, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander identifies and resolves shortfalls, or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment during his review. The supported CCDR submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing as described in Appendix B.

(9) Deployment and redeployment planning. The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of entry operations, deployment concept, mobility options, pre-deployment training, and force integration requirements. The CCDR is responsible for developing the deployment concept and identifying pre-deployment requirements. The combatant command is also responsible for movement planning, manifested through the TPFDD file, assisted by the force providers and USTRANSCOM. In particular, USTRANSCOM robustly assists with current analysis and assessment of movement C2 structures and systems, available organic, strategic, and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions. All parties recognize that operational requirements may change, resulting in changes to the movement plan. Planners must understand and anticipate the physical limitations of movement assets and infrastructure, and the impact of change, since any change will have an effect on the rest of the TPFDD. Finally, the supported command is responsible for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) planning. JRSOI planning ensures an integrated joint force arrives and becomes operational in the area of operations as required.

The supported command, in coordination with the Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, force providers, and supporting commands, conducts a refinement conference for deployment and JRSOI. The purpose of this conference is to ensure the force deployment plan maintains force mobility throughout any movements, continuous force visibility and tracking, effective
force preparation, and full integration of forces into a joint operation while enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines planned missions, the priority of themissions within the operational phases, and the forces assigned to those missions.

(10) Shortfall identification. Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall ID is conducted throughout the plan development process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors, capability shortfalls, and associated risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander resolves the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the JCS consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the completion of plan development is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-71)

(11) Feasibility analysis. The focus in this activity is to ensure assigned mission accomplishment using available resources within the plan’s contemplated time frame. The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors analyzed for feasibility include sustainment forces, resources, and transportation. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-72). The goal is to determine whether the apportioned or allocated resources can deploy to the joint operational area when required, be sustained throughout the operation, and be employed effectively, or whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting capabilities. Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.

(12) Documentation. When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-end transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the supported CCDR, the supported CCDR completes the documentation of the plan or OPORD and coordinates access with respective JPEC stakeholders to the TPFDD as appropriate. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-72) To ensure future planners can understand the history of decisions made (who, when, why, etc.), the planning products should be organized and put into proper documentation so that they can be stored and referenced when necessary. This step is difficult to manage because planners are quickly pulled away to work on other plans. However, if this step is not conducted, planners may find themselves “reinventing” the wheel, disconnecting future actions from a planned campaign or scrambling to find information during investigations or Congressional inquiries.

(13) Movement Plan Review and Approval. When the plan or OPORD is complete, JS J-5 coordinates with the JPEC for review. The JPEC reviews the plan or OPORD and provides the results of the review to the
supported and supporting CCDRs and the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and provides recommendations to SecDef, if necessary. The JCS provides a copy of the plan to OSD to facilitate parallel review of the plan, decisions, and authorities required, and to inform USD(P)’s recommendation of approval/disapproval to SecDef. After the CJCS’s and USD(P)’s review, SecDef or the President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The President or SecDef is the final approval authority for OPORDs, depending upon the subject matter. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-72)

e. Transition. Effective transition of the plan from the planners who have been intimately involved in developing all of the details of the plan, to the operators, who will not be as familiar with the intricate details of the plan, is critical. Transition is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the CONOPS, promote unity of effort, and generate tempo. ... Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate commands. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-73)

(1) Transition Brief. At higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to supporting, subordinate, or adjacent commanders, and to the staff supervising, provides an overview of the mission, commander’s intent, task organization, and the assessed enemy and friendly situation. The brief may include items from the order or plan such as:

- Higher headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent.
- Mission.
- Commander’s intent.
- CCIRs.
- Task organization.
- Situation (friendly and enemy forces and other threats).
- Neutral networks and nonmilitary considerations.
- CONOPS.
- Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
- Planning support tools (such as a synchronization matrix).
(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-73)

(2) Confirmation Brief. A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of commander’s
intent, their specific tasks and purpose, and the relationship between their unit’s missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the commander insights into how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their missions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(3) Transition Drills. Transition drills increase the situational awareness of subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(4) Plan Implementation. Plan implementation is the hardest thing for any large organization to do. This is especially true of military campaign plans, contingency plans and operations. The largest hindrance to plan implementation is use of the wrong staff organization, wrong command relationships, and the wrong command and control structure. Military plans and orders should be prepared to facilitate implementation and transition to execution. For a plan to be implemented, the following products and activities must occur: (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(a) Confirm assumptions. Analyze the current OE and establish as fact any assumptions made during plan development. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(b) Model the TPFDD to confirm the sourcing and transportation feasibility assessment. Validate that force and mobility resources used during plan development are currently available. Many critical capabilities reside in the Reserve Component (e.g., air and seaport opening), so planners need to know the mobilization authorities as they relate to deployment timelines. Additionally, as reserve units deactivate due to force structure changes, staffs have to revalidate TPFDDs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(c) Establish execution timings. Set timelines to initiate operations to allow synchronization of execution. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(d) Confirm authorities for execution. Request and receive the President or SecDef authority to conduct military operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(e) Conduct execution sourcing from assigned and available forces. If force requirements exceed the capability and capacity of assigned and available forces, submit an emergent RFF through the GFM process, which facilitates a risk-informed SecDef decision to allocate/re-allocate forces from other CCMDs or Services. Develop
new assumptions, if required. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

(f) Issue necessary orders for execution. The CJCS issues orders implementing the directions of the President or SecDef to conduct military operations. CCDRs subsequently issue their own orders directing the activities of subordinate commanders. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. III-74)

f. The planning requirements described above enable good coordination of the plan. The supported command’s CONOPS drives the supporting concepts, but not until the supported command completes coordination of all of the annexes to the plan can the supporting commands and agencies ensure that they have addressed all of the requirements adequately. Supported commands review all of the supporting plans once they are prepared to ensure that the plan is fully coordinated.

g. Planning for multinational operations is coordinated through various means. Individual treaty or alliance procedures set the stage for collective-security goals, strategies, and combined OPLANs, in accordance with U.S. doctrine and procedures. Thus, much guidance for joint operations is conceptually applicable to alliance and coalition planning; the fundamental issues are much the same. Host-nation support and mutual support agreements facilitate combined operations. Coordination of planning is through established, coalition bodies, and at the theater and operational levels by CCDRs or other subordinate U.S. joint commands who are charged with operational planning matters. This coordination should be continuous throughout the operational design and planning of the campaign, but there must also be a formal coordination step to validate that all of the coordination has been completed and accepted by all parties.

h. In a similar vein, coordination of the plan with interagency partners is conducted both informally and formally. CCDRs and JFCs should encourage and solicit maximum participation of appropriate interagency planners in the operational design of campaigns and operations. Their participation throughout planning is extremely beneficial to expand the perspectives and expertise provided in operational design and in achieving unity of purpose and then unity of effort in the campaign or operation. However, formal coordination of OPLANs is done at the Department level, once an OPLAN is approved by the SecDef.
1. Introduction. The NSS is required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by DOD relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting documents (e.g., the NDS and NMS). Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) develop a CCMD strategy that links national strategic direction to joint planning. CCDRs provide guidance that covers a narrower range of theater or functional situations. Documents such as the UCP, NMS, CPG, and JSCP provide near-term (0-2 years) strategic guidance, and the CCDR’s theater or functional strategy provides the mid- to long-term (greater than 3 years) CCMD vision for the AOR or global employment of functional capabilities prepared in the context of SecDef’s priorities. CCDR strategy links national strategic direction to joint planning. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. II-3 and III-14)

   a. The President, aided by the NSC, establishes policy and strategic objectives through continuous iteration. In parallel, SecDef translates the emerging policy into guidance that facilitates joint planning. CCDRs participate in strategic discussions with the President and SecDef, usually with the CJCS. CCDRs also participate in strategic discussions with allies and multinational partners. Thus, the CCDR’s strategy relates to both US national strategy and joint campaigns and operations within the AOR. This analysis informs the development of the strategic-level objectives, identifies obstacles to the achievement of these objectives, the associated narrative, required level of commitment, and the allocation of national resources to achieve those objectives. The strategy, derived from strategic direction and informed by planning, provides a framework for conducting campaigns and subordinate operations, activities, and investments at accepted levels of risk. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations and Campaigns, I-11)

   b. CCDRs use strategic guidance and direction to prepare command strategies focused on their command’s specific capabilities and missions to link national strategic guidance to theater or functional strategies and joint operations. The command strategy, like national strategy, identifies the command’s broad, long-range objectives that contribute to national security. The command strategy provides the link between national strategic guidance and joint planning. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, II-8)

   c. The purpose of CCMD strategy is to clarify and exert influence over the environment
of today to create strategic effects favorable to achievement of the desired environment of tomorrow. CCMD strategy must be framed in terms that allow adaptability and flexibility to react to the changing environment, to seize opportunities, and to hedge against setbacks. CCDRs develop a CCMD strategy focused on military objectives across the competition continuum for their area of responsibility that will further the national interests. Additionally, CCDRs assigned as a coordination authority for a primary threat listed in the NDS/NMS will describe desired conditions to be coordinated in other CCDR AORs necessary to achieve national ends.

In time of war, the President or SecDef may designate a theater of war, in which case a CCDR, or an assigned subordinate commander, may develop a CCMD strategy for the accomplishment of national or coalition aims within that theater of war. However, for the purposes of this chapter, our point of reference for developing a CCMD strategy is the CCDR’s assigned AOR in the Unified Command Plan. Note that the thought process for developing a strategy for a theater of war would be very similar.

d. Commanders and their staffs employ Strategic Art and Operational Art to develop a Strategic Estimate (Provides a format for capturing the four frames of operational design/output from the nine-step process) and their CCMD Strategy (Turns Strategic Estimate into a narrative format and includes a refined strategic approach).

(1) **Strategic art.** Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. xii)

(2) **Operational art.** Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. xii)

(3) **Linkage between Strategic art and Operational art.** Strategic art and operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to objectives, while operational art demonstrates the feasibility and efficacy of a strategy. Operational planning translates strategy into executable activities, operations, and campaigns, within resource and policy limitations to achieve objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. xii)

(4) **Strategic estimate.** The CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate commands and supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing and describing the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) factors and trends, key relationships and links between relevant actors or networks, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objectives over the timeframe of the strategy. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. II-9)

e. **The policy-strategy interaction.** Strategy is always subordinate to policy. However, there is a two-way dependent relationship between policy and strategy. Though many in the
military would like to be given clear policy aims and then be left alone to apply military power to achieve them, in reality, it does not work that way—nor should military strategists want it to work that way. In fact, there is a dynamic between policy aims and strategy (use of the instruments of power to achieve the aims). Strategy must be clear and flexible to react to changing policy aims. Political aims may evolve even as the strategy is being implemented and the effects of that strategy are seen. Policy may change in reaction to unanticipated opportunities or challenges. The CCDR must keep national policy makers informed of changes to the environment that affect such policy decisions and to provide advice on the potential outcomes of changing policy aims. Senior military commanders must be completely frank about the limits of what military power can achieve, with what risk, in what time frame, and at what cost. The CCDR must bridge the inevitable friction that policy and politics create when developing strategy.

2. Sources of Guidance and Direction for Theater/Functional (CCMD) Strategies.

a. The combatant command translates national policy and strategy into military ways. The guidance to the CCDR formulating the CCMD strategy comes from a variety of formal and informal sources. Very often, the national policy and corresponding guidance is not explicit. This places a premium on the CCDR’s ability to interpret, analyze, and synthesize the many sources of national intent, and then communicate this synthesis back to the national policy makers to ensure that he/she is in sync with their vision (in fact, the CCDR may actually shape their vision). Chapter 1 of this handbook describes the CPG, NDS, NMS, and JSCP, as sources of formal guidance. However, in a dynamic strategic environment, policy may evolve and the CCDR must stay attuned to evolving descriptions and applications of national interests as described by the President, SecDef, and other senior government officials through less formal means such as speeches, social media, and verbal guidance. Though not directive in nature, guidance contained in various U.S. interagency and even international directives, such as UN Security Council Resolutions, will also impact campaign end states and objectives. Perhaps most importantly, the CCDR must continually analyze the dynamic relationships within the theater to describe the desired end state and present limitations on ways to achieve that end state.

b. Identifying and collaborating with stakeholders. CCDRs must coordinate and synchronize their strategies and implementation activities with other stakeholders, to include non-DOD government agencies and other nations. One critical partner is the Department of State (DOS), which provides some guidance and many of the resources for the CCDR’s theater security cooperation program, which is vital to the implementation of the CCMD strategy. Similarly, other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), routinely conduct developmental activities in countries of the region, requiring the CCDR to ensure compatibility between military activities and USAID activities. The CCDR’s staff may have to find ways to work through some policy interpretations that might inhibit formal coordination with non-DOD executive branch agencies. The CCDR should coordinate closely with international partners, to include nations, international organizations, and non-governmental and private organizations. Though it is not always realistic to align goals and activities among all stakeholders, it is important to understand the purpose of the other activities, and to work towards mutual benefit when possible. On the other hand, the CCDR should be aware of competing agendas and activities by other non-U.S. organizations (and, in rare cases, U.S. organizations) that may present obstacles to achievement of the CCMD strategy objectives. Formally, the CCDR works through OSD to reconcile and synchronize
activities with other organizations, but an informal coordination network is also crucial to success. It is important to consider that non-military and international actors have legitimate agendas and will be active (sometimes the lead) players to a greater or lesser extent across the full spectrum of conflict.

3. **Components of Theater Strategy.** A recommended theater strategy consists at a minimum of:

   a. **Strategic Estimate.** The strategic estimate is an analytical tool available to CCDRs before developing theater or functional strategies; theater, functional or DOD-wide campaign plans, subordinate campaign plans; and OPLANs. Strategic estimates provide the commander’s perspective of the strategic and operational levels of the OE, threats and opportunities that could facilitate or hinder the achievement of NDS- and NMS-directed objectives, desired changes to meet specified regional or functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of how those objectives might be achieved. Developed annually and regularly updated, the strategic estimate is the basis for developing the CCDR’s theater or functional strategy.

   The CCDR, the CCMD staff, supporting commands, and agencies assess the broad strategic factors that influence OE, thus informing the ends, ways, means, and risks involved in achieving the prescribed campaign objectives. Both supported and supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple commands may prepare strategic estimates for each supporting operation.

   Section B of Annex B in JP 5-0, “Notional Strategic Estimate Format,” presents a format a CCMD Staff can use as a guide when developing a strategic estimate. The J-5 may provide the lead staff organization for the conduct of the strategic estimate with significant participation from the other staff directorates. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors.

   The result of the strategic estimate is a better understanding and visualization of the complete OE. The strategic estimate process is dynamic and continuous and provides input for developing theater strategies and campaign plans. This strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting more detailed staff estimates as well as the commander’s estimate of the situation for a potential contingency.

   The CCDRs strategic estimate should identify potential for spillover, both from the AOR and functional area perspective, into other CCDRs’ AORs or functional areas and into the CCDR’s AOR or functional area, based on operations and activities outside the AOR. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-1)

   b. **The Commander’s Vision.** The commander’s vision articulated in the strategic estimate directs the end state. Each subordinate commander must also possess the ability to envision the organization’s desired
end state, as well as those desired by their opposition counterpart. Staff estimates contribute to this vision. Failure to make staff estimates can lead to errors and omissions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. C-1)

c. The Command’s Strategy Mission (10-30 years). This is optional and is heavily debated as to whether or not a GCC/FCC can have a long-term command strategy mission statement that covers a timeframe of 10-30 years and a separate 5-year campaign plan mission. It is truly up to the CCDR. If CCDR chooses a long-term separate command strategy mission statement, then it should be broad while the CCMD campaign mission statement determined and approved during JPP will be more detailed in regard to the 5 W’s.

d. Assumptions. The assumptions should be directly tied to the risk assessment contained in the strategic estimate. Risk mitigation linked to potential invalid assumptions could include potential contingency plans. While individual contingency plan details will normally not be included in command strategies (especially if unclassified), the overall risk-mitigation should be discussed in concert with assumptions.

e. Ends. “Ends” is a word that may cause some friction with interagency partners. Military efforts are almost by definition bounded in time, space, and effect. At some point, military operations and activities cease when required conditions have been achieved that will place the environment into a favorable and sustainable state. However, senior civilian and military leaders know that the environment will continue to change based on forces acting on the system. An effective military campaign or operation should be planned and executed with a viewpoint towards positive sustainable outcomes. Sustainable (with favorable trends) without the presence of military forces and eventually sustainable with little or no requirement for U.S. resources. In a planning context, (and to be consistent with doctrine) the ends for the theater (and globe if assigned as a coordinating authority for a priority threat from the NDS/NMS) describe system conditions required to achieve the national aims as derived from various sources of strategic guidance. The comprehensive aims will likely not be clearly and completely laid out in directive guidance to the CCDR, so he/she must combine guidance with an understanding of the environment to clearly describe the set of conditions in the theater (global if assigned as coordinating authority) environment that will further national interests. Theater Strategies typically look 10-30 years into the future. This set of desired conditions (with time horizons) describes the desired end state, which provides the context for understanding what aspects of the current environment must change or must remain the same. CCMD ends must nest with strategic direction/guidance and/or policy. Ends should be resource informed/achievable with projected resources.

f. Ways. The command strategy ways are the strategic approach to the application of military power to be used in concert with the other instruments of power towards a unified action that also takes into account our multinational partners. The strategy’s ways describe the strategic approach to achieving the end state. This strategic approach should describe in general how resources (means) will be applied over time to achieve the desired conditions. It describes the general activities needed to accomplish the objectives (which, in turn, achieve the desired theater conditions). (In some interagency circles, the word “objective” may sound too military-oriented. Interagency planners should feel free to substitute another term like “outcome” to overcome semantic differences.) The strategic approach should be explicit
enough to provide sufficient guidance to planners, but not so detailed as to inhibit their creativity. One way to lay out the strategic approach is to develop lines of effort that lead to accomplishment of the objectives. If used, LOEs should also consider potential second and third order effects that will cascade towards achievement of other strategic effects. The strategist must also anticipate potential undesired effects and work to avoid or mitigate them. There are five primary ways Combatant Commands employ command strategies and campaigns.

(1) **Engagements.** This is often mistakenly taken to mean key leader engagements. While key leader engagements are a key element in commands engagement plan, all engagements must be aligned to strategy and campaign ends. Command strategy engagement guidance will be broad focusing on key areas of engagements. Campaign engagements plans will be more detailed and require constant synchronization with other campaign ways and various echelons of engagement. Strategic/campaign engagements are those discussions that require intended outcomes necessary to achieve strategy and campaign ends.

(2) **Exercises.** CCMDs execute two different types of exercise to achieve strategy/campaign ends. The first is multinational/joint exercises designed to build interoperability required to execute potential contingency plans and to achieve assurance and deterrence goals. These exercises also strengthen partnerships and can be used to evaluate partner capacity building programs. The second is service component led exercises focused on maintaining or improving readiness. These exercises could also be joint. Whether executed by one or multiple services the focus of the exercise is training readiness.

(3) **Operations.** CCMD operations are essential to achieving strategy and campaign ends. Today’s competitive environment requires multi-domain operations that includes cyber and space operations designed to win competition campaigns with top adversaries. Operations usually require special authorities from the President or Secretary of Defense to execute.

(4) **Posture, Presence, and Agreements.** CCMDs posture not only includes forward deployed forces but also include access to contingency locations, logistical sites, and ports required to compete with adversaries and win potential contingencies. CCMDs use force presence to execute Dynamic Force Employment and other activities to keep adversaries off balance and achieve strategic/campaign ends. Agreements are essential to winning the competition campaign and can be useful during armed conflict if partnerships are maintained. The CCMDs posture, presence and agreements are linked to specific strategy/campaign ends and are not themselves the objective.

(5) **Security Cooperation.** Security Cooperation is one of the most common ways used by CCMDs to achieve strategy/campaign ends. Security Cooperation includes partner capacity building programs and in most cases is a bilateral activity executed between the U.S. and a specific partner. As in all strategy/campaign ways security cooperation itself should not be the objective. The majority of security cooperation funding is aligned to Title 22 and controlled by the DoS. CCMDs and other DoD agencies work closely with DoS to ensure that security cooperation activities are executed in a unified action to achieve CCMD strategy/campaign ends.
g. **Means.** Means are the resources necessary to support the strategic approach (Ways). Resources may be tangible (such as forces, equipment, funding, authorities, programs, infrastructure, lines of communication, time, or seats in U.S. schools), or intangibly (such as processes, cultural appeal, goodwill from previous activities, or fear of invasion by another country). The command strategy focuses on how military power can be employed in concert with the other instruments of national power. The CCDR should consider all instruments that are available or may be made available from U.S. and partner sources. Insufficient means require adjusted ways. After adjusting the adjusting ways, if there is still no alternative approach that can achieve the desired ends which are nested with strategic guidance, then the CCDR must go back to the national policy makers and show how the national aims cannot be met, to reassess the national policy.

h. **Notional Strategic Estimate Format.** Below is a notional but not all-encompassing format for a Commander’s Strategic Estimate which feeds the CCMD Strategy and Campaign Plan.

(1) **Strategic Direction** (This section analyzes broad policy, strategic guidance, and authoritative direction to the theater or global situation and identifies strategic requirements in global and regional dimensions.) *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-1).*

   (a) **U.S. Policy Goals.** (Identify the U.S. national security or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.) *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-2).*

   (b) **Non-U.S./Multinational Policy Goals.** (Identify the multinational [alliance or coalition] security or military objectives and strategic tasks that may also be assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.) *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-2).*

   (c) **Opposition Policy Goals and Desired End State.** This should be extracted from current JIPOE, Strategic Direction, and what is believed to be achievable using systems thinking and critical thinking.

   (d) **End State(s).** (Describe the campaign or operation objective[s] or end state[s] and related military objectives to achieve and end states to attain and maintain.) *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-2).*

(2) **Operational Environment.**

   (a) **AOR.** (Provide a visualization of the relevant geographic, political, economic, social, demographic, historic, and cultural factors in the AOR assigned to the CCDR.) *(JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-2).*

   (b) **Area of Interest.** (Describe the area of interest to the commander, including the area of influence and adjacent areas and extending into adversary territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.) *(JP
(c) **Adversary Forces.** (Identify all states, groups, or organizations expected to be hostile to, or that may threaten U.S. and partner nation interests, and appraise their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of the magnitude of the potential threat, including threats to power projection activities.) (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-2).

(d) **Friendly Forces.** (Identify all relevant friendly states, forces, and organizations. These include assigned U.S. forces, regional allies and anticipated multinational partners. Describe the capabilities of the other instruments of national power [diplomatic, economic, and informational], U.S. military supporting commands, and other USG departments and agencies that could have direct and significant influence on the operations in this AOR.) (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-2).

(e) **Neutral Forces.** Identify all other relevant states, groups, or organizations in the AOR and determine their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of their motivations and how they may impact U.S. and friendly multinational operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, pp. B-2).

(3) **Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational Challenges.**

(a) This is a continuous appreciation of the major challenges in the AOR with which the CCDR may be tasked to deal. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).

(b) These may include a wide range of challenges, from direct military confrontation, peace operations, and security co-operation activities (that include security force assistance for building partner capacity and capability), to providing response to atrocities, foreign humanitarian assistance, and stability activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).

(4) **Potential Opportunities.**

(a) This is an analysis of known or anticipated circumstances, as well as emerging situations, that the CCMD may use as positive leverage to improve the theater strategic situation and further U.S. or partner nation interests. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).

(b) Each potential opportunity must be carefully appraised with respect to existing strategic guidance and operational limitations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).
(5) Assessment of Risks.

(a) This assessment matches a list of the potential challenges with anticipated capabilities in the OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).

(b) Risks associated with each major challenge should be analyzed separately and categorized according to significance or likelihood (e.g., most dangerous or most likely). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).

(c) The CCMD staff should develop a list of possible mitigation measures to these risks. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. B-3).

(d) The strategist must weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of the strategy in terms of risk and ensure a proper balance between ends, ways, and means, as discussed above. Part of the purpose of building the strategic assessment and command strategy is to identify shortfalls in required resources. On the other hand, if there is no reasonable expectation that a gapped resource may become available, then an infeasible strategic approach results, causing an unbalanced and hence risk-prone strategy. At that point where constraints on the strategic approach or on the means available to execute that concept risk achievement of the end state, the strategy is in jeopardy.

4. Using operational design to create a theater strategy. Developing a strategic estimate and ultimately a command strategy requires an approach that allows the JFC and staff to gain an understanding of the complexity of the environment, translate national level aims into desired conditions in the theater (globally if assigned as coordinating authority), and build flexible, adaptable approaches that will enable military means to work in concert with other instruments of power to achieve the desired conditions. As discussed above, the dynamic between policy and strategy demands that strategy be built to provide flexibility both to react to changes in policy and to advise policy makers as to the feasibility and potential effects of the policy.

Joint doctrine is not prescriptive in how a command strategy should be developed. The Joint Planning Process (JPP), described in JP 5-0 and earlier in this handbook, provides a systematic process to develop a plan, but focuses on development of courses of action to accomplish a specified mission. Planners can use a process such as JPP to guide development of the CCMD campaign plan, but the strategy that underpins that campaign plan should be clearly understood and communicated first. Operational design as described in Chapter 3 provides a way to think through the complexity to build the strategy. While operational design can help planners work the conceptual aspects of any plan, to include a campaign plan, it is especially suited to the development of CCMD strategy, which must inherently deal with complexity and a multitude of unfamiliar and ill-structured problems.

The methodology described below adapts operational design as described in Chapter 3 to work for the development of the CCMD strategy. Though some of the words are different, the principles are the same. The following paragraphs describe one way of developing a CCMD
Strategy. These paragraphs are meant to provide a guide, not to prescribe any method. Operational design must continue well beyond the initial development of the strategic estimate and command strategy to constantly assess impact on the environment, to reframe the strategy as needed during execution.

a. **Understand the Current Environment.** The CCDR analyzes the current environmental conditions, to include existing guidance, and determines what the desired future environment should look like. The CCDR also considers what adversaries may desire as end state conditions. Other interested parties should be invited to participate in the dialogue to frame the environment in order to gain as wide an understanding as possible. A secondary benefit of this inclusion is to gain potential buy-in for the eventual strategy by other relevant actors. CCDRs must consider areas of interests that are global for the top threats identified in the NDS/NMS. If assigned as a Coordinating Authority, CCDRs must include other CCMDs in the development of their strategic estimate and command strategy in order to enhance their understanding of the environment. Some questions pursued during this framing are:

- **What are the key actors, relationships, factors, and trends in the theater/globally?**
- **What is causing conflict among the actors in the theater/globe and from outside the theater/globally?**
- **What are the key historical and cultural aspects of the environment?**
- **How can national interests be affected in the theater/globally?**
- **What specific guidance has been given? Implied guidance? Is there any conflicting guidance?**
- **What aspects of the current and projected situation in theater/globe are desirable and undesirable?**
- **What do we want the theater/global threat to look like (conditions) in one/five/ten years? What is “strategic horizon?”**
- **What other actors have interests in the region that may present opportunities or challenges? What do other actors want the theater/globe to look like?**
- **What conditions are likely to emerge in the region if parties outside the region take no action?**
- **What conditions are not acceptable to us that others may want to see?**
- **Whom can we count on for support?**
- **What limitations/opportunities might there be in garnering applicable instruments of power (DIME)?**
- **Who may potentially oppose our desired end state and why?**

(1) **Describe the current environment.** This effort is described in the previous chapter. At the theater (global if coordinating authority) level, it is critically important to consider the impact of history and culture on aspects of the environment. To understand the essence of the environment that will affect the strategy, the analysis should enable a dialogue on how the various systems interrelate. Identification of the relevance and impact of key relationships between the many state and non-state actors are extremely important in this analysis and synthesis. Finally, there must be a clear understanding of how U.S., allies, and partner national interests are affected by the theater/global environment.
(2) **Determine the tendency of the OE.** Based on an understanding of the current environment, project the environment into the future to determine its tendencies that the commander needs to affect. This will help describe the desired end state and help the commander capitalize on opportunities presented by the natural tendencies wherever possible. Since campaign plans generally organize efforts and actions, the logical projection of the environment should be 2-5 years. If there are anticipated major milestones in the interim, or aspects of the environment that are of longer-term consideration, consider multiple projections of the tendency of the OE.

(3) **Analyze guidance.** These may be written directives; oral instructions from the President, SecDef, or CJCS; Presidential or Cabinet-member speeches; domestic and international laws; policies of other organizations that have interest in the theater (globe if assigned as coordinating authority); or existing strategic estimates (ours or other parties). Some of the guidance may be contradictory and should be clarified and confirmed. It is likely that the CCMD will have recent perspectives on the theater/globe that will enable a reconciliation of guidance. One challenge in reconciling the various sources of guidance is in the varying timeliness of the guidance. It is important to include policymakers in this dialogue to gain their insights, and to reconcile the differences in interpretation of the multiple forms of guidance among both policy-makers and the CCDR.

(4) **Analyze available instruments of national power and limitations.** Gain an understanding of what instruments of power that can be brought to bear by the United States or by other parties that the United States may be able to influence.

(5) **Determine the desired future condition (end state) for the theater/global threat if assigned as coordinating authority.** Describe the key conditions that must exist in the future OE to achieve the national aims. Focus on military conditions, but do not exclude other conditions that may impact the military conditions or achievement of which military activity may support (or potentially interfere with). Get a sense for the realistic timing for achievement of these conditions: 1 year, 5 years, sometime far into the future? Review the relationship between national and theater end states from the previous chapter. Additionally, the top threats as listed in the NDS/NMS are global challenges with global effects. Coordinating Authorities must consider required coordination with other CCDRs to ensure command strategies and CCMD campaign plans are synchronized globally.

(6) **Determine alternative future conditions (end states).** Competitors have interests in the theater/globe and may well have significantly different desired end states. There may be potential adversaries with opposing desired conditions to ours. There are likely to be other actors (influential stakeholders), not really adversarial, that have different aims or objectives that will have second or third order effects which can complicate our strategy. The CCDR and staff need to understand these, so that they can either work with or try to influence those other actors.

b. **Define the problem set that the command strategy must solve.** This entails identifying the differences between the desired conditions at end state and those that others want to see, and also between the desired conditions and those of the natural tendency of the environment. Think of the natural tendency as another actor, likely the most powerful actor. These comparisons between the desired conditions and the alternatives describe the relevant tensions in the environment. The points of
congruence between the desired conditions and others’ desires must also be identified. Those points of congruence offer opportunities that, if exploited, can help the CCDR achieve the desired conditions. Some of these opportunities are significant enough that they should also be part of the problem description.

Though identifying the root causes of problems in the theater/globe is certainly important, it is not the end of the problem framing. The CCDR may find that the military cannot solve the root causes and can only mitigate the effects of the root causes on the CCMD strategy.

The commander may see that the tensions are too great and the opportunities too few to be able to achieve a particular desired condition or set of conditions. In that case, the commander may see a need to adjust the desired end state. In this case, they are obligated to dialogue with the national policy makers.

Commanders might ask these questions:

- What are natural tendencies of the environment that will pose challenges to achievement of our desired conditions?
- What are the tensions between our desired conditions and those of other actors?
- Which tensions will preclude us from achieving our end state conditions?
- What are the similarities between our desired conditions and those of other actors?
- Which similarities offer opportunities for synergy in achieving our desired conditions?
- What are strengths and weaknesses of other actors that will affect how we can reconcile the differences?
- What are natural tendencies of the environment that we can leverage?
- What needs to change?
- What doesn’t need to change?
- What are the opportunities and challenges?
- What are the unintended long-range consequences of achieving our desired conditions?
- What is the reasonable timing for achieving the desired conditions? Do we need to have different short- and long-term timelines?

The goal in framing the problem is to describe the problem set concisely and completely. This problem statement is the one that the operational approach must answer. An example might be: Political and economic instability is rising in the ORANGECOM AOR. Caused by poor governance and black markets in the northern region, this instability over the next 5-10 years threatens the development and vitality of market economies, encourages aggressive behavior by country Y, and precludes influence by country Z, thereby putting U.S. economic and security interests at risk.

c. Develop the strategic approach. The strategic approach describes how the problem will be solved or managed. It is detailed enough to provide direction and boundaries for those implementing and supporting the strategy, but not so much that it precludes creativity by those implementers. The purpose is to outline the way to achieve the desired theater/global threat end state. It is important to understand that in the volatile and complex theater/global (if assigned as coordinating authority) environment, the approach is only a hypothesis to address/solve the problem. Thus, the approach must include flexibility to adapt to a different
Commanders might ask these questions:

- Is the problem we described solvable? manageable? If not, how can we reframe it?
- What distinguishable, measurable objectives/outcomes will let us achieve our desired conditions and prevent the other actors from achieving competing conditions?
- How might we shape the environment to make our desired conditions appealing?
- What are key events, activities, or states of the environment along the way that will either enable us to or preclude us from achieving our desired conditions?
- What are the lines of effort that we might use to organize our activities?
- What are the unintended consequences of our activities?
- What are the risks of this approach? Can I avoid or mitigate those risks by adjusting the approach?

(1) Develop objectives that will address the problem set. Determine the set of objectives that will enable the required conditions by reconciling those aspects of the environment that may preclude achievement of those conditions, especially those opposing desired conditions of other actors. The objectives should be focused on the stated problem, and should consider four areas: key actors, key relationships, managing tensions between actors, and managing opportunities presented by the convergence of desired conditions among actors. Some examples of theater objectives are:

- Regional countries, with U.S. assistance, have organized a military cooperation forum.
- Country R is a “security exporter” vice a “security importer” by 2028.
- The United States has an effective military relationship with Country S by 2022.
- Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Blue is maintained without interruption.

(2) Build a strategic approach that will link the objectives together in such a way as to achieve the desired conditions. An example approach statement might be:

- ORANGECOM will support DOS in achieving the necessary political and economic stability required to prevent conflict (in the northern region) by deterring non-state, black market violence in the next 2-5 years, building the capacity of Country Z to become a regional security leader by 2025 (discouraging aggressive behavior by its neighbors), and reassuring countries in the AOR throughout the next decade (by U.S. military presence). ORANGECOM will enable the regional security needed to revitalize commercial markets. We will place the majority of our theater security cooperation assets in the western part of the AOR. While we accept risk in the southeastern countries of our region, I believe we can mitigate it by close coordination with BLUECOM forces near our boundaries.

(3) Capture the strategic approach in a narrative that forms a hypothesis for solving the strategic problem. (“Here’s what’s likely to happen in the region and why it matters so much. Here’s what we have to do about it to achieve a future that looks like this…”).
(4) Analyze the strategic approach. Look at FSA-DC (feasibility, suitability, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness) and at risk. First, determine if the available and potentially available resources are sufficient to source the strategic approach. Second, determine if the strategic approach will accomplish the objectives. Third, determine if the objectives, when accomplished and if sequenced properly, will achieve the conditions that describe the desired theater/global threat end state. Look for second and third order effects of applying resources and of accomplishing objectives to find any places where the strategic approach may produce effects that complicate achievement of the desired conditions. Where these friction points are identified, look for ways to avoid or mitigate the undesired effects. Last, identify those remaining elements of strategic risk and discuss them with the national leadership. **Commanders might ask these questions:**

- What are the probable consequences of success and failure of the strategy?
- What assumptions were made in this strategy and what is the effect if one of them is wrong?
- What effect would a change in certain aspects of the environment have on the strategy?
- How will other actors react to certain activities of the strategy, and what happens to the strategy if they take unfavorable actions in reaction?
- What is the balance between intended and unintended consequences (effects) of our activities on the strategy?
- What mitigating activities will reduce the impact of unintended consequences of our activities?

**U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLES and FOCUS AREAS</th>
<th>REGIONAL GOALS</th>
<th>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>END STATE and CONDITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen Southeast Asia</td>
<td>• Deter PRC from aggression and malign actions.</td>
<td>• Deter PRC from aggression and malign actions.</td>
<td>Free and Open Indo-Pacific:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorient Northeast Asia</td>
<td>• Deter DPRK from aggression and malign actions.</td>
<td>• Deter Russia from aggression and malign actions.</td>
<td>1) Respect for sovereignty and independence of every nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Oceans</td>
<td>• Enhance combined joint fighting capability and posture that prevails in armed conflict.</td>
<td>• Enhance combined joint fighting capability and posture that prevails in armed conflict.</td>
<td>2) Freedom from coercion in free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create South Asia Opportunities</td>
<td>• Strengthen allies and partners to support a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.</td>
<td>• Strengthen allies and partners to support a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.</td>
<td>3) Adherence to international laws, rules, and norms of behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure access to shared domains for all nations.</td>
<td>• Ensure access to shared domains for all nations.</td>
<td>4) Relative peace, stability, and growing prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disrupt and degrade VEOs and threats to the homeland / key interests.</td>
<td>• Disrupt and degrade VEOs and threats to the homeland / key interests.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5-1 Example Theater Strategy Depiction**

5. The Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP). **CCPs are the primary plans through which the CCMDs execute day-to-day campaigning. CCPs address**
theater objectives as well as objectives directed by GCPs and FCPs

Campaign plans address detailed execution to implement the strategy. In this construct, the CCDRs and their planners develop campaign plans to integrate joint operations with national-level resource planning and policy formulation and in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies. Contingency plans are prepared to address known threats and possible crises that could prevent achievement of national objectives. (CJSI 3100.01E, Joint Strategic Planning System, p C-2 and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-1)

a. The CCDRs’ campaigns operationalize the guidance in the UCP, NSS, NDS, CPG, NMS, and JSCP by organizing and aligning operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCDRs’ objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theaters or functional areas. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-1)

b. CCDRs translate the guidance into executable actions to accomplish identifiable and measurable progress toward achieving the CCDRs’ objectives, and thus the national objectives. The achievement of these objectives is reportable to DOD leadership through IPRs and operation assessments (such as the CCDRs’ input to theAJA). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-1)

c. CCPs consolidate operational requirements identified across all the GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, as they pertain to the CCDR’s specific responsibilities identified in the UCP. The CCDR’s independent analysis could identify additional requirements the commander decides to include in the campaign. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-2)

d. CCPs integrate posture, resources, requirements, subordinate campaigns, operations, activities, and investments that prepare for, deter, or mitigate identified contingencies into a unified plan of action. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-2)

e. The purpose of CCMD campaigns is to shape the OE, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and when necessary, execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-2)

(1) Shaping the OE seeks to change current conditions within the OE to conditions more favorable to U.S. interests. It can entail both combat and noncombat operations and activities to establish conditions that support future U.S. activities or operations or validate planning assumptions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-2)

(2) Deterrence activities, as part of a CCMD campaign, are those
actions or operations executed specifically to alter adversaries’ decision calculus. These actions or operations may demonstrate U.S. commitment to a region, ally, partner, or principle. They may also demonstrate a U.S. capability to deny an adversary the benefit of an undesired action. Theater posture and certain exercises are examples of possible deterrent elements of a campaign. These actions most closely link the campaign to contingency plans directed in the CPG and JSCP as they can demonstrate commitment to a region or demonstrate U.S. ability to defend or reinforce a region in the event of aggression. Additionally, deterrence activities are associated with early phases of a contingency plan, usually directed and executed in response to changes in threat posture. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-3)

(3) A campaign can also set conditions that mitigate the impact of a possible contingency. Activities conducted as part of the campaign, such as posture and security cooperation activities (e.g., military engagement with allies and partners or building partner capacity and capability) can set the stage for more rapid, successful execution of a contingency plan if conflict arises, by leveraging the capabilities and capacities of allies and partners. Campaign activities can also validate or invalidate planning assumptions used during contingency planning. (See Figure 5-2) (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-3)
A campaign can support stabilization, and stabilization should be considered in planning as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions. Where U.S. national security objectives depend upon maintaining or reestablishing stability, stabilization is required to translate combat success into lasting strategic gains, achieve the objectives for which the military operation was conducted, and is a necessary complement to joint combat power. Stabilization links the application of joint force combat power and security assistance capabilities with the achievement of strategic and policy objectives. Stabilization efforts focus on the root causes of instability and mitigating the drivers of conflict for an affected HN, thus helping the HN reach a sustainable political settlement that allows societal conflicts to be resolved peacefully. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-3)

f. The CCP flows from the commander’s CCMD strategy and provides the detailed action plan to implement the first five years of the command strategy. While each combatant command’s campaign plan may approach the task of executing the strategy differently, the plan will address the commander’s AOR as well as linkages to other CCDR’s AORs (if assigned as a coordinating authority) in an interconnected and holistic manner and seekto
avoid what can be a myopic focus on one or two stove-piped contingency plans. The current
construct for nesting plans is first to build the GCPs, RCPs and FCPs, then to build a CCP that
implements the activities required to achieve the desired conditions for the theater/globe (if
assigned as coordinating authority for priority threat assigned in NDS/NMS) while dealing
with deviations from the strategy through branch plans. Branch plans are brought back into
a global planning framework by the creation of Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs). (See
Figure 5-3 and paragraph 6f of this handbook) Component activities (to ICPs and to the
GCPs/RCPs/FCPs) are contained in Campaign Support Plans (CSPs). **CCPs ways and
means are exactly the same as the strategy ways and means listed in paragraph 3 of
this chapter.** However, the CCP provides more detail about implementation and execution
of ways and means than the command strategy. The CCP should:

1. Synchronize the implementation of ways and means in a manner to which CCMD
   staff, subordinate commands, Joint Staff, OSD, interagency partners, and if releasable to
   multinational partners and work together in a unified action to win competition below the level
   of armed conflict while still being postured for armed conflict and other contingencies.
   Success is contingent on all personnel and organizations who have a part in the campaign
   rowing towards campaign ends. The bottom line is if an activity or resource is not required
   for a campaign end then it should not be executed or expended.

2. Describe the relevant environment(s).

3. Describe the desired military and associated conditions for the environment in the
timeframe covered by the strategy. This will include conditions associated with the Global,
Regional, and Functional Campaign Plans that apply to the command.

4. Address the use of all instruments of power, but be specific about the role of the
   military instrument in the strategy.

5. Describe the military ends that will support achieving the desired conditions for the
   relevant environment(s). This should be articulated via intermediate military objectives and 5-
   year campaign objectives/end states.

6. Describe the current and required force posture for the theater/global threat (if
   assigned as coordinating authority) and identify elements of risk in the gap between current
   and required forces.

7. Prioritize activity among subordinate components.

8. Link the five campaign ways (Engagements, Exercises, Operations, Posture/Presence/Agreements and Security Cooperation to specific campaign objectives
   and provide necessary detail for execution.

9. Link campaign means (forces, equipment, funds, authorities, infrastructure, lines of
   communication, time etc.) to specific ways and campaign objectives.

10. Describe branches to the campaign plan that require contingency plans and
describe the connectivity between the day-to-day activities of the plan and each contingency
plan’s shaping activities, such as setting the theater for successful contingency plan
execution should it be required.

6. **Components of a CCP.** The CCP format can be found in the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System. The format can be found in CJCSM 3130.03A w/CH 1 Planning Execution Formats and Guidance. CCPs generally consist of a base document/base plan with accompanying annexes. Annexes provide additional details beyond what is found in the base plan for execution of the campaign and cover all of the joint warfighting functions. Annexes can also include subordinate campaign plans, the posture plan, theater logistics and distribution plan, specific regional plans, and country-specific security cooperation plans. The aforementioned are nested with the CCP and should not be viewed as separate plans. For example, the posture plan should be driven by the campaign and its ends vice the posture plan driving the campaign. More details on CCP content and subordinate plans are found below.

   a. **Posture Plan.** The posture plan is the CCMD’s proposal for forces, footprint, and agreements required and authorized to achieve the command’s objectives and set conditions for accomplishing assigned missions. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-12)

   b. **Theater Logistics and Distribution Plans.**

      (1) **Theater Distribution Plan.** The TDP provides detailed theater mobility and distribution analysis to ensure sufficient capacity or planned enhanced capability throughout the theater and synchronization of distribution planning throughout the global distribution network. The TDP includes a comprehensive list of references, country data, and information requirements necessary to plan, assess, and conduct theater distribution and JRSOI operations. As required, the CCDRs develop their TDPs using the format in USTRANSCOM’s Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution 9033, JSCP, and CJCSI 3110.03 (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). TDPs and posture plans complement each other by posturing forces, footprints, and agreements that will interface with the theater distribution network to provide a continuous flow of material and equipment into the AOR. This synchronization enables a theater distribution pipeline to have sufficient capacity and capability to support development of CCPs, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-12)

      (2) **Theater Logistics Overview.** The TLO codifies the CCDR’s theater logistics analysis (TLA) within the posture plan. The TLO provides a narrative overview, with supporting matrices of key findings and capabilities from the TLA, which is included in the posture plan as an appendix. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-13)

      (3) **Theater Logistics Analysis.** The TLA provides detailed country-by-country analysis of key infrastructure by location or installation (e.g., main operating base [MOB], forward operating site [FOS],
cooperative security location (CSL)), footprint projections, HN agreements, existing contracts, and task orders required to logistically support CCPs and their embedded contingency operations (e.g., contingency locations). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-13)

c. Regional and CSCSs Plans.

(1) As needed or directed, CCDRs prepare country-specific security cooperation plans (codified in CSCS) within their campaign plans for each country where the CCMD intends to apply significant time, money, and/or effort. CCDRs may also prepare separate regional plans. These are useful to identify and call out activities directed toward specific regional or country objectives and provide focus for the command. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-14)

(2) Regional-specific security cooperation plans and country-specific security cooperation plans can also serve to better harmonize activities and investments with other agencies. By isolating the desired objectives, planners can more easily identify supporting efforts and specific assessment measures toward achieving US objectives. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-14)

(3) Where the United States has identified specific objectives with a country or region (through strategic guidance or policy), separate regional or CSCSs/country plans help to identify resource requirements and risk associated with resource limitations that maybe imposed. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. V-14)


(5) Operational Capacity and Capability Building. Build usable, relevant, and enduring partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and partner objectives.

(6) Multinational Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization. Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics with partners to enable effective combined operations or improve collective defense capability.

(7) Intelligence and Information Sharing. Gain and share specific kinds of intelligence or information and develop shared assessments of common threats.

(8) Assurance and Regional Confidence Building. Assure allies and partners, enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter/intra-state conflict, and expand the community of states dedicated to a more secure international order.

(9) Institutional Capacity and Security Sector Reform. Assist allies with transforming their defense/security establishments to become publicly accountable, well-managed, and subject to the rule of law.
(10) **International Armaments Cooperation.** Promote technological collaboration, foster mutually beneficial exchanges of technology and defense equipment, gain access to foreign technology, and reduce the overall cost of defense to the U.S. taxpayer.

(11) **International Suasion and Cooperation.** Build cooperative political-military relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in key regions and international organizations.

(12) **Human Capacity and Human Capital Development.** Enable the ability of partner country civilians and military personnel to understand the proper role of the military in society, promote human rights, and respect the rule of law.

(13) **Support to Institutional Capacity and Civil Sector Capacity Building.** Help develop the ability of partner country civil sector organizations to provide services to their populations, respond to humanitarian disasters, and improve living conditions.

d. **Subordinate, Supporting, and Campaign Support Plans.**

(1) **Subordinate Campaign Plan.** JFCs subordinate to a CCDR or other JFC may develop subordinate campaign plans in support of the higher plan to better synchronize operations in time and space. It may, depending upon the circumstances, transition to a supported or supporting plan in execution. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. V-14)

(2) **Supporting Plans.** Supporting plans are prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or the head of a department or agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. V-14)

(3) **Campaign Support Plans.** Campaign support plans are developed by the Services, NGB, and DOD agencies that integrate the appropriate USG activities and programs, describe how they will support the CCMD campaigns, and articulate institutional or component-specific guidance. (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, p. V-14)

e. **Contingency Plans.** Contingency plans are branch plans to the campaign plan that are based upon hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions. The campaign plan should address those known issues in the contingencies that can be addressed prior to execution to establish conditions, conduct deterrence, or address assumptions. As planners develop contingency plans, issues and concerns in the contingency should be included as an element of the campaign (JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, pp. V-14)

(1) **Integrated Contingency Plan Development.** An ICP is the primary contingency plan associated with a global problem set. ICPs are
informed by the complementary contingency plans that are executed in a synchronized manner in response to a priority challenge. Unlike GIFs, ICPs are contingency plans that are produced by designated CAs, and intended to achieve unity of effort across different organizations and complementary plans within a single problem set. To achieve this purpose, ICPs include integrated TPFDD based on the force requirements from complementary plans. (CJCSI 3100.01E, Joint Strategic Planning System) p. C-2)

(2) ICP Review. In accordance with the Chairman’s statutory responsibility to review contingency plans, the Joint Staff reviews CPG and JSCP-directed plans. The plans review process has four purposes: (1) ensuring plans are executable; (2) enabling the Chairman to provide informed military advice based on current plans; (3) integrating the SecDef’s and USD(P)’s guidance with plans; and (4) facilitating cross-domain and globally integrated planning. The Joint Staff J-5 is responsible for conducting the plans review process through the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC is composed of CCMDs, OSD, Services, NGB, CSAs, and other affected Defense Agencies. The JPEC process is used to review ICPs, campaign plans, and contingency plans. Plan review and approval processes are addressed in DoDI 3000.15 and the CJCSI 3141.01 series. (CJCSI 3100.01E, Joint Strategic Planning System) p. C-5)

f. Relationship of the CCP and Integrated Contingency Plans. The JSCP directs contingency planning consistent with the CPG. It expands on the CPG with specific objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP directs the development of Integrated Contingency Plans (ICP) and Global Integration Frameworks (GIF), formerly known as Globally Integrated Base Plans. (CJCSI 3100.01E, Joint Strategic Planning System, p. C-2)

The CCDR may also direct preparation of contingency plans to deal emerging or potential crises. One example might be a plan to deter the aggression of and, if necessary, defeat a regional threat in order to ensure stability in a part of the world important to U.S. and allied interests. Such a plan is likely to be an integrated campaign plan that would link several major operations together to achieve the military end state that is essential to a positive and enduring political outcome. Another example of a contingency plan might be a plan to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in the event of instability in a country. Such a plan would probably be a single operation plan, rather than a campaign plan.

The GCP, RCP, and FCP should identify the likely conditions that might lead to execution of a contingency plan. Execution of a contingency plan should either bring the situation back to the CCP desired conditions or cause a revision of the CCMD strategy due to the changed environment. (See Figure 5-3)

g. Planning Order (PLANORD) (classified document). A PLANORD is a planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development, adaptation, or refinement of a plan/order. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. GL-12) For details on the “levels of plans” see CH 2 of this document.
h. **Execution Order (EXORD)** (classified document). A Joint Staff EXORD is issued by CJCS at the direction of the SECDEF to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. A CCDR issued EXORD is an order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. GL-8)

![Plan Relationships](image)

*Figure 5-3 Plan Relationships (Figure V-3 JP 5-0)*

i. **Campaign Execution and Assessment.**

   (1) **Campaign Execution.** Campaign plans are executed/operationalized via Campaign EXORD or Campaign Operation Order (OPORD). These orders are issued after the plan is signed by CCDR and updated at least annually in accordance with assessment feedback. Additionally, in-stride adjustments can be made via fragmentary orders FRAGO. Since CCPs are only good for five years, a new plan is generally started at the four-year mark of execution or when the CCDR decides that ends and entire campaign needs changed. (See Figure 5-4 or 2-7) Below is the campaign execution cycle.
(a) **Direct.** Issue initial or annual campaign order and FRAGOs assigning tasks to components and subordinate commands.

(b) **Monitor.** Situational awareness for CCDR, staff, components, country teams, DoD agencies, interagency partners, multinational partners, and anyone else who is part of the unified action needed to campaign. Even though only U.S. military organizations within the CCMD task organization/command and control structure can be tasked, many other organizations are part of the campaign.

(c) **Assess.** When campaign ways and means are having limited effect or are in jeopardy of non-completion, assessment identifies impact on campaign ends.

(d) **Adjust.** Issue FRAGOs to adjust campaign ways and means.

* One of the biggest challenges is orienting a CCMD to campaign. Including external organizations like interagency or multinational partners in a campaign is already challenging. The command and control and internal organization of the staff must be adjusted to campaign in a manner that enables all involved to row together. CCMDs that rely on boards, bureaus, cells, and working groups along with the traditional J-Coded staff are generally challenged to campaign. Failure to properly organize results in failure to achieve campaign ends and more importantly hinders the CCDR’s ability to make appropriate campaign adjustments.
(2) Assessments. Assessing a campaign or operation is very difficult but is most critical to effective campaigning. The CCP must include an assessment methodology that meets the needs of the CCDR and enables the CCDR to effectively adjust campaign ways and means to meet campaign ends. Note: For more on Campaign Assessment, see JP 5-0 Chapter VI.

(a) Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources
such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-1)

(b) Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements (KLEs), and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander’s awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, identifying and analyzing commander decision points, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization’s planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander’s decision cycle. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-1)

(c) The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation of joint planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning to be effective in the OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-1)

(d) CCMDs, subordinate Service, joint functional components, and JTFs devote significant effort and resources to plan and execute operations. They apply appropriate rigor to determine whether an operation is being effectively planned and executed as needed to achieve specified objectives and attain end states. Assessment complements that rigor by analyzing the OE objectively and comprehensively to estimate the effectiveness of planned tasks and measure the effectiveness of completed tasks with respect to desired conditions in the OE. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-1)

(e) Campaign assessments determine whether progress toward achieving CCMD campaign objectives is being made by evaluating whether progress toward intermediate objectives is being made. Essentially, intermediate objectives (and associated conditions/effects) are multiple time-or condition-based objectives that are between initiation of the campaign and achievement of campaign objectives. Accordingly, at the strategic assessment level, intermediate objectives are criteria used to observe and measure progress toward campaign desired conditions and evaluate why the
current status of progress exists. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-3)

(f) Functional campaign assessments assist the CCDRs in evaluating progress toward, or regression from, achieving their global functional objectives. Functional CCDRs provide unique support to all CCDRs in their respective specialties and are required to assess progress toward their intermediate objectives in support of their global functional objectives or DOD-wide activities. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-4)

(g) The CJCS aggregates CCP assessments and sets assessment standards for functional objectives and DOD-wide activities. DOD-wide activities campaign plan assessments will be compiled into this assessment framework to inform an integrated evaluation of global progress against geographic and functional objectives. Planners developing GCPs will collaborate with CCDRs on common LOEs and intermediate objectives that affect functional objectives (e.g., distribution or DOD-wide activities). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-4)

(h) The CPG, NMS, JSCP, and other strategic guidance provide CCMDs with strategic objectives. CCMDs translate and refine those long-range objectives into near-term (achievable in 2-5 years) intermediate objectives. Intermediate objectives represent unique military contributions to the achievement of strategic objectives. In some cases, the CCMD’s actions alone may not achieve strategic objectives. Consequently, other instruments of national power may be required, with the CCMD operating in a supported or supporting role. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-4)

(i) The basic process for campaign assessment is similar to that used for contingency and crisis applications but the scale and scope are generally much larger. While operational-level activities such as, JTF operations, typically focus on a single military endstate with multiple desired conditions, the campaign plan must integrate products from a larger range of strategic objectives, each encompassing its own set of intermediate objectives and desired conditions, subordinate operations, and subordinate plans (i.e., regional and country-specific security cooperation plans, contingency plans not in execution, on-going operations, directed missions). (See Figure 5-5). (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-4)

(j) One common method to establish more manageable campaign plans is for CCMDs to establish LOEs with associated intermediate objectives for each campaign objective. This method allows the CCMD to simultaneously assess each LOE and then assess the overall effort using products from the LOE assessments. The following discussion uses
several cross-functional staff organizations. The names merely provide context for the process and are not intended to be a requirement for organizations to follow. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-4)

(k) The assessment needs to nest with and support the campaign and national objectives and cannot rely on accomplishment of specific tasks. Commanders and staffs should make certain the established intermediate objectives will change the OE in the manner desired. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-4)

There are many assessment-model options that CCDRs can use. The key is to find one that works within their campaigning construct and decision-making cycle.

![Figure 5-5 Campaign Assessments (Figure VI-JP 5-0)](image_url)
APPENDIX A:
MANAGEMENT AND REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN AND CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. Pursuant to legislation passed by Congress in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed globally integrated planning across the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). CJCSI 3141.01F The Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans was approved on 31 January 2019 to establish procedures to coordinate the planning and approval process for those plans requiring senior leadership review. These plans are Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs), Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs), and other plans directed by the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) or the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). For a detailed description of this process consult CJCSI 3141.01F and succeeding publications.

2. This process essentially replaces the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) construct that used specific in progress reviews (IPRs) to receive guidance and approval from senior leadership. In the APEX, the CCDR and the planning staff would present the plan directly to the Secretary of Defense (or the designated authority) for approval. The intent of the new process is for plans to be continuously reviewed in order to provide the most up-to-date advice to the Secretary and President. In addition, the planning and collaboration has been expanded to provide a true global perspective which includes the Services. The culminating events are a series of JCS Tank sessions at the Operations Deputies (OpsDep) and CJCS level.

3. As explained in the CJCSI, the plan review process has four purposes:

- To ensure the plans are executable. Of particular concern is the plan’s feasibility, acceptability, and completeness.
- To make sure plans are up-to-date, provide military advice to civilian leadership and provide guidance to CCDRs with a global and all-Service perspective.
- To integrate policy guidance from SecDef and the other OSD stakeholders. The iterative nature of the review process allows civilian department leadership to refine policy and planning direction.
- To facilitate the integration of plans across CCMDs, defense agencies, departments and Services.

4. The review process provides a common understanding of the strategic and operational environment, and the problem set requiring military planning. It involves the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) which consists of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, the CCMDs, the National Guard Bureau, the DoD combat support agencies, and other defense agencies. As the principal advisor on Global Integration to the SecDef, the CJCS is responsible for providing strategic direction, integrating the planning activities of the JPEC, and establishing the frameworks and processes to execute those responsibilities that allows input from all affected organizations.

   The CJCS publishes the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) that directs the planning activities across the Joint Force. The two basic types of plans are campaign plans and contingency plans. Campaign plans are most concerned with the day-to-day operations, activities, and investments (O/A/I) that address a problem which requires coordination across
the DoD and most likely the entire U.S. government. Campaign plans include Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs), Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs), and Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs). Contingency plans are best described as branches or sequels to campaign plans. Several related contingency plans may be bundled together as integrated contingency plans (ICPs). A significant challenge for the JPEC is to align campaign plans and contingency plans in such a way that campaign plans achieve national outcomes that would not require execution of an associated branch or sequel contingency plan or ICP. At the same time, campaign plans must be designed and executed in such a way that, if required, contingency plans or ICPs could be executed successfully.

After the priority challenge GCPs are created by the Joint Staff they are turned over to a coordinating authority (CA) to integrate planning and campaigning across the JPEC (especially with other CCMDs). A Coordinating Authority (CA) is the CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for plan execution. The CJCS will also designate CAs for RCPs and FCPs. The CJCS will also create Priority Challenge Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) to assist CAs with their planning integration responsibilities. The Joint Staff will also create Globally Integrated Frameworks (GIFs) that will direct modifications of Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAs) across the joint force if a contingency plan or ICP is likely to be executed.

5. The plan review process is a vehicle intended to provide a conversation among the JPEC and especially the civilian leadership in OSD. The process has two complimentary lines of effort:

- To ensure planning supports policy
- To ensure plans are militarily executable and they provide adequate, feasible, and acceptable options to SecDef and the Commander-in-Chief.

The process is a series of interactions between the CA, OSD, Joint Staff, and other members of the JPEC.

The planning review process starts when a plan’s CA or originator begins informal coordination, collaboration, or information exchange at the action officer (AO) level. As the plan matures, reviews are conducted at increasingly senior levels. Reviews can be conducted by paper, by secure video teleconference (SVTC), or in person. Paper reviews will normally be conducted for non-contentious issues.

Formal reviews are normally coordinated by the Joint Staff J-5 using Joint Planning Boards (JPBs). The lowest level JPB will be convened at the O-7/O-8 level with subsequent reviews conducted as required. Increasing reviews are likely to be held at the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD), OpsDep, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), JCS Tank, and SecDef (for approval) levels. The plan review process is intended to be flexible enough for planners to raise issues and for the JPEC to provide input to resolve those issues in a timely manner.

6. For existing plan updates, plan reviews will be conducted using in-progress reviews (IPRs). The plan update process is very similar to the previously described priority challenge plan review process. The lead will be the CCDR (i.e., CA) who will describe those essential elements of the plan which must be modified. After AO level stakeholder interaction, CCMD planners should use the JPB process to formally resolve remaining issues, update, and
approve the plan.

The following table lists the plan originator and approval authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Originator</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCP</td>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>CJCS (w/ SecDef endorsement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIBP</td>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SecDef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCP</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP (Lvl 4, 3T)</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SecDef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP (Lvl 3, 2, 1)</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure A-1: Plan Origination and Approval**

CA = Coordinating Authority  
GCP = Global Campaign Plan  
GIBP = Globally Integrated Base Plan  
RCP = Regional Campaign Plan  
FCP = Functional Campaign Plan  
CCP = CCDR Campaign Plan  
CP = Contingency Plan (Levels 4, 3T (with TPFDD), 3, 2, 1)  
TPFDD = Time Phased Force Deployment Data  
Link to CJCSI 3141.01F The Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans:
The demand for joint task forces ready to respond to contingencies is likely to remain high in the future. Determining the composition of a headquarters and the command relationships with the forces involved is often influenced as much by commander personalities and service interests as operational necessities. Some of the most contentious disagreements between service component, functional, and multinational commanders can be simplified by the arguments "I do not work for you" and "do not touch my stuff." Two imperatives of the authorizing commander during task force establishment are unambiguous articulation of each subordinate commander’s role and responsibility (to include supporting/supported relationships) as well as each subordinate commander’s control authority over the forces involved (to include OPCON and TACON designations as a minimum).

Joint Publication 3-30 "Joint Operations" pages IV-7 through IV-14 and Joint Publication 3-33 “Joint Task Force Headquarters” provide guidance for the selection of task force commanders, headquarter elements, forces, and operating areas. This guidance clarifies that a joint force must have the ability to conduct joint functions. Accordingly, either the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) on its own, or through support from a combatant command HQ or a Service component HQs, must have the ability to conduct the Joint Functions of command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, sustainment, protection, and information.

Usually, JTFs are formed to accomplish missions with specific, limited operational objectives. The CCDR often looks within his or her CCMD to select a JTF HQ, usually a Service component HQ or an existing Service component’s subordinate HQ (e.g., Army Corps, numbered Air Force, numbered Fleet, and Marine Expeditionary Force). The Theater Special Operations Command or a subordinate SOF HQ with the requisite C2 capability can also form the basis for a JTF HQ staff (see Figure E-1).

Joint Pub 3-33 Appendix A, Annex A through M provides detailed considerations for establishing a Joint or Multinational Task Force HQ. Although not specifically presented this way in Joint Doctrine, the following are examples of the types of general questions oriented along the lines of Joint Functions that can facilitate JTF HQ selection:

- Command and Control:
  - Does the mission require action in more than one domain?
  - Does the mission require action from multiple services in the same domain?
  - What planning capability does the JTF require?
  - What is the nature of operations the JTF will be required to execute?
  - What authorities will the JTF commander need?
  - Which whom will the JTF commander need to coordinate?
- **Who is the other U.S. agency and/or multinational participants?**
- **What is the role of multinational and/or interagency partners?**
- **When does the JTF HQ need to be operational?**
- **Where will the JTF HQ need to operate?**
- **To what degree will JTF actions need to be integrated with the plans and operations of other CCMDs or organizations?**
- **What capacity for the control, coordination, or liaison of air, maritime, land, space, or cyber forces will the JTF require?**
- **What are the JTF requirements for a Joint Operations Center?**
- **What are the JTF communications requirements?**
- **Do the CCDR’s subordinate HQ elements have the capabilities required by the JTF HQ?**

**Intelligence:**
- **What ability to collect, process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate information will be required by the JTF?**
- **What level of connectivity will the JTF have with the CCMD Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)?**
- **What are the intel capabilities of the CCDR’s subordinate HQ elements?**

**Fires:**
- **Will fires from multiple services occur in the same physical domain?**
- **Will fires need to be synchronized to occur simultaneously?**
- **Will fires need to be deconflicted to occur separately in time or space?**
- **Will an element of the JTF need to synchronize fires or can this be accomplished by a CCMD element with liaisons in the JTF?**
- **What liaison capability will the JTF need with other CCMD and/or service component fires elements? (CCMD Joint Operations Center, Air Operations Center, Maritime Operations Center, Marine Air to Ground Task Force, SOF Operations, etc.)**
- **What type of control authority will the JTF commander need to have over combat forces?**

**Movement / Maneuver:**
- **Will the JTF use forces already in theater or will additional forces need to be deployed?**
- **How will forces arrive in the JTF AO?**
- **What capability for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) of forces will the JTF required?**
- **What are the JTF requirements for developing logistics plans?**
- **What are the requirements for the JTF to integrate and synchronize logistics resources?**
o What authorities for logistics will the JTF require?

- Sustainment:
  o How long can JTF forces operate on their own without additional sustainment?
  o What level of sustainment, or how much sustainment and of what type, will JTF forces require?
  o What sustainment-related authorities will the JTF require?

- Protection:
  o What type of protection will JTF air, maritime, land, space, or cyber forces require?
  o What capacity for control, coordination, or liaison of air, maritime, land, space, or cyber protection forces will the JTF require?

- Information:
  o How can the JTF use information to affect behavior?
  o How can the JTF use information to influence relevant actors?
  o What must the JTF consider about information as it relates to domestic, international, local audiences?
  o Can the JTF attack and exploit information networks and systems?
  o What will the JTF need to do to protect its own information systems?
  o How will the JTF need to direct the collection of intelligence in support of information activities?
  o Can the JTF use Military Deception MILDEC in its operations?

CCDRs normally respond to crisis with in-place HQs (See Figure B-1 for potential HQ) because of their familiarity with the strategic environment, resident expertise, and availability. The CCDR and staff must understand the capability of each of the subordinate HQ elements within the CCMD in order to select one as the core of a JTF HQ. Although not clearly described in Joint Doctrine, the general capabilities and service preferences of various HQs are listed in Figure E-1 with the HQ element preferred by each Service in bold type.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>HQ (Bold is Preferred)</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Theater Army</td>
<td>May have a Contingency Command Post (CCP) that can form initial JTF HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Army preferred JTF-HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Tactical level JTF or limited mission (O-6 CMDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Command Element may form initial JTF HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Corps preferred JTF-HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Tactical level JTF or limited mission (O-6 CMDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Maritime Operations Center</td>
<td>Usually associated with CCMD service component HQ and liaisons in JTF. Limited C2 capability of air or land forces. Navy preferred JTF-HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Command Ship</td>
<td>Maritime command ship or surface group flagship can form initial JTF-HQ, maritime-focused JTF, or limited mission JTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Air Operations Center</td>
<td>Usually associated with CCMD service component HQ as single AOC for entire theater and liaisons in JTF. Limited C2 capability of maritime or ground forces. Air Force Preferred JTF-HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Task Force</td>
<td>AETF may form initial JTF-HQ, air-focused JTF, or limited mission JTF but usually forms the liaison element between theater AOC and JTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Command</td>
<td>Tactical level JTF or limited, special operations focused mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force</td>
<td>Limited mission JTF. SOF preferred JTF-HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure B-1: Potential JTF HQ**
Additional references, including the JFLCC Cdr’s Ref Guide, may be found at https://www.carlisle.army.mil/jflcc/references.cfm.
The following is a partial list of the areas that should be considered during an analysis of each of the PMESII areas. Some may be potential nodes in each of the systems as well:

**Political System**
- Leadership
- Core Leadership
- National Leadership
- Regional Leadership
- Local Leadership
- Local Workers Parties
- Regime Control of National Resource Systems
- Security Apparatus
- Secret Police
- Detention Camps
- Informants
- Alliances & External Support
- Legal
- Symbolic
- Domestic Image of Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Infallibility

**Military System**
- Leadership
- Command and Control
- Intelligence
- SIGINT
- HUMINT
- Electronic Warfare
- Logistics
- Mobilization
- Civil Defense
- Training
- Underground Facilities
- Stockpiles
- Power Ventilation
- Access Communications
- Missile Forces and Missile Defense
- Army
  - Artillery
  - Long-Range Missile Systems
Infantry
Armor
Engineers
  Mobility
  Mine Clearing
  Bridging
  Counter Mobility
  Obstacles
  Survivability
Navy
  Surface Capabilities
  Subsurface (Submarine)
  Remote Control Vehicles
  Mine Laying Submarines
  SOF Platforms
  Patrol Fleet Anti-Ship Missiles
  Coastal Defenses
  Radar Capabilities
Air Forces
  Air-to-Ground
  Fixed Wing
  Rotary Wing
  Air Defense
  Radar/Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
  Precision Munitions Capabilities
  Bases (Runways, Refuel Capabilities, Ramp Space)
  Force Projection
Special Operations
  Direct Action, IW, ISR, etc.
Industrial/Technical Base (For Production and Repair of Advanced Equipment)
Communications
EW/Jamming Forces
Cyber Forces (military and non-military)
Information Operation Forces (military and non-military)
Missiles (Theater/Ballistic)
WMD (Research, Production, Storage, Delivery)
Space
Insurgent Groups – sponsored/non-sponsored
Terrorist Groups – sponsored/non-sponsored
Economic System
  Industry
  Financial
  Debt
  Distribution of Humanitarian Aid
  Currency / Exchange Rates
  Arms Exports
  Corruption/Linkages
  Food Markets
  Black Market Agriculture
  Drug Crops & Trafficking
  Fuel/Power Markets
  Mining
  Natural resource areas/production
  Foreign investment
  Trade linkages
  Remittances
  Taxes/Revenue

Social System
  Culture/System
  Personality
  History
  Religion
  Gender and Age
  Demography
  Ethnicity
  Urbanization
  Family Ties/Tribal Linkages
  Literacy/Education
  Life Expectancy
  Entertainment, Immigration
  Organized Crime
  Families: Traditional/Influential Controlling Major Decisions
  Impact of Local Traditions

Infrastructure System
  Transportation
    Railroads
Trains
Bridges
Tunnels
Switches
Roads
Ships/Boats
Dams
Locks
Airports

Communications
Military Networks
Radio Telephone
Teletype Fiber Satellite
Visual
Civilian
Radio Telephone
Television Speakers
Signs

Energy/Power
Coal
Oil
Natural Gas
Hydro
Nuclear
Renewable Sources
Water
Fuel Stations
Electricity networks
Food Markets
Courthouses
Hospitals/Clinics
Water Treatment
Sewage/Treatment
Schools
Fiberoptic cables
Network services
Cell phone networks
Internet service providers (ISPs)
Social Media Saturation
Information System
Education
Propaganda
   Inside Country
   Outside Country
Newspapers/Magazines
Information Technologies
Radio
Television
Internet
Social Media
Informal Transmissions (Word of Mouth/Rumor)
Cyberspace
TAB A: Political System Points of Analysis

Political analysis of a foreign country begins with an assessment of the basic principles of government, governmental operations, foreign policy, political parties, pressure groups, electoral procedures, subversive movements, as well as criminal and terrorist organizations. It then analyzes the distribution of political power – whether it is a democracy, an oligarchy, a dictatorship, or has political power devolved to multiple interest groups such as tribes, clans, or gangs. Analysis must focus on determining how the political system really operates, not the way it is supposed to operate.

**Basic Governmental Principles.** The starting point of political analysis is the formal political structure and procedure of a foreign nation. Analysts must evaluate:
- Constitutional and legal systems.
- Legal position of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.
- Civil and religious rights of the people.
- People’s national devotion to constitutional and legal procedures.

**Governmental Operations.** Governments are evaluated to determine their efficiency, integrity, and stability. Information about how the government actually operates and/or changes its method of operation gives the intelligence user clues about the probable future of a political system. When assessing governmental operations, analysts should consider the following:
- Marked inefficiency and corruption, which differs from past patterns, may indicate an impending change in government.
- Continued inefficiency and corruption may indicate popular apathy or a populace unable to effect change.
- Increased restrictions on the electoral process and on the basic social and political rights of the people may mean the government is growing less sure of its position and survivability.

**Foreign Policy.** Analysis of a target country’s foreign policy addresses the country’s public and private stance toward the United States, foreign policy goals and objectives, regional role, and alliances. Analysts gather data from various sources, to include:
- Diplomatic and military personnel.
- Technical collection systems.
- Official foreign government statements.
- Press releases.
- Public opinion polls.
- International businessmen and other travelers.
- Academic analyses.

**Political Parties.** Analysts study special interest parties and groups (e.g., labor, religious, ethnic, industry) to evaluate their:
- Aims.
Pressure Groups. With few exceptions, most states have some type of formal or informal pressure groups. Examples include political parties, associations, religious or ethnic organizations, labor unions, and even illegal organizations (e.g., banned political party). The analyst must identify these pressure groups and their aims, methods, relative power, sources of support, and leadership. Pressure groups may have international connections and, in some cases, may be almost entirely controlled from outside the country.

Electoral Procedures. Elections range from staged shows of limited intelligence significance to a means of peaceful, organized, and scheduled revolution. In addition to the parties, personalities, and policies, the intelligence analyst must consider the circumstances surrounding the actual balloting process and changes from the historical norm.

Subversive Movements. In many countries, there are clandestine organizations or guerrilla groups whose intention is to overthrow or destroy the existing government. When analysts report on subversive movements, they should address:
- Organizational size.
- Character of membership.
- Power base within the society.
- Doctrine or beliefs system.
- Affiliated organizations.
- Key figures.
- Funding.
- Methods of operation.

Criminal and Terrorist Organizations. Criminal organizations in some countries are so powerful that they influence or dominate national governments. Analysts must examine the organization’s influence or forceful methods of control. Most terrorist organizations are small, short-lived, and not attached to any government. Analysts should determine if external factors or even the area’s government assists the terrorist group.
Political System Questions

National Political Structure:

• What is the type of governmental system in place?
  o Where does it draw its legitimacy from?
  o Are the sectors stable or in transition?
  o Does the electoral process affect them?
  o Where do they draw their power?
  o What is the source of their knowledge and intellectual income?
  o Who are the leaders? Where do they draw their power from?
  o Does a core bureaucracy staff them?

• Governmental Departments or Agencies (D/A)
  o Who are the key leaders? How are they linked within the power network?
  o Are the D/A stable or in transition?
  o Are new departments of agencies being created? If so, what is the cause of this transition? Societal/Cultural/Educational? Technical? Economic?
  o By D/A - What is the source of its workforce?
    - Who are the leaders? Is it staffed by a core bureaucracy? What skill level?
  o Inter-Agency and Departmental dependencies?
  o External dependencies - Societal/Cultural/Educational.

National Political Demographics Structure:

• Ethnic and Religious Groups having political power:
  o Are these groups regionalized?
  o How do they exercise political power?
  o What is their legislative representation?
  o Is there a paramilitary structure?

• How do these Ethnic and Religious groups wield power within urban society? Rural society?

• Political Parties
  o What are the political parties? Externally or internally supported
  o Are they associated with ethnic, religious, or cultural groups?
  o Who are their leaders? Their allies?
  o What is their political opposition? Their allies?

• Political Action Groups
  o Where do they draw their power? Societal, cultural, technical, economic?
  o Where do they draw their intellectual capital?
  o What is the source of their leadership? Knowledge?
  o What are their external organs? Expatriate communities?
  o What is their relationship with the government?
Regional Political Relationships:
- Regional - Non-adversarial and adversarial? How are relations maintained – through economics, religion, culture, ideology, common needs?
- International - Non-adversarial and adversarial? How are relations maintained – through economics, religion, culture, ideology, common needs?
- Potential Allies during a conflict - National resolve to engage in conflict? Military resolve to engage in politically motivated action?

Other Considerations:
- Public confidence in government and in society.
- Factionalism or regionalism within the governmental structure. Challenges faced by the Government.
- Political effects caused by Organized Groups.
- Government Political Response to Group pressures.
- Political effects upon Internal and External Security - relates to Military.
- Government Response to Diplomatic Overtures.
- National Economic Goals affecting the Political structure.
- Police Mechanisms.
TAB B: Military System Points of Analysis

The analysis of the adversary’s military will focus on its leadership, capabilities, dispositions, and morale/commitment to its government, to include:

- Key military leadership, including their training and previous experience in senior leadership.
- Installations and facilities of a military significance (both primary and secondary purpose).
- Infrastructure in place to support identified installations and force structure.
- Military Units, including personnel and chain of command.
- Assigned equipment.
- Current and projected weapons system capabilities.

Military System Questions

Military Environment:

- Will the national leadership use military means to achieve objectives?
- Does the leadership intend to forge or enhance military ties with another state that poses a threat to regional security or U.S. interests?
- Does the leadership intend to enhance national military capabilities in a way that could be regionally destabilizing?
- Are the national leader’s goals a cause for concern?
- Key Leadership – residence, office, wartime command post, telephone, email, political patronage, religious affiliations, ethnic affiliations, personal assets, non-military activities, influences.
- Soldiers -- ethnic/religious composition by region of regular forces and elite forces, pay, training, morale, benefits, gripes/issues.
- Capabilities.
  - Equipment imports: what, from whom, where based, points of entry.
  - Support (spare parts, maintenance, and operational training).
  - Indigenous production and assembly.
  - Raw materials, natural resources.
  - Supply - production, movement, storage.
  - Days of supply on-hand of key supplies (e.g., rations, fuel, ammo, etc…).
- Transportation.
  - Road capacity, primary lines of communication (LOC), organic transportation assets.
  - Rail (same as roads).
  - Water - Inland? Intra-coastal?
  - Bridges - classification, construction materials, length, bypass.
  - Tunnels - height/width restrictions, bypass.
- Organizations.
  - Garrison locations, brigade or larger combat, battalion or larger combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS).
  - Naval port facilities, home stations.
• Airfields.
  o Fixed fields, home station, associated dispersal/highway strips.
  o Number and type aircraft at base.
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
  o Assets and capabilities by echelon.
  o National level/controlled assets.
  o Associated ground stations/downlinks.
  o Centralized processing and dissemination facilities.
  o Center of excellence/HQ for each intelligence discipline.
  o Commercial sources for imagery, dissemination capability, mapping, other.
• Military Communications.
  o Fixed facilities.
  o Mobile capabilities.
  o Relay/retransmission sites Commercial access.
• Integrated Air Defense.
  o Early warning.
  o Target acquisition and tracking, guidance.
  o Fixed launch sites.
  o Mobile AD assets.
  o Centralized C2.
  o Airfields associated with counter-air assets.
  o Airborne warning aircraft (e.g., AWACS).
  o Electrical power requirements.
• Theater Ballistic Missile/Coastal Defense missiles.
  o Fixed launch sites.
  o Mobile assets.
  o Meteorological stations supporting.
  o C2 decision makers.
  o Target acquisition.
  o Target guidance/terminal guidance.
  o Power requirements.
• Weapons of Mass Effects Capabilities.
  o Number and type.
  o Production, assembly, storage, delivery means.
  o Imports required - source and mode of transport.
  o C2 decision maker.
• C2.
  o Rivalries - personal and inter-service.
  o Decision making – dissemination/transmission means, direct or through chain of command.
• Special Capabilities.
  o Special Operations Forces (SOF).
  o Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
  o TBM.
  o Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
  o Submarines.
Military Situation: Under what conditions does the military execute its missions?

- Internal Conflict: Is there internal conflict within the military that could destabilize this country?
  - Rivalry/Factionalism: Are there emerging or increasing rivalries or factionalism within the military?
  - Power Struggle: Are there emerging or increasing power struggles within the military?
  - Deteriorating Morale/Increasing Dissention: Is there deteriorating morale or increasing dissention within the ranks or in the officer corps?

- Civil-Military Relations: How loyal is the military to the current regime? Are there cultural or religious factors that might cause frictions and dissention? Are there changes or developments in civil military relations that could destabilize the country?
  - Government - Military Relations: Will the senior military leadership support and defend the government against internal resistance and insurgency? What factors might cause a loss of confidence and/or support? What factors might cause a military coup to occur?
  - Civil-Military Conflict: Is there increasing conflict between the civilian and military leaders? Is there a difference in views between junior and senior leaderstoward service to the government? To the peoples/constitution?
  - Constitutional/Legal Conflict: Is there increasing civil military conflict over constitutional/legal matters?

- Socio-Military Conflict: Are there growing tensions/conflicts in socio-military relations that could destabilize the country?
  - Internal Security Role: Is the military assuming a new internal security role or increasing its involvement in internal security affairs?
  - Military Activities: Are military operations/activities having an increasingly adverse impact on society?
  - Criminal Activities: Is the military involved in criminal activity that are contributing to increased tensions/conflict between the military and the public?

- External Military Threat: Is an external military threat emerging or increasing?
  - Limited/Covert Military Action: Is an adversary engaging in or increasing limited/covert military action?
  - Conventional Military Action: Is an adversary preparing to engage in conventional military action against this country?
  - WMD/Advanced Weapons: Is an adversary trying to acquire or is in the process of deploying WMD or advanced weapons?
• Operational Status/Capability: Are there changes or developments in the military’s operational status or capabilities that suggest pending military action?
  o Activity Levels/Patterns: Is there unusual change or a sudden increase in activity levels/patterns?
  o Personnel Status: Are there changes or developments in personnel status?
  o Force Capabilities: Are there significant changes or developments in force capabilities?
TAB C: Economic System Points of Analysis

Analysis focuses on all aspects of the adversary's economy that have the potential for exploitation. Among these are industrial production, agriculture, services and armament production. Concentration will be on those elements of the economy that are factors in foreign trade and factors on the internal economy that can have an impact on the political decision-making process and popular support for the government. Both the official and underground (black-market) economies must be examined.

Concentration will be on the adversary and the regional and global countries with which it has its major trade and exchange linkages. Certain specific nations and regional economic alliances could be highly dependent upon adversary exports, and the impact upon these must be considered. The focus will be on critical elements of the trading partners that may be exploited and not their economy as a whole.

In the economic system, a great deal of information is available from open source. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the adversary’s economy, such as gross domestic product, growth rates, unemployment rates, money supply, economic plans, inflation, and national debt. Analysis may include:

Sources of National Wealth:
- Natural Resources.
- Products (Agriculture & Manufacturing).
- Foreign Aid.
- Foreign Trade.
- Import/Export.
- Trading Partners.
- Domestic Consumption.
- Management of the Economy.
- Government Role.
- Private Sector Role.
- Corruption.
- Slush Funds, Leaders’ Bank Accounts.
- Counterfeiting.

Economic System Questions
- What are the key indicators of the economic health of the country(ies) of interest (COI)?
- Which external factors have the most impact upon the economy? What areas of the economy are most susceptible to foreign influences and exploitation?
- What is the impact of foreign economic assistance? What would be the impact of its reduction/removal?
- What percentage of the economy should be classified as “black/gray market”? Are we able to quantify activities in this sector? Can we influence this sector?
- What are the governmental rules on foreign investment? Who do they favor?
• Which nations have the most to gain or lose from damage to, or a collapse of the economy? What are the most likely areas of economic growth?
• Will there be growth in the private sector share of the economy? Who would benefit the most from this change?
• How effective will be steps to diversify the economy?
• What is the inflation rate? To what extent will steps to control inflation be successful?
• Will government subsidies of selected products for domestic use continue? What would be the impact of their reduction/removal?
• What is the anticipated trend in demand for foreign (particularly US) currency?
• What is the prognosis for food production? Are they dependent on imports? Will rationing of essential goods continue? Which items are most likely to be rationed?
• How will demographic factors (e.g., birth rate, adult/child ratio, rural migration to urban areas, etc.) affect the economy in the future?
• What is the impact of the drug trade on the overall economy? Regional economies?
• Will imports of military spending/hardware increase? Who is the most likely suppliers? Will these be cash transactions, or will a barter system be established?
• What is this nation’s standing within the International Monetary Fund and World Bank?
• Is trade with European Union member nations expected to increase? If so, in what specific areas?
• Have any key members of the economic sector leadership been educated in the West or China? If so, have they maintained contacts with their former colleagues?
• Are changes to the current system of state-owned monopolies anticipated? If so, what will be the impact?
• What are the key industries of the state(s)?
• What are the major import/export commodities?
• What is the trade balance? Is this a strength or vulnerability?
• What is the labor situation (e.g., unemployment statistics, labor sources, unions, etc.)?
• Who/what are the key government economic leaders/agencies?
• Who are the principal business leaders in the country?
TAB D: Social System Points of Analysis

Analysis must study the way people, particularly the key leadership and natural leaders, organize their day-to-day living, including the study of groups within society, their composition, organization, purposes and habits, and the role of individuals in society. For intelligence purposes, analysts study seven sociological factors. The detailed list should be viewed as a guide for developing the necessary information to develop the Sociological Systems Summary for the target countries.

**Population.** Intelligence data derived from censuses and sample surveys describe the size, distribution, and characteristics of the population, including rate of change. Most countries now conduct censuses and publish detailed data. Analysts use censuses and surveys to evaluate an area’s population in terms of:
- Location.
- Growth Rates.
- Age and Sex.
- Structure.
- Labor Force.
- Military Manpower.
- Migration.

**Characteristics of the People.** Analysts study social characteristics to determine their contribution to national cohesion or national disintegration. Social characteristics evaluated by analysts include:
- Social Stratification.
- Number and Distribution of Languages.
- Prejudices.
- Formal and Informal Organizations.
- Traditions.
- Taboos.
- Nonpolitical or Religious Groupings and Tribal or Clan Organizations
- Idiosyncrasies.
- Social Mobility.

**Public Opinion.** Key indicators of a society’s goals may be found in the attitudes expressed by significant segments of the population on questions of national interest. Opinions may vary from near unanimity to a nearly uniform scattering of opinion over a wide spectrum. Analysts should sample minority opinions, especially of groups capable of pressuring the government.

**Education.** Analysts concentrate on the general character of education and on the quality of elementary through graduate and professional schools. Data collected for these studies include:
- Education Expenditures.
- Relationship between education and other social and political characteristics
- Education levels among the various components of society.
• Numbers of students studying abroad.
• Extent to which foreign languages are taught.
• Subjects taught in schools.

Religion. Religious beliefs may be a potentially dangerous friction factor for deployed U.S. personnel. Understanding those friction factors is essential to mission accomplishment and the protection of friendly forces. Analysts evaluate data collected on an area’s religions, which includes:
• Types.
• Size of Denominations.
• Growth or Decline Rates.
• Cooperative or confrontational relationships between religions or sects, the people they represent, and the government.
• Ways the government deals with religious organizations.
• Roles religious groups play in the national decision-making process.
• Religious traditions and taboos.

Public Welfare. To evaluate the general health of a population, analysts must identify:
• Health delivery systems.
• Governmental and informal welfare systems.
• Social services provided.
• Living conditions.
• Social insurance.
• Social problems that affect national strength and stability (e.g., divorce rate, slums, drug use, crime) and methods of coping with these problems.

Narcotics and Terrorism Tolerance. A population’s level of tolerance for narcotics and terrorist activities depends on the relations between these organizations and the population as a whole. Analysts should determine if the tolerance is a result of the huge sums of money trafficker’s pump into the economy or a result of trafficker’s use of force. Terrorists may be accepted and even supported by the local populace if they are perceived to be working for the good of the local people. The intelligence analyst must evaluate the way these organizations operate.

Sources. Due to the nature of the social focus area, the preponderance of information is envisioned to be open source. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the target nation. Basic data will be collected and analyzed. Numerous studies, sponsored by the U.S. Government as well as academic treatises are available. A more difficult problem will be making the essential linkages within the sociological area and with other focus areas, particularly political and economic.
Social System Questions

- What are the general perceptions of social stability?
- Who are the population’s most respected figures, why are they so respected, and how do they maintain the public focus?
- What are the government’s most effective tools for influencing the masses?
- What dominant areas of society are emerging and causing instability or areas of conflict? Are any of these areas linked to political factors? Ethnic/racial?
- What are the predominant economic areas that are contributing to, promoting, or exacerbating social instability?
- How can interrelationships be established between religious and ethnic minorities in the COI? How can we effectively manipulate these relationships to affect a desired outcome?
- What are perceptions of public safety primarily attached to? How is the level of violence defined by society? What elements may make it appear excessive?
- What psychological effects does an increased level of violence have on a person’s notion of safety?
- What are the effects of increased criminal activity: on the family, the town, the region, and nationally?
- How can the Coalition increase the psychological perception that the global economy is surpassing the COI?
- How can the Coalition stimulate the notion that the government is failing to provide for basic elements, or is slow to produce results?
- Examine the adverse effects of increased organized criminal activity upon society by industrial component. White collar or financial crime. Drugs and drug smuggling.
- Proliferation of weapons: Note the types of weapons and to whom they are going.
- Gang related activity: Is there a predominant ethnic group asserting themselves in this arena, and are they utilizing any particularly violent tactics to assert themselves?
- What are the significant effects of increased public health problems? What public health issues have increased and how effectively is the government?
- Identify how extensive the division of wealth is between ethnic and religious groups and their potential for promoting tension or conflict.
- What are the effects of environmental problems having on society?
- Identify the key groups adversely affected by increasing poverty rates.
- Identify primary tools used by the government for influencing the masses. How do the masses validate information obtained by the government? Do they feel they need to validate information?
- Who are the key opposition leaders? How do they influence the masses? How are they funded and by whom are they primarily funded?
- Who are the key opposition groups? How do they influence the masses? How are they funded and by whom are they primarily funded? Identify any common themes to unite them, identify areas that may divide them.
- How do opposition groups recruit? Do they target a specific social group? Is there a hierarchical structure? How are members dismissed from the ranks?
- How do these groups affect one another? How do they affect similar groups in neighboring countries? Do they have external support?
- What are each faction’s mechanisms for influencing the others? How do they communicate officially and unofficially? What factions are armed? Where do they get their weapons?
- Are acts of civil disobedience increasing? Is the level of violence employed by the government to quell civil disobedience increasing? Are acts of vigilantism on the rise? How are disturbances quelled? What tools are brought to bear?
- Identify consumer goods that are most valued by the COI’s populace. Who controls supply? How are they networked? Any increase in a particular product?
- What are the “hot button” issues dividing the various factions of the society?
- What networks and mediums can be used to subvert and confuse each faction? What are the capabilities of regional allies to polarize these factions?
- How are rumors spread most effectively?
- What is the social perception of the military’s ability to meet that threat? The states’ ability to meet the threat? The state’s ability to provide overall security in a micro/macro context?
- How are troops conscripted? What are the incentives for service? What unofficial groups/assosciations exist within military? How do they recruit or dismiss people?
- Is criminal behavior increasing within the military? What types of criminal activity occur within the military?
- Identify the hierachical structure of the military. Is there a dominant ethnic group assuming more leadership roles? What ethnic groups stay the most connected in the military, which groups are more apt to include outsiders?
- Which ethnic and religious minorities feel the most repressed? How do they express their discontent? Do any organizations exist to channel their feelings? How responsive do they feel the government is to their issues?
- How does the population view outside assistance? How likely is the government to ask for assistance? How is the need for assistance determined?
- How are relief organizations viewed within the country? Are they busy? How effective are they at solving problems and meeting the needs of those they serve?
- Problems with immigrant flows? How are refugees treated?
- What consumer goods are in short supply? How are those goods brought to market, and who controls the flow of such goods? Is there a dominant ethnic group controlling the flow? How effective is the Black Market in producing hard to obtain goods?
- What goods dominate the black market? Who are the primary producers and end receivers of goods? Is there a particular group emerging as the leader of the Black Market?
- How are minority laborers networked with minority leaders? What are the links between labor groups and minority activists? What ethnic group(s) compose the majority of the skilled labor force? How is skilled labor kept from going abroad?
Infrastructure System Points of Analysis

Infrastructure analysis focuses on the quality and depth of the physical structures that support the people and industry of the state. In developed countries, it is the underlying foundation or basic systems of a nation state; generally physical in nature and supporting/used by other entities (e.g., roads, telephone systems, and public schools).

Infrastructure System Questions

- **Lines of Communications**: Where are the key ports, airfields, rail terminals, roads, railroads, inland waterways, etc. located? Where are key bridges, tunnels, switching yards, scheduling/control facilities, depots/loading stations, switchingyards, etc.?

- **Electrical Power**: Where are power plants, transformer stations, and relay and power transmission lines located? Where are the key substations, switching stations, and line junctures?

- **Potable Water**: Where is the water treatment plants, wells, desalination, bottling plants, and pumping stations? Where are the key pumping stations, control valves, and distribution line junctures?

- **Telecommunications**: What are the location and architecture of the domestic telephone system, cable, fiber-optic, microwave, internet, and cell phone networks and satellite stations? Where are the key control points and junctures?

- **Petroleum and Gas**: Where are the gas and petroleum fields, gathering sites, pumping stations, storage areas, refineries, and distribution lines? Where are the key pumping stations, control valves, and distribution junctures?

- **Broadcast Media**: What is the location, frequency, power, and radius of effective range (coverage) of the am/fm radio and TV stations? Where are the studios, antenna, and relay towers located? How are they powered? Where are the key control points and junctures?

- **Public Health**: What is the location of the hospitals and clinics? Are they adequately staffed, supplied, and equipped? Is the equipment well maintained? Is the staff well trained? Do they depend on foreign or domestic sources for their supplies, medications, and spare equipment parts? Where are the key control points and junctures?

- **Schools**: What is the location of the public, private, and religious primary and secondary schools and universities? Where are the key control points and junctures?

- **Public Transportation**: What are the public (bus/streetcar/taxi/etc.) transportation routes? Where are the key control points and junctures?

- **Sewage Collection and Treatment**: Where are the collections systems, pumping stations, treatment facilities, and discharge areas located? Where is the key control points and junctures?
Common Infrastructure Questions

- How are key facilities linked? (Physically, electronically, etc.)
- What are the key nodes? Where are they? Where is the disabling yet non-lethal/ non-destructive infrastructure nodes?
- What are their alternates? What are the alternates for the above and how are they linked to the key facilities and each other?
- Are there indigenous capabilities? What indigenous capabilities could be used? How are they linked and organized? What are the critical nodes?
- What is the security surrounding the nodes?
- What is the security posture at these facilities? Who controls the forces? How are security forces/police/paramilitary networked? What training do they receive? What is their level of proficiency? Are they augmented as alert status (national or local) changes? What is the ground/ naval/ air defense capabilities at/near these facilities? How are they networked? What groups are likely to conduct industrial sabotage? How are they tasked, linked, supported?
- Who owns and who controls the infrastructure? Who owns and/or controls all of the above entities? Is ownership by private, corporate, or governmental entities? What organizations have regulatory oversight/control?
- What is the capability to repair damage to the system and restore it to service? Is maintenance and repair an integral part of the organization? What are their capabilities and limitations? Which contractors are normally used and for what purpose? Are repair/restore materials readily available or is there a long lead-time for critical supplies/components? Who are the key engineering contractors for these facilities? Can/will they share plans, blueprints, schematics, etc.?
- What would be the second-order effects of influencing the infrastructure?
TAB F: Information System Points of Analysis

Analysis of Information Systems and Operations includes:
- Telecommunications capabilities and level of sophistication, tele-density rates, radio and television broadcast coverage including television, landline, cellular, Internet, radio, etc.
- Interconnectivity of communications via ISDN, fiber optic, satellite, and microwave.
- Primary nodes and trunks of telecommunications infrastructure including government, non-government, citizen, and military use of Information Operations.
- Knowledge of COI key leaders’ style and decision-making habits, advisors’ perception, and cultural influences.
- Understanding governmental use of media influence, public affairs, and civil affairs interrelationships.
- Knowledge of military, non-governmental organization, and law enforcement interrelationships.
- Understanding of effects on adversary under psychological, computer network attack and defense, electronic warfare, and space operations.
- Locations and purpose of physical infrastructure of communications and broadcast towers, cables, and supporting operations centers are included within the infrastructure focus.
- Development of and use of computer network operating systems, IT industry skill sets, and software applications.
- Media affiliations, perceptions and sympathies to include censorship and self-censorship in news and entertainment print, and broadcast industries.

Information System Questions
- How effective are the COI’s network defense capabilities? What reactions could be expected following an incident? What recovery procedures are routinely exercised?
- What is the organizational structure of the telecommunications industry? How effective is the COI at managing physical security of infrastructure an implementing network security practices?
- What interrelationships exist between civil law enforcement, military, commercial and non-governmental agencies that would enhance the COI’s response to an emergency?
- What redundancies exist within the COI’s network to eliminate or reduce network down time? Cellular, satellite, landline, power back up? How effective is their exchange, backbone, architecture in providing redundancies?
- What would cause a slow-down of COI’s network? In what ways can the effect be localized? (Geographic, logic, by agency, etc.)
• What bandwidth issues exist within the COI’s communications industry? How well, and in what ways, does the government manage its allocation?
• What type of OPSEC practices does the COI routinely exhibit to deny exploitation?
• In what ways have military/civil/corporate operations centers improved their practices/tactics in keeping with the COI’s technological improvements? Do they rely more heavily on computers/cellular/networks than in the past?
• What are the indicators, if they exist, that the COI has developed a more focused vision and strategic plan for using technology than it had in the late ‘90s? What effect has technology had on productivity, transportation, logistics, etc. in government, commerce, corporate, private sectors?
• What is known about the COI’s assessment of Blue network vulnerabilities and defense measures?
• Do regional and neighboring countries or satellite broadcasts (television, radio, and internet) have an audience in the COI’s population? Which broadcasts are popular with citizens and what is the audience’s demographic and statistic data? What programs or broadcasts are popular with minority political parties, resistance movements, academia, etc.?
• What is the topology design the COI networks utilize? Which exchanges and trunks are co-located within government-controlled facilities? Are government-commercial partnerships used to provide network services?
• What is known of current and planned technology projects: fiber optic cabling? ISDN access expansion? Satellite leases and launches? What is the operational status and capability of COI’s Low-Earth Orbit satellites?
• What Internet domains are accessible to the population? Is reliable language interpretation software available? What licenses does the government require for webhosting?
• What governmental directives address network security in supporting national security objectives?
• What messages might be effective in the COI? What themes are prevalent in the media?
• What advances in communications technology have enabled improvements in military hardware employment? Describe the use of telecommunications technology in law enforcement operations.
• To what degree and direction are telecommunications infrastructure investments impacting military readiness? Describe the state of international telecommunications connectivity to the COI?
• Which current telecommunications and Internet security operations have been exercised? Is there a national crisis action plan?
• What practices and policies does the government use in monitoring information-related media (TV, radio, Internet, etc.)? What enforcement methods have been employed?
• Which print media and on-line content do citizens turn to for news? Entertainment? Social Media? Do censorship policies or self-censorship trends exist in the COI?
• Is there a market and distribution pipeline for recorded or intercepted news or entertainment programs? In what ways does law enforcement interact in this market?
• What is known about COI's network operating systems? What IT skill sets are known to be in high demand?
APPENDIX D: OPORD FORMAT W/ STAFF ESTIMATE INFORMATION

Underlined and Blue Text = recommended additions to the JP 5-0 Format
* Italics and Highlighted = Staff estimate information per JP 5-0

Copy no. _____ of _____ copies
ISSUING HQ
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
Message reference number

OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)

BASIC ORDER (U)

REFERENCES:

(U) TIME ZONE:

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization).
  * Capability Shortfalls / excesses

1. (U) Situation
   a. (U) General. See Annex B (Intelligence).
      (1) (U) Environment of Conflict
         (a) Geostrategic Context
         (b) Domestic and International Context
         (c) Systems Perspective of the OE
      (2) (U) Policy Goals
         (a) US/Multinational Policy Goals
         (b) End states.
            1. Strategic End state & Objectives
            2. Termination Criteria (and issues w/ these criteria)
            2. Military End states
      (3) Non-US National Political Decisions
      (4) Operational Limitations
   b. (U) Area of Concern
      (1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander’s Area of Operations.
      (2) (U) Area of Interest.
c. (U) Deterrent Options

d. (U) Risk

e. (U) Adversary Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
   (1) Adversary Centers of Gravity
      (a) Strategic
      (b) Operational
   (2) Adversary Critical Factors
      (a) Strategic
      (b) Operational
   (3) Adversary Courses of Action
      (a) General (including Strength, weakness, composition, location, disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time/space factors, utilized and available bases, efficiency and proficiency in joint ops Capabilities/Limitations)
      (b) Adversary’s Political Intentions & End states
      (c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives
      (d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives
      (e) Adversary CONOPs
      (f) External Sources of Support
   (4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment
   (5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities
   (6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization

f. (U) Friendly Forces
   (1) (U) Higher.
   (2) (U) Adjacent.
   (3) Friendly Centers of Gravity
      (a) Strategic
      (b) Operational
   (4) Friendly Critical Factors
      (a) Strategic
      (b) Operational
   (5) Multinational Forces
   (6) Supporting Commands and Agencies

g. (U) Facts (Relevant & Key)

h. (U) Assumptions.
   (1) Threat Warning/Timeline
   (2) Pre-Positioning and Regional Access
   (3) In-Place Forces
   (4) Strategic Assumptions
   (5) Legal Considerations
      (a) ROE
      (b) International Law, including LOAC
(c) US law
d) Host-nation and partner nation policies
e) Status of forces agreements
(f) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including Article 98 agreements

(6) Deductions from Facts/Assumptions

2. (U) Mission.

3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Concept of Operations. See Annex C (Operations)
   (1) Commander’s Intent
      (a) Purpose and End state
      (b) Objectives
      (c) Effects, if discussed

(2) General
   (a) JFC Military Objectives, supporting desired effects and operational focus
   (b) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs
   (c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs
   (d) Phasing of operations, to include Commander’s intent for each phase.
      1. Phase I:
         a. JFC’s intent
         b. Timing
         c. Objectives and desired effects
         d. Risk
         e. Execution
         f. Employment (and/or Deployment)
            (1) Land Forces
            (2) Air Forces
            (3) Maritime Forces
            (4) Space Forces
            (5) Cyber Forces
            (6) SOF Forces

   g. Operational Fires
      (1) Joint forces policies, procedures, & planning cycles
      (2) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes
      (3) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets
      (4) Areas that require joint fires to support op maneuver
      (5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements
      (6) Fire Support Coordination Measures (if required)
2. Phase II through XX:

b. (U) Tasks
   (1) Specified
   (2) Implied
   (3) Essential
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
d. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements.
   (--) COA Evaluation Criteria – Staff recommendations (…then final Cmdr Decision)
   (--) COA Comparison w/ respect to Evaluation Criteria. Include staff recommendation.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics
   a. (U) Concept of Sustainment
   b. (U) Logistics. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).
   d. (U) Public Affairs. See Annex F (Public Affairs).
   e. (U) Civil Military Operations. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
   f. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. See Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
      g. (U) Environmental Considerations. See Annex L
      h. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. See Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
      i. (U) Health Service Support. See Annex Q (Medical Services).

5. (U) Command and Control
   a. (U) Command
      (2) Command Posts
      (3) Succession to Command.
   b. (U) Joint Communications System Support. See Annex K (CIS)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

ANNEXES:
A – Task Organization
B – Intelligence
C – Operations
D – Logistics
E – Personnel
F – Public Affairs
G – Civil-Military Affairs
H – Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
I – Knowledge and Information Management
J – Command Relationships
K – Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
L – Environmental Considerations
M – Not Currently Used (previously – Geospatial Information and Services)
N – Assessments
O – Host Nation Support
P – Foreign Disclosure
Q – Health Services
R – Reports
S – Special Technical Operations
T – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Response (CBRN-R)
U – Notional Counter proliferation Decision Guide
V – Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination
W – Operational Contract Support
X – Execution Checklist
Y – Commander’s Communication Strategy
Z – Distribution

OFFICIAL:
s/
{Name}
{Rank and Service}
{Title}
APPENDIX E: COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE FORMAT

HEADQUARTERS US XXXX
APO xx xxxxxx
Date xx xxxxxxxx xxxx
Title: Campaign for XXXX

   a. List relevant facts.

   b. List key assumptions.

   c. List limitations.

   d. List enemy objectives – identify both operational and strategic objectives.

   e. List enemy centers of gravity (COG). Identify the critical capabilities supporting each COG, critical requirements and the critical vulnerabilities within each critical capability.

      (1) Enemy COG #1

         (a) Critical Capability #1
             1. Critical Vulnerability #1
             2. Critical Vulnerability #2

   f. List friendly objectives – identify both operational and strategic objectives.

   g. List friendly COG. Identify the critical capabilities supporting each COG and the critical vulnerabilities within each critical capability.

      (1) Friendly COG #1

      (2) Critical Capability #1
          (a) Critical Vulnerability #1
          (b) Critical Vulnerability #2

   h. List essential tasks necessary to accomplish the mission.

   i. Identify the friendly end state.

   j. State the mission.
2. Situation and Courses of Action (COAs). This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail.

a. End states specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.

b. National strategic objectives specified by the President or Secretary of Defense and the supporting desired effects developed by the combatant commander.

c. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

d. Enemy Capabilities.

   (1) Summarize potential enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission.

   (2) Describe likely indications and warning that an enemy is preparing for military operations in the affected area.

   (3) Provide other information that will assist the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating various COAs.

e. Friendly COAs. List COAs that offer adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable and complete means of accomplishing the mission. Address the following for each COA:

   (1) Combat capability required (e.g., urban combat, air superiority, maritime interdiction)

   (2) Force provider

   (3) Potential Destination

   (4) Required delivery dates

   (5) Coordinated deployment estimate

   (6) Employment estimate

   (7) Estimated transportation requirements
f. COA Analysis. Summarize results from wargaming friendly and enemy COAs. Highlight enemy capabilities that may significantly affect friendly COAs.

g. COA Comparison. Identify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

h. Recommended COAs. State the recommended COA(s). Provide an assessment of which COAs are supportable, an analysis of the risk for each, and a concise statement of the recommended COA with its requirements.
APPENDIX F: Reference Times

Plans, reports, orders, and messages often reference dates & times defined as follows:

a. **C-day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter “C” will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. **D-day.** The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c. **F-hour.** The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. **H-hour.** The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

e. **H-hour (amphibious operations).** For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.

f. **I-day.** The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

g. **L-hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

h. **L-hour (amphibious operations).** In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone.

i. **M-day.** The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.

j. **N-day.** The unnamed day an active-duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

k. **R-day.** Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

l. **S-day.** The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more than 200,000).

m. **T-day.** The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 call-up).

n. **W-day.** Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).
APPENDIX G: Operation Assessment

Conducting operation assessment requires a detailed study of the following references: Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, “Chapter VI Operation Assessment OPERATION ASSESSMENT MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR OPERATION ASSESSMENT ATP 5-0.3 MCRP 5-10.1 NTTP 5-01.3 AFTTP 3-2.87, FEBRUARY 2020, hereafter cited as ATP 5-0.3


Definitions:

Assessment: Assessment is a continuous process where the staff observes and evaluates the operational environment and the impact of friendly unit actions against their mission to better inform the commander. (ATP 5-0.3, 7 FEB 2020, p. xi)

Operation Assessment: Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-1)

Indicator: An indicator is defined as: a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. Indicators are only important if they answer the correct questions. (ATP 5-0.3, 7 FEB 2020, p.16)

Measure of Effectiveness: Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are indicators used to help measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and attainment of end states. MOEs help answer the question: Are we doing the correct things to create the effects or change in the OE that we desire? (ATP 5-0.3, 7FEB 2020, p.17)
**Measure of Performance:** Measures of performance (MOPs) are indicators used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs commonly reside in task-execution matrices, and answer general questions such as: Are we doing things correctly? Was the task completed to standard? (ATP 5-0.3, 7 FEB 2020, p. 17)

*The following is from the Executive Summary of Joint Publication 5-0 (2017 pages xxvi to xxix, with clarifying figures and texts from Chapter VI “Operation Assessment.”

**Operation Assessment**

Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements (KLEs), and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander’s awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, identifying and analyzing commander decision points, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization’s planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander’s decision cycle. (JP 5-0, Joint Planning, p. VI-1)

---

**Figure G-1: Campaign Plan Assessments (JP 5-0, Figure VI-1, p. VI-5)**
**Tenets of Operation Assessment**

**Commander Centricity.** The assessment plan should focus on the information and intelligence that directly support the commander’s decision making.

**Subordinate Commander Involvement.** Assessments are more effective when used to support conversations between commanders at different echelons.

**Integration.** Operation assessment is the responsibility of commanders, planners, and operators at every level and not the sole work of an individual advisor, committee, or assessment entity.

**Rhythm.** To deliver information at the right time, the operation assessment should be synchronized with the commander’s decision cycle.

**Integration of External Sources of Information.** Operation assessment should allow the commander and staff to integrate information that updates the understanding of the OE in order to plan more effective operations.

**Credibility and Transparency.** As much as possible, sources and assessment results should be unbiased. All methods used, and limitations in the collection of information and any assumptions used to link evidence to conclusions, should be clearly described in the assessment report.

**Continuous Operation Assessment.** While an operation assessment product may be developed on a specific schedule, assessment is continuous in any operation.

**Operation Assessment Process**

There is no single way to conduct an assessment. Every mission and OE have its own set of challenges, and every commander assimilates information differently, making every assessment plan unique. The following steps in table 1 (see page 4) can help guide the development of an assessment plan. (ATP 5.0.3, 7 FEB 2020, p. 3)
- **Step 1**—Develop the Operation Assessment Approach
- **Step 2**—Develop Operation Assessment Plan
- **Step 3**—Collect Information and Intelligence
- **Step 4**—Analyze Information and Intelligence
- **Step 5**—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations
- **Step 6**—Adapt Plans or Operations/Campaigns

Below, Figure G-2: Operation Assessment Steps (ATP 5.0.3, 7 FEB 2020, Table 1, p. 4)

### Table 1. Operation Assessment Steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Operations Process Activity</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Personnel Involved</th>
<th>Staff Activity</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop Assessment Approach</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>• JIPOE</td>
<td>• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel</td>
<td>• Clearly defined end states, objectives, and tasks</td>
<td>• Information, intelligence, and collection plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Staff estimates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Operational approach development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• JPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint targeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AWG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Assessment Plan</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>• Develop a framework</td>
<td>• Operations planners • Intelligence planners • AWG personnel</td>
<td>• Operational approach • JIPOE • Desired end state • Feedback mechanism parameters</td>
<td>• Assessment plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Select measures (MOE and MOP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop a feedback mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect Information and Intelligence</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Joint targeting</td>
<td>• Intelligence analysts • Current operations • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established)</td>
<td>• Multisource intelligence reporting, and joint force resource and disposition information</td>
<td>• Estimates of OE conditions, enemy disposition, and friendly disposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• JIPOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Staff estimates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• IR management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ISR planning and optimization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze and Synthesize the Feedback</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Assessment work group</td>
<td>• Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established)</td>
<td>• Intelligence assessments • Staff assessments • Analysis methods</td>
<td>• Estimate of joint force effects on OE (draft assessment report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Staff estimates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate the Assessment and Recommendations</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Provide a timely recommendation to the appropriate decision maker</td>
<td>• Commander • Subordinate commanders (periodically) • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established)</td>
<td>• Estimate of joint force effects on OE (draft assessment report)</td>
<td>• Assessment report, decisions, and recommendations to higher headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt Plans</td>
<td>Execution Planning</td>
<td>• Joint targeting</td>
<td>• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established)</td>
<td>• Commander’s guidance and feedback</td>
<td>• Changes to the operation and assessment plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• JPP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- AWG—assessment working group
- IR—information requirement
- ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- JIPOE—joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
- OE—operational environment
- JPP—joint planning process
- MOE—measure of effectiveness
- MOP—measure of performance
The assessment process is continuous. Throughout JPP, assessment provides support to and is supported by operational design and operational art. The assessment process complements and is concurrent with JPP in developing specific and measurable task-based end states, objectives, and effects during operational design. These help the staff identify the information and intelligence requirements (including CCIRs). During execution, assessment provides information on progress toward creating effects, achieving objectives, and attaining desired end states. Assessment reports are based on continuous situational awareness and OE analysis from internal and external sources and address changes in the OE and their proximate causes, opportunities to exploit and risks to mitigate, and recommendations to inform decision making throughout planning and execution. (JP 5-0, p. VI-12)

See ATP 5.0.3, 7 FEB 2020, Appendix A, Connecting Outcomes to Indicators Model for a detailed explanation of how to approach the development of indicators that will allow for an accurate assessment of the desired outcomes.
Conceptualizing Principles in Operationalizing Women, Peace, & Security (WPS)


Figure H-1: DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework
The DOD WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (June 2020) lists the following Defense Objectives (DOs) and Intermediate Defense Objects (IDO):  

- **DO 1**: The DoD exemplifies a diverse organization that allows for women’s meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force.  
- **IDO 1.1**: DOD recruitment, employment, development, retention, and promotion efforts are informed by WPS initiatives to ensure a diverse and inclusive fighting force.  
- **DO 2**: Women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors.  
- **IDO 2.1**: DoD supports women’s meaningful participation with partner nation defense and security sectors.  
- **DO 3**: Partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis  
- **IDO 3.1**: DoD works with partner nation defense and security sectors to help strengthen their understanding of and commitment to international humanitarian law and international human rights law  

Given the above, it is imperative to consider a gender perspective within strategic, operational and tactical planning to maximize understanding of the operating environment and the potential risks or opportunities involved. Below is a sample of how one might apply PMESII-PT in Joint operations to four areas underlying concepts within WPS:  

As part of the Joint Planning Process, a cultural or gender subject matter expert (SME) may engage to assist each staff section in applying a gender perspective. This SME may be called a Gender Advisor (GENAD) or a WPS Advisor and may network with Gender Focal Points (GFP) or WPS Focal Points within each staff section. Below is a snapshot example of what each functional staff (special staff also apply) section may consider when conducting a gender analysis. (Source: Smart Book, COL Oswald-Hrutkay)
**PMESII-PT/GP4 Gendered Security Analysis Tool**

**INSTRUCTION:** Assess the security environment for each gender by crosswalking the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) with the gendered security principles of gendered perspective, prevention, protection, participation, and environment (GP4). This table defines 37 aspects of gendered security in an operational environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military/Police</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Physical Environment</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Perspective</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation, and perspective in law, civic life, decision-making, conflict resolution, and resource distribution.</td>
<td>Forces and capabilities of the national military, paramilitary, and police forces.</td>
<td>Individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, consuming resources.</td>
<td>Cultural-religious, ethnic makeup of a society and its members’ behaviors, beliefs, values, customs.</td>
<td>Nature, scope, effects of individuals and systems that use, collect, process, and disseminate info.</td>
<td>Facilities, services, and installations needed for development &amp; function of a community/society.</td>
<td>Ecosystem/geographic area’s plants, animals, soil, water, air, sunlight, temperature, &amp; climate.</td>
<td>Time use and duration of activities, events, and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil-Police Perspective</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation, and perspective in the military, paramilitary, and police forces.</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation and perspective in economic and livelihood empowerment of finance, agriculture, industry, etc.</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation and perspective in family, society, culture, and religion.</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation and perspective in the production and access of information.</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation and perspective in infrastructures that provide for health, well-being and care of common resources.</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation and perspective in the physical environment that provides for health and well-being.</td>
<td>Engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation and perspective in the use of individual time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Prevention</td>
<td>Equal access to justice and political power through voting, and decision-making.</td>
<td>Equal access to jobs, leisure, financial services, property rights, legal services, representation for sustainable incomes and livelihoods.</td>
<td>Equal access to family, social, cultural &amp; religious services that act on issues of one’s importance, and special access to social assault counselors, maternal health.</td>
<td>Equal access to literacy, information, knowledge, print media, TV, radio, internet, telecom and gender-sensitive information to include early warning alerts.</td>
<td>Equal access to food, water, sanitation, hygiene, health, energy, education, utilities, transportation and communication.</td>
<td>Equal access to the ecosystem’s benefits of food, freshwater, fiber, shelter, medicine, fuel, pest &amp; disease control, and spiritual, cultural &amp; recreational uses.</td>
<td>Equal protection and equal access to paid productive time and unpaid reproductive time to maintain domestic life and to bear and rear children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil-Police Prevention</td>
<td>Equal access to military and police institutions with established norms, rules, and jobs that uniformly engage people.</td>
<td>Equal protection for safety &amp; security, and protection from harassment, assault, coercion, exploitation, crime and trafficking.</td>
<td>Equal protection as consumers and merchants in barracks, markets, businesses.</td>
<td>Equal protection in society, culture, and religion, and special protection from infanticide, child marriage, intimate partner violence.</td>
<td>Equal protection in the use of publically provided infrastructure and in public places and refugee &amp; internal displacement camps.</td>
<td>Equal protection using ecosystems and equal protection from diseases and climate impacts on health and well-being.</td>
<td>Equal protection of individual time for engagement in and access to the family, society, governance, economy, and security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Protection</td>
<td>Equal protection under all laws, rules and regulations.</td>
<td>Economic Protection</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>Information Protection</td>
<td>Infrastructure Protection</td>
<td>Environment Protection</td>
<td>Time Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil-Police Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>Equal participation in elections, governments, councils, meetings, and capacity to change policies, practices, and institutions.</td>
<td>Equal participation in economic and financial institutions.</td>
<td>Equal participation in families, communities, schools, places of worship.</td>
<td>Equal participation in information agencies.</td>
<td>Equal participation in infrastructure services and development &amp; construction.</td>
<td>Equal participation in ecosystems and benefit distribution.</td>
<td>Equal participation in paid productive time &amp; unpaid reproductive time to maintain domestic life and to bear and rear children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. C/J 1

i. Manning

1. Ensure deploying force has a Gender Advisor/Gender Focal Points at appropriate levels.

2. Ensure deploying force has sufficient trained servicewomen to fulfill military tasks e.g.
   a. Female searchers, Interpreters, Medics
   b. Female Engagement Teams
   c. Mixed Engagement Teams

3. Ensure deploying force has enough service members in each unit trained and aware of how to respond to incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and the presence of child soldiers?

ii. Discipline

1. Ensure service members are trained on standards of behavior when interacting with the local population. This can include considering gender differences within the defense and security sector, such as national servicewomen.

2. Clear rules to be issued placing brothels and prostitutes off limits.

iii. Medics

1. Ensure female medics are part of Force establishment.

2. Ensure medics are trained in outreach programs in support of Information Operations.

3. Include training on how to respond to victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

4. Are trained in the appropriate access and use of ‘rape kits.’ C/J 2

iv. Human Terrain

1. Availability of female interpreters, interrogators, and handlers.

2. Does the staff and component commands recognize the need to engage with local women as well as men for HUMINT and Counterintelligence?
3. Readiness of C/J 2 trained servicewomen to deploy.

4. Inclusion of local women when conducting background checks on selection for local militia (local women more likely to identify corrupt and criminal individuals unsuitable for task of local policing).

b. C/J 3

i. Combined/Joint Effects and Information Activities

1. Understand the role of women in society (positive influence for women likely includes the family).

2. Understand that there are ways to work with cultural traditions that place the role of women in the private sphere only.

3. Understand that human rights of individuals are more important than cultural norms which may subjugate women and violate children.

4. Information operations to target women as well as men. One example is Key Leader Engagements. Patrolling (proactive, diverse, trained)

5. Include Female (or mixed) Engagement Teams on patrols.

6. Include females as gender sensitive searchers and intelligence gatherers.

7. Include females to model balance in male/female positive dynamics.

8. Include females to potentiate a less hostile presence.

9. Include females capable of engaging MWBG.

ii. Military Police

1. MPs are to understand their apprehension and detention authorities including reporting procedures regarding sexual and gender-based conflict (e.g., abuse, rape, and mistreatment of children).

2. MPs are to understand the powers of detention regarding sexual and gender-based violence in conflict.

3. MPs are to be familiar with International Criminal Court report paperwork to increase the rate of prosecution where rape has been used as a weapon of war.
4. MPs are to know which agencies are operating in the local area who can support sexually abused survivors and children.

iii. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)/Refugees

1. In unsecure areas, adapt plans for foot and vehicle patrols to coincide with health and welfare activities such as food and water collection.

2. Ensure lighting and locks for camp perimeters account for differences between genders (including women and girls) for safe freedom of movement in areas of health, welfare and hygiene.

3. Adjust allocation of humanitarian assistance based on separate queuing for women and men. C/J 4

iv. Contracts

1. Consider employing local female as well as male contractors for commercial activities.

2. Consider local women’s markets for contracts.

3. Ensure that contractors selected treat staff appropriately and are sensitive to gender discrimination policies. C/J 5

v. Diversity.

1. Male-only planning cells are unlikely to adopt gender mainstreaming and may rely on traditional views of security; ensure servicewomen are included in planning meetings.

2. Ensure female combatants and child soldiers are included in DDR programs (housing/education/work opportunities).

3. Ensure planning factors include deploying servicewomen and female interpreters for addressing female combatants entering DDR programs.

vi. Security Sector Reform Policies and Programs ensure recruitment and training programs consider diverse perspectives including women.

1. Ensure training programs include service women (to train local women nationals) as cultural sensitivities apply. Ensure military operations appropriate and account for safe available accommodations in support of the different health and welfare needs of MWBG. Post-conflict negotiations.

2. Ensure peace negotiation policies include diverse perspectives
and ways of including local women in the talks and political agreements.

3. If practical, ensure women’s perspectives are included across all phases of the negotiation process. Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs)/ Refugees

4. Ensure policies regarding IDPs/refugees include diverse perspectives for the safe and secure accommodations of the different needs of MWBG.

5. Ensure military support planning within and around the camps includes gender consideration for differing needs and movement of MWBG.

c. C/J 7 Training

1. Military capacity building/training of host nation security forces to include briefs on Rule of Law and Human Rights.

2. NATO troops to receive gender awareness training.

3. Ensure Joint personnel involved in contracting maintain annual training in combating trafficking in humans with consideration of contracting overseas.

d. C/J 8 Budget Allocation.

1. Funding to be sought out and made available for projects engaging local women.

2. Ensure funding is available for female interpreters in contracting programs.

e. C/J 9 Civil Military Cooperation

1. Ensure that liaison with state actors and civil state actors includes groups representing women and children’s security and welfare.

2. Women’s initiatives to be considerate as well as traditional projects.

3. Before deploying establish communications with organizations in country, that respond to sexual based violence and are concerned with children’s welfare.

Below is another sample of how one might use the above PMESII-PT analysis to apply a simplified operational approach overlay for planning integration.
Gender Perspectives

**Concept of Implementation**: Integrate Gender Perspectives and support organizations into operations, including strategic communications, non-kinetic targeting, rules of engagement, targeting directives, and human terrain analysis. Align activities which address the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and children and exclusions of women from peace processes.

**Figure H-3** (Amy Sheridan, Australian CRCG for Talisman Saber 2015, revised by MSG Vince Lowery, US Army, I Corps G9 Senior Operations Sergeant Major and Gender Advisor for Talisman Saber 2017).

- **Perspective**
  - Gender Intelligence Reports: build situational awareness and understanding of gender roles and issues
  - Identify/integrate key women and women’s groups into information collection
  - Establish dialogue, leverage UN/NGO efforts and expertise in theater

- **Prevention**
  - Identify vulnerable communities
  - Identify Hazards
  - Develop strategies
  - Worst-case scenario planning

- **Protection**
  - Appoint Gender Coordinators
  - Establish female engagement and population protection units/patrols
  - Set security conditions for NG/NGO return
  - Leverage capabilities, resources, and expertise as force multipliers
  - Facilitate Humanitarian Assistance Operations
  - Identify and process individuals targeting vulnerable populations

- **Participation**
  - Public Messaging and Information Operations
  - Identify female political stakeholder/leaders

- **Internal CCMD Capabilities**
  - Preparatory Individual and Collective Training, SOP for dealing with sexual based violence
  - Trained personnel to respond to gender based violence and presence of children soldiers
  - Appoint Gender Advisors and female military personnel: interpreters, medics, check point searchers
  - Establish Female Engagement Teams, Female Population Protection Teams, and Mixed Engagement Teams (as outlined in OPORD or mandates)

- **Conflict**
  - Coordinate with NGOs to ensure IDP camps address unique needs of women & girls
  - Health and sanitation requirements
  - Separate gender and children latrines, showers and kitchens
  - Organize populated camps and other displaced gatherings by gender specific security and cultural requirements

- **Competition and Cooperation**
  - Leadership engagement plan with female communities and political leaders: continue public messaging and IC
  - Female contractors, commercial activities, markets
APPENDIX I

AUTHORITIES

1. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of how authorities impact military strategy, plans, and campaigns. While a large portion of the appendix is derived from “Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016”, this appendix combines large portions of that document with additional explanation and recommendations from the Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Campaigning, U.S. Army War College.

2. Explanation of Authority. Authority, in its simplest form, can be characterized as the power to perform some act or take some action. It is not a doctrinal term and is often characterized as permission. In order to fully understand their authority commanders must consider not only those things which provide affirmative permission to act, but also those things which restrict their ability to act. Therefore, authorities provide the “left and right limits” within which one has freedom of action. Additionally, commanders must consider guidance and intent issued by higher echelons to determine what should be done as well as what can be done. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)

Authority can be restrictive or permissive and understanding the implications of a specific authority is critical to mission success. Authority for most military action stems from the Constitution, laws, statutes and judicial decisions. In most cases, specific authorities for military action stem from the 54 titles found within the United States (U.S.) Code. U.S. domestic law is represented with U.S. Code and when laws are amended or new laws are created, those amendments or new laws will be represented in U.S. Code. Each amendment of law will reference the specific title of U.S. code to which authorities are provided. Not only does authority enable military commanders the ability to execute their duties, but authority also enables money to be appropriated through congress and potentially executed by the Department of Defense or other portions of the U.S. Government. However, authorization does guarantee that congress will appropriate money that can be linked to a specific authority. The most common example of this is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which is amended each year. While the NDAA provides authority it does not guarantee follow-on appropriations.

3. The U.S. Code. As described above most military authorities are represented in U.S. Code. Additionally, domestic authorities for unified action that enable all parts of the U.S. government to work in concert towards common goals are found with in various titles of U.S. Code. The 54 titles of U.S. Code are found in Table 1. Each title is broken into subtitles, parts, chapters, and sections. For example, authorities for “Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties” is found in Title 10, Subtitle A: General Military Law, Part I “Organization and General Military Powers, Chapter 6 Combatants. More specifically, Section 161 of the aforementioned provides details on the
establishment of combatant commands. The abbreviated listing of the section of U.S. Code is written as “10 U.S. Code § 161”.

Once a law is enacted, the U.S. Code is amended or updated to reflect the new law. Many acts amend previous acts that have existed for a long period of time. For example, the 2018 International Assistance Act which provides authorities for both military assistance and security assistance reform amends both the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Some laws or “acts” are amended annually while other are amended as required. Each authoritative act links specific authorities to specific titles of U.S. Code. Most authoritative acts amend multiple parts of U.S. Code. For example, the NDAA while mostly being captured in Title 10, also amends Titles 5, 18, 22, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 49, 50, and 51.

Knowledge of U.S. Code enables commanders, planners, and other staff members to find the details of existing authorities and also may assist in requesting new authorities. While many authorities are found in Title 10 of U.S. Code, not all necessary authorities are found in Title 10. For example, many of the authorities required for Combatant Commanders to execute relevant portions of security assistance are found in Title 22 of U.S. Code. Once authorities are enacted as law under U.S. Code, CJCS and the Joint Staff will implement new authorities or changes to existing authorities via the orders process (e.g., EXORDs). The majority of the service chief’s authorities to “man, train, and equip” come from Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title 1 - General Provisions</th>
<th>Title 28 - Judiciary and Judicial Procedure *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 2 - The Congress</td>
<td>Title 29 - Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 3 - The President</td>
<td>Title 30 - Mineral Lands and Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 4 - Flag and Seal, Seat of Gov’t, and the States</td>
<td>Title 31 - Money and Finance *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 5 - Government Organization and Employees</td>
<td>Title 32 - National Guard *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 6 - Domestic Security</td>
<td>Title 33 - Navigation and Navigable Waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 7 - Agriculture</td>
<td>Title 34 - Crime Control and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 8 - Aliens and Nationality</td>
<td>Title 35 - Patents *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 9 - Arbitration *</td>
<td>Title 36 – Patriotic/Nat’l Observances, Ceremonies, &amp; Orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10 - Armed Forces *</td>
<td>Title 37 - Pay &amp; Allowances of the Uniformed Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 11 - Bankruptcy *</td>
<td>Title 38 - Veterans’ Benefits *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 12 - Banks and Banking</td>
<td>Title 39 - Postal Service *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 13 - Census *</td>
<td>Title 40 - Public Buildings, Property, and Works *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 14 - Coast Guard *</td>
<td>Title 41 - Public Contracts *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 15 - Commerce and Trade</td>
<td>Title 42 - The Public Health and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 16 - Conservation</td>
<td>Title 43 - Public Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 17 - Copyrights *</td>
<td>Title 44 - Public Printing and Documents *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure *</td>
<td>Title 45 - Railroads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 19 - Customs Duties</td>
<td>Title 46 - Shipping *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 20 - Education</td>
<td>Title 47 - Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 21 - Food and Drugs</td>
<td>Title 48 - Territories and Insular Possessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse</td>
<td>Title 49 - Transportation *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 23 - Highways *</td>
<td>Title 50 - War and National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 24 - Hospitals and Asylums</td>
<td>Title 51 - National and Commercial Space Programs *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 25 - Indians</td>
<td>Title 52 - Voting and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 26 - Internal Revenue Code</td>
<td>Title 53 [Reserved]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 27 - Intoxicating Liquors</td>
<td>Title 54 - National Park Service and Related Programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure I-1 Titles of U.S. Code
Military commanders and their staffs are typically familiar with the large and diverse body of authorities under Title 10 of the United States Code. The authority necessary to equip and train the armed forces, establish a command structure, maintain good order and discipline, and some operational authorities are addressed in Title 10. For example, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which establishes the missions and geographic responsibilities among the combatant commanders, is based on authority found in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which modified Title 10. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)

4. Other sources of military authority.

a. Other Sources of Domestic Authority. Domestic authorities can exist outside U.S. Code. Although the ability, to provide authoritative guidance to DoD usually originates from U.S. Code. For instance, the President’s authorities and duties are outline in U.S. Code to which he/she may provide or delegate authority to military commanders within the confines and direction of the Constitution and U.S. Code. Authority can also be expressed in national policy and mission-type orders and can be enabling or limiting. In some cases, policy can provide very concrete boundaries, such as the President’s March 2011 decision not to deploy ground troops into Libya. This national policy decision impacted planning for Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and ODYSSEY GUARD in Libya. The commander’s staff has to know and understand these authorities, assess their impact on operational planning, and seek additional authorities critical to mission success. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)

b. International Authority. International law impacts the planning and execution of virtually every military operation and springs from codified law found in treaties and agreements, as well as from customary law based on the practice of nations over time. Some of these international agreements establish and empower international bodies such as the United Nations (U.N.) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, when the U.N. Security Council issues a resolution (U.N. Security Council Resolution or UNSCR), it provides international authority for nations to undertake action under the UNSCR. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)
c. Authorities in Multinational Operations. Because international law is often drawn from custom and practice in addition to written agreements, partner nations may bring different interpretations of international law to the planning effort. In addition, the differing domestic laws and national policies of each partner nation can generate diverse authorities, capabilities, and limitations among the multinational forces. Understanding these disparate authorities is essential to taking full advantage of the capabilities within a coalition and avoiding wasted planning effort. Command authority in an international operation will be linked to the mission authority. For example, a coalition formed under a lead nation will normally leave coalition forces under their national command authority. A coalition formed under a multinational organization, such as the U.N. or NATO, will usually place coalition forces under the command authority of the multinational commander. Operation DESERT STORM was undertaken under the lead nation model, while the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was established as a NATO-led mission. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)

5. Combatant Command implementation of authorities. Combatant commanders, planners, and staffs execute their assigned missions using a multitude of authorities which may seem to be hard to understand. While Staff Judge Advocates are generally subject matter experts on authorities. Planners and other staff members must be familiar with existing authorities and understand the process for requesting new authorities in order to execute their duties. A good place to start is understanding Combatant Commander Authority generally referred to as COCOM authority. The following provides some key highlights of COCOM authority:

a. General. The combatant commander exercises authority provided directly from Goldwater-Nichols and the UCP. This “COCOM” authority is not transferable and cannot be delegated. It authorizes a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assigned missions. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016 and 10 US Code § 164)

b. Directive Authority for Logistics. COCOM authority includes directive authority for logistics (DAFL), which is the authority to issue those directives to subordinate commanders that are necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operational plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component
commands. Under this authority, the Combatant Commander may delegate common support capability directive authority to subordinate commands which allows for centralized control of specific logistics functions in a theater or area of operations. This authority is not commonly used below the level of armed conflict because other logistics control options exist, such as executive agency and lead Service designations. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)

c. **Operational (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON).** Operational control (OPCON) is inherent in COCOM authority and may be delegated to subordinate commanders. OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It includes authority over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These matters normally remain within the Title 10 authorities of the various armed service branches. Tactical control (TACON) of assigned or attached forces is inherent in OPCON and can be delegated to subordinate commanders. TACON is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (Best Practice and Focus Paper, Authorities, Second Edition, 2016)

d. **Overcoming Challenges.** Tracking and understanding every authority linked to combatant command strategies, plans, and campaigns is challenging and at times may seem impossible. One technique is to ensure that all strategies, plans, and campaigns reference all existing authorities required to implement and execute the aforementioned while also acknowledging authority gaps as a shortfall to which risk is associated. While the SJA is one subject matter expert, involving subject matter experts from across interagency partners, multinational partners, and the private sector during design and planning efforts is crucial to ensuring authorities are understood.

In many cases, the commander is either supported by or supporting a non-DOD agency. The whole-of-government approach to these missions presents unique challenges that may involve subject matter expertise outside the commander’s staff. Integration of interagency, interorganizational, and partner subject matter experts or liaison personnel into the staff processes allows international, national, agency, and stakeholder authorities to be identified and understood. One of the ways military staffs accommodate these high-demand, low-density assets is to focus on expanding the information sharing
aperture by declassification of information and development of commonly shared information platforms such as the All-Partners Access Network (APAN). Another effective tool to facilitate partner subject matter expert participation is the use of online conferencing, video teleconferencing, and collaboration web-based portals. Interaction can be enhanced by recording and archiving information for unavailable participants to review later.

6. **Additional Resources.** As previously reference, the Joint J7 Insights and Best Practice paper provides additional details on authorities. It can be found on the Joint Electronic Library URL: [https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers](https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers). Additionally, there are multiple websites that contain the U.S. Code in its entirety as well as applicable laws/acts. One such website can be found at URL: [https://www.congress.gov/](https://www.congress.gov/).