How the Army Runs

A Senior Leader Reference Handbook

1997-1998

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security... of the United States,... supporting the national objectives,... and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. [The Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land...[and] is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated... mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war."

Title 10, United States Code: Section 3062

Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of Title 10, Section 3062 is a demanding task for commanders, leaders, and managers. Contrary to popular opinion, the Army is not a rigid, monolithic organization. Instead, it is a dynamic organization; it is constantly changing because it is a system of systems. It is the product of scores of small systems, interacting to produce the entity known as the Army.

These systems neither exist in a vacuum nor run themselves. *Systems* exist to fulfill *functions* which, ultimately, contribute to fulfilling the Army's Congressional and Title 10 requirements. These systems require constant attention as changes in the national and military strategy occur, doctrine is changed, new units are organized and existing units are reorganized, requirements for new equipment are determined, new technology and new fighting support skills

are introduced, training methods are modernized, the roles of each component of the Total Army are revised, and literally tens of thousands of other actions are taken which exercise the systems to fulfill the functions of the Army.

The interaction of the systems described above defines how the Army runs. This text explains that process. The purpose of this text is to provide a primer and ready reference to officers preparing to assume command and management positions of senior and strategic leadership. While the primary objective of this reference text is for use in conjunction with the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum, there are additional objectives which serve broader purposes. These other objectives include its use:

    −   by   nonresident   students   in

meeting objectives of the Corresponding Studies Program.
- as a general reference by service schools in the military education system.
- as a primer for all who seek to understand better the Army's organization and functions, and how its systems and subsystems operate and are interrelated.

Army interfaces with the other Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands are addressed, but the major focus of the text is on the United States Army; a large, complex organization with operations and activities extending around the globe.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

This reference text supports the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum. Elihu Root founded the institution "not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression." He charged the faculty with directing "the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander-in Chief of all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement." Much of that original emphasis is reflected in the current USAWC mission of preparing students to assume high-level command and staff positions and in the objectives of the DCLM program of instruction.

The Department of Command, Leadership, and Management presents that portion of the curriculum which is designed to promote a better understanding of the theory and practice of command, leadership, and management in the Department of the Army. Several methods are used to include faculty presentations, lectures, and discussions with distinguished academicians and prominent practitioners, seminar group discussions, case studies, and practical exercises.

In past years the primary reference text produced by the DCLM was entitled *Army Command, Management, and Leadership: Theory and Practice.* Because of the growing body of theory developed in this area as well as many changes which have occurred in Army organizations and systems since the end of the Cold War, the single theory and practice volume has been replaced by two reference texts. The first reference text, titled *Leading and Managing in the Strategic Arena* deals with the strategic art, strategic leadership, and the strategic arena. This is the second reference text. It explains the operation and relationships of the systems which enable the Army to fulfill its roles and accomplish its missions. It explains, as stated in its title, "How the Army Runs."

ORGANIZATION

This text is organized into three parts:

(1) a review of the Army as a system,

(2) a detailed examination of planning and structural systems/subsystems and how they operate and are related to each other, and,

(3) a review of management and management support systems.

The Army as a System

Chapter 2 addresses the Army as an organization and provides an overview of the systems and subsystems which affect it. Chapter 3 discusses Army structure. Chapters 4 and 5 identify the processes of force planning and design, determining manpower requirements, and developing the manpower management program. Chapter 6 deals with mobilization and deployment. Chapter 7 examines the role, structure, and status of the Reserve Components, and Chapter 8 delineates force readiness concepts, the system, and its reporting procedures.

Army Systems/Subsystems.

The major and supporting systems of the Army are identified, described, and analyzed in the remaining chapters. Chapters 9 and 10 examine the Army's resource management systems at Headquarters, Department of the Army, Major Command, and installation level, and the interface with the Department of Defense systems. Throughout, the interfaces with Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are examined. Chapters 11 and 12 describe the organizations, functions, policies, and procedures associated with Research, Development, and Acquisition, and the logistical systems at Department of the Army and U.S. Army Materiel Command.

Management and Management Support Systems.

Chapters 13 and 14 address the military and civilian personnel management systems. The remaining chapters through Chapter 22 examine Army training, information systems, installation management, intelligence management, health services, legal support, civil functions, and public affairs. With the completion of this portion of the text, the major systems used by the Army to accomplish the organizational mission of Title 10 will have been identified and reviewed in detail.

To ensure that all elements of the Total Army are heading in the same direction as we face our many challenges over the next several years, goals have been established by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff to mold the Army of the late 1990s into a disciplined, well-trained fighting force, prepared for the next century. This text is in consonance with those goals as it addresses the areas of readiness, people, materiel, strategic deployment, future development, and management. The published goals encompass specific objectives for the Army, and they contain principles to guide its efforts in each area. We are obliged to provide the country the kind of Army that will, in conjunction with the other Services, protect our national interests and achieve our national security objectives. It is to that ultimate end that this reference text was written.

CHAPTER 2

INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE

In his <u>Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the</u> <u>Secretary of War</u> for the period July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, General George C. Marshall described the stark situation in which he found the Army as the war in Europe erupted and threatened to involve a neutral United States. President Roosevelt's emergency proclamation of September 8, 1939 had given the authority for the Active Army to expand from 210,000 to 227,000 men and to reorganize from the World War I square divisions to the new triangular divisions. General Marshall's problems were not solvable by a manpower increase of less than 10% and a division reorganization. He also had major training deficiencies to correct ("There was such a shortage in motor transportation that divisional training was impracticable."), obsolete equipment (an Army Air Corps request to purchase replacements for World War I aircraft was cut by Congress to 57 airplanes), training deficiencies ("...a complete lack of corps headquarters and experienced commanders..."), obsolete doctrine and obsolete organizations (over half of the undermanned Active Army divisions were horse-mounted and the horse was still the primary means of mounted movement). It was even worse in the National Guard organizations. General Marshall's solution to these massive problems was to reconstruct the Army systemically, resourcing, structuring and integrating new equipment, personnel, and organizations while training. Ultimately, he improved the youth and vitality of the Army by discharging elderly and substandard soldiers. The U.S. Army's success in creating, deploying, and sustaining 89 divisions to Europe during World War II was largely due to General Marshall's genius for leadership and his skill at what, today, is known as force management and force integration.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an overview of the systems employed by the Army to manage change on a continuing basis. It reflects the fact that General George Marshall understood all too well what too few others did in the days before World War II; in complex organizations every action or problem will impact upon every function of the organization. As a result, systems working together within the management process are really systems of systems. These systems encompass the entire life cycle of the Army, from the earliest stages of force development to the final disposition of people, equipment, and facilities which are no longer needed by the Army.

This chapter looks holistically at systems where the various products of one

become the inputs or constraints of others. This overview of how the Army runs addresses systems that are critical to the overall leadership and management of the Army, and which are integral to the force management processes. Change and adjustment are continuous processes resulting from dynamics that are both internal and external to the Army. Subsequent chapters will expand upon the the subelements of the systems presented here, and will review micro systems.

FORCE MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION

There are four terms which are commonly used, and misused, when describing the force management process.

- **Force management** is the capstone process to establish and field mission-ready Army organizations. The process involves organization, integration, decision making, and execution of a spectrum of activities. These activities include defining force requirements, force development, force structuring, combat development, materiel development, training development, and resourcing, and all elements of the Army Organizational Life Cycle model. Figure 2-1 shows the relationship of the force management process to the Army's developmental processes.
- **Force development** is the process of determining Army doctrinal, leader development, training, organizational, soldier development, and materiel requirements and translating them into programs and structure, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions.
- **Force integration** is the synchronized, resource constrained execution of an approved force development program to achieve systematic management of change. The key word is "change." Force integration is a critical process because it ensures that change is coordinated and fully integrated, ensuring that capabilities reach the field in complete packages. In this sense, organization, doctrine, and materiel also include the training and leadership development needed to insure proper use of the newly integrated capability. The Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) plays a large role in the process, since he determines the Army's requirements.
- **Force modernization** is the process of improving the Army's force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.

While there are distinctions for personnel working in these fields, for common usage, these terms are often collectively referred to as "force management and integration."

The Developmental Processes and Inter-Relationships

DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT

- DOCTRINE REQUIREMENTS
- TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
- LEADER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
- ORGANIZATION REQUIREMENTS
- MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS
- SOLDIER DEVELOPMENTS

ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT

MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT

FORCE DEVELOPMENT

FORCE MANAGEMENT

Figure 2-1

The Changing Force Management and Force Integration Focus.

The U.S. Army's focus on force integration in the early 1980s and force management and integration today reflects the greater understanding of the process of managing change. In the early 1980s, the Army began a series of unprecedented, revolutionary changes designed to significantly improve readiness and effectiveness to execute prompt and sustained combat. A critical aspect of change was initiating the fielding of over 400 new equipment items. Some of these were designed to replace less effective items in the current inventory. For example, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS) replaced the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier in maneuver units. Others, like the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), brought an entirely new dimension to the fire support force structure. Coupled with this pervasive equipment modernization effort was the requirement for widespread documentation of changes that restructured Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) units to achieve the Army of Excellence (AOE) goals. In addition, to fulfill a commitment to improve unit cohesion, the personnel manning system added the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) and Regimental philosophy to an individual replacement system that had its genesis in World War I. Separately each of these changes would have been a significant challenge. Together they fully tested every facet of the abilities of the Army to raise,

sustain, maintain, and resource the Army. World events of 1989 and 1990 ended the Cold War and resulted in force reductions which further tested the Army. In an era of dynamic political and strategic change, further stress is inevitable.

In parallel with the changes taking place, the Army went through a process of self-examination.

The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) Inspection of 1980-1983. The major self-examination conducted by the Army was an Inspector General Special Inspection. The extent of the changes occurring in the Army in the early 1980s revealed a wide range of system-oriented integration problems. The DAIG was tasked to conduct an Army-wide systemic inspection of the management processes caused by the internal and external dynamics of change. The inspection which spanned the period FY 80 to FY 83, reported two principal findings:

- There were extensive documentation and execution problems in force management.
- There was a lack of knowledge at all levels of the interrelationships of Army systems and how they are used to manage change. This was described by The Inspector General as a general lack of knowledge of "how the Army runs."

Since publication of the results from this inspection, the term "force integration" has gained wide usage in the Army. Force integration may be viewed as maintaining a constant, productive output while the transformation activity absorbs significant change. Thus, the focus of force integration and management today centers on those subsystems that support conceiving, developing, organizing, training, and equipping the U.S. Army.

The DAIG Special Inspection of 1985-1986. A follow-up of the 1983 Force Modernization Special Inspection was conducted by the DAIG in 1985-1986. This special inspection included an assessment of the force integration process, from threat identification to the fielding and sustainment of equipment, personnel, doctrine, and structure. The inspection report noted that although the Army was modernizing, changes in orientation and organization would result in more effective force management. Both studies and processes overlaying the existing processes for the conduct of major change continue today and will in the future as we assess and seek ways of responding to the dynamics of our environments. They may be called Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) or Force XXI in the Army, or include an invigorated Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) at the joint level but they are all about the management of change. In this process, there are goals and programs, but no definitive end state. Change and evolution are constant. All of these systems and processes are designed to insure we maintain the operational capability of the Army while maintaining a qualitative and quantitative superiority over every known and definable threat.

Documentation Modernization. In 1983, the Vice Chief of Staff formed a special Documentation Study Task Force to identify problems and recommend improvements to the existing data management structure of the Army. The need for this effort was generated by the fact that as the

Army began the modernization effort, off-line management became the rule rather than the exception in efforts to solve the crisis of the moment. It was obvious that a major portion of the difficulty was endemic to the proliferation of functionally-oriented data management systems that were not interactive. The Task Force recommended interim short-term fixes to the existing process; however, the long-term goal was to establish a single unified data system which would serve all functions; Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD).

The Army Force Management Study. The combination of the Reagan buildup years followed by the Defense reductions in the late 1980s/early 1990s resulted in unprecedented turbulence in the management and execution of changes. Many of the databases which supported the process of change were overwhelmed due to their technological obsolescence. In 1993-1994, the Army conducted a Force Management Study to evaluate the need for revisions to the force management systems. The study documented the extent of the inadequacies of the Army's system of force management. One recommendation of the study was to create the Army Force Management School. That recommendation was approved and it was subsequently established at Fort Belvoir, VA. It has the mission to provide command, management, and leadership expertise in the arcane and complicated function of force management.

Reinstitution of the Position of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army. In June 1986, *The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management* ("the Packard Commission) issued its final report to the President. It recommended "The position of a four-star Vice Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] should be established by law ..." Shortly later, it was. *Public Law 99-433*, the *Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*, established the position and since then the Services have been deeply immersed in coordinating many force management actions not only with each other but with the Joint Staff as they provide forces to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs). The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a key player in this process. The Vice Chairman is the CINCs' proponent in one sense, and is active in integrating the CINCs' warfighting requirements into the doctrinal, materiel, and other systems of the Services, and the Joint plans process. In response to the greater role being played and the workload resulting from these new conditions both the Air Force and the Navy established the position of Assistant Vice Chief of their Services. This has proved to be a successful organizational change that enabled those Service leaders to establish a logical division of labor and efficiently interact with the Vice Chief of the Joint staff. During the period 1966-1973 the Army had an Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, but the position was later abolished. In view of *Goldwater-Nichols* and the success other Services have had, the Army recently reinstated the position of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army (AVCSA). The AVCSA is responsible for the development and articulation of Army requirements. In response to the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA[FM&C]), the AVCSA also assists in integrating military requirements into the overall planning and programming process. In fulfilling these roles he becomes a major player in Army force management and integration matters.

Changed Role of the Vice Chief of Staff, Army and Larger Role of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODSOPS). Previous force integration activities, such as the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) special inspections and the functional area assessments (FAA), uncovered weaknesses in the manner in which the Army performed force management. Correction of these weaknesses, combined with staff reorganization and streamlined acquisition initiatives, have led to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) being designated as the force integrator of the Army. As such, he is responsible for Army-wide management of force integration. The Director of Force Programs who is located in the Force Development Directorate of the ODCSOPS is the VCSA's executive agent for the management of change. He is the approval authority for all requirements documents and the allocator of Army force structure resources.

The Functional View of the Army.

One of the key by-products of the 1980-1983 DAIG special inspection was a review of the functional structure of the Army organizational system. Over the years, the Army's supporting structure had grown in size and complexity resulting in greater differentiation and specialization. The traditional basis for that differentiation and specialization has been the functions of creating, raising, sustaining, maintaining, training, and resourcing the Army to provide the combat ready forces to the CINCs of the Unified Commands.

In each of these traditional functional areas, their component tasks, policies, procedures, and tools have been developed over time to support the mission requirements of the various organizations which focus on a particular function. The sums of these aids are often referred to as supporting systems. As the Army entered the computer age, it became possible to create large databases and rapid computational tools for the supporting systems. The products of these efforts tend to solidify vertical or "stovepipe" supporting systems by function. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) is an excellent example of this phenomenon. Data are input at the lowest unit level and then consolidated, manipulated, and transmitted up the various levels of the personnel (manning) elements of the Army structure to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). At the HQDA level, the data are used to update the Total Army Personnel Data Base—Active Enlisted and Active Officer (TAPDB–AE & TAPDB–AO). These files are, in turn, used to support other planning and decision tools. One of the major consequences of the evolutionary development of these vertical support systems is that the various databases are captured within the functions and their associated organizations and do not communicate with other databases which may require similar information. One of the objectives of the Army's Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) effort, which will be discussed later in this chapter, was to create a corporate database.

The difficulties inherent in coordinating the various vertically-oriented systems have been amply exposed in the Army's force modernization effort and documented in the DAIG inspection results. It was this environment which led the DAIG to attempt to evaluate the Army (Active, National Guard, Army Reserve, and Civilians) from an operating and management perspective which could be better understood and used to isolate the

frictions resulting from change. The result was the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model displayed at Figure 2-2.

The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model. The model's underlying philosophical concept is acceptance that the priority output of the Army system is combat-ready units—a combination of soldiers and equipment organized in units with appropriate doctrine and trained to accomplish their mission. Each individual resource (a person or thing) required by a unit is somewhere on a life continuum which stretches from the establishment of need and entry into the Army to ultimate separation. The model details eight critical functions through which an individual resource will move, clockwise, during its life span. The dynamic of the model, however, is that the Army leadership must resource and control all of the functions simultaneously, since some resources will be in each functional stage all of the time.

Force Development. Force development is the first phase of the life cycle and is the basis underlying all other functional areas. Essentially, force development involves identifying a needed capability, determining how to achieve that capability, designing units and force structure capable of accomplishing the national military objectives, determining the personnel and materiel requirements necessary for rounded, efficient organizations and then allocating capabilities within the constrained resources available.

Acquisition. After the Congress authorizes and the DOD provides the force structure allowance in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Army then must acquire the people and materiel specified in the requirements and authorizations documents which are necessary to accomplish the mission. Normally, we view acquisition as an initial procurement activity that results in an asset being brought under military control. From a force modernization perspective, concern for the acquisition function extends beyond the specific materiel item being fielded to other complementary areas such as the availability of Associated Support Items of Equipment and Personnel (ASIOEP), publications, prescribed load list items, trained personnel, and appropriate facilities. Acquired personnel must be imparted the discipline, drill, and practices of the military.

Training. The training function is the vehicle for accomplishing an orderly transition from civilian status to military life. In this context, the training function is somewhat different from what most Army officers think of when discussing training. At this point in the life cycle, training is considered only from the aspect of initial entry training or the requirement to provide soldiers with initial-familiarization training on new or displaced equipment. In other words, it is the aspect of the training cycle that imparts new skills to the soldier or converts the individual into a soldier. It imparts a military occupational specialty (MOS). The training function also includes the transition of U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates into officers through the basic course. It is applicable to units down to company/battery/troop level for the training of secondary MOSs as well as on-the-job training.

THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE MODEL

Develop capable combat force within constrained resources

Force Development

Release or remove people and equipment from military control; dispose of facilities or real property

SEPARATION

Obtain people, equipment, money and facilities

ACQUISITION

Increase force capabilities; bring people and/or equipment to a more advanced state

DEVELOPMENT

TITLE 10 USC

TRAINING

Impart and instill that discipline, instruction, drill and practice designed to create military efficiency or proficiency

Provide for people organizations and equipment by furnishing means or funds

SUSTAINMENT

DISTRIBUTION

Allot people and/or equipment to claimant organization according to priorities

COMMAND, MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP

Structuring, equipping, training, manning, sustaining, deploying, stationing, funding readiness

DEPLOYMENT

Project a combat force rapidly to any place in the world to satisfy a national requirement

Resources

People, Things, Time, Money, Information & Technology

Figure 2-2

Distribution. Having produced soldiers and provided them with basic skills and knowledge, we must then distribute these people and the materiel they will employ according to established priorities and constraints. Generally speaking, we view the distribution function as assigning or transferring people or materiel from the entry or wholesale level to the user.

Deployment. After determining the distribution of people and things, we must then deploy units, people, and things not only in the continental U. S. (CONUS) but overseas in accordance with worldwide commitments of the Army. This involves not only agencies on the Army Staff or at other levels of DOD but also civilian transportation organizations.

Sustainment. In peace or war the arrival of people and materiel in units, at a predetermined destination, establishes a requirement to sustain them. This requires training an organization at a designated level of capability through replacement, repair, or rotation of its existing assets. The ten classes of supply, the authorized stockage list (ASL), or the prescribed load list (PLL) are some examples of systems or techniques used to sustain people and materiel. Maintenance is also a sustainment process for materiel. Included, too, is that aspect of sustaining dealing with common soldier skills

that maintain unit or individual proficiency to accomplish assigned missions.

Development. While the Army is sustaining itself, it is constantly developing itself. The Army develops individuals by civilian, enlisted, and officer education programs. Soldiers are required to take Skill Qualification Tests (SQT), and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) encompasses all grades of the noncommissioned ranks. Similarly, the officer education program ranges from individual self-development to the officer school system, which runs from basic courses in the service schools through senior service colleges and civilian graduate education. Units are developed through collective training using devices such as the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE), Operational Readiness Tests (ORT), and training rotations to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs).

Separation. Finally, there comes a time when the Army does not have a requirement for specific people or equipment, and they are separated from military control. People may separate voluntarily by either not reenlisting or by retiring. Involuntary separation may occur due to reduction in force actions. The Army normally separates materiel through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) process or through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) actions. In the case of older equipment, the commander losing the older model may view it as a "Separation" action, while the commander receiving the displaced item will view it as an "Acquisition" action. In fact, displacing equipment in the force modernization process which does not result in a DRMO or FMS transfer is, in reality, a "Redistribution" action.

Model Inputs. While the above discussion provides an overview of the components of the model, there are two external inputs to it. First, the functional activities in the model must be resourced, and those resources are inputs. Resources are sometimes thought of as tangible objects; dollars, materiel, or personnel. In the context of the model, all of these resources are included, but also included are less tangible resources such as time, information, and technology. Secondly, it is clear that each of the activities, from force development through separation, require thousands of inputs, decisions, and actions as well as continuous guidance and oversight. The command, management, and leadership which ensures that those elements occur on a timely basis becomes the second essential input.

It is useful to contrast the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model with the traditional and resource models of the Army. These three perspectives are depicted in Figure 2-3. The crosswalk between the life-cycle view of a functional Army and the traditional and resource models shown in Figure 2-3 reveals that some elements of the models (such as manning, sustaining, and deploying) are the same or similar. Other elements, however, are quite different.

Achieving and maintaining the base product of the Army -combat-ready units for CINCs of unified commands- requires that agencies organized to focus on the traditional functions impact on those units in a very coordinated manner. The arrival of Bradley Fighting Vehicles in a unit without mechanics trained to maintain them or doctrine to fight them results in a

THE ARMY AS A FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
THREE PERSPECTIVES

TRADITIONAL	RESOURCING	LIFE CYCLE
• **STRUCTURING** - Doctrine - Design - Requirements	• **STRUCTURING** - Doctrine - Design - Requirements	• **FORCE DEVELOPMENT** - Threat Appraisal - Design - Manpower Requirements - Equipment Requirements - Faces
• **EQUIPPING** - Research - Development - Acquisition - Distribution	• **EQUIPPING** - Research - Development - Acquisition - Distribution	• **ACQUIRE** - Access People - Procure Equipment - Buy Real Property
• **TRAINING** - Initial Entry - Specialty - Professional - Unit	• **TRAINING** - Initial Entry - Specialty - Professional - Unit	• **TRAIN** - Initial Entry - Specialty - Base Officer
• **MANNING** - Accession - Assignment - Progression - Separation	• **MANNING** - Accession - Assignment - Progression - Separation	• **DISTRIBUTE** - Assign People - Allocate Equipment
• **SUSTAINING** - Supply - Maintenance - Transportation - Other Services (facilities, medical)	• **SUSTAINING** - Supply - Maintenance - Transportation - Other Services	• **DEVELOP** - Unit Training - Professional Training - Promotion - Improve Facilities
• **MOBILIZING**	• **MOBILIZING/DEPLOYING**	• **DEPLOY** - Move Equipment - Move People
• **DEPLOYING**	• **FACILITIES** - Construction - Repair	• **SUSTAIN** - Maintain Facilities - Repair Equipment - Repair People - Repeat Core Training
	• **MANAGING INFORMATION** - Communication - Intelligence	• **SEPARATE** - Release People - Release Equipment - Release Facilities

Figure 2-3

significant degradation of combat readiness. Solutions to such problems are often difficult because of the complexity of systems analysis to isolate the problem, and the fact that isolated short-term fixes often produce imbalances throughout the system. The resourcing model is just that; a model which is designed for the allocation of resources. Neither the traditional nor the resourcing model treats the total Army system, from threat appraisal, through separation of people, equipment, and facilities. Only the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model provides a sound basis for viewing the Army as a total system.

Force Integration—The Army War College Model.

To aid in examining specific support systems and their interactions, the U.S. Army War College has adopted the model shown in

Figure 2-4 which highlights key aspects of force management and integration. Each of the processes displayed in the figure are examined in detail in subsequent chapters of this text.

The underlying basis for this model is that force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change. The model, therefore, depicts the processes of the life-cycle continuum of change in the Army.

The starting point is the *Determine Battlefield Requirements* process. Change is necessary when a future requirement is projected which the Army cannot fulfill with current capabilities. These needs are initially documented as required capabilities by Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Requirements Determination Process. A capability may be acquired by a change in Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, or Soldier Systems (DTLOMS) or some combination of changes in two or more of these areas. The lower cost solutions are changes to doctrine and training, which can be matured within TRADOC, packaged, and provided directly to the unit. If a reorganization is required, the necessary organizational Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) changes must be matured in the *Conduct Force Development* process. If a change in materiel, the most expensive solution, is required, it occurs through the *Conduct Research Development and Acquisition* process. The Research Development and Acquisition (RDA) process must be initiated unless nondevelopmental (off the shelf) items will meet the need. It is axiomatic that equipment (materiel) changes will require concurrent changes in structure which, in turn, require RDA to be closely linked to the force development process.

Change, from this perspective, relates to specifics or "eaches" such as a type Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or an item of equipment. The other key ingredient to change is the extent to which the change will be promulgated throughout the Army. The controlling factor in this instance is resources. Thus, the *Provide Resources* process helps determine force size. In the first case, we are establishing what will be changed; in the second, we are determining how much or how many. The marriage of these two processes occurs in the Structure and Composition System (SACS) which establishes personnel and materiel requirements based on The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), TOE, and Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) as applied to the force structure. The importance of SACS, colloquially stated, is "If it ain't in SACS—it ain't." From SACS the processes to *Acquire, Train, and Distribute Personnel* and *Acquire and Distribute Materiel* may be executed. Since at that point we are dealing with individuals and things, the linking of the thought process which analyzes the tools the Army uses to manage change with the functional requirements for producing combat-ready units portrayed in the life-cycle model should be apparent.

Overarching the processes just summarized are the higher level inputs. These include the National Security Strategy, and the guidance, plans, and other inputs of the DOD, CINCs, and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the *Determine Strategic and Operational Requirements* process.

Coordinating Information Flow.

Coordination of all aspects of force integration requires the constant exchange of information. In the Army's battle to achieve

effective force integration, there have been and continue to be initiatives which focus on improving the information flow within and between the multiple processes of force integration. The following are four key examples of vehicles designed to exchange information and coordinate essential force integration actions and plans, and to ensure the success of the systems integration process.

Army Modernization Reference Data (AMRD). The AMRD replaces the Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 5-25, the Army Modernization Information Memorandum (AMIM) which contained planning data extracted from source documents such as basis of issue plans (BOIP) or new equipment training plans (NETP). The AMRD therefore serves two purposes. First, the AMRD is a collection of primary source reference documents designed to support materiel system fielding. Second, the AMRD is designed as a "bookshelf" of references on force modernization materiel systems for use by commanders, staffs, and support agencies at major Army command and lower echelons (corps, divisions and installations) to quickly answer everyday questions.

The AMRD is published annually on a CD-ROM. It displays authoritative data on all HQDA-approved force modernization materiel systems and provides read-only access to the data utilizing the "look and feel" of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) office applications. AMRD data can be used for the planning, programming, and budgeting of resources to operate and support the fielding and sustainment of newly developed, major product-improved and selected displaced items of equipment.

Specifically, the AMRD can be used to answer questions related to:

- Structuring. The Master Force (M-Force) file and BOIPs contain the effect of materiel system fielding on the organizational structure of the gaining organization and its direct support/general support structure.

- Manning. Information in BOIPs shows the effect of materiel system fielding on the personnel authorized to the gaining organization and its direct support/general support structure by grade and skill.

- Equipping. BOIPs and Materiel Fielding Plans (MFPs) can be used to show the effect of materiel system fielding on the major end items (with all components of the end item); associated support items of equipment; test, measurement and diagnostic equipment; special tools and test equipment; maintenance floats; and all authorized common items of the gaining organization and its direct support/general support structure.

- Training. The Integrated Logistic Support Plans (ILSPs) and System Training Plans (STRAPs) display the effect of materiel system fielding on institutional and modernization training, organizational training support materials, training devices and training systems, training ammunition, and training facilities of the gaining organization and its

direct support/general support structure.

– Sustaining. Materiel Fielding Plans, BIOPs and ILSPs show the effects of materiel system fielding on organization-level combat support and combat service support personnel, support equipment, facilities, spares, software and supplies of the gaining organization and its direct support/general support structure.

– Funding. The Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) and Cost Data files can be used to show the effect of materiel system fielding on costs associated with activation, reorganization, conversion, stationing, property turn-in or transfer, transportation, facility construction or renovation and operating tempo of the organization and its direct support/general support structure.

– Deploying. Transportability data show the effect of materiel system fielding on the transportation modes required to deploy the gaining organization and its direct support/general support structure.

– Stationing. ILSPs show the effect of materiel system fielding on organizational and training facilities and support infrastructure for the gaining organization and its direct support/general support structure.

Acquisition Management Milestone System (AMMS). The AMMS is a consolidation of the Integrated Logistic Support Milestone Reporting System (ILSMRS) and the Force Modernization Milestone Reporting System (FMMRS). It is the standard life-cycle milestone reporting system of the Army that records milestone schedules and achievements during the acquisition process through system fielding. Data is contained in a central repository maintained by the U.S. Army Logistic Support Agency (LOGSA) at Huntsville, Alabama. AMMS provides management information to the Army for use in ensuring effective materiel fielding. The AMMS tracks:

– all AMIM systems,

– other developmental, nondevelopmental, reprocurement items (rebuys),

– product improvement programs leading to type classification and displaced systems leading to equipment availability date (material release),

– First Unit Equipped Date (FUED) or Initial Operational Capability (IOC), and

– all major items under development, major product improvement efforts, or items being procured for Army use that will be assigned a Line Item Number.

Functional Area Assessment. The Functional Area Assessment (FAA) is another tool which supports force management by improving information flow and coordination. Its purpose is to enable senior leaders to identify and resolve issues which affect the execution of HQDA short range plans and programs. The FAA is a

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detailed management review of a functional area. All functions which support the area being assessed—manning, equipping, structuring, etc.— are concurrently subjected to scrutiny. The proponent and coordinator of the FAA is the TRADOC Service School Center or DA Agency responsible for that type unit. The FAA approach is to analyze in terms of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS) which TRADOC uses in its Requirements Determination Process. The assessment culminates with a presentation of the results to the Vice Chief of Staff with senior representatives from each functional area and proponent present. This meeting provides a basis for interactive communication, management guidance, and problem resolution. The interaction is handled in an informal, non-pejorative environment where anyone present (usually about 150 people) can speak on any of the issues that may be involved. Designated issues are carried forward so that visibility is maintained community-wide on solving specific problems. Significant value is gained through the preparation for the FAA as many of the obstacles to effective force management are overcome as the participating agencies coordinate horizontally and vertically to provide the assessment.

Force Integration Practice.

Force integration is a method of change management which focuses Army management actions towards organizations to ensure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure, equipment, and doctrine in the Total Army. The objective of the effort is to assess proactively the combined impacts of Army functional systems on units and ensure the appropriate mix of resources (structure, people, equipment, dollars, facilities, and information)

is available and fielded to support a planned activity for an organization or system at the appropriate time, with the result being combat-ready units.

Execution of this proactive process falls upon the Organization Integration (OI) Team.

Organization Integration Team. The OI team includes representatives who have knowledge of the doctrine, design, structure, personnel, acquisition, equipping, resources, facilities, information management, and training activities which will impact upon a unit. These team members include, but are not limited to, organization integrators (OI), force integrators (FI), system integrators (SI), documentation integrators (DI), and resource integrators (RI). As required, representatives from MACOMs and Reserve Components and other functional representatives may be included in HQDA teams. The OI Team can be compared to the battlestaff of a tactical organization. The team members are not fixed, nor is the specific role each will play. They "organize for battle" depending on what the specific challenge may be. The OI may play a leading role in one instance and be a supporting player in another. The Personnel Systems Staff Officer (PERSSO) may be an essential member of the team in one instance, but not be involved at all in others. The same is true of other members of the Team.

The OI team is the vehicle which analyzes Army leadership decisions affecting force structure, coordinates implementing action, recommends further action, and monitors the execution of actions. OI teams use and share information available in existing Army information systems. If disconnects appear in the information validity or Army plans, the OI team is charged with fixing the disconnect.

Organization Integration Team Composition

Organization Integrator

Force Integrator

Command Manager

System Integrator(s)
Resource Integrator(s)
Document Integrator(s)

Structuring
Equipping
Manning
Training
Sustaining

ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATION

FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATION

SPECIAL INTEREST REPRESENTATION

Stationing
Funding
Deploying
Readiness

Installation
Management
Affected
Commands

Reserve Components

Program Management

Figure 2-4

The OI team is an informal organization. Each action officer on the team is responsible for preparing, handling, and coordinating actions in his or her area of expertise. A representative team is shown at Figure 2-5.

Organization Integrators. OIs are assigned at HQDA, The National Guard Bureau (NGB), Office of the Chief of the Army Reserves (OCAR), and at some MACOMs. OIs represent the interests of functionally similar organizations. The OI is charged with managing the fielding and sustainment of organizations as integrated packages. Using HQDA as an example, OIs are assigned to the Force Development Directorate (FD), Office of the Deputy Chief

of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS). The OIs in the functional hardware division of the FD are responsible for vertical integration of units which possess a Standard Requirements Code (SRC). OI duties include:

− assessing the Army's ability to provide required personnel, materiel, and facilities for units (primarily battalions and separate companies),

− evaluating and analyzing the impact on unit readiness of changes in personnel, training, equipment, facilities, doctrine, or structure,

− recommending, allocating, fielding, and distributing personnel, materiel, facilities,

and other assets to units as integrated packages,

- analyzing inputs from members of the OI team to develop recommended ODCSOPS priorities for phasing in or replacing specified personnel MOSs, equipment, and facilities which affect battalions/ separate companies and similar size units,
- reviewing applicable Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) to assess impacts of the new capability on unit structure, doctrine, or resources,
- coordinating approval of TOEs and concept plans, and
- acting as Army Staff (ARSTAF) lead for appropriate FAAs.

Force Integrators. FIs work with multiple SRC organizations and integrate the entire force structure posture for a specific MACOM, reporting activity, or tactical organization. They represent the interests of functionally dissimilar organizations. FIs who work with tactical organizations are horizontal integrators and work with brigades, regiments, groups, divisions, and corps. Essentially, FIs tie together the work of the OIs and the SIs above SRC level. FIs designated as Command Managers coordinate force structure actions and manage Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) structure for a MACOM. Command Managers are vertical integrators. Specific duties of the FI include:

- assessing the Army's ability to provide required personnel, equipment, facilities, and fiscal resources for major units (primarily larger than battalion) in the near term, the POM (mid term), and the far term,

- chairing appropriate force integration meetings to facilitate integration of units into major organizations,
- developing, assessing, and making recommendations for alternative use of resources for establishing and maintaining major organizations to support the warfighting CINCs and other MACOMs,
- evaluating and analyzing the aggregate impact of incorporating personnel, facilities, equipment, doctrine, structure, and capability changes into major organizations of the Army,
- ensuring that major units are adequately represented in all force integration and other HQDA processes (e.g., TAA, FFR, FAA), and
- assessing impacts of mid-range and long-range planning on major units (includes new doctrine, structure, manning, equipment technology, facilities, stationing, strategic policy, training, mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and resource strategies).

System Integrators. The system integrator (SI) assists the OI and FI in managing the equipment-oriented aspects of integration, and is a member of the OI team.. The SI concentrates on the front-end combat development/requirement determination process and fielding, with less emphasis on the management of "eaches" during the acquisition cycle. Functions of the SI include:

- acting as the point of contact for recurring TRADOC approved requirements, accomplishing fielding and other user-oriented functions related to materiel acquisition,
- coordinating with Project/Program/Product Managers (PM) and TRADOC System Managers (TSM) on activities relating to their systems,
- developing and coordinating the DA position on proposed materiel requirements documents,
- reviewing, validating, and determining the affordability of the materiel requirements produced by the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS), and developing acquisition alternatives,
- recommending the ODCSOPS materiel acquisition priorities for research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, and product-improvement programs,
- develop and coordinate the DA position on combat developer-proposed basis-of-issue plans (BOIP),
- provide recommended priorities for materiel distribution,
- review appropriate Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) for materiel user implications,
- coordinate input and provide recommendations concerning Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) to the approving authority, and
- review the equipment portions of TOEs, Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and TDAs for adequacy and accuracy.

Documentation Integrators. The documentation integrator (DI) from the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) assists the FI/OI/SI community by ensuring requirement documents comply with the approved Army force program as reflected in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and the FMMP. The DI is a critical component in the force structure, force development, force programming, and force integration processes, linking the planned or programmed actions and the documentation processes. The primary duties of the DI include:

- reviewing proponent proposed or approved authorization documents, ensuring compliance with manpower, personnel, and equipment policies and directives,
- reviewing source requirements planning documents, such as Incremental Change Package (ICP) and the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), and
- building, under centralized documentation (CENDOC), authorization documents based on HQDA guidance, Command Plan, CENDOC transition plan, and input from the MACOM.

Resource Integrators are responsible for providing to the OI team chief and other team members current and potential impacts of resourcing plans and decisions on all areas of OI team interest. The RI must be thoroughly knowledgeable about all aspects of current Army plans, programs, budget requests, and budget, including:

- national, OSD, Chairman, JCS, and Joint Staff plans and guidance,
- the Army PPBES implementation and status,
- current and programmed resourcing of all Army personnel strengths, Army and applicable joint materiel RDA programs, individual and unit training programs, and facilities programs with particular focus on the resourcing activities involving materiel systems and organizations that are the specific responsibility of the particular OI

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*********** alternatives and recommendations with detailed justification,

−   maintains the "cross-walks" among Army programming decision mechanisms and related automated systems and those of DOD, OMB and the Congress, and

−   provides the OI team with a thorough analysis of resourcing alternatives and assesses the resourcing executability of all organizational actions under consideration.

The Future of Organization Integration. The representative OI team depicted in Figure 2-5 is large because of the diverse knowledge required to accomplish such integration. Another factor affecting its size is the fact that many different databases and models at several locations have to be accessed, and it presently takes persons of differing skills and experience to do so. That is in the process of changing, however. The Army Force Management School (AFMS), in coordination with the Army Artificial Intelligence Center, has established an Organizational Command Training Program (OCTP). OCTP is computer-based training program which is linked electronically to the multiple models and databases essential for organizational integration. In trials using the OCTP capability, three or four well trained staff officers have accomplished the integration work presently done by the much larger OI team. The AFMS will train the integration staff officers attending their courses, and the Army staff will soon have OCTP-like access to the models and

databases by which they will conduct the Army's integration.

An important element of the OCTP is the capability it provides to the AFMS to conduct force management assessments and analyses for the Army staff. This is a valuable, cost effective enhancement of the force management and integration process.

SUMMARY

In modern complex organizations everything is likely to impact on everything else. The conceptualization of organizations as interrelated subsystems of a master system is a very useful tool for understanding and managing in a holistic and integrated manner.

The revolutionary changes being instituted in the Army have made clear our need to take an holistic approach to understanding the impact of those changes on the organization. For that approach to be successful, senior Army leaders and managers must understand the nature of the interrelations of the systems and subsystems and how they must be coordinated. Only then can force management objectives be met. The overview of the Army Functional Life Cycle Model and the Army War College Model of Force Integration introduced in this chapter provide a basis for subsequent, more detailed examinations of the Army as a system.

REFERENCES

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(3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Modernization Reference Data: AMRD Version 1.0, 1997 (CD-ROM)*

(4) U.S. Congress: *Public Law 103-62: Government Performance Results Act of 1993.*

(5) Presidential Commission ("The Packard Commission"): *The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,* June 1986.

(6) U.S. Congress: Public Law 99-433, the *Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*: 1986.

CHAPTER 3

ARMY STRUCTURE
THE ARMY AS AN ORGANIZATION

The resolution of Congress on 2 June, 1782 clearly illustrates both the concept of civil control of military forces, and the primacy of the Congress in the determination of the Army's structure. That resolution resolved to discharge all remaining Continental Army troops from Federal service except 80 men. It further assigned the remaining men to "guard stores." It established the Army's force structure as:

- *25 privates at Fort Pitt*
- *55 privates to be assigned at West Point and "other magazines"*
- *a "proportionate number of officers," none above the rank of captain.*

INTRODUCTION

How the Army is organized is the result of systematic approaches and conscious decisions on how the Army is to perform its doctrinal tasks and how it is to deal with its environment. While AR 10-5 should be consulted for a description of Army organization, it is important to understand why the major components are arranged as they are, and why the units and subunits are linked together as they are. Such an insight is necessary for an understanding of how the Army operates as a system to carry out its Title 10, and Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) functions; it also enables us to weigh the advantages which can be derived from changes to the system against the turmoil that invariably accompanies systemic changes.

Definition of Terms.

The following terms are used, but are not defined elsewhere in this chapter:

Combatant Command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

Specified Command. A command that has a broad and continuing mission, normally functional, and is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single

Military Department. Also called specified combatant command.

Unified Command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Multinational Operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

Combined. Military action between two or more armed forces of two or more allies, to achieve the military end state. Combined command relationships can be formed to carry out these actions.

Joint Force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements of two or more Military Departments operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control.

Army Service Component Commander. The senior Army commander of an Army Service Component Command, assigned to a unified command, who performs service functions assigned by the UNAAF for the Army forces within the command and who performs three strategic and operational-level roles: establishes linkage, conducts operations, and conducts support operations.

Major Army Commands. A command directly subordinate to, established by authority of, and specifically designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM

The Army can be considered an open organizational system of three primary components: the combat, production, and integrating/coordinating subsystems. Each of these has tasks to accomplish, each operates in a given environment, and each requires and acquires resources.

Although the system view is useful as a conceptual look at what the Army does, one must go beyond it to understand how specific Army functions, missions, and tasks are accomplished and examine some design criteria. The process of further dividing the subsystems is one of organizational design and structure.

The Contingency Model: Differentiation and Integration.

Organizations are designed and structured along two primary dimensions. The first is task and/or functional specialization, or what has been called "division of labor." The second, needed to tie together the functional specialists, is integration.

Differentiation. Organizations are, or should be, tailored in design to meet specific needs. For example, to demonstrate a forward presence in an area of vital interest to U.S. security, such as Europe, and to enhance relations with our allies, the Army has organized U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Conversely, the U. S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) was established to deal with the soldier acquisition task. To accommodate these different demands, the Army's systemic

organizational response must be different. USAREUR would be as ineffective recruiting in CONUS as Recruiting Command would be in dealing with the Army's situation in Europe.

Task or functional specialization is also a dimension of the structure of Army organizations. Such functions as personnel management, resource (funds and manpower) management, operations, intelligence and security, logistics, and research and development are found separately identified in both staffs and commands.

A major result of task specialization is that organizations tend to be designed and structured to fit the requirements of their subenvironments. Depending on the demands of the environment, organizations in one functional specialty tend to be differentiated from organizations in other specialties in terms of their:

- missions;
- orientation on time, i.e., a focus on short-term, mid-term, long-term results;
- degree of formality of structure of organizations, i.e., rules, job descriptions, chain of command, adherence; and,
- interpersonal orientation—ways of dealing with people, i.e., very mission-oriented vs. a concern for relationships with others.

Integration. The environment within which the Army deals requires basically one principal output: mission-ready forces, and the Army is successful only to the extent that it produces them. The widely diverse environments which the Army faces also require a high degree of differentiation if the Army is to meet its requirements. Obviously these two environmental demands—output and high differentiation—must be reconciled and the Army must integrate its diverse elements to produce mission-ready forces. One should expect that the greater the degree of differentiation in an organization, the more difficult it is to get the necessary coordination and interdependence or integration.

There are three kinds of integrative devices, ranging from simple to complex; the use of each depends on the kind of integration desired. The simplest devices, which can be used to deal with more certain environments, are standard rules and procedures. Integration is achieved through procedures and no direct interaction is necessarily required between organizational units. Somewhat more complex is a plan. Interdependence is achieved through an operational plan or order in which the responsibility for and sequence of task accomplishment are specified. Third, and the most complex, is the process of mutual adjustment in which closely coordinated contact is required within the management hierarchy (or chain of command) and which also implies cross-functional teams or individual integrators. A good example of the last device is the battalion task-force approach to integrating tanks and infantry. A project management organization also exemplifies integration by mutual adjustment. Each of these devices is operating in any Army organization to some extent. Effective organizations facing more diverse environments will use many of these integrative devices.

Conflict Resolution.

The difficulty of achieving simultaneous differentiation and integration must be recognized, as these two tend to work at cross-purposes. In fact, there is great potential for conflict between the differentiated units and the integrators.

THE PRODUCTION SUBSYSTEM

The Army's purpose is to preserve peace and security and provide for the defense of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealth and possessions, and any area occupied by the United States. If it must fight, it must be prepared to fight and to win. The forces needed to fight are composed of people and machines. While the combat subsystem welds them into units and organizations, the job of the production subsystem is to secure from its resource environments the "raw materials" for its many production efforts: recruiting untrained people, searching for useable technology, and dealing with producers of outside goods and services. Its task, accomplished through its people and structure, is to convert the "raw materials" into the "intermediate goods" required by the combat system. Training centers and schools transform untrained people into tank crewmen, infantrymen, and mechanics. Schools convert ideas and knowledge into doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training methods for the use of the combat subsystem. Laboratories, arsenals, and procurement and test organizations convert technology and contractor effort into weapons systems and equipment for the combat subsystem. Other parts of the production subsystem provide such sustaining support to the whole organizational system as health care, commissary support, and services. The production subsystem serves primarily to meet the needs of the combat subsystem.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

This organization is one of the two major components of the production subsystem, the other being the Army Materiel Command (AMC). TRADOC is a result of the realization that the then-existing Continental Army Command (CONARC) and Combat Development Command (CDC) were not capable of producing training, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and, at the same time, providing the required user representation in the materiel acquisition process. On one hand, some of the combat development functions then held by CDC (doctrine development and user representation) should be more closely integrated with the training function then held by CONARC. On the other hand, it was recognized that CONARC, already overextended, could not absorb any CDC functions.

In terms of differentiation, the task of producing training, doctrine, and the material acquisition interface required a different perception of objectives than did the force readiness tasks. One organization, CONARC, could not concentrate on the missions of both a major part of the combat subsystem and a major part of the production subsystem.

The reorganization resulted in the establishment of functionally oriented matrix-type organizations to accomplish the assigned mission of preparing the Army for war, and being the architect of the Army of the future. This is done by the conduct of concept and doctrine development, the maintenance of the training system, and the conduct of the combat development process: the articulation of the capabilities required of the future force.

Army Materiel Command (AMC).

Taking combat development requirements and converting them into materiel solutions is but one element of the Army Materiel Command. Production of weapons systems and other materiel is not simply a matter of developing, procuring and

shipping the system to organizations. Most critical to any system's combat readiness is the ability to repair and maintain the assets which organizations already possess. The provisioning of repair parts, diagnosing causes of failure and the development of correctional procedures or modifications are additional functions. Additionally, AMC is involved in the depot level rebuild of major items, the control of inventories of supplies, and the technical support provided through the logistics assistance program. Continuing support across the spectrum of operations plays a large role in maintaining combat readiness.

INSTALLATION OPERATIONS.

The integration of installation organization and operations into the Army's overall organizational structure, both as a home and training base marks the dawn of a new era. Installations must be organized for and capable of training, mobilizing, deploying, sustaining, supporting, recovering, and reconstituting assigned and mobilized operating forces. The traditional boundary between tactical and sustaining base activities must disappear as the installation power projection platforms assume an active role in the welfare of deploying operating forces.

This most important task has a large influence on structure. The focus is the operations task. An installation is an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense controlled by an Army unit or activity that is permanently assigned there. The Army organizes installations using tables of organization and equipment, tables of distribution and allowance, and personnel resources documents. Installations are designed to

support the Army. Activities on the installation receive installation support in accomplishing their missions. Examples of these are schools, hospitals, reserve component elements, and Army divisions. Although this function is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 17, its organizational impact is pertinent to our considerations here.

Maintaining the edge requires a well-trained and ready force. A trained and ready force needs an installation that has a fully effective capability to train, launch, sustain, and reconstitute the force. The installation requires training and support facilities to deploy and recondition returning forces rapidly and to maintain the edge between contingency missions. It means providing the facilities and services that make the installation a home to the force.

Reshaping the force includes the Army's sustaining base infrastructure as well as the active and reserve component mission elements. Reshaping means changing the operating support infrastructure. The goal is to make it quantitatively and qualitatively more productive.

The Army must base its force integration strategy on the total Army concept. The strategy must support achieving continual readiness. Active forces must develop ways to work more closely with installation staffs. Integrating the force also means that commanders must view their role as a force integrator. This is at the most basic level of the Army structure-the installation.

The Army established installation management goals to aid in the development of a new installation management program. Commanders must develop management strategies that balance the Army imperatives with the installation goals. This is necessary due to the fact that installations of the future

will be power projection platforms (see mobilization centers, Chapter 6). They must provide a home to the force and be equipped as a productive work and training site. This evolution of the installation's role in the Army structure and its placement in the Army's organization has established it as a critical element of the Army.

Functional Commands.

Not only is the installation operations task common to both the combat and production subsystems, but parts of the installation operations function have become recognizable "specialty" commands — and therefore part of the production subsystem — providing their goods and services usually to both the combat and production subsystems. For example, U. S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) operates most Army medical activities in CONUS; U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) directs all criminal investigators.

The evolution of functional commands was the result of performance not meeting requirements. There was evidence from the late 1960s of criminal investigation results relating to influential people not being made known to the senior leadership — or worse, investigations not being initiated. Delivery of medical care did not make sufficiently good use of decreasing resources due, at least in part, to the fragmenting of scarce medical skills between the Surgeon General-run general hospitals and the installation-owned station hospitals and dispensaries. Lack of adequate commissary performance was another example.

A second common reason is that the required degree of integration for the specialty functions differs from those functions which have remained the responsibility of the installation commander.

Each of the specialty functions is a goods or service producer which can stand apart from the major mission of the installation, whether it is force readiness or training. Mission performance does not require that telephone service, or commissary operations, or medical care delivery be meshed closely with facilities or maintenance so that unit readiness or training objectives can be met. The same is not true of functions like maintenance or personnel support which more directly affect installation goal achievement.

Thirdly, the conceptual model would suggest that achieving greater performance from these functions could best be accomplished by improving the degree of differentiation. The "functional" organizational model appears to do just that. The central control reinforces the commitment by the local agency to: high quality, efficient telephone service, and medical care, good commissary support, meeting recruiting objectives, carrying out engineer construction projects, by emphasizing the uniqueness of the function and demonstrating career paths for civilian employees.

Nevertheless, it is only fair to point out that the establishment of the functional commands has met with some resistance. The opponents raise the issue of lack of unity of effort and control, of divided loyalties, and of fragmenting scarce Army resources into semi-independent structures.

The Headquarters Support Specialty Commands.

A second category of organizations within the producer subsystem is the group of service-producing, special-purpose organizations reporting to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). This category includes, among others, the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

(PERSCOM). It has tasks which do not require field units to produce the service, so it does not fall into the functional command category. PERSCOM's services are used by both the producer and combat subsystems, as well as HQDA. Because of its specialty tasks, it has a direct tie-in with a particular element of the DA staff, yet we do not class it as an extension of the staff because its functions are operational, rather than staff. Most organizations such as this are categorized as field operating agencies (FOAs).

THE COMBAT SUBSYSTEM

The combat subsystem's major task is to convert the Army's intermediate products, obtained from the production subsystem, into mission-ready forces, that is, into units and organizations. Each element of its structure welds together individual soldiers, equipment, and procedures and produces combat readiness. The combat subsystem engages in a process of continued interaction with its resource environment, primarily the production and the integrating subsystems. Its task environment includes the enemy threat(s), the unified commands, allied forces with whom it must deal, and, especially in peacetime, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Congress.

The Army in the Field.

This subsystem of the Army consists of seven Major Army Commands: the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR); Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA); U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ); U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC); U.S. Army South (USARSO); Forces Command (FORSCOM); and the U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). In some respects each command faces similar environments although they differ from each other in many ways. Each has the task of providing mission-ready land forces—the primary output of the Army. Each has developed an organizational structure reflecting its environment.

THE INTEGRATING SUBSYSTEM

Headquarters, Department of the Army ties all the subordinate subsystems together as the integrating subsystem for the Army as a whole. Its tasks are to decide what is to be "produced" or accomplished by the whole system and to see to it that the system performs as expected. It also acts as the source of funds for the subsystems, obtaining them from Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress.

In any large organization, the headquarters has the major function to see to it that the major tasks of the organization are accomplished. It is the most prominent integrating device in the organization. The challenge for the integrating subsystem is one of structuring the organization to accomplish the tasks of effectively

- determining the nature of demands and requirements (e.g., from OSD, Congress, the Public, other Services, the nature of the threat);
- charting a course for the Army;
- securing the necessary resources (appropriations authority) for the Army;
- allocating resources, responsibilities, objectives, and performance requirements to the combat and production subsystem;
- evaluating the performance of the subsystems' organizations against the requirements; and,

–   bringing about change in cases where performance does not meet requirements.

The exercise of these functions calls for both a high degree of differentiation within the headquarters and many integrative devices. Each function must relate to a similar functional group in OSD, to some extent to interested committees in Congress, and to members of the same specialist community in the combat and production subsystems.

Achieving Differentiation.

Differentiation is achieved through the assignment of functional responsibilities to the HQDA directorates and the DA special and personal staff sections. It is within the directorates that assigned tasks such as recruiting, JCS planning, or budgeting can be dealt with; goals can be reasonably clear-cut; appropriate time dimensions exist; and the proper degree of formality of structure is established. The directorates possess knowledge and experience sufficient for most decisions which concern their task environments.

It is important at HQDA that the requirements of particular environments be well understood. This includes both upward relationships—with OSD, OMB, and Congressional committee staffers—and downward relationships with the major commands. The senior leadership of the Army has a large influence on goal-setting and performance evaluation for the whole functional or specialty community within the Army and a similar influence on getting the needed resources from OSD, OMB, and Congress.

Differentiation in the HQDA.

Part of the past debate on DA reorganization was the belief that the structure of HQDA actually complicates the achievement of the required differentiation and performance. The criticism focused on the functional parts of the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff directorates which seemed to be duplicating each other's efforts or have overlapping responsibilities. Title V of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 required the integration of the two staffs into a single HQDA comprised of a civilian element primarily focused on policy and resourcing matters, and depicted in Figure 3-1; and, a military element oriented on planning and military operations shown in Figure 3-2. Acquisition provides a good example of the differentiation sought by Congress. The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) has now incorporated into his office by law the acquisition function assigned by Congress. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition has been appointed by the Secretary of Army to perform this function.

Achieving Integration.

Integration is achieved in daily and weekly meetings of the senior staff with the Under Secretary and the Vice Chief, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff, through the staffing procedures which provide for coordination of decision memoranda with the relevant agency in the Directorate of the Army Staff and through the PPBES process and procedures. The heads of the staff agencies, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff themselves, have a principal integrating role—serving more as a corporate management committee, than as simply representatives of their own staff agencies. And there are also many task forces,

SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION

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                          ┌──────────────────────────┐
┌────────────────────┐    │   SECRETARY              │    ┌────────────────────────┐
│ Deputy Under       │◄───│   OF THE ARMY            │───►│ Administrative Assistant│
│ Secretary of the   │    │                          │    │                        │
│ Army (IA)          │    ├──────────────────────────┤    └────────────────────────┘
└────────────────────┘    │ UNDER SECRETARY OF THE   │
┌────────────────────┐    │ ARMY                     │    ┌────────────────────────┐
│ Deputy Under       │◄───│                          │───►│ Army Reserve Forces    │
│ Secretary of the   │    │                          │    │ Policy Committee       │
│ Army (OR)          │    └──────────────────────────┘    └────────────────────────┘
└────────────────────┘
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| Assistant Secretary (Civil Works) | Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller) | Assistant Secretary (Installations, Logistics and Environment) | Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) | Assistant Secretary (Research, Development and Aquisition) | General Counsel |

| Director of Information Systems for C4 | The InspectorGeneral | The Auditor General | Chief of Legislative Liaisons | Chief of Public Affairs | Director of Office Business Utilization Small & Disadvantaged |

Figure 3-1

working groups, and committees with membership from lower levels of the hierarchy which also serve as important knowledge-based integrators.

The Inspector General (TIG) performs a singularly important integrative function in evaluating the accomplishment of the overall mission, that is: maintaining combat-ready forces. TIG serves on the personnel staff of the Secretary of the Army (SA) and has direct access to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). TIG provides the SA and CSA a continuing assessment of the Army's command, operational, managerial, logistical, and administrative effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA) is the field operating agency (FOA) of the TIG. USAIGA conducts inspections, inquiries, and investigations to gather information, identify systemic problems, and recommend solutions. TIG provides timely feedback on important issues to the Army's senior leadership.

Integration is also the primary function of the "Big Four," The Secretary, Under Secretary, Chief of Staff, and Vice Chief of Staff. This group decides on management strategies: stability, modernization of equipment, and balance. These strategies, enunciated in the yearly Posture Statement, are unifying, integrating statements of objectives which relate directly to the dominant overall issue—maintaining mission-ready forces.

SUMMARY

The United States Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1997 provides a concise discussion of the mission and role of the Army. In the document it states that: *America's Army is a ready, versatile force, capable of projecting power. The Army may be called upon to win major regional*

Organization of the Army Staff

Management Directorate	
CSA'S Staff Group	
Sergeant Major of the Army	
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff*	
General Officer Management Office	

CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
DIRECTOR ARMY STAFF

Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate
Army Safety Office
Liaison Office
Field Operating Agencies / Staff Support Agencies

Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel	Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence	Deputy Chief of Staff Operations & Plans	Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics

Chief of Engineers	The Surgeon General	Chief National Guard Bureau	Chief Army Reserve	The Judge Advocate General	Chief of Chaplains	Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

* Office is established; changes to AR - 5 are in the staffing process

Figure 3-2

conflicts, conduct peace operations, or deliver humanitarian assistance. As a mostly U. S. -based force, it must be a power-projection army, capable of rapid response, trained and ready to deliver decisive victory. In order to be truly mission capable, the Army must successfully address three major challenges. First, in order to be trained and ready, the Army must balance six basic imperatives: the people who will have to be sufficiently versatile to function effectively in a wide variety of challenging situations; the doctrine which provides the "azimuth" for the conduct of future operations; the proper mixture of forces; high quality, demanding training to ensure that the Army is prepared to execute any and all missions; the most modern equipment; and, the development of confident, competent leaders. Secondly, the Army must create a stable environment; stability in personnel, quality of life, installations and funding. And lastly, the Army must become a model of managerial efficiency at every level within the organization; it is incumbent upon the Army to: "...avoid costs and generate savings..." in order to pay for a force structure that will support the National Military Strategy.

As the Army moves away from the industrial-age, threat-based Cold war environment into the information, capabilities-based force needed for the 21st century — as Force XXI becomes a reality — it is adapting to the requirements of a changing world.

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CHAPTER 4

THE RELATIONSHIP OF JOINT AND ARMY FORCE PLANNING

> *Joint matters are defined as "...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to:*
> *1. national military strategy*
> *2. strategic planning and contingency planning; and*
> *3. command and control of combat operations under unified command."*
>
> Title IV, *Public Law 99-433*
> *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*

INTRODUCTION

Goldwater-Nichols profoundly changed the relationships among the Services, and with the organizations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This chapter addresses the processes used within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the combatant commands, and the Army to determine the force levels required to meet the U.S. national objectives and military strategy, and to fulfill the force requirements of the unified commanders. These processes also determine the force levels to be used for development of the Services' programs within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and provide the basis for the DOD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CINCs, carries out his statutory responsibilities required by *Title 10, USC* and *DODD 5100.1*. The CJCS statutory responsibilities include: assisting the National Command Authorities (NCA) in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; advising the Secretary of Defense on programming priorities; preparing strategic plans; advising the Secretary of Defense on the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Services and Combat Support Agencies of the Department of Defense. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the PPBS and the strategic guidance for use in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JSPS provides the venue for the CJCS, in consultation with the other

members of the JCS and the CINCs, to review the national security environment and US national security objectives; evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense. (see Figure 4-1)

As the principal military advisor to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the CINCs' advocate, the CJCS is responsible for the assessment of military needs from a joint warfighting perspective to ensure that the nation effectively leverages joint Service and Defense agency capabilities while minimizing their limitations. Such assessments involve readiness requirements, and plans for recapitalizing joint military capabilities. The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA) process, overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), is one of the mechanisms for conducting such assessments. JWCA are continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense Agencies, and others as required.

The Army participates fully in the planning phase of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Army Staff supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), as a member of the JCS, by performing analyses and providing input to the JSPS. The Army Staff supports the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), as a member of the JROC, by direct participation in the JWCA process. The Army Staff supports the Secretary of the Army (SA), as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB), by participating in JSPS and JROC/JWCA, and by performing additional analysis as required in support of the development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

JOPES provides the procedural foundation for an integrated and coordinated approach to developing, approving, and publishing operation plans. This operational planning process concerns the deployment and employment of current forces, and not the identification of future force requirements. The latter is part of the force planning/development process. (See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion of JOPES.)

The Army supplement to JOPES is the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). AMOPES provides the structure and process for Army participation in JOPES, as well as serving other purposes. AMOPES is not part of the DOD PPBS process. (See Chapter 6 for further discussion of Army Mobilization and AMOPES.)

While the emphasis of this text is on the Army management systems, it is first necessary to understand the relationship of DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commands to the Army Force Planning Process.

THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)

The CJCS is charged by *Title 10, United States Code (10 USC)* with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The JSPS, as prescribed by *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (MOP 7),* as modified by *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01,* provides the framework for

JSPS & *CJCS* Documents

Joint Strategy Review (JSR) Chairman's Guidance (CG)
(Continuous Assessment of Strategic Environment)

National Military Strategy (NMS)
(Strategy With Constrained Force Structure)

Defense Planning Guidance

Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR)
Joint Planning Document (JPD)
(Program Priorities)

POM

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
(GUIDANCE and Tasking for Deliberate Planning)

Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)
**(POM Force Assessment)**

Figure 4-1

strategic planning and strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Joint strategic planning begins the process which creates the forces whose capabilities are apportioned for theater operation planning.

Within the Joint Staff, strategic planning is primarily the responsibility of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, and the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8, who use input from the Joint Staff, OSD, other DOD and Federal agencies, unified combatant commands, and the Services to assist in policy formulation, develop strategy, and provide force planning guidance. Primary responsibility for the management of JOPES, to include the review and approval of

operations plans, resides with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, and Operations Directorate, J-3.

The JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which documents or products are coherently produced. Some are developed concurrently. Key outputs of the JSPS include the National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Two closely related documents are produced by the JROC/JWCA process: Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR), and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) (formerly part of the JSPS). The NMS, JPD, and CPR are provided as advice to the

Secretary of Defense for use in preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

In the resulting DPG, the Secretary of Defense provides policy; articulates strategic objectives and the national military strategy; and provides force and resource guidance to the Services, other DOD agencies, and to the combatant commanders. Based on the DPG, the Services and DOD agencies prepare their Program Objective Memorandums (POM).

Using the CPA, the CJCS assesses the adequacy of the Service and DOD agencies' POMs. The CPA comments on the risk associated with the planned allocation of defense resources. The CPA evaluates how well POMs conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and the CINCs' requirements.

The NMS, JPD, and CPR initiate the planning phase of the DOD PPBS. They provide CJCS advice to the NCA on the overall military strategy, fiscally-constrained force structure, and joint program priorities required to support U.S. national security objectives. Considering its impact on planning and programming, it is essential that CJCS advice be included in the formulation of the DPG.

The JSCP provides strategic guidance, contingency taskings, and apportions major combat forces to combatant commanders for use in operational planning. Using the JSCP guidance, the CINCs prepare operation plans in accordance with the procedures of JOPES.

HQDA, Army MACOMs, and Army Component Commanders interact with the operational planning process through the AMOPES. Interaction also takes place through Army Commanders Conferences, the Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG), The Army Plan (TAP), and major Army command submissions.

Based on planning directives of the combatant commanders, AMOPES, and other guidance from HQDA, Army component commanders provide input to the theater commander's operation plans and participate in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) preparation and refinement process. (A TPFDD is the computer-supported data base which contains time-phased force data, nonunit-related cargo and personnel data, and transportation data for a particular OPLAN.)

The Joint Strategy Review (JSR).

The JSR is the continuous JSPS process for gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of the strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. Products of the JSR include Issue Papers, the Long-Range Vision Paper, and the JSR Annual Report. The JSR Annual Report recommends, as appropriate, changes to the NMS and guides the development of the JPD. Approval of the JSR Annual Report is one of the means available to the CJCS to inject his guidance into the JSPS.

The Chairman's Guidance.

The Chairman's Guidance (CG) provides the principal guidance to the Joint Staff and information to the Secretary of Defense, the CINCs, and the other members of the JCS regarding the framework for building the NMS. This guidance serves as a bridge between the initial assessments and conclusions reached during the JSR process and the specific processes that build the NMS, the JPD, and the JSCP. The J-5 recommended CG is presented in the JSR Annual Report and when approved, provides his initial guidance. CG may also be

JROC Membership

JROC Chairman ⟨☆ ☆ ☆ ☆⟩ Vice Chairman, JCS

⟨☆ ☆ ☆ ☆⟩ Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

⟨☆ ☆ ☆ ☆⟩ Vice Chief of Naval Operations

⟨☆ ☆ ☆ ☆⟩ Vice Chief of Staff, US Air Force

⟨☆ ☆ ☆ ☆⟩ Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

Figure 4-2

promulgated via other means anytime during the JSR process, such as the CINCs'Conference.

Joint Strategic Planning Documents.

The National Military Strategy (NMS), the first formal JSPS document fulfills the chairman's *Title 10, USC* responsibility to "...assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction of the Armed Forces." It is reviewed annually during the JSR and revised or republished as needed. It provides the advice of the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the CINCs, to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, as to the recommended military strategy and fiscally-constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The NMS consists of a contextual setting, an updated intelligence appraisal, descriptions of ways to achieve national security objectives, a description of the strategic landscape, and the foundations and principles upon which the strategy is based. Additionally, during NMS development, force levels required to support the strategy, with acceptable risk, are identified. The NMS is then forwarded to the President through the Secretary of Defense. The NMS

JROC Review Board (JRB)

- Director, J8 Chairman ☆ ☆ ☆
- DEPOPSDEP, ADCSOPS - FD ☆ ☆
- Assist the JROC:
  - Oversees requirements generation process for Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP)
  - Oversees Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Process
  - Reviews JWCA insights, findings, recommendations, and provides guidance / direction

Figure 4-3

is developed as required by changes in the recommended strategy.

The Joint Planning Document (JPD) supports the NMS by providing concise programming priorities, requirements or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG. It is published in seven stand–alone volumes: Intelligence; Nuclear; C4 Systems; Future Capabilities; Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy; Manpower and Personnel; and Logistics.

The JPD and the NMS are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his review. Both documents provide supporting documentation to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration during the preparation of the DPG.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance to the CINCs and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP apportions resources to the CINCs, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA.

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA)

Services — CINCs — Joint Staff — Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment — OSD — Others — DOD Activities/Agencies

Inclusive Examination of Joint Warfighting Areas

Comprehensive View of Intersecting Capabilities

JROC: Assessment Integrator

Figure 4-4

The JSCP is the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are tasked to develop operations plans, concept plans and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. The JSCP gives strategic planning direction for deliberate plans to be developed over an 18 to 24 months period. The JSCP supports and implements, through the CINCs' operations plans, the NMS, and NCA's Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The JSCP apportions major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period for both Active and Reserve component forces found under various conditions of mobilization. These apportionments are incorporated into CINC theater plans. The JSCP provides the CINCs a threat estimate likely to impact the operational planning and force apportionment during the planning period.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Process.

The JROC consists of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (See Figure 4-2). Since April 1994, the CJCS expanded the authority of the JROC to assist in building senior military consensus across a range of issues.

First, the JROC's agenda broadened to include greater initiative in defining military requirements with an expanded focus on the planning, programming and budgeting process. The JROC oversees the requirements generation process for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) as specified in DOD 5000.1. Second, the JROC activity has been increasingly linked to a dialogue with CINCs on warfighting requirements. Third, the JROC established, as a new analytical forum for deliberations, the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA). These assessments cover ten interacting warfare areas consisting of the following: Strike; Land and Littoral Warfare; Strategic Mobility and Sustainment; Sear, Air, and Space Superiority; Deter/Counter Proliferation of WMD; Command and Control; Information Warfare; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Regional Engagement/ Presence; Joint Readiness; Combating Terrorism.. Fourth, the JROC increased its direct integration in PPBS. The most significant effort has involved the production of the two Chairman's documents: the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) with a changed emphasis; the Chairman's Program Recommendations(CPR), a new document.

To assist the integration and coordination effort of the JWCA, the JROC created the JROC Review Board (JRB) (See Figure 4-3). The JRB consists of the Director, J8, and Service Deputy Operations Deputies. The JRB assists the JROC in overseeing the requirements generation process and the JWCA Process. The JRB reviews JWCA insights, findings, recommendations, and provides both guidance and direction.

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA).

JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate (Director), examines key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identifies opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness (See Figure 4-4). The teams consist of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, OSD, DOD agencies, and others as deemed necessary. JWCA issues are presented to the JRB, and then to the JROC for consideration. The JROC then is instrumental in helping the CJCS forge consensus and explore alternatives. The CJCS draws advice from the JROC, the other JCS members, and the CINCs, to fulfill his statutory responsibility to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense regarding program recommendations and budget proposals. The CPR and CPA form the basis for fulfilling the CJCS's responsibilities. Designed to offer the CJCS's personal viewpoint, the CPR and CPA are supported by both the deliberate planning process and JWCA. Both are produced and delivered separately from other PPBS and JSPS documents (See Figure 4-5).

Chairman's Documents.

The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) provides the CJCS's personal recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration in the DPG. The recommendations are the CJCS's views of programs critical to creating or enhancing joint warfighting capabilities (See Figure 4-6).

The CPR is delivered early in the POM cycle. It provides input to programming and budgeting and provides advice to the Secretary of Defense for use in

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Areas

A S S E S S M E N T

A R E A S

Strike
Land and Littoral Warfare
Strategic Mobility & Sustainment
Sea, Air, and Space Superiority
Deter/Counterproliferation
Command & Control
Information Warfare
Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance
Regional Engagement/Presence
Joint Readiness
**Combating Terrorism**

Figure 4-5

preparing the DPG. The CPR delineates the issues the CJCS deems critical priorities and performance goals for the Secretary to consider. The Secretary considers the CJCS's recommendations, and then publishes the DPG.

The recommendations contained in the CPR are not restricted to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Examining and recommending program alternatives within joint warfighting capability areas require careful scrutiny of empirical data, appropriate application of analytical processes, and sound military judgment. The CPR focuses upon specific recommendations that will enhance joint readiness, promote

joint doctrine and training, and satisfy joint warfighting requirements.

The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) contains the CJCS's alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for Secretary of Defense's consideration in refining the defense program and budget. These adjustment are intended to enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and reflect strategic and CINC priorities. The CJCS reviews the POMs of the Services and other DOD agencies and the preliminary program decisions.

JWCA Process

Across Service Lines
Focus on Joint Warfighting
Identify Change Levers

A
S
S
E
S
S
M
E
N
T

Strike
Land and Littoral Warfare
Strategic Mobility & Sustainment
Sea, Air, and Space Superiority
Deter/Counterproliferation
Command & Control
Information Warfare
Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance
Regional Engagement/Presence
Joint Readiness
Combating Terrorism

A
R
E
A
S

Dominant Maneuver

Full Dimensional Protection

Precision Engagement

Focused Logistics

Figure 4-6

The CPA is delivered late in the Program review cycle, and provides the CJCS assessment of the adequacy of the composite Services' and DOD agencies' POMs. The CPA evaluates the extent that the POMs conform to strategic priorities and CINC requirements. The CJCS comments on the risks associated with the planned allocation of DOD resources. When applicable, the CJCS recommends to the Secretary of Defense specific alternative programs and budget proposals based upon personal assessment of current and future joint warfighting capabilities.

DOD PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)

PPBS is a cyclic process containing three distinct but interrelated phases: planning, programming, and budgeting (See Figure 4-7). The process provides for decision making on future programs and permits prior decisions to be examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current environment (threat, political, economic, technological, and resources), and for the time period being addressed.

PPBS is the formal resource management system for constructing and

Department Of Defense Planning Guidance →

PPBS

Service Program Objective Memorandum (POM)

President's Budget

Service Budgets

Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)

Figure 4-7

maintaining the FYDP. It progresses from the articulation of the military strategy to defining the organizations, training, and forces to support that strategy. During the planning phase, the Secretary of Defense provides policy direction, program guidance, and fiscal manpower controls for the remainder of the PPBS cycle.

The planning phase of PPBS culminates with the issuance of the DPG. The DPG contains planning, programming, and resource guidance to the Services and the Defense agencies for the conduct of force planning and program development. The DPG identifies the major dangers and opportunities bearing on America's security

and prosperity, outlines the force structure and modernization priorities best suited to implement the NMS, and establishes policies in a host of other areas from counter-proliferation initiatives to defense manpower and infrastructure. It establishes overall resource priorities and provides specific programming guidance in the following categories:

Readiness: Is the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ without unacceptable delays—normally includes pre-D-day

Army Planning and PPBES Cycle

Standing Priorities

Defense Planning Guidance

NMS JPD CPR

PLANNING
- Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG)
- Functional & Special Area Long-Range Plans
- TAP Process
- TAA/FFR

TAP

PROGRAMMING
- POM
- CPA & Issues
- CINC IPLs
- Defense Resources Board (DRB)
- Program Decision Memorandum

Review Updates

EXECUTION
- QAPR
- Mid- Year Reviews

President's Budget

BUDGETING
- BES
- OSD & OMB Reviews
- Program Budget Decisions
- Budget Justification

Figure 4-8

measures), and sustain their peacetime operations/maintenance support.

Sustainability: This is the "staying power" of forces, units, weapons systems, and equipment, often measured in number of days or in terms of uncommitted units and personnel. This includes those mechanisms, equipment, and facilities necessary to produce and deliver those people and things over prolonged periods (normally associated with post-D-day measures).

Force Structure: This refers to the manpower and materiel resources of units/organizations tasked to perform missions in peace and war. It includes those units/organizations which will activate, inactivate, or change during the planning/programming period.

Modernization and Investment: This category will be given a high priority in our efforts to ensure qualitative superiority in technology. It provides acquisition approach guidance including the use of reduced cost advanced commercial technologies, products, and practices; research and development hedging strategies; judicious incorporation of advanced technologies into existing or new systems; and research and development cooperation with allies. It also provides guidance on increasing the

efficiency of acquisition strategies; research, development, test, and evaluation procedures; the acquisition work force; industrial base policies; and supporting logistics systems.

Infrastructure and Overhead: In order to add to our efficiency and redirect our shrinking resources while maintaining high quality forces, infrastructure and overhead are examined in all program areas.

The DPG is the OSD guidance document for providing general policy and direction for program development. It is the link between planning and programming. The DPG containing Services, Defense Agency, CJCS, and combatant command input is published in January/February of even fiscal years. This document provides guidance for the development of a specific POM period. The guidance covers the entire six year period of the POM and concurrent two budget years. A similar document called the Fiscal Guidance, developed in the same manner as the DPG, is issued in January/February of odd fiscal years. This document provides guidance for updating and adjusting the POM and budget years developed in the previous even fiscal year. (In even years the document is called the DPG; in odd years the document is called Fiscal Guidance.) (See Chapter 9 for a complete discussion of PPBS/PPBES.)

THE ARMY PLANNING SYSTEM

The Army planning system is designed to meet the demands of JSPS, JROC/JWCA, JOPES, and PPBS. Through the JSPS and the JROC/JWCA processes, the Army provides its input to the documents which present the advice of the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the CINCs, to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The Army planning system initiates the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) (See Figure 4-8). (The Army has chosen to add an E to the process acronym to emphasize the execution phase.) This system addresses the development of defense policies and the military strategy for attainment of national security objectives and policies. It determines force requirements and objectives, and establishes guidance for the allocation of resources for the execution of Army roles and functions in support of national objectives. It provides the forum within which the Army conducts all planning, except operational (contingency) planning which is performed by the CINCs with CJCS and Service assistance. Planning in the PPBES supports the planning phase of the DOD PPBS and the JSPS. It also provides guidance for the subsequent phases of the Army PPBES. Planning is defined as the continuing process by which the Army establishes and revises its goals or requirements and attainable objectives, chooses from among alternative courses of actions, and determines and allocates its resources (manpower and dollars) to achieve the chosen course of action. The value of comprehensive planning comes from providing an integrated decision structure for an organization as a whole.

Adequate planning requires "causative thinking"—a way and means of making events happen to shape the future of an organization instead of adapting to a future that unfolds from "blind forces." Planning is experimenting with ideas that represent the resources of an organization without risking those resources. It is designed to reduce risk by simplifying and ordering as much information as possible upon which to make a decision. It includes the development of options.

The Army planning system includes strategic planning and force planning for both requirements and objectives. Strategic planning is the development of national defense policy, national military objectives, and the national military strategy. Strategic planning provides direct support to the DOD PPBS and JSPS, while concurrently supporting the Army PPBES. These planning activities serve to guide the subsequent development of programs and budgets. The focus of the Army planning system is the identification of policy and the national military strategy necessary to maintain our national security and support U.S. foreign policy. It includes the identification of the integrated and balanced military forces necessary to accomplish that strategy, and provision of a framework for effective management of DOD resources towards successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource limitations.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has primary Army Staff (ARSTAF) responsibility for Army planning. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is responsible for the development of threat estimates. ARSTAF functional proponents are each responsible for supporting this planning within their proponency. This staff support is essential to ensure the accuracy of macro-level resource projections. Staff participation in Joint actions is also a major and continuous planning activity. The DCSOPS has the additional responsibility of Army Operations Deputy (OPSDEP) for assignment, review, coordination, and staff supervision of all joint actions in the ARSTAF. Each agency head is responsible, within his staff area of responsibility, for advising the CSA, through the DCSOPS, on all matters of joint interest and necessary actions resulting from CJCS decisions.

Army planning for the PPBES focuses on the policy and programming guidance determined during DPG development, and force and program recommendations established during NMS, JPD, and CPR development. The Army planning process provides the systematic means to develop guidance for program and budget development. Conceptually, this process is a generalized risk assessment/management model that supports the senior leadership of the Army in decisions on resource allocation for the Army. Through this planning process, known as Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army determines force requirements, and required force capabilities (objectives), and allocates the resources needed to execute Army roles and missions. The resulting documents are used by the CSA, major commands, and Army component commanders of the unified combatant commands to develop their requirements. (See Chapter 9 for detailed discussion of PPBES.)

Force requirements planning is conducted in order to translate JSPS and CJCS advice and recommendations and DOD guidance and objectives into Army terms (See Figure 4-9).

Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG)/Force XXI Guidance. While still required, the ALRPG has not been published since 1991. The ALRPG has been replaced by Force XXI Guidance. No single definitive document has been published on Force XXI. *Army Vision 2010* is the most definitive document available on the subject of Force XXI, but it does not satisfy the regulatory description of ALRPG. The ALRPG discussed here outlines the requirements that Force XXI Guidance must satisfy for Army planning process to continue in a logical manner.

Army Force Planning

Figure 4-9

Documents from the DOD PPBS, JSPS, and JROC/JWCA (Chairman's documents) process are used in this effort to update the Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG). Army long-range planning provides a logical and consistent framework for developing the future Army and for fielding requisite warfighting capabilities. It considers threats, national security, national military strategies, requirements of the combatant commands, Army operations doctrine, and the long-range vision of the Army's leadership. It relies on a combination of the leadership vision for the Total Army and the principles and guidelines that the Army's force designers need to develop specific force capabilities.

The ALRPG identifies and analyzes major trends and other influencing factors which may affect the capability of the Army to perform its mission, or may affect the environments within which the Army may have to operate. By design, it addresses a time frame 10-20 years into the future, linking near and midterm planning to the future by identifying the "start point" for the long-range planning horizon. A whole host of "players" provide formal and informal input to the ALRPG. It outlines policy objectives and their future implications for the Army, essential features of future Army

force structure, potential equipment capabilities, and projected requirements for joint and combined operations. As such, the ALRPG is the lead document in the Army long-range planning process. It provides guidance necessary for the functional and special areas, the MACOMs, and the Army component commands of the unified commands to prepare their long-range plans which are also disseminated biennially. For the most part, these plans address goals outlined in the format of the Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs). These plans, in turn, feed the next iteration of the ALRPG. Further, the ALRPG serves as a reference document during the development of the Army's input to the JSR and to DOD/JCS/CJCS formal planning documents.

The Army Plan (TAP). The POM Force represents SA/CSA guidance to the ARSTAF and MACOMs for program development and is published in TAP. Subsequently, based upon estimated resource constraints, this force is developed to identify long-range force levels. TAP provides the basis for the development of specific programs. It establishes priorities for resource allocations, both dollars and manpower, and is published in both draft and final versions. The final TAP is published biennially in the fall of odd-numbered years. It is used by the MACOMs in their POM development. TAP establishes force packages for procurement and distribution using the Army Force Packaging Methodology (FPM). This methodology states that those forces that are most critical in the early stages of a conflict receive the highest priority and receive resources at a higher percentage than later deploying forces. FPM is a detailed statement of priorities based upon the decision of the SA/CSA. In essence, FPM permits

decisionmakers at all levels to compare issues against a command criteria and ultimately to aid in defending those issues to the Congress, OSD, and the Army.

Army force planning is based upon numerous documents and decisions to include the DPG, the previous POM, previous Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), Program Budget Decision (PBD), the Army Commanders Conference decisions, SA/CSA guidance and direction, CINC's Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), documents associated with the JSPS (NMS and JPD), Chairman's documents (CPR and CPA), ALRPG input, and other formal guidance. The TAP establishes the guidance and framework for determination of Army force requirements to support the NMS and develops several constrained force alternatives for SA/CSA decision. The planning phase of the Army's PPBES is completed with the publication of TAP. In October of odd-numbered years, the ARSTAF begins development of input which begins the next Army planning cycle. The substantial overlap of cycles thus becomes apparent but can be confusing, especially to those who are new to the system. It is important to know just where you are in each cycle and to realize how decisions made in subsequent programming or budgeting phases in one cycle may influence the planning phases of succeeding cycles.

Although it is tempting to say that at the completion of the planning phase the ARSTAF moves into the programming phase of the cycle, it doesn't work quite that way. Overlapping of phases within single cycles, due to time constraints and to ensure maximum participation from the field, is as common and necessary as the overlapping of the cycles themselves. The initiation of Army program development begins before formal receipt of the DPG and TAP, as the drafts of

Force Development Stages

		Document	System
	CJCS Fiscally Constrained Force	NMS JPD CPR	JSPS CJCS PPBS
	Army Fiscally Constrained Force	TAP	PPBS
	POM Force	CPA POM &FYDP	CJCS PPBS
	Budget Force	Presidents Budget & FYDP	PPBS
Increased risk; decreased capability	Current Force	JSCP	JSPS JOPES

Figure 4-10

these two documents have provided guidance to the programmers. Within specified constraints, program development translates Army force planning objectives into a comprehensive and balanced allocation of force structure, manpower, materiel, and funds for a six-year period. These programs are documented in the Army POM.

The Army POM, with the other Service and DOD agencies POMs, is submitted for review by the JROC/JWCA to prepare the CPA. The CPA and the Service and DOD agencies POMs are submitted to the DRB for formal review and issue development. Following the resolution of issues and issuance of Program Decision Memorandums, the POMs are approved by the Secretary of Defense. The POMs, as amended by the PDM, provide the basis for formulating budget estimates.

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). Another element of the Army planning system includes AMOPES. AMOPES provides the interface between combatant command plans for utilization and deployment of Army forces and Army plans for providing mobilized forces and resources. It also serves as the Army supplement to the JSCP. AMOPES Volume II provides guidance to Army staff agencies, Army

commands, and Army components of unified combatant commands for the employment and/or support of Army forces in the near-term period. It reflects specific tasks and capabilities attainable within existing programs and budget limitations. It also documents the Army forces available to execute contingency plans; presents the mobilization schedule and major combat forces together with planned availability for deployment of these forces; sets priorities for apportionment of combat support and combat service support units; presents joint strategic concepts; assigns tasks to commanders of major Army commands; provides personnel, intelligence, and logistics guidance; provides guidance for development of plans with and without mobilization; and provides guidance required to plan for mobilization of units and individuals to meet established force requirements in the event of the need to expand the Active Army. Refer to Chapter 6 for more detail on AMOPES.

THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

In studying force planning, it is necessary to understand the approach used within the DOD (including the Joint Staff and the Services) in determining the proper size forces the nation should have. This "force sizing" is an integral part of PPBES which allocates limited resources, and adheres to the PPBS schedule and discipline. As in all other aspects of the PPBES, the guidance received from OSD plays an important part. The JCS considers the previous DPG, Presidential National Security Directive (NSD), and other pertinent policy information issued by the Administration when advice in the form of the NMS, JPD, and the CJCS' CPR are provided for the development of the DPG.

The force requirements process is not solely an Army process but rather is accomplished by all the Services—usually in concert with one another but sometimes unilaterally. It is a process inextricably linked with the DOD PPBS. Whether it be the sizing process characteristic of the mid-range (3-6 years) period or the structuring process associated more frequently with a shorter period (0-2 years), force requirements receive their inputs from and are manifested in key documents of the PPBES. Force requirements must be based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved. Consequently, this process begins with the articulation of United States national interests and objectives by the political leadership and the formulation of a National Security Directive (NSD). Guided by the NSD, the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and CINCs, develops a recommended NMS which is provided to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. Using this national military strategy and the Fiscally-Constrained Force Levels contained in the NMS as a basis and taking into account the threat and, where appropriate, the externally-imposed constraints (dollars, manpower, equipment, industrial capacity, technology, etc.), the force design process is begun.

The evolution of the force results from a sequence of actions which progressively refine initial estimates. Beginning with the CJCS (J-8) recommended force requirements and progressing to the current force, one sees an increasingly detailed definition of force structure components and increasingly definitive resource guidance. As the resource constraints increase, the forces become progressively smaller and the amount of risk inherent in strategy execution increases (See Figure 4-10).

CJCS Fiscally-Constrained Force

- Reasonable assurance of success
- Fiscally constrained
- Fully supported
- Fully structured
- Responsive to CJCS sizing and structuring scenario
- Developed by CJCS with CINC and Service input
- Benchmark for assessing Program Force risk

Figure 4-11

CJCS Fiscally Constrained Force.

A product of the JSR process is the CJCS' Fiscally Constrained Force developed to support the NMS for the last year of the planning period (See Figure 4-11). It is based on force structure recommendations solicited from the CINCs and the other members of the JCS. The development of an estimated force structure (J-8 lead) begins early in the JSR process, and is adjusted and finalized during the NMS development and assessment process. It is defined as that force which would be necessary to achieve the strategic objectives with acceptable risk. It is derived by considering active and mobilized forces of the United States and its allies capable of meeting various threats in diverse regions of the world as postulated in the DPG illustrative planning scenarios.

The Fiscally Constrained Force describes in broad terms a fully structured, manned, trained, and supported force (active and reserve) developed by analyzing and assessing force structures recommended by the CINCs, the Services, and the Joint Staff. The Services, CINCs, and Joint Staff provide force structures, based on their respective responsibilities, which they believe are required to achieve national security objectives with a reasonable assurance of success. The analysis of the force structure includes evaluations of simultaneous military operations in major theaters, prioritizing missions, sequencing force deployment and employment, and eliminating duplicate threat data. The analysis considers the contributions of friendly and allied forces. and assessment

Army Fiscally Constrained Force

- Adequate Assurance
- Fiscally Constrained
- Reasonably Attainable
- Reasonably Structured and Supported
- Responsive to OSD Sizing and Structuring Scenario
- Starting Point for POM Force

Figure 4-12

of the Services', CINCs', and Joint Staff's input and include simultaneous military operations in major theaters, prioritizing missions, sequencing force deployment and employment, and eliminating duplicate threat data. The level of acceptable risk is ultimately determined by the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the CINCs.

A complete description of the Fiscally Constrained Force includes a summary of sealift and airlift requirements as determined by the mobility analysis, the level of prepositioning used in the analysis, a discussion of significant risks and shortfalls in comparison to programmed mobility assets, and appropriate mobility trade-offs. In order to assess military and industrial mobilization, the capability of the United States to produce the Fiscally Constrained

Force is determined. This assessment includes an evaluation of various levels of investment in industrial preparedness and evaluate how to improve the premobilization industrial base.

The Fiscally Constrained Force contains:

- Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces (includes space-based systems whose primary mission is active strategic defense).
- Space Forces (excludes active space-based strategic defenses).
- General Purpose Forces (includes identification of the subset of nonstrategic nuclear forces).
- Special Operations Forces.

POM FORCE

- Based on the Fiscally Constrained Force
- Responsive to OSD Sizing and Structuring Scenario
- Resource Constrained Based on OSD Projections
- Higher Degree of Risk
- Not Fully Structured Nor Supported
- Analysis Two to Six Years Into the Future
- Careful Balance Between Resource Availability and Force Capability

Figure 4-13

Army Fiscally Constrained Force.

The Army Fiscally Constrained Force is the OSD directed force in terms of force structure, readiness, modernization, and sustainability which is constrained by expected fiscal and manpower levels (See Figure 4-12). The force provides SA/CSA guidance to the ARSTAF and MACOMs for program development. The Army conducts an initial analysis of force alternatives to determine the best force mix.

Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Force.

The POM Force is based on the Fiscally Constrained Force, and must be responsive to the OSD sizing and structuring scenario.(See Figure 4-13). In the case of the Army, using major combat forces established in the Fiscally Constrained Force, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the achievable manning, equipment, and modernization levels for the major combat units. For the Army, once the Fiscally-Constrained Force has been determined, and the specific number of Army divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry

Budget Force

- Force and Its Associated Capabilities That Would Be Achieved If the Budget Were Fully Executed
- Drawn From the First Two Years of the Six Year Defense Program
- Less Capable Than the Program Force
- Accordingly Higher Risk Than the Program Force

Figure 4-14

regiments, and special forces groups (above-the-line forces) have been identified, the combat support and combat service support units (below-the-line forces) required to support the force in combat are determined using TAA process. The TAA takes the major divisional and nondivisional combat forces of the Army Fiscally-Constrained Force and identifies (or develops) the necessary below the line forces required to support deployed major combat units. This provides a basis for examining trade-offs between types of units and assessing risk when shortfalls occur in the program. Considerable data are amassed on the contribution various units make towards the combat effectiveness of the Army, and these data are used in assessing trade-offs as the structure of the POM Force is determined.

(TAA is discussed in Chapter 5.) Similarly, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the amount and location of stockpiles and other logistical functions that can be programmed to support the POM Force. This information is also incorporated in the trade-off analysis.

As a consequence of the numerous analyses mentioned, a POM Force is determined which is a delicate balance between resource availability and force capability. As might be suspected, the resultant POM Force has considerably more risk associated with it than the Fiscally Constrained Force. These risks are enumerated by the force programmers of the Services in their POMs and by the CJCS in the CPA. A Service's POM presents its programs for achieving objectives in the

Current Force

- Force and Its Associated Capabilities That Is In Being Today
- Reflects Real-Time Readiness Conditions
- Represents Latest Adjustments to the Budget Force Based On:
  - Congressional Resource Constraints
  - Command Priorities and Decisions
- May Be Less Capable Than the Budget Force
- Possible Higher Risk

Figure 4-15

areas of forces, manpower, equipment, materiel acquisition, and logistic support within constraints specified by the Secretary of Defense. The CPA provides the views of the CJCS on the balance and capabilities of the composite POM force and the risks associated with Service programs. The CJCS may offer specific recommendations to reduce identified risks.

Budget Force.

The Budget Force is that force and its associated capabilities which would be achieved if the budget requests were fully appropriated (See Figure 4-14). The capabilities of the Budget Force are slightly less than the POM Force, and it has an accordingly higher associated risk. The Budget Force is drawn from the first two years of the POM.

Current Force.

The Current Force is that force and its associated capabilities that is in being today (See Figure 4-15). It is the force that reflects real-time readiness conditions. The Current Force also represents the latest adjustments to the Budget Force based on congressional resource appropriations and command priorities and decisions. When more constraints are applied to it than the Budget Force, it manifests a different level of risk.

JOPES Deliberate Planning

Initiation Phase → **Concept Development Phase**

CONCEPT REVIEW

Plan Development Phase

PLAN REVIEW PHASE → **Supporting Plans Phase**

Figure 4-16

THE JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES)

The objective of JOPES is the timely development of effective operation plans throughout the combatant commands. Through the use of uniform planning procedures and formats, JOPES facilitates CJCS review of operation plans, incorporates automatic data-processing techniques and interchange of data, standardizes operation plans, and provides for reporting any force shortfalls and limiting factors identified during the planning process.

JOPES establishes a comprehensive set of procedures to be used in both deliberate and time-sensitive (crisis action) planning of joint military operations and, to the extent possible, in combined operations. Planning in JOPES begins with the assignment of missions and publication of other data to combatant commanders in the JSCP. The phases of deliberate planning under JOPES are: (See Figure 4-16)

Initiation Phase, in which planning tasks are assigned, forces and resources available for planning are identified, and the stage is set for planning.

Army Force Providers

MACOMs	Component Commands	Combatant Commands
• USAREUR	*USAREUR*	*USEUCOM*
• EUSA	*FORSCOM*	*USACOM*
• USARPAC	*USARSO*	*USSOUTHCOM*
• USARJ	*USARPAC*	*USPACOM*
• USARSO	*USARCENT*	*USCENTCOM*
• USASOC	*SSDC*	*USSPACECOM*
• SSDC	*MTMC*	*USTRANSCOM*
• FORSCOM	*USASOC*	*USSOCOM*
• TRADOC		*USSTRATCOM*
• AMC		
• MEDCOM		
• INSCOM		
• COE		
• MDW		
• CIDC		
• MTMC		

Figure 4-17

Concept Development Phase, in which all factors which can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, the best course of action is determined, and the concept of operations is developed. The CINC's strategic concept is submitted to the CJCS for approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), or his representative, reviews selected concepts.

Plan Development Phase, in which force requirements are identified, the force list is structured, resupply and transportation requirements are determined, time-phased force deployment information are developed (not required for Concept Plans (CONPLANs) and concept summaries), and all elements of the plan are documented in JOPES format and submitted for CJCS approval.

Plan Review Phase, in which all elements of the plan are assessed, validated, and approved by the CJCS. Again, the USD(P), or his representative, may review selected plans.

Supporting Plans Phase, in which all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated.

When required during crisis action, execution planning is conducted as the

Combatant Command

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┌─────────────────────────┐
│       PRESIDENT         │
│  ───────────────────    │
│  Secretary of Defense   │
└─────────────────────────┘
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Through CJCS		Services
Combatant Commands		
Component Commands		

Figure 4-18

traditional planning necessary to convert an Operations Plan (OPLAN) or CONPLAN into an Operation Order (OPORD) for the purpose of achieving timely military response for a specific situation. It is normally initiated by a CJCS alert order. A no–plan situation is one in which an operations plan (OPLAN, CONPLAN, or concept summary) does not exist. In this case, JOPES provides standardized procedures for crisis action planning.

Clearly, all aspects of an OPLAN are of interest to the participating Service(s). Some are singled out here since they impact so heavily on the Army's force-structuring process and ultimate assignment of priorities for unit deployment and levels of readiness (See Figure 4-17). It is during the plan development phase that the warfighting CINCs time-phase force lists provided by component/subordinate commanders to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the visualized concept of operations. Planning for deployment is the product of mission analysis and intelligence assessment and is keyed to the supported commander's concept of operations. It is based on Joint and Service doctrine, guidance, review, and the availability of forces. While this planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported joint commander or the CINC, the component commanders develop detailed

lists of combat and support forces to be employed in accomplishing the assigned tasks, including the required closure time of forces (as specified in the supported commander's concept of deployment) to be deployed to the area of operations. This phase concludes with the production of the supported commander's Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TPFDD includes assigned forces, augmentation forces, resupply, replacements, and supporting forces which are to be deployed to the area of operation and forces stationed within the area of operation.

The TPFDD is built by each warfighting CINC and refined in a conference in detail by various participants to ensure the feasibility and acceptability of the data. The TPFDD is then made accessible to planners throughout the joint military community on the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

Closely related to major forces planning is support planning, where the support requirements necessary to sustain the forces are determined. This entails computation of support requirements based upon Service planning guidance and the time-phasing of this support in accordance with the supported commander's overall concept. Most critical to the process is the proper assignment of air or sea mode to time-phased requirements to ensure optimum use of mobility/transportation assets.

Another significant consideration of the whole process is the identification of shortfalls and associated risks. Coordination with and between all commands and agencies concerned is essential to make the detailed adjustments necessary to resolve shortfalls or limiting factors. When a plan has been approved, subordinate and supporting commands and Services must update/modify force and resupply requirements and identify units in light of real-world asset availability/readiness. They must also consistently address the basic execution planning tasks: identification of forces required, designation of units, determination of movement requirements to include actual resupply, and planning the movements of forces and supplies. (See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion of JOPES.)

UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS

Unified commands provide for the integrated effectiveness of U.S. military forces in combat operations and for the projection of U.S. military power in support of U.S. national policies. They are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the CJCS (See Figure 4-18). The chain of command extends from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the unified combatant commands. Forces are assigned under the authority of the Secretary of Defense . This prevents any Service from unilaterally removing its forces, thereby undercutting the authority of these commanders. A unified command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services. Unified combatant commanders have full combatant command (COCOM) of those forces assigned. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the document that establishes the combatant commands.

The unified commands areas indicated in Figure 4-19.

Unified Combatant Commands

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                    ┌─────────────────────┐
                    │ Secretary of Defense │
                    └─────────────────────┘
┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐
│ Central  │  │ European │  │ Pacific  │  │ Atlantic │
│ Command  │  │ Command  │  │ Command  │  │ Command  │
└──────────┘  └──────────┘  └──────────┘  └──────────┘
┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐
│ Southern │  │ Special  │  │ Strategic│  │  Space   │
│ Command  │  │Operations│  │ Command  │  │ Command  │
│          │  │ Command  │  │          │  │          │
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┌──────────┐
│  Trans   │    ┌────────┐  Regional
│ Command  │    └────────┘
└──────────┘    ┌────────┐  Functional
                └────────┘
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Figure 4-19

U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) is responsible for the defense of the eastern approaches to the United States and the lines of communication in the Atlantic area. USCINCACOM is also Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a major NATO commander. Additionally, USACOM has assumed responsibilities as joint force integrator and trainer for most CONUS-based forces.

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is responsible for Southwest Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa.

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is responsible for the U.S. contribution to NATO and for commanding U.S. forces assigned to Europe. Its area of responsibility also includes portions of the Middle East and most of the African states bordering on the Mediterranean and Africa south of the Sahara. USCINCEUR is also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a major NATO commander, and as such is responsible for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is responsible for defense of

the United States from attacks through the Pacific Ocean, and for U.S. defense interests in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.

U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established 23 September 1985. It is responsible for space operations in support of U.S. forces across all levels of conflict. USCINCSPACE supplies warning of ballistic missile attack, communications, navigation/positioning, and environmental support to U.S. military and selected government users. USCINCSPACE also controls military space launch and satellite on-orbit control operations. Additionally, USSPACECOM ensures the safety of U.S. satellites against attacks and initiates actions against foreign satellites to safeguard U.S. forces from attacks in space. USCINCSPACE, when designated as Commander-in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD), is responsible for binational aerospace surveillance and warning, and atmospheric defense of North America.

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established 16 April 1987. It exercises combatant command (COCOM) of all CONUS-based Special Operations Forces (SOF). The principal mission of USSOCOM is to prepare assigned forces to carry out Special Operations (SO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA) missions as required, and to plan for and conduct SO in support of United States national security objectives. Major units include: Army Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units; Navy SEAL and Special Boat Units; and Air Force Special Operations Squadrons. USSOCOM is unique in that USCINCSOC

is responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for Major Force Program 11, Special Operations Forces.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is responsible for the defense of the Panama Canal and fulfills our military responsibilities throughout the Latin American area, less Mexico.

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) established in 1987, is responsible for providing global air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives. Its component commands are the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) designated as a unified command in May 1992, is responsible for worldwide strategic nuclear operations. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy strategic nuclear assets are assigned to USSTRATCOM. The USCINCSTRAT billet rotates between the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

Relationship of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) to CINCs.

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 specifies that the Secretary of Defense may assign to the CJCS responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) directs that communications between the combatant commanders and the NCA shall be transmitted through the CJCS, unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. These two directives place the CJCS in a unique and pivotal

position. However, such directives do not confer command authority on the CJCS and do not alter the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. Subject to the direction of the President, a combatant commander:

- − Performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA; and
- − Is directly responsible to the NCA for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

SUMMARY

Joint planning is conducted under the guidance from CJCS, in coordination with the Services and CINCs. The JSPS is oriented toward identifying and evaluating the threat facing the nation, looking at various times into the future. It provides the basis for formulating the nation's strategy and resource needs in terms of forces and material. This activity is mainly conducted at the CJCS level.

The PPBS is primarily concerned with resource allocation, which means it is primarily dollar and manpower oriented. The PPBS is primarily concerned with the acquisition of those resources necessary to meet the threat and to execute the strategy identified by the DPG. Cost is balanced against risk, with an objective assessment being provided by the CJCS in the CPA. Thus, the JSPS and JROC/JWCA (CJCS documents) impact the PPBS starting with the planning and programming advice contained the NMS, JPD, and CPR and through the assessment of the resulting POMs contained in the CPA.

JOPES focuses on deliberate operation planning and crisis action, planning, deployment, and execution. The JSCP translates the national military strategy into taskings and requires that plans be completed to accomplish tasked missions within available resources. The JSCP may be viewed as a capabilities planning document which represents the last phase of resource management. The combatant commands are the main players in this activity. JOPES is oriented on the most effective use of the nation's current military capability against the near-term threat. The JSCP is the JSPS document that starts the deliberate planning process. The JSCP is the formal tie between JSPS and JOPES.

The details of planning change constantly. The overall procedure of identifying the threat, developing a military strategy, structuring forces to support the strategy, providing resources for priority requirements, and planning for the deployment of those forces to meet contingencies, remains essentially the same from year to year.

Force planning is not a precise activity, even though the resulting force levels are stated precisely in terms of divisions, airwings, carriers, and the like. There are many uncertainties involved in force planning, and the procedures used in determining force levels, as well as the risks inherent with a particular force level, are judgmental in nature.

Force planning is complex and is characterized by an interrelated series of analyses to determine an affordable force. It begins by establishing the force requirements and accepts resource and time constraints to develop the Program, Budget, and Current Forces. Throughout this process, the key consideration is how to execute successfully the national military strategy and to keep risk at an acceptable level. Much analysis and time is spent in developing a force within resource constraints to execute that strategy.

The JSPS, JROC/JWCA, JOPES, and PPBS are processes in place to guide force/operation planning into 21st Century.

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CHAPTER 5

ARMY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

The only way America's future Army will remain the world's best is for all of us to understand how both requirements and operational needs will be determined and what the entry points are in the systems to satisfy each.

General Dennis J. Reimer, CSA

INTRODUCTION

Force development is the initiating process of the Functional Life Cycle of the Army, and is the underlying basis for all other functions. It is a process which consists of defining military capabilities, designing force structures to provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army.

This chapter explains the Army force development processes (Figure 5-1). The five-phased process includes:

    (1) Determine Requirements
    (2) Design Organizations
    (3) Develop Organizational Models
    (4) Determine Organizational Authorizations
    (5) Document Organizational Authorizations

The first phase determines warfighting requirements for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS). These requirements are identified through TRADOC's refocused Requirements Determination Process (which prior to 1996 was known as the Concept Based Requirements System - CBRS). This process incorporates guidance in the form of constraints from the Army's senior leadership, and/or new materiel capabilities evolving from the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process.

The second phase of the force development process, is designing organizations, which have their beginnings in branch/functional concepts. After analysis, organizational capabilities are captured and documented as future operational capabilities (FOC). Organization solutions to FOC require the development of a Unit Reference Sheet (URS). After the design has been laid out and approved, this document will lead to the next phase, which is the development of the organizational models which are the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

The third force development phase is then the development of the organizational model. This is where rules, standards, and guidance are applied by the

FORCE DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW

DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS

DEVELOP ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS

DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS
- DOCTRINE REQUIREMENTS
- TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
- LEADER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
- ORGANIZATION REQUIREMENTS
- MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS
- SOLDIER REQUIREMENTS

DETERMINE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

FORCE DEVELOPMENT

FORCE MANAGEMENT

Figure 5-1

Requirements Documentation Directorate of the U. S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) to the doctrinally correct design, and produces the organizational model, a requirements document, and the definition of a fully mission-capable organization (i.e. an unresourced TOE).

The fourth phase of the force development process is the determination of the organizational authorizations. It determines and/or verifies the affordability, supportability, and executability of the organizational model. This is the resourcing phase, where the organizational model competes for resources in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process.

The fifth and final phase of the process is the documentation of the organizations. This is the phase in which the review, approval, and documentation of quantities authorized occurs.

The schematic framework of this process is displayed as a model in Army Force Integration chart in Figure 2-4 in Chapter 2. This model reflects a system of systems, each of which provides an essential force integration function and, more importantly, how these functions relate to each other. In this network, the processes for determining warfighting requirements, conducting research and development, and providing resources all provide input to the force development process. The resulting products of force development, in turn,

Force Management: The process of determining force requirements and alternative means of resourcing requirements

Included Processes	Task
Combat Developments	Develop Concepts and Doctrine
Training Developments	Determine Rqmnts: Structure, Personnel
Materiel Developments	Materiel, Facilities Training
Doctrine Development	Prioritize above with funding
Organization Development	Authorize/Allocate all resources
	Integration: mix and timing of resources
	Program analysis
	Operational Testing and Evaluation

Force Integration: Capstone process which examines, validates, modifies, and monitors all aspects of change during introduction and incorporation of that change, then measures force readiness.

Nine Functions

Structuring	Training	Deploying
Manning	Sustaining	Stationing
Equipping	Funding	Readiness

Figure 5-2

provide the basis for acquiring and distributing materiel and acquiring, training, and distributing personnel in the Army. It is useful to use the Army Force Integration chart to visualize how each system relates to the others and contributes to the accomplishment of each task.

FORCE MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION

Force development falls within the force management process and in turn is its primary integrator. Force Management is the process of determining force requirements and alternative means of resourcing requirements. It allocates resources and assesses their utilization to accomplish Army functions. It encompasses all processes associated with the progression from

requirements identification through execution of implementing programs. Figure 5-2 displays its seven primary tasks, one of which is integration. Force integration, which includes the functions of structuring, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, funding, deploying, stationing, and readiness, encompasses the introduction and incorporation of change.

Relationships to Change.

In the context of Force Development (the basic and initiating process for the entire Functional Life-Cycle Model), we need to understand change as a dynamic in the process. The elements for change are themselves changing and this fundamentally impacts the Force Integration processes. Force XXI and Battle Labs were products of

The Road to Army XXI
Redesigning the Operational Army

Leader Development

4-8 Years

Battle Labs

Organizational Redesign

Army XXI

redesign the force .... Factory to Foxhole

DOCTRINE

2-4 Years

Materiel Modernization

Training

Figure 5-3

our recognition of the fact that we are changing the way we change. Today, our ability to envision future operational concepts and capabilities is challenged by the rapid pace of environmental change and the time required to change the primary long lead elements of the institution: doctrine, materiel, and organization.

Historically there has been a competition between the main factors driving change; concepts and technology. By the late '70s the pace of technology was providing more options than were affordable or necessary. CBRS, with the emphasis on concepts, was developed to focus technology nd change on elements which enabled us to better implement combat operations or military operations other than war (OOTW). Solutions included changes to our doctrinal base, training procedure enhancements,

leader development processes, organizational changes, and ultimately improvements in our materiel.

The U.S. Army has been and remains today a concept-based Army. While Doctrine codifies changes in the "how," concepts are out in front describing the "what" we want to do. Materiel changes can require 15 years to develop and field (Figure 5-3). Organizational change requires 4-8 years, Doctrine itself requires 2-4 years, and Leader Development and Training follow changes in the other "drivers" by several years. For the future Army to benefit from the synergism of the integrated DTLOMS, we must work to shorten development and fielding times, and increase our ability to envision and conceive.

Probably the best example of warfighting concepts leading change is the

evolution of capabilities to conduct Air Land Battle in Europe. The need to strike a massive enemy before they could overwhelm us at the front lines led first to the "Active Defense" in the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5, Operations*, and then to "Air Land Battle" articulated initially in *TRADOC Pam 525-5* in 1981. This overarching concept quickly became doctrine in *FM 100-5* (1982). The new requirements to see the battlefield in depth and shoot deep led to the evolution of Deep Battle capabilities including: MLRS, APACHE, JSTARS, ATACMS, and a number of sensors, precision guidance, and coordination systems which satisfied this new requirement. It can be argued that this evolution won both the "Cold" and "Desert" wars.

The dynamic coming from these latter two wars continues to fundamentally change the environment and how we must cope with it. TRADOC's CBRS could no longer get concepts far enough in the future to guide change based on threat. The CJCS directed a "capabilities" rather than a "threat" based orientation for structuring our force. Yet the vision of what we want to do (concept) is dependent on the question of what is possible; that is, what can technology provide. Battle Labs were developed to assist in integrating technology into our conceptual base. Finally, for a decision to be made and endorsed by subsequent senior leaders, there had to be a high degree of consensus. The Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) provided that strategic intellectual agility and arrived at a consensus. That environment, therefore, was considered to be driven by a practical combination of concept, capability, consensus and technology.

Today we are in the midst of change again. Formally the Army recognizes and maintains the philosophy of the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) as the process which effects changes to the organizational Army, that is, that concepts are a starting point and drive the process. Given the pace of change and finite resources, CBRS served to provide the framework for change and it included in the process the dynamics among the factors of "concept, capability, consensus, and technology." Thus while we use a system, we should continue to challenge it as it evolves to meet changing needs. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to reviewing the CBRS process that served the Army so well in the past and examine the new requirements process which will take the Army into the 21st century.

DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS

Background.

Requirements determination is the first phase of the Army force development process. Traditionally, that process has fostered competition among materiel systems, organizations, training, and doctrine to develop feasible solutions to resolve perceived deficiencies or shortcomings in the force. In recent history, due to leap ahead technological advances, materiel systems changes captured more attention than changes to training, doctrine, or organizations thereby creating a potential imbalance/inefficiency in correcting deficiencies. It was felt that the Army should first seek alternative solutions in doctrine, training, leader development, and organization, mainly because of the associated cost and timesaving advantages over materiel development programs. To reestablish a competitive balance and facilitate a proactive versus a reactive process among the optional solution areas, CBRS was created in 1980.

CBRS was based on the premise that future Army requirements for doctrine, training, organizations, and materiel should be derived from concepts of how-to-fight and how-to-support on the future battlefield. Concepts, written in general terms, then provided that broad description of what operations should be executed by Army forces on future battlefields. TRADOC'S past (and current) "overarching concept" was articulated in TRADOC Pam 525-5. Since the overarching warfighting concept provides a holistic macro-level description of the future Army, it had to be augmented by more detailed operations and functional concepts, which then describe the full range of inter-dependent and related future Army capabilities from a variety of perspectives and levels. The HQ TRADOC school commandants and selected non-TRADOC leaders provided these concepts. Once the TRADOC overarching concept was validated and accepted it was incorporated into the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5: *Operations*. Other operational and functional concepts, once approved, were also incorporated in appropriate field manuals. Various versions of the CBRS were developed through the years. Battle labs were also formally adopted as part of the CBRS process and Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) were introduced. This became the Army's Combat Training Center, where the Army staff and field commanders conducted large scale exercises using simulations, models, and constructive and virtual technology. By this time CBRS was redefined as the "process which identifies, prioritizes, and integrates doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel-required capabilities." To facilitate explanation and understanding, CBRS was described as having five interactive and continuous phases. Using the conventional combat development model, the CBRS process was divided into two parts:

- *Cyclic CBRS* consisted of the first three phases and was designed to review concepts, identify needs and solutions, and produce products used to support the DA Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

- *Implementing Phases*, which were the last two phases of CBRS, were used to obtain and deliver the solutions identified in the first three phases. The solutions were changes (modifications/additions) to doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel.

The traditional CBRS evolved into a new process, termed the "Requirements Determination Process." This new process retains the philosophy of CBRS, in that concepts provide the azimuth or direction for the future. Additionally, however, it streamlines the procedure. On 28 March 1996, the CSA directed the TRADOC Commander to chart the course for the Army to follow into the 21st century. The CSA further directed that the TRADOC Commander would approve all Army Warfighting Requirements prior to their submission to HQDA. As a result, TRADOC published its third in a series of "black books" outlining, in general terms, the new requirements determination process. It will provide a current and future Army capable of success in any contingency from humanitarian assistance to full tactical operations in joint and combined operations. It also recognized that LAM had in fact accomplished its objectives, that is, to

redirect the Army to a Force Projection Army. Thus the LAM Task Force was abolished in 1996 and its continuation projects given to the Force XXI Task Force. Significant aspects of the new process are:

(1) A holistic approach to determine requirements based on desired Joint and Army warfighting capabilities versus known deficiencies. These capabilities must consider new threats in contrast with the full spectrum of Army operations and functions. This is a substantial change from the previous emphasis on Army deficiencies against a single, well defined threat.

(2) Focus on requirements as a change to any DTLOMS domain, with materiel being the least desirable domain to change because of acquisition costs and schedules. Previously, materiel was the primary domain for developing requirements.

(3) Requirement of a multidisciplinary team effort. Previously, combat developers developed requirements with minimal input from other DTLOMS agents. The establishment of Integrated Concept Teams will provide that disciplined team effort.

(4) Cost as an independent variable(CAIV) was introduced to insure the preferred solution will include an affordable life cycle cost. The Army cannot expect performance at any cost or every thing it wants. CAIV will not, however, preclude consideration of a new, high potential, leap-ahead technology (often referred to as a "potential silver bullet").

(5) Assignment of CG TRADOC as the single approval agent for **all** warfighting requirements. Also, the requirement for all Army commands and the Army staff to follow CG TRADOC's established

procedures for determining and documenting requirements. Approval is no longer split between and within HQDA and Army proponent commands. Different procedures and approval authorities previously applied to all domains. Today, a single manager, who writes the policies and procedures, approves the process, and ultimately approves the product has been established.

THE NEW METHOD OF DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS

Requirements Determination Process (RDP).

The Army continually upgrades and changes the way it fights so it can maintain battlefield superiority over all adversaries and can achieve complimentary capabilities with other services and other nations. Requirements are determined holistically and are driven by warfighting concepts focused on the future and on experimentation in our battlelabs which will provide us insights to discern viable requirements. Figure 5-4 is a graphic portrayal of the process.

The Vision.

The TRADOC Commander develops the Army's future warfighting vision. It is a rudimentary abstract description of a desired goal as seen by a commander as he looks to the future. It is influenced by national security and military strategies with science and technology providing a frame of reference. It is promulgated in a series of white papers designed to provoke thought and dissertation by the military, academia, industry, and other futurists. When it appears to be sufficiently developed, that vision is translated into an overarching concept, still

REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

Figure 5-4

abstract, but a much more detailed description of the desired goal or end state.

Overarching Warfighting Concept.

An integrated concept team (ICT) is formed at HQ TRADOC to develop the overarching concept. The ICT is made up from members of TRADOC, Army Materiel Command (AMC), other Army commands, HQDA, other military services, academia, industry, and others, to capture the synergy of the group and translate the commanders vision into the next level. The overarching concept will reflect direct linkages to the National Military Strategy (NMS), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), The Joint Vision, The Army Plan and other visionary documents. This overarching concept becomes the primary focus for all other concept development activities within the Army. Today, the Army's overarching concept is Articulated in TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*. Once validated and approved, the thoughts captured will provide the basis for changing the Army's field manuals which guide how the Army will operate on tomorrow's battlefield.

Operational/Functional/Branch Concepts.

Because the overarching concept provides a macro level description of the future Army, it must be augmented by more detailed operational, functional, and branch concepts. The ICT process will be used by the school commandants and other Army leaders charged with responsibility to develop more detailed concepts that describe the full range of future capabilities needed

for the Army to execute the overarching warfighting concept.

Future Operational Capabilities(FOCs).

A product of the RDP, FOCs are structured statements of operational capability required by the Army to achieve its goals as stated in approved concepts. They are identified in each concept and consolidated in TRADOC Pam 525-66 This document will be the control mechanism for requirements determination activities and also provide a cross reference for all capabilities to ensure they support approved warfighting concepts. It will also help guide Army Science and Technology (S&T) activities as well as industry research and development initiatives. A holistic appraisal of current and desired operational capabilities will produce a future capabilities strategy.

Experimentation and Analysis.

Warfighting experiments and analysis are key to the requirements determination process. When properly planned and executed, warfighting experiments and analysis give the Army an unsurpassed means to understand future warfighting requirements. Progressive and interactive mixes of constructive, virtual, and live experiments combined with operational experience and appropriate analysis yield insights to better define not only warfighting concepts but also requirements across the spectrum of DTLOMS.

DTLOMS Requirements.

Requirements determination occurs in the sequence: doctrine, training, leader development, organization, soldiers and materiel. This sequence is based on the

relative expense and timeliness of the process to field the capability. TRADOC PAM 71-9 outlines the detailed processes.

Battle Labs. Battle Labs (Figure 5-5) were created as a means to develop capabilities for a Force Projection Army that begins where future warfighting appears to be changing. The five battlefield dynamics in the past served as the mechanism to grapple with abstract ideas or experiment, and to assess new technologies using a pragmatic approach. Today their focus has changed dramatically. The principal role of the Battle Labs of the future will be to plan and conduct warfighting experiments in support of the Requirements Determination Process.

There are two main categories of Warfighting experiments: Concept Experimentation and Advanced Warfighting Experiments. The overwhelming majority are warfighting concept experiments pertaining to individual operations and branches.

Battle Labs create an institutional link between emerging technologies and warfighting ideas (Concepts) to foster the intellectual leap from the technologically plausible to the development of warfighting requirements and attainment of warfighting capabilities. Battle Lab information supports HQ TRADOC's input along HQDA to develop and revise the Army Modernization Plan (AMP), and the Army Science and Technology Master plan (ASTMP). Battle Labs responsibilities enhance all related combat and force development efforts required to maximize capability within a time of constrained resources and still maintain combat superiority over all potential threats.

TRADOC Battle Labs

ROLE
Plan & Conduct
Warfighting Experiments

Maneuver Support
Fort Leonard Wood, MO

Mounted Battlespace
Fort Knox, KY

Depth and
Simultaneous Attack
Fort Sill, OK

Combat Service
Support
Fort Lee, VA

Battle Command
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Fort Gordan, GA
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Early Entry, Lethality,
and Survivability
Fort Monroe, VA

Air Maneuver
Fort Rucker, AL

Dismounted
Battlespace
Fort Benning, GA

Figure 5-5

Force XXI. Force XXI is a CSA initiative to meet the exceptional challenges of our changing national security environment. It is a conceptualization which integrates and leverages information technology, redesigns the tactical forces, and re-engineers the base. The three major thrusts of its focus are depicted in Figure 5-6. Joint Venture, the TOE or Operational Army axis is supported by the TDA/Institutional (Title 10) Army redesign axis, and the Acquisition/Technology (including digitization) axis. Today we are a "Force Projection Army" largely based in the continental United States, employing split-based methodologies and operating as elements of joint task forces. Force XXI is a process which serves as the bridge to the 21st century and into the information age. The destination of Force XXI is Army XXI. Force XXI can be viewed as an appliqué over the existing Force Development processes, and one which will update the Army's operational modus-operandi and re-engineer its institutional processes to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Army Modernization Plan (AMP). The AMP, as another product of the requirements determination process is a key planning document that articulates the Army's modernization vision for the future force (Figure 5-7). It translates vision into a strategy for near–to–mid-term force development, modernization, and long-term evolution of the Army. The AMP codifies programs and modifications required by the

Campaign Plan

Institutional Army / TDA Axis
- redesign the Institutional Army

redesign complete by 2000

Joint Venture Axis → **Brigade Task Force XXI (March 97)** → **Division XXI (Nov 97)** → **Corps XXI** → **Force XXI**
- Redesign the Operating forces

Force XXI Division design by 1998
First appliqué Division by 2000
Field first appliqué Corps by 2006

?

Army Digitization Office Axis
- information technology Assimilation

Figure 5-6

Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (RDAP), the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), and the Extended Planning Period (EPP), and it identifies unprogrammed requirements. The AMP, produced by DA DCSOPS in coordination with HQ TRADOC, provides the modernization objectives which will serve as a tool for prioritization at HQDA. It is published annually to support the budget and POM and amended budgets.

Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP). The ASTMP is a strategic plan for the technology base, which synthesizes national, DOD, and Army top-down guidance to the S&T community. The ASTMP provides an underpinning concept and a vision of future constraints by applying realistic funding limits. ASTMP is a vital link between DOD technology objectives, planning, and force modernization efforts. It provides a road map of how Army Research and Development (6.1/6.2/6.3) funds support the AMP. It lists Army science and technology objectives and advanced technology demonstrations.

Link to the Doctrine Development Process. Doctrine is the authoritative guide to how the Army fights and conducts operations. It reflects an application of required and attainable capabilities for fighting on today's battlefield. The Doctrine and Literature Master Plan (DLMP), *TRADOC Regulation 25-32*, includes tactics, techniques, and procedures that provide Branch Chiefs and proponents, the "how" of doctrine focus.

Army Modernization Plan Functional Areas

- Air Defense
- Training
- C⁴
- Nuclear, Biological & Chemical
- Combat Maneuver
- IEW
- Fire Support
- Army Modernization VISION
- Force Structure
- Combat Health Support
- Aviation
- Missile Defense
- Logistics
- Space
- Tactical Wheeled Vehicles

Figure 5-7

Branch Chiefs and proponents, provide to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC, a detailed, prioritized description of near-term to far-term required doctrine capabilities. As discussed under the section of Relationships of Change, the development of both concept and doctrine is restricted by the executable and the imaginable. Technology can provide capabilities which then drive concept and doctrine. Requirements are identified as stand-alone and/or associated programmed capabilities, and are not unprogrammed new issues.

Link to the Training/Leader Development Process. Training/Leader Development capabilities identified will be evaluated at every stage of the process, ensuring that the Combat Arms Training Strategy (CATS) interfaces with the Requirements Determination process. System training device requirements are incorporated into the specific system Management Decision Packages (MDEP) and applicable AMP annexes. Non-system training devices and MDEPs are incorporated in the AMP Training Annex. Training and Leader Development requirements identified by Branch Chiefs and Proponent assessments are provided to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, HQ TRADOC. Requirements are for stand-alone and/or associated programmed capabilities and are not unprogrammed new issues.

Link to the Organizational Development Process. Organizational capabilities required are identified through Branch Chiefs' and Proponents' continuous assessments. TRADOC's Force Design Update (FDU) process ensures the integration of force planning with all other Force Development issues which are then prioritized in the TAA process to meet overall Army force program requirements.

Link to the Materiel Development Process. Warfight Lens Analysis (WFLA) is used to assess improvements in specific systems in the context of their synergistic effect on the battlefield. Capabilities are examined in an organizational context. HQ TRADOC incorporates into the WFLA process the investment programmatics provided by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASA[RDA]). Requirements for new materiel emerging from the requirements determination process follows the DOD, CJCS and Army guidance.

DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction.

Organizational requirements are, as stated, derived from the continuous assessments conducted by the branches and functional proponents to identify whether a new or modified organization is required on tomorrow's battlefield. Once identified, organizational requirements then are documented through a series of connected and related development processes: Unit Reference Sheet (URS) development; Force Design Update (FDU) process; Table of Organization and Equipment Development; and Total Army Analysis (TAA). Every process may not always be required before organizational changes are made to the force structure.

The Organization Development Process.

Organizations have their beginnings in branch/functional concepts which are connected to the overarching concept. Together they provide the basis for the proposed organization and address a unit's mission, functions, and required capabilities. Organizational solutions to FOC require the development of a URS which is the first document that ultimately leads to a TOE. It must contain sufficient data about a unit's personnel and equipment to be used to support Army force design initiatives and related study and analysis. Personnel and equipment should be developed as accurately as possible and refined throughout the process. As a minimum the URS must contain data personnel requirements by job title, grade and quantity. It must include quantities of equipment requirements to include nomenclature, and a breakout of the organization elements with related personnel and equipment requirements. Also a summary that captures other relevant data such as unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility requirements, and concept of operations. The commandant forwards the design to HQ TRADOC who approves force designs, but also garners senior Army leadership approval, as required. The Basis of issue feeder data (BOIPFD) and the QQPRI are used to capture new equipment requirements and personnel changes. The URS is staffed with the CINCs and other MACOMs.

FORCE DESIGN UPDATE (FDU) METHODOLOGY

Issue Development

Decision Process

- Field Units
- ACC/MACOMs
- CINCs
- TRADOC FDD

Review by Organization Proponent

- FDD
- TRADOC
- DAMO-FDF
- NGB
- OCAR
- CASCOM

CMDT

Approval: fwd issue to FDD.

Murder Board by VTC

Research and Analysis

Approval: brief issues to DCG,TRADOC

FDD

CDR TRADOC

TRADOC FDD

Coordination: Field, ARSTAF

CDR TRADOC

Approval: Include in cycle; release for field comment.

Documentation in TOE

CSA/VCSA

DCSOPS

ARSTAF info brief

Figure 5-8

The Force Design Update (FDU) is a semi-annual process used to obtain CSA approval for new force designs as well as changes to existing force designs. FDU issues are organizational solutions to FOCs and other improvements to existing designs in which other DTL solutions were insufficient. The FDU process is not a resourcing tool, however it may have impacts in other DTLOMS domains. The FDU serves as the link between the development of the URS and the development of the TOE. The VCSA ultimately approves FDU issues for resourcing competition in the next TAA and/or implementation by TOE documentation (Figure 5-8).

DEVELOP ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS

Organizations developed in the preceding phase become the start point for the next phase.

The processes for developing unit models fits within the broader methodology. As Figure 5-9 shows, the process follows the Force Management and Integration Process of Figure 2-4. TRADOC proponent schools develop new designs or correct deficiencies in existing organizations by developing branch or functional concepts. The TRADOC Commander is responsible for the integration and approval of the concepts developed by the respective proponent school. Branch/ functional concepts normally address:

- − missions, functions, capabilities, and limitations,
- − command and control linkages,

Force Design Methodology

```
Strategic
Requirements
     ↓
  Army
Requirements
     ↓
  Army
 Concepts
     ↓
  Unit
  Design
     ↓
 Integrate
 Designs  →  Analysis  →  Documentation  →  Field Test  →  Input to
                                                            Program
```

Figure 5-9

− individual, collective, and leader training requirements,
− sustainment; both in field and garrison,
− doctrinal impacts, and,
− impacts on materiel programs.

Following HQDA approval of the URS during the FDU process, the design is handed-off to USA Force Management Support Activity (USAFMSA) for TOE, documentation. USAFMSA, Requirements Documentation Directorate (RDD) headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, KS, completes development of the BOIP and TOE documents fusing the input from the URS basic design. TOEs and BOIPs are developed using an Army wide data base called the Requirements Documentation System (RDS). When the Requirements

Document has been approved, it becomes part of the RDS data base and competes in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) for resourcing, if necessary (Figure 5-10).

BOIP.

A BOIP is a requirements document which states the planned placement of new or improved items of equipment and personnel in TOEs at 100% of wartime requirements. It reflects quantities of new equipment and associated support items of equipment and personnel (ASIOEP), as well as equipment that is being replaced. In addition to its use for TOE development/revision, it is used by HQDA for logistics support and distribution planning for new and improved items entering the Army supply system. Materiel developers (PEOs/PMs, AMC, and ASOC

FORCE DESIGN UPDATE (FDU) COORDINATION CYCLE (SPRING, FALL)

DEC JUN	JAN JUN	FEB AUG	MAR SEP	APR OCT	MAY NOV	JUN DEC

• CSA
• VCSA
• DCSOPS
• ACDSOPS-FD
• CDR,TRADOC(APPROVAL FOR CSA)
• CDR, CAC, DCGCD
• CDR, OASCOM
• CDR, FORSCOM
• CONUS CORPS CDRs
• CINCUSAREUR
• CofS, EUCOM
• USAREUR CORPS CDR
• ARSTAF
• CDR, TRADOC (RELEASE FOR COORDINATION)
• CDR,CAC, DCGCD

SCHEDULE BRIEFINGS

REQUEST TRAVEL

FWD READ-AHEADS

PUBLISH RESULTS

DEVELOP ISSUES	ISSUE RESOLUTION GUIDANCE	INPUT	DECISION

TRACK PREVIOUS DECISIONS (CONTINUOUS)

Figure 5-10

communities) use it as input for concept studies, life-cycle cost estimates, and trade-off analyses during the research and development process.

A BOIP provides personnel and equipment changes required to introduce a new or modified item into the Army inventory. The development of a BOIP can play an integral part in TOE development. A BOIP is developed to place a new or substantially changed materiel item into organizations along with associated equipment and personnel to maintain and operate it. As mentioned above, an ORD for a new equipment requirement is one source of such guidance.

The qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements information(QQPRI) is a compilation of organizational, doctrinal, training, duty position, and personnel information that is incorporated into the BOIP. The information is used to determine the need to develop or revise military occupational specialties and to prepare plans for the personnel and training needed to operate and maintain the new or improved item. The QQPRI and BOIP also form the basis for the operator and maintainer (O/M) decision. The O/M decision is the responsibility of PERSCOM.

The BOIP process begins when the materiel developer (MATDEV) receives an approved Operational Requirements Document (ORD) from the combat developer. The project manager and/or MATDEV develops BOIP feeder data (BOIPFD) and QQPRI, then obtains a Developmental Line Item

Number (ZLIN) and Standard Study Numbering (SSN) from AMC.

The BOIPFD and QQPRI is submitted via the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) system to USAFMSA where the information is reviewed for accuracy, continuity, and completeness prior to the formal development of the BOIP. During staffing, the training impacts associated with the BOIP item and the QQPRI are developed. If the QQPRI includes an occupational identifier (AOC, SI, MOS, SQI, or ASI), the personnel proponent must prepare a proposal per *AR 611-1* for submission to PERSCOM to revise the military occupational classification and structure. USAFMSA requests TDA requirements for new or modified items from the MACOM and TDA requirements are entered into the BOIP at UIC level. When the BOIP is complete, it is submitted to DA for approval. USAFMSA publishes approved BOIPs in the consolidated TOE update (CTU) released in April of each year.

There may be several iterations of the BOIP: an initial BOIP, developed during Phase I - Demonstration and Validation of system development; and amended BOIPs which are based on updated information provided by the materiel developer as required, 30 months prior to the first unit-equipped date (FUED), and prior to a production and deployment decision. This allows sufficient time for units receiving the equipment and their higher and supporting headquarters to plan and conduct personnel, training, and supply activities essential to the orderly fielding of the equipment. A BOIP may be amended at any time during system development and fielding when new or changed information becomes available.

TOE.

A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for several levels of organizational options for a particular type unit. These organizational options provide a model for fielding a unit at full capability or at a reduced capability if resource constraints so mandate. A TOE also specifies the capabilities (and limitations or dependencies) the unit has to accomplish its mission.

TOEs are the basis for developing authorization documents and are a vital input for determining Army resource requirements for use by force managers. In addition, these unit models establish increments of capability for the Army to develop an effective, efficient, and combat-ready force structure.

A TOE normally contains requirements for three levels of organization based on the strength necessary to achieve the following percentage levels of combat capability: 100% (level 1), 90% (level 2), and 80% (level 3). Equipment quantities for levels 2 and 3 are normally equal to level 1 except for individual equipment such as protective masks, bayonets, individual weapons, and tool kits issued to mechanics and repairers. Quantities of individual items or equipment are adjusted to correspond to personnel strength levels. TOEs provide a standard method for documenting the organizational structure of the Army and the relationship between unit requirements and authorizations. TOE documents affect the validity of Army requirements, the Army budget, efficiency and readiness of the Army, and the management of Army resources.

Force design guidance, developed during capabilities analyses, provides TOE developers with recommended TOE additions/modifications. The missions and probable areas of use of a unit are provided

by policy and doctrine. Policy includes guidance, procedures, and standards, in the form of regulations, on how to develop TOEs. Policy published in the *AR 611-series* also contains standards of grade (SG), duty titles, and guidance for occupational identifiers (AOC, MOS, SI, SQI, ASI) used in the development of requirements documents. Doctrine describes how each type of unit will perform its functions and details the mission and required capabilities.

TOE developers consider the type of unit's mission and required capabilities when applying equipment utilization policies, manpower requirements criteria (MARC), standards of grade (SG), and BOIPs, to develop the proper mix of equipment and personnel for an efficient organizational structure. Resource constraint guidance is considered during the development of draft TOEs to ensure that a type of unit can perform its mission using resources available in the inventory.

The TOE development and revision process is controlled by the annual Army TOE development plan. (ATDP). A draft plan is prepared by USAFMSA and submitted to HQDA (ODCSOPS) for review and approval. The HQDA approved plan provides the basis for USAFMSA to task and issue expanded guidance to TOE developers (such as RDD, the Intelligence and Security Command [INSCOM], Army Medical Department Center and School [AMEDDC&S], and the U. S. Army Special Operations Command [USASOC]) who, in coordination with the proponent schools and centers, prepare and coordinate draft TOEs (DTOEs). DTOEs are reviewed and finalized by USAFMSA and provided to HQDA and interested major Army commands (MACOMs) (such as FORSCOM, AMC, and USAREUR) for an area-of-interest (AOI) review. After HQDA approval and

AOI review USAFMSA makes final changes prior to presenting the TOE to Director, Force Programs for approval. Following approval, the DTOE status is changed to "DA approved" in the RDS database and subsequently included in the Consolidated TOE Update (CTU) file.

TOEs are scheduled for revision to accommodate changes in doctrine, introduction of new or improved equipment, or to incorporate more effective organizational designs. Development of new TOEs is scheduled to accommodate requirements for new organizations. If a TOE is not scheduled for revision or replacement by a new TOE, it will be scheduled for cyclic review every three years.

Incremental TOE System.

The Army uses an incremental TOE system. TRADOC developed the incremental TOE system to add capabilities to an organizational model by application of related doctrinally-sound personnel and equipment changes (BOIPs and ICPs) packaged in separately identifiable increments. The TOE is a collection of related records in the RDS database. The records for a TOE prescribe the organizational design, including personnel and equipment requirements, for a type unit displayed in discrete evolutionary increments of capability over time. The incremental TOE begins with a doctrinally-sound base TOE (BTOE) and, through the application of incremental change packages (ICPs), can provide a series of intermediate TOEs (ITOEs) up through a fully modernized objective TOE (OTOE) design. The TOE is the basis for force programming and becomes an authorization document (modification TOE - MTOE) when resources, specific unit designations, and effective dates for the activation or reorganization are approved at

HQDA. The incremental TOE system consists of the following components:

Base TOE (BTOE).

An organizational design based on doctrine and equipment currently available. It is the least modernized version of a type of organization and identifies mission-essential wartime requirements (MEWR) for personnel and equipment.

Incremental Change Package (ICP).

A doctrinally-sound grouping of personnel and equipment change documents (BOIPs) that is applied to a BTOE or intermediate TOE (ITOE) to provide an increased capability or modernization that results in a new ITOE or an objective TOE (OTOE).

ICP Index.

A listing of all ICPs for a specific type of organization in the sequence of intended application. The ICP index depicts a unit's doctrinal modernization path (MODPATH). The MODPATH is standardized by unit type.

Intermediate TOE (ITOE).

An organizational design which results from applying one or more ICPs to a BTOE (or to an ITOE) to produce an enhanced capability. ITOEs form the bridge between BTOE and objective TOE and provide the primary tool for programming, executing, standardizing, and documenting the force structure during phased modernization.

Objective TOE (OTOE).

A fully modernized, doctrinally-sound organizational design which sets the goal for planning and programming of the Army's force structure and supporting acquisition systems, primarily in the last year of the POM and the extended planning annex.

Consolidated TOE Update.

BOIPs and TOEs, or changes thereto, are published once a year in the CTU file distributed by USAFMSA RDD. Information from this file is used by USAFMSA Authorization Documentation Directorate (ADD) to update the requirements information contained in authorization documents for tactical units (modified TOE [MTOE]), and to refine planning and program data for the future fielding of new equipment.

DETERMINE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

Introduction.

The fourth force development phase, determining organizational authorizations, provides the mix of organizations which comprise a balanced and affordable force structure. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Staff Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). It is the resource-sensitive process portrayed in the Provide Resources section of the Army Force Management and Integration Chart at Figure 2-4. It develops force structures in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming, and budgeting. The development of a force is

NMS to MTOE

NMS   18 to 10 Divs

DPG
1 ABN   2 LT   ALO 1   2 MRCs
1 AA   6 HVY   495K   (NEA/SWA)

TAP   9 MVR/3 DSFA/MSB/FSB/SIG/MP/ETC

TAA
EAD/EAC   CBT/CS/CSS
COMPO/SRC/QTY/ALO

SAMAS
UIC/SRC/EDATE/STR
8500+

TAADS-R
MTOEs
TDAs

Figure 5-11

based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, threats, and externally imposed constraints (e.g. dollars, end strength, roles, and missions.). These are summarized here.

The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process, not all of which is exclusively within the purview of the Army. The National Military Strategy (NMS) states, in addition to overall national military objectives, the specific number of divisions in the Army (and naval ships and wings for the Navy and Air Force, respectively), the number of major regional contingencies (MRCs) and the total end strength constraints for all branches of the military within DOD. These parameters are further specified in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). For FY 96 and beyond,

and in the case of the Army specifically, the DPG directed the number (ten) and type (one airborne, one air assault, two light infantry and six heavy [armored or mechanized infantry]) of divisions. The DPG also directed the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO1) at which those divisions were to be built, an end-strength constraint (495,000 spaces). It further defined the two nearly simultaneous MRCs (the first in Northeast Asia [NEA]; the second in Southwest Asia [SWA]). With additional information provided on separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments and special forces groups, this guidance identifies the "above the line" force structure. These documents constitute the JCS/DOD directives and constraints imposed upon Army force structure.

Force Development

Then.......

MINIMUM RISK FORCE	60 DIVS
PLANNING FORCE	
OBJECTIVE FORCE	
PROGRAM FORCE	
BUDGET FORCE	
CURRENT FORCE	18 DIVS

Figure 5-12

Force Development

Now.......

CJCS FISCALLY CONSTRAINED FORCE	10 DIVS
ARMY FISCALLY CONSTRAINED FORCE	
POM FORCE	
BUDGET FORCE	
CURRENT FORCE	10 DIVS

Figure 5-13

The Army Plan (TAP), a HQDA ODCSOPS document, defines the types and quantities of units within the divisions. The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process defines the "below the line" echelon above division/echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) combat, combat support, combat service support and TDA force structure required to support the "above the line" structure. All units are programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in the Army Authorization Documents System-Redesigned (TAADS-R) (see Figure 5-11).

The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Fiscally Constrained Force is developed for all services in an effort to achieve a realistic force capable of achieving the national objectives with reasonable assurance of success. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the JCS, CINCs, and Services. The Army Fiscally Constrained Force is that portion of the CJCS Fiscally Constrained Force that applies to the U.S. Army. The POM Force, the force supported by resource requests in the Army POM, is developed during the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. TAA analytically and objectively generates the tactical support forces and the general

purpose forces necessary to support the "above the line" forces contained in the Army Fiscally Constrained Force. As part of the TAA process a Force Feasibility Review (FFR) is conducted to review and adjust the force to assure affordability, supportability, and executability. Contentious issues are reviewed and resolved during the Force Program Review (FPR). The resulting force becomes the Budget Force with the submission of the President's Budget. The Current Force are those units currently in the force structure.

The results of iterative, risk-benefit force structuring have significantly changed in the last decade. To the end of the Cold War, an "upside-down pyramid" (Figure 5-12) defined the challenge between what size force assured success and what size force was affordable. With a Cold War threat based on general war in central Europe against Warsaw Pact forces, the Minimum Risk Force stated a requirement for 60 Army divisions, although that force was clearly unaffordable. In the risk-benefit trade-off, reduced numbers of divisions (and more risk) were accepted at each subordinate force level. At the end of the Cold War, the Army had 18 divisions on active duty and 10 divisions in the Army National Guard (not

Authorization Allocation


```
ES ─────────────────────────────  495K
       TTHS
FSA ─────────────────────────────  60K

        ABOVE THE LINE      175K
─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ MTOE ─ ─ ─ ─
            BELOW THE LINE   135K

                  TDA         125K
```

Figure 5-14

counting Training Divisions in the Army Reserve).

The end of the Cold War caused the "upside-down pyramid" to be changed to a "vertical stovepipe" (Figure 5-13) because, quite simply, the threat changed. There was no longer a monolithic Communist Soviet threat of invasion in central Europe and Americans wanted and expected a "peace dividend" as a result of reduced defense needs. The Minimum Risk Force and the Planning Force were combined as the Risk Evaluation Force and then subsequently renamed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Fiscally Constrained Force. The CJCS Fiscally Constrained Force initially stated a requirement of 12 Army divisions (sometimes referred to as the "Base Force"). Following the "Bottom-Up Review," the Army divisional requirement was reduced to 10 divisions. The Army Fiscally Constrained Force replaced the Objective Force and the POM Force replaced the Program Force. The Budget Force and the Current Force remained the same.

Allocation of personnel spaces within the constrained end strength of 495 thousand is depicted in Figure 5-14. Trainees, Transients, Hospital and Schools (TTHS) accounts for approximately 12% of the end strength (or 60 thousand). This is the "individuals account" (soldiers not available to be assigned in units). The TDA account (sometimes referred to as the "infrastructure account") comprises approximately 25% of the end strength (or 125 thousand). The "MTOE Army" in the center of the chart accounts for both "above the line" force structure directed by the NMS/DPG and "below the line" force structure generated

during Total Army Analysis (TAA) (approximately 175 thousand and 135 thousand, respectively, for a total of 310 thousand personnel spaces). The MTOE and TDA accounts constitute the Force Structure Allowance (FSA) for the Army, or that part of the Army which is programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented as authorizations in TAADS-R. In other words, these are the 435 thousand spaces of the Army's end strength on MTOEs and TDAs.

There is no longer a lot of "trade-off" analysis required to determine Army "above the line" force structure. The 10 divisions directed by the CJCS Fiscally Constrained Force equals the 10 divisions in the Current Force. The Army National Guard Divisions have come under intense scrutiny given the large force structure shortfalls in COMPO 4 (required, but unresourced) units. Divisional redesign and reorganization efforts continue to increase the Army National Guard's warfighting contribution. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), initiated in 1996, will have direct effects on Army force structure and could result in significant changes in both active component and reserve component "above the line" and "below the line" force structure.

Total Army Analysis (TAA).

TAA is the process that takes us from the Army of yesterday to the Army of the future. It requires a doctrinal basis and analysis; is based upon strategic guidance from above the Army; and involves threat analysis, specific scenarios, and an Army "constrained" force.

The purpose of TAA is to define the required support forces, combat (CBT), combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS), at echelons above divisions (EAD) and echelons above corps (EAC),

called below-the-line, necessary to support and sustain the specified divisions and non-divisional combat forces, called above-the-line.

TAA supports the fourth force development phase which determines the mix of organizations that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Staff Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). TAA is the resource-sensitive process that is used to develop force structure in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming and budgeting. An understanding of National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives to be achieved, threats and the dynamics of internally and externally imposed constraints is the basis for the resulting force. The Army develops the TAA base force to achieve an affordable and competent force capable of best supporting national objectives and Commanders-in-Chiefs' (CINCs') warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the Joint Staff (JS), CINCs and the Services at the transition between planning and programming.

TAA is the process that executes the decisions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the DOD PPBS, directives and initiatives of the JS, and the Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system (PPBES). TAA serves as the bridge between OSD/JS guidance and the Army's planning and program building processes, balancing the Army's force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources. The Army's strategic roles must support the NMS. These roles have a major impact on the shaping of the Army. Therefore, TAA develops a force that meets

the NMS, defeats the threat, within the defined scenarios, under the established dollar constraints, and fulfills all the roles and missions listed, within the parameters of congressional oversight and guidance. Additionally, the TAA process is the means to transition from the Planning phase to the Programming phase within the Army's PPBES, assisting in determining, verifying and justifying Army requirements, while assessing force capabilities. The TAA process is flexible and responsive to the dynamic changes. The process flows from internal Army actions, decisions and guidance (for example: allocations rules, resource assumptions, warfighting capabilities, and infrastructure priorities), and from the external inputs from the National Command Authorities (NCA), CJCS, JS, and OSD, and CINCs' priorities (for example: anticipated threats, scenarios, and assumptions).

The mix of unit models that make up a balanced and affordable force structure must support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

TAA is a multi-phased force structuring process. It consists of both qualitative and quantitative analysis designed to generate tactical support forces and general purpose forces necessary to sustain and support the divisional and non-divisional combat forces of the fiscally-constrained force delineated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS), and the Army Plan (TAP). TAA is a biennial process conducted during even-numbered years. DCSOPS initiates the formal TAA process upon receipt of OSD/JS DPG, IPS, and draft TAP. Based on these documents and guidance, the routine TAA cycle occurs. The development of the force structure is based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, threats, and

externally-imposed constraints (for example, dollars, end strength, roles and missions). The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. The POM force results from TAA. TAA determines the force for each program year.

The TAA's principal products are:
- the Army's *total* warfighting *requirements*;
- the defined, required support forces (EAD/EAC); and
- the initial POM force.

TAA Highlights

-It is a *biennial, two phased* force development process.

–It is primarily a *force structuring process* (all components, MTOE and TDA).

–It specifies *force structure requirements* for each year of the POM.

–It incorporates resource/program *constraints*.

–It is a *computer assisted* process.

–It has *Army-wide participation*, including CSA decision and SA review.

TAA Objectives are to:
(1) develop, analyze, determine and justify a POM force, aligned with OSD/JS DPG and TAP. The POM force is that projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP);
(2) provide analytical underpinnings for the POM force for use in dialogue among Congress, OSD, JS, CINCs and the Army;

Total Army Analysis

Figure 5-15

(3) assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production base, and equipment distribution programs on the projected force structure;

(4) assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBS and PPBES; and

(5) provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations.

Figure 5-15 depicts the sequence of the TAA activities. TAA is a two-phased analytical and subjective process consisting of Requirement Determination (force guidance and quantitative analysis) and Resource Determination (qualitative analysis and leadership review).

Phase I. Requirements Determination.
Requirements Determination is made up of two separate actions: Force Guidance and Qualitative Analysis. Phase I is the most critical of the two Phases. Accurate planning, consumption and workload factors, threat data, and Allocation Rules ensure accurate computer developed requirements.

Force Guidance. Force guidance consists of data input and guidance from various sources. The DPG and TAP provide the NMS objectives, threat data, and resource assumptions and priorities. The IPS provides DOD directed scenarios called Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) and Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs). DPG/IPS also specify the quantity and type of combat forces (divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, ranger

battalions, and special forces groups) for employment in each scenario. These specific combat forces are often referred to as "above-the-line" forces because they constitute the start point for force structuring activities. ODCSOPS-SSW (War Plans) and ODCSOPS-FDF (Force Structure) determine the specific identification, size, and composition of those "above-the-line" forces in accordance with TAP force structure guidance.

AFPDA. The Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions (AFPDA), published in three (3) volumes, is a single source reference document and repository of planning factors for theater-level studies and modeling. The AFPDA contains theater-specific information concerning logistics and personnel planning, consumption, and workload factors, host-nation support offsets, and other planning factors crucial to theater force development. A critical step during the Force Guidance development is the update and revision of the AFPDA data by TRADOC, CASCOM, the theater MACOMs, and elements of the HQDA staff (LOG, PER, OPS).

Allocation Rules. Another critical step during the Force Guidance development is the review and updating of support force unit allocation rules used by the U.S. Army Concept Analysis Agency (CAA) during the modeling process (Quantitative Analysis). These allocation rules, developed by TRADOC and the functional area proponents, represent a quantitative statement of each type of combat/combat support/combat service support (CBT/CS/CSS) unit's capability, mission, and doctrinal employment; and are adjusted as necessary to incorporate theater-specific planning factors. There are three basic types of rules: Direct Input (Manual),

which are stand-alone requirements for a unit in a theater; Existence Rules, which tie a requirement for one unit to another; and Workload Rules, which tie unit requirements to a measurable logistical workload. The allocation rules need modification whenever unit TOEs, scenario assumptions, logistical support plans, or doctrinal employment concepts change. Study Advisory Groups (SAGs), attended by Army Staff (ARSTAF), support agencies, MACOM and proponent representatives, ensure all allocation rules are appropriate and approved for use in the current DPG scenarios.

SAGs. Study Advisory Groups (SAGs) are decision forums where the all parameters, constraints, data inputs and guidance are identified and approved for inclusion in the current TAA cycle and CAA models. There are two types of SAGs: Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer (GOSAG). ARSTAF, MACOMs, TRADOC schools and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) participate in the CoC forums. The very senior leadership of the Army participates in the GOSAG. The SAG CoC ensures all data input and guidance is appropriate and approved for use in the current DPG scenario. The GOSAG addresses those issues that were unresolved at the SAG CoC and approves all assumptions, planning factors, allocation rules and guidance as inputs for the second part of Phase I, the CAA modeling.

SAG I approves the inputs for the deployment models. These inputs include the general parameters, forces used in modeling U.S., allied, and threat weapons, munitions, and deployment assumptions.

SAG II focuses on inputs for the combat modeling. SAG II approves the priority of flow, requirements versus

capabilities, the campaign plan (warfight and support concept) and the casualty rates.

SAG III approves the factors prepared for the FASTALS modeling. SAG III approves the fuel, ammunition, Host Nation Support (HNS), coalition support, stockage levels, evacuation policy and the Allocation Rules. SAG III terminates the guidance determination when all assumptions, planning factors and guidance inputs are approved for the current TAA cycle.

SAG IV reviews the warfighting force structure requirements developed through the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) modeling.

During the early stages of Phase I, CAA makes several model runs of GDAS/ TRANSMO and CEM to set the stage for the second part of Phase I, Quantitative Analysis.

Quantitative Analysis. CAA takes the above-the-line combat forces identified in the NMS scenarios for employment in the DPG scenarios and determines the below-the-line force structure. Through computer modeling, CAA develops the EAD/EAC, CBT/CS/CSS forces, required to support the deployed above-the-line division and non-division force, given the assumptions and guidance approved by the SAGs. CAA accomplishes the modeling of TAA through a series of analytical efforts and associated computer simulations. Improved modeling, accurate consumption factors, proper allocation rules, and application of the rules, develop the most accurate definition of the total force requirements to support the directed MRCs.

TRANSMO. A strategic deployment analysis, Transportation Model (TRANSMO) and Global Deployment Analysis System

(GDAS), is accomplished for each scenario. The CAA models have as their major inputs the available strategic mobility (lift) forces, the joint force(s) requiring movement, the required mobilization and training times for Reserve Component forces, and the DPG's specified desired delivery schedule for the above-the-line force. The major output is the achievable port-to-port arrival schedule for the above-the-line units that becomes one input into the theater combat operations analysis, Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM).

CEM. A theater combat operations analysis (CEM) is accomplished at both tactical and operational levels for each scenario, using the additional major inputs of friendly and enemy weapons' quantities and effectiveness data, friendly and enemy tactical and operational doctrines, projected resupply capabilities, and available joint and combined forces. Major outputs which become inputs to the theater logistical analyses, Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administrative and Logistics Support (FASTALS) include friendly line of troops movement over time, personnel and equipment casualties to the above-the-line force, ammunition expenditures, and brigade/division combat intensities.

FASTALS. A theater logistical analysis for each scenario utilizes the outputs of CEM as inputs, along with such logistical data as in-place stocks, existing infrastructure and transportation network, available host-nation support, projected consumption rates, unit DS and GS maintenance requirement factors, and supply, medical, and construction policies to determine time-phased personnel, replacement, medical, material, maintenance, construction, and transportation workloads. In combination

with the allocation rules approved by the SAGs, these workloads generate the CS/CSS support force requirements and a time-phased required troop deployment list for that scenario.

MERLIN. Combining the troop lists of required forces for various scenarios, in accordance with guidance provided from ODCSOPS, produces the "required TO&E force" file. MDEP Equation for Resource Linking (MERLIN), a computer program, compares the newly determined doctrinally required TO&E force from FASTALS with a current list of on-hand and programmed units (MFORCE) to provide the "delta" (COMPO 5) for future programming discussions and issue formulation. The MATCH report and required TOE force file is provided to ODCSOPS for dissemination to the MACOMs for review and issue formulation in preparation for the Resource Determination phase.

Phase I, Requirements Determination, is complete after SAG IV reviews the CAA output.

Phase II. Resource Determination. Resource Determination consists of two separate activities: Qualitative Analysis and Leadership Review. The qualitative analysis is the most emotional facet of the TAA process because the results impact every aspect of the Army. Therefore, this phase requires extensive preparation by participants to ensure the best warfighting force structure is developed.

Qualitative Analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within end strength guidance, for use in the development of the POM. A series of resourcing forums, analyses, panel reviews, and conferences consider and validate the FASTALS model generated requirements and the analysis of those requirements. The qualitative analysis is conducted in the resourcing conference. The Resourcing Conference is held in two separate sessions: Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC).

Resourcing Conference. The Resourcing Conference CoC provides the initial Qualitative Analysis and review of the CAA developed force. The Resourcing Conference CoC provides the opportunity for the ARSTAF, MACOMs, proponent representatives and staff support agencies to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues. The issues focus on Component (COMPO) and ALO, and center on defending claimant versus billpayer resourcing issues, while voicing concerns about priorities versus risks. It allows CINC representatives (Army Component Commanders) to verify that theater specific requirements are satisfied by Army force structure assigned/apportioned to their commands to meet current CINC OPLAN/CONPLAN warfighting requirements.

The Resourcing Conference is conducted over a 3-5 day period. The focus is to identify and develop potential solutions for the myriad of issues brought to TAA. The Organizational Integrators (OI) and Force Integrators (FI) are key individuals in this forum. The OI and FI have the responsibility to pull together the sometimes diverse guidance and opinions developed during the conference, add insight from a branch perspective, and establish whether the changes in the building blocks for the design case were in fact the best course of action. The OIs pull all the relevant information together for presentation to the CoC over a 2 day period. During these presentations, the OI reviews each Standard Requirements Code (SRC) that falls under his/her area of

responsibility, and presents recommendations on how to solve the various issues. For example: a Reserve Component over-structure problem; or requirements for MTOEs not in the design case. The FI has the responsibility to provide a macro view of issues across the functional branches.

HQDA action officers and their counterparts enter an intense round of preparations for the upcoming resourcing conference. Since the quantitative analysis only determined requirements for fully resourced (ALO 1) CBT/CS/CSS units deployed into the theater(s) of operations, the determination of a need for additional nondeploying units, the acceptance of risk through the reduction in ALO of units, and the allocation of resourced units to components (Active, USAR, NG) must all be accomplished during the Resourcing Conferences. HQDA bases force structuring options on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, the threat and the constraints. The primary differences among various options are the extent to which risk, constraints and time are forecast. The Resourcing Conference CoC integrates TDA issues and requirements. The Resourcing Conference CoC reviews and resolves issues, and forwards resourcing decisions and recommendations based upon sound military judgment and experience to the Resourcing Conference GOSC. The Qualitative phase culminates with the Resourcing Conference GOSC. The GOSC approves the decisions of the Resourcing Conference CoC and addresses any remaining unresolved issues. The Resourcing Conference GOSC approves the force that is ultimately forwarded for CSA approval and Secretary of the Army briefing.

FFR. Once the Resourcing Conference is completed, the ARSTAFF further analyzes the force, initially approved by the GOSC, via the Force Feasibility Review (FFR). FFR process uses the results of the TAA Resourcing Conference as input, conducting a review and adjusting the base force to assure it is affordable, supportable and executable. At the MACRO level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FFR determines if the POM force can be manned, trained, equipped, sustained and stationed. The FFR process identifies problems with the base force and provides alternatives to the GOSC for determining the most capable force within constraints.

Leadership Review. After the Resourcing Conference GOSC meets to resolve any contentious or outstanding issues, the leadership review is initiated through the Force Program Review (FPR) process. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army chairs the FPR resolving any issues forwarded from the Resourcing Conference forums. The VCSA scrutinizes, reviews and approves the force ultimately presented to the Army Chief of Staff for decision and briefed to the Secretary of the Army. The resulting TAA base force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, host nation) and TDA requirements through the end of the POM years (MFORCE). The POM force meets the projected mission requirements within anticipated end strength and equipment level. The final output should result in an executable POM Force. The Army forwards the POM force to OSD with a recommendation for approval.

The principal products of the TAA are:
- the Army's total warfighting requirements;
- defined required support forces (EAD/EAC);

– the initial POM force; and

– the Army Structure (ARSTRUC) message.

The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved force structure for the Total Army which has been divided for resource management purposes into components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), the Army National Guard (COMPO 2), the United States Army Reserve (COMPO 3), and unresourced units (COMPO 4). COMPO 4 units, mostly Combat Service Support (CSS) units, are part of the Army's required force structure, but are deliberately unresourced so that available resources can be applied to higher priority peacetime force structure initiatives and other Army programs. Three other components — direct host-nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host-nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9) — comprise force structure offsets guaranteed by Host-Nation Support Agreements, CINCs' estimates as to how much additional indigenous labor would be available in wartime, and contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms. Such agreements and contracts are said to "offset" requirements for force structure to accomplish essential service support tasks.

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

Documentation Components.

The fifth and final phase of force development, the documenting of unit authorizations, can be viewed conceptually as the integration of the products of the first two tasks, designing unit models and developing force structure. The unit modeling process is driven by battlefield requirements for specific military capabilities that will defeat a postulated threat. The results of this process are TOEs for organizations staffed and equipped to provide increments of the required capabilities. TOEs specify Army requirements. Force structuring, on the other hand, is a resource-driven process which determines authorizations for each unit in the Army.

Force structuring is first driven by directives and constraints in the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for "above the line" units. As of the beginning of FY 97, the NMS/DPG directives and constraints stated the Army was constrained to an end strength of 495 thousand spaces; would be capable of fighting two nearly simultaneous wars; and, for divisional force structure, contain ten divisions; one airborne, one air assault, two light infantry and six heavy divisions. Nine of those divisions are at ALO 1. The 2d Infantry Division in Korea is organized at ALO 2, with Korean Augmentees to the United States Army (KATUSA) soldiers making up the difference between ALO 2 and ALO 1. NMS/DPG does not contain directives on internal composition of Army "above the line" forces or the COMPOs of the Army within which they are organized. The Army Plan (TAP), a HQDA document, defines the COMPO and internal organization of divisions (based on requirements and authorizations in TOEs and MTOEs) and the TAA process defines the "below the line" echelon above division/echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) combat, combat support, combat service support and TDA force structure, allocated by COMPO, SRC, ALO and numbers of units, in support of the "above the line" force structure.

Because the Army is a complex array of people, each with one of a multitude of

different skills, and many millions of items of equipment, there must be an organized system for documenting what is required and how much is authorized. More importantly, as the Army moves forward with its equipment modernization program, and new doctrines and organizations evolve, the Army must have a way of keeping track of changes that are made so that they may be managed efficiently and with a minimum of turbulence. The Army's authorization documentation system meets these needs.

Each unit in the Army has its mission, structure, personnel and equipment requirements, and authorizations established in an authorization document. These documents are essential at each level of command for the Army to function. A unit uses its document for authority to requisition personnel and equipment and as a basis for readiness evaluation. Authorization documents data are used to manage personnel and materiel procurement, force planning, programming, budgeting, training, and distributing. Additionally, these data are used at various levels of command for inspections, surveys, special projects, and studies.

Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS).

The Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) is the force development automated data processing (ADP) system that records, maintains and distributes force structure information for all 8500+ units in the Total Army. SAMAS is the Army's "force programming database of record" for all force structure actions. It maintains information for all Active Component (COMPO 1), Army National Guard (COMPO 2), Army Reserve (COMPO 3), required (but unresourced) units (COMPO 4) and pre-positioned Army War Reserve (AWR) sets of equipment (COMPO 6).

The primary inputs to SAMAS are the "above the line" forces (divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments and special forces groups) directed by the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and "below the line" forces echelon above division/echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) forces (combat, combat support, combat service support and TDA) derived from the TAA process.

SAMAS has two primary files. One is a Force Structure (FS) File (commonly referred to as the "Force File"), which reflects the approved (documented and programmed) force structure position for each unit in the Army. The Force File produces the Army's Master Force (MFORCE). The second file is a Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) File (commonly referred to as the "Budget File"), which produces both the civilian annex to the MFORCE as well as the Manpower Addendum to the PBG.

The Force File.

The Force File is updated and maintained by the Force Integrators/ Command Managers and Organizational Integrators at HQDA ODCSOPS-FD. The Budget File is updated and maintained by the Resource Integrators/PBG Command Managers of USAFMSA. The Force File displays the force structure position for every unit in the Army at Unit Identification Code (UIC), Standard Requirement Code (SRC), effective date (EDATE), Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO), Management Decision Package (MDEP), Resource Operating Code (ROC), required and authorized strength levels (personnel spaces), MTOE and TDA number level of detail. Additional data items include Troop

Extract Report
82ABN Division DIVARTY

UIC	COMPO	TPSN	ES	UNMBR	CARS	BR	ULC	UNTDS	EDATE

TPSN	UIC	CR	UNBR	BR	UNTDS	SRC	DOCNO	CCNUM	EDATE	P	A	STOFF	STWO	STENL	AUOFF	AUWO	AUENL
WAGRAA	1		00001	40	0008		02		AR	BN		TANK(M1A1)		97	1016		

01082	WABDAA	00	0082	FA	DIVARTY	06202L000100	06202LFC82	FC1096	951016	D	R	24	4	86	24	4	86
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	DIVARTY	06202L000100	06202LFC82	FC2097	961017	D	R	23	4	84	23	4	84
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	DIVARTY	06202L000100	06202LFC82	FC2097	961017	D	U	23		84	23	4	84
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1096	951016	D	R	36	3	405	36	3	405
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1097	961016	D	R	38	3	404	37	3	404
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1097	961016	D	R	37	3	401	36	3	401
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1096	951016	D	R	36	3	405	36	3	405
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1097	961016	D	R	38	3	404	37	3	404
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1097	961016	D	R	37	3	401	36	3	401
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1096	951016	D	R	36	3	405	36	3	405
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1097	961016	D	R	38	3	404	37	3	404
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	105T ABN	06205L000100	06205LFC82	FC1097	961016	D	R	37	3	401	36	3	401

ACTCO	PHASE	SRC	NTREF	STNNM	LOC	ASGMT	PRUIC
U	D	17375L000100	**	FT HOOD	5TX	FC	******

STRUCTURED STRENGTH					CCNUM	ADCCO	AMSCO	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH				
OFF	WO	ENL	AGG	CIV				OFF	WO	ENL	AGG	CIV
41	1	567	609	0	FC1098	******	11101100000	40	1	567	608	0

Figure 5-17

ROC	DC	ROBCO	UNPID	DAMPL	MDEP	AUTHORITY
761	DC	****	******	*****	W51C	

Figure 5-16

Program Sequence Number (TPSN), unit number and regimental designation, unit description, command assignment code, location code, station name, phase and action codes, required and authorized strength levels, mobilization data, Army Force Package Code (FPC) and Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) number. (A sample force file record is displayed in Figure 5-16) There are approximately 70 total data items for each unit displayed over-time (previous, current and future programmed and approved actions). SAMAS does not contain MOS and grade level of detail, but drives the development of authorization documents in the Army Authorization Documents System — Redesigned (TAADS-R), which contains the MTOEs and TDAs at paragraph, line, MOS and grade, line item number (LIN),

equipment readiness code (ERC) and quantity level of detail.

A sample SAMAS extract report for the 82d Airborne Division DIVARTY is displayed in Figure 5-17. It shows the four units of the DIVARTY (HHB and three DSFA battalions) and the FY 96/97 approved force structure in the May 96 MFORCE. Data elements include unit identification, required organization, authorization document numbers, effective dates and required and authorized strength levels. In less than a dozen lines, the "history" and "justification" of the 82d Airborne's DIVARTY is depicted.

The Budget File.

The Budget File contains Active Component military and civilian manpower

data. The Budget File represents manpower for which budget authority is available. The Budget File is the feeder system to the HQDA Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Program Optimization and Budget Evaluation (PROBE) data base which captures the Army's POM and Budget submissions. The Budget File also feeds civilian data to the ASA (FM&C) Civilian Manpower Obligations Resources (CMORE) system where civilian costing is performed for all PPBES events. Primary inputs to the Budget File are: MACOM Command Plans, Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) and POM decisions. Primary outputs of the Budget File are the Manpower Addendum to the PBG and the civilian annex to the MFORCE. The Addendum is normally published three times a year.

Force Documentation.

The Army Authorization Documents System-Redesigned (TAADS-R) applies to the Total Army – Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian work force. The Army uses the system to record changes in requirements and authorizations that result from changes in unit missions, organizational structure, and equipment.

TAADS-R defines requirements and authorizations for MTOE units at various levels of the organization using data from SAMAS, the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Basis of Issue Plans (BOIPs), and Incremental Change Packages (ICPs). Requirements and authorizations for TDA units and are derived from SAMAS, concept plans, manpower surveys/studies, and manpower standards applications.

Detailed integration and documentation of the force centers on the Management of Change (MOC) window. The Army uses the MOC window to update and create MTOE and TDA documents. These documents officially record decisions on missions, organizational structure, and requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment. As of May 1997, one MOC window per year, running for a one year period, was effective for MTOE documentation. Efforts to integrate TDA documentation into the one year cycle are on-going. (Figure 5-18)

MTOE Documentation Process
MTOE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

MASTER FORCE | HQDA GUIDANCE | DRAFT MTOES | MACOM Review | COMMAND | MACOM Review | AUTS | MASTER FORCE | SAMAS - Budget File - Force File | MACOM | SACS | LOGSA

Winter 95 — MOC Window — Winter 96 — MOC Window — Winter 97 — MOC Window

ARSTAF Review | ARSTAF Review 96 | TAADS-R Document File | PERSCOM

Focus:
- FY97
- Below the line
- Above the line forces by *NET EDATE 961016

Document Build

DAMO- FDF | Force Structure / PBG Affordability Assessment

DALO / DAMO-FD S | Force Modernization / Equipment Documentation Assessment

DAPE / DAMO - FD | Personnel Documentation Assessment

Focus:
- FY98
- Above and below the line forces
- *NET EDATE 1016

Command Plan Decisions

Document Adjustment

On Going

Focus:
- FY99
- Above and Below the line forces
- *NET EDATE 981016

New Force Structure Decisions

On Going

Focus:
- FY00
- Above and Below the line forces
- *NET EDATE 991016

Products

On Going

*NET - Not Earlier Than

On Going

Document changes and input by MACOM, Corps, Divs, Bdes, Bn

Figure 5-18

Figure 5-19

The documentation process (Figure 5-19) begins with documentation guidance released by HQDA ODCSOPS-FD at the start of the MOC window. The HQDA guidance establishes the focus ("target") of the MOC window and directs documentation of specific units and actions. Under Centralized Documentation (CENDOC), USAFMSA-ADD builds draft MTOEs based on the documentation guidance and forwards them to HQDA and the MACOMs for subject matter expert (SME), usually the Organization Integrator for that type of unit, and unit review. TDA documents are built by the MACOMs.

The Command Plan (CPLAN) process is used to make adjustments between SAMAS programmed spaces and the proposed draft MTOE authorizations. In some cases, two to four years separate the force programming for a unit and the documentation of the unit. Changes in structure over time necessitate that "bills" and "billpayers" for authorized spaces be identified and adjustments made to balance the Force and Budget Files in SAMAS with TAADS-R. Those issues without resolution are deferred pending identification of other solutions (directed military overstrength – DMO, overstructure/undermanning–OS/UM, re-order documentation priorities, as examples). CPLAN is also used by the MACOMs to comply with TAA directed force structure actions and to submit selected MACOM initiatives.

Unprogrammed force structure actions (activations, inactivations, changes in strength or Authorized Level of Organization –ALO, as examples), deviation from MTOE standardization, changes in organization from

doctrinal changes not yet reflected in units designs and changes in Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA) accounts, as examples, must be submitted to HQDA by Concept Plan. The Concept Plan will state, among other things, the purpose, objectives, advantages, and disadvantages of the proposed activation or reorganization, and include resource requirements (force structure and budget). HQ, USARC submits a Command PLAN for all USAR CONUS units (less USAR Special Operations Forces) through HQ, FORSCOM. Force structure issues for OCONUS USAR units are submitted through the respective MACOM. The National Guard Bureau (NGB), in coordination with the STATE NG HQ, develops the Army National Guard Troop Structure Program (ARNG-TSP). After acceptance by the States, the ARNG-TSP is submitted to HQDA as the ARNG CPLAN.

Following CPLAN, SAMAS is adjusted to the "corrected" strength levels and the draft MTOEs, with changes applied, are again forwarded to the SMEs and the MACOMs for review to insure the agreed upon positions have been documented.

At the close of each MOC window, the Automatic Update Transaction System (AUTS) is run. AUTS compares SAMAS programming against TAADS-R documents submitted for approval. Those TAADS-R documents that match SAMAS programming at UIC, SRC, EDATE, strength level, and OFF/WO/ENL/CIV level of detail are approved and make up the new MFORCE. Approved documents are forwarded to the MACOMs for distribution to the appropriate units. "Disconnected" SAMAS/ TAADS-R actions are not approved or included in the updated MFORCE. Approved post-AUTS TAADS-R documents provide the basis for updating the ODCSPER/PERSCOM Personnel Management Authorization

Document (PMAD) and are a primary input to the Structure and Composition System (SACS). Additionally, the MFORCE is sent to and provides the baseline for HQDA ODCSOPS-Training (DAMO-TR) in the Battalion Level Training Model (BTLM) for developing Operating TEMPO (OPTEMPO) funding, HQDA (PA&E) for Operations Maintenance Army (OMA) funding and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)) for civilian costing through the CMORE model.

The Structure and Composition System (SACS), in conjunction with the Force Builder, produces the Army's time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the Current, Budget and Program Years and is extended for a total of a ten year period. Additionally, SACS defaults to FY 2050 and builds a fully modernized OTOE position for all units. In this way, SACS can show current levels of modernization, levels achieved at the end of the POM and a fully modernized Army (for planning purposes). SACS outputs combine information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, TAADS-R and known force structure constraints not included in the previous files. Key outputs are the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS). Both PERSACS and LOGSACS are at the UIC/MTOE/TDA/ EDATE and MOS/GRD/LIN/ERC/QTY level of detail for requirements and authorization.

The Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), for example, uses equipment requirements and authorizations from LOGSACS to plan equipment distribution. The PMAD, used by ODCSPER and PERSCOM for personnel requirements and authorizations, is

updated (in part) by TAADS-R, not PERSACS. In is hoped that with further improvements in SACS, greater utility will be found for PERSACS, allowing it eventually replace PMAD.

Authorization Documents.

There are four basic authorization documents in the Army: Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), Mobilization TDA (MOBTDA), and Augmentation TDA (AUGTDA).

MTOE. The MTOE is a modified version of a TOE that prescribes the unit organization, personnel, and equipment necessary to perform a mission in a specific geographical or operational environment. It reflects the organizational option selected from the TOE. Thus, the MTOE of a unit organized at the Authorized Level of Organization 3 (ALO 3) has been based on the Level 3 organizational structure found in the TOE. At unit level, the MTOE is the base document for:

- requesting personnel and equipment;
- distributing personnel and equipment resources;
- unit status reporting; and
- reporting supply and maintenance status.

TDA. The TDA prescribes the organizational structure for a unit having a support mission for which a TOE does not exist and which may include civilian positions. TDAs are unique in that they are developed based on the type and level of workloads associated with the unit's mission. Units with similar missions, like U.S. Army Garrisons, may be organized similarly but

may have a substantially different mix and number of personnel and equipment authorizations due to differences in the population and composition of the post they support. At unit level, a TDA is used for the same purposes as an MTOE except for unit status reporting, which is generally not required of TDA units. At MACOM and HQDA level, the MTOE and TDA are used to provide equipment and personnel MOS and grade details for planning, programming, budgeting, and force structuring activities.

MOBTDA. The MOBTDA records the mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations for an Army unit to perform its assigned mission upon mobilization. It reflects the unit's mobilization plan by identifying functions to be increased, decreased, established, and discontinued.

AUGTDA. The AUGTDA records the mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations to augment an MTOE unit to perform added non-TOE peacetime missions. AUGTDA can include civilian personnel and/or commercial equipment allowances required and authorized to an MTOE unit. An example is the augmentation of an MTOE general hospital with personnel and equipment to provide dependent and retiree care during peacetime.

The Army Authorization Documents System-Redesigned (TAADS-R).

Every Army unit (Active, Reserve, and Guard) and Army components of other agencies must have an authorization document to reflect a supportable organizational structure. Authorization documents state a unit's approved structure and resources and

serve as a basis and authority for requisitioning.

The development and documentation of authorization documents is supported by TAADS-R. TAADS-R is a HQDA automated system that contains all unit authorization documents; maintains quantitative and qualitative personnel and equipment data for individual units and the entire Army force structure; standardizes authorization documents for similar parent units; and interfaces with other DA automated systems, such as SAMAS.

The authorization document data maintained in TAADS-R are organizational structure, personnel, and equipment requirements and authorizations. The basic procedures for documentation are the same for MTOE and TDA units; that is, all unit personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations are written in the same detail. However, the basis for developing the two documents differs.

MTOEs are derived by adjusting/ modifying TOEs, when required, to meet specific operational requirements. A unit will be organized under the proper level of its TOE to the greatest extent consistent with the mission and the availability of manpower spaces as directed by the DPG for "above the line" forces (ALO 1 for divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments and special forces groups) and allocated to "below the line" forces (EAD/EAC combat, CS, CSS and TDA) and equipment modernization fielded in accordance with HQDA systems distribution plans and the TAEDP.

TDAs are uniquely developed for units with specific support missions. The organizational structure of TDA units will be developed to attain only essential manning, the most efficient use of personnel, and the most effective operational capability within the manpower spaces prescribed in the command force structure. Manpower Standard Applications, Manpower Surveys, and Manpower Requirements change requests, and personnel requirements from BOIPs will be used to structure TDA manpower. When manpower authorizations are insufficient to satisfy valid requirements, Garrison/Post and/or Unit Commanders will distribute resources on a mission-priority basis. Unsupported requirements are sometimes filled by a variety of means, e.g. Borrowed Military Manpower, Overhires, or the Restructuring/Redefining of Work Responsibilities. Equipment utilization and BOIP data will be used to develop TDA materiel requirements.

Authority to execute unprogrammed organizational activities, conversions, or reorganizations is requested by MACOMs via Concept Plans. Proposed authorization documents are submitted concurrently with the plan to accelerate the review process. Approved Concept Plans do not serve as an authorization document but support the creation of one. For MTOE units, HQDA will draft the organizational structure of newly-activated units and provide the authorization document to the MACOM in TAADS-R format. In the case of TDA units, MACOMs will submit draft TDA documents based on the Concept Plan; however, the draft TDAs will not be valid for requisitioning personnel or equipment until HQDA approves the Concept Plan and the MFORCE is updated with approved TDAs.

HQDA reviews and approves all authorization documents (MTOEs and TDAs) to ensure compatibility among the unit's mission, capabilities, organization, ALO, and the allocation of resources. Approved MTOEs and TDAs are documented in TAADS-R.

Structure and Composition System (SACS).

The Structure and Composition System (SACS) process is supported by the Force Builder Decision Support System (FBDSS). Operated and maintained by USAFMSA, FBDSS combines data from a multitude of management information systems and data bases addressing force structure, personnel, manpower, and dollar resource constraints.

FBDSS produces the SACS output that provides time-phased personnel and equipment requirements and authorization needed for a specified force structure for a 10-year period (Current, Budget and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years, extended).

USAFMSA produces SACS output three to four times per year. These outputs are used to analyze force structure decision impacts on out-year programming in terms of Army forces (COMPOs, unit types and quantities) and unit composition (personnel and force modernization levels). A major improvement to the discipline and oversight of the SACS process occurred as a result of the reinstitution of the SACS Council of Colonels (CoC), chaired by the Chief, Force Integration and Management Division, ADCSOPS-FD. Figure 5-20 shows schematically how the SACS process works.

Each SACS cycle begins with the analysis and synchronization of key force management information inputs – BOIP Files, TOE Files, SAMAS, and TAADS-R. These inputs provide insights to today's and tomorrow's structure, and the resources available for feasible modernization. Both the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and Logistic Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS) are

based on these force structure decisions and resource constraints.

FB/SACS Process

BOIP TOE SAMAS TAADS-R RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

FORCE BUILDER (FB) / STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION SYSTEM (SACS)

PERSACS

LOGSACS

- Reads Planned Force Structure
- Applies TAADS-R
- Applies TOE / BOIP Based on Programmed Actions
- Develops "Objective Force" View

Figure 5-20

PERSACS combines data from the HQDA SAMAS, TAADS-R, and TOE systems to state military personnel requirements and authorizations by grade, branch, and Military Occupational Specialty/Area of Concentration (MOS/AOC) for each unit in the force for the 10 years of the SACS. This data supports planning for personnel recruiting, training, promoting, validating requisitions, and distribution.

LOGSACS combines data from the HQDA SAMAS, TAADS-R, TOE, and BOIP to state equipment requirements and authorizations by Line Item Number (LIN) and ERC for each unit in the force for the Current, Budget, and POM years extended for a total of ten years. Authorized/required quantities of currently documented equipment

are determined for each unit from its authorization document in TAADS-R for the first two years of the SACS run. Data for the POM period and beyond is derived from the unit TOE model and data on unit equipment for new developmental items that are undocumented, but planned for inclusion at a later date, are applied through application of the applicable BOIP/ICP file(s).

A summary of all unit requirements for a particular LIN, as computed by LOGSACS, is the Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ) of that LIN. FBDSS takes the IIQ input and adds requirements for Army War Reserves, OPS Projects, War Reserve Stocks for Allies and ORF/RCF to produce the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) "K Page" reports. Data from the "K Page"

reports are used by ODCSOPS, SARDA, and PEOs as a baseline to develop programming and budgeting requirements for equipment procurement (P20 Reports).

SACS output products (PERSACS and LOGSACS) are published after the AUTS process at the end of the MOC Window. The MFORCE reconciled at the end of AUTS is the key force structure input to initiate the SACS cycle.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM MODERNIZATION

The Army, having been involved in the most massive and turbulent period of modernization and reorganization since mobilization for World War II and now faced with completing a significant downsizing of a quality force, requires strict management systems to ensure control and maintain readiness of the resultant force.

In 1983, in an effort to provide discipline and control on the force management process, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army formed a steering committee to study the documentation problem. The Documentation Modernization (DOCMOD) Study Group's charter was to standardize, stabilize, and modernize the documentation system from a centralized location. These actions facilitate developing an integrated force structure which will be tied to the Army's ability to provide people and equipment in the proper sequence to maintain readiness. The goal was to manage authorization document change in a way that minimizes turbulence.

This group produced the following recommendations:

- Dampen organizational and documentation changes in the short term.

- Stabilize the force for the Budget Year so that asset management and distribution systems can catch up.
- Identify systemic problems in the automatic data-processing systems and management techniques and supply specific recommendations for correcting each.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved a strategy to minimize documentation changes for the short term while adjusting existing systems. This will effectively synchronize requirements, authorizations, and resources. One major initiative to improve the documentation system is highlighted below.

The Centralized Documentation System (CENDOC).

A documentation system which can accurately project program requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment is crucial to the Army's force integration. Accordingly, the Army, under Defense Management Review Decision 945I, transitioned from a MACOM decentralized to a HQDA centralized documentation system for MTOEs, completing the transition in FY 97. TDA documentation, however, remains the responsibility of each MACOM.

The Year - to - Year Flow

Figure 5-21

CENDOC transition was accomplished by developing a system which better executed the guidance in the NMS, DPG, TAP and TAA. Draft MTOE documents are developed by USAFMSA-ADD and provided to HQDA SMEs and MACOMs for an affordability, supportability and executability analysis.

The affordability analysis indicates whether the proposed MTOEs remain balanced within the end strength; the supportability analysis shows whether the proposed MTOEs can be filled, at the MOS/GRD/LIN/ERC/QTY level of detail, with personnel and equipment within readiness standards; and executability analyzes when (or whether) the personnel and equipment can be brought together at the unit locations on an particular EDATE to meet the specified readiness standards.

Historically, turbulence has been a problem and several initiatives have been taken in an effort to dampen its effects. In September 1995, the HQDA DCSOPS directed that, effective FY 96, there would be one MTOE per UIC per year; one CTU per year; and, one MOS and LIN edit per year.

This was followed in May 1996 with additional direction that, for MTOEs, the Army would transition to one MOC widow per year effective May 1997. The MOC window would run for a period of one year. In order to accomplish that transition, MOC 2-96 (Summer/Fall 96) would address FY 98 MTOEs and MOC 1-97 (Winter/Spring 1997) would address FY 99 MTOEs. The first "one year MOC" in May 1997 would focus on FY 00. TDA documentation will coincide with MTOE production beginning with TDAs effective in FY 00. MACOMs will have one opportunity per year to initiate TDA changes and produce documents.

The "one MOC" per year is an effort to reduce turbulence, minimize the frequency of change and synchronize documentation with funding, training and personnel

resourcing. Figure 5-21 depicts the documentation history of 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division. It shows four MTOEs in one thirteen month period (in 1993-94). However, since October 1995, there has been one MTOE per year, each spaced a year apart. This dampened turbulence and led to greater standardization among units of similar types.

United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA).

USAFMSA (formerly the United States Army Force Integration Support Agency – USAFISA) is a Field Operating Agency under HQDA ODCSOPS-FD. In October 1994, the U.S. Army Force Management Study recommended centralized force management functions and USAFISA, U.S. Army Combined Army Organization Directorate (Fort Leavenworth, KS), and U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command Documentation Division (Fort Lee, VA) merged into a single organization. In FY 97, USAFISA was renamed USAFMSA. USAFMSA consists of the Requirements Documentation Directorate, Authorization Documentation Directorate, Army Force Management School, and the Chief of Staff's office.

USAFMSA's organization and "customer" focus provides accurate and timely requirement and authorization data bases for both personnel and equipment. The Chief of Staff's office concentrates on Force Accounting, Force Planning, and Programming. The Requirements Documentation Directorates (Forts Leavenworth and Lee) and the Authorization Documentation Directorate (Fort Belvoir) support all MACOMs with a full range of documents. The Army Management School supports the force management and education process through the Army Force Management Course, General Officer/Senior Executive Service (GO/SES) Course, Action Officer's Course and specialized academic studies in the force management field.

SUMMARY

Army force development is accomplished through the integration of two fundamental processes. One is requirements-driven and determines what the Army needs to give it the capability to deter or conduct operations across the spectrum in support of national security objectives. The other is resource-driven and determines the capabilities the Army can afford.

Force development begins with requirements for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier systems derived from a concept of how-to-fight/operate (required capabilities). These requirements initiate the five force development phases: determining requirements, designing organizations, developing organizational models, determining organizational authorizations, and documenting those authorizations. The BOIP/QQPRI and TOE systems provide the organizational models which are the building blocks of force structure. The resource-driven force-structuring process determines the mix of units for a balanced force and how many units the Army can afford in our resource-constrained environment.

Finally, the authorization documentation process documents the decisions of the organizational unit modeling and force structuring activities and provides the detailed forecast of authorizations that forms the basis for acquiring, distributing, and sustaining personnel, materiel, and facilities in the Army.

The past several years have seen significant changes to the force development process that have served us well since the 1960s. These new information management and integration systems provide quantum improvements in capability, but the process of change and how to manage it remains dynamic. Organizational and process changes will certainly evolve from Force XXI and from resource constraints. This chapter has been a snapshot of a process that needs to remain as dynamic as the environment it supports.

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CHAPTER 6

PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

"In today's International Security climate, the United States has to respond quickly and, often, forcefully, to a range of contingencies."

Secretary of the Army
Togo D. West

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of the Army's quote forcefully stated in the 1997 Army Posture statement that in view of today's complex global environment, the Army must remain prepared, trained and ready to deploy operationally, and to expand rapidly and if necessary, mobilize to meet its regional and territorial responsibilities. The Army's force structure must be designed to allow force projection with maximum combat power and support units to sustain that power. The Active and Reserve Components must provide both capabilities without the lengthy preparation periods that have been characteristic of the past. The need for deploying a substantial number of Reserve Component units overseas in the initial stages of a conflict underscores the importance placed on the Total Army force structure. The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the Active and Reserve Components, but also in the preparedness to convert civilian manpower and industrial production rapidly into military

power, individual replacements, and supplies. The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is essential in deterring potential enemies. Such a capability assures our allies of U.S. resolve. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments for war which require mobilization.

CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

This chapter covers mobilization and deployment planning systems. Although the focus is on joint planning systems, the Army's participation in these systems is explained in some detail. Also discussed are DOD's objectives for improving industrial preparedness in the U.S. and the Army's Industrial Preparedness Program. The discussion of mobilization and deployment is presented in 7 sections:

- The Planning System
- Deliberate Planning Process
- Crisis Action Planning

- Army Mobilization
- Mobilization Management
- Industrial Preparedness
- Summary

THE PLANNING SYSTEM

Joint operational planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations and include mobilization, deployment, and employment planning. Joint Operational Planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) (discussed in Chapter 4) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). These systems are related to each other and to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (discussed in Chapter 9). Army operations planning to implement joint operational planning tasks is conducted within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). Other Service systems, similar to the Army's AMOPES, include the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP) and Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), and the Coast Guard Capabilities Plan (CG CAP) and Coast Guard Logistic Support and Capabilities Plan (CG LSCP).

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

The JSPS is a flexible and interactive process, and is the primary formal means by which the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities and discharges his Strategic Planning responsibilities by translating national security policy, resource planning guidance (as reflected in the National Security Decision Directive[s] [NSDD]), and CINCs' requirements into strategic guidance, force structuring objectives, and operations planning guidance. See figure 6-1. The link with JOPES is through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provides short-term operational planning guidance to the military Services and CINCs (See Chapter 4).

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

The JSCP, as the link to JOPES, provides guidance to the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of services to accomplish tasks and missions utilizing the current force structure. It also apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. Additionally the JSCP provides a solid framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authority (NCA).

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

JOPES provides a single, interoperable planning and execution process using similar policies and procedures needed during war and operations other than war (OOTW) or in lesser regional conflicts (LRC). It also provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making supported by modern communications and computer systems. Thus, it is the joint command and control system for operation planning and execution covering the full spectrum of potential threats identified

Joint Strategic Planning System

NCA Guidance →
CINC, Service →
Agency
↓
SECDEF ←→
Defense
Planning &
Resources
Board

Joint Strategy Review
Continuous Assessment of the
Strategic Environment
What has Changed?
Joint Staff, Services,CINCs Efforts

- Strategic Vision
  Direction
- Military Strategy
- Future Environments
- Security Needs
- Options
- Assessments

CHAIRMAN'S GUIDANCE
Top Down Guidance

PRESIDENT ←
SECDEF

National Military Strategy

- Strategic Direction
- Military Strategy
- Strategic Landscape
- Security Needs
- Program / Budgets
- Risk Evaluation
- Strategic Plans
- Operation Plans
- Logistic Plans
- Net Assessments
- CINC Requirements

Contingency
Planning →
Guidance(CPG)

OPLAN DEV ←

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
Guidance & Tasking
for Deliberate Planning

Figure 6-1

through the national security planning process. JOPES provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated planning and execution. It also addresses mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment mission areas. The design is to support commanders and planners at National, Theater, and Supporting levels. The goals of JOPES are to:

- Support the development of operation plans (OPLANs), concept plans (CONPLANs), and concept summaries, and the development of operation plans and orders (OPORD) within time-constrained crisis situations.

- Permit theater commanders to start, stop, or redirect military operations effectively and rapidly.
- Support peacetime, crisis, and wartime planning and execution.
- Integrate mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
- Standardize policies and procedures which will be similar, in peacetime (including exercises) and crisis situations.
- Support the rapid evaluation of military options and development of Courses Of Action (COA) in single or multi-theater scenarios (for example two Major Regional Conflicts [MRC]).

- Exploit Automated Data Processing (ADP) and communications technology advances. Specifically, utilization of the capabilities of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and such communications assets as the Defense Data Network (DDN)
- Expedite the development of military estimates of situations.
- Ensure the dissemination and presentation of timely, accurate, and properly aggregated information.
- Allow planners to identify resource shortfalls (personnel, transportation, materiel, forces, medical, and civil engineering services).
- Secure from unauthorized access, data manipulation, and data retrieval. System hardware must be TEMPEST qualified and must be security certifiable for TOP SECRET Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

Systems Relationship.

JOPES is the principal system for translating and implementing policy decisions of the National Security Council System (NSCS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) into plans and orders for operations in support of national security policy. It also provides a means of identifying risks in executing currently assigned missions employing currently available resources.

AMOPES is the Army's mobilization interface with JOPES. It is applicable to Army components of unified commands, the MACOMs, and other supporting commands and agencies.

JOPES Overview.

JOPES is the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support all military operation monitoring, planning, and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with ADP systems, reporting systems, and the underlying GCCS. JOPES provides ADP support to senior-level decisionmakers and their staffs with enhanced capabilities to plan and conduct joint military operations. JOPES procedures and ADP systems are the mechanisms for submitting movement requirements to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).

JOPES provides support to and is used by decision makers and their staffs at all levels of the national structure for joint planning and execution. This structure is defined as the NCA and the JPEC. Membership includes, but is not limited to the following:

National Level.
  − Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  − Other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  − Joint Staff
  − Services
- Theater Level.
  − Supported commands (including Service component commands,

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

Simulation & Analysis		Threat Identification And Assessment		Monitoring
		Strategy Determination		
		Course of Action Development		
		Detailed Planning		
		Implementation		

Figure 6-2

sub-unified commands, and joint task forces).

Supporting Organizational Level.

- Supporting commands (including Service component commands and supporting combatant commands)
- Defense agencies
- Non-DOD departments and agencies
- Allied commands and agencies

JOPES Planning and Execution Methodology.

JOPES supports the joint planning and execution process used during peacetime operations, exercises, hostilities other-than-war, and war. JOPES procedures provide for various levels of decisionmaking in deliberate and crisis action planning environments. JOPES five operational functions (figure 6-2) govern both deliberate and crisis action planning processes. Together with the two JOPES supporting functions (simulation & analysis and monitoring), they form the JOPES methodology.

JOPES Procedural Principles.

Single Set of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Procedures. JOPES embodies a single set of ADP procedures that, combined with administrative policies and procedures, govern all aspects of conventional military operation planning and execution (including theater-level nuclear

and chemical plans). This single networked system ensures that all participants in all aspects of joint military planning and execution use the same vocabulary, procedures, and joint ADP support, thus facilitating the transition from training to planning, then to effective military operations.

Use of Existing or Programmed Capabilities and Resources. JOPES planning is capabilities based. Military planners use the forces and resources specified for regional or global planning, as appropriate, in the JSCP and CJCS orders, Service capabilities documents, and approved operation plans or operation orders. Using the forces and resources apportioned for planning, the CINCs select those forces they intend to employ within their plans to complete the assigned tasks.

Shortfall Identification and Risk Analysis. JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported command to identify shortfalls between the planned requirement and the identified capability at various points in the planning process. The supported command then attempts to resolve shortfalls, conducts risk analysis if the shortfalls are not resolved, and redefines the CINC's Strategic Concept if the resultant risk is too great.

Plans Maintenance. Completed and approved plans will be maintained and updated as changes occur. A new plan is required only when the threat, taskings, forces assigned, resources available, or concept of operations change to the extent the supported CINC and the CJCS deem it necessary to develop a new plan. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs concentrate on

keeping existing plans and orders up to date and executable.

JOPES Procedures, Guidance, and ADP Support.

Procedures, guidance, and descriptions of ADP system support necessary to conduct joint operation planning and execution are contained in three JOPES volumes.

- **JOPES, Volume I (Joint Pub 5-03.1):** *Planning Policies, and Procedures,* provides policy, guidance, and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, approval, and implementation of joint OPLANs and OPORDs. Volume I also contains standard formats and minimum content for Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures, orders, letters, reports, and the CAP checklists.

- **JOPES, Volume I, Supplement (Joint Pub 5-03.11):** *Executive Guidance and Procedures,* sets forth principles, procedures, and guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance and procedures for the exercise of authority by commanders of the U.S. Armed Forces in preparing their respective detailed plans and orders and their execution.

- **JOPES, Volume II (CJCSM 3122.03):** *Planning Formats and Guidance,* prescribes standard formats and minimum content for operation plans, concept summaries, annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. It

FUNCTIONAL PROCESS MAJOR INPUTS AND OUTPUTS

Figure 6-3

is functionally oriented and provides directional, procedural, and planning guidance keyed to certain plan annexes. Formats for classified subjects and detailed functional area guidance are contained in the Supplement (classified) to JOPES, Volume II.

- **JOPES, Volume III (Joint Pub 5-03.3):** *Automated Data Processing Support,* describes the standard computer-based ADP system that supports the planning and implementation of

joint operations. It also describes the JOPES ADP application software, which provides automated assistance to the JPEC throughout the JOPES planning and execution process.

- **Joint Training**: JOPES procedures to support training and exercises are contained in MCM-71-92, *Joint Training Manual,* 21 May 1992.

JOPES Functions.

JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework for joint military planning and execution. Figure 6-2 depicts the five operational functions and two supporting functions. The operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order from identification of a threat, to determination of strategy that counters the threat, to course of action (COA) development, to detailed planning, and finally, to actual implementation of military operations. The supporting functions, on the other hand, relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each.

JOPES Operational Functions. Figure 6-3 displays the operational functions and identifies the major inputs and outputs of each operational function.

- **Threat Identification and Assessment**. This function addresses procedures for continuous monitoring of the international political and military environment so threats to national security can be detected and analyzed, alerting decisionmakers, and determining and defining threat capabilities and intentions. Through detailed planning and the development of courses of action at the operational level,and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution, this function provides information for strategic planning and resource allocation at the national level. All organizational levels are supported by this function during crisis action planning and execution.

- **Strategy Determination**. Using this function, the NCA, CJCS, and Joint Staff formulate suitable and feasible military direction to counter the threats and to develop courses of action. It involves formulating politico-military assessments, developing and evaluating military strategy and clearly defining political and military objectives or end state, apportioning forces and other resources, formulating concepts and military options, and developing planning guidance leading to the preparation of COAs, OPLANs, and OPORDs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategy guidance in light of the intelligence estimate and ends with issuance of either the JSCP in peacetime or a CJCS warning or planning order during crisis action planning situations.

- **Course of Action Development**. In COA development during peacetime, the supported command develops the CINC's Strategic Concept based on Joint Staff and Service planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In crisis situations, the supported command develops COAs based on CJCS planning guidance and resource allocation from approved OPLANs and CJCS warning or alert orders. Using this JOPES function coupled with the JOPES support function simulation and analysis, force, sustainment, and transportation feasibility are

analyzed. The Services, through Service component commands, and supporting commands provide supportability estimates of the CINC's Strategic Concept or COAs to the supported command. Products from COA development include CINC's Strategic Concept; CJCS-approved Concept of Operatiopns (CONOPS); the Commander's Estimate, including COAs; supportability estimates; and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased data base of notional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) force requirements, with an estimate of required sustainment.

- **Detailed Planning**. This function is used in developing a CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD with supporting annexes and in determining preliminary movement feasibility. This function provides detailed force lists and required sustainment. This includes a fully integrated schedule of deployment, employment and mobilization activities, determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation support and transportation needs, all based on the CJCS-approved CONOPS or COA. Detailed planning begins with CJCS guidance in the form of an approval for further planning in a peacetime environment or a CJCS Alert or Planning Order in a crisis action planning situation and ends with a CJCS-approved

OPLAN or NCA-approved OPORD.

- **Implementation**. This function provides decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during the conduct of military operations. It encompasses the execution of military operations and provides procedures to issue OPORDs; conduct mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities; and adjust operations where required. The ability to monitor and compare actual events with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment; controlling, directing, replanning, redirecting, or terminating operations; and conducting redeployment. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Implementation begins with the CJCS Execute Order and usually ends with some type of replanning effort such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

- **Supporting Functions.** Two supporting functions identified in Figure 6-2, monitoring and simulation and analysis, complement the operational functions to complete the conceptual framework of JOPES.

  - **Monitoring**. This supporting function supports each of the other JOPES functions by obtaining current, accurate information concerning the status of friendly, enemy, and

neutral forces and resources in accomplishing mission tasks. Examples of information processed are objective accomplishment; consumption data; and the status of deployment, procurement, mobilization, forces, and facilities.

  – **Simulation and Analysis**. This supporting function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications, when feasible, are force-on-force assessments (suitability); generation of force requirements; comparison of requirements to capabilities, such as consumption data; closure profiles (feasibility); and generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on need.

JOPES Planning Process. Joint operation planning and execution is a continuous, iterative process. It begins in response to perceived and identified threats to U.S. security interests; continues through military option and COA selection, operation plan, and operation order development and implementation; and ends when the requirement for the plan is canceled, the operation is terminated, or the crisis is satisfactorily resolved. Figure 6-4 shows the JOPES operational functions aligned with the deliberate and crisis action planning process.

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

Purpose.

This section describes the applicability of JOPES to deliberate planning, describes the deliberate planning process for operation plans, outlines responsibilities and recommended time requirements for the planning cycle, and provides guidance for resolving conflicts. JOPES applies to all operation plans, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), prepared by CINCs in response to CJCS requirements. Operation Plans are prepared in complete format or in Concept Plan format. Functional Plans and Campaign Planning are also a vital portion of the Deliberate Planning process. All are described below:

- **Operation Plans (OPLANs)**. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan for the conduct of joint military operations. Prepared by the combatant commander, it includes a full description of the concept of operations and all annexes applicable to the plan. It identifies the specific forces, functional support and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be quickly developed into an OPORD. OPLANs are normally prepared when the contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning or when detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness through planning. In some cases detailed planning is required to support alliance or

JOPES RELATIONAL FUNCTIONS

| THREAT IDENTIFICATION & ASSESSMENT | → | STATEGY DETERMINATION | → | COA DEVELOPMENT | → | DETAILED PLANNING | → | IMPLEMENTATION |

JSCP

APPROVED FOR FUTHER PLANNING

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

PLAN MAINT

PHASE III PLAN DEVEL

PHASE II CONCEPT DEVEL

PHASE IV PLAN REVIEW

JOPES TPFDD

PHASE I INITIATION

OPLAN

PHASE V SUPPORTING PLANS

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESS

| WARNING ORDER | | ALERT ORDER | | PLANNING ORDER | OPORD | EXECUTE ORDER |

| SITUATION DEVELOPMENT PHASE I | → | CRISIS ASSESSMENT PHASE II | → | COA DEVEL PHASE III | → | COA SELECTION PHASE IV | → | EXECUTION PLANNING PHASE V | → | EXECUTION PHASE VI |

Figure 6-4

combined planning. OPLANs also facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan's concept of operations.

- **Concept Plans (CONPLANs)**. A CONPLAN is an operation plan with or without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs

w/TPFDD require more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces. Supporting Plans are prepared as tasked by the supported Combatant Commander in support of their deliberate plans. As a rule, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

- **Functional Plans**. Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or nonhostile environment are developed by the combatant commanders. Examples include plans for disaster relief, peace keeping, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S.

citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations. Requirements for these plans should be satisfied by command publications. An example is the USCINCEUR Reconstitution Plan. Unless specifically directed, no requirement exists to submit these plans to the Joint Staff for review and CJCS approval, but information copies will be submitted to the Joint Staff, J-7, for internal Joint Staff distribution. Although the planning procedures and formats prescribed in JOPES, Volume II, are not mandatory for such plans, they may be useful.

- **Campaign Planning.** Campaign planning is the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint task force commanders translate national and theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin prior to or during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance and resources become evident, but is not completed until National Command Authorities select the COA during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is normally conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

Deliberate Planning Process for OPLANs.

Conducted primarily during peacetime, deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process which involves the entire JPEC in a coordinated effort to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. In its basic form, deliberate planning has five formal phases (see Figure 6-4). These phases produce a family of plans (the supported commander's plan, supporting plans, and plans designed for concurrent execution). Forces and sustainment requirements are developed by the supported commander and resourced by the Services, supporting commanders, and Defense agencies. The resourced forces and sustainment requirements requiring common-user lift are time-phased by the supported CINC and scheduled for movement by USTRANSCOM. The supported commander prepares the various annexes that provide detailed guidance to supported command components and subordinate commanders. The supported commander is authorized to task supporting commands and DOD agencies to participate in the planning process to include submitting supporting plans, as required. The supported command may also request Joint Staff assistance in gaining planning support from agencies outside the Department of Defense. Supporting commands and agencies should be informed of support requirements as early as possible in the planning process. OPLANs must be thoroughly coordinated. The format and content for an OPLAN are prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.2: JOPES, Volume II.

Deliberate Planning Process for CONPLANs.

The planning process for CONPLANs is the same as for OPLANs,

except that the CONPLAN process normally omits the resource detail developed in the Plan Development Phase. The format and content for a CONPLAN are prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.2: JOPES, Volume II.

Planning Cycle Responsibilities and Time Requirements.

JOPES uses a planning cycle that begins when the Joint Staff, in the name of the Chairman, publish the JSCP and planning schedules and terminates at the end of the period to which the JSCP applies. The Joint Staff also reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs, Strategic Concepts and Concept summaries prepared by the CINC in accordance with provisions of chapter IV Joint Pub 5-03.2. The JSCP provides guidance, assigns tasks, apportions major combat forces, and specifies items of materiel and lift assets available for planning. Following publication of the JSCP, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, will produce an initial planning schedule for the development of the operation plans and concept summaries tasked in the JSCP. The initial planning schedule will be disseminated by message and will set forth established OPLAN submission and if required, plan refinement conference dates. All CINCs plans will be forwarded to the joint staff for approval. Upon receipt and after analysis of JSCP taskings and planning guidance, supported commanders develop new OPLANs, request permission to cancel approved plans no longer meeting JSCP requirements, or revise existing plans to conform to current JSCP and Chairman taskings. Canceled plans must be retained on file for a two year period. Upon expiration of the two-year period, the record copy of the OPLAN (less TPFDD file) or CONPLAN specified as the permanent record will be retired to the applicable Federal Records Center. Records so retired will be marked with appropriate instructions to ensure their protection against improper release in accordance with CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 60. If the requirement for an existing operation plan is not changed by the JSCP tasking, the supported commander should review the plan to determine whether it is still sufficient and can still pass the tests of acceptability, feasibility, adequacy, and consistency with joint doctrine. If the plan still sufficiently passes these tests, the tasking may be satisfied by a message to the CJCS stating that the plan has been reviewed, analyzed, and can still meet the JSCP tasking. If the CJCS review results in concurrence, a CJCS message or memorandum will approve the plan for the appropriate JSCP period.

Conflicting Guidance.

CINCs who are also commanders of combined commands or who conduct coordinated planning on a bilateral or combined basis will report to the CJCS any conflicts between the guidance contained in JOPES and directives received from international authorities or provisions of any plan established by international agreement. The Chairman, U.S. Section, Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, will report to the CJCS any conflicts between plans developed by the committee and the guidance in JOPES. In all cases, the provisions in JOPES will have precedence pending resolution of the conflict.

JOPES Deliberate Planning

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┌─────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────┐
│                     │          │  Concept Development     │
│  Initiation Phase   │ ───────► │        Phase             │
│                     │          │                          │
└─────────────────────┘          │   CONCEPT REVIEW         │
                                 └──────────────────────────┘
                                              │
          ┌──────────────────────┐            ▼
          │  Plan Development     │ ◄──────────
          │       Phase          │
          └──────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌─────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────┐
│   PLAN REVIEW       │ ───────► │   Supporting Plans       │
│      PHASE          │          │        Phase             │
└─────────────────────┘          └──────────────────────────┘
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
Figure 6-5

Deliberate Planning Procedures.

Procedures for deliberate planning are designed to assist the planning community in the timely, efficient development of OPLANs and to provide a consistent framework for the Planning process. The deliberate planning process phases and procedures are as shown in figure 6-5 and 6-6.

A detailed discussion of the requirements of each phase follows:

- **Phase I—Initiation.** Initiation is the phase in which planning tasks are assigned, resources available for planning are identified, and

the groundwork is laid for planning.

- − Task Assignment. In the JSCP, the CJCS tasks the CINCs to develop Operation Plans and Concept Summaries. When such taskings are issued by message or other directive, they will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP. The extent of CINCs' planning is not limited by JSCP taskings. Each CINC has broad responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command

THE PLANNING PROCESS

Deliberate Planning

PHASE I   **INITIATION**
- CINC Receives Planning Task From CJSC
- Major Forces Available For Planning

PHASE II   **CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT**
- Mission Statement is Deduced
- Subordinate Tasks Are Derived
- CINCs Strategic Concepts Are Developed
        The Product :A Concept of Operations

PHASE III   **PLAN DEVELOPMENT**
- Forces Selected and Time Phased
- Support Requirements Computed
- Strategic Deployments Simulated / Analyzed
- Shortfalls Identified and Resolved
- Operation Plan Completed
        The Product: A Complete Plan

PHASE IV   **PLAN REVIEW**
- OPLAN / CONPLAN Reviewed & Approved By CJCS
- CINC Revises Plan / Based on Review Comments
        The Product: An Approved Plan

PHASE V   **SUPPORTING PLANS**
- Supporting Plans Prepared

Figure 6-6

Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2 and may prepare whatever plans are necessary to discharge those responsibilities. The CINC may decide to prepare an operation plan not required by the JSCP that would task forces not apportioned to the affected theater. However, the CINC will submit the requirements for the plan to the CJCS for approval before preparing the plan.

- Resources. The Joint Staff and the Services identify resources and provide guidance to the supported commander. The JSCP, other JSPS documents, joint doctrine,

and Service planning documents provide the following:

- strategic intelligence and guidance
- Service doctrine and guidance
- resources available for planning
- priorities for accomplishing tasks
- Review of Previous Operations. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), as well as the Joint Utilization Lessons Learned (JULLS) data base, should be queried early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise occurrences. A regular review of this information during plan development can alert planners to known pitfalls and to highlight successful and innovative ideas.

- **Phase II—Concept Development.** Concept development is the phase in which all factors that can significantly affect mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, the mission statement is deduced, subordinate tasks are derived, COAs are developed and analyzed, the best COA determined, and the CINC's Strategic Concept developed and documented.

- **Phase III—Plan Development.** Plan development is the phase in which the basic OPLAN or CONPLAN and supporting annexes are prepared. Upon receipt of the approved concept of operations, the supported commander prepares the OPLAN or CONPLAN in the format prescribed in JOPES, Volume II, and submits it to the CJCS for formal review and approval. During this phase, the supported commander publishes guidance in a Memorandum of Instruction (MOI); the force list is structured; the nonunit-related materiel, nonunit-related personnel, NEO and medical evacuees, EPWs, retrograde cargo, and transportation requirements are determined; the nuclear, civil engineering, and medical support planning is conducted; the TPFDD file is developed; shortfalls are identified; transportation feasibility is determined; and all the elements of the plan are documented for TPFDD refinement and preparation of the plan for submission to the CJCS for review and approval. At the beginning of the Plan Development Phase, the supported commander publishes an LOI. The purpose of the LOI is to provide specific guidance to the CINC's component commanders and supporting commands and agencies on how

JOPES Crisis ActionPlanning

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┌─────────────────┐                    ┌─────────────────┐
│    Situation    │ ─────────────────▶ │     Crisis      │
│   Development   │                    │   Assessment    │
└─────────────────┘                    └─────────────────┘
                                               │
                              ◀────────────────┘
┌─────────────────┐                    ┌─────────────────┐
│ Course of Action│ ─────────────────▶ │ Course of Action│
│   Development   │                    │    Selection    │
└─────────────────┘                    └─────────────────┘
                                               │
                              ◀────────────────┘
┌─────────────────┐                    ┌─────────────────┐
│    Execution    │ ─────────────────▶ │    Execution    │
│    Planning     │                    │                 │
└─────────────────┘                    └─────────────────┘
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
Figure 6-7

to develop the plan. The LOI should be coordinated with affected organizations (as an example, USTRANSCOM, or DLA) prior to publication to ensure that the planning guidance is current. The LOI should contain the supported commander's classification and OPSEC planning guidance.

- **Phase IV—Plan Review.** In this phase, all elements of the OPLAN, CONPLAN, and Concept Summary are assessed and validated. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries in accordance with the procedures in Chapter IV, Joint Pub 5-03.1.

- **Phase V—Supporting Plans.** In this final phase, all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, will be submitted by the supporting command or agency to the supported commander within 60 days after CJCS approval. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless it is so directed by the supported commander. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported

commander will review and approve supporting plans.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP)

Purpose.

This section describes how the basic planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. Crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an *incident* or *situation* involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military response to crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. In time-sensitive situations, the JPEC follows formally established CAP procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans or to develop and execute OPORDs where no useful contingency plan exists for the evolving crisis. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders. See Figure 6-7.

Relationship to Deliberate Planning.

CAP procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to hostilities other than war or war. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for a hypothetical crisis based on the best available intelligence and using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it improbable that any contingency plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds, and every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decisionmaking and execution planning as the crisis unfolds and assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. CAP procedures provide the means to respond to any crisis within a constrained time frame. CAP routinely includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate contingency planning whenever possible.

Crisis Action Planning Phases.

Because crises are fluid and involve dynamic events, planning procedures must be flexible. The activities of the JPEC are keyed to the time available and the significance of the crisis. Planning procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of a crisis and progressing through the employment of U.S. military forces. Several points are identified in this sequence where key activities (or decisions) are required.

- *Phase I- Situation Development.* An event when possible national security implications occur, are recognized, and reported
- *Phase II- Crisis Assessment.* The diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are weighed. A decision is made on possible requirement for a military force. Current strategy and applicable operations plans are reviewed.
- *Phase III- Course of Action Development.* CINCs are tasked, or a CINC is tasked to develop and recommend COAs, or the NCA may develop its own COA.
- *Phase IV- Course of Action Selection.* The NCA selects the COA.
- *Phase V- Execution Planning.* A detailed operation order is prepared to support the selected COA. The level of detail is proportional to the time available for planning.
- *Phase VI- Execution.* The decision of the NCA to deploy or employ U.S. Forces is implemented.

CAP phases are further defined in the remaining paragraphs of this section. Through the inherent flexibility of CAP, the time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis.

Postexecution Activities.

Postexecution requirements (including preparing detailed after-action reports, assessing results, developing lessons learned, declassifying material, releasing information, and preparing follow-on plan reviews) will be as directed by the CJCS.

Operation Plans.

In a crisis, existing OPLANs or CONPLANs are reviewed for applicability to the situation at hand. Using CAP procedures, applicable existing plans are expanded or modified to fit the situation. If no existing plan applies, CAP procedures are followed to build an OPORD.

Joint Planning and Execution Community Responsibilities.

Many organizations are involved in planning for a crisis. The composition of the JPEC and roles of members of the JPEC are described below.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS manages the planning process; provides advice, options, and recommendations to the NCA; and conveys NCA decisions to the CINCs. More specifically, the CJCS receives and analyzes reports, tasks commanders to prepare estimates and COAs, reviews those estimates and COAs, resolves conflicts and shortfalls or seeks resolution from the NCA, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces. The NCA has the final responsibility and authority in a crisis. The NCA approves a COA and authorizes the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces. Authority to conduct military operations against a potential enemy, as delineated in the JSCP, rests solely with the

NCA, except as authorized under the applicable rules of engagement (ROE)

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when requested.

Supported Commander and Service Components.

The supported commander, designated by the CJCS, has the primary responsibility for responding to a crisis. The supported commander is usually the commander of the unified command of the geographic area in which the crisis occurs. The supported commander begins COA development as soon as he is aware that a military response may be needed and provides an estimate of the situation to the CJCS. In developing COAs, the supported commander will consult with and task the commanders of subordinate components, subunified commands, or JTFs. If time permits, the Service component commands will develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and build TPFDD files to implement appropriate concepts. The Service

component commands will also work within Service channels to identify CS and CSS forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, filler and replacement personnel, and reserve component (RC) asset availability. Throughout the crisis, the supported commander will ensure that continuous communications are maintained with the supporting commanders concerning present requirements and anticipated future actions that might affect or necessitate additional support.

Supporting Commanders.

Supporting commanders are designated by the CJCS. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2. Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military COAs and identify the actual units and associated movement data. Additionally, when supporting commanders provide lift assets in support of a COA, they will provide deployment estimates and schedules for non-USTRANSCOM assets. Supporting commanders will ensure that all cargo and personnel requiring USTRANSCOM-provided transportation during deployment and redeployment operations will be documented in accordance with DOD 4500.32-R: MILSTAMP.

Services.

The Services are responsible for mobilizing and calling up RC forces when authorized; providing units, individual filler, and replacement personnel; and sustaining deployed forces.

THE PLANNING PROCESS

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

PHASE I   **SITUATION DEVELOPMENT**
      - An event occurs w / National Security Implications
      -- Monitor, Recognize Problem, Submit Cincs Assessment
      -- Report event to NCA / CJCS

PHASE II   **CRISIS ASSESSMENT**
      - CINCs assessment received
      -- Increase awareness / reporting, JCS assess, advise on possible Military
        Action
      -- NCA / CJCS Evaluation, Decide to develop Military COA

PHASE III **COA DEVELOPMENT**
      - CJCS publishes warning order
      -- Develop / Evaluate COAs, Modify JOPES database
      -- CINC assign tasks to subordinates by Evaluation Request Message
      -- CINC reviews Evaluation MSGs from subordinates
      -- USATRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates, JCS reviews
        MDRS Estimate
      -- CINC Publishes Commanders Estimate with Recommended COA

PHASE IV **COA SELECTION**
      - CJCS presents refined and prioritized COA to NCA
      -- CJCS gives Military Advice to NCA / May publish planning order
        before final selection by NCA
      -- NCA selects COA, CJCS publishes selected COA in Alert Order

PHASE V   **EXECUTION PLANNING**
      -CINC receives Alert Order / JOPES database adjusted/Movement Reqs.
      Identified
      --Convert COA into OPORD and Supporting OPORDs/ CINC Publishes
      OPORD

PHASE VI **EXECUTION**
      -NCA decision to execute / CJCS Publishes by Authority / Direction of
      SECDEF
      --JPEC Reports execution status / Monitors until Crisis is resolved

Figure 6-8

USCINCTRANS and Components.

As a supporting commander, USCINCTRANS is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning (deliberate and crisis) and centralized wartime traffic management, including:

- Developing and operating the deployment elements of the crisis action planning and execution system.
- Receiving, evaluating, and coordinating global strategic mobility requirements in support

of the other unified and specified commands.

- Optimizing the use of transportation capability.

Other Supporting Agencies.

Combat Support Agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), Central Imagery Office (CIO), and National Security Agency (NSA); and other U.S. Government agencies, such as Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), play important roles as part of the planning community in developing, evaluating, selecting, and executing military COAs. These agencies provide information vital to NCA decisionmaking and should be considered early in the planning process; other agencies supply materiel, personnel, or other resources to support the military forces.

Single-Crisis Procedures. As previously discussed, a response to a crisis is normally carried out in six sequential phases. The time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the time spent in each phase can be compressed so that all decisions are reached in conference and orders are combined or are initially issued orally. A crisis could be so time-critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first written directive might be a Deployment or Execute Order. The time sensitivity of some situations may require so rapid a response that the normal CAP sequence cannot be followed.

Accordingly, the commander's assessment may also serve to indicate his recommended COA, normally developed in Phase III. In this situation, no formal warning order is issued, and the next communication received by the supported commander from the CJCS is the planning order or alert order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. A commander's assessment and proposals should be submitted at the earliest possible time to preclude an execution decision that may not consider the commander's position. Meanwhile other members of the JPEC are gathering information and developing an accurate picture of the crisis event.

The following subparagraphs describe key activities during each phase of a crisis, and Figure 6-8 presents a general flow of the CAP procedures.

- **Phase I—Situation Development**. Phase I begins with an event having possible national security implications and ends when the CINC submits an assessment of the situation to the NCA and the CJCS.When a significant event is recognized, an initial report is submitted to higher headquarters. If the National Military Command Center (NMCC) receives the report from a source other than the commander of the unified command in whose area the event occurred, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communication with the CINC and request a report. In his CINC's assessment report, the CINC provides as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis, the forces readily available, major

constraints to possible force employment, and actions being taken, if any, within existing ROE. As appropriate, the CINC's report also contains a succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander. A report that initiates CAP may be received by message or voice. Two formal reports that could initiate action are:

- Critical Intelligence Communication (CRITIC).
- Operational Report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE — Which is an event or incident report of possible national interest.

- **Phase II—Crisis Assessment**. Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for possible consideration and possible use. Phase II is characterized by increased awareness and reporting and intense information-gathering activity. The CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the JCS, provides the NCA with an assessment of the situation from the military point of view and provides advice on possible military action. The CJCS reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in the JOPES and evaluates reports from the CINC and other sources. The CJCS establishes, or directs the establishment of a crisis teleconference if the supported commander has not already done so. The assets being provided by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). The CINC continues to issue status reports as required and to report the significant actions taken within the existing ROE. The CINC continues to evaluate the crisis event and the disposition of assigned and available forces. The CINC will assess the employment status and availability of theater transportation assets and the transportation infrastructure. The Services participate in the CINC's review of available military forces, when time permits. The Services review will include, as appropriate, actions within Service purview to improve force readiness and sustainability and to identify potential RC requirements. USCINCTRANS reviews the status of strategic lift assets and takes action as authorized and appropriate to improve the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets and common-user port facilities.

- **Phase III—Course of Action Development**. Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs, normally transmitted by a CJCS warning order, and ends when COAs are presented to the NCA. The warning order is a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC and establishes command relationships

(designating supported and supporting commanders) and states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The warning order usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using JOPES. A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the warning order, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour. Finally, the warning order directs the supported commander to develop COAs. If time permits, the supported command should use JOPES ADP and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific COA is already being considered, the warning order transmits the COA and requests the supported commanders assessment. It also establishes a deadline for USTRANSCOM's preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile, and for the supported commander's response which is the commander's estimate. Time permitting, the CJCS may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a Deployment Estimate for analytical purposes. During the preparation of the warning order, the CJCS will use the GCCS to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission support requirements are adequately detailed. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the warning order may be issued orally or even omitted. When it is

omitted, a planning order or alert order may be issued in lieu of it and will contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information. In response to the warning order, the supported commander works with supported command components, subunified commands, and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) and develops possible COAs using JOPES. The amount of time available for planning governs the level of activity. The supported commander manages the use of JOPES to construct COAs and tasks Service component commanders and supporting commanders to evaluate the proposed COAs by releasing an Evaluation Request Message. The supported commander directs a review of existing OPLANs for applicability. Even if not applicable in full, deployment data extracted from existing plans may be useful. Finally, the supported commander prepares and submits his Commander's Estimate to the CJCS. It contains one or more possible COAs and the supported commander's recommendation. If time permits, COAs will include deployment estimates. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the Commander's Estimate may be provided orally. The supporting commanders and Service components take action as directed by the supported commander's Evaluation Request Message. Activities will normally include the creation of combat, CS, and CSS lists and generation

of a movement requirement estimate. Normally, they are directed to provide the required information in an Evaluation Response Message or in JOPES (by developing a deployment data base). Sustainment planning (nonunit-related cargo and nonunit-related personnel data) will be coordinated with the Services as directed by the supported commander. USCINCTRANS reviews the supported commander's proposed COAs and prepares and forwards deployment estimates to the supported commander, normally 24 to 36 hours prior to the Commander's Estimate, for each proposed COA. As time permits (as directed by the supported commander), the JOPES data will be used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and a force closure profile. The Services monitor COA development using JOPES and begin preliminary plans for providing support forces and sustainment. In addition, the Services continue to monitor force readiness and requirements for the RC, taking action or making recommendations to the CJCS, as appropriate.

- **Phase IV—Course of Action Selection**. This Phase begins when COAs are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected. The primary activity in this phase of crisis planning rests with the CJCS and NCA. All other members of the JPEC continue their activities as described in Phases II and III. The CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS, reviews and evaluates the commander's estimate. Based on the supported commander's assessment, the CJCS prepares to advise the NCA. The CJCS may concur in the supported commander's recommended COA in whole or in part, direct the supported commander's development of an additional COA, or may develop and recommend a different COA. The CJCS presents possible military COAs to the NCA and, following the NCA decision, normally issues the alert order.

The Planning Order is a message from the CJCS to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC. The primary purpose of the planning order is to direct that execution planning activities begin before formal selection of a COA by the NCA. Used in this manner, the planning order saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V to begin pending a decision by the NCA. The planning order is designed to allow the CJCS additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the planning order may be used in lieu of a warning order. When used in this manner, the planning order will describe a specific COA; direct execution planning activities; and provide

the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a warning order. The planning order will normally NOT be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the planning order will require approval of the secretary of defense.

The Alert Order is approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA. The alert order will describe the selections in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to begin the detailed planning required to deploy forces. The alert order will also contain guidance, as needed, to change or amplify the guidance provided in the warning order. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the alert order may be omitted or issued in lieu of the warning order. When issued in lieu of a warning order, the alert order will contain the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in the warning order.

- **Phase V—Execution Planning**. Phase V begins when a planning or alert order is received and ends when an executable OPORD is developed and approved for execution on order. Execution planning activities begin with the CJCS-issued planning or alert order. If (in the case of a planning order) an NCA decision on a COA is still pending, then the Chairman will notify the supported commander by message, GCCS, or orally (in extremely time-sensitive situations) when the NCA decision is made. The CJCS monitors the execution planning activities using JOPES and reviews the supported commander's OPORD for adequacy and feasibility. Time permitting, the CJCS may direct USCINCTRANS to develop a deployment estimate for analytical purposes. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, the CJCS will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-03.2: JOPES Volumes I and II. during the execution planning phase, the supported commander publishes a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) that provides procedures for the deployment, replacement, and redeployment of the operation's forces. The LOI provides instructions and direction to the CINC's components, supporting CINCs, and other members of the JPEC. Also, the supported commander converts an approved COA into

an OPORD. The purpose of the supported commander's OPORD is to provide the components, supporting commands, and agencies a detailed operation plan and to task those involved to prepare for the operation. The supported commander also submits the OPORD to the CJCS for review. The amount of time available will govern the level of activity. A primary deployment concern of the supported commander during execution planning is to ensure that early deploying force requirements are adjusted as required in response to the Alert or Planning Order and to the current situation. When firm force requirements and priorities are established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for sourcing. This signals force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts the Service logistics and personnel offices to adjust sustainment requirements based on the most accurate assessments available. When the above actions have been completed, the supported commander will review the TPFDD and notify USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. The supported commander also requests that the Joint Staff and supporting commands and agencies assist in resolving any critical resource shortfalls or limitations.

Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components During Phase V.

Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for the first increment of deployment. Supporting commanders will develop OPORDs to support the approved COA effectively. The Service component commanders work with the Services and their major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements in JOPES. Service components and supporting commands also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves). USCINCTRANS takes action to provide effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD. USTRANSCOM will apply available transportation assets against the transportation requirement identified by the supported commander and will develop feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules. The level of detail will be commensurate with the availability of detailed movement requirements and the time available for planning. USTRANSCOM establishes air and sea channels for movement of nonunit sustainment and personnel. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM will focus its planning effort on the first increment of the movement requirement.

During Phase V, the Services determine mobilization requirements and take action to request the authority to mobilize. The Services also provide nonunit sustainment and recommend the necessary

actions to improve manpower and industrial readiness. The Services work with the supported commander's components in establishing or updating sustainment requirements. The Service subordinate commands that provide augmentation forces as supporting commands also schedule organic (self-deploying) movements in JOPES.

- **Phase VI—Execution**. Phase VI begins with the decision to execute an OPORD, transmitted by a CJCS Executive Order, and continues until the crisis is resolved satisfactorily. The CJCS, reflecting the decision of the NCA, publishes the Execute Order, issued by authority and direction of The SECDEF, orders the supported commander to execute his OPORD. The Execute Order is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the Execute Order may be the only message provided. In such situations, the CJCS ensures that the Execute Order contains the information normally provided in the warning and alert orders. Throughout the operation, the CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, the CJCS will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP

procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Joint Pubs 5-03.1 and 5-03.2: JOPES Volumes I and II.

Should the NCA desire to increase the deployability posture, position forces, or take other preparatory action that might signal a U.S. intent to respond militarily to a situation, a deployment preparation or deployment order will be published by the CJCS. These orders are issued *by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense* and may be issued at any time throughout the crisis. Deployments or Preparations for Deployment may also be included as part of the Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders and will always require NCA approval.

Activities of the Supported Commander During Phase VI.

The supported commander executes the OPORD and uses JOPES to monitor the force deployments. Incremental force sourcing and lift scheduling continue, with USCINCTRANS managing the deployment process in accordance with the supported commander's force and sustainment priorities. The supported commander reports force or resource shortfalls to the CJCS for resolution. The supported commander employs assigned forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

- *Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components.* The Service component commanders work with the Services and their subordinate commands to continue to provide forces and to report movement requirements within JOPES. Supporting

commanders execute their supporting OPORDs.

- *Activities of USCINCTRANS.* Management of common-user transportation assets needed for movement of forces and sustainment is a function of USCINCTRANS, who will report the progress of the deployment to the CJCS and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the Joint Staff in developing lift allocations and report shortfalls to the Chairman and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the Joint Transportation Board (JTB), as required, during resource deliberations. The Services continue to provide for the sustainment of forces.

Multiple-Crisis Conditions.

Multiple-crisis procedures are used by the JPEC to respond to situations in which more than one crisis is occurring simultaneously. The following procedures define only those procedures unique to multiple-crisis situations. These procedures supplement, but do not replace, those found in the preceding section. Multiple-crisis procedures apply when all of the following conditions are met:

- CAP procedures are in progress for two or more crises.
- Competing demands for combat forces or resources exceed availability.
- The supported commanders are unable to resolve the conflict over combat forces or resources.

Multiple-crisis events may occur in a single theater. The supported commander facing two or more crises may apply multiple-crisis procedures when the available forces or resources are insufficient to carry out assigned missions simultaneously.

Multiple-Crisis Procedures. The procedures unique to multiple crises are provided in the following subparagraphs. The procedures are organized by phases as are single-crisis procedures. Within each phase, activities are described for applicable members of the JPEC.

- **Phase I—Situation Development**. No procedures unique to multiple crises are established in this phase.
- **Phase II—Crisis Assessment**. The key activity in this phase is the exchange of information. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be provided to all the supported commanders involved.
- **Phase III—Course of Action Development**. When publishing warning orders for multiple crises, the CJCS will allocate forces and resources as necessary. Combat forces will be allocated to supported commanders within each warning order. If forces or resources are insufficient, the CJCS will establish planning priorities. The JTB or the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) may be convened, if needed, to allocate the available resources and strategic lift or recommend allocations to the CJCS.

- Activities of the Supported Commanders. The supported commanders will develop COAs using those forces and resources allocated for planning. The effect on mission accomplishment of force, materiel, strategic lift, or other resource shortfalls will be defined briefly in the Commander's Estimate.
- Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. The supporting commanders and Service components allocate CS and CSS forces to the tasked supported commanders. This allocation will be in rough proportion to the CJCS-allocated combat force. If CS and CSS forces are insufficient to meet all tasks, the supporting commanders and Service components will allocate such forces in accordance with priorities established by the CJCS.
- Activities of USCINCTRANS. The command coordinates the preparation of movement requirements and deployment estimates with the supported commanders to resolve potential conflicts in the use of transportation assets, to remain within

port workload constraints, to identify firm movement requirements. Issues that cannot be resolved will be referred to the CJCS.
- Activities of the Services. The Services will take action to identify and alleviate anticipated shortages in supplies and forces. The Services will identify and take action to activate needed Reserve units and personnel.

- **Phase IV—Course of Action Selection**. The primary activity in this phase rests with the CJCS and NCA. In recommending COAs to the NCA, the CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will consider, and brief to the NCA, the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. The briefing will include the impact of multiple deployments on strategic lift and other resources. If resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all supported commanders, the CJCS will brief plans in priority order and recommend that the available resources be based upon these priorities.
- **Phase V—Execution Planning.**
  - Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The primary activity of the CJCS during this phase is the adjudication of conflicting demands for forces, resources, and

strategic lift. The CJCS may convene the Joint Materiel Priorities Analysis Board (JMPAB) or the JTB to resolve resource or strategic lift shortfalls.

– Activities of the Supported Commanders. The supported commanders monitor the process as forces and resources are identified ("sourced") in all the OPLANs being considered. The supported commanders react to conflicts, dual-tasking of units, and resource shortfalls by modifying the concept of operations or by seeking resolution by the CJCS.

– Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. The supporting commanders and Service components seek to allocate forces and resources without conflict (e.g., dual-tasking units) or shortfalls (e.g., unfilled force or resource requirement). The supported commander will be advised of all known unresolved conflicts or shortfalls.

– Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS will examine port workloads and other factors that may be affected by the execution of multiple plans. USCINCTRANS will develop and integrate movement schedules.

– Activities of the Services. The Services will attempt to resolve dual-tasked units and shortfalls by advising the supported commander and Service component commanders of untasked or substitute units. The Services will participate in the JMPAB, assisting the CJCS in resolving resource shortfalls.

- **Phase VI—Execution**. If a force deployment is in progress and a second, more threatening, crisis erupts, the NCA, through the CJCS, may halt existing deployments or order the redeployment of forces. The procedures in Phases I through V of this section apply.

ARMY MOBILIZATION

The framework for mobilization planning within the DOD is provided by the DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP). The MMP provides a conceptual overview of the DOD mobilization planning process and its relationship to the development of military operations plans. It also provides a basis for making mobilization decisions within the DOD and managing the mobilization process to support military operations.

Army participation in joint operations planning and Army planning for mobilization must be integrated processes. Joint Pub 4-05, Mobilization, facilitates integration of these processes by identifying the responsibilities of the JCS, Services, CINCs, transportation component commands, and

Army Mobilization Planning

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    CJCS                                              OSD

  OPLAN                                              DOD MASTER
                        HQDA                      MOBILIZATION PLAN

  ARMY MOBILIZATION & OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

                      MACOM                         MOBILIZATION
                                                        PLAN

                  INSTALLATIONS                     MOBILIZATION
                                                        PLAN
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
Figure 6-9

other agencies engaged in mobilization planning. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, incorporates DOD and CJCS mobilization planning guidance in a single Army publication. It recognizes the close relationship between operations planning and mobilization planning. It provides the means, within the Army, to accomplish both in a coordinated manner. The mobilization plans of Army MACOMs and agencies, together with those of Headquarters, Department of the Army, constitute the Army Mobilization Plan (see Figure 6-9). AMOPES is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of unified commands. AMOPES serves as the Army supplement to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. It provides the interface between the Army's plans to provide forces and resources

and the unified commander's plans to deploy and use them. It also provides a standard set of guidelines for developing these plans and an integrated structure for the planning products.

System Overview.

AMOPES. AMOPES ensures that the Army plans and executes actions necessary to provide the forces and resources to meet requirements of the combatant commanders. It covers a wide range of general functions covering the full course of a military action, conflict, or war. These functions include training, exercises, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, expansion of forces beyond the approved force structure, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstruction of Army forces. The goal of AMOPES is to ensure

that the Army can adequately support all future combat operations of the combatant commanders, as opposed to concentrating only on getting our forces into the theater of operations. AMOPES is also adaptable for planning operations other than war. The system is not just a planning system but also an execution system. The use of OPLAN format, with functional annexes and appendices, emphasizes the operational nature of the system.

Required Mobilization Plans. Each of the following commands/activities will prepare mobilization plans, to include deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution actions when appropriate. Mobilization plans of MACOMs, Army components of unified commands and other army elements as indicated by DCSOPS HQDA are forwarded for review prior to publication. Plans will be prepared in accordance with guidance contained in the AMOPES basic plan and annexes:

- MACOMs
- Army Components of unified commands
- Power Projection Platforms
- Coordinating Installations (AR 5-9)
- Support Installations (AR 5-9)
- Staff Support agencies and Field Operating agencies

Mobilization Files. Mobilization files in place of plans will be maintained as directed by commander FORSCOM or the commanders of the EUSA, USAEUR, USASOC, or USAPAC. The latter will use FORSCOM guidance to develop mobilization files.

The Army Mobilization Plan (AMP). The AMP is a collection of individually published mobilization plans of MACOMs, Army Components of unified commands, and other designated Army elements. The AMP currently consists of Volume I through Volume XIX. AR 500-5 further amplifies responsibility for each volume.

Responsibilities.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, has Army staff responsibility for developing Army mobilization and operations policy and guidance; developing priorities for mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) units; directing the call-up of RC units and preparing them for deployment; and establishing, publishing, and maintaining AMOPES. DCSOPS (DAMO-ODM) will develop, publish, and maintain the Unit Deployment Designator System and use it during contingency planning events. The AMOPES responsibilities include coordinating the structure and content of AMOPES with ARSTAF, MACOM, and other Army activities; tasking agencies and commands to prepare appropriate portions of AMOPES; reviewing agency and command mobilization plans; and ensuring AMOPES guidance, policies, and products satisfy applicable OSD and CJCS guidance and are updated biennially, as a minimum, but not later than 45 days after publication of the JSCP.

Principle DA Officials and Army Staff agencies are responsible for assisting the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of AMOPES pertaining to their respective areas of interest and for mobilization and operational planning activities within their respective functional areas. They disseminate additional guidance to staff support agencies (SSA) and field operating activities (FOA) on related matters

In development of mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization and reconstitution plans and other matters, they review and approve mobilization plans of respective SSAs and FOAs.

Major Commands are responsible for assisting the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of the AMOPES pertaining to their respective mission areas. Major Commands are also responsible for mobilization and operations planning within their respective mission areas and for publishing a command mobilization plan as a volume of the Army Mobilization Plan. Such plans will be submitted to HQDA for review and approval prior to publication. Major Commands are also responsible for compliance with the guidance and procedures published in the AMOPES.

Specific Responsibilities.

FORSCOM Acts as the DA executive agent for CONUS unit mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution planning and execution and for the development, publication and maintenance of UDDS. FORSCOM is also responsible for developing the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS which will standardize CONUS wide policies and procedures for all Army Mobilization efforts for CONUS based Army forces in support of approved military operations.

SOCOM is responsible for the alert notification of all US Army Reserve Component Special Operations Forces (RCSOF) units to include mobilization, validation, deployment, and demobilization for wartime or other assigned missions. SOCOM coordinates with FORSCOM during the mobilization process to ensure

sustainment, training, equipping, and deployment of CONUS based RCSOF is accomplished in a timely manner. SOCOM provides follow-on personnel and equipment to sustain RCSOF units and individual replacements provided to the CINCs.

TRADOC acts as HQDA executive agent for the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) operations. TRADOC will establish and operate CRC which will receive and prepare individuals and filler personnel for onward movement. TRADOC will establish procedures and ensure that the training base infrastructure can be rapidly expanded to support contingency operations and insure that Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are properly assessed, trained and processed for onward movement in time of crisis. As part of the AMOPES, develop and maintain the TRADOC Mobilization Operation Planning and Execution System (TMOPES)

MACOMS/Army Components of Unified Commands support HQDA in developing and maintaining AMOPES and UDDS, assist FORSCOM units to ensure plans to mobilize, deploy, redeploy, demobilize, and reconstitute are sound and workable. Memorandums of Understanding will be initiated with FORSCOM, where appropriate, for execution of the Army Mobilization functions.

MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT

Mobilization, under the concept of Graduated Mobilization Response, is a tool provided to the NCA to respond in varying degrees to crises as they occur. It is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. It is also the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national

AMOPES Subsystems

MILITARY MANPOWER

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

MATERIEL

THEATER FORCE

AMOPES

MAJOR SUBSYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

MAJOR SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL SUBSYSTEMS

POWER PROJECTION PLATFORMS

CONUS BASE

TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT

TRAINING BASE

MEDICAL SUPPORT

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Figure 6-10

emergency. It can include actions up to ordering Reserve Components (RC) to active duty, extension of terms of service, and other actions necessary to transition to a wartime posture. This section provides an overview of the mobilization process within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). It describes the functional subsystems of AMOPES, the types of mobilization, the mobilization process, and the interface with non-DOD agencies.

AMOPES Functional Subsystems.

The primary objective of the Army mobilization process is to mobilize, deploy, and sustain the theater force. The major subsystems involved are theater force units, military manpower, and materiel. Supporting these subsystems are a number of interrelated CONUS-based functionally-oriented subsystems; principally mobilization stations (Power Projection Platforms), the training base, the logistics structure, the medical structure, and transportation support. These subsystems are interrelated as shown in Figure 6-10 and described in more detail below.

Theater Force Units.

The theater force consists of theater force units, military manpower (individuals), and materiel apportioned for deployment to the theater of operations. The objective of the theater force units subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of Army units at ports of embarkation (air and sea) for deployment as prescribed in war plans or as directed by the JCS. The approved force consists of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units. It also may include certain

new, or unresourced, units that would be activated on order.

Active Component. Active Component units do not require mobilization; they are either forward-deployed or designated to support one or more operation plans by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Annex A of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). When an emergency arises, the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert CONUS-based active units through FORSCOM channels (through CINCPAC channels for Hawaii and Alaska-based units). PREPO Units, which deploy by air to link up with prepositioned equipment, turn in equipment that will remain behind, load equipment to accompany troops, load equipment not authorized prepositioning (NAP) and items that may be short in PREPO, and move to a designated airport of embarkation. PREPO shortages may be shipped by air and/or sea as required by the TPFDD. Units with organic equipment load their equipment and move either to an air or seaport of embarkation.

Army National Guard. During peacetime, the preparation of Army National Guard units for mobilization is the responsibility of the State Governor. Guidance is issued to the Governor by HQDA through the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and by FORSCOM and USARPAC to The Adjutants General of the respective States. ARNG units are commanded by the State Governor until federalized. Once federalized, ARNG units become Active Component units under the appropriate MACOM.

Army Reserve. During peacetime, the preparation of Army Reserve units for mobilization is the responsibility of the CG,

FORSCOM through the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC); the Commander, USARPAC; and CINC, USAREUR for assigned Army Reserve units. Army Reserve units are usually apportioned to one or more operations plans or designated to support the CONUS sustaining base. Selected later-deploying units may receive interim assignments to augment a particular element in the CONUS base. ARPERCEN is responsible for the management and continued training of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Retired Reserve. These pools provide for the largest resource of pretrained soldiers. ARPERCEN executes its peacetime mission through direction of OCAR and, on order of DCSPER, orders to active duty selected numbers of individuals.

Unresourced and New Units. FORSCOM prepares, in coordination with each supported CINC, a proposed activation schedule for each major planning scenario identified in the JSCP. Changes emanating from the CINC's response to biennial JSCP guidance (TPFDD shortfall), TAA determinations of which units in the required force structure will be unresourced, and structure changes reflected in POM development will all be considered in the development of the proposed Unit Activation Schedule (UAS). The prioritized activations will include additional support units required to sustain the current force. In preparing this activation schedule, close attention will be given to recognized equipment availability constraints, particularly major weapon systems. The composition of the proposed UAS and the recommended priorities will be reviewed and approved by HQDA.

Unit Deployment and Designator system (UDDS). An umbrella system

designed to integrate DOD policy and the strategic objectives in the JSCP, with the training, doctrine, and readiness criteria essential to the integration of the Army Reserve Components with active components for contingencies. It clarifies the amount of post-mobilization training time programmed for reserve component units and assists in prioritization of unit training time required following mobilization.

The Army WARTRACE Program. The Army WARTRACE program organizes the total force into cohesive groupings of Active and Reserve (ARNG and USAR) units based on contingency mission requirements. The primary objective is to train in peacetime in the alignment configuration the unit will go to war. The program is governed by AR 11-30 and FORSCOM Reg 11-30. Headquarters FORSCOM is the coordinating authority for the WARTRACE program. The peacetime commander has primary responsibility for execution of the WARTRACE program. This is accomplished through notification of alignment, ensuring training and resourcing are focused on wartime mission, and monitoring subordinate units' receipt of mission guidance. The wartime gaining command is responsible for providing mission guidance to all units within their WARTRACE program. This guidance, as a minimum, will contain the unit's wartime mission, area of employment, and the recommended priorities for planning and training.

Military Manpower. The objective of the military manpower subsystem is to ensure full and timely use of all available sources of individual military manpower to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment, sustain the deployed force with trained fillers and replacements, and provide mobilization augmentation for the CONUS sustaining base. Prior Service personnel are grouped generally by their training status. Pretrained individual manpower (PIM) is a generic term consisting of the following manpower categories: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), Standby Reserve (SBR), and the Retired Reserve. Qualified individuals in these categories are the primary source of manpower to reinforce Active Component and Reserve Component units during the early phases of mobilization. Unskilled individuals, principally IRR members whose skills have eroded, or who were transferred to the IRR in lieu of discharge prior to the completion of initial entry training, will be ordered to an appropriate training center to complete training. Each of these PIM categories is explained further in Chapter 7. Nonprior Service personnel include Selective Service inductees, delayed entry enlistees, and volunteer enlistees who, by law, require a minimum of 12 weeks training prior to deployment.

Selective Service inductees constitute the largest single source of postmobilization manpower. Delayed entry personnel are active and reserve enlistees who are high school graduates or students awaiting graduation, and reserve unit members who have completed basic training and are awaiting advanced training.

Replacement centers to process and equip nonunit-related individual replacements will be established by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at sites normally collocated with Army Training Centers. These CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) are close to the Air Force Air Mobility Command designated airfields with strategic lift capability. In

addition to final preparation of replacements for oversea movement, Preparation for Overseas Relacement, (POR), CRCs will issue individual clothing, equipment, and weapons.

Materiel. The objective of the materiel subsystem is to ensure the full and timely availability of adequate military materiel to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment and to sustain the deployed force in accordance with requirements and priorities. Sources of supplies and equipment include the organic equipment of deploying and nondeploying units, PREPO Unit Residual (left behind) Equipment (PURE), and that equipment scheduled for delivery through procurement and maintenance channels.

War Reserve Materiel Stocks (WRMS) consist of military materiel acquired in peacetime to meet military requirements at the outbreak of war until the sustaining production base can be established. WRMS are acquired to meet the War Reserve Materiel Requirement (WRMR) established in the Army Guidance.

Power Projection Platforms (PPP). The objective of the mobilization stations subsystem, now called PPPs, is to ensure the orderly expansion of Army posts, camps, and stations and their timely ability to receive, house, supply, train, and deploy theater force units. There are 15 designated PPP, and 12 Power Support Platforms. PPPs develop mobilization TDAs (MOBTDAs) based on guidance provided by their parent MACOM to enable mobilization stations to meet surge population and operational requirements. Expansion of mobilization services is accomplished by deleting nonmission-essential services; extending the workweek; executing option clauses in existing

contracts; and contracting for personnel and services.

When mobilized units arrive at their designated PPP, command passes to the commander. The PPP commander is responsible for correcting readiness deficiencies that restrict the deployment readiness of the units. He cross-levels personnel and equipment in accordance with established HQDA policies and priorities and FORSCOM/USARPAC instructions. He is responsible for unit training and deployment validation in accordance with HQDA policy as implemented by FORSCOM/USARPAC.

Training Base. The objective of the training base subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of trained manpower to mobilize for CONUS base support and theater force requirements. TRADOC and HQDA are responsible for operating the component organizations which comprise the postmobilization training base, induction centers, reception stations, training centers, and Service schools.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (ODCSPER) is the agent for DOD and all matters pertaining to the operation of the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) and the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), also known as induction centers. MEPCOM, through the MEPS, is responsible for providing facilities for conducting physical and mental examinations, and inducting qualified registrants into the Armed Forces.

The Army's capability for receiving and processing enlistees, inductees, and other accessions will be increased in the event of mobilization. The existing reception stations (all collocated with existing TRADOC training centers) will be expanded. USAR training divisions/brigades will be

mobilized to increase the capacity of TRADOC training centers and establish new training centers at selected FORSCOM installations. This is important, especially during any MRC, however it seldom happens or is very limited during OOTW.

The capacity and capability of the Army Service Schools will also be expanded. The existing TRADOC Service School structure will be expanded and selected United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools will be mobilized to expand the capability of designated TRADOC Service Schools and to augment the U.S. Army Training Centers.

AMC provides extensive refresher and skill sustainment training for both ARNG and USAR units and individuals during peacetime and specialized postmobilization training in accordance with existing agreements.

Logistics Support System. The objective of the logistics support system is to provide logistical support to meet mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the Total Army. Supply, maintenance, services, and facilities capabilities must be expanded to deploy and sustain the force.

The Army will expand its supply storage, handling, procurement, and production capabilities. Storage policies will be relaxed to permit open storage on improved and unimproved sites, public warehouses, and contractor facilities. The waiving of formal advertising and competitive bidding will expedite the ability to procure goods and services. Suppliers will accelerate deliveries by going to multishift production operations. A major objective of the supply system will be to expedite the availability of needed materiel for entry into the transportation subsystem and responsive

delivery to the recipient. The Army will call on the existing (wartime) authority to utilize the national industrial base for preplanned production and buy, lease, or contract for goods and services from any available commercial source.

Upon mobilization, the Army maintenance structure has several immediate goals. It absorbs Reserve Component combat service support units, executes emergency civilian hiring procedures in accordance with mobilization TDAs, and implements already negotiated maintenance contracts and interservice and Federal agency support agreements. Mission-essential items receive the highest priority of maintenance effort. First priority will go to equipment items for deployed and/or deploying theater force units. Equipment in excess of mobilization needs left behind by deploying units would be second priority and third would be specific items identified and managed by HQDA.

It will be necessary to expand troop service support (food services, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, and mortuary) to accommodate the expanded mobilization station population. Service facilities at newly activated mobilization stations will be renovated utilizing available materiel, funds, and manpower. As required, support units will be tasked to provide mobilization stations with unit facilities and equipment until general support force units can assume these functions.

The Army production base is comprised of Army-controlled industrial activities and contractor facilities. Included in these industrial activities are active and inactive ammunition plants, arsenals and proving grounds, missile plants, and other miscellaneous plants. These facilities are to be activated or expanded to provide

maximum wartime levels of production of materiel.

Expansion of the CONUS training and sustaining base facilities will be required under full mobilization. Initially, expansion of capacity will be achieved from immediate cessation of nonessential activities; relaxation of space, environmental, and other constraining criteria; and the rehabilitation of facilities using available labor and the self-help effort of using units. New facilities construction will feature modern prefabrication technology to provide increased living, storage, and work space needed early in the postmobilization buildup period.

Medical Support. As dictated by crisis action, U.S. Army hospitals will initiate conversion to their planned mobilization configuration to accommodate the vastly increased military population and expected theater force casualties. Health care services (inpatient and outpatient) will be limited to active duty military personnel, with the exception that outpatient occupational health services will continue for civil service employees. All nonmilitary inpatients will be discharged or transferred to civilian or other federal hospitals as expeditiously as possible.

The civilian health and medical program of uniformed services (CHAMPUS) advisory offices will assist eligible beneficiaries in completing administrative requirements for procuring health care from civilian sources. With the approval of the Commander, Medical Command (MEDCOM), and the Office of The Surgeon General, HQDA, inpatient services may be continued beyond M-Day to D-Day for family members and retirees (if M-Day and D-Day do not coincide). Medical Center/Medical Department Activity Commanders may continue outpatient services for family members and retirees as resources permit.

Transportation Support. The objective of the transportation support subsystem is to move the Total Force (units and materiel) within CONUS, and to and from overseas commands. Overall responsibility for transportation support is vested in USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands. Intra-CONUS movements of mobilizing units and materiel are coordinated by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) in cooperation with installation transportation officers and various state and local agencies. Strategic transportation to and from overseas theaters is the responsibility of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Air Force Air Mobility Command (AFAMC), the other two component commands.

Management of the surface lines of communication is split among MTMC, MSC, and the theater commanders. MTMC is responsible for CONUS line-haul and common-user terminal operations. MSC is charged with ship contracting and scheduling. The theater commander manages intratheater surface movements. The schedule for cargo movement and port operations must interface with the schedule for ships. Port throughput capacity, both in CONUS and in a theater of operations, is a major consideration and is often a limiting factor. Finally, surface transportation planning procedures must be flexible enough to allow planners to adjust to exigencies such as ship or port losses.

Reserve Categories and Mobilization

Ready Reserve | **Standby Reserve**

**Selected Reserve
[TPU, AGR, IMA]**

**Individual Ready Reserve
[Control Group (AT), Control Group (Reinf)]**

PSRC

**Standby Reserve
[Control Grp Standby (Active),
Control Grp Standby (Inactive),
Control Group (Ineligible)]**

Partial Mob

Retired Reserve

Full Mob

Total Mob

Figure 6-11

AFAMC is responsible for airlift operations. To meet response times postulated by the JSCP, planners must be able to develop and maintain flow plans that can be executed rapidly. This capability requires detailed planning among the users of common-user airlift assets. In addition, AFAMC requires 3-4 days to achieve a full-surge airlift capability. This time is required to marshal Active Air Force elements and to mobilize and position essential Air National Guard and Air Reserve units. Therefore, to develop realistic flow plans, planners must carefully balance airlift requirements with capabilities until a full surge capability can be achieved and maintained. A limiting factor to U.S. airlift capability is the availability of SAC tanker resources which are periodically tasked to support other national-level operations. Planners must consider the potential availability of tanker resources when developing flow plans and must closely coordinate with other claimants for refueling aircraft. USTRANSCOM coordinates and monitors time-sensitive planning and execution of force and resupply movements for deployment of CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat forces. It also coordinates deployment planning with Navy and Marine Corps forces. (These deployments should not be confused with the normal rotation of units, ships, squadrons, etc. in peacetime.) USTRANSCOM assists the CJCS in resolving transportation shortfalls with supported and supporting commanders, military transportation agencies, and the Services.

Types of Mobilization.

Generally, the magnitude of the emergency governs the type of mobilization.

As authorized by law or congressional resolution and when directed by the President, the Department of Defense (DOD) mobilizes all or part of the Armed Forces. Concurrently, the DOD and other Federal agencies marshal national resources in order to sustain the mobilized force. Reference figure 6-11, Reserve Categories and Mobilization.

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). The President may augment the active forces by a call-up (involuntary) of units and individuals of the Selected Reserve, up to 200,000 persons, from all Services, for up to 270 days, to meet an operational requirement. The President must notify Congress whenever he uses this authority to call up the RC.

Selective Mobilization. For a domestic emergency, the President (or Congress, upon special action) may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by activation of RC units and/or individual Reservists to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, federal property, and functions, or to prevent disruption of federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

Partial Mobilization. For a contingency operation or war plan or upon declaration of a national emergency, Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) by mobilization (involuntary) of up to one million persons of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to 24 months. Actually, only the President is limited by the one-million-person ceiling

and 24-month limit. Congress may specify other limits in a partial mobilization implemented with a congressional declaration of national emergency.

Full Mobilization. Full mobilization requires passage by Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the approved force structure, all individual Reservists, and the materiel resources needed for this expanded force structure. Terms of service may be extended to the duration of the war plus six months under this authority. For both planning and operations, Mobilization Day (M-Day) is the day full mobilization occurs.

Total Mobilization. Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces beyond the approved force structure by organizing and/or activating additional units to respond to requirements of the emergency. The national resources— to include production facilities—to sustain additional forces will also be mobilized. Congressional authorization is required for these actions.

Mobilization Authority.

The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or Congress as outlined in the stages of mobilization shown in Figure 6-12. An example of the USAR Participation on the Mobilization Continuum is shown in Figure 6-13, Operational and Mobilization Continum. A national emergency may be declared by the President, Congress, or both. The National Emergencies Act passed in 1976 provides that when the President declares a national emergency he must specify in the declaration or subsequent executive order the specific authorities he is invoking. His powers are

STAGES OF MOBILIZATION

AUTHORITY LIMITS	• EXPAND BEYOND THE APPROVED PEACETIME RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE • DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS • DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY				
	• ALL EXISTING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE • DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS • DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY				TOTAL MOBILIZATION
	• 1 MILLION ALL SERVICES • 24 MONTHS • DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY			FULL MOBILIZATION	
SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION	• 200K ALL SERVICES • 270 DAYS W/ NO EXTENSION • PRESIDENTIAL ORDER		PARTIAL MOBILIZATION		
	*	PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP			
AUTHORITY TYPE	SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION				
CRISIS LEVEL	DOMESTIC EMERGENCY	OOTW OR LRC	1 OR 2 MRC	2 PLUS MRC	GLOBAL WAR

* PERSONNEL AND DURATION BASED UPON SITUATION

Figure 6-12

limited to those invoked until he subsequently announces the invoking of additional specific authorities. Once the President declares a national emergency for a specific purpose, the national emergency will remain in effect for one year, unless sooner rescinded or extended. Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, all executive orders must be published in the *Federal Register.*

The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and recommendation of the Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), recommends to the President and the Congress the mobilization authority required to support a given contingency, OPLAN, or national emergency. The SECDEF directs mobilization of Reserve Component units and manpower through the military departments.

OPERATIONAL & MOBILIZATION CONTINUUM

PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE

DOMESTIC ENGAGEMENT/MOOTW

WARFIGHTING

HI

HURRICANE ANDREW, ANIKI

FLOODS IN MIDWEST GEORGIA, TEXAS

NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE

PANAMA

GRENADA

HAITI

OOTW

BOSNIA

INITIATION OF OPEN HOSTILITIES

DESERT SHIELD/STORM

IRAQ AGAIN

KOREA

2 MRCs?

PSRC   PARTIAL MOB   FULL MOB

INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

LO   HI

VOLUNTEERS   UNITS, IMA, DIMA   INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RETIRED RESERVE

PEACE   CONFLICT   WAR

USAR PARTICIPATION ON THE MOBILIZATION CONTINUUM

Figure 6-13

Peacetime Planning.

The Army plans and prepares for mobilization in peacetime. It participates in war planning to establish Army forces and the requirements for their augmentation. It programs and budgets resources and acts to man, equip, and train the Total Army and to prepare for its employment during a war or other national emergency. Planning is accomplished in accordance with the provisions of the JOPES and AMOPES. This peacetime planning essentially consists of war planning, intended to develop the OPLANs for the conduct of operations (addressed earlier in the chapter and in Chapter 4) and mobilization planning.

DOD Mobilization Planning Process. Mobilization planning, primarily a

Service responsibility, is based on guidance from OSD and JCS. OSD guidance is included in the biennial Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (see Chapter 4). JCS guidance is contained in the JSCP (see Chapter 10). In addition, Joint Pub 4-05, Mobilization, assigns general responsibilities and procedures for mobilization. The JCS coordinates the mobilization plans of the Services and ensures the interface of these plans with deployment.

Mobilization Planning in Other Federal Departments and Agencies. In addition to DOD, approximately 50 Federal departments and agencies have emergency planning responsibilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the Federal Government coordinator of these emergency management activities in both peace and war. FEMA's responsibilities

include policy guidance and planning to ensure that government at all levels is able to cope with and recover from emergencies. FEMA assesses national civil mobilization capabilities and develops concepts, plans, and systems for management of national resources. It identifies actual and potential shortages in natural, industrial, economic, and other resources; develops plans to mitigate their national security impacts; and fosters programs to reduce our national vulnerability to such resource shortages. FEMA is the principal respondent to military requirements for civilian sector resources during mobilization. It coordinates the response of the civil agencies to defense needs, always cognizant that without the might of the Nation's industrial production, transportation networks, work force, financial institutions, energy, and natural resources, there could be no national security. Likewise, without food, clothing, housing, health care, and education, there would be no civilian population to support the defense of our way of life and our constitutional government. FEMA must, therefore, see to it that national resources are used to meet both the military and the essential civilian needs of the nation.

Army Mobilization Planning. The purpose of Army mobilization planning is to provide the resources required to support various OPLANs. This includes mobilizing the units, manpower, and materiel required for immediate implementation of an OPLAN as well as the resources required to sustain the operation.

AMOPES incorporates the guidance of the DPG, JSCP, and Joint Pub 4-05, and specifies the planning process used to develop HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans. The FORSCOM Mobilization Plan, with its associated FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), details the time-phased flow of mobilizing RC units from home stations to their mobilization stations. The TRADOC Mobilization Operational Planning and Execution System (TMOPES)provides installations and training base augmentation units in the USAR with guidance on training base expansion activities.

Relationships of War Planning and Mobilization Planning. AMOPES provides the linkage between war planning under JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) and mobilization planning as directed by DOD and the JCS. AMOPES establishes the who, what, where, why and how of mobilization. It further prescribes the Army Crisis Action System for managing the execution of mobilization and operation plans. The principal products of AMOPES are prepared executable plans, supporting information, and data bases prepared and maintained for use during national crises.

Mobilization plans incorporate the specific actions and responsibilities which must be accomplished both in peacetime and upon the order to mobilize. The HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans which constitute the Army Mobilization Plan (AMP) are based on guidance contained in AMOPES and other documents. Most mobilization plans are oriented toward full mobilization. (See figure 6-14). For selected contingencies, however, the Army has developed partial mobilization plans.

MOBILIZATION
EXECUTION PROCESS

MOBILIZATION PHASE	PHASE 1 PRE-MOB	PHASE 2 ALERT	PHASE 3 HOME STATION	PHASE 4 POWER PROJECTION PLATFORMS	PHASE 5 PORT OF EMBARKATION
PRIMARY ACTIVITY LOCATION	HOME STATION (ARMORY OR USAR CENTER)	HOME STATION (ARMORY OR USAR CENTER)	HOME STATION (ARMORY OR USAR CENTER)	Power Projection Platforms	AIR OR SEA PORT
ACTIVITY DURATION (DAYS)	AS TIME PERMITS	3 to 7 DAYS	3 DAYS	10 to 180 DAYS	1 to 2 DAYS
PRIMARY ACTIVITY	• MOB PLANNING • TRAINING • SOLDIER READINESS PROCESSING	• UNIT RECALL • MOB ORDER PREP • PERSONNEL SCREENING • EQUIP. RECORDS CHECK	• CONTINUE SRP • INVENTORY EQUIP. • CROSS LEVEL PER./ EQUIPMENT • LOAD FOR MVMT. • ADV. PARTY TO MS	• MOVE TO PPP • COMPLETE SRP • CONDUCT TNG • COMPLETE CROSS LEVEL • COMPLETE VALID. • LOAD FOR MVMT.	• MOVE TO POE • LOAD TRANSPORT. • DEPLOY
OUTCOME	PLANNING	NOTIFICATION	PREPARATION	VALIDATION	DEPLOYMENT

Figure 6-14

Peacetime Preparation.

Preparation for mobilization proceeds concurrently with planning. The Army programs, budgets, and funds resources to overcome the shortfalls and limiting factors identified from a continuing analysis of the various operations plans. Concurrently, the Army trains units and individuals. Within its capabilities, it identifies and preassigns augmenting manpower and prepositions materiel to support those plans.

Alert, Mobilization, and Deployment.

On receiving the order to mobilize, the Army begins a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC), a partial or full mobilization, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, of RC units, pretrained manpower, and materiel. A portion or all of the mobilizing force may augment an established theater force such as Europe, or may augment a force deployed in a contingency operation. Under the general supervision of HQDA, FORSCOM, USAREUR, and USARPAC bring Active and Reserve Component units to combat-ready status and then deploy them by air and sea to the area(s) of operation according to the deployment plans. An initial pool of reserve materiel resources exists in war reserve stocks in the continental United States and prepositioned stocks in overseas areas.

The initial resources sustain the deployed force until reinforcement and resupply pipelines can be established or the emergency is resolved. Active Component units in place in the theater of operations are referred to as "forward-presence" units. Other AC units, most of them CONUS-

based, are earmarked by FORSCOM war plans to support one or more requirements of the JSCP and AMOPES. When an emergency arises, units are alerted through FORSCOM, USAREUR, or USARPAC channels to deploy to the theater of operations in accordance with applicable OPLANs.

Reserve Component units (ARNG and USAR) are ordered to active duty by mobilization orders transmitted by HQDA through FORSCOM/ USARPAC command channels. Units may be apportioned to support one or more OPLANs or they may be apportioned to become part of the CONUS base.

FORSCOM Mobilization Planning.

FORSCOM publishes the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), FORSCOM Regulation 500-3, based on HQDA guidance contained in AMOPES. FORMDEPS contains planning directives and guidance to MACOM commanders, CONUSA, Major Troop Units, FORSCOM Installation Commanders, other MACOM Installation Commanders, State Adjutants General (in consonance with NGB), and the major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC). FORMDEPS also contains annexes on the various functional aspects of mobilization and updates the Mobilization Planning and Execution System (MPES) based on OPLAN TPFDD. FORSCOM coordinates with USASOC, TRADOC, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, MTMC, AMC, and NGB in preparing MPES data. The MPES includes scenario dependent data on all AC and RC deploying and nondeploying MTOE and TDA units in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). The MPES includes the following data (as applicable) for these units:

- Unit description, component, and home station.
- Power Projection Platform Data
- Unit Mobilization Data (notional).
- Ready-to-Load Dates.
- Deployment data for the applicable TPFDD(s).

Mobilization Flow. Mobilization execution is decentralized to major commands. FORSCOM, USARPAC, and USAREUR are the principal MACOMs which command mobilizing Reserve Component units. Other MACOMs (USASOC, TRADOC, MEDCOM, AMC, and MTMC) assume command of designated nondeploying units. Upon receiving the order to mobilize, most Reserve Component units move to one of 15 PPPs within the two CONUS Army areas and the USARPAC area to train before deploying or augmenting the CONUS base. Cross-leveling of equipment and personnel assets, required to make units mission-capable, takes place primarily at PPPs. AMC provides wholesale management for materiel. PERSCOM serves in a similar management role for personnel. Medical Command expands medical support services and facilities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers expands troop housing, training, industrial, and other facilities.

INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS

In the post-Cold War era when global conflicts are unlikely, we must maintain a viable industrial base that can replenish expenditures of critical war material following regional conflicts or operations other than war in a timely manner. Most future conflicts will be short-lived, "come as you are" actions. The industrial base will not be called upon to sustain the deployed

forces, but to expeditiously replace losses in order to be prepared for another contingency.

DOD Industrial Base Preparedness Objectives.

OSD's objectives for improving the preparedness of our nation's industrial base to meet contingency requirements have changed radically in recent years. There are six objectives set forth in the Defense Planning Guidance:

- Promote a strong, technologically-advanced industrial base able to develop, produce, and support advanced military systems in a cost-effective manner.
- Foster integration of the civilian and military industrial and technology base by: encouraging and using commercial technologies in military equipment to the maximum extent feasible; eliminating defense-unique specifications and standards wherever possible; and demonstrating a clear preference for commercial and other nondevelopmental items, as well as commercial buying and manufacturing practices, to the extent permitted by law.
- Preserve only those unique defense-related skills, facilities, processes and technologies essential to execute the program, or that are highly likely to be essential beyond the program, and not likely to be economically reconstitutable, or available from other nondomestic sources. This includes cost-effective investments in layaway/shutdown procedures for

those assets deemed essential to support requirements; e.g., storage of blueprints, videotapes, data files, or other documentation of the production processes/skills and, where necessary, storage of production equipment and tooling, etc.

- Maintain real growth in industrial preparedness planning funding levels. Use the funding to support planning and to accomplish the first three objectives.
- Program industrial preparedness measures to permit accelerated production of only those munitions, critical support items, and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to full war reserve inventories.
- Reduce weapon system support costs without sacrificing readiness or wartime mission capability. Near-term actions are desired that will result in outyear support cost reductions.

The DOD strategy that can be inferred from these objectives is relatively straightforward. To begin with, the focus is on producing advanced military systems cost-effectively. The next objective deals with utilizing commercial and dual-use technology by eliminating defense peculiar specifications and standards whenever possible. The next two deal with retention and enhancement of the industrial base. Retention will only be undertaken for those essential unique defense-related processes and technologies which cannot be economically replaced or substituted. Enhancement of the industrial base (Industrial Preparedness Measures) will only be employed to accelerate production of

critical items where economically advantageous to retention of assets.

DOD-Level Industrial Preparedness Management.

It is DOD policy to maintain a state of industrial preparedness by working with private industry to produce, maintain, and repair materiel that meets mobilization requirements. Where it is determined that required mobilization items cannot be provided by the private sector, then Government-owned facilities and equipment are acquired and maintained to produce them. Overall responsibility for managing the DOD Industrial Preparedness Program is vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (ASD(ES)). The Office of the ASD (ES) develops policy to ensure the rapid and coordinated production of materiel to meet mission requirements; providing a basis for planning, programming, and budgeting relating to improving industrial base responsiveness; and it directs the industrial preparedness programs of the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). It develops procedures to guide the allocation of available industrial production capacity for contingencies to avoid conflicts or overcommitment. The ASD (ES) is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the relative urgency of acquisition programs. The recommendations are presented as the DOD Master Urgency List (MUL) and provide the priority basis for assigning production resources. The DOD MUL includes the items and quantities in the highest national priority or the highest DOD urgency categories. Essential support items are assigned to the same urgency category as their end items. National and military urgency categories have been established in the following order of precedence:

- BRICK-BAT programs have the highest national priority by reason of key political, scientific, psychological, or military objectives.
- CUE-CAP programs are selected military, research and development, and industrial programs and projects of the highest DOD priority based on military criticality.

BRICK-BAT items must be approved by the President. These items are assigned a Highest Defense Order Priority Rating (DX), indicating the highest national priority. All BRICK-BAT items are of equal priority.

CUE-CAP items must be approved by the Secretary of Defense. These items are arranged in descending order of priority within each category. All CUE-CAP items that take priority rankings will be used to determine resource use. Since the production of every item needed by the Services is prohibitively expensive, the key to a successful industrial preparedness program is the careful selection of critical materiel on which to apply scarce resources. The following exemplify this management philosophy.

The Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS). This system is used to assure the availability of an adequate supply of industrial resources for defense requirements. Title I of the Defense Production Act (50 USC app. 2061, et seq.) requires priority performance on contracts and orders to allocate materials and facilities as necessary or appropriate for national defense over other contracts or orders. In the event of a problem in the acceptance, scheduling, or shipment of a properly rated

DOD contract, there exists a special priorities assistance procedure to alleviate the issue. Commonly, special priorities assistance is provided to expedite deliveries, resolve delivery conflicts, place rated orders, or locate suppliers.

The National Defense Stockpile. The Federal Government maintains a supply of strategic and critical materials in order to decrease the costly and dangerous dependence upon foreign sources in time of national emergency. It requires that the inventory be sufficient to cover U.S. needs for not less than three years of national emergency. The Secretary of Defense is the single manager for the stockpile.

DOD Key Facilities List (KFL). This is a list of facilities of such importance that loss through sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or other hostile acts would seriously impair the national defense posture of the United States. FORSCOM uses these documents in fulfilling its responsibility for CONUS land defense planning.

Army Industrial Preparedness Program. The DOD-level management philosophy applies to the Army's Industrial Preparedness Program as well. The Army depends on private industry as the foundation for production of military materiel. Therefore, when Army production facilities or depot-level maintenance do not exist, first consideration will be given to developing private industrial facilities which produce critically-needed items. Management tools available include the following:

Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP). This planning is conducted to ensure that an adequate industrial base is established, maintained, and retained to be responsive to military materiel requirements in the event of an emergency. It involves the assessment of the capability of the industrial base to support peacetime and emergency operations, and planning with industry to ensure adequate procurement, production, and maintenance capabilities to meet support requirements.

DA Critical Items List (DACIL). This is a list prepared by HQDA (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) which provides biennially a priority list of items which would be required to sustain warfighting for either an indefinite or surge contingency. It also provides stable mobilization requirements to support planning with industry. The DACIL is the basic document from which industrial preparedness planning is conducted.

Industrial Preparedness Planning List (IPPL). This list is prepared by Army Materiel Command (AMC) from the DACIL. The IPPL consists of critical items having long lead-time components, components requiring special manufacturing skills, or other production challenges which require detailed planning.

Production Base Analysis (PBA). This describes the status of the Army's industrial readiness. It shows the base required for production and depot-level maintenance of IPPL items. Contingency production requirements are matched against the capacity of the industrial base, and actions needed to improve base readiness are identified

Industrial Preparedness Measures (IPMs). These are actions to aid industry to overcome production deficiencies in the

Army's industrial base. IPMs are designed to shorten production lead time, increase production or repair capacity, and reduce inspection time. IPMs for accelerated production will only be used where this is a cost-effective alternative to stockpiling.

SUMMARY

The utility of the Army to the nation depends to a large extent on whether its forces can be rapidly and effectively mobilized, deployed, employed, and sustained. The process of planning for contingencies or for eventualities that Army forces are needed somewhere to accomplish specified tasks, is a continuous, all-encompassing process. It includes all aspects of Army management, be it manpower procurement, training, materiel development, or fiscal assets and constraints.

Central to the task of reinforcing existing active forces is the ability to mobilize Reserve Component assets and to deploy them with the least possible delay to the theater where they will be needed. In rare cases the U.S. Industrial Base will be called upon to accelerate production to directly support the deployed forces. The industrial base will normally be utilized to repair and replace the damaged/destroyed equipment and munitions expenditures following the conflict.

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(5) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (Planning Forums and Guidance),* 1 June 1996.
(6) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-03-3, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (Automated Data System Support).*
(7) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, *Joint Training Manual,* 21 May 1992.
(8) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 700-90: Army Industrial Base Program,* 1 April 1992.
(9) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Mobilization , 7 June 1996.*
(10) U.S. Department of the Army, *FORSCOM Regulation 500-3*: *FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMSDEP), Vols. 1-10 (U).* Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, January 1991 - March 1993.
(11) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 11-30: The Army WARTRACE Program,* 28 July 1995.
(12) U.S. Department of the Army, *FORSCOM Regulation 11-30: The Army CAPSTONE Program,* 19 June 1989.

CHAPTER 7

RESERVE COMPONENTS

"A total force simply reflects that we are a total force. When I talk about America's Army, I'm really talking about the Active Army, United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. We have got to make that reality. We've been working on that for some time. It is really improving, and we need to continue to make it work. It has to go that way."

General Dennis J. Reimer, CSA
Address to the Reserve Officer's Association
23 January 1996

INTRODUCTION

In this and other addresses, the Chief of Staff and other Army leaders talk in terms of changes to and impacts upon the Total Army since the end of the Cold War. Traditionally, demands upon the Army to accomplish the missions to which the CSA referred have been accomplished using a mix of Active and Reserve Component forces. The power-projection force of today is somewhat different; we can *only* accomplish those missions using a mix of Active and Reserve Component forces. The Reserve Components are vital to mission accomplishment.

The reserve forces of the Army consist of two components: the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). These forces, which are referred to in this chapter as Reserve Components (RC), together with the Active Component (AC) and the Civilian Component (Department of the Army

Civilians), make up the Army of the United States.

THE NATIONAL GUARD (ORIGINS/HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)

The National Guard is an important link in a unique American tradition tracing its origin back to the militia in 1636. Many Guard units in the eastern U.S. can trace lineage back to local militia organizations who fought on the side of the British during the French and Indian War and later against the British in the Battle for Independence.

The term "National Guard" was first used to honor the Marquis de Lafayette. On his visit to New York in 1824, the American honor guard was renamed the "Battalion of National Guards" in tribute to Lafayette's command of the Garde Nationale of the French Army in Paris during 1789. With the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916),

the term "National Guard" became the official name.

The NDA-1916 expanded the role of the National Guard in national defense. Though the Guard remained a state force, increased federal oversight and assistance was a direct result of the act. NDA-1916 increased the number of times a National Guard unit was brought together for training called drills. These drill periods increased from twenty-four to forty-eight periods of four hour duration. Additionally, it authorized National Guard units to perform fifteen consecutive days of paid Annual Training (AT), paid for the drill periods, and increased overall federal funding. NDA-1916 also required National Guard units to be organized like Active Army units, established federal standards for commissioning officers in the Guard, and gave the President authority to mobilize the National Guard in case of war or national emergency.

Following World War I, questions arose over the National Guard's status and existence that were ultimately resolved in the National Defense Act of 1933. The 1933 Act created a new Army component, the National Guard of the United States, identical in personnel and units to the States' National Guard. This new component was part of the Army, and could be ordered into federal service by the President when Congress declared a national emergency. The National Guard by statute is the primary reserve force for the Active Army. At the same time, the Guard provided the state governors a force for disaster relief, maintaining public peace, and a force to be utilized during state and local emergencies in the several states and territories, when in a State Status.

The National Guard has made significant contributions to the Army's combat power throughout this century. The National Guard provided 17 of the 43 divisions in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I. The 30th Division, made up of Guardsmen from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, received the highest number of Medals of Honor in the AEF.

In World War II, total mobilization was ordered and National Guard units were some of the first to fight. New Mexico's 200th Coast Artillery and two newly created tank battalions helped in the defense of the Philippines and soldiered on with their Regular Army counterparts as prisoners of war after U.S. forces surrendered on the Bataan peninsula and Corregidor. Eighteen National Guard divisions fought in World War II, equally divided between the European and Pacific theaters. The first division to deploy overseas, the 34th Division, was a National Guard division. National Guard divisions were an instrumental part of General MacArthur's island hopping campaign in the Pacific theater. In the European theater, National Guard divisions participated in all campaigns from North Africa, to Sicily and Italy, to the Normandy Invasion and subsequent breakout, the race across France, the Battle of the Bulge, and the final campaign to conquer Germany. Following World War II, the Air National Guard was formed and remains part of the National Guard.

The Korean War was a partial mobilization of the National Guard. A total of 138,600 soldiers were mobilized, including eight infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams. Two of these divisions served in Korea, two went to Europe, and four remained in the U.S. to help reconstitute the strategic reserve.

During the Vietnam War the National Guard played a much smaller role than in the past. This was primarily a political decision not to mobilize the country's reserve components. After the Tet Offensive of January 1968, a small number of RC units were mobilized, including thirty-four Guard units. Most were support units.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Reserve Component units were on active duty within days after the invasion of Kuwait. The majority of the Army's combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units were in the RC. A majority of the first Guard units mobilized were transportation, quartermaster, and military police units. Later two ARNG field artillery brigades were deployed to Southwest Asia providing essential fire support capabilities. In total, 62,411 ARNG personnel were ordered to active federal service of which 37,848 deployed to Southwest Asia.

Today as a result of the Total Force Policy and recent agreements between the Active Component and the Reserve Components, the ARNG now contains over half of the Army's combat force structure. The ARNG is currently structured with eight combat divisions and fifteen separate combat brigades. The fifteen separate combat brigades receive additional federal resources in structure, funding, personnel, equipment, and training. These fifteen brigades are referred to as Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB), and are apportioned to warfighting in support of the AC. The ARNG also has the only two RC Special Forces Groups, which are part of Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The ARNG is also structured with Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support units. Many of these units are considered high priority and apportioned to support AC forces.

THE ARMY RESERVE (ORIGINS/HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)

Whereas the National Guard evolved from the tradition of the decentralized colonial or state controlled militia system, the Army Reserve evolved from the reality that a significant portion of the nation's military reserve must be centrally controlled in times of peace and war, like the Active Army, by the Federal Government. The concept for an American federal reserve force was first proposed by General (and later as President) George Washington, Generals Frederick von Stueben and Henry Knox, and Alexander Hamilton during the formative years of the United States military establishment (1783-92).

Due to the lack of a visible threat to national security, combined with the young republic's regional focus, only a paramilitary structure for Army reserve officer training materialized during the nineteenth century. Today, the private military academy, Norwich University, founded in 1819 by Captain Alden Partridge for training citizen-soldiers as officers, is considered the origin of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). Following this precedent and model, many other state and private military schools were founded, while the provisions of the Morrill Act (1862) for military instruction at state universities further supplemented this movement. Thousands of Army officers who served in the Civil War (1861-65), on both sides, and World War I (1917-18) received their military education in the reserve officer training programs of these institutions.

Problems faced in mobilizing the Army for the Spanish-American War (1898-99) and the emergence of the United States as a world power at the beginning of the 20th

century, with international commitments, pressured American political and military leaders to finally establish the federal reserve force proposed by Washington and Hamilton. Initially, in 1908, Congress established the Medical Reserve Corps. Then, using its constitutional authority "to raise and support armies," Congress passed legislation in 1916 and 1920 creating the Organized Reserve Corps, which included the Officers Reserve Corps and the ROTC.

More than 160,000 reservists served on active duty in World War I. During the interwar period, the Army planned for thirty-three divisions at cadre status, and from 1933 to 1939, approximately 30,000 reserve officers served active duty assignments as commanders and staff members of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps. Twenty-six reserve divisions were mobilized for World War II (1941-45), and roughly a quarter of all Army officers who served were reservists, of which over 100,000 were ROTC graduates.

About 200,000 reservists were mobilized for the Korean War (1950-53), comprising 64% of the total reserve component mobilization and involving 971 reserve units. In the 1950s, under the patronage of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the Organized Reserve Corps was reformed into the present U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) structure and revitalized in order to play a more prominent role in supporting the Active Army in the "first line defenses." As a result, in the decades that followed, the USAR force structure evolved away from a combat role to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles. By the end of 1993, the USAR troop unit composition was 56% CSS, 18% CS, 20% mobility base expansion, and only 6% combat.

This change in mission necessitated a command and control reorganization in order to effectively regulate the thousands of company and detachment-sized CS and CSS units. Reorganization led to the establishment of: (1) Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC); (2) the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) to direct MUSARC operations on the national level; (3) the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) to administer the nonaligned reserve force; and (4) the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) to advise the Army Chief of Staff on USAR matters.

The Army Reserve participated in Operation Just Cause (1989), 85,276 reservists served in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (1990-91), and 647 reserve units were activated during the Gulf War to accomplish both continental U.S. and overseas missions. More than 70% of all reserve forces mobilized for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti came from the USAR; and as of June 1996, more than 67% of all reserve forces mobilized for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia are Army Reserve.

Today's restructured Army Reserve provides 46% of the Army's CSS units, 31% of the CS, 100% of its railway units and enemy prisoner of war brigades, 100% of the training and exercise divisions, 97% of its civil affairs units, 86% of its psychological operations units, and more than 70% of the Army's medical and chemical capability.

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS' ROLE IN THE TOTAL ARMY

Title 10, U.S. Code, contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of Title 10 establish and govern the RC. Specific provisions of the Code pertaining to the

Total Army Composition

FY 97 By Component (MTOE Only)

National Guard (NG)
45%

Army Reserve (USAR)
17%

Active Component (AC)
38%

*Cbt

NG 55 %

AC 42%

USAR 3 %

*Cbt Spt

NG 33 %

USAR 31%

AC 36%

*Cbt Svc Spt

NG 26%

USAR 46 %

AC 28%

*MTOE Units Totals Only

SOURCE: SAMAS: 9611 Master-Force

Figure 7-1

Army and Air National Guard are contained in *Title 32, U.S. Code.*

The role of the RC as stated in Section 10101, Title 10, is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or when national security requires. Title 32 further states that Army National Guard units shall be ordered to federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines they are needed. These basic roles are further defined through policy statements.

The role of the RC clearly has been expanded from one of wartime augmentation to being an integral part of the total force. The Army can meet no major contingency without the Reserve Components. The Total Army is no longer just a concept; it is a guiding principle (Figure 7-1).

Categories.

There are three major categories of reserve service: the Ready Reserve; the Standby Reserve; and the Retired Reserve (Figure 7-2).

The Ready Reserve.

The Ready Reserve has three subcategorizes:

The Selected Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of ARNG and USAR unit members, Active Guard Reserve (AGR), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (USAR only).

Normally, members of ARNG and USAR units attend forty-eight paid unit training assemblies (UTA), each of which is a

Reserve Service Categories

- Ready Reserve (ARNG/USAR)
  - Selected Reserve
    - Troop Program Units
    - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)
    - Active Guard Reserve (AGR)
  - Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (USAR Only)
  - Inactive National Guard (ING) (ARNG Only)
- Standby Reserve (USAR)
- Retired Reserve (USAR)

Figure 7-2

minimum of four hours' duration, and perform two weeks of annual training (AT) each year (USAR:14 days, ARNG:15 days). Officers, noncommissioned officers, and members of high-priority units have increased AT and inactive duty training (IDT) requirements. The prevalent system in most units is to conduct multiple unit training assemblies (MUTAs) consisting of the equivalent of one weekend per month (MUTA-4). Individuals are also eligible for Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), or Active Duty for Training (ADT) to accomplish military training and schooling. The minimum training objective is that each unit attain proficiency at platoon level in combat arms units, and company level in combat support/combat service support units during peacetime.

USAR soldiers are acquired primarily through USAR AGR recruiters working for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), and with Total Army Career Counselors at transition points. ARNG soldiers are acquired primarily by ARNG AGR recruiters working for State ARNG recruiting organizations and, like USAR soldiers, with the assistance of Total Army Career Counselors at transition points. Both ARNG and USAR units have technicians who serve as federal civil service employees during the week and as members of the unit during training assemblies or periods of active duty. Reserve Component personnel serving on active duty in an AGR status and members of the Active Component, attached directly to the units, provide full-time support.

Officers' assignments are made by the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) from the Individual Ready Reserve in coordination with Major Army Command (MACOM) and gaining troop program units. Officers are referred for

ARNG End Strength & Force Structure Allowance

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
ES	410	397	375	368	367	367	367	367
FSA	427	420	420	420	413	405	405	405

Figure 7-3

voluntary assignment in units of the ARNG through a coordinated effort between ARPERCEN and the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

The charts at Figures 7-3 and 7-4 show the historical and projected decline in the strength of the Selected Reserve. Current plans reduce the Army Guard from 413,000 force structure allowance (FSA) spaces to 405,000 FSA spaces in Fiscal Year 1998 with a 367,000 programmed end strength (ES). For the USAR, force structure allowance equals the programmed end strength and the Fiscal Year 1997 allowance of 215,000 spaces, decreases to 208,000 in Fiscal Year 1998.

Included in the Selected Reserve are Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) (USAR only). Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), members of the Selected Reserve, are assigned to AC wartime-required (mobilization TDA or MTOE) positions that are not authorized in peacetime. They are also assigned to Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Selective Service positions. As members of the Selected Reserve, IMA are subject to the Presidential 200,000 call-up. The IMA program provides for a mandatory 12 days of annual training.

Individual Ready Reserve (USAR only). ARPERCEN exercises command and control over the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Stand-by Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The IRR consists of members (officer and enlisted) in nine basic control groups. These control groups provide for control and administration of USAR personnel not assigned to troop program

USAR End Strength = Force Structure Allowance

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
ES/FSA	279	260	242	230	215	208	208	208

Figure 7-4

units. "Annual Training" consists of nonunit Ready Reserve members with a training obligation, who may be mandatorily assigned to a unit by the Commander, ARPERCEN. "Reinforcement" consists of obligated members who do not have a mandatory training requirement and those nonobligated members interested in nonunit programs which provide retirement point credit. Many nonobligated reservists are assigned to this group while attached as students in a United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) school or members of Reinforcement Training Units (RTU), units organized to train nonunit members of the USAR. See *AR 140-1* for definitions of these control groups. The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS-USAR) broadens the scope of training opportunities for IRR and unit officers. The Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS-USAR) focuses on training and personnel management of IRR enlisted members.

The IRR constitutes the largest of the pretrained individual manpower categories. These personnel provide the majority of fillers required to bring both the Active Component and Selected Reserve units up to the wartime required personnel strength in the event of mobilization, and initial casualty replacement/fillers in fighting theaters. Figure 7-5 shows the history of growth in the IRR since 1989 and the projected strength by the end of FY 2000.

Legislative initiatives in 1984 resulted in an increase in the Military Service Obligation from six to eight years. This provided further growth in the IRR in FY 91. The FY 88-92 Defense Guidance (DG) directed that, commencing in FY 87, the IRR of all Services serve at least one day on active duty each year for screening. The Army program began on 1 October 1986,

Individual Ready Reserve

Note: FY 91 increase due to extension of military service obligation from six to eight years.
FY 98 - FY 00 Projected Strength.

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
ES	275	284	359	419	438	412	427	431	422	320	320	320

Figure 7-5

and proved cost prohibitive. Subsequently, the program was modified so that selected IRR personnel report to an Army recruiting station on their birth date to receive a visual physical screening and answer questions concerning their address, phone number, training status, and availability in the event of mobilization.

Inactive Army National Guard (ING). The Inactive Army National Guard provides a means for individuals who are unable to participate actively to continue in a military status in the ARNG. While in the ING, individuals retain their federal recognition and Reserve of the Army status as members of ARNG units. They are subject to immediate involuntary mobilization with the units to which they are assigned in time of Federal or State emergency. Personnel transferred to the ING normally will be attached to their former ARNG units and they are encouraged to participate in annual training with their parent unit.

Individuals assigned to the ING are accounted for in the Ready Reserve strength of the Army. ARNG units schedule an annual muster day assembly for their ING personnel each fiscal year. The muster serves to:

– Screen soldiers for mobilization.
– Inform soldiers of unit training plans and objectives.
– Conduct lay-down inspections of clothing and/or equipment.
– Update personnel records.
– Determine requirements for immunization and physical examination.
– Discuss transfer back to active status (especially with those individuals who possess a critical skill).

Standby Reserve (USAR only).

Individuals in the Standby Reserve are those soldiers who have completed all active duty and reserve training requirements and have either requested reassignment to the Standby Reserve to maintain an affiliation with the military, or who have been screened from RC unit or IRR roles for one of several cogent reasons. Key employees of the Federal Government (for example, members of Congress or the Federal Judiciary), whose positions cannot be vacated during a mobilization without seriously impairing their agency's capability to function effectively, are examples of Standby Reservists. Other reasons for a Standby Reserve assignment include graduate study, temporary (one year or less) medical disqualification, or temporary extreme hardship.

Standby Reservists may not be ordered to active duty except during a declared national emergency. Those assigned in an active status are authorized to participate in Ready Reserve training at no expense to the government. Such participation includes training to earn retirement points or to qualify for promotion. Those assigned in an inactive status are normally not authorized to participate in reserve duty training. In recent years, the Standby Reserve has consisted of less than five-hundred individuals.

Retired Reserve (USAR only).

Individuals who are eligible for and have requested transfer to the Retired Reserve are in this third category. Included are those individuals who are entitled to retiree pay from the Armed Forces because of prior military service or who have completed twenty or more qualifying years of reserve (ARNG or USAR) and/or active service for which retirement benefits are not payable until age sixty. In addition, ARNG/USAR officers and warrant officers who are drawing retired pay after completing twenty or more years of active federal service are, by statute, members of the Retired Reserve. Regular Army enlisted personnel, retired after twenty, but less than thirty, years of active service, are transferred to the Retired Reserve until they have completed thirty years of service. Members of the Retired Reserve and those with less than twenty years of active service are not provided any form of training and are not available for military service except in time of war or a Congressionally-declared national emergency. However, retired personnel with twenty or more years of active service may be recalled to active duty at any time by Service Secretaries in the interests of national defense. Additionally, anyone over thirty-seven years of age with a minimum of eight years of service is eligible for transfer to the Retired Reserve.

RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

As with the Active Component, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are affected by actions of the Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Department of the Army.

Congress.

Strength authorizations and other matters concerning the ARNG and USAR are proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House National Security Committee. Certain areas such as pay and allowances and officer promotions are closely controlled. The most significant congressional action may be establishing and approving the annual paid end strength authorizations. Each year minimum paid end

strength floors are authorized to support appropriations for reserve pay and allowances. Although floors are established, Congress has been known to appropriate less money than needed to fund the authorized strength.

Strength authorizations and other matters concerning the ARNG and USAR are proposed by the Committees of both Houses. The Defense Subcommittees of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees prepare the Appropriation Acts which allow funding.

Department of Defense.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD[RA]). Overall responsibility for all Reserve Components at OSD level is vested in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD[RA]).

Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). Also at OSD level, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the RC. The RFPB includes a civilian chairman, Guard and Reserve general officers, the Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of each Service, and one Active Component general or flag officer from each Military Department. An RC general officer is also designated to be the executive officer. The Secretary of Defense is formally associated with the RC community through the RFPB. The RFPB is required by statute to prepare and submit an annual report to the President and Congress on the status of the RC. That report normally reviews the progress made by the Department of Defense and the Services in improving readiness and areas where, in the Board's judgment, further improvements are required to make the Reserve Forces more effective members of the Total Force.

National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. This OSD-level committee has operated since 1972 with the purpose of improving relations between civilian employers and local ARNG and USAR units. The committee has successfully resolved many employer/employee misunderstandings arising from RC service. It operates on an informal basis with the goal of ensuring that individuals have the freedom to participate in training without job impediment or loss of earned vacations. In FY 1979, state chairmen were appointed to work with the national chairman. The use of state committees is to provide more widespread support for the program.

Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The management structure for the U.S. Army Reserve is shown in Figure 7-6. Almost all USAR Troop Program units are commanded by the USAR Command subordinate to Forces Command (FORSCOM) except for designated Special Operations Force (SOF) units which are commanded by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and OCONUS units commanded by USAREUR and USARPAC. ARNG units are commanded by their respective state governors until federalized by Presidential executive order.

U.S. Army Reserve
Command Relationships

NOTE: CAR is also CG, USARC, and Deputy CG for Reserve Affairs, FORSCOM

Figure 7-6

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA[M&RA]). Within DA, overall responsibility for Reserve Components is vested in the Office of the ASA(M&RA).

Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC). The RCCC, established in 1976, reviews progress on RC matters related to readiness improvement, examines problem areas and issues, coordinates the tasking of issues to the Army Staff, and reviews staff efforts. The Council is chaired by the VCSA, and membership includes selected general officers from the Army Staff, Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve, Director of the Army National Guard, the FORSCOM Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC). The ARFPC reviews and comments to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army on major policy matters directly affecting the Reserve Components and the mobilization preparedness of the Army. Membership of the committee consists of five AC general officers on duty with the Army Staff, five ARNGUS general officers, and five USAR general officers. There are also five alternate members appointed from the ARNGUS and the USAR. OASA(M&RA), NGB, OCAR, TRADOC, and FORSCOM provide liaison representatives. The Director of the Army Staff serves as adviser to the committee. The committee chairman is selected from among the RC members, and serves a two-year term. The committee normally meets in March, June, September, and December.

Committee members are appointed by the Secretary of the Army. Reserve Component principal members are appointed for a three-year term, Reserve Component alternate members are appointed for a one-year term, and Active Component members are appointed for the duration of their assignment to the Army Staff.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 did affect the operation of the ARFPC. The act reassigned the committee from the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The Chairman of the ARFPC now reports directly to the Secretary of the Army. The act also modified the nomination procedures.

The National Guard State Bureau (NGB). The NGB is the legally designated peacetime channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the National Guard as established by *Title 10, U.S.C., Section 10501*. It is both a staff and an operating agency. The Chief, NGB (CNGB) reports to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through the respective Chiefs of Staff and is their principal staff adviser on National Guard affairs.

As an operating agency, the NGB is the channel of communication between the States and the Departments of the Army and Air Force. This means that the CNGB must deal directly with the State Governors and The Adjutants General (TAGs) (Figure 7-7). Although he has no command authority in these dealings, cooperation is facilitated through control of funds, end strength, equipment, force structure programs, and by authority to develop and publish regulations pertaining to the ARNG when not federally mobilized.

The CNGB is appointed for a four-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate from a list of National Guard officers recommended by the State Governors. He may succeed himself. The grade authorized for this position is Lieutenant General.

The function of the NGB is to formulate and administer a program for the development and maintenance of the National Guard units in accordance with Army and Air Force policies. The NGB is a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

The CNGB is the appropriations director of six appropriations by law: three Army National Guard and three Air National Guard appropriations (pay and allowance, operations and maintenance, and construction). He delegates administration through the Vice Chief, NGB (a major general of the opposite Service of the CNGB) to the Directors of the Air National Guard and Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard. The Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG), a federally recognized major general, directs resources to provide combat-ready units. In support of the federal mission, the DARNG formulates the ARNG long-range plan, program, and budget for input to the Army Staff. The DARNG administers the resources for force structure, personnel, facilities, training, and equipment. The DARNG is assisted in these efforts by the Army Directorate, National Guard Bureau. The organization of the Army Directorate, National Guard Bureau is at Figure 7-8.

National Guard
Management Structure

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                    └─────────────────────────┘
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│ SECRETARY OF THE ARMY    │              │ SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE   │
├──────────────────────────┤              ├──────────────────────────────┤
│ CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY     │              │ CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE    │
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              │      CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU            │
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              │              VICE CHIEF                      │
              │        NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU                 │
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
Figure 7-7

The Army Directorate, National Guard Bureau. The Army Directorate, National Guard Bureau serves as the Chief, National Guard Bureau's primary channel of communications between the Department of the Army and the States and the Territories. The Army Directorate functions as part of the Army Staff (ARSTAFF) and as a MACOM. Its mission is to acquire, manage and distribute resources to meet the ARNG priorities and influence the development of policies in order to support the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), Services, and States. The Director, Army National Guard serves as the head of the Army Directorate. The Army Directorate is the program manager for the following functional areas:

– Personnel.
– Operations, Training, and Readiness.
– Force Management.Installations, Logistics, and Environment.
– Aviation and Safety.
– Comptroller.
– Information Systems.
– Operational Support Airlift.

Figure 7-8 shows the organization of the Army Directorate, NGB. As part of the ARSTAFF, the Army Directorate assists HQDA in developing resource requirements and allocation (including: funding, personnel, force structure, equipment, and supplies) and coordinates with HQDA to ensure proposed policies are conducive and responsive to

Army Directorate, NGB

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│   Force Managment    │────────────┤──────────│ Installations, Logistics, & Environment │
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
Figure 7-8

ARNG unique requirements. While functioning as a MACOM, the Army Directorate assists the Chief, NGB and Director, ARNG in the execution and implementation of ARNG policies and programs, prepares detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans, and supervises execution of plans and instructions. Also, the Army Directorate serves as the Chief, NGB's executive agent for policy, procedures, and execution of the Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) program.

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR). The OCAR provides direction for USAR planning to accomplish the mission of providing trained units and individuals to support Army mobilization plans. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and holds office for four years. The CAR may succeed himself one time, and holds the rank of Major General, Army of the United States, for the duration of his tenure. The CAR performs additional duties as Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs, Forces Command (FORSCOM).

The duties of the Chief, Army Reserve are:

- Adviser to the Chief of Staff, Army on USAR matters.
- Directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army for matters pertaining to the development, readiness, and maintenance of the USAR.

- Responsible for implementation and execution of approved Army plans and programs.
- USAR representative in relations with governmental agencies and the public.
- Adviser to Army staff agencies in formulating and developing DA policies affecting the USAR.
- Assists in development of policy and plans for mobilization of the USAR.
- In coordination with other appropriate Army staff agencies, develops, recommends, establishes, and promulgates DA policy for training the USAR.
- Director for three USAR appropriations (pay and allowances, operations and maintenance, and construction).
- Member of DA and OSD Committees as required.

Figure 7-9 shows the organization of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.

The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). This organization is a field operating agency of OCAR which serves the U.S. Army Reserve with a mission similar to that performed by Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) for the Active and Civilian Components.

The major responsibilities of the Commander, ARPERCEN, are:
- Conduct personnel and training management.
- Command and control the IRR, Standby Reserve, and retired personnel.
- Manage and implement OPMS/ EPMS for the Army Reserve.

- Plan and implement management information systems to support personnel management.
- Administer the USAR Individual Reserve Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program.
- Support statutory and regulatory programs that provide assistance to soldiers, former soldiers, government activities, and the general public.
- Develop Army Reserve data for the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.
- Seek training opportunities and provide training management for the IRR and IMA programs.
- Manage the professional development of IRR and IMA program members.
- Manage records.
- Serve as the depository for the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) of the U.S. Army Reserve and retired soldiers eligible for mobilization.
- Provide support services for other agencies and activities, for example, PERSCOM, with respect to data on reserve personnel.
- Supervise mobilization.
- Prepare for mobilization and mobilize required numbers of trained individual reserve soldiers and retired soldiers to enable the Army to successfully wage war.
- Prepare for demobilization.

ARPERCEN provides those services necessary for maintaining high individual morale and esprit de corps by administering to those individuals who are veterans or retirees. In this capacity, ARPERCEN provides information to various government

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

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                    │     Army Reserve         │
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Programs and Liaison Office

Senior Officer/ Enlisted Management Office (SOEMO)

Program Analysis & Evaluation Div

Public Affairs Office

Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN)

Chief of Staff Executive Officer

Full Time Support Management Center (FTSMC)

Administrative Office

Comptroller Division

Engineer Office

Logistics Division

Information Management Office

Personnel Division

Medical Affairs Office

Operations Division

Figure 7-9

agencies to be used as a basis for obtaining entitlements or benefits. ARPERCEN corrects records, replaces essential documents, verifies status and service, and accomplishes many other functions involving the individual military personnel record. In addition, ARPERCEN provides administrative support for many DOD programs involving records in its custody, as well as records of discharged personnel in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Major Commands.

Forces Command (FORSCOM). The missions of the Commanding General, FORSCOM, include command of all assigned USAR troop program units in CONUS (less USAR Special Operation Forces), and evaluation and support of training of the ARNG. He is responsible for organizing, equipping, stationing, training, and maintaining the combat readiness of assigned units. He also manages the RC advisory structure and exercises command of the USAR units through the CG, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC).

The USARC was established as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM on 18 October 1991, and became fully operational on 1 October 1992. The USARC commands and controls all USAR troop program units assigned to FORSCOM. The Chief, Army Reserve fills three roles: CAR, CG, USARC, and Deputy CG FORSCOM for Reserve Affairs.

The USARC commands and controls assigned units through Regional Support Commands (RSC), Direct Reporting Commands (DRC), and Functional Commands. The ten USAR Regional Support Commands (RSC) provide support to all units located within their are of responsibility. Their responsibilities include operations, mobilization and deployment activities, and training assistance and support of the RC within their geographical area of responsibility. The RSCs are based in California, New York, Alabama, Minnesota, Kansas, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Utah, Pennsylvania, and Washington state. Command and control of USAR units may flow through the RSC or through other, Direct Reporting Commands (DRC). Examples of DRC are Divisions (Institutional Training) and Divisions (Exercise) which provide regional training support to Total Army individuals and units, and major functional organizations such as Theater Army Area Commands. The RSCs also assume operational control of volunteer units serving as Military Support to Civil Authorities for natural or manmade disasters where a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up has not been declared, and assume command and control of mobilized USAR units. Three Regional Support Groups (RSG) support those RSCs with large unit populations. Three Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) are located outside the continental U.S. in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Germany.

The USARC also established garrison support units (GSU) and reorganized port/terminal units, medical augmentation hospitals, movement control units, and replacement battalions/companies to provide the Army with a robust power-projection capability. These units are ready on the first day of any contingency and are essential to the successful deployment of AC heavy divisions. The GSUs backfill Active Army installation base operations activities vacated by deploying active component units. In addition, the GSUs provide peacetime support to their respective active component counterparts.

Among USAR units are such diverse organizations as combat support, and combat service support units; training divisions with a mobilization mission of conducting Basic Training (BT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and One Station Unit Training (OSUT); Army garrisons with a mobilization mission of staffing a post; and USARF schools which conduct enlisted MOS courses, special courses, and Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) courses for Active Army, National Guard, and USAR soldiers. The USAR, in addition to maintaining units, has individuals in nonunit control groups as described in the section on the IRR. In addition to the major USAR organizations, there are almost 2,000 company/detachment-sized units.

TRADOC. TRADOC is responsible for initial entry training for RC members. All nonprior service enlistees under the Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963 (REP-63) perform Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT). This includes Basic Training (BT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) or One Station Unit Training (OSUT) under

Active Component auspices. An alternative method of conducting this training is the "split-option training" concept whereby an RC member may do BT during one year and AIT the following year.

State Adjutants General (Army National Guard).

Army National Guard units are located in the fifty States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The ARNG mans more than 4,464 units located in over 2,600 communities throughout the country. Command of the ARNG when not in active federal service is vested with the Governors of the States. The Governors exercise command through The Adjutants General (TAG). The TAG is a State official whose authority is recognized by federal law. The TAG is normally appointed by the governor but in certain instances is elected or appointed by the President. The grade authorized is normally Major General.

TAGs of the several states manage federal resources to build combat-ready units. Their management staffs include both state and federal employees. ARNG commanders under the TAG lead their combat-ready units in training during peacetime. A State Area Command (STARC) is organized within each state. Upon full mobilization the STARC assumes command and control of ARNG units during premobilization, is charged with initial postmobilization, and command and control of mobilized ARNG units until the units arrive at their mobilization station. The STARC also provides installation support, family support, and mobilization support to other reserve components within the state upon declaration of a national emergency.

The United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO). The USPFO is an officer (Colonel) of the National Guard of the United States (Army or Air) ordered to active duty under the provisions of *Title 10, USC* and is normally collocated with the STARC. The USPFO receives and accounts for all Federal funds and property and provides financial and logistical resources for the maintenance of Federal property provided to the State. The USPFO manages the Federal logistics support systems (Army and Air Force) for the States and, upon mobilization of a supported unit, provides that support necessary for the transition of the mobilized entity to active duty status. Additionally, the USPFO functions as a Federal Contracting Officer and is responsible for Federal procurement activities within the State. The USPFO is also the payroll certifying officer responsible for certifying the accuracy of Federal payrolls.

Funding of Facilities. *Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 18203*, provides for Federal support of construction of National Guard facilities. This law permits construction of facilities on sites furnished by States at no cost to the Federal Government, or on Federal property licensed to the States specifically for Army National Guard purposes. Funding for approved armory construction is normally 75% Federal funds and 25% State funds, with 100% Federal support for other construction such as administrative, logistics support, and training facilities that are in direct support to sole Federal functions.. Operations and maintenance costs for these facilities are funded via cooperative agreements between the Federal Government and the State Military Departments. All funding for construction and maintenance of facilities for

the USAR is provided by the Federal Government.

TRAINING

The training goals of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are the same as the Active Army. Plans to achieve objectives are accomplished during inactive duty training (IDT), commonly referred to as UTAs, MUTAs, drills, or assembly periods; and during a fifteen-day period generally known as annual training (AT). The same standards of training are expected and required of ARNG/USAR units as that of their counterparts in the Active Army.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, as elements of the Selected Reserve, are normally authorized forty-eight drills and a two-week (14-17 days) annual training period during the training year, which starts on 1 October and terminates on 30 September of the following year. The general trend is to consolidate these unit training assemblies during the year so that four UTAs (sixteen hours minimum) are accomplished during a single weekend. This MUTA-4 configuration provides continuity for individual and crew training, qualification firing, field training, and refresher training.

Annual Training (AT) is primarily directed to collective premobilization tasks. Individual training and weapons qualification are typically performed during IDT. Soldiers and units train to established premobilization levels of proficiency. Combat maneuver units generally train to an individual/ crew/platoon levels of proficiency. CS/CSS units are generally required to train to company level proficiency.

EQUIPMENT

Department of the Army policy is to distribute equipment to units in first-to-fight/ first-to-support sequence. The component to which a unit belongs (active or reserve), with the exception of specified programs (for example, National Guard Reserve Equipment (NGRE) formerly known as Dedicated Procurement Program), is not a factor in equipment distribution. This policy is intended to ensure that units employed first in time of crisis will be adequately equipped. Under this policy, the RC have received substantial amounts of modern equipment in recent years. New equipment is distributed from Army procurement and excess Active Component equipment is redistributed in priority sequence. Later deploying units are provided the minimum-essential equipment required for training and to achieve minimum acceptable readiness levels.

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation is a special appropriation designated for the acquisition of equipment by the RC to improve readiness. These funds may be further fenced by Congress for the purchase of specific items of equipment. NGRE funds complement the Service appropriations which primarily fund force modernization, thereby improving training and readiness in the RC.

Procedures are in place to ensure that new and/or serviceable equipment is not withdrawn from the RC without justification. Requests for withdrawal of equipment must be coordinated with the Secretary of Defense. Waiver of this provision during a crisis allows the Secretary of Defense to delegate that authority to the Assistant Secretary of the Army.

READINESS/MOBILIZATION ASSISTANCE

Background.

In 1973, the Army leadership recognized the potential of many types of RC units for early deployment. Accordingly, the Affiliation Program was conceived to improve the mobilization and deployment readiness of selected RC units and provide added combat power earlier in the execution of contingency plans. As part of this program, RC combat battalions and brigades were selected to "round out" Active Component divisions that were understructured. Additionally, some RC combat battalions and brigades were selected to "round up" AC divisions, as additional force structure to existing AC structure. Roundout units were accorded the same resourcing priority as the parent unit, were scheduled to deploy with the parent unit, or as soon as possible thereafter, and entered into close planning and training associations with the parent unit to improve readiness. Other categories of the original Affiliation Program were given resources to foster close training associations between like AC and RC units to help upgrade the readiness and capabilities of certain other RC units.

As more structure and missions were added to the RC in the mid-to-late 1970s, the Army instituted several other programs to facilitate achievement of higher training readiness levels for the RC. These included the AC/RC Partnership Program which aligned selected major combat and special forces units, the Counterpart Program which aligned ARNG attack helicopter units with AC counterparts, and the Corps and Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN) which associated AC/RC combat units with a CONUS Corps for command post exercises. Together these programs provided resources and opportunities for RC unit leaders and soldiers to work closely with and learn from their AC colleagues who shared with them a common goal of improving unit capability for wartime mission accomplishment.

WARTRACE

In 1979, HQDA approved a FORSCOM initiative called CAPSTONE, subsequently changed to WARTRACE. This program established an organizational structure for managing the Total Force by placing all Active and Reserve Component units into a wartime organization designed to meet the enemy threat in a European, Southwest Asian, or Pacific contingency. A later update of the structure also included the units assigned to operate the CONUS sustaining base.

WARTRACE provides the basis for establishing planning and training associations to enable units to focus planning on specific wartime missions and, where feasible, to train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime. Under WARTRACE, RC units concentrated their limited training time on tasks bearing directly on their wartime mission. Units slated for more than one theater are assigned a priority theater and directed to focus training on that contingency.

Army Regulation 11-30, published first in 1983, expanded the CAPSTONE Program to provide a better framework for managing the Affiliation, Partnership, Counterpart, and CORTRAIN Programs already in being. CAPSTONE also provided a more rational basis for participating in the Mutual Support Program (which allows AC and RC units to conduct mutually beneficial activities on their own volition), overseas deployment training, and joint exercises.

Force Support Package Units

"Tiered Resourcing Strategy"

TIER I	TIER II	TIER III	TIER IV	TIER V
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE FORCE	**2nd MRC CS/CSS**	**READINESS ENHANCEMENT**	**USAR C2 MOB/TNG SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT SPT**	**READINESS ENHANCEMENT INACTIVATING UNITS**
C2 OR BETTER	*C3 OR BETTER*	*70% CAPABLE*	*FULLY CAPABLE*	*50% CAPABLE*
FSP 1-2 410 UNITS	CA SOF FSP { (10 SOF UNITS) PSYOPS RC CS / CSS	DIVISION (IT)- (MINUS SCHOOL BDES) XX (IT)-	XX RSC 70% CAPABLE XX (IT)-	XX (IT)- DIVISION (IT)- (MINUS SCHOOL BDES) X OSUT
CONUS SUPPORT BASE TDA	XX (EX) READINESS ENHANCEMENT DIV (EX) READINESS ENHANCEMENT USARF SCHOOLS	X BCT	DIVISION (IT): (MINUS SCHOOLS) X OSUT IMA	C4 INACT UNITS
FULLY CAPABLE	CONUS SUPPORT BASE CONUS MED SUPPORT GARRISON			
% of USAR force				
30.4%	**59%**	**1.5%**	**4.1%**	**5%**

Figure 7-10

WARTRACE replaced the CAPSTONE program in 1994. WARTRACE planning alignments and missions provide a basis on which to establish a mission essential task list (METL), develop effective training programs, and for participating in various collective training activities.

While WARTRACE is useful in establishing reliable training and planning associations based upon validated CINC OPLAN requirements, it is not fully integrated with the current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG directs the Army to organize, train, and equip to defeat two aggressors in two nearly-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). Based on this combat structure, FORSCOM designed a support structure capable of providing support to a total of 5 1/3 divisions. These support forces, shown at Figure 7-10, are designated as Force Support Package (FSP)

units, consisting of AC/RC early deploying CS and CSS type units. These FSP units support the Contingency Response Force and the Rapid Regional Response force for MRC 1 and 2. These early deploying units organize and train based more upon their MRC/FSP relationships than upon WARTRACE alignments. Later required units, non-FSP, and the National Guard Divisions use WARTRACE to develop unit training programs. National Guard Enhanced Brigades have been apportioned to the warfight. Although the goal is to align units with a MRC, units may find themselves mobilized with a different WARTRACE based upon the needs of the warfighting CINCs. The 1995 Zero Base Review (ZBR) conducted by the JCS J-1 resulted in new requirements for IMA support to the warfighting CINCs. CINC augmentation units called Joint Reserve Units (JRU) have

Joint Reserve Unit

`Documented Joint Manning Rotating Command`

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              │  JOINT RESERVE UNIT     │
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
Mission Statement

To provide trained Reserve Component (RC) personnel to augment and fully integrate into CINC's staff, leveraging military experience, civilian skills, and availability to meet peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements on a timely basis.

Figure 7-11

been established as shown at Figure 7-11 for U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This concept incorporates soldiers into a joint unit with RC manpower administration in one place. The component billets are then assigned to staff directorates where soldiers work in functional areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, training, and logistics.

Overseas Deployment Training.

The Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) Program provides RC units the opportunity to train in their skills in a realistic environment with the added benefit of reducing Active Component operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Selected units normally train up to twenty-two days in JCS exercises and in non-exercise mission training enhancing their awareness of mobilization/ deployment processing. The ODT Program

has deployed larger units with an increasing number of companies/battalions having the opportunity for this training. Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) Programs allow the Reserve Components to conduct realistic mobilization mission training in peacetime, in many cases with the organization with which they will be associated when mobilized. This training increases awareness of mobilization mission requirements, allows training to be conducted in an overseas environment which reinforces a sense of belonging, and increases units' abilities to mobilize and deploy.

Drug Interdiction and Counter Drug Activities.

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and subsequent legislation, directly affects the extent to which military forces (including Reserve Components) can

participate in law enforcement activities. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to perform internal police functions. The Act does not pertain to the Army National Guard (ARNG) when in State Status.

Public Law 97-86, passed in 1982, amended the Posse Comitatus Act. The law, as amended, now authorizes indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information. Indirect support must be incidental to the military mission, or provide substantially equivalent military training. Further, it cannot degrade combat readiness nor the capacity of the Department of Defense to fulfill its defense mission. The law does not limit the National Guard in State Status (on State Active Duty or under *Title 32, USC*) from performing law enforcement functions authorized by the States concerned.

The 1989 National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts provided funding for the National Guard to support drug law enforcement agencies in drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. The Secretary of Defense provided funds to the governors of states who submitted plans specifying how the National Guard was proposed to be used. Such operations were required to be duty served in addition to normally scheduled (weekend drill (IDT) and annual training (AT)) training requirements.

In 1988, National Guard military policy was used in a pilot/test program to assist U.S. Customs agents in searching commercial cargo entering various land and sea border-entry points. This very successful program was expanded in 1989 to nearly every major seaport and many major airports throughout the United States, increasing the U.S. Customs Service capability to inspect cargo. Other examples of missions for State interdiction and eradication efforts are: helicopter transport of law enforcement personnel and confiscated illegal drugs; special operations forces identification of ground and air traffic; loan of equipment and training of law enforcement agencies; aircraft photo reconnaissance; and monitoring air traffic with organic radar.

The USAR counterdrug program is applicable to all drug supply reduction operations in CONUS and OCONUS. It includes all resources (personnel, logistics, funding, and facilities) and activities employed in the planning, resourcing, development, dissemination, distribution, and management of information related to counterdrug support operations. The USAR counterdrug program responds to DOD, CINC taskings for operational and non-operational support.

Operational support includes personnel units in support of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA), Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), and host countries. Non-operational support is a broad category which can include facilities, formal military school training opportunities, intelligence, equipment loans, counterdrug funding, and personnel support to non-DOD agencies.

Federal, state, and local LEAs originate requests for DOD counterdrug operational support in CONUS and submit them to either Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) or the Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA) with geographical responsibility. The approval process for the use of USAR forces is retained at the highest level. Current authority for the employment of USAR soldiers and assets in counterdrug related support activities rests with the Commander, FORSCOM, or a CINC. For CONUS based operations, FORSCOM has further delegated this authority to the Commander, JTF-6. All OCONUS operations are approved by either

FORSCOM or the appropriate geographical CINC.

USAR units and individuals have supported the Army's counterdrug effort since 1989. The USAR support to CINCs, DLEAs, and LEAs have been manifested in several areas of support. This support includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Ground reconnaissance.
- Detection monitoring and communication about land trafficking.
- Aerial reconnaissance.
- Counterdrug related training of DLEA and LEA personnel.
- Nonherbicidal cannabis eradication.
- Linguist support.
- Transportation, both aerial and ground.
- Intelligence analysis.
- Tunnel detection.
- Diver support for subsurface hull inspections.
- Engineering support (vertical and horizontal construction and crack house demolition) and training.
- Use of military vessels for bases of operations for DLEAs.
- Maintenance support.

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

MSCA is the employment of military resources (personnel and equipment) in support of civil authorities during periods of emergency. In most cases this includes Army and Air National Guard units. Civil authorities have primary responsibility for emergency planning, response, and recovery during emergency situations. Emergencies that could result in a need for military support are as follows:

- Civil. Any man-caused emergency or threat which causes or may cause substantial property damage or loss.
- Natural. Any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mud-slide, snowstorm, drought, fire, or other catastrophic event.
- Other. An emergency in any part of the United States which requires assistance to supplement local or state efforts to save lives and protect property, public health and safety, or to avert or lessen the threat of a disaster.

MSCA missions are authorized by Executive Order of the Governor of a State, using his/her State's National Guard in a State Active Duty Status. In this status, pay and allowances are paid by the governor utilizing state funds. Payment for utilization of federal equipment and facilities in state status is reimbursed to the federal government by the state governor. MSCA missions are of a temporary nature and will be terminated as soon as possible after civil authorities are capable of handling the emergency. Employment of National Guard assets by the Governor will be in accordance with state laws and constitutions. In addition, deployment of National Guard forces and equipment between states is expected, in accordance with federal guidelines and legal agreements between the states

If the scope of a civil emergency exceeds the capabilities of the civilian response agencies, military assistance may be requested. The National Guard in State Status is the primary responder during most U.S. natural or man-made disasters and other

emergencies. When catastrophic events escalate to such a magnitude to warrant a declaration of national emergency, then a Federal response is usually required.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the proponent for the Federal Response Plan and is charged with the responsibility of coordinating disaster assistance provided by all agencies of the Federal Government in the continental U.S. and its territories. FEMA coordinates public assistance to state and local governments and works with volunteer agencies providing aid for disaster victims. FEMA is the validating authority for all support and assistance in a declared national emergency.

Full-Time Support.

A Full-Time Support (FTS) Program was directed by Congress to increase the unit readiness of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units by providing full-time support personnel. The FTS Program provides the ARNG and USAR with full-time personnel needed in peacetime to support ARNG and USAR manpower requirements determined by mission, organization, equipment, and readiness objectives. This program encompasses Active Component (AC), Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers, military technicians, and civilian personnel serving on a full-time basis for the purpose of organizing, administrating, recruiting, instructing, or training the ARNG and USAR.

The Full-Time Support Program faces reductions in authorizations through 1999 in proportion to the total Reserve Component end strength. These reductions are due to force structure changes and unit priority.

Full Time Support Categories.

Technicians. ARNG and USAR technicians provide full-time, day-to-day assistance and support and act as the representative for their commanders during nondrill periods. Technicians ensure continuity in administration, supply, maintenance, and training, and their services are critical to mobilization preparedness.

Both ARNG and USAR technicians are Federal Civil Service employees. The Army Reserve Technicians (ART) are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service System. ARNG technicians are governed by the same provisions except as modified by *Public Law 90-486 (National Guard Technician Act of 1968)* as well as *Title 32, USC, Section 709*, and regulations prescribed by the National Guard Bureau. As a provision of employment in the military technician program (Civil Service) program, technicians must also be members of the ARNG or USAR. Many technicians are employed in the same unit they are assigned to.

Active Guard/Reserve (AGR). AGR soldiers serve on full-time military duty in support of the RC. *Title 10, U.S. Code* personnel are available for worldwide assignment, whereas *Title 32, U.S. Code* personnel (unique to the National Guard) must remain within the confines of the state boundaries. The Full-Time Support Management Center and the Full-Time Support Division administer the programs for USAR and ARNG personnel respectively. This program will remain an important and vital part of the RC system.

The Total Army School System.

The TASS initiative is a TRADOC Total Army program designed to leverage

existing Total Army school resources. It is organized into seven regions which unites TRADOC schools, Army Reserve School Brigades and Battalions, and Army National Guard Academies. Courseware and standards will be the same throughout the system, and students will be chosen from all three components depending on the situation. During mobilization, the TASS School Battalions have the mission to assist TRADOC in recertifying or reclassifying IRR and recalled retiree filler personnel.

The USAR has organized an Institutional Training Division to provide instruction in each of the seven TASS regions. DIV (IT)s are given the mission to teach reclassification training for CS, CSS, Health Services Education, and the Officer Education System (OES) (Combined Arms and Services Staff School and the General Staff Officers Course). Each of the DIV (IT)s have four Brigades each of which is responsible for one of these subject areas. Additionally, four TASS regions have USAR Non-commissioned Officer Academies (NCOAs) in their regions and USAR NCOEs battalions are structured in three of these TASS regions.

The ARNG has faculty and support personnel executing the ARNG TASS mission in fifty-four states and territories. The ARNG mission is to conduct leadership (OCS/NCOA), combat arms, and selected CS/CSS training in each region. There are seven Guard Leadership Training Brigades that each have an Officer Candidate School (OCS) and Non-commissioned Officer Academy (NCOA). The Combat Arms Training Brigades conduct training in the Career Management Fields (CMF) of Armor, Field Artillery, Infantry, Air Defense Artillery, and Aviation. Additionally, in four of seven regions, the ARNG is responsible for the Ordnance Training Battalion, and

provides assistance to the USAR in the remaining three regions.

RESERVE COMPONENT PAY, BENEFITS, AND ENTITLEMENTS

In general, Reserve Component pay and allowances are determined on the basis of the individual reservist's status. During inactive duty training periods, members of the Selected Reserve receive one day of basic pay (based upon years of service and grade) for each UTA attended. During active duty for training periods, members receive the same compensation (basic pay, quarters, and subsistence allowances) as their Active Component counterparts.

Depending upon assignment, some reservists may be eligible for additional special pay for aviation duty, medical or dental service or hazardous duty pay, all on a pro rata basis.

Eligibility for other service-associated benefits depends upon the status of the service member. For example, members of the Army's Reserve Components are entitled to full use of the exchange system. Unaccompanied spouses with proper identification are authorized to use the Post Exchange (PX) at all times. Qualified Reserve soldiers and their families may shop in the commissaries at any time, up to twelve days a year, on days of their choosing. This entitlement is based on the number of days served during the previous calendar year. In addition, during IDT, Reservists may use military clothing stores, official library services, and some clubs. Ready Reservists assigned or attached to units which schedule at least twelve drills yearly and ADT also are entitled to receive full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.

While on ADSW or ADT, Reservists receive the same benefits and privileges as Active Component members. However, they

do not receive CHAMPUS coverage or dental care unless the training period exceeds thirty days.

Members of the Retired Reserve under age sixty, known as "Gray Area Retirees," are entitled to use the Post Exchange (PX), military clothing stores, official library services, and receive a burial flag. (Note: Although retired Active Army enlisted soldiers with less than thirty years service are part of the Retired Reserve, their benefits differ.) Upon reaching age sixty, members of the Retired Reserve receive basically the same benefits as retired active counterparts except for military burial assistance and a military death gratuity.

Members of the Reserve Component who accumulate twenty years of creditable service and reach age sixty are entitled to retired pay computed on the basis of retirement points accumulated. In general, a creditable year is one during which a Reservist accumulates fifty or more retirement points. Points are awarded on the basis of one point for each four-hour assembly, each day of active duty, and each three credits of correspondence courses completed. Additionally, fifteen points are awarded for membership. However, not more than sixty points per year may be awarded for IDT activities. Retirement pay is computed by totaling all retirement points accumulated and dividing by 360. The quotient is then multiplied by 2.5%. The resulting percentage is then applied to active duty basic pay of an individual with the same grade and number of years of service.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was extended to RC members as of 14 November 1986, when President Reagan signed into law the "Military Justice Amendment of 1986" as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987. Under these changes, USAR soldiers are subject to the UCMJ while in an inactive duty training (that is, drill) status. The military can now recall a soldier to active duty for trial for crimes committed while performing active duty for training or inactive duty training. The decision to activate a soldier for trial must be approved through the Reserve chain of command to the Secretary of the Army if confinement is contemplated. In other cases, the Active Component General Court-martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) is the final decision authority.

SUMMARY

Over half of the Army's total deployable forces are in the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. The management of these forces is of paramount importance to the Total Force. The structure for RC Management includes the Congress, DOD, HQDA, MACOMs, States, and Units. Two key managers at HQDA are the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve. At the MACOM level, FORSCOM and its subordinate CONUS armies and USARC have a leading role in preparing RC forces for mobilization and deployment.

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CHAPTER 8

FORCE READINESS

"Again and again the readiness was tested and not found wanting, not on the night when we launched an invasion to Haiti, then called it back, and then in hours reformulated and reorganized the entire operation. Nor was it found wanting when, even while we were engaged in Haiti, our forces rapidly responded to the unexpected movement of Saddam's divisions towards Kuwait's border. Hollow forces don't have this kind of edge."

General John Shalikashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

INTRODUCTION

General Shalikashvili's statement stands as a marker against which future readiness will be subjectively measured. As the Army moves towards the 21st Century, it confronts the major challenge of maintaining readiness. Maintaining readiness requires that Army leadership make difficult decisions and identify trade-offs in maintaining current readiness and building toward future readiness needs and requirements. The Army guides its decisions by balancing the fundamental imperatives that have shaped the development of today's Army: quality people, doctrine, force mix, training, modern equipment, and leader development. (See Figure 8-1.)

In order to make the decisions necessary to achieve and maintain a combat ready force, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Department of Army (DA) have developed and continue to improve upon systems designed to assist the leadership at all levels managing force readiness. This chapter discusses the concepts surrounding the measurement of force readiness and the systems and procedures used to prompt decisions related to force readiness. This chapter will discuss how the Army uses the DAMPL and ALO systems to manage both readiness and resourcing. It provides insights as to the difficulty in defining readiness both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Specifically the following processes are discussed: the Chairman's Readiness Systems to measure current and future readiness, the role of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA), and the role of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. Finally, the Army's readiness system is discussed to include the Chief of Staffs monthly reviews and the status of current Unit Status Report criteria.

BALANCING THE IMPERATIVES

Figure 8-1

MANAGING FORCE READINESS

The Army defines unit readiness as the ability of a unit to deliver the output for which it was designed. However, the Army also uses the term "force readiness" which can be equated to the DOD term "military capability." Force readiness is defined as the readiness of the Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to call up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war to accomplish assigned missions. DOD defines military capability in relation to force readiness, sustainability, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure. This definition is directly linked to how the total force is planned, programmed, and budgeted.

These combinations of force readiness functions can best be seen as a set of interrelated, sequential, responsive, reciprocal, and comprehensive functions for the preparation and conduct of war. The functions are responsive to the time/phasing requirements of war plans.

Force readiness is affected by many quantitative and qualitative factors. For example, it is easy to measure the status of personnel, equipment, or war reserves. It is not so easy to assign a value to morale, cohesion, or the increased use of full-time manning in RC units. Because force readiness is so dynamic, encompasses so many functions, and is influenced by so many factors, as yet no single measurement system has been developed by the army.

Figure 8-2

Estimating Capability.

Force readiness is only one of the components of military capability. (See Figure 8-2.) Estimating or measuring capability is a very difficult task because each element is made up of many factors, some subjective, some quantifiable. For example, an estimate of military capability would include these factors:

- Unit status
- Design of weapons systems
- Construction of facilities
- Availability of supplies
- Relationship with allies
- Strategic intelligence capability
- Application of Unit Manning principles of Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and

Training
- Civilian personnel force planning—availability and experience; strategic force sustainment
- Quality of Soldier/Family Services in support of deployments
- Civilian and military airlift
- Civilian and military sealift
- Civilian and military land transportation assets
- Line of communications preparation
- Availability of prestocked equipment
- Mobilization capability
- Recruitment of manpower for

The Cost of Force Readiness

Current Readiness Needs

Future Investment Needs

Figure 8-3

military and industry
- Capability to receive, process, and transport forces in theaters
- Senior leadership—quality of strategic planning and decision making
- Capability of the enemy
- Quality and morale of personnel

Estimating military capability is difficult and highly situational, yet the American people and their elected representatives need to know how much security is required and what it costs. Short of war, the only measure of return on the dollar that the Services can show is some level of force readiness, as deduced from analytical tools and other indicators.

Cost of Force Readiness.

Force readiness is expensive. Readiness of the current force is a budget issue that must be balanced against other program needs. (See Figure 8-3.) Within a decreasing level of resources, the purchase of a balanced program which satisfies future or investment needs such as research and development, procurement, and facilities can impact current readiness needs such as spare parts, depot maintenance, and war reserves. The Army has moved to a smaller force which demands that it be better manned, equipped, and trained to maintain the highest readiness of the available force

Readiness costs increase sharply as the higher levels of readiness are approached. At the unit level, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A unit can

attain a very high level of readiness and a short time later, without continued intensive resource allocation, have the trained expertise and peak maintenance levels ebb away. Expensive repair parts and supplies and markedly increased training costs (especially for ammunition, fuel, and maintenance of combat equipment) all contribute to these increased costs.

Because of the costs of readiness and the response times of war plans, the Army maintains some units at a higher level of readiness than others. This stratification of readiness is brought about in several ways. First, the Army assigns units Authorized Levels of Organization (ALO) commensurate with a unit's primary mission and required availability dates from the war plans. The Army is the only Service that uses an ALO system. The system has a significant effect on unit status-levels and trends. Second, the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) prioritizes units according to their deployability dates. Equipment and personnel are then distributed generally in DAMPL sequence. Since resources are constrained, this causes a higher status for early deploying units. This "First to Fight, First to Resource" procedure is the current Army policy for distribution of resources. This ensures that the early deploying units in both the AC and RC are priority resourced.

The costs of readiness add to one of the most perplexing problems facing the Army, tying resources to readiness. The resource-to-readiness relationship is complex but essential to the proper management of total force capability; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES); and justification of Army programs to Congress and the people.

Tiered Resourcing vs Tiered Readiness.

The Tiered Resourcing Concept is descriptive of the Army's approach to managing the resourcing of units. The Tiered Readiness Concept is an approach to explain the impacts of resourcing on readiness.

Tiered Resourcing proclaims that the prioritization of manning and equipping units is based on "first to fight." It assumes that training and equipment availability is consistent throughout the total Army for both RC and AC units. It assumes that all units maintain similar levels of deployment readiness. It assumes that all units are a potential source of fully trained personnel and fully maintained equipment. It further assumes that units other than first deployers are capable of short notice deployment for contingency missions.

Tiered Readiness assumes that a specific portion of the force is maintained at less than full readiness consistent with anticipated taskings and exercises, availability of strategic transportation, and crisis response. It specifies the levels of manning, equipping and training. It sets unit readiness ceilings and maintians high and low priority units.

Tiered Readiness assumes that training is the major "bill payer." It accepts the reality that not all units can conduct like levels of training. As training levels decrease, the time required to brings units to an acceptable state of readiness increases. This due to the fact that increasing levels of individual or unit training requires far more time than that required to make up unit personnel and equipment shortages. Tiered readiness maintains force structure with less personnel, equipment, and operating (training) resources, as permitted by deployment and or utilization schedules.

An analysis of actual Army policy reveals the conflict between these concepts. Personnel is managed by priority groups (PPG) contained within the unit's DAMPL. This tiers personnel based upon a unit's likelihood of being deployed. Equipment is managed through force modernization fielding. New or next generation equipment is provided based on the "first to fight" concept. Units are not denied equipment due to late arrival dates.

All units are resourced at the same OPTEMPO level. This permits every unit to train to the maximum level its personnel and equipment fill permit. Only units that are listed for very late deployment, such as the National Guard Divisions, or very late deploying AC and RC combat service supports units, are dramatically short personnel, equipment, or training readiness.

CHAIRMAN'S READINESS SYSTEM.

The Chairman's Readiness System was implemented in the fall of 1994. (See Figure 8-4.) It was designed to provide the CJCS the information necessary to fulfill his *Title 10, USC* responsibilities. The system applies to the Joint Staff, Services, unified commands, and the Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies. The system is designed to assess both unit and joint readiness. Unit readiness focuses on people, training, and equipment. Joint readiness assesses against key functional areas that enable the CINCs to integrate and synchronize forces. The Chairman's Readiness System is designed to provide a current assessment of readiness and systematic analysis of future capabilities and requirements.Until recently, readiness was defined as the capability of a unit to accomplish the mission for which it was designed. Readiness was Service oriented, with no consideration given to requirements

to operate as a intregal part of a joint or combined multinational force.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) has redefined readiness in terms of the three levels of war. The strategic level is the level at which the Nation determines national security objectives. The operational level is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained. The tactical level is the level at which the battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

The traditional way of looking at readiness by the Services focused only on the tactical level of war. The Chairman's Readiness System includes the definition and delineation of responsibility for readiness at all three levels of war.

The CJCS is responsible for strategic level of readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy (NMS). Readiness at this level is defined as the synthesis of readiness at the operational and tactical levels. It focuses on the broad functional areas such as intelligence and mobility.

The operational level of readiness is the responsibility of the CINCs, and considers the joint perspective. Joint readiness is defined as the CINC's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces in order to execute his assigned mission.

Readiness at the tactical level remains the primary responsibility of the Services. Unit readiness is defined as the ability to provide the capabilities required by CINC's to execute their assigned missions.

These definitions are considered key because they delineate the responsibilities of the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and CINCs in maintaining readiness.

Chairman's Readiness System

Strategic

CJCS
Ready to Fight

Tactical

Services
Unit Readiness
-people
-equipment
-training
-enablers

"Traditional Readiness"

Operational

CINCs
Joint Readiness
- Ability to integrate and synchronize forces to execute assigned missions

"The Joint Perspective"

Figure 8-4

The Chairman's Readiness System provides the Chairman and the other members of the JCS a current focus and macro-level assessment of the military's readiness to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy as assessed by the CINCs, Services and Combat Support Agencies. The Chairman's Readiness System consists of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCA), established programs, and frequent communications with the CINCs. (See Figure 8-5.)

Current Readiness System.

Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). The JMRR provides the CJCS a current and broad assessment of the military readiness to fight, across all three levels of war at a briefing conducted by the Services (See Figure 8-6.)

The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle The "Full JMRR" is conducted quarterly or as requested by the CJCS. The Services present an assessment of unit readiness. The CINCs submit an assessment of joint readiness. Selected DOD Agencies comment on joint readiness by functional areas. The J3, Joint Staff, presents a combined readiness assessment of the CINCs and the DOD agencies.

The "By-Exception JMRR" is scheduled for the two (2) months per quarter that a "Full JMRR" is not presented. Significant changes are reported since the last "Full JMRR." A briefing is scheduled only if the changes have a major warfighting impact.

- Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)
- Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA)
- Other established programs, e.g. Chairman's Exercise Program
- Frequent communication with the CINCs and Service Chiefs

Figure 8-5

The "Feedback JMRR" is conducted quarterly, in conjunction with a "By-Exception JMRR." It provides a forum to review actions to address specific current readiness deficiencies raised in previous assessments.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) chairs the JMRR. The Director of Operations (J3) organizes the process and presents the joint readiness briefing. All Directors of the Joint Staff attend the JMRR.

The Service Vice Chiefs are the senior service representatives to the JMRR. The Service Operations Deputies present the unit readiness briefing for their respective Services. During "Full JMRR," the Services report on current real-world force commitments and force assignments to a notional warfighting scenario. Data includes current unit location, current and projected unit readiness, support force capability and readiness, and major Service readiness trends.

The CINCs provide a representative at each JMRR. The CINCs submit a readiness assessment in the eight functional areas that enable them to integrate and synchronize forces to execute their assigned missions. (See Figure 8-7.) The U.S. Special Operations Command representative briefs unit readiness in the same format as the Services.

The selected DOD Agencies provide a representative at each JMRR. The selected DOD Agencies submit

JMRR Responsibilities

- CINCs submit readiness assessments in the eight functional areas that enable them to integrate and synchronize forces to execute their assigned missions
- Selected DOD Agencies submit readiness assessments in the eight functional areas and provide a narrative overall assessment of their ability to support the CINCs
- Services provide the current and projected readiness of major combat and support forces, and assess readiness trends

Figure 8-6

assessments in the same eight functional areas as the CINCs. Agency directors provide a narrative overall assessment of the agency's ability to support the CINCs.

The CINCs and selected DOD Agencies submit a current assessment and a 12 month projection.

The JMRR provides a current readiness assessment at the strategic level. It produces an assessment of the Armed Forces readiness to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. In addition, the JMRR produces a list of CINC and Service current readiness deficiencies or strategic concerns. Based on these concerns an overall risk assessment at the strategic level is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). The SROC brings together the senior civilian (Deputy Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries) and military leadership (VCJCS, Service Chiefs, and others) in monthly meetings to review significant readiness topics. (See Figure 8-8.) At each meeting the Service Chiefs provide a current and projected assessment of their unit status, similar in scope and form to the assessment provided in the JMRR. The VCJCS provides a joint readiness assessment and overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS.

Fixing Current Readiness. The results of joint and Service actions to address readiness deficiencies are presented to the VCJCS and the Service Vice Chiefs at "Feedback JMRR" sessions. Deficiencies can either be resolved by accepting the risk they pose or by taking direct action to correct the shortfall. The Joint Staff directorates lead the

Joint Readiness Functional Areas

- Joint Personnel
- Intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance
- Special operations
- Mobility
- Logistics/sustainment
- Infrastructure
- Command/control/communications/computers
- Joint Headquarters capability

Figure 8-7

deficiency analysis effort for their respective functional areas. Close coordination is required among the Joint Staff, Service Staffs, CINCs, and DOD agency staffs. Appropriate CINC mission impacts are analyzed. Solutions and "workarounds" are proposed; courses of action are approved.

Future Readiness.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC, with membership of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chiefs of each Service, performs mission needs review, validates and prioritizes requirements, and makes recommendations on the placement of scarce dollars and resources. The JROC provides the senior military perspective on national defense, and the major weapons, weapon systems, and other military capabilities requirements. (See Chapter 4 for discussion of JROC.)

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA). The JROC uses the analytical process known as JWCA to maintain continuity between current readiness and future capability. (See Chapter 4 for discussion JWCA.) JWCA is composed of ten long term assessment areas: strike; land and littoral warfare; strategic mobility and sustainment; sea, air, and space superiority; deter/counterproliferation; command and control; information warfare; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; regional engagement/presence; joint readiness; and combating terrorism.

Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)

- Provides top-level coordination and oversight of DOD readiness activities.

- Makes recommendations to SECDEF on readiness policy.

- Coordinates DOD position on readiness to outside agencies.

- Membership includes:
  - *DEPSECDEF (Chairman)*
  - *VCJCS (Co - Chairman)*
  - Under Secretaries of Defense and Comptroller
  - Service Under Secretaries
  - *Service Chiefs of Staff*
  - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
  - Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
  - *Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness*

Figure 8-8

The result of the JWCA analyses and their review by the JROC is input to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). The CPR is provided to the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG provides programming guidance to the Services. The CPA provides an assessment of the Service composite programs and Combat Support Agencies programs to the Secretary.

Because deficiencies identified in the JMRR may require long-term programmatic fixes, the deficiency is passed to the JWCA appropriate assessment team for action. The JWCA ensures that the CINCs are included in this process.

JROC uses the JWCA process to assist in preserving the current capabilities while building on future military capability by investing in people, force enhancements, modernization, and infrastructure.

STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM (SORTS)

SORTS is an internal management tool for use by the CJCS, Services, and combatant command. SORTS is the single, automated reporting system within the Department of Defense that functions as the

ARMY READINESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED FIX

MEASURE	PROGRAM	PROJECT
STATUS / REQ / AUTH	RESOURCES/PRIORITIES/ DECISIONS	WHEN FIXED?
UNIT STATUS REP CMDR SITUATION REP JCS PREPAREDNESS EVALUATION REPORT IAMS JCS SORTS	PBBES (TAP/TAA/DAMPL/ ETC) SPS* RESOURCES ALLOCATION MODEL* PRIORTIZATION MODEL* ARMY DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM* TRAINING RESOURCE MODEL*	TAEDP REQVAL TRAINING RESOURCE MODEL* SPS* DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM

WHAT NEEDS TO BE FIXED

HOW TO FIX FUTURE READINESS REQUIREMENTS

UNIT / FORCE PROGRESS

* BEING CONDENSED AND / OR DEVELOPED

DAMPL - DEPT OF ARMY MASTER PRIORITY LIST
IAMS - INTEGRATED ARMY MOBILIZATION STUDY
PPBES - PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING
          AND EXECUTION SYSTEM
REQVAL - REQUISITION AND VALIDATION SYSTEM
SORTS - STATUS OF RESOURCES ANDTRAINING SYSTEM

SPS - STATUS PROJECTION SYSTEM
TAA - TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS
TAEDP - TOTAL ARMY EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM
TAP - THE ARMY PLAN
TLR/S - TOTAL LOGISTICS READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

Figure 8-9

central registry of all operational units of the Armed Forces and certain foreign organizations. SORTS provides a current snapshot on a select slice of resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. SORTS measures the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake the missions for which the unit was organized or designed.

SORTS is designed to support, in priority order, information requirements related to crisis response planning; deliberate or peacetime planning; and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces for use by the CINCs. SORTS provides the CJCS with the necessary unit information to achieve adequate and feasible military response to crisis situations and participate in the joint planning and execution process associated

with deliberate planning. SORTS provides data used by other automated systems (JOPES, GCCS) in support of the joint planning process.

ARMY READINESS

The Unit Status Report (USR) is the Army's input to the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). The primary purpose of the USR is to provide the National Command Authorities, JCS, HQDA and all levels of the Army's chain of command with the current status of U.S. Army units, the necessary information for making operational decisions. (See Figure 8-9.) The USR is designed to measure the status of resources and training level of a unit at a given point in time. The reports should not be used in isolation to assess

Active Army and Army Reserve, Unit Status Reporting Channels


```
                    JCS                                              HQDA

                                        MACOM

               UNIFIED                                            OTHER
               COMMANDS                                           MACOM

            INSTALLATION                                       REGIONAL
            OR DIVISION                                        HEADQUARTERS

          ACTIVE ARMY                  OCONUS                CONUS
          REPORTING                 ARMY RESERVE          ARMY RESERVE
          UNITS                   REPORTING UNITS        REPORTING UNITS
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
Figure 8-10

overall unit readiness and the broader aspects of Army readiness. The USR provides a timely single source document for assessing key elements of unit's status. It does not provide all the information necessary to manage resources.

Joint Pub 1.03.3 and *MOP 11* require all reporting units to report their status in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The Army Unit Status Reporting System is required by *Army Regulation 220-1* and provides the data required in the *Joint Pub 1-03.3* and *MOP 11*. The Army requires additional data which increases the value of the USR as a resource management and operations tool. The supplemental data required by the Army was selected by HQDA in coordination with the MACOMs. This information passes through but is not

retained by the Joint Staff. The higher level of detail allows units to better express their status and all levels of command to use the report to analyze key status indicators (see figures 8-10 and 8-11).

The current version of *AR 220-1* was published in July 1993 and incorporates the following changes: requires stricter classification of reports; updates guidance on substitutes; considers DA Form 2406 reportable equipment for equipment readiness calculation; provides new, detailed guidance to units reporting C-5 due to DA-directed change or low resourcing; requires all units to report mission accomplishment estimate (MAE); revises the calculation process for composite reports; streamlines personnel reporting by replacing two personnel cards with one; and deletes non-reportable line items (NRLIN) policy. (AR

Army National Guard
Unit Status Reporting Channels

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┌─────────┐                                                      ┌─────────┐
│   JCS   │◄──────────┐   ┌──────────────┐   ┌────────────────► │  HQDA   │
└─────────┘           │   │  NATIONAL    │   │                  └─────────┘
     │                └───┤   GUARD      ├───┘                       ╎
     ▼                    │   BUREAU     │                           ╎
┌─────────┐           ┌───┤              ├───┐                       ╎
│ UNIFIED │           │   └──────────────┘   │                       ╎
│COMMANDS │           │                      │                       ╎
└─────────┘           ▼                      ▼                       ▼
┌─────────┐                              ┌─────────┐
│  STARC  │                              │ FORSCOM │
└─────────┘                              └─────────┘
     ▲                                        │
     │                                        ▼
┌─────────┐                              ┌─────────┐
│REPORTING│                              │ CONUSA  │
│  UNITS  │                              └─────────┘
└─────────┘
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
Figure 8-11

220-1 is currently under revision, a final coordinating draft is being staffed with MACOMs.)

Unit Status Reporting Procedures.

USR data are transmitted through command and control communications channels. For this reason the report cannot be all-inclusive. Problems are highlighted for commanders and operators. Detailed reviews of problems are conducted using other data systems.

Details of Army unit status reporting procedures are explicit in *AR 220-1*. Since procedures for measuring and reporting unit status have changed considerably with each revision, each commander, manager, or staff officer concerned with readiness should carefully study the detailed guidance and requirements of the latest edition. A summary of the key aspects of the procedure is included here to provide a basic understanding of the system.

Chapter 2 AR 220-1 clearly identifies what units must report readiness.

Each unit required to submit a USR will report on the units resource status and training status levels. The category status level (C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5) indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of personnel and equipment, the training of those personnel, and the maintenance of the equipment. These levels reflect the status of the unit's resources and training measured against the resources and training required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. Category levels do

not project a unit's combat ability once committed to action. The overall unit category level will be based only upon organic resources and training under the operational control of the reporting unit or its parent unit. The categories of overall unit levels are:

- C-1. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-2. Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-3. Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-4. Unit requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with resources on hand.
- C-5. Unit is undergoing a directed resource change and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake a portion of its wartime mission(s) with the resources on hand. C-5 units are restricted to:
  - units undergoing major reorganization or

equipment conversion or transition.
- units placed in cadre status by HQDA.
- units which are being activated or inactivated.
- units which are not manned or equipped, but are required in the wartime structure.
- units with primary tasking as training units that could be tasked to perform a wartime mission.
- units within 365 days of inactivation or that have drawn down to point where the unit is no longer capable of accomplishing its wartime mission(s). A unit may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with the resources on hand.

Personnel Data. The USR provides the indicators of a unit's personnel status by developing a personnel status level by comparing available strength, available MOS qualified strength, and available senior grade strength against wartime requirements. In addition, assigned strength and personnel turnover information is provided.

Equipment on Hand Data (EOH). The USR provides indicators of a units EOH status level by comparing the fill of selected equipment to wartime requirements. A level is determined for all of an MTOE unit's primary items of equipment to include: Principal Weapons Systems and Equipment (ERC A/P), each individual pacing item

(ERC P), and support items of equipment (ERC B/C).

Equipment Serviceability (ES). The USR provides an ES status level which indicates how well a unit is maintaining its on hand equipment. A status level is calculated for on hand reportable equipment referred to as pacing items (ERC P). A separate status level is calculated for each on hand pacing item. The status level is calculated by comparing the aggregate Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate for "all on hand reportable equipment" regardless ERC and including pacing items and a separate calculation for each "individual pacing item" (ERC P). The units over ES status is equal to the lower of these calculated levels.

Training Data. The USR provides a training status for the reporting unit. The primary purpose of the unit training level indicates the current ability of the unit to perform assigned wartime missions. A secondary purpose of the unit training level shows resource shortfalls that prevent attainment of a training tempo necessary to achieve or maintain proficiency. A commander assesses his unit's ability to execute mission essential tasks (METL). The estimated number of training days needed to reach full proficiency determines a unit's training status level.

Mission Accomplishment Estimate (MAE). The MAE is the commanders subjective assessment of his unit's ability to execute that portion of his wartime mission it would be expected to perform if alerted/committed within 72 hours of the date of the report. The estimate is expressed in terms of the percent of wartime mission that can be accomplished if the unit were alerted/committed. MAE is determined by all reporting units.

Overall Unit Status Level (READY). To determine the overall unit status level, the commander reviews the status levels attained in the measured resource and training areas. The overall unit category level will normally be identical to the lowest level recorded in any of the unit's individually measured resource areas of personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training, but the overall category may be upgraded or downgraded by the unit commander. However, modification of a unit's overall level by its commander does not permit modification of the computed status of each individually measured area, which must be reported without adjustment. The Unit Status Report measures unit personnel and equipment against wartime requirements and provides a subjective training rating.

Department of the Army.

At DA level, the Unit Status Report is a part of a larger readiness picture compiled from many functional reports and sources. It provides a quick channel whereby the chain of command is alerted to the status of units and, thus, can exercise the appropriate management actions and provide the required assistance. The Department of the Army uses the Unit Status Report in conjunction with other personnel and logistics reports to improve resource management of people, equipment, and the programming of facilities and training areas/exercises to increase the combat effectiveness of subordinate elements.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) receives the reports from the major commands through the JCS. Upon receipt,

ODCSOPS prepares USR summaries for AC units and for RC units. Copies of these summaries, in the form of computer printouts, are provided to elements of the DA Staff, as well as other logistics and personnel agencies, and Service schools. Data is arranged in these summaries in a large variety of ways to meet specific needs. For example, data is assembled by type unit, OPLAN, major command, and unit category.

The Chief of Staff receives a monthly written readiness summary and briefing from the ODCSOPS. The status of major units by Strategic Force Package (SFP) is provided as well as a two year projection of each resource area. Special interest items, such as division reorganization, equipment conversion, or critical personnel issues are covered. This briefing provides the latest readiness information to the Army leadership and provides a forum to identify trends and address readiness issues in a timely, proactive manner.

Each principal DA Staff element uses the information provided by ODCSOPS to effect resource allocation in consonance with the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) and ALO. Inputs from the Unit Status Reports also serve as a yardstick to judge how well the functional systems in the personnel, logistics, and training fields are performing.

MACOM.

The use of status information as a management tool is probably more sophisticated at the major command (MACOM) level than at any other level within the reporting chain. At each major command, Unit Status Reports provide information which is used by the commander and his staff to assist in the management of resources. Only two of the Army's MACOMs, USAREUR and FORSCOM,

are discussed here since they control most Active Army combat units.

A key management tool at both Headquarters, FORSCOM and USAREUR, is an array of data compiled in a monthly Unit Status Summary Book. FORSCOM also publishes a quarterly Force Status Summary which displays the status and trends of all CONUS-based AC and RC units. While there are some differences between the two headquarters' status books, each is a complete and detailed report depicting, with charts, graphs, and tables, many varied aggregations of the latest data. These books depict trends and identify units not attaining ratings equal to their ALO, allowing for management by exception techniques to be used in correcting problems.

Detailed briefings on the status of subordinate commands are presented quarterly to CINCUSAREUR and to CINCFOR. The FORSCOM quarterly briefings cover the unit status of all CONUS-based AC and RC major combat units, plus trends of all other AC and RC units with emphasis on the contingency force. The status briefing is normally attended by the command group and representatives from the United States Army Reserve Command, the Army National Guard, and others. At FORSCOM, other attendees often include general officers from the DA Staff, AMC, and TRADOC. At the briefing, each staff principal provides a complete overview of the unit status in his particular area, then highlights the problem areas, and tells what is being done to alleviate unit problems. The Army National Guard representative also provides a complete overview of the unit status for the National Guard units.

Both the CINCFOR and CINCUSAREUR actively pursue answers to questions on the depicted critical personnel, equipment, training, or monetary shortfalls at

their unit status briefing, and each has the requisite representation of general officers from his and other headquarters to give impetus to efficient management of resource allocation and shortage difficulties.

Preparation for the scheduled briefing is in itself a major management process. In FORSCOM the J5 and in USAREUR the ODCSOPS is in charge of overall coordination. In addition to briefing major divisional forces, Army National Guard and Army Reserve roundout elements are reported along with their respective affiliated divisions, and other special category nondivisional units.

In ODCSOPS USAREUR, there are personnel who devote their full time to unit status. They check the logistical rating of all reporting units on a monthly basis. They categorize units making and failing to achieve their ALO, both in equipment fill and condition. The DCSOPS looks to the 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC) to identify problem areas, conduct detailed reviews of problems noted, and recommend solutions. The 200th TAMMC uses the data to cross-level or issue equipment to improve unit readiness rates, and identifies theater shortfalls to HQDA for assistance. The 1st Personnel Command (PERSCOM) also considers the information a valuable tool in distributing personnel assets. The MOS shortages reported are extracted and used to identify to DA on a quarterly basis the critical skill shortages in the command. 1st PERSCOM provides feedback to corps and division commanders on the MOS situation and advises commanders where they can substitute MOS, or take other local action. Reports are used to "cross-level" personnel (within PCS constraints), and the personnel data is compared with other USAREUR sources for accuracy. The CG, 1st PERSCOM is briefed

monthly by his staff and attends the CINC's quarterly and DSCOPS' monthly briefings prepared to address personnel problems surfaced by units.

SUMMARY

Readiness is a primary mission of military forces in peacetime. Readiness is highly situational and subjective. Nevertheless, readiness is a yardstick for programming and budgeting, and the Army's readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources to meet the demands of war plans. The more accurately the Army captures and quantifies readiness, the better the Army can articulate resource needs to Department of Defense and the Congress.

The Chairman's Readiness System demands an ever increasing requirement on the Army to provide the most accurate measure of readiness. This improved process of evaluating current readiness and future readiness requirements has led to an understanding of how to view readiness from the joint perspective. Army is a major element in the evaluation of the joint force. The Army must take full advantage of this process to ensure that it needs and requirements both current and future are captured, and presented in the most favorable manner possible. This requires that Army be fully committed to actively participating in this most important venue. The Chairman's Readiness System provides an additional methodology to the Army to justify resource needs as they impact Army readiness as a part of the joint community.

Unit status reporting is an indispensable part of the Army readiness system. Currently, the Army uses the Unit Status Reporting System as an indicator of unit readiness.

The status reporting procedures prescribed by *AR 220-1* define the Army's method for determining unit status. Each data item included or not included has been the subject of considerable study and debate. Nearly every point represents some degree of compromise. Unit status reporting procedures must provide operations personnel the status report they require and management personnel the information they need to use resources efficiently.

The Unit Status Reporting System provides information to commanders at each echelon which they can use to manage their organizations better. The data supplements information from other reporting procedures and it can also be used to cross-check inputs from other systems. At the organizational level, the USRs give the commander criteria against which to measure his or her unit and its progress. It is also an opportunity to highlight problems which require additional resources. At the higher levels, the report provides data which the staff can use to assist subordinate units, and it is a vehicle to keep the commander informed. Unit Status Reports measure available resources against wartime requirements.

Other reports and analyses are now being used in conjunction with USRs to examine and measure force readiness. Action is also being taken to improve the Army's ability to project changes in force readiness. This will enhance the Army's ability to make resource decisions and develop balanced programs that achieve desired results. Improvements in technology and new initiatives are making it possible for the Army to better manage force readiness.

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(1) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *CJCS Guide 3401: CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System,* 1 October 1995.

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(3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 220-1 Field Organizations: Unit Status Reporting,* 31 July 1993. *AR 220-1* is currently under revision.

(4) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 700-5: Total Logistics Readiness and Sustainability (TLRS) Analysis,* 16 December 1985.

(5) U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 100-11, Force Integration,* 15 January 1995.

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CHAPTER 9

ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

Prior to the era of Secretary of Defense McNamara, each Service essentially established its own single-year budget and submitted it to Congress annually. Secretary McNamara's approach to planning and budgeting was quite different, however, and was founded upon his experience with civilian industry. He required the Services to prepare a single document, the Five Year Defense Program, or FYDP, which detailed their resource requirements on a multi-year basis. He established himself as the sole authority for approving changes to the FYDP, and Services which desired change to the aproved FYDP had to obtain his approval. That was the rudimentary beginning of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPBS) process. It has changed greatly over time. Today, the PPBS is paralleled by the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System. Together, they cover virtually all activities which involve the distribution of resources in the Services in general, and in the Army specifically.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). It outlines responsibilities for managing the system and performing its operational tasks. It also discusses the system's phase-by-phase biennial process. Prescribed by *Army Regulation 1-1*, the PPBES makes up the Army component of the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) governed by *DOD Directive 7045.14* and *DOD Instruction 7045.7*.

PPBES STRUCTURE

The DOD PPBS.

The PPBS is DOD's primary resource management system for the department's military functions. Its purpose is to produce a plan, a program, and finally the defense budget. The system documents the program and budget as the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

The Future Years Defense Program.

The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) officially summarizes the programs developed within the PPBS and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The

FYDP exists in machine readable form, which lists resources by program element (PE), resource identification code, fiscal year (FY), and value. The FYDP exists also in paper form, which sums resource data in various management arrays.

The FYDP has two dimensions. Its first dimension specifies 11 major defense programs (Figure 9-1). Constructed from PE building blocks, the programs offer an output or mission-oriented structure, within which each PE represents an organizational or functional entity and its associated resources. DOD uses the structure for internal program review. In its second dimension, the FYDP records program decisions on dollars and manpower applying the input-oriented appropriation structure of congressional budget requests (Figures 9-2 and 9-3). The FYDP includes separately published annexes for procurement; construction; and research, development, testing, and evaluation.

The FYDP identifies and accounts for the total of all resources programmed by DOD. Assigning resources to specific major force programs, the FYDP shows fiscal year totals for forces, manpower, and dollars. For example, the FYDP for the FY 1998-1999 President's Budget (Figure 9-4) would:

- give totals for each resource group by prior year (PY), current year (CY), and the FY 1998-1999 budget years (BYs).
- extend TOA and manpower totals 4 years beyond the FY 1998/99 BY to FY 2003.
- extend force totals 7 years beyond the FY 1998/99 BY to FY 2006.

The FYDP is updated at least three times each year. One update occurs when defense components submit their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) to OSD in the spring -- a full POM during even years and an amended POM during the odd-year off cycle. A second update occurs when defense components submit budget estimates about mid-September and a third, when the President's Budget goes to Congress in January. DOD is required to submit an amended OSD Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and President's Budget (PB) for the second year of each biennial budget. For this reason, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions has recommended discontinuing biennial budget submissions until such time as Congress acts upon both years concurrently.

A Dynamic System.

A brief look at the introduction of the PPBS and its subsequent changes reveals a dynamic system that after 30 years continues to evolve. By presidential administration, the changes are as follows.

1962—Kennedy/McNamara. The DOD PPBS began in 1962 as a management innovation of President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Before McNamara, each Military Department had prepared its budget following its Service interests with very little guidance. Previous SECDEF involvement was for the most part limited to dividing DOD's budget ceiling between the Services. If the Services exceeded their "share of the pie," the SECDEF would reduce their budget, usually by a percentage cut across the appropriations. The PPBS changed all this. Based on a concept developed at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s, it introduced a multi-year programmatic focus. Annual ceiling reductions gave way to analysis centered on 10 major force and support programs over a five-year program period.

Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure

Figure 9-1

1969—Nixon/Laird. The first major change in PPBS occurred under President Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. The Laird management style stressed participatory management. OSD no longer initiated detailed program proposals; they reviewed those put forward by the Services using specific budgetary ceilings.

1977—Carter/Brown. President Carter introduced Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) to the Federal Budget. It achieved only limited success. The goal of ZBB was to more clearly identify marginal programs. "Decision packages" were arrayed at three different resource levels, giving OSD greater opportunity to alter Service program proposals. Each Service developed procedures to array the decision packages. As an aid in building and displaying its program, the Army installed a Program Development Increment Package (PDIP). Used internally and not reflected in programs and budgets forwarded by the Army, the PDIP has since evolved into a Management Decision Package (MDEP). In 1979, as a result of a Rand Corporation study (the *Rice Study*), Secretary of Defense Brown formed the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to manage

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Army Appropriation and Fund Managers

Resource identification code	Appropriation (fund) [1]	Manager for requirements determination	Manager for program and performance
	Investment		
RDTE	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
ACFT (APA)	Aircraft Procurement, Army	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
MSLS (MIPA)	Missile Procurement, Army	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
WTCV	Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
AMMO (PAA)	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
OPA	Other Procurement, Army	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
	OPA 1	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
	OPA 2	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA), DISC4
	OPA 3	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
	OPA 4	DCSOPS	ASA(RDA)
MCA	Military Construction, Army	ACSIM	ACSIM
MCNG	Military Construction, Army National	CNGB, ACSIM	CNGB
MCAR	Military Construction, Army Reserve	CAR, ACSIM	CAR
AFHC	Family Housing, Army (Construction)	ACSIM	ACSIM
	Operations		
OMA	Operation and Maintenance, Army	See figure 9-3.	
OMNG	Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard [2]	CNGB, ACSIM	CNGB
OMAR	Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve [2]	CAR, ACSIM	CAR
MPA	Military Personnel, Army	DCSPER	DCSPER
NGPA	National Guard Personnel, Army	CNGB	CNGB
RPA	Reserve Personnel, Army	CAR	CAR
AFHO	Family Housing, Army (Operations)	ACSIM	ACSIM
DERA	Defense Environmental Restoration Act	ACSIM	ACSIM
DBOF	Business Operations Fund	ASA(FM&C)	ASA(FM&C)
CAWCF	Army Conventional Ammunition Working Capital Fund	ASA(RDA)	ASA(RDA)
IMET	International Military Education and Training Transfer Appropriation	DCSLOG	DCSLOG
FMFE	Foreign Military Financing Executive	DCSLOG	DCSLOG
FMS	Foreign Military Sales Program	DCSLOG	DCSLOG
HOA	Homeowners Assistance Fund, Defense	COE	COE
ATF	Department of the Army Trust Funds	ASA(FM&C)	ASA(FM&C)

Notes.—[1] ASA(FM&C) serves as appropriation sponsor for all appropriations (funds) except ARNG and USAR appropriations, whose sponsors are the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Chief, Army Reserve, respectively.
[2] See figure 9-3.

Figure 9-2

Operation and Maintenance, Army

Army manpower and total obligation authority

n	**Budget activity (BA)**	
nn	**Activity group (01 level)**	
nnn	Budget subactivity	

Records resources for Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO) nnnxxx, where nnn shows budget subactivity.

Code	Description	Manager [1]
	BA 1: Operating forces	**DCSOPS**
11	**Land forces**	
111	Divisions	DCSOPS
112	Corps combat forces	DCSOPS
113	Corps support forces	
114	Echelon above corps forces	DCSOPS
115	Land forces operations support	DCSOPS
12	**Land forces readiness**	
121	Force readiness operations support	DCSOPS
122	Land forces systems readiness	DISC4, ACSIM, DCSOPS
123	Land forces depot maintenance	DCSLOG
13	**Land forces readiness support**	
131	Base support	ACSIM
132	Maintenance of real property	ACSIM
133	Management and operational headquarters	ASA(MRA)
134	Unified commands	DCSOPS
135	Additional activities	DCSOPS
	BA 2: Mobilization	**DCSOPS**
21	**Mobility operations**	
214	POMCUS [2]	DCSOPS [3]
211	Strategic mobilization	DCSOPS [3]
212	War reserve activities	DCSOPS
213	Industrial preparedness	DCSLOG [3]
	BA 3: Training and recruiting	**DCSOPS**
31	**Accession training**	
311	Officer acquisition	DCSOPS
312	Recruit training	DCSOPS
313	One station unit training	DCSOPS
314	Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)	DCSOPS
315	Base support (academy only)	ACSIM
315	Maint of real property (academy only)	ACSIM
32	**Basic skill and advanced training**	
321	Specialized skill training	DCSOPS
322	Flight training	DCSOPS
323	Professional development education	DCSOPS
324	Training support	DCSOPS
325	Base support (other training)	ACSIM
325	Maint of real property (other training)	ACSIM
33	**Rcrtng, and other tng and education**	
331	Recruiting and advertising	DCSPER
332	Examining	DCSPER
333	Off-duty and voluntary education	DCSPER
334	Civilian training and education	DCSPER
335	Junior ROTC	DCSPER
336	Base support (recruiting leases)	ACSIM

Code	Description	Manager [1]
	BA 4: Administration and service-wide activities	
41	**Security programs**	
411	Security programs	DCSINT
42	**Logistics operations**	
421	Servicewide transportation	DCSLOG
422	Central supply activities	DCSLOG
423	Logistic support activities	DCSLOG
424	Ammunition management	DCSLOG
43	**Servicewide support**	
431	Administration	ASA(MRA)
432	Servicewide communications	DISC4, ACSIM
433	Manpower management	ASA(MRA)
434	Other personnel support	ASA(MRA)
435	Other service support	Various
436	Army claims activities	TJAG
437	Real estate management	ACSIM
438	Base support	ACSIM
439	Maintenance of real propety	ACSIM
451	Closed account	Note [4]
493	Environmental restoration	Note [4]
44	**Support of other nations**	
441	International military headquarters	DCSOPS
442	Miscellaneous support of other nations	DCSOPS

Manpower-only activity structure

PROBE generates categories 8 and 9 below to meet manpower reporting requirements.

Category 8 records resources for AMSCO 84nxxx where n=1, 6, 7, or 9 shows the budget subactivity. Category 9 records resources for AMSCO 9nxxxx, where n=1, 2, 3, or 4 shows the 0-1 level structure.

Code	Description	Manager [1]
	Category 8: Medical activities, manpower only—reimbursable labor	
84	**Medical manpower—reimbursable**	**TSG**
841	Examining activities	
846	Training-medical spaces	
847	Care in Army medical centers	
849	Defense medical spaces	
	Category 9: Other—manpower only	
91	**Defense agency manpower (military only)**	**DCSOPS**
92	**Special operations forces manpower—reimbursable**	**DCSPER**
93	**Outside Department of Defense**	**DCSPER**
94	**Transients, holdees, and operating strength deviation**	**DCSPER**

Figure 9-3

Operation and Maintenance, Army—continued

Base support

Provides installation support functions for budget subactivities, 117, 315, 325, 336, and 438. Includes former accounts for base operations (BASOPS) (AMSCO xxxx96), real property mainten-ance (RPM) (AMSCOs xxxx78 and 76), real property services (AMSCO xxxx79), and environmental compliance (AMSCOs xxxx53, 54, and 56).

Code	Account	Manager[1]
A.	Real estate leases	ACSIM
B.	Installation supply operations	DCSLOG
C.	Direct and general support (DS/GS) maintenance of nontactical equipment	DCSLOG
D.	Transportation services	DCSLOG
E.	Laundry and dry cleaning services	DCSLOG
F.	The Army food services program	DCSLOG
G.	Personnel support	ASA(MRA)
H.	Unaccompanied personnel housing operation	ACSIM
J.	Operation of utilities	ACSIM
K.	Maintenance and repair of real property	ACSIM
L.	Minor construction	ACSIM
M.	Engineer support	ACSIM
N.	Command element, special staff, headquarters commandant	ACSIM
P.	Automation activities	DISC4, ACSIM

Code	Account	Manager[1]
S.	Community and morale support activities	ACSIM
Q.	Reserve component support	ACSIM
T.	Preservation of order/counterintel-ligence operations	DCSOPS
U.	Resource management	ASA(FM&C)
W.	Contracting operations	ASA(RDA)
Y.	Records management, publications (summary account)	DISC4, ACSIM
.	Environmental compliance, pollution prevention, and conservation pro-grams	ACSIM

Added function	Manager[1]
Base communications AMSCO xxxx95	DISC4, ACSIM
Audio visual AMSCO xxxx90	DISC4, ACSIM
Youth services, family programs AMSCO 315819 and 315820 (for USMA resources) and AMSCO xxx719 and xxx720 (where xxx is 117, 325, or 438 depending on the command owning the resources)	ACSIM

Operation and Maintenance—Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve

-Army National Guard

Records resources for AMSCO 5nxxxx, where n=1 or 4 designates the 0-1 level structure.

Code	Description	Manager[1]
	BA 1: Operating forces	CNGB
51	Mission operations Training operations Recruiting and retention Medical support Depot maintenance Base support[2]	
	BA 4: Administration & servicewide activities	CNGB
54	Administration & servicewide activities Information management Public affairs Personnel administration Staff management	

U.S. Army Reserve

Records resources for AMSCO 5nxxxx, where n=1 or 4 designates the 0-1 level structure.

Code	Description	Manager[1]
	BA 1: Operating forces	CAR
51	Mission operations Training operations Recruiting and retention Medical support Depot maintenance Base support[2]	
	BA 4: Administration & servicewide activities	CAR
54	Administration & servicewide activities Information management Public affairs Personnel administration Staff management	

Figure 9-3 (continued)

FYDP for the President's FY 98-99 Budget

budget years				program years						
PY	CY	BY	BY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06

$TOA & MANPOWER

▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬

FORCES

▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬

Figure 9-4

the PPBS process more effectively. The DRB consisted of various under and assistant secretaries in OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

1981—Reagan/Weinberger. The Reagan Administration pledged to revitalize American military strength in the most effective and economical manner. This objective led to significant changes to PPBS known as the *Carlucci initiatives* (Frank Carlucci was DEPSECDEF and Chairman of the DRB). Initiatives included a greater emphasis on long-range planning, a greater decentralization of authority to the Services, closer attention to cost savings and efficiencies, a refocus of DRB Program Review on major issues only, and a general streamlining of the entire PPBS process. The DRB was restructured to include the Service Secretaries as full members. The DRB would

now review and approve policy and strategy in the planning phase (development of Defense Guidance [DG]). Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of unified and specified commands would now be invited twice a year to participate (brief) in the initial DRB deliberations of planning and programming phases (DG & DRB Program Review).

1984—Army/Air Force Joint Memorandum of Agreement. In 1984, Army Chief of Staff, General Wickham, and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Gabriel, signed a Joint Memorandum of Agreement aimed at improved coordination of budget priorities, elimination of duplication of functions, and more efficient joint operations in the AirLand Battle during war. The Joint Memorandum of Agreement was not a DOD initiative, but had direct impact on DOD

PPBS. The memorandum addressed overlap in existing Army and Air Force roles and missions. The memorandum was an effort to reduce resource redundancy and interservice rivalry for limited resources. It stressed Army and Air Force cooperation during program development. Interservice debate over program issues was to be resolved during program development and not during annual DRB Program Review.

1984—Enhancement of CINCs' Role in the PPBS. DEPSECDEF Taft endorsed PPBS procedures to allow the CINCs a greater voice in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process and the DRB Program Review. The procedures included: CINCs' submission of prioritized requirements (via Integrated Priority Lists [IPLs]); tracking CINCs' concerns during POM development and execution; visibility of CINCs requirements in the POMs; enhanced participation of the CINCs in DRB Program Review process; and enhanced role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the review and coordination of the CINCs concerns.

1986—Conversion from Annual to Biennial PPBS Cycle. In response to his Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the *Packard Commission*) and the DOD Authorization Act of 1986 (*Public Law 99-145*), President Reagan issued *National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219*, directing that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the DOD produce a two-year budget beginning with the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget years. In response to this direction, OSD and the Military Departments have implemented a biennial PPBS process. In practice, however, Congress still requires an annual

budget submission, compelling an off cycle update for the second budget year.

1987—CINC Capabilities to Participate Effectively in the PPBS Budget Phase. Earlier DRB decisions gave the CINCs a role in the planning and programming phases of the PPBS. A more recent (Oct. 87) DRB decision expanded the CINCs' role to the budget (review and execution) phase.

1989—Bush/Cheney. During the early stages of DOD downsizing, President Bush instituted a series of Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRDs). In another initiative, Secretary of Defense Cheney modified the framework for PPBS decisionmaking, including in the structure a core group of DOD officials he used to help manage the Department.

1993—Clinton/Aspin, Perry. DOD downsizing continues under the Clinton Administration guided initially by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Bottom Up Review and later to be guided by the results of the *Defense Performance Review and Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.*

The Clinton administration continues the PPBS framework used during the Bush Administration, using a core group of DOD managers and several review forums.

Core DOD Managers.

DOD officials, who serve as the core group of DOD managers, include the following:

- *The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF)* assists the SECDEF in overall leadership of the department. He exercises

authority delegated by the SECDEF and conducts the day-to-day operation of DOD. The DEPSECDEF manages the PPBS.

- *The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)* assists the President and SECDEF in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces. The CJCS serves as the principal military adviser to the President and SECDEF. Shouldering responsibilities for planning, advising, and policy formulation, the CJCS participates in DOD's senior councils, where he speaks for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Commanders in Chief of U.S. unified (US combatant) commands (CINCs). The Vice Chairman of the JCS, who is the second-ranking member of the Armed Forces, acts for the Chairman in his absence.
- *The Service Secretaries* convey the Service perspective on defense matters to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF and, as key advisers, provide them with candid personal views.
- *The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD [A&T])* exercises responsibility for acquisition matters DOD-wide and performs as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).
- *The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)* represents DOD on foreign relations and arms control matters and serves as the primary adviser to the DEPSECDEF for the PPBS planning phase.

DOD Executive Committee.

Chaired by the SECDEF, the DOD Executive Committee (EXCOM) meets regularly as the key, senior deliberative and decisionmaking body within DOD for all major Defense issues. The core group of DOD managers just described comprises the membership of the committee.

Defense Resources Board.

The Defense Resources Board (DRB) assists the Secretary in making major program decisions. In addition to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary (acting as DRB Chairman in the Secretary's absence) the DRB includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Members from within OSD include the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), DOD Comptroller, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. (Although not official members of the body, Service Chiefs often accompany their Secretaries.) The Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation acts as Executive Secretary. The Deputy Secretary of Defense designates other members for individual meetings as appropriate.

Considering broad policy and developing guidance on high-priority objectives, the DRB helps promote long-range planning and stability in the Defense program. Among other functions, the DRB:

- reviews guidance for planning and programming,
- evaluates high-priority programs,
- considers the effect of resource decisions on baseline cost, schedule, and performance of major acquisition programs and

aligns the programs with the PPBS,

- helps tie the allocation of resources for specific programs and forces to national policies,
- reviews the program and budget,
- reviews execution of selected programs, and,
- advises the SECDEF on policy, PPBS issues, and proposed decisions.

Program Review Group.

Initiated by the Clinton Administration, the Program Review Group (PRG) identifies major issues, analyzes them, and develops decision options for the DRB. The Director for PA & E chairs the group. Members from OSD include the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Members from the Services include the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCOPS), the Assistant Chief of Staff, Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments), the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs and Resources), the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8). Other principals from DOD agencies attend PRG meetings as appropriate to the subject matter under discussion.

Defense Acquisition Board and Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

As chairman and vice chairman, respectively, the USD (Acquisition and Technology) and VCJCS direct the efforts of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The DAB oversees defense system acquisition, providing discipline through review of major programs. At each milestone in the system's life cycle, the Board assures that programs have met established performance requirements, including program-specific exit criteria.

Assisting the DAB and USD (Acquisition and Technology) is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which is chaired by the VCJCS. The JROC articulates military needs and validates performance goals and program baselines at successive milestones for each DAB program.

The USD (Acquisition and Technology), with the DAB and JROC, helps link the acquisition process to planning, programming, and budgeting. Serving as a key adviser to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF, the USD (Acquisition and Technology) participates in all resource decisions affecting the baselines of major acquisition programs, including costs, schedules, and performance.

PPBS/PPBES Process.

Figure 9-5 provides a schematic representation of the PPBS/PPBES process and its general timing.

ARMY PPBES ROLE

The Army's Primary Resource Management System.

The PPBES is the Army's primary resource management system. A major decisionmaking process, the PPBES interfaces with joint strategic planning and planning conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Linking directly to OSD programming and budgeting, the PPBES develops and maintains the Army portion of the defense program and budget. The PPBES supports Army planning, and it supports program development and budget preparation at all levels of command. It also supports execution of the approved program and budget by both headquarters and field organizations. During execution, it provides feedback to the planning, programming, and budgeting processes.

PPBES Concept.

The PPBES ties strategy, program, and budget all together. It helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs, programs from requirements, requirements from missions, and missions from national security objectives. The patterned flow—from end purpose to resource cost—defines requirements in progressively greater detail.

Long-range planning creates a vision of the Army 10 to 20 years into the future. In the 2- to 15-year midterm, long range macro estimates give way to a specified size, composition, and quality of divisional and support forces. Derived from joint strategic planning and intermediate objectives to achieve long-range goals, this force provides the planning foundation for program requirements.

Guided by force requirements and still in the midterm, programming distributes projected resources. It seeks to support priorities and policies of the senior Army leadership while achieving balance among Army organizations, systems, and functions.

In the 0- to 2-year near term, budgeting converts program requirements into requests for manpower and dollars. When enacted into appropriations and manpower authorizations, these resources become available to carry out approved programs.

Formally adding execution to the traditional emphasis on planning, programming, and budgeting emphasizes Army concern for how well program, performance, and financial execution apply allocated resources to meet requirements.

Documents produced within the PPBES support defense decisionmaking, and the review and discussion that attend their development help shape the outcome. The following are examples.

- The Army helps prepare Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and planning documents produced by the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The participation influences policy, strategy, and force objectives considered by the SECDEF and the CJCS, including policies for development, acquisition, and other resource allocation issues.
- Major Army Command (MACOM) commanders similarly influence positions and decisions taken by the Secretary of the Army (SA) and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA). They develop and submit force structure, procurement, and construction requirements;

command programs; and program estimates. They also make their views known through periodic commanders' conferences held by the CSA on the proposed plan, program, and budget.

- The CINCs influence Army positions and decisions through MACOM commanders serving as Army Service Component Command (ASCC) commanders, who integrate CINC operational requirements into their POMs. They also highlight pressing requirements in an Integrated Priorities List (IPL) that receives close review during program development.

PPBES Objectives.

A main objective of the PPBES is to provide essential focus on Departmental policy and priorities for Army functional activities during all phases of the PPBES. Phase by phase objectives are as follows:

- Through planning, to size, structure, man, equip, train, and sustain the Army force to support the national military strategy.
- Through programming, to distribute projected manpower, dollars, and materiel among competing requirements according to Army resource allocation policy and priorities.
- Through budgeting, to convert program decisions on dollars and manpower into requests for congressional authorization and appropriations.
- Through program execution, to:

  - apply resources to achieve approved program objectives, and,
  - adjust resource requirements based on execution feedback.

- Through program and budget execution, to manage and account for funds to carry out approved programs.

Control of planning, programming, and budgeting documents.

- Papers and associated data sponsored by the DOD PPBS give details of proposed programs and plans. The proposals often state candidate positions and competing options that remain undecided until final approval. Access to such tentative material by other than those directly involved in planning and allocating resources would frustrate the candor and privacy of leadership deliberations. Moreover, access by private firms seeking DOD contracts would imperil competition and pose serious ethical, even criminal, problems for those involved. For these reasons, DOD closely controls documents produced through the DOD PPBS and its supporting databases. Thus, OSD restricts access to DOD and other governmental agencies directly involved in planning, programming, and budgeting defense resources, primarily OMB. The list that follows cites major documents illustrative of

PPBS / PPBES PROCESS

Figure 9-5

AB - ARMY BUDGET
ACC - ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE
ALRPG - ARMY LONG RANGE PLANNING GUIDANCE
AMP - ARMY MODERNIZATION PLAN
APGM - ARMY PROGRAM GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM
APPI - ARMY POM PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS
ASCC - ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND
BES - BUDGET ESTIMATES SUBMISSION
CG - CHAIRMANS GUIDANCE

CJCS - CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CINCs - COMMANDERS-in-CHIEF
CPA - CHAIRMAN's PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
CPR - CHAIRMAN's PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION
C-PLAN - COMMAND PLAN
DPG - DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE
DRB - DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD
FFR - FORCE FEASIBILITY REVIEW
FG - FISCAL GUIDANCE

FYDP - FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PLAN
IPL - INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST(CINC)
JCS - JOINT CHIEF of STAFF
JPD - JOINT PLANNING DOCUMENT
JSCP - JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
JSR - JOINT STRATEGY REVIEW
MPDI - MACOM POM DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTIONS
MFORCE - MASTER FORCE

NMS - NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
OSD - OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY of DEFENSE
OMB - OFFICE of MANAGEMENT and BUDGET
PBAC - PROGRAM BUDGET ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PBD - PROGRAM BUDGET DECISION
PBG - PROGRAM and BUDGET GUIDANCE
PDD - PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE
PDM - PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM

POM - PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM
PRD - PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVES
QAPR - QUARTERLY ARMY PROGRESS REVIEW
RDAP - RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT ACQUISITION PLAN
RDP - REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS
TAA - TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS
TAP - TOTAL ARMY PLAN

9-13

Figure 9-5 goes here.

but not limiting PPBS-sponsored material requiring restricted access. Planning phase. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

- Programming phase.
    - Fiscal guidance.
    - Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
    - Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) documents for the POM, including procurement annex and RDT&E annex.
    - Issue papers (for example, major issue papers, cover briefs).
    - Proposed military department program reductions (or program offsets).
    - Tentative issue decision memoranda.
    - Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).
- Budgeting phase.
    - Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) documents for the September budget estimates submission and President's Budget, including procurement, RDT&E, and construction annexes classified P-1, R-1, and C-1.
    - Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).
    - Reports Generated by the Automated Budget Review System (BRS).
    - DD 1414 Base for Reprogramming.
    - DD 1416 Report of Programs.

- Congressional data sheets.

Exceptions to the limitations described require SECDEF approval. After coordination with the General Counsel, Army proponents may request an exception, but only for compelling need. Statutes and other procedures govern disclosure of information to Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO).

ORGANIZATION FOR PPBES ACTIVITY

Secretarial Oversight.

PPBES oversight and Army-wide Policy Development. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA (FM&C)) oversees the PPBES and the development and promulgation of Army wide PPBES policy. ASA (FM&C) also oversees all Army appropriations and serves as the sponsor for all appropriations except Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) appropriations.

Functional oversight. Principal officials of the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) oversee operation of the PPBES process within assigned functional areas and provide related policy and direction.

System Management.

The ASA (FM&C), with the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) manages the overall PPBES. As shown below, the DCSOPS, DPAE, and ASA (FM&C) manage functional phases of the system, each establishing and supervising policies and procedures necessary to carry out phase functions.

Planning. The DCSOPS manages the PPBES planning phase and:

- administers the Army Planning System (APS) to meet and complement the demands of the JSPS and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
- validates CINC requirements and provides CINC linkage to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to make sure CINC-required warfighting capabilities receive consideration in developing Army doctrine,
- integrates the views of Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) principal officials on Army missions and capabilities consonant with national security objectives and DOD guidance. Based on the integrated view, recommends Army priorities to the CSA for approval by the SA, and,
- prepares the Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) Plan. The RDA Plan determines battlefield requirements and ranks them in priority. It then matches them to materiel solutions, that is, to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE) and procurement programs. Developed through analysis by TRADOC and AMC and guided by the National Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance, the materiel solutions present an integrated HQDA position.

Programming. The DPAE manages the PPBES programming phase and:

- provides the SA and CSA with independent assessments of program alternatives and priorities,
- serves as the authoritative source of the FYDP resource position for the Army as a whole and, specifically, for CINC issues resourced by HQDA, and,
- exercises HQDA staff jurisdiction over the POM development process and FYDP to include interaction with OSD and the Joint Staff.

Budgeting. The ASA (FM&C) manages the PPBES budgeting phase and supervises and directs preparation of Army budget estimates, incorporating the budgets of the ARNG and USAR.

Execution. The ASA (FM&C) manages the PPBES execution phase and applies funds appropriated by Congress to carry out authorized programs. The ASA (FM&C) also tracks and reports on budget execution and conducts reviews of program performance in the Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR).

The QAPR evaluates overall program performance to make sure that total resources are applied to achieve approved objectives and to gain feedback for adjusting resource requirements.

Responsibilities for PPBES Operational Tasks.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The DCSOPS:

- determines force-related requirements of the Total Army—Active Army, ARNG, and USAR.

Managers for Manpower and Force Structure Issues	
Issue	**Manager**
Military (Active)	ASA(MR&A)
Force structure/UIC	DCSOPS
Civilian (end strength)	ASA(MR&A)
Army National Guard Manpower	CNGB
U.S. Army Reserve Manpower	CAR
Individuals account	DCSPER
Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA)	ASA(MR&A)
Joint and Defense Accounts	ASA(MR&A)

Figure 9-6

- Through TRADOC, integrates CINC requirements and those developed through the JSPS and JOPES into the Requirements Determination Process (RDP).
- Prepares the RDA Plan,
- Develops near-, mid-, and long-term force requirements,
- Develops requirements for organization, force structure, personnel, materiel, command and control, mobilization, facilities, and training devices,
  - prepares Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG),
  - documents, in the TAP, policy set by the senior Army leadership and leadership priorities for force-related resource requirements, midterm objectives for long term functional goals, and approved base force levels developed through the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process (below),
  - develops the preliminary program force,
  - sets priorities for Army requirements, programs, and resources,
  - exercises staff supervision of joint matters and assigns, coordinates, and reviews Joint Staff actions,
  - provides the operational link between HQDA, the Joint Staff, and, through ASCCs, the CINCs,
  - participates with DPAE in preparing Army input to the OSD Program Projection and Army comments on the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG),
  - participates with the DPAE in preparing briefings on the resource status of CINC issues,
  - participates with ASA (FM&C) in coordinating CINC major budget issues, and
  - serves as Army manager for force structure issues (Figure 9-6), and

performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in figures 9-2, and 9-3.

Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The DPAE:
- with DCSOPS, develops programming guidance for incorporation in the TAP.
- develops guidance for, and with functional proponents, prepares responses to, OSD program guidance documents.
- with functional proponents:
  - develops and defends the Army program, manages its codification in the POM, and,
  - reviews CINC integrated priority lists (IPLs) and MACOM-PEO POMs.
- with ASA (FM&C) and DCSOPS, guides and integrates the work of Title 10 Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) throughout the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, (Chief, National Guard Bureau and Chief, Army Reserves direct the work of the reserve component advisory PEGs). (Figures 9-7 and 9-8)
- directs the review and analysis of Army programming actions, performs selected studies, and develops alternatives for resource planning and programming,
- reviews Reserve Component programming actions to make sure they are coordinated before interacting with the Army Secretariat,

- manages the Management Decision Package (MDEP) architecture,
- insures the force structure and manpower information included in FYDP submissions to OSD match the positions in the force structure and accounting data bases for the Active Army, ARNG, USAR, and civilian work force. (Data in the FYDP and in the force structure and manpower data bases must match before the FYDP can be provided to OSD),
- with DCSOPS and ASCCs, briefs each CINC on the resource status of the CINCs issues after submission of each POM,
- With ASA (FM&C):
  - maintains the data architecture of the Army Management Structure (AMS) to meet management needs for each phase of the PPBES and to support FYDP submissions (including annexes),
  - maintains a resource management architecture to support the integration of PPBES processes and systems,
  - maintains the data base architecture for the PPBES Data Management System (Probe), including

Title 10 PEGs
Listing Area of Activity, and Proponent Agency and Co-Chairs

Manning (MM) –DCSPER

Provides the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve with authorized personnel in appropriate grades and skills. Integrates these activities for the ARNG and USAR. (Co-chairs — ASA (M&RA), DCSPER)

Training (TT) -- DCSOPS

Provides resources for Active and Reserve component unit readiness (to include medical units) and unit and collective training (Ground OPTEMPO and the Army Flying Hour Program), strategic mobility, combat training centers (CTCs) mobilization, CJCS exercises, and military operations.

Provides for collective training within such categories as officer acquisition (USMA, ROTC, OCS) and institutional training (initial entry training, leader development, professional development, functional training).

Deals with programs, systems, and activities to satisfy intelligence requirements of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and Army leadership- requirements funded in the Army portions of the NFIP under Program 31 and Army intelligence support to national agencies under Program 9. (The Equipping PEG addresses most requirements for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) managed by ACDSOPS-FD under Programs 2, and 4 through 10 and acquisitions to meet other intelligence and electronic warfare IEW) requirements.) (Co-chairs-ASA (M&RA), DCSOPS)

Organizing (OO)-DCS)OPS

Provides resources for Active and Reserve component modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and table of distribution (TDA) units; the individuals account (TTHS-trainees, transients, holdees, and students); and force manning decisions, civilian and military.

Addresses activations and inactivations, as well as adjustments in authorized levels of organization (ALO), conversions of military and civilian manpower spaces, and related requirements for personnel, equipment, and facilities.

Supports the Army health care program, which embraces activities of the Defense Health Program (DHP), U.S. Army medical commands, and deployable medical units of other MACOMs. Interests include requirements for medical readiness funded by the Army that concerns wartime deployable assets. Interests also include requirements for peacetime healthcare in fixed facilities funded by OSD through the DHP.

In addition, addresses daily activities to

Equipping (EE)-DCSOPS

Provides resources for the integration of new doctrine, training, organization, and equipment to develop and field warfighting capabilities for the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR. Focuses mainly on research, development, and material acquisition.

Considers operating and support costs to field weapons and equipment as well as the costs of incremental sustainment and combat development. (Co-chairs—ASA (RDA), DCSOPS)

Sustaining(SS)-DCSLOG

Provides resources to sustain operations of the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR, stressing worldwide readiness. Scope embraces Army reserve stocks, industrial preparedness, and central supply, and also internal operations of Army depots and arsenals, procurement of secondary item Army reserves, and transportation. Includes depot material maintenance.

Includes measures to assure the quality and timeliness of sustainment resources and to develop and maintain strategic logistics systems, manage weapon systems, provide security assistance, conduct logistics long-range planning, and reshape Army logistics.

Addresses measures to streamline Army business operations, improve the information management structure, and develop concepts of operations and procedures to further the integration, sharing, standardization, and interoperability of information systems. (Co-chairs—ASA (IL&E), DCSLOG)

Installation (II)-ACSIM

Provides resources to maintain services and infrastructure to support installations as power projection platforms. Plans and programs for installations services that minimize migration of resources into BASOPS. Provides housing for military personnel and their families.

Scope embraces Real Property Maintenance (RPM) funding to maintain facilities and covers measures to comply with environmental laws and the exercise of good stewardship of natural and cultural resources. Scope includes installation quality of life programs to ensure soldier morale, retention, readiness, and family support.

Supports measures to establish and maintain information systems communications, and audio-visual infrastructure to support power projection platforms and logistical sustainment base operations.

Makes sure within assigned responsibilities that programs to maintain a trained and ready force receive

Figure 9-7

Reserve Component Advisory PEGS

Listing Proponent Agency and Area of Activity

Army National Guard (NG) — CNGB

    Provides technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs and monitors actions to integrate into the Total Army program the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of the Army National Guard.

U.S. Army Reserve (AR) — USAR

    Provides technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs and monitors actions to integrate into the Total Army program the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of the U.S. Army Reserve.

Figure 9-8

    – managing data entry into Probe and making sure that Probe data elements are consistent both internally and with AMS and FYDP reporting requirements (including annexes), maintains the official database for submitting the Army portion of the FYDP,

    – produces the FYDP resource position in paper and machine-readable form for periodic issue of Program and Budget Guidance (volume II), and,

    – generates machine-readable data in support of Army budget estimates.

- with appropriate HQDA principal officials develops automated management systems, decision support systems, and predictive models to support program development and management through program and budget execution.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller). The ASA (FM&C):

    – with functional proponents, prepares the Army budget from the approved Army program.

    – reviews and consolidates the ARNG and USAR budgets with the Active Army budget for submission to OSD and Congress.

    – during the budgeting phase, guides and integrates the work of the designated PEGs and ARSTAF functional proponents.

    – with DCSOPS, coordinates with each CINC on major budget issues affecting the CINCs resource requirements.

    – supervises and directs financial execution of the congressional approved budget.

- develops and approves the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) to check the reasonableness of the Baseline Cost Estimate (BCE) for selected major weapon and information systems and sets the Army Cost Position (ACP) that certifies or modifies the BCE as appropriate.
- validates economic analyses supporting new programs.
- oversees the Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR).
- oversees policy and guidance to account for and report on Army managed funds.
- oversees accounting for and reporting on use of Army managed funds to OSD and Congress by appropriation. As applicable to each appropriation includes FYDP program, program element (PE), project number, budget line item number (BLIN), budget activity (BA), budget activity group (BAG), budget subactivity (BSA), element of resource (EOR), and financing data. Also as applicable to an appropriation, accounts for and reports on the use of manpower by manpower category.
- develops and maintains nonstandard Army systems in support of financial review and analysis and implements nonstandard Army systems in support of fund distribution, accounting, and reporting of funds. Oversees the development and maintenance of standard Army systems, such as the Standard Army Financial Inventory Accounting and

Reporting System (STARFIARS) in support of financial analysis; and oversees implementation of the same standard Army systems in support of distribution, accounting, and reporting of funds.
- with DPAE, performs system and data management functions as described above.
- issues resource controls for authorized or projected levels of total obligation authority (TOA), manpower, and force structure before each update of the PPBES Data Management System (PROBE) data base.
- performs budget and appropriation sponsor assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA [MR&A]):
- approves policy for, and oversees, manpower, force structure, and personnel activities conducted throughout the Army.
- oversees development and promulgation of ARNG and USAR policy.
- performs PPBES functions and responsibilities outlined in AR 10-5 and related functions affecting manpower, including review of proposed manpower levels before approval by the SA and CSA.
- serves as Army manager for Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA) (Figure 9-6) and performs programming and

budgeting assignments listed in Figure 9-2 and 9-3.

- approves allocation of civilian and military end strength and civilian work years to MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition). The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (ASA (RDA)):

- performs Army acquisition management activities as the designated AAE and:
    - represents the Army on the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee, and the Conventional Systems Committee.
    - advises the Secretary of the Army on matters of acquisition management.
    - with the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, co-chairs the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).
- manages the Army Baselining Program and makes sure that baseline documentation reflects the current Army cost position.
- integrates the development and acquisition of materiel into all phases of the PPBES process and:
    - exercises responsibility for the RDTE and procurement appropriations in formulating, presenting, and executing the budget

and in related data base areas as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between ASA (FM&C) and ASA (RDA).

- with the ASA (FM&C), prepares and justifies budget estimates for the RDA appropriations.
- performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT):

- prepares, justifies, and submits the program and budget for the Army portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) per the policy, resource, and administrative, guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence and DOD NFIP Program Managers.
- performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG):

- Reviews the program and budget for its capability to sustain the force.
- Performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER):

- manages the individuals' account for Active Army military manpower not included in Army operating strength.
- allocates Active Army military strength to MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.
- collects for reimbursable manpower allocated to revolving funds and non-Army agencies.
- serves as Army manager for manpower issues as assigned in Figure 9-6 and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.

Chief, National Guard Bureau. The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB):
- prepares and justifies the budget for ARNG appropriations and performs operational tasks set forth for commanders of major Army commands and operating agencies.
- serves as Army manager for ARNG manpower issues as listed in Figure 9-8 and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2, and 9-3.

Chief, Army Reserve. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR):
- prepares and justifies the budget for USAR appropriations.
- serves as Army manager for USAR manpower issues and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.
-

Other Principal Officials. Other HQDA principal officials, as assigned, serve as Army managers for manpower issues listed in Figure 9-6, and perform programming and budgeting assignments listed in Figures 9-2 and 9-3.

Commanders of Major Army Commands and Other Operating Agencies. MACOM commanders, PEOs, and heads of other operating agencies:
- plan, program, and budget for assigned missions, responsibilities, and functions.
- document manpower in their subordinate organizations per allocated manpower levels.
- execute the approved MACOM or agency program within allocated resources, applying the inherent flexibility allowed by law and regulation.
- assess MACOM or agency program performance and budget execution and:
  - account for and report on use of allocated funds by appropriation and MDEP. As applicable to each appropriation, include FYDP program, Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO), PE, project number, BLIN, BA, BAG, and EOR. Also account for and report on use of allocated manpower by unit identification code (UIC).
  - use manpower data (especially the Civilian Employment Level Plan (CELP)) and financial data from budget execution in developing future requirements.

Commanders of Major Army Commands serving as Army Service Component Commanders. MACOM commanders serving as ASCC commanders identify and integrate with their other missions and operational requirements the requirements of the CINC.

Staff Managers and Sponsors for Congressional Appropriations. Separate resource allocation structures for congressional appropriations and the FYDP lie at the heart of getting Army resources. Figure 9-6, above, assigns staff managers for manpower and force structure issues. Figures 9-2 and 9-3 assign staff managers and sponsors for Army appropriations and funds and 0-1 level budget activities of the operation and maintenance appropriations. Responsibilities of the designated staff managers and sponsors are as follows.

Manager for Manpower and Force Structure Issues. The manager for manpower issues and the manager for force structure issues work together to maintain a continuous exchange of information and collaboration. As appropriate, they:

- coordinate instructions to the field, and the processing of requests from the field, for manpower or force changes.
- align and balance manpower and unit information among the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), Probe, and the FYDP.
- provide lead support to the PEG chair on manpower issues.

Manager for Requirements Determination. The manager for requirements determination:

- determines the scope, quantity, and qualitative nature of functional requirements for planning, programming, and budgeting.
- checks how commands and agencies apply allocated manpower and dollars to be sure their use fulfills program requirements.
- reviews unresourced programs submitted by MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.
- resolves conflicts involving unresourced requirements or decrements on which MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies fail to reach agreement in developing the program or budget.
- recommends to the Program and Budget Committee (PBC) the allocation of available resources, unresourced programs, and offsetting decrements.
- during program and budget reviews, and throughout the process, coordinates resource changes with agencies having proponency for affected MDEPs.

Manager for Program and Performance. The manager for program and performance:

- represents the functional program and monitors its performance.
- as required, acts with the appropriation sponsor or helps the appropriation sponsor perform the duties listed below.
- translates budget decisions and approved manpower and funding into program changes and makes

sure that data transactions update affected MDEPs.

− checks budget execution from the functional perspective.

− for investment appropriations:

  • operates and maintains databases in support of Probe.

  • during budget formulation, determines how changes in fiscal guidance affect budget estimates and reviews and approves the documentation of budget justification.

  • during review of the budget by OSD and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and by Congress, serves as appropriation advocate, helps prepare the Army response to OSD program budget decisions (PBDs), and prepares congressional appeals.

  • during execution determines fund recipients, monitors execution, performs decrement reviews, plans reprogramming, and controls below threshold reprogramming. On RDA matters and otherwise as required, testifies before OSD and Congress.

Appropriation Sponsor. The appropriation sponsor:

− controls the assigned appropriation or fund.

− serves as Army spokesperson for appropriation resources.

− helps resource claimants solve manpower and funding deficiencies.

− issues budget policy, instructions, and fiscal guidance.

− prepares supplemental budgets.

− during budget formulation:

  • Provides lead support to the ARSTAF functional proponent.

  • Bears responsibility for PROBE updates.

  • Prepares and justifies budget estimates.

− testifies before Congress during budget justification.

− manages financial execution of the appropriation and reprograms allocated manpower and funds to meet unforeseen contingencies during budget execution.

Management Decision Packages.

The PPBES architecture distributes and maintains program and budget resources by appropriation, MACOM, program element (PE), and MDEP. Used internally within the Army, Management Decision Packages provide a useful resource management tool. Collectively, MDEPs account for all Army resources. They describe the capabilities programmed over a 9-year period for the Total Army — Active Army, Guard, and Reserve. Taken singly, an MDEP describes a particular organization, program, or function and resources associated with the intended output. An individual MDEP applies uniquely to one of the following six management areas:

  • Missions of MTOE units.

  • Missions of TDA units and Armywide standard functions.

- Missions of standard installation organizations (SIOs).
- Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of weapon and information systems. (with linkage to organizations).
- Special visibility programs (SVPs).
- Short term projects (STPs).

Maintained in the Probe database, each MDEP records manpower and total obligation authority over 9 fiscal years.

MDEP for the FY 98-03 POM

Figure 9-9

System MDEPs also show item quantities over the same period. A 2-year shift forward occurs in January each even (biennial POM submission) year. Probe drops the 2 earliest years from the data base and adds 2 new years. The MDEP then displays the 6 years of the new program and the 3 preceeding years (Figure 9-9).

The first of the preceding years is the prior fiscal year (PY). It records resources spent in executing the budget the year before the current fiscal year (CY). The CY shows resources in the budget being executed. The last preceding year is called the budget year (BY). It lists resources requested in the President's Budget being reviewed by Congress.

Another shift occurs in the odd year (the year in which the President submits the next 2-year defense budget). The shift leaves each year's resources intact but changes their relative position in the program or budget process. Thus as shown in Figure 9-10, in January 1997 budget years 95 and 96 both become prior years; budget year 97 becomes the current year; and the first 2 program years both become budget years 98 and 99. The last 4 years (years 00 through 03) remain program years.

During programming, MDEPs provide useful visibility. MDEPs help Army managers, decisionmakers, and leaders assess program worth, confirm compliance, and rank resource claimants. During budgeting, MDEPs help convey approved programs and priorities into budget estimates. Providing the vehicle for data entry, MDEPs also help PEGs post program changes caused by budget decisions and approved funding. During execution, the posted MDEPs assist HQDA principal officials, MACOM commanders, PEOs, and heads of other operating agencies track program and financial performance. The financial data they get as feedback help determine future requirements.

Adjusting program and budget resources.

Recurring changes. Changes in resources occur throughout the PPBES process. HQDA staff agencies update MDEPs through their respective feeder systems to reflect the position of the last program or budget event. During programming, competition may reduce programmed amounts originally recorded. Decisions during OSD POM and budget reviews will further alter amounts initially approved. Sometimes the decisions affect requests in the President's Budget already before Congress, as do authorization and appropriation decisions by Congress. Budget execution often results in different rates and

quantities from those planned, and at times it results in different purposes. The changes require that resource managers continually weigh how the stream of program and budget actions:

- change MDEP resource levels,
- shift resources between years, and,
- affect resources in related MDEPs.

MDEP for the President's FY 98-99 Budget

budget years						program years			
PY	PY	CY	BY	BY		3	4	5	6
FY95	96	97	98	99		00	01	02	03

$TOA $TOA

Manpower   Manpower

Figure 9-10

Manpower and Fund Flexibility. Flexibility in managing Army manpower and funds differs depending on whether the resources apply to the program or budget. In the program or POM years, manpower is restricted by total military and civilian end strength and dollars are restricted by TOA only, rather than by appropriation. This gives the Army the latitude to redistribute previously programmed resources among appropriations to meet changing requirements. In later POM or budget submissions, for example, the Army can, as needed, move program year resources between MDEPs, appropriations, and PEs.

In contrast, tight controls govern the redesignation of manpower and funding once the President's Budget has gone to Congress. The Army can reallocate previously budgeted manpower and dollars between MDEPs or operating agencies but not between 0-1 level budget activities or appropriations. Once the budget goes to Congress, the Army must leave budget manpower and dollars unchanged until current year appropriations become law.

Some flexibility during execution allows financing unbudgeted requirements to meet unforeseen needs or changes in operating conditions. Even so, congressional rules and specified dollar thresholds severely restrict spending for purposes other than those originally justified and approved. During execution, military and civilian manpower transfers within 0-1 level budget activities or appropriations may occur without a corresponding transfer of funds.

For investment accounts (RDA and construction), manager's first allocate program and budget resources by AMSCO, PE, project number, and BLIN. They then distribute the resources to MDEPs within the six management areas.

PPBES Deliberative Forums.

Army Resources Board (ARB). Chaired by the SA, the ARB serves as an Army senior leadership forum, through which the SA and CSA review Army policy and resource allocation issues, particularly those emanating from PPBES. In particular, the ARB focuses on planning, programming, and budgeting matters. It sets policy and approves guidance and priorities. It approves the prioritization of Army programs and selects resource allocation alternatives. And on their completion, it approves the Army Plan (TAP), Program Objective Memorandum (POM), and budget submissions to OSD and Congress. ARB membership includes-

From the Secretariat. The Under Secretary of the Army (USA); Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and Comptroller; Installations, Logistics, and Environment; Manpower and Reserve

Affairs; Research Development, and Acquisition.

From the Army Staff. The Vice Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans (DCSOPS).

ARB Support Group (ARBSG). Chaired by the ASA (FM&C), the ARBSG serves as the central council for coordinating Army policy, PPBES, and other issues requiring ARB action. It meets weekly to resolve emerging resource allocation issues or to refer them to the ARB. It provides recommendations to the ARB regarding prioritization of programs and resource allocation alternatives. It also monitors the implementation of resource alternatives. ARBSG membership includes:

From the Secretariat. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment; Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Research Development, and Acquisition; the DISC4; the General Counsel, the ARB Executive Secretary, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Army Budget (DAB).

From the Army Staff. The Vice Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans (DCSOPS).

ARB Support Group-Ad Hoc. The ARBSG-Ad Hoc consists of the members of the ARBSG plus the Director of the Army Staff (DAS); Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER); Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG); Assistant Chief of Staff for Installations Management (ACSIM); Director, Army National Guard; and Chief, Army Reserve. The Ad Hoc group convenes to consider issues having broader implications for the Army than the

resource allocation or other PPBES matters. When convened the group functions in the same manner as the ARBSG.

Strategy and Planning Committee. The Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC) is chaired by the Assistant DCSOPS (ADCSOPS). Alternate chair for international activities is the ADCSOPS (Joint Affairs). Members consist mainly of officials responsible for planning in the various Army Staff agencies and offices of the Army Secretariat. Membership includes the DPAE and DAB. The SPC provides an integrating forum for Army planning. It considers guidance and analyses related to strategy and planning and makes recommendations to the ARBSG. The SPC:

− recommends force structure guidance to SA and CSA for approval.
− monitors force development to make sure the program force meets requirements identified through the ALRPG, and TAP and those related to CINC IPLs, and,
− serves as coordinating body for the TAP.

Program and Budget Committee. The Program and Budget Committee (PBC) is co-chaired by the DPAE and DAB, each presiding depending on the subject. PBC members consist mainly of officials responsible for programming or budgeting in the various offices and agencies of the Army Secretariat and Staff.

The PBC oversees the programming, budgeting, and execution phases of the PPBES, including information feedback among the phases. The PBC serves in both a coordinating and executive-advisory role. It provides a continuing forum in which

program and budget managers review, adjust, and decide issues. An aim of the PBC is to ensure the internal consistency of Army policy and to make sure that program adjustments remain consistent with Army policy and priorities.

The PBC may return the results of committee deliberations to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action. It may pass them, in turn, to the ARBSG and ARB for review or approval.

The PBC may set up standing committees or working groups to resolve difficulties in managing the program or budget. An example of a standing committee is the Construction Requirements Review Committee (CRRC). Another example is the PBC Systems Subcommittee. This subcommittee consists of general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). It is co-chaired by representatives of the DPAE and DAB. It broadly represents the Army Staff and Secretariat and includes appropriate representation from the field. The subcommittee reviews program, budget, and cost estimates for the life cycle of major weapon and information systems. It assigns agency responsibilities for issues needing further review and follows up on action taken. As appropriate, the subcommittee presents the results of its deliberations to the PBC.

Council of Colonels. A group of Colonels or civilian equivalents, who represent PBC members, meet throughout the programming and budgeting process in a forum known as the Council of Colonels. The Council is co-chaired by the Deputy Director of Management and Control, Army Budget Office and Chief of Program Development Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation. The group packages proposals, frames issues, and otherwise

coordinates matters that come before its principals meeting in the Program Budget Committee.

Prioritization Steering Group. The Prioritization Steering Group (PSG) serves as another PPBES deliberative body. The DCSOPS chairs the PSG. Members consist of the Director of the Army Staff and other primary Army Staff principals. Membership includes the DPAE and DAB and, when requested by DCSOPS, extends to selected representatives of the Army Secretariat. The PSG's responsibilties are exercised as required.

- − Review unresourced programs submitted by MACOMs and PEOs and proposed decrements recommended by the PBC.
- − Resolves differences involving unresourced requirements or decrements on which the PBC fails to reach agreement during program or budget development.
- − Review prioritized and integrated lists of unresourced programs and decrements against fiscal and manpower constraints imposed by OSD.
- − Make recommendations on unresourced programs and proposes off-setting decrements to the ARBSG or ARB.

Related Committees.

In addition to PPBES forums, the Army Committees oversee specific needs within their areas of responsibilty. They include the following:

- Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

- Army Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC).
- Study Program Coordination Committee (SPCC).
- Stationing and Installations Planning Committee (SIPC).
- Installation Management Steering Committee (IMSC).
- Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) Board of Directors.
- Army Science Board

Program Evaluation Groups.

HQDA uses six Title 10 PEGs and two Reserve Component advisory PEGs to support planning, programming, and budgeting (see Figures 9-7 and 9-8). Title 10 PEGs program and monitor resources to perform Army functions assigned by Title 10, United States Code. An Army National Guard PEG and a U.S. Army Reserve PEG comprise the Reserve component advisory PEGs. Operating without assigned resources, the advisory PEGs, help integrate their respective programs into the Total Army program addressed by the Title 10 PEGs. PEGs support planning, programming, and HQDA uses six Title 10 PEGs and two Reserve component advisory PEGs to support budgeting within assigned areas of responsibility as follows:

- Title 10 PEGs administer assigned MDEPs that define each PEG program and its resources.
- The Army National Guard PEG and the U.S. Army Reserve PEG provide Title 10 PEGs technical assistance and monitor actions to integrate into the Total Army program the statutory, Defense,

and Army requirements of their respective programs.
- In particular, all PEGs help HQDA functional proponents—
  - build the The Army Plan (TAP) and Army program and help convert the program into budget-level detail.
  - maintain program consistency, first during planning and program review, and later during budget analysis and defense.
  - track program and budget performance during execution.
  - keep abreast of policy changes during each phase of the PPBES process.

Process.

Figure 9-5 shows the sequence and interrelationship of events of the biennial PPBES cycle. This figure shows a doctrinal baseline typically subject to cycle-specific changes. The system has four formal phases. Three it shares with the DOD PPBS: planning, programming, and budgeting. The fourth, execution, applies uniquely to the Army as a distinct system phase. PPBES cycles overlap as do the four phases within each cycle. The sections that follow explain the phases.

PLANNING PHASE

PPBS Planning.

OSD and Joint Strategic Planning. Drawing on guidance from National Security Council (NSC), OSD and joint strategic

planning make up PPBS planning. The planning examines the military posture of the United States in comparison with national security objectives and resource limitations. It develops the national military strategy, and it identifies force levels to achieve the strategy.

OSD and joint strategic planning provides a framework of requirements, priorities, and risk. OSD uses the framework to give each CINC the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within defined fiscal constraints.

NSC Guidance. Two sets of NSC documents bear importantly on the PPBS process. Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) make up one set. A PDD promulgates presidential decisions implementing national security policy and objectives in all areas involving national security. Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) make up the second set. A PRD directs studies involving national security policy and directives.

Joint Strategic Planning. Joint strategic planning examines the global security situation. It develops national military strategy to achieve national security objectives and sets related force requirements. It also prepares strategic and contingency plans, prepares supporting joint logistic and mobility plans, and conducts capability assessments.

Joint strategic planning helps the CJCS discharge the functions prescribed by 10 USC 153 (a) and 10 USC 163(b)(2). Specifically, joint strategic planning underlies the military advice the Chairman gives to help the President and SECDEF:

- Provide strategic direction to the armed forces.
- Form defense policy, programs, and budgets.

Led by the Joint Staff, joint strategic planning involves each of its directorates and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Moreover, it entails close consultation with the combatant commands, Services, and other defense agencies.

Joint strategic planning takes place within the context of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Prospective changes to JSPS appear in Figure 9-11. Featuring a continuous review of the national military strategy, the JSPS yields five principal products described in the paragraph on JSPS documents and plans, below. The products help the joint community relate strategic planning to both the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and PPBS.

Joint Strategy Review. The Joint-Strategy Review (JSR) lies at the core of the JSPS. The review helps the Joint Staff integrate strategy, operational planning and program assessments. It covers the short-, mid-, and long-range periods: 0-2, 2-10, and 10-20 years in the future.

A continuous process, the JSR assesses the global strategic setting for issues affecting the national military strategy. The Joint Staff, with the combatant commands and defense agencies, develops issue papers highlighting how changed conditions affect current strategy. Key judgments, if not earlier acted on, appear in the next JSR Annual Report. Provided to the

A process action team from the Joint Staff and Services has recommended several changes to the JSPS. Once approved, changes likely will occur substantially as follows.

- ✔ Reaffirmation that the CJCS remains charged with, and thus the JSPS encompasses, four functions:
    - − Strategy formulation and strategic advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA)
    - − Strategic planning.
    - − Programmatic advice.
    - − Assessments relating to the three preceding functions.

- ✔ Re-orientation of the Chairman's Guidance (CG) (fig 9-5) to provide the *commander's intent* for strategy formulation out to a 20-year common planning horizon.

- ✔ Addition of a Joint Strategic Engagement Plan (JSEP) as a supplement of the JSCP. The document will provide guidance and set general priorities for use by the CINCs in their engagement planning. Intent of the document is to identify CINC needs and allow the Services to resource requirements.

- ✔ Revitalization of the Joint Planning Document (JPD). The JPD is a Chairman's memo with supporting volumes that are tied to Joint Warfighting Capabilities

Assessments (JWCA). The JPD acts as the initial authoritative advice to the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It also sets the baseline programmatic direction later refined by the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and evaluated by the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The J-5 checks the JPD for harmony with strategic goals. The J-8 checks for conformance with programmatic guidelines and fiscal realities. The Joint Staff briefs the JPD to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to make sure that JWCA activities focus on achieving long term priorities.

- ✔ Establishment of a process for Joint Net Assessment (JNA) to incorporate ongoing staff actions that evaluate strategy, plans, and programs. The process will produce a JNA Report that measures capability to execute the entire range of National Military Strategy (NMS) missions. The report can be adapted also to measure risks of alternative force structures. The JNA Report will supersede the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), which was not a formal JSPS product.

- ✔ Improve linkages between the JSPS and JROC and its subordinate JWCA assessments to enable the CJCS to provide the best possible programmatic advice.

Figure 9-11

CJCS, Chiefs of Services, and CINCs, the report, when approved by the Chairman, becomes guidance for maintaining or revising the NMS and other JSPS products.

As needed the JSR produces a long-range vision paper addressing plausible strategic settings 10-20 years in the future.

JSPS Documents and Plans. As mentioned, the JSPS generates five products.

Shown in figure 9-5, they are described below.

National Military Strategy. The CJCS approves and issues the National Military Strategy (NMS). The strategy advises the SECDEF, and after SECDEF review, the President and National Security Council on the strategic direction of the armed forces. A standing document changed when needed, the NMS applies to program years, 2-8 years in the future. The NMS:

- summarizes the global strategic setting from the JSR,
- recommends military foundations and strategic principles to support national security objectives, and,
- provides a strategy and force levels that conform with NCA Fiscal Guidance.

Joint Planning Document. The Joint Planning Document (JPD) derives from the NMS. Prepared by the Joint Staff with the Service Chiefs and the CINCs, the document exists as seven stand-alone volumes. Each volume advises the SECDEF on requirements and programming priorities in a specific functional area. Published in September in the odd year, the JPD receives distribution in time to influence the biennial DPG.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) underlies the capabilities-based military advice the CJCS gives the President and SECDEF. Another standing document, the JSCP, undergoes revision as needed, receiving formal review early each even year. Covering the 2-year, near term planning period, the JSCP:

- Gives strategic guidance to the CINCs, JCS members, and heads of defense agencies.
- Apportions resources to the CINCs.
- Tasks the CINCs to develop major and lesser regional plans to employ the force resulting from completed program and budget actions.

Chairman's Program Recommendation. The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) provides recommendations for developing Service and Defense agency POMs. It compares planning guidance and objectives with current and projected resource profiles from the most recent President's Budget and related FYDP. It recommends changes in programs to correct deficiencies in capabilities and to align resources more closely with plans and requirements. Completed about the same time as the DPG, the document helps the SECDEF make strategic decisions to guide POM development.

Chairman's Program Assessment. The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) checks the balance and capabilities of composite force and support levels recommended by the Service POMs. It compares the recommended capabilities and levels with priorities recommended by U.S. strategic plans and requirements of the CINCs. Completed about 45 days after the Services submit their POMs, the document helps the SECDEF make program decisions ultimately recorded in Program Decision Memorandums (PDM) that approve Service POMs with specific changes.

Special Assessments. Four related assessments support the JSPS documents and plans. One is the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). Closely involving the CINCs and other members of the JCS, the CJCS prepares the JMNA. The document compares defense capabilities and programs of the United States and its Allies with those of potential adversaries. The SECDEF reviews and approves the JMNA, then sends it to Congress with the defense budget per 10 USC 1139 (I) (1).

Included among three other assessments is the Logistics Sustainability Analysis. (LSA). The analysis considers logistics capabilities and limiting factors of

individual OPLANs prepared by the CINCs. Another, the Chairman's Preparedness Assessment Report (PAR), checks the ability of the combatant commands to carry out assigned missions. Still another, the Chairman's Contingency Capabilities Assessment, considers the effect of critical deficiencies in contingency planning.

OSD Planning Products. Two SECDEF documents influence products of the JSPS. One is Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the other Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).

Defense Planning Guidance. The SECDEF places responsibility and authority for program execution with the Services and other DOD components but maintains central direction. Serving this central purpose, the DPG presents the SECDEF's strategic plan for developing and employing future forces. Prepared by OSD and published normally in the odd year before POM preparation, the DPG is a principal product of OSD planning. It reflects:

- military advice and information recommended by the CJCS,
- Service long-range plans and positions on policy and other matters advanced by Service Secretaries, and,
- CINC appraisals of major issues and problems bearing on command missions.

Contingency Planning Guidance. The CPG provides the CJCS written policy guidance for preparing and reviewing contingency plans. Focusing NMS and DPG guidance on contingency planning, the CPG bears directly on the JSCP. The SECDEF prepares the document annually in coordination with the Joint Staff. Then, on

approval by the President, the SECDEF provides guidance to the Chairman.

PPBES PLANNING

Army Planning.

Army, or PPBES, planning responds to and complements OSD and joint strategic planning. PPBES planning:

- helps the senior Army leadership determine force requirements and objectives and set priorities,
- provides the basis for positions and comments supporting Army participation in OSD and joint processes, and,
- lays the planning basis for the Army program.

Role of Long-Range Planning.

Long-Range planning looks 10-20 years ahead. In the process, the senior Army leadership creates a vision of the future Army. Fleshing out the design, commands and agencies develop long-range plans in their respective mission and functional areas. Long-Range planning guides the midterm vision to develop the force and set program requirements.

Army Long-Range Planning Guidance.

Scheduled for distribution in the fall of even years, the ALRPG records the vision of the senior Army leadership. The ALRPG:

- describes a framework for defining future requirements,
- examines national security objectives against a range of potential requirements,
- lays out long-range planning assumptions and objectives, and,

– lists underlying conditions likely to hold over the 10-20 year period.

The ALRPG goes on to examine political, military, economic, and technological events. The examination identifies trends and determines a range of possible results that bound the future operating environment. It also draws implications for future missions and for achieving required capabilities.

The biennial plan helps commands and agencies translate leader vision into long-range plans. Command and agency long-range plans, in turn, help fashion the midterm vision by setting goals and strategies to get the capabilities to meet future requirements. Together, the ALRPG and command and agency long-range plans guide the TAP. In addition, the ALRPG sets the course for requirements determination and force development for the next PPBES cycle.

Army Modernization Plan.

The Army Modernization Plan (AMP) outlines the vision for modernizing the future force and a strategy for near to midterm force development and long term evolution. The AMP provides a start point for developing the RDA Plan. Its modernization objectives guide program prioritization at HQDA.

The AMP codifies required capabilities programmed through the PPBES and assesses the impact of required capabilities remaining to be programmed. It describes the relationship between desired future capabilities and materiel system development.

The AMP, the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP), and the Weapons System Handbook, together,

present the total picture of the Army's RDT&E investment. The AMP in addition supports review of the approved POM by congressional authorization and appropriation committees and their staffs.

Requirements Determination Process (RDP)

RDP is a process designed by TRADOC to determine warfighting capabilities required by the Army. Guided by the National Military Strategy, CINC IPLs, DPG, and other key guidance documents, TRADOC develops an overarching concept for requirements determination. This concept, with individual branch concepts, forms a determination baseline.

Army branches (schools), proponents, and TRADOC Battle Labs use the baseline to identify needed capabilities in terms of solutions over a number of functional domains. Focusing on the soldier, these domains embrace doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel,and soldiers (DTLOMS).

The RDP process helps evolve the Army's vision of future battlefield functions and required capabilities to retain battlefield advantage.

Army Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan.

The RDA Plan is a 15-year plan for developing and producing technologies and materiel to support Army modernization, which focuses on integrating new doctrine, training, organization, and equipment to develop and field warfighting capabilities. The plan converts materiel requirements from an unconstrained planning environment to a balanced but truncated RDA program that is both technically and fiscally achievable. Conforming to force

structure guidelines, the plan seeks to maximize warfighting capabilities and supporting infrastructure within resources expected to be available.

The Army RDA Plan takes the form of a priority list of program increments and funding streams for RDT&E and procurement over the 15-year planning period. TRADOC provides annual input to the plan by applying its Warfighting Lens Analysis (WFLA) to the President's Budget. Guided by the national military strategy, DPG, AMP, and other key guidance documents, TRADOC calculates current warfighting (battlefield) requirements (capabilities) using WFLA techniques, and matches them to materiel solutions in the RDT&E and procurement programs.

AMC performs an analogous function in determining requirements for RDA science and infrastructure (S&I). Supporting warfighting, modernization, and other HQDA high visibility programs, S&I requirements are defined, ordered in priority, and managed by materiel developers' labs, RDE centers, and support activities. Each year during October through February, AMC reviews the requirements jointly with other materiel developers. These include the Corps of Engineers (COE), Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC), Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC), and Army Research Institute (ARI). The review integrates and sets priorities for requirements and reconciles funding allocations. AMC records the results in the Science and Infrastructure RDA Plan (SIRDAP), which it forwards and briefs to HQDA each February.

HQDA divides TRADOC and AMC programs, as approved by the senior Army leadership, into increments (entire programs often form a single increment) and then determines an integrated ranking for the approved increments. The consolidated list of program increments in 1–*n* priority and their funding streams form the Army RDA Plan.

The plan receives update each February on receipt of the TRADOC and AMC products. It may receive further update in the spring after completing the biennial POM (or POM update) and in September after preparing the Budget Estimates Submission (BES).

The first 6 years of the RDA plan form the start point of the RDA portion of the POM. The final 9 years compose the Extended Planning Period (EPP). The RDA plan also informs the TAA process of RDA programs planned for Army modernization.

The Army Plan.

The TAP guides programming, budgeting, and execution. Documenting initiatives and policies of the senior Army leadership, the TAP reflects the NMS and DPG. It also reflects Army long-range planning and the Army Modernization Plan. A counterpart to OSD's DPG, the TAP serves as source document for Army planning and priorities..

The TAP identifies combat force requirements derived from planning scenarios. Then, for each program year, the TAP develops a force that meets projected mission requirements within expected end strength and dollar and equipment levels. The TAP projects a view of the force at midrange, or 6th program year, and for the long range 10 years beyond.

The TAP eases the transition from planning to programming. It takes into account concerns of ASCC and other MACOM commanders and guides the application of constrained resources in building the Army program. The TAP sets the Army's priorities within expected resource levels, while introducing essential

requirements from long-range plans into the midrange resource prioritization process.

The DCSOPS Resource Analysis and Integration Office prepares the TAP each odd year. Incorporating input from field commands, the process proceeds in concert with DPAE, the PEGs, and the HQDA staff. DCSOPS then distributes the approved TAP to ASCCs and other MACOMs in time for them to prepare their input to the Army POM.

Force Development and Total Army Analysis.

PPBES planning develops an achievable force structure for America's Army that supports the National Military Strategy. The approach centers on TAA, a computer-aided force developmental process that gets under way about January of the even year.

Drawing on guidance in the DPG and other sources, TAA begins by modeling Illustrative Planning Scenarios to determine warfighting force structure requirements. Once those warfighting requirements are approved, TAA compares or *matches* the programmed force to those requirements to identify mismatches and shortfalls. Then, to overcome shortfalls and mitigate warfighting risk, a Resourcing Conference Council of Colonels (formerly called Force Structure Conference II) proposes various adjustments to the programmed force. Made within the force structure allowance of each component (active, Guard and Reserve), such adjustments could include converting units from one component to another component or within a component from one branch to another. For example, combat support units in the active component may convert to combat service support units. Similarly, Reserve component units with a low warfighting priority may be converted to provide the combat support capability no longer residing in the active component.

A Force Feasibility Review (FFR) identifies the manning, equipping, and training costs and potential friction points to implement proposed force adjustments. The FFR follows the review conducted by the Resourcing Conference Council of Colonels but precedes a review by a Resourcing General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) (formerly GOSC-II). Thus, the Resourcing GOSC can use FFR data to help evaluate force adjustments proposed by the Resourcing Council of Colonels. From its knowledge of available resources, the GOSC can amend or delete adjustments deemed too costly or difficult to implement. The GOSC then sends the resulting fiscally constrained TAA force to the Army leadership. When approved, the TAA force sets the force structure baseline for the POM.

Alternatively, the GOSC can recommend that the Army leadership approve the proposed TAA force without applying fiscal constraints. That unconstrained TAA force would then compete for near- to mid-term resources during the development of the POM. These proposed TAA force adjustments also could be slated for the latter years of the POM period, deferring their review for the resourcing until the next POM.

Force Management.

Detailed integration and documentation of the force centers on the Management of Change (MOC) window. The Army uses this period to update and create MTOE and TDA documents. These documents officially record decisions on missions, organizational structure, and requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment.

The process begins with the Command Plan (CPLAN) guidance message, released to HQDA (ODCSOPS) at the start of the MOC window. CPLAN guidance sets the focus of the MOC window, establishes documentation priorities and actions, and provides force structure allowances (FSA). Draft MTOEs are prepared by the U. S. Army Force Management Support Activity-Authorization Documents Directorate (USAFMSA-ADD), and reviewed by HQDA and MACOMs. Proposed CPLANS incorporate the strength levels of the draft MTOEs and reflect force decisions in HQDA guidance, including the program force approved in the TAP and Troop Program Guidance. CPLANs reflect the current and projected force structure of each command. CPLANS normally contain only military manpower. After HQDA review, DCSOPS publishes an adjusted MasterForce (MFORCE) and an associated civilian annex reflecting the approved plan. The adjusted MFORCE provides the basis for resourcing personnel and equipment in the draft MTOEs and TDAs.

The Army Authorization Documents System-Redesigned (TAADS-R), applies to the Total Army-Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian work force. The Army uses the system to record changes in requirements and authorizations that result from changes in unit missions, organizational structure, and equipment.

TAADS-R defines requirements for MTOE units at various levels of organization using data from the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) system, Incremental Change Packages (ICPs), and Basis of Issue Plans (BOIPs). Data from the BOIP identifies quantitative and qualitative requirements for new items of equipment, including personnel requirements to accomodate them. Requirements for TDA units derive from concept plans, manpower surveys and studies, and manpower standards application.

The Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) serves as the force development database that records the authorized level of manpower and force structure for the Army program and budget. SAMAS has two primary files. One is the Force Structure file (commonly referred to as the "force file"), which reflects the approved and documented force structure position. The force file produces the MFORCE. The second file is the Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) file (commonly referred to as the "budget file"), which reflects the approved CPLAN force structure plus additonal budgeting assumptions. The budget file produces both the civilian annex to the MFORCE and the Manpower Addendum to the Program and Budget Guidance (PBG).

At the close of the MOC window, the Automatic Update Transaction System (AUTS) is run. AUTS compares the CPLAN, MFORCE, (FS/PBG) against the TAADS-R documents. When descrepancies are discovered, the TAADS-R documents are corrected or the MFORCE (FS/PBG) adjusted to match TAADS-R. The AUTS comparison occurs at the close of the MOC window and approves those MTOEs/TDAs whose TAADS-R position matches their MFORCE (FS/PBG) position. HQDA publishes a new MFORCE showing which units have approved TAADS-R documents. This post-AUTS MFORCE provides the basis for updating the Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD) and Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP).

The Structure and Composition System (SACS), in conjunction with Force Builder (a management database integration

system), produces the Army's time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the current budget, and program years. SACS information combines information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, and TAADS-R data. A key output is the Personnel and Structure Composition System (PERSACS). PERSACS summarizes time-phased requirements and authorization for personnel, specifying grade and branch as well as Areas of Concentration (AOC) and Military Occupational Speciality (MOS). Another key product is the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS). LOGSACS summarizes time-phased requirements and authorizations for equipment by Line Item Number (LIN). Both PERSACS and LOGSACS form the requirements and authorizations base used by other personnel and logistics systems. The Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), for example, uses equipment requirements and authorization from LOGSACS to plan equipment distribution throughout the program years.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING LINK TO THE PPBS

Operational Planning.

Operational planning addresses the 0-2 year short-range planning period. It takes place under JOPES and the counterpart Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). Through JOPES, the CINCs and their Service component commands develop concept plans (CONPLANs) and operation plans (OPLANs). Capabilities based, the plans employ the current force to carry out military tasks assigned in the JSCP. Plan preparation and review return information about shortfalls and limiting factors for consideration in current planning, programming, and budgeting.

Missions and Tasks.

The JSCP carries out the NMS through unified command OPLANs. Its accompanying intelligence estimate assesses potential threats and their impact on available U.S. forces. Based on the assessment, the document assigns missions and planning tasks to the CINCs. It also apportions the combat forces expected to be available. Annexes amplify guidance, capabilities, and tasks in specified functional areas.

OPLAN development and review.

HQDA provides ASCCs, supporting MACOMs, and reserve components additional guidance through AMOPES. AMOPES provides planning assumptions, policy, and procedures. It applies both to mobilization and to military operations before the involuntary call up of reserve component forces. AMOPES Annex A describes the availability of Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units for developing Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). AMOPES Annex S guides planning to survive a nuclear attack on the United States and to recover and reconstitute essential HQDA missions and functions.

ASCC TPFDDs specify arrival priorities for force augmentation, resupply, and troop replacement. TPFDD review and later logistics and transportation assessments help refine the priorities to accord with CINC OPLANs. Issues remaining after negotiation become the subject of a force conference in December of the even year and logistics and transportation conferences the following August. ASCCs, supporting

MACOMs, and HQDA agencies participate in these deliberations. The participants bring information about current shortfalls and limitations to bear on future requirements through the FFR and program development processes.

In July (odd year), the CINCs submit their OPLANs for final JCS review and approval. The OPLANs provide a basis for CINC IPLs, which influence program development. Their earlier drafts have influenced the TRADOC Black Book Requirements Determination process and MACOM POM development.

PROGRAMMING PHASE

Army Programming.

Army programming helps the senior Army leadership distribute resources to support Army roles and missions. Programming translates planning decisions, OSD programming guidance, and congressional guidance into a comprehensive allocation of forces, manpower, and funds. In the process, programming integrates and balances centrally managed programs for manpower; operations; research, development, and acquisition; and stationing and construction. Concurrently, programming incorporates requirements stated by MACOMs and PEOs for manpower, operation and maintenance, housing, and construction.

The POM presents the Army's proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified constraints. OSD reviews the POM and issues a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) to reflect SECDEF program decisions. The program, as approved by the SECDEF, provides the basis for preparing Army Budget Estimates. During execution, program reviews help HQDA, MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies make sure that financial allocations support approved program objectives.

Army Program Guidance Memorandum.

Typically published in conjunction with the TAP, the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM) is issued by the SA and CSA to HQDA principal officials to guide preparation of the POM. Incorporating recent OSD guidance, the memorandum gives general guidance, sets priorities, and provides coordination instructions. It also directs PEGs to resource to a hierarchical list of programming goals, objectives, subobjectives, and tasks. Format of the APGM parallels the structure of the title 10 PEGs, whose titles (and related codes) are:

- Manning (MM).
- Training (TT).
- Organizing (OO).
- Equipping (EE).
- Sustaining (SS).
- Installations (II).

Program Administrative Instructions.

MACOM POM Development Instructions. HQDA issues MACOM POM Development Instructions (MPDI) in the fall of the odd year. The document gives administrative instructions to guide MACOMs and PEOs in preparing their program submission and to MACOMs for submitting CINC high priority warfighting needs.

Army POM Preparation Instructions. HQDA issues the Army POM Preparation Instructions (APPI) in the even year. Providing guidance to HQDA staff agencies, the document augments OSD's PPI.

Resource or Program and Budget Guidance.

The PBG provides resource guidance to MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies. The document covers the force structure and associated manpower. It also covers appropriations of immediate MACOM and PEO interest, such as:

- Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA), Army Reserve (OMAR), and National Guard (OMNG),
- Military Construction, Army (MCA), Army Reserve (MCAR), and National Guard (MCNG),
- Army Family Housing (Operation and Maintenance) (AFHO) and (Construction) (AFHC), and,
- construction-using trust funds for commissary construction and nonappropriated funds (NAF) for morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) construction.

When the President submits the budget to Congress, HQDA issues a corresponding PBG for the information of MACOMs and PEOs. Another PBG follows submission of the POM to OSD. Then, a PBG update in the fall reflects the on-cycle BES forwarded to OSD in September.

Program Development.

Army program development formally gets under way when HQDA publishes the TAP and its related APGM in the fall of the odd year. Reflecting affordability analyses from the FFR process, the TAP locks the preliminary program force and stabilizes manpower and key equipment requirements for program development. The provisions of the TAP apply to HQDA, MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies.

Work in developing the APGM in conjunction with the TAP serves as the program baseline for the following:

- An Army Force Posture Statement submitted earlier to SECDEF on 1 April.
- The POM years of the RDA Plan.
- ASCC, other MACOM, and PEO POM requirements submitted to HQDA in late November.

The APGM, in conjunction with the TAP, directs HQDA agencies to prepare alternative programs to support the preliminary program force. An alternative, for example, might vary the distribution of resources to readiness and sustainability. Such alternatives provide insights on various ways to apply resources to achieve Army goals and flexibility to adapt to variations in resource levels (and since they are presented in MDEP structure, the alternatives readily convey to management information system data bases.)

Program Development Process.

Using the MDEP as a building block, program development applies information from the APGM to refine and extend the program of the previous POM Cycle.

Typically, under the biennial cycle, program development by MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies gets under way early in the odd year. The resource position reflected in the FYDP for the President's Budget and related PBG serve as the base for developing program requirements. Then per the schedule set by the HQDA, MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies prepare and submit their POMs to HQDA.

Information for the early years of the approved RDA Plan serves as the RDA program guidance equivalent to MACOM and PEO POMs. HQDA agencies, guided by the APGM, collect and review program information. They study the existing program considering new requirements, determine program needs, and, then, begin preparing their functional programs. Under DPAE lead, the agencies incorporate program requirements into POM alternatives directed and constructed to achieve programmatic balance. Key considerations include:

- resource assessments and new requirements submitted by MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies,
- CINC IPLs and ASCC-developed requirements supporting them,
- the DPG, and
- final Army fiscal guidance provided by OSD toward the end of program development.

Proponent agency PEGs, guided by DPAE, build the Army program using a strategy approved by the SA and CSA. Coordinating as required with MDEP proponents, DPAE assigns MDEPs to PEGs. The PEGs review MDEP resources from a functional or program perspective. In building the PEG portion of the overall program, each PEG rank orders unresourced programs submitted by MACOM, PEO, and other agency POMs. The PEG also reviews command and agency zero-sum realignments, which reallocate programmed resources to meet existing shortfalls and changed requirements. The purpose of the review is to make sure that proposed reallocations:

- conform to legal restrictions and Army policy and priorities,

- avoid imprudently high risk, given recent congressional action, and,
- do not cause a mandatory program or subprogram to become inexecutable.

Army Program Reviews.

Frequency. The program undergoes review by the senior Army leadership early in the even years.

Army Commanders' Conference. The Army Commanders' Conference scheduled during this period provides field commanders the chance to influence program alternatives.

PBC and ARB. The PBC, which oversees the POM build, reviews and adjusts program issues and sets preliminary positions. As appropriate, the PBC returns the results of its deliberations to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action or passes the results to the ARBSG or ARB for review or approval.

POM preparation and submission.

HQDA prepares the POM in the spring of each even year. The POM reflects program actions fleshed out by the HQDA staff with DPAE. It also documents the program decision of the SA and CSA. Submitted to OSD, the POM presents the Army program for its review.

POM updates.

Congress requiring the President to submit annual budgets under the biennial cycle has led OSD to prepare a POM update in the off-cycle year. Typically, the off-cycle update re-looks at the previous biennial

POM, now minus 1 year. It revises the program to:

- − keep its 5 remaining years consistent with original decisions and strategy,
- − adjust to program decisions reflected in the PDM and budget decisions reflected in PBDs.

An important aspect of the POM update centers on program resource allocations for the upcoming (or second) budget year. The aim is to make the allocations as correct as possible in terms of program balance and executability. By re-examining the POM, the task of making program resource changes shifts from budget analysts to program analysts.

The process remains essentially the same as for the biennial POM, but is abbreviated. For the update, DPAE, DCSOPS, and ASA (FM&C) together:

- − re-assess the strategy and determine what changed during the last program review and the last budget review.
- − assess how conditions have changed and what is needed next.
- − capture current positions and guidance of the Army senior leadership to detect changes since the spring before, when the original program was prepared.
- − adjust for the latest fiscal guidance.
- − review issues raised by PEG chairmen.

OSD program review.

Also known as the summer issue cycle, OSD program review begins soon after POM submission and continues normally until mid to late summer.

The review features program review proposals that recommend alternatives to POM-submitted programs. Two- or three-page issue papers fully describe the proposed alternative and give evidence for its adoption.

Issues arise early in the process. They develop from review by members of the DRB and nonmember Assistant Secretaries of Defense who manage specific programs. Each reviewer prepares a set of proposals whose recommended program additions and reductions sum to zero. Submitted to the DEPSECDEF, the balanced sets add nothing to the cost of the defense program. CINCs also may submit proposals but need not balance theirs.

DPAED serves as Army executive agent for the OSD review, interacting primarily with the Joint Staff. As issues arise, representatives of HQDA principal officials meet with their OSD counterparts. The Army representatives present the Army position and try to clarify the issue. If possible, they resolve the issue. An issue resolved outside the DRB becomes known as an out-of-court settlement. Such settlements require the signature of responsible officials, both Army and OSD.

The principal official primarily responsible for the subject matter reviews each issue and helps DPAED prepare and coordinate a recommended Army position. Recommended positions for unresolved tier II issues go to the ARBSG or ARB for review. The DPAED, under the auspices of the ARB, briefs the SA and CSA for their decision. A shorter response time for tier I topics requires abbreviating the procedure. Normally, the DPAE and proponent jointly draft the Army position for decision by the SA and CSA without intermediate review. Approved positions become the basis for

Army participation in DRB discussions if required.

Program Decision Memorandum.

Typically, in mid to late summer, after the DRB has debated all outstanding issues, the DEPSECDEF signs the PDM. The PDM approves the POM with specific changes as the program basis for Army Budget Estimates submitted to OSD.

Sometimes, however, practice varies from plan. Circumstances may cause OSD review and the PDM process to lag behind budget preparation and even OSD-OMB budget review. When that occurs, the Budget Estimates Submission (BES) reflects early decisions recorded in an initial PDM. Follow-on program decisions recorded in several PDMs become intertwined with budget decisions. As a result, the series of PDMs blurs the break between the program and budget and makes it difficult to track changing resource allocations.

BUDGETING PHASE

Army Budgeting.

Budget process. Army budgeting proceeds in three stages: formulation, justification, and execution. Budget formulation converts into Army Budget Estimates the first 2 years of the program approved by the DEPSECDEF's PDM. Budget justification presents the estimates to Congress and defends them before that body. Budget execution applies congressional approved resources consisting of the authorized manpower and appropriated funds to carry out approved programs.

Budget Guidance. Adding to a DOD budget guidance manual and OSD budget call memorandum, ASA (FM&C)

administrative instructions guide HQDA in preparing Army Budget Estimates.

Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF). The AWCF includes revolving funds (industrial and stock), plus some appropriated-fund activities (including finance and accounting services; commissary operations; and some smaller DOD agencies).

AWCF is a financial framework within which designated support organizations operate. It is a business-type system, accounting for total costs and relating them to outputs produced. Full cost visibility for both providers (AWCF businesses) and their customers gives managers information on the cost implications of their decisions. As in any business, the costs include both operating and capital (investment-type items).

Operating costs include total costs of operating the support activity (for example, personnel, travel, transportation, supplies and materials) as well as depreciation on capital equipment. Capital costs include investment items costing over $100,000 and having a life expectancy greater than two years (for example, equipment; software; hardware; minor construction; reliability, maintainability and supportability modifications).

Revolving fund activities in the AWCF recover their costs through stabilized prices charged to customers. These rates remain constant throughout a fiscal year to protect customers from unforeseen inflationary pressures and other cost uncertainties. The fund has the ability to absorb those unforeseen costs within a fiscal year (that is, incur a loss) and then must recover any losses (or return any gains) in the subsequent year's rates.

Formulation.

MACOM Budget Input. As part of the overall effort to streamline financial management, eliminate redundancy, and reduce administrative burden on the field commands, the ASA (FM&C) has discontinued the MACOM Command Budget Submission (CBE) and Resource Management Update (RMU).

The Army Budget Office (ABO) has identified minimum essential information requirements that must be solicited from the field in order to prepare the Budget Estimate Submit (BES), and now includes those requirements as part of the MACOM POM Development Instructions (MPDI). In addition, the ARSTAF now places greater emphasis on ensuring the consistency, executability, and defensibility of the first two years of the Army POM. This facilitates a significantly less turbulent transition of the near-term program to the Army's budget request.

A major aim during budgeting and execution is to maintain consistency with the program. Acceptance of any change to program levels in the approved POM requires determining program tradeoffs to achieve a zero-sum change. Adjustments during budget formulation must remain within the levels approved for Army TOA. Proposed program changes receive review from functional proponents and appropriation sponsors. Changes accepted by the PBC and ARB make their way into the budget.

Used in support of the Army budget submission to OSD, MACOM input has the most impact on the 2 budget years. This is because changes here make a difference in the request that will go to Congress as the President's Budget. (Changes in the coming execution year must be met within the limits of the congressional appropriation or manpower authorization, essentially by reprogramming either within the MACOM and PEO or at DA level.)

Other Budget Submissions by MACOMs. Certain other budget submissions and processes parallel those for the BES. They apply to appropriate MACOMs for RDTE, procurement, and military construction resources as well as for National Guard and Reserve resources.

Acquisition Reviews. Materiel development and procurement programs undergo evaluation during acquisition reviews held in the spring and summer. The reviews consider recent execution experience in pricing and projected program changes by PE, project number, and BLIN. Major issues failing to receive required resources at these levels go to the PBC and ARB for review and to the SA and CSA for decision.

Transition From Program to Budget. On receipt of the PDM, the DPAE, with the Army Staff and Secretariat, adjusts the program. The DPAE then forwards the result to the DAB. The DAB, through appropriation sponsors (Figure 9-2):

– develops budget estimates from POM dollar and manpower levels as adjusted by the PDM.
– revises the estimates to incorporate changes determined through review of MACOM input and centralized programs for the RDTE, procurement, construction, and military personnel appropriations.
– adjusts budget estimates to conform to changes required by pending authorization and appropriation legislation.

Preparing the Budget Estimates Submission. Beginning in May, for both the POM year and off-cycle even year, appropriation sponsors review and mark up estimates prepared for each appropriation. The DAB fits the separate estimates including those of the ARNG and USAR into a single Army budget.

A major objective is to maintain consistency with the program. Accepting any change to approved program levels generally requires program trade offs to achieve a zero-sum change. Adjustments during budget formulation must remain within levels approved for Army TOA unless otherwise directed by the senior Army leadership.

Proposed program changes undergo review by functional proponents, managers for force structure and manpower issues as well as program and appropriation sponsors. Staff review includes analysis of centrally managed appropriations for RDTE, procurement, and the military personnel accounts.

Appropriation sponsors brief the results of staff decisions arising from the review to the PBC when presenting appropriation budgets for approval. PEG chairmen follow with a programmatic assessment of the budget. The DAB chairs the PBC while it discusses the issues and alternatives to appropriation sponsor proposals.

The PBC reviews the "scrub" of appropriation budget estimates to make sure they reflect SA and CSA guidance.

Review and Approval.

The PBC presents summary budget estimates to the ARB, CSA, and SA for review and final decision. After the review, the ASA (FM&C) presents the budget to the SA and CSA for approval.

Once proposed estimates receive approval, appropriation sponsors, aided by managers for program and performance, prepare detailed justification books and furnish DPAE update tapes reflecting the approved Budget Estimate Submission (BES). The DAB prepares the executive summary of the budget and a forwarding letter from the SA to the SECDEF. Separately, the DAB submits the justification books by appropriation to OSD, and the DPAE submits an update tape for the FYDP. The combined events constitute the Army's BES to OSD.

OSD-OMB Budget Review.

Members of OSD and OMB jointly review the BES. Also called the fall review, the joint review focuses on proper pricing, reasonableness, and executability. Appropriation and program sponsors provide appropriation and program overviews at OSD-OMB hearings and respond to questions on the budget submission. Based on the hearings and discussions with Army budget analysts, OSD analysts draft Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) for review and coordination.

PBDs usually present at least one alternative to the budget area addressed. An alternative poses dollar and manpower increases or decreases. They may issue from errors or from the strength of the justification. Sometimes they are motivated by cost savings or the need to reflect changes in policy. Sometimes they result from analytical disagreement. Whatever the reason, the Army analyzes each PBD and responds to OSD, either agreeing or disagreeing with the OSD position.

ASA (FM&C) meets with the USD (C) at periodic Service financial manager meetings. At these meetings, toward the end of the PBD cycle, ASA (FM&C) discusses

Financial Management (FM) Direct Appeals. In the appeals the Services try to reverse OSD positions on critical issues raised by PBD alternatives before OSD's final decision.

Then, after the DEPSECDEF or USD (C) has signed most PBDs, each Service identifies certain pending decrements as Major Budget Issues (MBIs). Army MBIs center on decrements to specific initiatives or broad issues that would significantly impair ability to achieve program intentions. An MBI addresses the adverse impact that would occur if the decrement were to prevail. JCS coordinates MBIs affecting a combatant command to get CINC comments and, if appropriate, CINC support. At the end of the PBD process, the SA and CSA meet with the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF on MBIs. The SECDEF decides each issue, if necessary meeting with the President to request fund restoration or recommend other action.

In December, at the end of the PBD cycle, OSD normally issues a final PBD or OSD memorandum incorporating any changes from MBI deliberations, thus completing the PBD process. OSD then issues each service its final TOA and manpower controls. The DAB incorporates the final changes in the developing President's Budget while the DPAE uses the information to adjust or revalidate the program.

The DAB supervises the PBD and MBI processes and throughout the review:

- maintains coordination between the USD (C) and HQDA.
- makes sure that adjustments to fiscal controls are correct on all records for each PBD. (Verification of corresponding manpower controls is an ASA (M&RA) responsibility.)

- gives special attention to any PBD under appeal since the DEPSECDEF may revise the pending adjustments on review.

President's Budget.

After implementing the final resource distribution at the budget activity and object class level, Army sends the information to OSD. OSD and OMB forward the information as the Army's portion of the Defense budget, which OMB incorporates into the President's Budget.

The President's Budget covers prior year obligations and updated resource estimates for the current year. It also covers TOA estimates for the budget year and budget year plus 1.

Army Budget Office analysts translate decisions into program changes, posting the program elements (PEs), MDEPs, and MACOM distributions, as required. Managers for program and performance update their internal systems.

ABO forwards data base update tapes to DPAE, and DPAE updates PROBE to produce the President's Budget FYDP. (As mentioned, a 1987 statutory change (10 USC 114a) requires DOD to submit a President's Budget FYDP to Congress each year.)

Justification.

Budget hearings. During budget justification, the Army presents and defends its portion of the President's program before Congress. The process proceeds formally and informally under the staff supervision of the Chief of Legislative Liaison and ASA (FM&C).

After the President formally submits the budget, the Army provides detailed budget justification to the authorizing and

appropriations committees. First, however, appropriation sponsors will have prepared material in Army justification books to conform with decisions of the President and SECDEF and congressional requirements for formats and supporting information. Justification books undergo internal Army review under ASA (FM&C) and are then sent to OSD for final review.

The Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) and House National Security Committee (HNSC) conduct authorization hearings for the various programs and appropriations. Concurrently, the Army's budget request goes before the House and Senate Appropriation committees. In these hearings, the SA and the CSA normally testify first. Then, helped by ASA (FM&C) and the Chief of Legislative Liaison, appropriation sponsors present and defend the details of the budget.

Legislative Approval and Enactment. When the congressional sub-committees complete their review, the Senate and House vote on the committee bills. Differences between the Senate and House versions get resolved via a joint conference.

Budget justification ends when the President signs the authorization and appropriation bills for the coming fiscal year. Enacted into law, Army appropriations provide the legal authority to incur obligations and make payments.

Continuing Resolution Authority. When Congress fails to pass an appropriation by the end of September, it may pass a continuing resolution. Continuing resolution authority (CRA) derives from emergency legislation that authorizes the funding of Government operations in the absence of appropriations. A temporary measure, the CRA usually restricts funding to the prior

year level and prohibits new initiatives. HQDA separately publishes specific policy on how the Army will operate under the CRA.

Failure to pass either an appropriation or CRA could result in a temporary close down of government operations. Normally, however, until an appropriation or CRA is enacted, DOD would continue minimum essential operations based on the requirements of national defense.

EXECUTION PHASE

Execution.

During execution the Army manages and accounts for funds and manpower to carry out approved programs. It checks how well HQDA, MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies use allocated resources to carry out program objectives. Through the Army Joint Reconciliation Program, it strengthens financial accounting and management to make sure financial reports accurately reflect the results of budget execution. The Army, (and of even greater importance) OSD and Congress apply execution feedback to adjust resource requirements.

This section describes budget execution. The section that follows addresses program performance and review.

Financial Management.

Budget execution applies the funds appropriated by Congress to carry out authorized programs. The procedure entails apportioning, allocating, and allotting funds; obligating and disbursing them; and associated reporting and review. The procedure also entails performing in process evaluations and making necessary course

corrections to reallocate resources to meet the changing requirements that develop during execution.

The joint reconciliation program applies the skills of those responsible for various aspects of financial management. The skills include those of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, and Internal review auditors. The program applies the combined skills to verify the validity of unliquidated obligations, contractor work in process, billing status, and the continued need for goods and services not yet delivered. The program achieves dollar savings by identifying and canceling obligations for goods and services no longer needed or duplicative. The program also reconciles current appropriations to verify the correctness of amounts obligated. In addition, the program assures the liquidation of appropriations to be canceled by the end of the fiscal year.

Budget execution includes financing unbudgeted requirements that result from changed conditions unforeseen when submitting the budget and having higher priority than the requirements from which funds are diverted (reprogramming).

Funds Control.

Several events must occur before the Army can execute its programs for a new fiscal year under a new appropriations act. OMB must apportion the appropriations, which provides obligation/budget authority. The Department of the Treasury must issue a Treasury Warrant providing cash. Finally, program authority must be released by the USD (C). Then, before the Army can execute its programs for the new fiscal year, all these authorities must be loaded into the Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS). Additionally, PBAS must be loaded

with execution restrictions in accordance with Congressional language an undistributed decrements must be spread to appropriate program.

Apportionment.

An apportionment distributes funds by making specific amounts available for obligation. The apportionment requests (DD II 05s) are prepared by the Office of the Deputy ASA for Budget within 5 days of the availability of an appropriations act and in response to approved reprogramming requests, supplementals, or rescissions. The apportionment requests are approved or revised by OSD and submitted to OMB for approval. OMB approves, changes, or disapproves the requests and returns apportionments through OSD to the Army for entry into PBAS.

OMB apportions the operating accounts (O&M, Military personnel [MILPERS], and Army Family Housing, Operations [AFHO]) quarterly. It apportions the investment accounts (RDT&E, Procurement, Military Construction [MILCON], and Army Family Housing, Construction [AFHC]) initially for the entire amount of the appropriation. The apportionment determines the Budget Authority (BA) available in PBAS. For the operating accounts--even after releasing the entire program to the command--it is the cumulative amount of BA issued to operating agencies by quarter that determines the execution level for the appropriation

Program Release.

For the investment accounts, the Army releases program and budget authority in equal amounts. The USD (C) releases the program to the Army for execution. For the

procurement appropriations (Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and Other Procurement) the program is released at the budget line item (BLIN) level. For the RDT&E appropriation, the program is released at the program element (PE) level. These are the same levels as those authorized and appropriated by Congress and reported in the DD 1414 and DD 1416 Reports (which are provided to Congress to show execution changes to appropriated amounts). Both the MILCON and the AFHC appropriations are released at the project level as contained in the conference report accompanying the Military Construction Appropriations Act. The program release for the operating accounts, O&M and MILPERS, are contained in the obligation authority (OA) letter issued by the USD (C). A separate OA letter is issued for AFHO.

Allocation, Obligation, and Reconciliations.

Guided by appropriation and fund sponsors at HQDA and via PBAS, ASA (FM&C) allocates apportioned funds to operating agencies.

Operating agencies, in turn, make funds available to subordinate commands and installations by an allotment. Allotments authorize users to place orders and award contracts for products and services to carry out approved programs. Installations obligate funds as orders are placed and contracts awarded. They make payments as materiel is delivered or as services are performed. Finally installations, MACOMs, and appropriation sponsors conduct joint reconciliations. Reconciliations make sure financial statements and reports accurately represent the results of the apportionment, allocation, and allotment program. Reconciliations also make sure payments align properly with supporting obligations.

Changes from the President's Budget.

After appropriations are enacted, appropriation sponsors and the Army Budget Office review the legislation to determine changes which include congressional adds, denial of programs, or changes to the funding level as submitted in the budget. Changes also include identification of congressional special interest items, undistributed reductions, and any language relating to execution of the programs. These changes are applied to amounts loaded into PBAS.

Appropriation sponsors must determine how to spread any undistributed reductions. In addition, they may also have to spread some unapplied reductions in the appropriations act, which are distributed to the Services (and appropriations) during the PBD cycle.

For those reasons, the actual funding level for a particular project, BLIN, PE, or budget activity may not be finally set until several months into the new fiscal year. This is so even if the appropriations act is passed before October 1, and the ultimate funding level for individual programs will almost certainly be less than shown in the joint conference reports.

Funding Letters for O&M and AFHO.

HQDA issues funding letters to operating agencies for both OMA and AFHO. ARNG and USAR issue their own funding letters for their O&M appropriations. The letters indicate funded programs and give guidance on how they should be executed. They also provide an audit trail from the resource position in the President's Budget to the revised, appropriated position. The OMA funding letter outlines the funding posture and goals set by the senior Army leadership for

command execution. Preparing and issuing the funding letter takes about 30 days after the appropriation act is passed.

Revised Approved Program for RDT&E.

HQDA issues a Revised Approved Program (RAP) for the RDT&E appropriation The RAP shows the congressional changes at both the PE and project level. In addition, the RAP spreads general reductions at the project level. It includes the amounts set aside for the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology Transfer Pilot Program (STTR) as specified I Public Law 102-564. The RAP also includes amounts withheld by the USD (C) and DA and provides language on congressional restrictions as well as congressional special interest items. Because of the level of detail and the extensive information included, the RAP is not available until several months after the appropriations act is enacted.

Program Budget Accounting System.

The PBAS is used to issue both the program and BA to operating agencies for all appropriations. After appropriation directors determine the revised appropriated level for each appropriation, the amounts are adjusted in the PBAS. Program and BA are released in equal amounts for all appropriations except MILPERS, O&M, and AFHO. These accounts receive the total program for the fiscal year but receive BA quarterly throughout the year. BA controls the total amount of obligations an operating agency can execute through any given quarter but allows flexibility in applying BA against the program received.

PBAS uses special reprogramming keys either to allow operating agencies to move the program below threshold or to restrict the ability to reprogram below threshold to the DA level. The use of the keys in PBAS varies from one appropriation to another. Special keys may also be used in PBAS to identify congressional special interest items or programs that have been denied by Congress.

PBAS agrees with the program detail contained in DFAS-IN Manual 37-100**: The Army Management Structure (AMS). Changes to PBAS can only be made at the DA level and must be approved as a change to DFAS-IN Manual 37 -100**. This pamphlet initially agrees with the detail obtained in the President's Budget request and is changed to incorporate congressional adds. Any additional changes may be controlled by congressional language and vary from one appropriation to another.

ASA (FM&C) controls PBAS at the DA level. The appropriation sponsor may request the release of the program and BA, or below threshold reprogramming actions. The Office of the Deputy ASA for Budget (SAFM-BUC-E) reviews requests for compliance with congressional language and USD (C) guidance before entering the action in PBAS. PBAS produces documents that display both BA and the program. The documents include a section for remarks for executing the program and footnotes that provide statutory restrictions according to the revisions of 31 USC 1517.

Obligation and Outlay Plans.

During December and January, the ASA (FM&C), in coordination with field activities and appropriation sponsors, develops obligation and outlay plans. The obligation plans address unexpired funds for all Army appropriations. The outlay plans address unexpired and expired funds.

The ASA (FM&C) sends completed obligation and outlay plans to the USD (C).

Based on MACOM and PEO estimates of annual obligations, the plans tie to obligation and outlay controls in the President's Budget. The importance of the outlay plan is that it is directly tied to the projected amounts the Treasury must borrow to maintain proper balances to meet expected disbursements (outlays). Actual execution greatly in variance with the outlay plan can result in the Treasury having to pay more than necessary to borrow money.

Financing Unbudgeted Requirements.

Congress recognizes the need for flexibility during budget execution to meet unforeseen requirements or changes in operating conditions, including those to address minor, fact-of-life financial changes. Congress accepts that rigid adherence to program purposes and amounts originally budgeted and approved would jeopardize businesslike performance.

Thus, within stated restrictions and specified dollar thresholds, Congress allows federal agencies to reprogram existing funds to finance unfunded requirements. Typically, reprogramming diverts funds from undertakings whose requirements have lower priority than the new requirements being financed.

Congressional language on reprogramming, which varies by appropriation, controls the Army's ability to move the program within appropriations (below threshold reprogramming). Moving the program in excess of specified limits requires congressional approval via a formal reprogramming (DD 1415) request. Moving amounts between appropriations always requires a formal reprogramming request.

Provided reprogramming authority is not required, another way to finance unfunded requirements is to apply obligation authority harvested from joint reconciliations. This means uses unexpired funds originally obligated against a contract or order but identified as excess to the need and subsequently deobligated. Reutilizing funds in this way gives allotment holders greater leverage in executing the budget and increases the buying power of the Army's financial resources.

FY 91 marked the first year of Omnibus Reprogramming, which, except for construction accounts, consolidated all DOD reprogramming actions into one very large reprogramming action which identified all DOD reprogramming requirements at one time. This allowed the Congress and DOD to set priorities for limited funding and make smarter decisions.

Program Performance and Review.

Program Implementation. MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies carry out the approved program within manpower and funds provided. They review budget execution, account for and report on use of allocated funds by appropriation and MDEP. As applicable to each appropriation, they include FYDP program and subprogram, AMSCO, PE, project number, BLIN, BAG, and EOR. They also account for use of allocated manpower by Unit of Identification Code (UIC). The manpower and financial data obtained help MACOMs and agencies develop future requirements.

Formal Program Performance.

Selected Army Programs. ASA (FM&C) oversees a management review of Army Programs via the Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR). The QAPR compares program performance with objectives set at the beginning of the fiscal year by Secretariat and Army Staff principals. These individuals personally

present the review to the SA and CSA on a quarterly basis.

Review of Selected Army Systems.

The means for checking system program performance include milestone reviews of designated acquisition programs by the Army Systems Acquisition and Review Council conducted by ASA (RDA) and the VCSA. Another means includes milestone and in-process reviews (IPRs) of designated automated information systems by the MAISRC conducted by DISC4 and the ASA (RDA).

Oversight of Nonappropriated Funds.

Applying various methods, the ASA (FM&C) also oversees nonappropriated funds. One method is by participating on the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Board of Directors. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C) is a voting member of the MWR Executive Committee. In addition, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C) chairs the Audit Committee, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Arrny for Resource Analysis and Business Practices serves on the Investment Subcommittee. Through these positions the ASA (FM&C) influences virtually all aspects of MAR financial policy. As part of the responsibility of overseeing nonappropriated funds, the ASA (FM&C) presents nonappropriated funds issues to the SA and CSA during the QAPR.

SUMMARY

The purpose of the OSD PPBS is to produce for the entire DOD a plan, a program, and finally, the budget. Since its inception in 1962 it has evolved continuously in terms of the product produced, the system

itself, and the supporting organizations. This evolution has led, over time, to greater participation by the Services, CINCs, and the JCS. Underlying the OSD PPBS is each Service PPBS, which varies from Service to Service.

The PPBES is the Army's resource management system and includes the execution phase in addition to planning, programming, and budgeting. It interfaces with the OSD PPBS and sequentially integrates and coordinates Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. The decisions and priorities developed during the planning and programming phase are the foundation of the Army budget. Depending on the particular phase of the PPBES cycle, actions proceed under the direction of the functional proponents: planning under DCSOPS; programming and evaluation of program execution under DPAE; and budgeting and financial execution under ASA(FMC).

The Army PPBES is dependent on the actions of many organizations. These actions culminate with the reviews and decisions made by the ARB, under the direction of the SA and the CSA.

Today, the evolution of the OSD PPBS and the Army PPBES continues and reflects the changes in organizations and the adaptation of the process to advancements in computer and software technology.

REFERENCES

(1) U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Department of Defense Instruction 7045.7, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,* May 1984.
(2) U.S. Joint Staff. *CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 7: The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS),* 17 March 1993.
(3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 1-1, Planning Programming,*

Budgeting, and Execution System, 30
January 1994.

CHAPTER 10

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The fact that the Army is charged with the management of its resources is neither surprising nor controversial. What is surprising, and frequently controversial, is the use of those resources. Mr. Norman Augustine, former Under Secretary of the Army and current President and CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation, has a fascinating manner of putting resource management in perspective. In the May/June 1996 issue of National Defense magazine he stated:

"I also added up the money spent in recent years on canceled programs as a whole— programs which did nothing to help our nations fighting capability— and found that the funds expended could have purchased 1,000 Abrams tanks, 100 F-16 fighters, 1,000 advanced medium range air to air missiles, 10 Titan IV launch vehicles, 20 Joint Surveillance target attack radar system aircraft, 10,000 Javelin missiles, 70,000 multiple launch rocket systems, and one nuclear attack submarine"

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Augustine's comments regarding the resources expended on canceled Department of Defense (DOD) weapons programs were directed primarily to the need for acquisition reform. That sector of the Army's resource funds is relatively small, and is yet decreasing. The total picture of Army resources and the importance of proper management is even larger than the acquisition problems cited. The Army is vested with the public's trust and confidence for defending our Nation. Its members have a responsibility for all of the assets with which they have been entrusted by the American people. Resource management is an integral part of the commander's role in fulfilling this stewardship responsibility. Responsible resource management is the key to sustaining and modernizing the Army and

is essential for the Army's readiness posture. In today's Army, this applies to both appropriated funds (APF) and nonappropriated funds (NAF). Although different rules apply to these two types of funds, actions taken to increase or decrease APF will affect NAF, and decisions on use of NAF will affect requirements for APF.

Resource management in the 1990s will be marked as an era of declining resources. This has already had a major impact on all Military Departments as well as the entire U.S. Government. This nation's deficit reduction measures implemented under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Legislation in FY 1986 had the effect of taking the first step in containing the Reagan defense buildup. Two-year budgeting, which was recommended by the President's Commission on Defense Management and required by the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Act, represented

a serious effort to promote stability and consistency in defense budgeting.

The Bush Administration, in an attempt to bring the national deficit down and to create a better working relationship with Congress, placed new budget levels on the DOD and the individual military Services. The result was $295.6 billion for FY 90 and $311 billion for FY 91 (a total of $20 billion less than agreed upon during the 1987 Budget Summit Agreement).

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the decline of the communistic governments in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, placed great pressure on the Bush Administration to further reduce the defense budget and make significant reductions in force structure in Europe. As a result, the DOD's budget authority for FY 91 was again reduced ($276.2 billion) and the new budget authority for FY 92 and FY 93 was $281.9 billion and $267.4 billion, respectively. The Army's budget authority was also reduced, from a high of $92.5 billion in FY 91 to a low of $66.7 billion in FY 93.

The Clinton Administration, starting with the FY 94 defense budget, proposed the first post-Cold War era budget. For FY 94-97, President Clinton proposed budgets ranging from $252.1 billion ($63.1 billion for the Army) to $242.6 billion ($60.1 billion for the Army). These budget reductions have had a dramatic impact on resource management; for as dollars went down, missions went up. The Army's participation in operations other than war (OOTW) has been disproportionate to budget authority. Although Congress provided supplemental appropriations, not all contingency costs were reimbursed. Consequently, funds diverted to support contingency operations continue to undermine quality of life and the execution of the service's

training, maintenance, and base operating programs. No area of the defense budget has been exempt from close scrutiny: reductions in force structure are planned to ensure that the military departments do not return to the era of a "hollow," unprepared, and ill-equipped force; uneconomical or marginal programs may be eliminated; and programs proposed as new starts will be reevaluated so all Services can maintain momentum in their limited modernization efforts. Every effort will be made to preserve a balanced program among people, readiness, and modernization.

Therefore, in recognizing the lower funding levels, both at DOD and Army, key resource management issues emanate from a policy, programmatic, and financial perspective. Foremost among the issues is the generic question of how we as an Army can reduce spending, make trade-offs, and restructure our reduced programs, and do so, in a most efficient and effective manner. In some instances we must realize that doing more with less places subordinates into dilemmas that can be solved only by the reduction or elimination of functions. With the current crisis of the national deficit, increased pressure is on the U.S. Government and the Military Departments to be more efficient.

One strategy to meet this challenge is to develop, market, and implement new and better ways of doing business that are less costly and more efficient. Many private industry business practices "make sense" for the DOD and can potentially be applied to optimize the use of resources. The overall objective is to stretch available resources by generating revenues, reducing costs, and improving the delivery of services. We must be able to assure our customers, the American tax-payers, that they are getting a dollar's worth of value from every dollar spent in defense. In some cases, existing

policies or legislation may need to be changed. This step, however, should not deter the Army from continually looking for new and innovative ways of doing business or improving on past business management initiatives. We must all make a commitment to excellence.

From a resource management policy perspective, it is clear that the Army's downsizing has impacted and will continue to impact military and civilian end strengths, and has shifted the focus to "internal harvesting." Harvesting has permitted the TOE Army to realign its tooth-to-tail ratio, revisit manpower allocation rules for combat support/combat service support units, use host nation support (HNS) offsets, and to streamline heavy divisions—all to generate new deterrent combat power.

Similar efforts have been underway to harvest the TDA Army, in particular civilian spaces. Some efficiency reviews have shown that noncompetitive internal "scrubs" have generated as much as 9% manpower savings, but that those activities which can be put out for external competition may generate as much as 25% manpower reductions. There are limits, though, to the ability of this kind of internal "harvesting" to create additional capabilities and then to sustain them. Resource management, at the policy level, must question where these limits lie and what the costs are to achieve them. Resource management policy must deal with the larger questions of whether particular programs are needed, how they serve the specific missions the Army has delineated, and whether those missions and the strategies they serve are sensible.

The Army is wrestling with the same problems for activities supported by nonappropriated funds. Base closures, troop realignments, and declining appropriated fund support create an environment in which the continuation of existing programs must take into account NAF policy decisions and ensure that there is a cross-fertilization of information between the two funding sources. Without coordination between the two communities, actions taken by either can have serious impacts on the other. For example, NAF major construction projects are authorized APF maintenance and repair support as well as other operational support, depending on the type of facility constructed.

Conversely, reduction of APF for MWR activities can force dramatic changes in the types of quality-of-life programs available to soldiers and their families. MWR activities can benefit from "internal harvesting," but limits exist and reductions will result in the same larger issue questions facing non-MWR programs.

Programmatic and financial resource perspectives examine the efficiency with which funds are allocated and spent, and with how effectively particular programs are managed and integrated. Resource management at the programmatic level encompasses the way we integrate soldiers, civilians, facilities, equipment, information, time, and dollars to produce viable combat power. We have created over the years a number of stovepipe systems to manage vertical stovepipe functional areas efficiently. However, maximizing stovepipes may not necessarily optimize capabilities that require horizontal integration from a resource management perspective. The Army's force modernization inspection in 1982, conducted by the Department of the Army Inspector General, demonstrated only too clearly the resource disconnects of inadequate horizontal programmatic integration. Force integration analysis at the Department of the Army level will clearly facilitate these integrative efforts, but it is the Management Decision Packages (MDEP)

concept, cited in Chapter 9, which will give us the capability to enhance resource management integration throughout the Army to achieve the most effective utilization of our scarce resources, not only on a yearly but also on a six year basis. The MDEP provides the building blocks for the first step in Resource Management which is building of the six year POM. (The first two years are the basis for the budget and lead to the budget formulation process.) Implicit in this programmatic resource management perspective is the recognition that all of us participate in a resource decision stream that requires some of these decisions, once made, to remain unalterable. For example, placing a new facility at an installation requires a minimum of four years. Training instructors and then troops on a new piece of equipment requires three years. Ordering the secondary spares for new end items requires at least two years. Integrating all three of these resourcing decisions requires that we consider them to be "irreversible," otherwise we will find new facilities being completed at one installation, while we have resourced new equipment and soldiers trained on that equipment to be serving on another installation. More importantly, this "unalterable decision base" will have created "a receivables stream" such as aircraft, training packages, TAC equipment shops, displaced equipment, etc. of substantial proportion. Reconfiguring these "receivables" into one's own conception without considering the previous decision rationale may well create resource management disconnects which tend to surface in OSD and congressional budget hearings.

Financial resource management has its focus on how efficiently we use our funds and how effectively our programs are managed. This fiduciary responsibility finds its roots in statutes such as *Title 31 USC 1514a, 1517, 1518, 1519; Title 32 USC;* and in the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA). This Act requires all Federal agencies to establish and maintain effective accounting and administrative controls to provide "reasonable assurance" that:

- obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable laws;
- funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation; and,
- revenues and expenditures are properly recorded and accounted for.

The Act also requires agency heads to submit an annual statement to the President and the Congress indicating whether the agency's management controls are reasonable and, where they are not, material weaknesses are identified and corrective actions are taken. The implementing *OMB Circular A-123* and *DOD Directive 5010.38* clearly indicate that the provisions of the Act apply to all functions and programs and that effective management controls are an inherent responsibility of all managers and commanders. Management controls are nothing more than the procedures we establish to ensure that we accomplish our objectives. Numerous audit and inspection reports, however, continue to find serious management control deficiencies in DOD. This damages our reputation as stewards of public resources and hinders our ability to compete effectively in Congress for the additional resources we need. Congress, has made it clear that the emphasis on management controls will continue. As the Army downsizes and adjusts to changing world conditions, the risk of mission failure

will increase, making effective management controls even more important.

Within the Army, AR 11-2 (*Management Control*) establishes policies and guidelines for implementing the provisions of the FMFIA, the OMB Circular and the DOD Directive. The current AR 11-2 describes the Army's management process, which was restructured effective FY 95, to reduce the administrative burden greatly, to provide commanders and managers with greater flexibility in scheduling and conducting their evaluations, and to make them directly accountable for the effectiveness of their management controls. The restructured process requires management control evaluations only for the most critical controls (the "key management controls") and encourages commanders and managers to use existing review and oversight processes, wherever possible, to accomplish these evaluations.

Resource Management Functions.

Resource management is the direction, guidance, and control of financial and other resources. It involves the application of programming, budgeting, accounting, reporting, analysis, and evaluation. The functional focus of resource management can be summarized under the "Four A's":

- Acquisition of resources.
- Allocation of resources according to the priorities, generally considered in terms of dollars and manpower.
- Accounting for resources with:
    - a system that provides decision support and tracking capability for the program and budget functions.
    - a system that performs accounting for fiscal compliance required by statutes.
- Analysis and course correction as required.

These functions are a closed-loop process. It is recognized that there are other listings that describe the functional components of resource management. However, the interrelationships between the four "A's" highlight the preceding discussion of the need to achieve better horizontal and vertical integration of resource management.

FUND MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Assistant Secretary of the Army - Financial Management and Comptroller ASA(FM &C).

Pursuant to the *Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* the ASA(FM&C), subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of the Army, has statutory responsibility for Army budgeting and execution. The ASA(FM&C) discharges the function through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget (known as the DAB) who responds concurrently to the Chief of Staff of the Army. A sponsor for each congressional appropriation assists the ASA(FM&C) and DAB in discharging their statutory responsibilities relative to fund management. The appropriation sponsors also coordinate the allocation of funds in support of the Army program. A full breakout of the Army budget structure with the corresponding appropriation or fund sponsors will be discussed later in this chapter.

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).

On 15 January 1991, DOD activated the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The establishment concluded a number of developments in the area of accounting and finance, yet truly was more an initiation of actions to improve and consolidate accounting and finance functions throughout the DOD.

Mission. The specific mission adopted for DFAS was to control, direct, and standardize policies, standards, systems, and operations of DOD finance and accounting functions. The mission again reflects the DOD-wide nature of the agency and its functional orientation, but moves more directly to the control and standardization aspects of reasons for the creation of DFAS. Army retains responsibility for oversight of the Finance and Accounting mission within the Army.

Organizations Transferred to DFAS. Deputy Secretary Atwood's July 1990 authorizing memo established the basic ground rules for which activities would transfer into DFAS to form its nucleus. These were the existing military departments and DLA accounting and finance centers, specifically the:

- U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center, Indianapolis
- Navy Finance Center, Cleveland
- Air Force Accounting and Finance Center, Denver
- Marine Corps Finance Center, Kansas City
- Defense Logistics Agency Finance Center, Columbus

DFAS Organization. DFAS comprises a small headquarters in the Washington area and five operating centers (see above), wholly aligned with the prior accounting and finance centers. The five centers report to the DFAS Director.

The headquarters has several support staffs: legal, public affairs, internal review, and liaison. The major components of the headquarters are Accounting Systems Program Management, Resource Management, Finance, Human Resources, Plans and Management, Customer Service and Performance Assessment, and Information Management.

Currently DFAS is consolidating their installation Defense Accounting Offices (DAOS) into one of their regional operating locations (OPLOCs). Remaining at each CONUS installation is a small DFAS cell called a Defense Military Pay Office (DMPO) responsible for military pay and emergency disbursing.

The Future. More important than all the necessary organizational work is the view of the future. The DFAS strategic plan calls for developing and operating standardized systems in each business area within five years. To improve the quality of accounting support, DFAS will select interim migratory systems along military component lines in general accounting and along business lines for the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF).

Simultaneously, DFAS is implementing plans to consolidate DOD financial accounting resources at the 21 regional OPLOCs, thus streamlining finance and accounting operations and improving their support to the Army and other services.

ARMY BUDGET OFFICE (ABO)

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                    │  Deputy ASA     │              │ Congressional Budget│
                    │  for Budget     │──────────────│   Liaison Office    │
                    │  SAFM-BU        │              │   SAFM-BUL          │
                    └─────────────────┘              └─────────────────────┘
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Management & Control Directorate SAFM-BUC	Investment Directorate SAFM-BUI	Operations & Support Directorate SAFM-BUO	Business Resources Directorate SAFM-BUR
Formulation Division SAFM-UC-F	Weapons System Division SAFM-BUI-W	Operational Forces Division SAFM-BUO-O	
Budget Execution Policy and Funds Control Division SAFM-BUC-E	Other Procurement Army Division SAFM-BUI-O	Management, Control Integration Division SAFM-BUO-S	
PAED Data Base * DACS-DPI	Facilities Division SAFM-BUI-F	Military Personnel Division SAFM-BUO- C	
Integration and Evaluation Division SAFM-BUC-I	Acquisition Integration Division SAFM-BUI-A		

* During BES and Presidents Budget Cycles

Figure 10-1

Above all, the new Defense Finance and Accounting Service has focused its attention on the main reason for the existence of the accounting and finance community—to provide timely and accurate finance and accounting support to Commanders and managers at all levels of DOD.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget (the DAB) heads the Army Budget Office (ABO) and exercises supervision over the formulation, justification, and execution of the Army budget (see Figure 10-1). The DAB provides the guidance, direction, and initiative within

which the appropriation and fund sponsors perform their respective responsibilities. He does this by ensuring that the budget flows from and stays in consonance with the programming actions of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) and the budget guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This interface with the DPAE is very important, as many of the decisions for the budget are made by the Army and the Office of The Secretary of Defense leadership in the six year POM process. Additionally, the DAB directs the formulation of the Army budget, and leads its presentation to OSD and Congress, maintaining liaison with the appropriations committees and Congress. He also controls the allocation of apportioned funds to commands and agencies (in conjunction with DFAS) and exercises control over the budget execution review.

Staff Resource Managers and Appropriation and Fund Sponsors.

Getting Army resources involves two distinctly separate resource allocation structures. One structure relates to congressional appropriations, the other to the FYDP. The FYDP identifies and accounts for the total of all resources programmed by DOD. As noted in Chapter 9, the FYDP is a resource management language having two dimensions. Its first dimension uses the OSD program element (PE) as a building block, with each PE representing an organizational or functional entity and its associated resources. Using the PEs, OSD constructs the 11 major force programs. The 11 programs form an output or mission-oriented structure, used primarily for internal DOD review. The FYDP's second dimension applies the input-oriented appropriation structure of congressional budget requests. Fed by that

structure into PEs, decisions on dollars and manpower flow into the 11 major force programs. This second dimension helps FYDP data satisfy congressional reporting requirements.

To accommodate HQDA's organization for resource management, the Army has refined the DOD program structure. The Army scheme adds a number of budget activities, activity groups, and subactivity groups to allow definition by HQDA functional responsibilities, including separately managed accounts for base operations and real property maintenance.

In contrast to the FYDP structure, the Army Management Structure (AMS) provides a resource management language based on congressional appropriations. It relates program dollars and manpower to a standard classification of activities and functions per *DFAS IN MANUAL 37-100-***. AMS codes (AMSCOs) help record the data in the detail needed for budgeting, execution, and accounting.

Some AMS data link directly to OSD PEs. This is true for manpower data, which is recorded as military and civilian end strength. It is true also for dollars in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army (RDTE) appropriation and the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation and the Military Personnel, Army (MPA) appropriation.. All the procurement appropriations distribute AMSCO data to the OSD PEs using discretionary algorithmic spreads.

To help manage resources within the two structures, HQDA relies on designated Staff Resource Managers and Appropriations and Fund Sponsors. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget serves as the appropriation sponsor for all Army appropriations except those for National Guard and Army Reserve. Figures 9-2 and 9-

3 in the previous chapter show staff managers and sponsors for Army appropriations and funds and FYDP-related subprograms of the appropriation for Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA). Figure 9-7 in the previous chapter shows PEG assignments for these managers and sponsors, and the staff managers and sponsors are discussed below. The PEGs are expected to program resources for given programs across a wide range of appropriations. Any failure on a part of a PEG or PEGs to consider full life cycle costs and related resourcing of programs results in serious resource disconnects that undermine budget justification and program execution.

Managers for Manpower and Force Structure Issues. The manager for manpower issues and the manager for force structure issues work together to maintain a continuous exchange of information and collaboration. As appropriate, these managers coordinate instructions to the field, and the processing of requests from the field, for manpower or force changes. They align and balance manpower and unit information among the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), the Program Optimization and Budget Evaluation (PROBE), and the FYDP. They also provide lead support to the PEG chair on manpower issues.

Manager for Requirements Determination. The manager for requirements determination defines the scope, quantity, and qualitative nature of functional requirements for planning, programming, and budgeting. He or she checks how commands and agencies apply allocated manpower and dollars to make sure their use fulfills program requirements. He or

she reviews unresourced programs submitted by MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies and, in developing the program and budget, resolves conflicts involving the unresourced requirements or decrements on which the MACOMs, PEOs, and other operating agencies fail to reach agreement. The manager for requirements determination recommends to the Program and Budget Committee (PBC) the allocation of available resources, unresourced programs, and offsetting decrements. During program and budget reviews, and throughout the process, he or she coordinates resource changes with agencies having proponency for affected MDEPs.

Manager for Program and Performance. The manager for program and performance represents the functional program and monitors its performance. As required, the manager for program and performance acts with the appropriation sponsor or helps the appropriation sponsor perform the general duties outlined below. The manager for program and performance translates budget decisions and approved manpower and funding into program changes and ensures that data transactions update affected MDEPs. He or she also checks budget execution from the functional perspective.

During budget formulation, the manager for program and performance assists in determining how changes in fiscal guidance affect budget estimates and reviews and approves the documentation of budget justification. During OSD/OMB budget review and justification before Congress, he or she serves as appropriation advocate, helps prepare the Army response to OSD program budget decisions (PBDs), and prepares congressional appeals. During execution, the program manager for program

and performance determines fund recipients, monitors execution, performs decrement reviews, and plans reprogrammings. On RDA matters and otherwise as required, he or she testifies before OSD and Congress.

Appropriation Sponsor. As previously noted, the DAB is the appropriation sponsor for all Army appropriations, except the National Guard and Army Reserve. The appropriation sponsor controls an assigned appropriation or fund. The sponsor also serves as Army spokesperson for appropriation resources. He or she not only issues budget policy, instructions, and fiscal guidance, but also prepares supplemental budgets and assists in solving Manpower and funding deficiencies. During budget formulation the appropriation sponsor bears responsibility for PROBE updates, and prepares and justifies budget estimates to OSD and the Congress. During budget execution, the appropriation sponsor oversees financial execution of the appropriation and reprograms allocated manpower and funds to meet unforeseen contingencies.

Commanders.

Commanders of major commands and commanders and other heads of operating agencies are responsible for developing, justifying, presenting, and defending programs supporting their assigned responsibilities, and for ensuring approved budget programs are properly executed and certified. This responsibility includes ensuring that accounting and fund status reporting for appropriated and nonappropriated funds is accomplished in accordance with fiscal law and governing regulations and policies.

PPBES EXECUTION

The Chief of Staff of the Army in 1981 renamed the Army's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), adding Execution to the process title—PPBES. This constituted a marked change from the prior decentralized concept in which PPBS execution responsibility was transferred to the field commanders. He charged the Army's leaders with the responsibility to evaluate and report on the effectiveness of program and budget accomplishment. These evaluations and reports relate funds and personnel inputs in output terms, to the Army's Title 10 responsibilities. The execution phase formally begins when an appropriation bill is signed into law or, in the absence thereof, a Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) is passed providing temporary funding. The execution phase encompasses all the actions required to carry out approved programs efficiently and economically. This phase overlaps the formulation and review phases and continues throughout the period of availability of the appropriation for obligation or expenditure. Budget execution must comply with regulations and limitations established by the Congress, the General Accounting Office, the Treasury Department, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Secretary of Defense, as well as those of the Department of the Army. It should also be noted that when funds are received from other Government agencies that the Army must also comply with their rules.

SELECTED TERMS

Apportionment Requests.

To assure that funds are provided when needed, and to facilitate control over their expenditure, the OMB apportions operating

funds. After Congress passes the Appropriation Act and the President signs it, the Army submits through OSD to OMB its request for apportionment of funds. The approved apportionment authorizes the Army to obligate specific funds in specific periods, for activities, functions, or projects.

Program Documents.

In addition to the approved apportionment, Army receives one or more documents from OSD that may restrict the obligation authority provided in the apportionment document by withholding specific programs. These documents come in a multitude of different forms depending on the appropriation involved. The documents can represent subdivisions of the congressional appropriation. The Army must abide by the restrictions imposed by OSD.

Appropriation Warrants.

After Congress has enacted the appropriation bill and the President has signed it into law, the Treasury Department issues appropriation warrants. These warrants establish the appropriation amounts within the Army and simultaneously make funds available for disbursement in payment. of obligations incurred against the appropriations.

Distribution, Obligation, and Disbursement of Funds.

After obtaining obligation authority, HQDA directs the major commands to carry out their budget—that is, to execute their approved plan in terms of training, construction projects, and the like. Concurrently, HQDA authorizes commands to obligate funds for these purposes. This authorization is referred to as the allocation process. Major commands in turn suballocate or allot funds to the appropriate levels where programs are to be carried out. As orders are placed or contracts awarded, funds are obligated. Based on these orders and contracts, material is delivered or services are performed which require the disbursement of funds. Obligations and disbursements for each appropriation are reported monthly through the DFAS accounting systems which provide the primary management tool for budget execution. Review and analysis of monthly reports ensure the prompt detection of adverse trends that could jeopardize successful budget execution as well as the identification of favorable trends that should be exploited. (As there are a number of terms involved in the execution stage which may tend to be confusing, Figure 10-2 is provided as a summary.)

Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR).

Major legislative and Army management initiatives have introduced an unprecedented focus on performance and results. These initiatives all point to the transition to more outcome-oriented program management and performance budgeting. The QAPR is a tool that Army management uses to monitor its performance in accomplishing its major goals and objectives. In 1995 the PPBERS (Planning, Programming, Budgeting Execution Review System) was eliminated and the QAPR developed and institutionalized.

The QAPR cycle begins with identification, by the Secretariat and Army staff principals, of the core performance measures that relate to explicit goals and objectives. Each quarter these performance measures are monitored to determine the

DELEGATION OF OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY

AGENCY	ACTION	RECIPIENT
CONGRESS	APPROPRIATES	OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET	APPORTIONS	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	SUBAPPORTIONS	DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ASA(FM & C)	ALLOCATES	SPECIAL OPERATING AGENCIES AND THOSE GENERAL AGENCIES WHICH ARE NOT SUBORDINATE TO SPECIAL OPERATING AGENCIES (e.g. MACOMs)
SPECIAL OPERATING AGENCIES	SUBALLOCATES	SUBORDINATE GENERAL OPERATING AGENCIES
GENERAL OPERATING AGENCIES (e.g. MACOMs)	ALLOTS OR PROVIDES ALLOWANCES	INSTALLATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
INSTALLATION AND ACTIVITIES	MAY DISTRIBUTE FUNDS BY OBLIGATION AUTHORITY, CITATION OF FUNDS, EXPENSE CEILINGS, OR FUNDING ALLOWANCES	ACTIVITIES

Figure 10-2

progress made towards accomplishing these goals. In addition, other critical issues that may be of immediate interest and impact for the Army can be presented. This review is presented directly to the SA and CSA personally by the Secretariat and Army Staff principals.

Joint Reconciliation Program.

The Joint Reconciliation Program is an effort combining the skills and expertise of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, internal review auditors, and DFAS personnel for the purpose of verifying the validity of unliquidated obligations, contractor work in progress, billing status, validating the continued need for goods and services that have not yet been delivered. The reconciliations must be performed by all commands, and when performed properly, will result in real dollar savings through the identification and cancellation of nonessential goods and services, reconciliation of current appropriations to ensure the correctness of amounts obligated, and liquidation of appropriations expiring at the end of the fiscal year.

The primary objectives of the Joint Reconciliation program are to "harvest" obligation authority through deobligation of funds supporting invalid obligations; eliminate the use of current funds to pay liabilities arising from appropriations that are expired; reconcile and liquidate delinquent travel advances; and eliminate/ avoid

unmatched disbursements (UMD) and negative unliquidated obligations (NULO).

Every transaction must be reconciled once during each phase and actions must be taken early to ensure orderly liquidation of expiring accounts.

As a result of performing effective joint reconciliations, command increases their purchasing power which directly enhances readiness and preparedness. Purchasing power is increased in that canceled account liabilities are reduced, current TOA is harvested for reutilization, erroneous and over payments are identified and eliminated, visibility over contractor Work In Process (WIP) and Contract In Process (CIP) is increased and delinquent travel advances are eliminated. Additionally, joint reconciliations increase the Army's stewardship credibility with external stockholders. DOD leadership has recognized and applauded the Army's efforts in reducing UMD's and NULO's. The integrity and accuracy of financial records has improved and the cycle time for processing financial transactions has been reduced.

History has proven that thorough and intense joint reconciliations are an excellent investment of time and resources, and add value to financial management, logistics, and procurement activities.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF FUNDS

Because funds are provided by Congress in specific amounts for specific purposes through the enactment of public law, the expenditure of those funds must be within the boundaries established by the law. The term "administrative control of funds," as required by law and defined in *DFAS IN MANUAL 37-100-**, is used to identify those actions, events or systems which are required to ensure essentially three things:

(1) the funds are used only for the purposes for which they were intended; (2) that amounts of funds in excess of that available are neither obligated, disbursed nor further distributed; and (3) that the agency head is capable of fixing responsibility in the event of violations of either of the first two. This section will describe the various types and levels of administrative control of funds.

Congressional Controls.

The Constitution forbids the disbursement of funds from the Treasury except by consequence of *appropriations* made by law. In addition, the Constitution requires that a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money be published from time to time. Therefore, the requirement for fund accountability is fundamental to our system of government. In implementing the requirement, Congress has taken five major actions to control budgetary affairs. These actions are:

(1) Requiring budget justification to consist of an *authorization* action to justify selected major facets of the Army's program, and a separate *appropriation* action to subsequently finance the authorized items.

(2) Requiring the executive branch to develop procedures to control the flow of funds in a manner that will prevent overspending of the amounts made available. (OMB performs this control function by apportioning, or releasing, funds to the agencies as they are required, rather than at the time Congress makes it available.)

(3) Requiring each department to establish a resource management

organization (ASA[FM&C]) to provide technical competence on a consistent basis for the management of funds appropriated by Congress.

(4) Forbidding the acceptance of voluntary services on behalf of the Government, except as may be necessary in emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.

(5) Establishing the General Accounting Office (GAO) to be the watchdog on expenditures and to institute standards for financial and other resource management systems.

Flexibility in Shifting Funds.

The congressional committees concerned with the DOD have generally accepted the view that rigid adherence to the amounts justified for budget activities, appropriations, or for subsidiary items or purposes may unduly jeopardize the effective accomplishment of planned programs in a businesslike and economical manner. Transfer procedures have been worked out with the Congressional Committees to indicate different degrees of interest in the changes; e.g., certain changes require prior approval by the appropriate committees of Congress, while others require advance notification, and still others are provided after the fact.

The DOD Authorization Acts often include "guidance" concerning transfer of funds. Here's an example of "guidance" from the *FY 97 DOD Authorization Act*.

"Sec. 1001. Transfer Authority.

(a) Authority To Transfer Authorizations.

(1) Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in the national interest, the Secretary may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the Department of Defense in this division for Fiscal Year 1997 between any such authorizations for that Fiscal Year (or any subdivisions thereof). Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which transferred.

(2) The total amount of authorizations that the Secretary of Defense may transfer under the authority of this section may not exceed $2,000,000,000.

(b) Limitations: The authority provided by this section to transfer authorizations—

(1) may only be used to provide authority for items that have a higher priority than the items from which authority is transferred; and

(2) may not be used to provide authority for an item that has been denied authorization by Congress.

(c) Effect on Obligation Limitations: A transfer made under the authority of this section increases by the amount of the transfer of the obligation limitation provided in this division on the account (or other amount) to which the transfer is made.

(d) Notice to Congress: The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify Congress of transfers made under the authority of this section."

Other flexibility is obtained through additional laws, committee reports, administrative actions such as reprogramming, or by requesting supplemental appropriations. Reprogramming reapplies funds from one

project to another or transfers funds from one appropriation to another to resolve financial shortfalls or to adjust programs to meet unforeseen requirements. The process is subject to designated dollar thresholds and congressional requirements for advance approval or notification. No shifts between appropriations are allowed without prior consent of Congress and must be requested in writing, by the submission of the Congressional Reprogramming Request.

Antideficiency Act.

Chapters 13 and 15, *Title 31, United States Code (USC),* (known as *Section 3679, Revised Statutes*) contains prohibitions with respect to the legal use of funds and establishes punitive provisions in the event the prohibitions are violated. The following is a summary of the principal provisions of the law which are of critical concern to any individual, especially a commander, who is responsible for public funds. The law:

- Forbids any officer or employee of the Government from making or authorizing an expenditure or obligation in excess of the amount available in an appropriation or an apportionment or in excess of the amount permitted by agency regulations *(31 USC 1341 [a] and 1517[a])*.
- Forbids involving the Government in any contract or obligation to pay money in advance of appropriations *(31 USC 1341)*. Forbids exceeding statutory or administrative limitations on a given transaction *(31 USC 1517 [a][1][2])*.
- Provides administrative and criminal penalties for a violation. The person who caused the

violation may be subject to discipline, to include suspension without pay or removal from office *(31 USC 1349 and 1518)*. (The Army's implementation of these statutes is in *DFAS-IN 37-1)*. If action is taken knowingly and willfully, the person may be fined up to $5000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both *(31 USC 1350 and 1519)*.

- Requires apportionment by months, quarters, or other regular periods; by activities or functions; or combination of both methods *(31 USC 1512 [b][1])*.

*DFAS-IN MANUAL 37-100-**.*

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Army Management Structure (AMS) provides a resource management language based on congressional appropriations.

The details for constructing the accounting and classification codes for all funds received by the Army are contained in *DFAS-IN MANUAL 37-100-** The Army Management Structure (AMS)*, where the ** indicates the fiscal year (e.g., *DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-95* provides the AMS for FY 1995).

A simple illustration of an accounting classification code would be the following fund cite on an accounting transaction at Fort Sill: 21 4 2020 57-3106 325796.BD 26FB QSUP CA200 GRE12344019003 AB22 WORNAA S34031.

Translating this fund cite:

Code	Data Element (Explanation of Code)Treasury Symbol:
21	Department Code (Department of the Army)
4	Period of Availability (Fiscal Year 1994)
2020	Basic Symbol

	(Operations and Maintenance, Army Appropriation)
57	**Operating Agency (57-TRADOC)**
3106	**Allotment Serial Number (locally assigned by operating agency)**
325796BD	**AMS Code (Base Operations [BASOPS] TRADOC Directory of Logistics [DOL])**
26FB	**Element of Resource Code (Supplies-Army Managed/DBOF item)**
QSUP	**Management Decision Package (MDEP) (Installation Supply Operations)**
CA200	**Functional Cost Account (Commercial Activities -Contract Furnished Supplies)**
GRE1234-40109003	**Document Control Number (locally assigned)**
AB22	**Account Processing Code (APC)**
WORNAA	**Unit Identification Number (Garrison Fort Sill, OK)**
S34031	**Fiscal Station Number (Ft. Sill Defense Accounting Office)**

Funding Guidance.

Guidance consists of a number of documents designed to give a "complete understanding." One type of guidance is that which is continuing and generally is transmitted through functional channels. Another is the marked-up budget returned to lower levels to indicate approval or suggested changes to the PBG or Budget Manpower Guidance (BMG). Also, there are funding letters to operating agencies for OMA and AFHO that indicate funded programs and give guidance on how they should be carried out.

The PBG or BMG are documents issued by a higher headquarters to their subordinate commands to provide information and guidance pertaining to missions, resources, objectives, policies, and related matters upon which the subordinate commands can base

their programmed course of action for the fiscal year(s) concerned.

Funding Authorization Document.

The receipt of the PBG or BMG provides the guidance, but does not include the specific authority to obligate funds. The Funding Authorization Document (FAD) is used to allocate, suballocate, and allot Annual Funding Programs and provide obligation authority. For the procurement and RDTE appropriations, an approved program document accompanies the FAD to provide further administrative limitations on the use of funds.

Fund Distribution and Control.

"Pass funds through command channels and make the commander responsible for their control" is the basic tenet of the Army's system.

The use of the term "funds" implies that the authority to create obligations against the U.S. Government has been granted. Distribution of funds is any documented action that makes funds available for obligation. This distribution is made in a stated amount for specific purposes and to a specific organization for a specific time period.

The commander's authority to incur obligations is received on a funding document which specifies the appropriation and budget program for which the funds may be used, and identifies applicable statutory limitations. This process is used to facilitate control over funds and the reporting of violations of laws and directives.

Although distribution of funds is a means of controlling obligations and fixing responsibility, the policy is to minimize the formal distribution and to fund an operation at the highest practical level. As an example,

the Military Personnel, Army appropriation is held and controlled centrally at HQDA whereas the Operations and Maintenance, Army appropriation is decentralized through the Major Command to the installations.

Fund Allowance System.

Some major Army commanders have implemented a fund allowance system (FAS) whereby the lowest formal distribution of funds is at MACOM level with funding allowances being issued to subordinate installation commanders. Exceeding this funding allowance does not constitute a statutory violation but could cause an overobligation or overexpenditure of the MACOM's allotment provided on the FAD. Individuals responsible for exceeding their allowances will be named responsible for any resulting antideficiency act violations. Commanders are still responsible for assuring the execution of their mission remains within the fund allowance provided and violations of that guidance may warrant administrative disciplinary action. The advantages of this system are that it allows more flexibility in fund control and lessens the possibilities of reportable statutory violations.

Delegation of Funding Authority.

Commanders to whom funds are made available may delegate authority to establish and maintain such administrative controls as may be necessary to comply with the provisions of the laws and directives. This may be done keeping these key points in mind:

- Delegation of authority must be in writing. (Verbal or telephonic authorizations will not be recognized except in emergency circumstances— those jeopardizing

health and/or safety of the command—and must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.)
- Authority may be delegated to a named individual or a position so long as the authority is vested in a readily identifiable person at all times.
- Delegation of authority does not relieve commanders of their responsibilities under the law.

Special Classified Programs.

Classified programs which are sensitive "need to know" may be compartmentalized for security reasons. Specific funding procedures have been created to accommodate the unique requirements of such programs and must obtain Vice Chief of Staff, Army approval for use.

Obligations.

An obligation is the action taken to establish a liability against the U.S. Government that will ultimately result in a disbursement from the U.S. Treasury. The dollar amount established by Congress for a particular appropriation limits the amount of total obligations that may be incurred. However, a time factor may also limit the availability of an appropriation for obligations. In this regard, an appropriation may be referred to as an annual, a multi-year, or a no-year appropriation.

- An **annual** appropriation is available for incurring obligations only during the one fiscal year (that is, 1 October through 30 September) specified in the appropriation act. The operations and maintenance funds at an

installation are a portion of an annual appropriation.

- A **multi-year** appropriation is available for incurring obligations for a definite period in excess of one fiscal year. The RDTE and procurement appropriations are multi-year. Their programs may be obligated for two or three years, respectively.
- A **no-year** appropriation is available for incurring obligations for an indefinite period of time, until exhausted, or until the purpose for which appropriated has been accomplished. The Defense Business Operating Fund is a no-year fund.

Fundamental Principles of Obligation.

There are several basic or fundamental principles which must be observed in budgeting and recording obligations. The foundations for these principles is contained in *Title 31, USC,* and are therefore a part of public law. While only the more important principles will be identified here, the entire listing is available in *AR 37-1: Army Accounting Guidance*

Bona Fide Need of the Current Fiscal Year. A determination must be made that supplies or services required pursuant to contracts entered into or orders placed obligating an annual appropriation are intended to fill a bona fide need of the current fiscal year. However, there are provisions when lead time is an important factor to obligate funds in the current year for a subsequent year delivery.

Intent of Performance. Contracts entered into or placed for supplies or services are executed only if there is a bona fide intent on the part of the contractor (or other performing activity) to commence work promptly or to perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions (to include beginning date).

Assure Availability. Before binding the Government in an agreement with a second party which will result in a claim against the Government, the responsible official must ensure that proper funds are available.

Charge Immediately. Obligations, when incurred, must be charged immediately to the applicable funds. The recording of obligations incurred cannot be deferred until additional funds are received. The obligation must be recorded even if there are insufficient funds to cover it, thereby recording the statutory violation which must then be reported through command channels. Failure to record an obligation will not obviate a suspected violation of DFAS IN MANUAL 37-100-** or a statute.

Prompt Adjustment. Any adjustment to previously recorded obligations, either as an increase or decrease, must be entered in the accounts as soon as the necessity for adjustment is evident and the amount can be determined.

Documentary Evidence. Each obligation recorded in the official record must be supported by proper documentary evidence. These may be originals, duplicates, or copies of appropriate documents so long as signatures are visible. A memorandum of telephone conversation or an electronically-received written message may be used temporarily until the actual document is received.

Contingency Funds.

Congress also makes available to the Secretary of the Army (SA) from the annual appropriations certain small contingency funds entitled .0012, .0014, .0015, .0017, and .0019 as described in *AR 37-47*. These are very closely monitored and fall under audit responsibilities of the Army Audit Agency to ensure that such funds are used solely for the purposes intended and approved by the SA. The rules for use of these funds are very specific and exceptions to deviate should be obtained from higher headquarters. A brief description of these funds is provided below.

Limitation .0012 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category A). For official representation expenses, as authorized by the SA, in connection with official functions at times of national holidays; dedication of facilities; visits of distinguished guests; purchase of floral wreaths, decorations, and awards upon occasions of national holidays and similar observances in foreign countries; and gifts and mementos by the authorized host, costing not more than $200 each, used in connection with official ceremonies or functions. Commanders of MACOMs, their subordinate commanders, and installation commanders are authorized to present gifts or mementos in circumstances that they personally document as being a necessary part of the event or occasion being observed.

Limitation .0014 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category B). For miscellaneous expenses, other than for official representation, which are not provided for in other appropriations. Examples of these expenses are awards for emergency rescues, witness fees for the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, and settlement of meritorious claims.

Limitation .0015 (Criminal Investigation Activities, AR 195-4). For emergency and extraordinary expenses in support of the worldwide expenses of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command's activities.

Limitation .0017 (Intelligence Contingency Funds, AR 381-141). For expenses related to worldwide intelligence activities.

Limitation .0019 (Compartmented Special Operations, SECARMY Letter of Instruction, proponent ODCSOPS). For emergency and extraordinary expenses related to worldwide compartmented operations.

SOME KEY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Standard Finance System.

The Standard Finance System (STANFINS) performs "consumer fund" accounting for the majority of Army installations (exceptions that do not use STANFINS include AMC and USACE activities). It records funding authorizations; accumulates and reports on obligations/ disbursements against fund authorizations for control purposes; and provides breakout to installation, MACOM, and HQDA financial managers of funds, obligations/ disbursements by appropriation at prescribed levels of detail. STANFINS serves as the Army's primary formal record of account at installation level for installation-level appropriation accounting.

Program and Budget Accounting System.

The Program, Budget, and Accounting System (PBAS) is a Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) system which the Army uses as a control of both program and budget authority. The system uses centralized processing over program and fund distribution functions from HQDA to the MACOMs and to the installations. PBAS provides data to the accounting systems for the purpose of creating monthly departmental accounting reports. PBAS also produces managerial reports on a monthly basis for appropriation managers and HQDA personnel.

Standard Army Financial Inventory Accounting and Reporting System.

The Standard Army Financial Inventory Accounting and Reporting System (STARFIARS) performs financial inventory accounting for stock-funded supply transactions. This includes recording obligations, receipts, and payments related to inventory transactions; maintaining a general ledger; producing management reports; and generating obligations and disbursement records for STANFINS.

Tactical Unit Financial Management Information System.

The Tactical Unit Financial Management Information System (TUFMIS) is an automated system that is operated in direct support units (DSUs) which receive requests for materiel from tactical units. TUFMIS records inputs and outputs to and from DSUs by supported units/ organizations. The system produces daily and cumulative-to-date reports on commitments for materiel costs by unit and by weapon system. TUFMIS provides reports and information for resource management at the tactical level; however, it is not a formal accounting system with certifiable records. TUFMIS does provide commanders with the dollar value of supply requisitions by unit and the availability of funds to purchase supplies from a higher echelon source.

Budget Preparation and Execution Application for Army Installations and MACOMs.

The Budget Preparation and Execution System - Installation (BPSI/BESI) and Budget Preparation and Execution System - MACOM (BPSM/BESM) are being developed under the Army's Sustaining Base Automation effort. These efforts will provide standard applications at the MACOM and installation levels, eliminating existing redundant systems. BPSI/BESI and BPSM/BESM will focus on budget preparation, justification, execution, and analysis for Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA).

FINANCIAL REPORTING

Year-End Certification.

Since the establishment of DFAS, the Defense Accounting Office (DAO) has had the responsibility for preparing and monitoring "accounting reports" at the installation. Commanders who receive FADs authorizing them to incur obligations not in excess of certain amounts and for specific purposes have a legal requirement to "certify the status" of those funds as of 30 September (end of fiscal year). Commanders may delegate the authority to certify fiscal year-end reports to the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Garrison Commander, or Director of Resource Management. The

DAO will make the certification on the "accounting reports" substantially as follows:

"I hereby certify that the attached reports and associated schedules include all transactions received which have been properly recorded and are supported by subsidiary accounting records."

The DAO will forward the certification to the Commander or his designated representative, who, in turn, will make the following certification:

"I hereby certify that the attached reports and schedules include all known transactions. Those meeting the criteria of 31 U.S.C. 1501 (A) have been obligated and are so reported. All reports and schedules for all transactions for fiscal year ended September 30, ____, are correct and are supported by subsidiary accounting records. All individual upward obligation and open allotment disbursement adjustments in excess of $100,000 expired appropriations have been properly approved and are on file for audit purposes."

Certifications are required for all appropriations and for any reimbursable activity performed by the command or agency.

The Chief Financial Officers Act.

The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act (*Public Law 101-576*), November 15, 1990, was enacted to bring more effective general and financial management practices to the federal government. Its key purpose is to provide more accurate, timely, and reliable financial information for decision-makers through the improved accounting systems, integrated functional and financial management, and strengthened internal controls. The law also establishes initial requirements for the "systematic measurement of performance." The CFO Act promotes a shift in management focus from resource acquisition to resource execution—not in terms of obligation and outlay rates, but in how well taxpayer dollars are spent.

A major provision of the CFO Act mandates the preparation of audited annual financial statements for revolving funds, trust funds, and substantially commercial activities. In addition, the law designated ten federal agencies— including the Department of the Army—as pilots for comprehensive, agency-wide financial statements covering all operations and activities. The Army was designated a pilot for Fiscal Year 1991 and 1992 reporting; the pilot project was extended by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) through FY 1995. With the enactment of *The Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) of 1994* (see below), agency-wide CFO reporting became mandatory for all federal agencies effective FY 1996.

Army Annual Financial Reports.

As a pilot, the Army submitted audited annual financial reports covering all Army operations from FY 1991 through FY 1995. The presentation of information in these reports resembles a corporate annual report and depicts more than just financial information. The overview discusses Army missions, major accomplishments, and performance at the "corporate" level. The FY 1994 and 1995 reports are organized as follows:

- Message from the Secretary of the Army
- Overview
  - U.S. Army
  - Army Missions and Performance (includes program performance measures)
  - Financial Management Issues

- Principal Statements and Footnotes
- Supplemental Financial and Management Information (includes financial performance measures)
- Audit Opinion

The financial statements, footnotes, and supplemental financial information are prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service - Indianapolis Center (DFAS-IN). The Overview is prepared at the Headquarters, Department Of The Army. Together, DFAS-IN and HQDA prepare a "guide" which is intended to accompany the report and translate the numbers in the statements into user-friendly and relevant information for readers both within and outside the Army.

The auditor for the FY 1991 and 1992 reports was the General Accounting Office (GAO). The US Army Audit Agency assumed responsibility with the FY 1993 report. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the CFO reports and audit findings in 1992, 1993, and 1994. The House Committee on Governmental Reform and Oversight held a hearing on CFO implementation in the Department of Defense in November 1995.

As a the first DOD pilot under the CFO Act, the Army broke new ground in a number of important areas—e.g., physical inventory policy, valuation of assets, interface between military pay and personnel systems, the incorporation of outcome-oriented program performance measures in financial reports, and the restructuring of the management control process. Army efforts and improvements have been acknowledged by the GAO and both congressional committees. However, the Army cannot by itself achieve full compliance with the standards of the CFO Act. The resolution of long-term problems with financial systems is a DOD-wide effort, and there must be government-wide accounting principles and standards to support both management decision-making and public accountability.

The Army is widely acknowledged as setting the standard for DOD implementation of CFO reporting. With the end of the pilot project and full implementation of CFO reporting under Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) the Army continues working to implement the letter and the spirit of the legislation and to improve all aspects of the Army financial management and stewardship.

The Government Management Reform Act .

(GMRA)(*Public Law 103-356*), October 12, 1994, GMRA implements the requirements for audited annual financial statements "covering all accounts and associated activities of each office, bureau, and activity of the agency" for all federal agencies, effective March 1, 1997 (for FY 1996). Beginning no later than March 31, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, is required to submit to the President and Congress government-wide audited financial statements that cover all accounts and associated activities of the executive branch of the federal government.

The Government Performance And Results Act.

As noted above, the CFO Act was intended to integrate financial and functional systems to provide better information for decisionmakers and shift management focus to how well taxpayer dollars are spent. Although implementation of the CFO Act

and audited financial statements have led to significant improvements in financial reporting, the law itself provided only limited guidance with regard to its provisions for "the systematic measurement of performance." *The Government Performance and Results Act(GPRA)* (*Public Law 103-62*), August 3, 1993, builds on the CFO Act and establishes the framework for full integration of financial and functional data in <u>all</u> phases of the resourcing cycle.

The purpose of the GPRA is to increase public confidence in the federal government, and improve program effectiveness and public accountability, by systematically holding agencies accountable for achieving program results. The law also is intended to improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending. The major provisions of the law include the following:

Strategic Plans. By 30 September 1997, each agency must submit to OMB and Congress a strategic plan that includes a comprehensive mission statement, general goals and objectives, and a description of how programs will be evaluated. The plan must cover at least five years and be updated at least every three years.

Annual Performance Plans and Reports. Beginning for FY 99, each agency must submit an annual performance plan covering every major activity in the budget. The plan must include objective and measurable performance goals linked to required resources. Beginning no later than 31 March 2000, each agency must submit an annual report on program performance that reviews success in achieving the previous year's performance goals and explains why goals were not met.

The GPRA provides for a series of pilot projects prior to implementation: Performance Measurement (FY 94/95/96); Managerial Accountability and Flexibility (FY 95/96); and Performance Budgeting (FY 98/99). Performance budgets are to present the varying levels of performance that would result from different budgeted amounts.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for DOD implementation of the GPRA. OSD intends to begin phased implementation of the GPRA by developing and monitoring internal DOD strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports for FY 96 and FY 97.

The GPRA is major management reform legislation and a critical step in inevitable transition to more outcome-oriented program management and performance budgeting. The Army is committed to ensuring the provisions of the GPRA are fully integrated into the PPBES process and documents.

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act Of 1996.

The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 builds upon and compliments the CFO, GMRA and GPRA discussed above. Four key requirements of the law are cited below.

    (1) Beginning the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, each agency shall implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and United States Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level.

(2) The Head of the agency shall determine whether the financial management systems of the agency comply with the above requirements no later than 120 days after the earlier of the date of receipt of an agency wide audited financial statement, or the last day of the fiscal year following the year covered by such statement.

(3) If the agency Head determines that the financial management systems do not comply with Federal accounting standards and the United States Government Standard General Ledger, the Head of the agency in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall establish a remediation plan. The plan shall include resources, remedies and target dates necessary to bring the agency's financial management systems into compliance.

(4) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is required to submit a report no later than March 31 of each year to Congress regarding implementation of this act. He may include reasons why an agency has not met the intermediate dates established in the remediation plan.

BUSINESS PRACTICES IMPROVEMENT

An essential element of Resource Management is the process of reviewing, revising and reengineering the business practices of the Army. Several tools have

been developed to assist in furthering business practices improvements:

- The Waiver Program facilitates preparation, coordination, and submission of waiver requests to improve financial management.
- The Legislative Program expedites processing of viable, high payoff reengineering legislative proposals through OSD, OMB, and Congress.
- The Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Financial Oversight prepares policy guidance and conducts reviews of NAF finances and encourages NAF activities to operate more like a business.
- The Business Practices Initiatives focus on Army operations to avoid or reduce costs, generate and collect revenues, streamline and consolidate functions, form partnerships, and use the latest technology to help the Army better utilize diminishing resources.

Improving business and operating practices is complimentary to financial reform and is in the spirit of reinventing government. Enabling and encouraging improved operating efficiency, better use of information, implementation of private sector practices, and enhanced utilization of Army resources is essential to maximizing the use of the Army's increasingly scarce resources to carry out its mission in a volatile world.

SUMMARY

Resource management in our Army is undergoing significant changes. Part of these changes are directly attributable to the 1986

Defense Reorganization Act; the balance is due to pervasive application of technology and to new approaches to resource management. The Goldwater-Nichols Act called for reductions of 15% in the DA staff manning, as well as 10% reductions in subordinate MACOM headquarters. The resource management community was not exempted from these cuts. The Army Budget Office (ABO) at Headquarters, Department of the Army, with its centralized budget formulations and reduced staff, is presented a challenge. It is expected that a more coherent, defensible Army budget will result from this reorganization effort.

For the MACOMs, resource management in the near-term horizon will also require some organizational realignment, most certainly leading to greater decentralization due to mandated manpower cuts, and the need to give commanders greater flexibility in their use of constrained resources. In some instances, through these organizational efforts, MACOMs will also have to reconcile the additional workload generated by dealing with CINCs and their increasing role in the programming and budgeting processes.

Application of technology has literally revolutionized the resource management community. The power of the computer and its sophisticated software has provided decisionmakers at all levels with powerful tools to maximize the allocation and application of resources. PBG is now being passed between higher and subordinate commands via electronic media.

The real innovation lies, however, in the thrust of the entrepreneurial approaches being advocated in the resource management community. The recognition that the Army budget levels are declining has forced us to reexamine how we do business, to integrate in a far more comprehensive manner the programming and budgeting, and to look seriously at ways of enhancing the productivity of the people that constitute our Total Army team. The MDEP concept has been a forerunner of this integration effort. Third-party financing, value engineering, charge-back/direct-customer payment (selectively implemented for information services in FY 1987), self-sufficiency, organizational efficiency reviews, and output focus based on unit cost (DBOF) are some of the concepts that allow us to examine the way we manage our Army in a more productive way to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources that Congress and the American taxpayer provide to us to forge combat capabilities.

This chapter was intended to summarize the more pertinent features of resource management systems using a minimum of the complex terms associated with the process. We have identified the major players, the major steps they must take, and the various controls which guide their actions in the budget process of resource management, particularly during the execution stage.

REFERENCES

(1) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 11-2: Management Control*, 1 August 1994.

(2) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 37-1: Army Accounting and Fund Control*, 30 April 1991.

(3) U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Pamphlet 37-100-FY: The Army Management Structure*

CHAPTER 11

MATERIEL SYSTEM RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 directed changes to the defense acquisition system. In particular, NSDD 219 directed the Services to:

Appoint full-time Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) to administer acquisition programs.

Appoint Program Executive Officers (PEOs) for a defined number of programs.

Direct that Program Managers (PMs) report on program matters directly to a PEO (or the SAE).

− *Establish no more than one level of program supervision between a PM and the SAE, and not more than two levels between the PM and Defense Acquisition Executive*

In effect, NSDD 219 created a programmatic decision chain analogous to that found in the corporate business community. The Defense Acquisition Executive and, in the case of the Army, the AAE, are the Defense Department's counterparts to the corporate Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Group Vice Presidents in industry.

In one of his continuing initiatives to respond to the NSDD, Mr. Gilbert F. Decker, the Army Acquisition Executive, approved the "Guidelines for Army Acquisition Reform (AR) Strategic Planning" in September 1996 to provide guidance for strategic planning to implement the Army acquisition reform strategy.

INTRODUCTION

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), Title 10, USC was enacted to improve the overall effectiveness and professionalism of military and civilian personnel who work in acquisition—which is *"the planning, design, development, testing, contracting, production, introduction, acquisition* logistics support, and disposal of systems, equipment, facilities, supplies, or services that are intended for use in, or support of military missions"* as defined in *DOD 5000.52* and *DOD 5000.58*. The major aspects of include:

- recognizing acquisition as a professional career field;

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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|            Systems Acquisition Management Individual Elements          |
|                                                                       |
|         System              Acquisition            Management         |
|       • Hardware          • Determine Need          • Plan            |
|       • Software          • Design                  • Organize        |
|       • Logistic Support  • Develop                 • Staff           |
|       • Manuals           • Test                    • Control         |
|       • Facilities        • Produce                 • Lead            |
|       • Personnel         • Field                                    |
|       • Training          • Support                                  |
|       • Spares            • Improve                                  |
|                           • Replace                                  |
|                           • Dispose                                  |
|                                                                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Figure 11-1

- establishing an Acquisition Corps within each of the services;
- establishing an acquisition career management structure within DOD;
- identifying career paths in acquisition for civilians and military personnel;
- establishing programs to assist acquisition personnel in their professional development;
- improving the education, training, and experience levels of acquisition professionals;
- establishing policy to provide for the selection of the best qualified individual for a position; and
- establishing policy for effective management of the acquisition workforce.

This chapter describes the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army Management System used for the Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) of materiel systems, both major and nonmajor. As a result of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASTA) of 1994 and the DOD Process Action Team (PAT) efforts to re-engineer the acquisition oversight and review process, the current materiel systems acquisition structure within DOD and the Army is in a state of change. Major system acquisition policy changes resulting from these activities are currently being integrated into the DOD and Army materiel acquisition systems. The information presented in this chapter is based on the DOD Materiel Acquisition System as it exists at the time of publishing this chapter. That system can be viewed simply as a combination of structure, process, and culture.

Structure is the sum of the guidance provided by law, policy, regulation or objective, and the organization provided to accomplish the RDA function. Process is the interaction of the structure in producing the output. Culture is the cumulative sum of past practices and their impact on interpretation of guidance and attitude toward institutional changes to the system.

For the Army, the focus of materiel acquisition management output is producing military units that are adequately trained, equipped, and maintained to execute national military strategy (NMS) effectively. The focus of the RDA management system is the development and acquisition of systems that are affordable and support the enforcement of our NMS. The RDA management system is a fully coordinated effort concerned with the total fielding of a system consisting of hardware, software, logistic support, manuals, facilities, personnel, training, and spares. Figure 11-1 shows the elements of Systems Acquisition Management.

The RDA system manages a significant portion of the Army's annual budget (FY98: 17.0%). The RDA process is a critical component of the Army's force integration efforts as depicted in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-4). To facilitate an understanding of the process, this chapter will begin by highlighting some of the critical aspects of structure.

DOD ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

DOD Policy.

The basic policy is to ensure that acquisition of defense systems is conducted efficiently and effectively in order to achieve operational objectives of the U.S. Armed Forces in their support of national policies and objectives within the guidelines of the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109: *Major System Acquisitions. DOD Directive 5000.1: Defense Acquisition,* 15 March 1996 and *DOD Regulation 5000.2R: Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,* 15 March 1996, are the documents that provide the DOD guidance for system acquisition policy and procedure. These documents establish an integrated management framework for a single, standardized DOD-wide acquisition system that applies to all programs including highly-sensitive classified programs. Within the DOD system there are four acquisition program-size categories with decision authority placed at the lowest practical level. The system is characterized by four phases and four milestones (discussed later in the chapter) which track a DOD program's progress throughout its development and program life. "Tailoring" is encouraged in each phase of the process to reflect specific program needs. In accordance with DODD 5000.1 "One size does not fit all." The essential features of the DOD materiel acquisition system are:*

- *a clear acquisition strategy (AS),*
- *a thorough program plan,*
- *risk management techniques, and*
- *systematic program tracking against the plan.*

NOTE: An acquisition program is defined as a directed, funded effort designed to provide a new, improved or continuing weapon system or automated information system (AIS) capability in response to a validated operational need. Acquisition programs are divided into different categories which are established to facilitate decentralized decision-making, and execution and compliance with statutory requirements.

Organizational Linkage for Army Materiel Acquisition

* Materiel Developer (MATDEV) includes Program Executive Officers (PEOs); Program, Project, Product Managers (PMs); and Army Materiel Command (AMC). The Army's primary Combat Developer(CBTDEV) is Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC Battle Labs, Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs), and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) support the MATDEV/CBTDEV Team.

Figure 11-2

Acquisition phases provide a logical means of progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into well defined system-specific requirements and ultimately into operationally effective, suitable, and survivable systems. All the tasks and activities needed to bring the program to the next milestone occur during acquisition phases. A milestone (MS) is the major decision point that initiates the next phase of an acquisition program. MDAP milestones may include, for example, the decisions to begin engineering and manufacturing development, or to begin either low-rate initial or full-rate production.

DOD Acquisition Management.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD[A&T]) is the senior procurement executive and the principal staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and takes precedence in DOD for all matters relating to the materiel acquisition system: research and development, production, logistics; command, control, and communications, and intelligence activities related to acquisition; military construction; and procurement.

The USD(A&T) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) with responsibility for supervising the performance of the entire DOD acquisition system in accordance with the laws, Congressional guidance and direction, and *OMB Circular No. A-109*. The DAE establishes policy for all elements of DOD for acquisition. The basic policies of the DAE are established and implemented by *DOD Directive 5000.1* and *DOD Regulation*

5000.2R. The DAE also serves as the chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), assisted by three Overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPTs) that relate to the acquisition process. As DAB chairman, the DAE recommends to the SECDEF acquisition resource matters, and other acquisition management matters required to implement acquisition milestone decisions. A clear distinction exists between responsibility for weapon systems acquisition and budgetary authority. While the DAE, as DAB Chairman, makes recommendations on whether to proceed with plans to acquire major materiel systems, the Defense Resources Board (DRB), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), makes budgetary recommendations on the same programs. Acquisition programs must operate within the parameters established by the DRB and the SECDEF through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPBS) process.

Organizational Linkage.

The managerial process of transforming a materiel requirement into a fielded and supported system consisting of hardware, software, and personnel is conducted by various organizational structures in DOD and the Services responsible for RDA. Figure 11-2 shows the primary elements involved for the Army, including the linkage between the defense community, industry, and academia. The arrows in the figure depict the flow of business in the process of this transformation.

DOD Science and Technology.

Since World War II, owning the technology advantage has been a cornerstone of our NMS. Technologies like radar, jet engines, nuclear weapons, night vision, global positioning, smart weapons, and stealth have changed warfare dramatically. Maintaining this technological edge has become even more important as the size of U.S. forces decreases and high technology weapons become readily available on the world market. In this new environment, it is imperative that U.S. forces possess technological superiority to ensure success and minimize casualties across the broad spectrum of engagements. The technological advantage enjoyed by the United States in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and still enjoyed today, is the legacy of decades of wise investments in science & technology (S&T). Similarly, our warfighting capabilities 10 to 15 years from now will be substantially determined by today's investment in S&T.

Defense Science and Technology Strategy. The *Defense S&T Strategy* with its supporting *Basic Research Plan (BRP), Joint Warfighting S&T Plan (JWSTP), Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP),* and *Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs)* provide DOD's S&T vision, strategy, plan, and objectives to the planners, programmers, and performers of defense S&T. Revised annually, these documents and the supporting individual S&T master plans of the Services and defense agencies guide the annual preparation of the DOD S&T budget and Program Objective Memoranda (POMs).

Basic Research Plan (BRP) presents the DOD objectives and investment strategy for DOD-sponsored Basic Research (6.1) performed by universities, industry, and Service laboratories. In addition to presenting the planned investment in 12 broad research areas, this year's plan

highlights six strategic research objectives holding great promise for enabling breakthrough technologies for 21st century military capabilities.

Joint Warfighting S&T Plan (JWSTP) objective is to ensure that the S&T program supports priority future joint warfighting capabilities. The *JWSTP* looks horizontally across the Services and Agencies and together with the *DTAP* ensures that the near-, mid-, and far-term needs of the joint warfighter are properly balanced and supported in the S&T planning, programming, budgeting, and assessment activities of DOD. The *JWSTP* is focused around 10 Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOs). These objectives support the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process and the four leveraged concepts emphasized in the Joint Vision 2010: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics. The *JWSTP* is issued annually as defense guidance. Advanced concepts and technologies identified as enhancing high priority joint warfighting capabilities, along with prerequisite research, receive funding priority in the President's Budget and accompanying Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).

DOD Technology Area Plan (DTAP) presents the DOD objectives and the Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced Technology Development (6.3) investment strategy for 10 technology areas critical to DOD acquisition. It takes a horizontal perspective across Service and Agency efforts, thereby charting the total DOD-wide investment for each technology area. The *DTAP* documents the focus, content, and principal objectives of the overall DOD science and technology

efforts. The 1997 *DTAP* includes an assessment of the potential technology capabilities of other countries vis-a-vis the United States.

Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs). The focus of the S&T investment is enhanced and guided through DTOs. Each DTO identifies a specific technology advancement that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated date of technology availability, and the specific benefits resulting from the technology advance. These benefits not only include increased military operational capabilities but also address other important areas, including affordability and dual-use applications, that have received special emphasis in the *Defense Science and Technology Strategy.* Each of the 300 DTOs identifies funding required to achieve the new capability. Two-thirds of the DTOs are identified and described in the *DTAP*, which cites the anticipated return on the S&T investment through 10 broad technology areas. The remaining DTOs support the 10 JWCOs of the *JWSTP. JWSTP* DTOs are limited to Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) discussed later in this chapter.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA is a unique management tool of the SECDEF. It consists of a mix of military and civilian scientists and engineers, and has a broad charter to conduct advanced research which fills R&D gaps between Service lines of responsibility or handles high priority problems that cross Service lines. DARPA is charged with the maintenance of leadership in forefront areas of technology so DOD can be aware as soon as possible of

developments of potential military significance. DARPA's purpose is to review ongoing research and development, determine whether or not the concept is feasible, determine its usefulness, and transfer it to the appropriate Service. DARPA does not have its own in-house research facilities and relies on the Services and other Government agencies for technical and administrative support. Once a decision to support a research proposal is made, responsibility for contracting is generally assigned to one of the Services.

Defense Acquisition University (DAU). The Defense Acquisition University is a consortium structure of existing DOD institutions that include the Defense Systems Management College. Its operation and structure is designed to be similar to a state university with many campuses each specializing in certain acquisition disciplines.

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) required the formation of the DAU with operation commencing on August 1, 1992. Also, the law required the establishment of a course for senior personnel serving in critical acquisition positions that is equivalent to existing senior professional military education programs. The USD(A&T) has oversight authority for the acquisition curriculum of the course, located at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) of the National Defense University.

Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) is the USD(A&T)'s tool for ensuring the up-to-date training of military and civilian professionals in the management of materiel acquisition programs in DOD and the Services. One such course is the Advanced Program Management Course (APMC), a required 14-week course for individuals seeking Level III certification in the Program Management Acquisition Career Field (ACF).

The Defense Systems Management College, founded July 1, 1971, is a joint military professional institution operating under the direction of the Policy Guidance Council, chaired by the USD(A&T), to support acquisition management as described in *DODD 5000.1*, and to assist in fulfilling education and training requirements set out in appropriate DOD directives and public laws. The mission of the Defense Systems Management College is to:

- conduct advanced courses of study in defense acquisition management as the primary function of the College;
- conduct research and special studies in defense acquisition management;
- assemble and disseminate information concerning new policies, methods, and practices in defense acquisition management; and
- as the DOD executive agent, provide oversight for the education and training program for the acquisition work force.
-

Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)

Figure 11-3

ARMY ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

Army's RDA Goals.

The Secretary of the Army (SA), under *Title 10, USC*, is responsible for DA functions necessary for the research, development, logistical support and maintenance, preparedness, operation, and effectiveness of the Army. Also required is supervision of all matters relating to Army procurement. The SA executes his acquisition management responsibilities through the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).

Special emphasis is placed on medium and long-range materiel planning, product modification, and life extension programs. Major state-of-the-art advancements are sought only in carefully selected areas. Stability of materiel acquisition programs is a matter of utmost interest, especially after the system passes the Engineering and Manufacturing Development decision. Reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) goals; manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT); integrated logistics support (ILS); survivability; effectiveness; safety; and product quality are incorporated into system performance objectives. Contractual incentives for the improvement of RAM and ILS are encouraged.

Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

(ASA[RDA]) is the AAE. The AAE is designated by the SA as the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) and the Senior Procurement Executive within DA. He is the principal DA-staff element for the execution of the AAE responsibilities. When serving as the AAE, the ASA(RDA) is assisted by a Military Deputy (MILDEP) and the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).

The MILDEP is assigned to the Office of the ASA(RDA) and provides staff support to the AAE in managing the research development, developmental test and evaluation, and the acquisition of materiel for all Army major weapon and support systems. The MILDEP, delegated down from the AAE, is the Army's Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM). The DACM is responsible for directing the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) as well as implementation of the acquisition career management requirements set forth in the DAWIA legislation.

The DISC4 provides staff support to the AAE in managing the research, development, and acquisition of automated information systems (AIS) (includes automation, telecommunications, and command and control) and information technologies (IT). The DISC4 also serves as the Army's Chief Information Officer (CIO) as directed in the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996. The CIO's primary responsibility, under ITMRA, is the management of resources for all Army information programs. The day-to-day management of Army acquisition programs is shown in figure 11-3.

Similar to the DAE, the AAE develops Army acquisition policies and procedures and manages the Army's Production Base Support and Industrial Mobilization Programs.

The ASA(RDA), as the AAE, acts with the full authority of the SA (unless otherwise restricted) is responsible for administering acquisition programs according to DOD policies and guidelines, and exercises the powers and discharges the responsibilities as set forth in *DODD 5000.1* for component acquisition executives. In addition, the AAE will:

− Appoint, supervise and evaluate PEOs and direct-reporting PMs.
− In coordination with Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), establish policy and guidance for Analysis of Alternatives (AoAs); for army category (ACAT) I and II programs, designate the organization responsible for performing system engineering trade-off analyses for the AoA; and provide issues and alternatives to ODCSOPS for inclusion in the AoA tasking document. ACATs are described in figure 11-4.
− Develop guidance, in coordination with the ODCSOPS, and serve as co-proponent for the RDA Plan.
− Formulate Army-wide S&T base strategy, policy, guidance, and planning.
− Establish and validate Army Technology Base priorities throughout the planning, programming, budget, execution system (PPBES).
− Approve and resource Army Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and the Advanced Concepts and Technology II (ACT II) Program.

- Co-chair all Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) meetings with the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (VCSA).
- Establish and implement Army Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) policy.
- Carry out all powers, functions, and duties of the SA with respect to the acquisition work force within the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SA.
- Act as the final authority of all matters affecting the Army's acquisition system, except as limited by statute or higher level regulation.
- Develop and promulgate acquisition, procurement, and contracting policies and procedures.
- Appoint the source selection authority (SSA) for specified programs. *The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)* is the primary contracting regulation. It is the first regulatory source to which DA acquisition personnel refer. The ASA(RDA) issues the *Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS)* to implement and supplement the *FAR* and the *Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)* and to establish uniform policies and procedures for use in the Army.
- Review and approve, for ACAT ID programs, the Army position at each decision milestone before the DAB review. This includes the review and approval of Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs). The AAE also serves as the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for ACATs IC, II, and IIA and assigns the MDA for ACAT III, IIIA, and IV programs. The MDA is the individual designated to approve entry into the next phase; this decision is made for each milestone used in a program.
- Approve the establishment and termination of all Program Management Offices (PMO) and PEOs. The AAE has authority to designate a system for intensive, centralized management and prescribe the appropriate level of management at any point in the program management process.

NOTE: ACAT IV is used by the Army and Navy only. ACATs are defined in DOD Regulation 5000.2R, Part 1.

DA System Coordinator (DASC). The DASC is the primary acquisition staff officer at DA. The DASC is responsible for the day-to-day support of his/her assigned program and serves as the PM's representative and primary point of contact (POC) within the Pentagon. Depending on whether the system or program falls within the purview of the DISC4 or ASA(RDA), the responsible DASC may report to either the Vice Director, Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (VDISC4) or the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (ASA[RDA]), Deputy for Systems Management. The DASC is responsible for keeping the acquisition chain of command

Acquisition Categories

Program Category	Program Management	Primary Criteria	Milestone Review Forum	Milestone Decision Authority
		$ = FY 96 Constant		
ACAT I				
ACAT ID	PEO/PM	RDTE > $355M PROC > $2.135B	DAB	USA(A&T)
ACAT IC	PEO/PM	RDTE > $355M	ASARC	AAE
ACAT IA	PROC > $2.135B			
ACAT IAM	PEO/PM	Single Year > $30M or Total Program > $120M or Total Life-Cycle Costs > $360M	DOD MAISRC	ASD(C3I)
ACAT IAC	PEO/PM	Single Year > $30M or Total Program > $120M or	Army MAISRC	AAE/CIO
ACAT II		Total Life-Cycle Costs > $360M		
ACAT II	PEO/MAT CMD CDR /PM	RDTE > $140M PROC > $645M	ASARC	AAE
ACAT IIA	PEO/MAT CMD CDR /PM	Single Year: $10-$30M or Total Program: $30-$120M or	Army MAISRC	AAE/CIO
ACAT III		Total Life-Cycle Costs: $159-$360M		
ACAT III PEO/MAT CMD CDR	PM	High Visibility; Special Interest	IPR	
ACAT IIIA	PEO/PM	Single Year: $10-$30M or Total Program: $30-$120M or	IPR	PEO/MAT CMD CDR
ACAT IV		Total Life-Cycle Costs: $159-$360M		
ACAT IV CDR	System Manager, or Equivalent	All Other Acquisition Programs (includes AIS)	IPR	MAT CMD

Figure 11-4

(SARDA or DISC4) informed of the status of the assigned acquisition program. In addition, the DASC assists the PM in issue resolution at DA and OSD levels. The DASC is the "eyes and ears" of the PM at the Pentagon and ensures that the PM is advised of any actions or circumstances that might negatively impact their program.

The Program Executive Officer (PEO).

The PEO system structure was implemented by the Army on May 1, 1987 in response to requirements established by the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986,* and the recommendation of the Packard Commission which the President approved and then ordered by *NSDD 219* (see figure 11-5). The PEO and direct-reporting PMs serve as materiel developers (MATDEVs). The PEO, administering a defined number of AAE assigned major and/or non-major programs, is responsible for making programmatics (materiel acquisition cost, schedule, and total system performance) and for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution necessary to guide assigned programs through each milestone. In addition, the PEO provides program information to the AAE, HQDA, DOD, and Congress; defends assigned programs to Congress through the Army Legislative and Budget Liaison Offices; and participates in the development

of data to support AAE programmatic decisions in the PPBES and in the provision of development and acquisition system resource data to support development of the RDA Plan. Other PEO and direct-reporting PM responsibilities include assisting the combat developer (CBTDEV) and training developer (TNGDEV) in developing operational requirements documents (ORDs) by providing technical, availability, performance, anticipated materiel acquisition cost, and schedule type information as needed.

The AAE currently has seven PEOs—Air and Missile Defense; Aviation; Command, Control, and Communications Systems; Intelligence and Electronic Warfare; Ground Combat and Support Systems (GCSS); Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS); and Tactical Missiles—responsible for the intensive management of RDA weapon and information systems. The PEO STAMIS organization will transfer to Army Materiel Command (AMC) by the end of FY 98. With the transfer of this organization to AMC, the number of PEOs will be reduced to six. Programs within the STAMIS organization will be assigned to U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM).

The CBTDEV, referred to above, is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC formulates and documents operational concepts, doctrine, organizations, and/or materiel requirements (MNS and ORDs) for assigned mission areas and functions. The CBTDEV serves as the user representative during acquisitions for their approved materiel requirements as well as doctrine and organization developments.

A MATDEV is the RDA command, agency, or office assigned responsibility for the system under development or being acquired. The term may be used generically to refer to the RDA community in the materiel acquisition process (counterpart to the generic use of CBTDEV).

A TNGDEV is a Command or agency that formulates, develops, and documents or produces training concepts, strategies, requirements (materiel and other), and programs for assigned mission areas and functions. TNGDEV serves as user (trainer and trainee) representative during acquisitions of their approved training materiel requirements (MNS and ORDs) and training program developments. They perform the following functions solely in support of training systems:

- − fund and conduct concept formulations for all system training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) in support of assigned system.
- − embed system training capabilities into assigned materiel systems in accordance with the approved system ORD and in coordination with the CBTDEV/TNGDEV.
- − develop, acquire, and field the subsystem training package with the materiel system.
- − plan and program resources for the execution of new equipment training (NET) using Distance Learning (DL) technology and/or contract NET as the desired training strategy in support of TRADOC developed/approved system training plan (STRAP).

DOD Acquisition Authority Chain

Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
USD(A&T) / ASD(C3I) *

- Establishes DOD Policy for:
  - Acquisition / Procurement / R&D
- Supervises Acquisition System
- Provides DOD Program Oversight
- Approves Program Baselines

Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
ASA(RDA)

- Supervises the Army Acquisition Process
- Establishes Army Acquisition Policy
- Appoints Army PEOs
- Approves Army Program Baselines

Program Executive Officer (PEO)
(GO / SES)

- Oversees Program Execution
- Screens Staff Reviews
- Reports Only to AAE for Program Matters
- Reviews Program Baselines

Program / Project / Product Manager (PM)
(GO / COL / LTC / Civilian)

- Manages / Executes Program
- Reports Only to PEO for Program Matters
- Develops Program Baselines

* Delegated DAE for Automated Information Systems

Figure 11-5

- program and budget resources for TADSS as specified in the training support requirements (TSR) annex of the ORD.
- program and budget resources to support and ensure attention to and integration of MANPRINT in the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) and acquisition processes.
- provide TNGDEV perspective through input to the RDA Plan and the Army Modernization Plan (AMP).
- lead the cost performance Integrated Product Team (CPIPT) to institute the cost as independent variable (CAIV) process beginning with the approval of the Mission Need Statement (MNS).
- conduct a crosswalk, with the CBTDEV (TNGDEV for TADSS), of the ORD to the request for proposal (RFP) to verify that the RFP, to include system specification or purchase description and the statement of work (SOW), accurately reflects the operational requirements stated in the ORD for all programs. The MATDEV and CBTDEV (MATDEV and TNGDEV for TADSS) will formally certify that the RFP has been crosswalked with the ORD and is in agreement prior to the ASARC or program review.

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The Program/Project/Product Manager (PM).

The program management approach to materiel acquisition management is a distinct departure from the Services' traditional practice of establishing functionally-oriented organizations to carry out well-defined, repetitive, and continuous long-term tasks. Organization for program management is a tailored, task-oriented process. This approach requires the program manager to establish management arrangements among the PM Office (PMO), other military organizations, and various contractors to coordinate their efforts and to accomplish program objectives effectively, efficiently, and economically. A variety of PMO organizations have been established. They operate on the matrix management principle and must draw all functional support from a host command or installation. In addition to the formal PM organization, the PM heads and uses the informal MATDEV/CBTDEV team to execute the assigned materiel acquisition program. MATDEV/CBTDEV Team is the terminology used to describe the informal, but essential, and very close working relationship among the MATDEV, CBTDEV, and other players in the RDA management process (see figure 11-2).

The PM has authority and responsibility for all programmatic cost, schedule, and performance decisions to execute the assigned program within the approved program baseline and subject to functional standards established by regulation, Secretarial direction, or law. Generically, all PMs are program managers, but they are chartered as a Program Manager, a Project Manager, or Product Manager based on the value and importance of the program they manage. The criteria established for designation of a Program Manager are generally the same as those which cause a system acquisition to be designated as a major program—high defense priority, high dollar value, or high Congressional or OSD interest. Most Program Managers report to a PEO and to the AAE. Project and Product Managers report to a Program Manager or a PEO. The Army also has many PMs who report to U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC). Their programs are usually more mature systems or programs that have been through production and fielding. As a general rule, a program manager is a general officer or Senior Executive Service (SES); a project manager is a colonel or GS 15; a product manager is a lieutenant colonel or GS 14.

NOTE: This distinction between PMs is unique to the Army and does not apply to the other Services or within industry.

PEO Resource Control.

The Army has revised its resource support system structure for the PEOs to improve their control over the funding and manpower resources they need to carry out their responsibilities. With respect to both dollars and personnel authorizations, PEOs and subordinate PMs are receiving their resources directly from HQDA rather than through the materiel commands. The materiel commands continue to provide a variety of support services without duplicating any of the PEOs or PMs management functions. This enhanced resource control system ensures that PEO and PM-managed programs operate as centers of excellence, managed with modern efficient techniques, without administrative

burdens or materiel command layers being inserted into the chain of command.

Acquisition Career Management.

The MILDEP to the ASA(RDA) serves as the Army's Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM). The DACM is assisted by the Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management (DDACM) and the Acquisition Career Management Office in OASA(RDA). The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel work closely with the DACM in implementing the requirements and intent of DAWIA for the Army.

The Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) was established for both military and civilian personnel and is a subset of the entire Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW). The AAW consists of those personnel who work directly with acquisition in the various acquisition career fields at the CPT/GS-5 and above levels. The AAC consists of military and civilian personnel at the rank/grade of MAJ/GS-13 and above who have met the statutory requirements for experience, education and training. Current Army policy focuses on accessing individuals at the GS-14 and above level into the AAC. All AAW positions at rank/grade of LTC/GS-14 and above are designated Critical Acquisition Positions (CAPs); and thus, must be occupied by AAC members. For program management and contracting positions, statute or regulation further dictates education, training, and experience requirements which must be met prior to placement of an individual in these positions.

AAC Vision. The Army's senior leadership is committed to the building of acquisition leaders who are dedicated and motivated to provide the most effective,

affordable and supportable weapon systems and materiel for our soldiers. The strategic vision for the AAC forms the foundation for all policies and initiatives impacting the AAW. This vision is to develop *"a small premier professional corps of acquisition leaders willing to serve where needed and committed to developing, integrating, acquiring and fielding systems critical to decisive victory...for the 21st century."* The vision focuses on *"a small premier professional corps of acquisition leaders...It is these leaders the Army must develop early in their careers to ensure they possess the requisite experience and skills to successfully manage the acquisition challenges of the 21st century."* The key to developing the best possible leaders for the Army lies in educating the workforce, particularly at the lower levels, as to the DAWIA requirements and the policies, procedures, and tools available to meet those requirements. Thus, as new professionals enter the Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW), a culture change will have taken place with the successful implementation of DAWIA.

Career Development as a Mission. Career development is more critical than ever in the building of future acquisition leaders. In the past, many supervisors have not been fully committed to the career development of their employees. The Army is now striving to change the way that education, training and career development is viewed. The driving principle is that active career development is a mission for all organizations. Toward that end, the ASA(RDA) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) have jointly signed a policy memorandum (April 1996) which states that organizations must insure that each individual's career

development activities, whether training courses or developmental assignments, are part of the organization's mission. Organizations must plan for and allow employees (both military and civilian) to participate in the various career-enhancing activities. A major challenge for today's Army is to focus on integrating military and civilian acquisition workforce employee education, training, and career development into the mission of the organization.

The leader development career pattern for an AAC officer is clearly defined and highly rewarding. Military acquisition career development is covered under *DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization*. An officer should normally serve eight years in branch qualifying assignments prior to entering the AAC. Upon AAC selection, the officer will attend Functional Area (FA) specific military training courses, and selected officers will have the opportunity to attend Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS). Attendance at ACS is contingent on the officer's manner of performance, potential for academic success, and support of his/her career time line. Graduate level education opportunities are an important part of career development within the AAC. However, job experience and strong performance across a variety of acquisition positions remains the key indicator for success. Recent initiatives seek to increase developmental acquisition experience opportunities while providing improved support for alternative advanced degree schooling. AAC officers compete for product/project management or acquisition command positions in the same manner as field commands. AAC LTCs and COLs are ineligible for selection to non-acquisition command positions.

For career development of civilians, the Army has developed a civilian acquisition career model as well as a matrix of quality achievement factors as a "roadmap for success." The focus of the career model is to begin to develop acquisition leaders and managers early in their careers, giving them a broad-based knowledge of the various acquisition functions supported by leadership and management experience. The quality achievement factors are the combination of training, education, and experience at the higher grade levels which can also be used as a guide.

Central Management. The cornerstone of ongoing efforts to reengineer the civilian component of the AAC is the centralized management of the AAC and selected members of the AAW. In meeting the goals of DAWIA, acquisition policy is designed to provide for the selection of the best qualified individual for a particular position. To meet this goal, documentation of civilian personnel training, education, experience and leader development is comparable to that of the military officers they are competing against. This is best achieved by conducting centralized management of civilians in a manner analogous, to a large extent, to that of military acquisition personnel—with central acquisition career file development, education and training, and facilitation of career broadening assignments.

The objective of centralized management is to facilitate the career and leadership development of AAC members. Centrally managed career development consists of an interactive relationship between the Corps member and the Functional Acquisition Specialists (FASs) using clearly established career paths as well as integrated training and education and information from Individual Development Plans (IDPs). Career development remains a

responsibility of the Corps member. The FASs facilitate acquisition training and developmental assignments and insure all required data is correct. The personnel office processes the personnel actions.

Centralized management is currently being piloted on a subset of the AAC, with approximately 850 members in the program management (PEO/PM) organizations which report to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). Additionally, a small number of GS-13s, who will be selected as part of the Competitive Development Group (CDG), will be centrally managed while participating in the program. All AAC graduates of Senior Service Colleges will also be included in this pilot group. As the central management processes and procedures are refined, central management will be expanded to a larger number of acquisition organizations and AAC members.

Selecting the Best Qualified. For certain program manager and other key leadership positions, civilians will be competing head-to-head with military officers for selection and placement in these positions. In accordance with the intent of DAWIA, the Army must select the best qualified individual, whether a civilian or military officer. The Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II Project/Product Manager (PM) Board, also known as the Best Qualified Board, reviews both military and civilian career records to identify the best qualified candidate for each PM position. The Best Qualified boards will be expanded to include ACAT III PMs as well as other key positions in the future.

Corps Eligibles Program. Although the AAC, for the most part, is comprised of civilians in grades GS-14 through SES, the Army is reaching out to those employees at the GS-13 level who are not currently in the Acquisition Corps. Through an application process, the Army is identifying these Corps Eligible individuals who currently meet the statutory education, training and experience requirements to be a member of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC). These Corps Eligibles are being afforded several competitive and non-competitive career enhancing opportunities. Upon selection for a critical acquisition position, Corps Eligibles will be rapidly accessed into the AAC.

Competitive Development Group (CDG). The most significant career development opportunity for the Corps Eligible members, as well as GS-13 AAC members, is the CDG. The objectives of the CDG program are to select the very best GS-13s, broaden their leadership and management skills, and expand their knowledge of the acquisition process conducted in the various acquisition career fields. The CDG program is designed to develop these future leaders throughout functional acquisition career fields.

The CDG Year Group 1997 will consist of twenty-five members, each having a sponsor to assist in career development and to provide guidance throughout the training period. CDG members will be assigned to centrally funded developmental positions for three years based on their individual experience, education, and training needs documented in an Individual Development Plan. These positions will be located throughout the acquisition community. CDG members will receive priority access to cross functional training and advanced leadership or management courses. CDG participants will graduate from the program upon successful completion of the requirements and will be accessed into the AAC.

To ensure that the acquisition workforce routinely receives consistent, timely information on the acquisition programs, education, training and competitive opportunities generated by AAC initiatives, Acquisition Career Management Advocates (ACMAs) have been designated at many regional organizations or commands. These individuals are senior acquisition leaders. They serve to enhance the communication of information routinely routed through the functional and command channels. The ACMA ensures that all members of the Army acquisition workforce have equal and timely access to information and opportunities. By serving as the DACM's link to the field, the ACMA also offers commands an opportunity to express concerns and to register issues.

Headquarters, Department of the Army Elements.

Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The CSA is responsible by law to the SA for the efficiency of the Army and its preparedness for military operations. The CSA acts as the agent of the SA in carrying out the plans or recommendations submitted by the ARSTAF and approved by the SA. The Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA) supports the CSA by managing the day-to-day operations of the Army, and specifically in the area of RDA, co-chairs the ASARC with the AAE.

The Army recently created the position of Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (AVCSA) whose purpose is to develop and articulate Army warfighting requirements; integrate requirements into the overall planning and programming process; and help the Army better compete for modernization funding in the Joint arena.

Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research). The

DUSAR(OR) establishes, reviews, and supervises Army test and evaluation (T&E) policy and procedures; oversees all Army T&E associated with RDA, as well as combat development programs; provides staff management (policy formulation, program direction, and resource oversight) of all test and evaluation programs of interest to the Office of the Secretary of the Army; approves all Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs) requiring HQDA approval, as delegated by the AAE; and is responsible for all software development for modeling and simulations and software T&E policy.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA[FM&C]). The ASA(FM&C) has secretariat responsibility for all financial management activities and operations for appropriated funds. While the budget is in preparation, the ASA(FM&C) receives and consolidates procurement and RDT&E budget forms from MACOMs and PEOs. The ASA(FM&C) also:

- represents the AAE on all cost and economic analysis matters related to the acquisition process;
- carries out all financial management responsibilities assigned under *Title 10, USC* as pertains to DA;
- tasks the appropriate CBTDEV or MATDEV to conduct program office estimates (POE) and/or economic analyses (EA) to milestone decision review (MDR) and PPBES requirements;
- manages all budgeting activities in support of the Army materiel requirements processes and RDA modernization program, with the framework of PPBS/PPBES; and,
- provides oversight, review and approval for all costing and

economic analysis efforts, as carried out by the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC) within the Cost and Economic Analysis Program to include preparation of the Component Cost Analysis (CCA).

For ACAT I and special interest programs ASA(FM&C) establishes a Army Cost Review Board (CRB) of senior leadership to review the life-cycle cost estimates and recommend the Army Cost Position (ACP) to the ASA(FM&C) for approval. The ASA(FM&C) Deputy for Cost Analysis ensures that the ACP reflects the costs and risks associated with the program in concurrence with the cost as independent variable (CAIV) process.

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment (ASA[IL&E]). The ASA(IL&E) has responsibility for policy on supportability and sustainability and is supported by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) who has ARSTAF responsibility for logistical acceptability and supportability of materiel systems, interoperability, integrated logistics support (ILS), materiel release, and logistics research and development (R&D) programs for the Army.

Assistant Chief of staff for Installation Management and Environment (ACSIM). The ACSIM is responsible for developing criteria for the mitigation of environmental impacts, and reviewing emerging Army RDA systems for environmental effects.

Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and

Computers (DISC4). The DISC4 is the Army's chief information officer (CIO) and has ARSTAF responsibility and serves as the military deputy (MILDEP) to the AAE for Army AIS and Information Technology (IT) activities. These include establishing and approving policies, procedures, and standards for the planning, programming, life-cycle management, use of Army IT resources, and responding to and validating all warfighting requirements. The DISC4:

– validates all IT related to MNS, ORD, and Operational Need Statement (ONS) by ensuring that they meet three criteria:
  – they conform with the Army Technical Architecture (ATA) and address integration into Army Enterprise Architectures;
  – the requirement has gone through business process reengineering (BPR);
  – they are in concert with emerging command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technologies.
– has overall responsibility for Army software policy for both AIS and weapon systems.
– oversees the activities of PEOs or PMs managing command, control, communications, and computer and IT acquisition programs.
– provides technical oversight for both AIS and weapon systems on software and IT matters during the acquisition approval process.
– directs and approves standards for data and interoperability of products, to include joint and combined programs.

- provides software R&D advice and management oversight for all systems during the ASARC and the Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC) processes.
- reviews materiel system programs and warfighting rapid acquisition program (WRAP) candidate systems for compliance with HQDA policy for software reuse, technical and systems architectures, data element standardization, post production software support, spectrum management, and Ada software initiatives.
- ensures proper implementation of the ILS and MANPRINT programs in IT.

Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE). The DPAE is responsible for reviewing and analyzing requirements and programs in force structure development, providing analytical support to the Army Resources Board (ARB) and subordinate committees, developing resource guidance, developing and compiling the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), maintaining the Army portion of the DOD Future Year Defense Program (FYDP), and presenting an affordability analysis to the ASARC and MAISRC. The DPAE is a regular member of the ASARC. Other responsibilities include conducting and presenting affordability assessments to support DOD and HQDA ACAT I programs, and managing the programming phase of the PPBES.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). The DCSOPS has primary ARSTAF responsibility for the prioritization and validation of both materiel quantitative and performance requirements. DCSOPS develops broad force requirements and issues guidance for the combat developments programs to include establishing materiel objectives and requirements, overall force structure design, and Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP). DCSOPS provides guidance and reviews results of AoAs, establishes priorities for materiel development for designating major Army programs, and is a regular member of the ASARC. Other DCSOPS responsibilities include:

- developing Army policy and guidance for materiel requirements and combat development programs. This includes the requirements determination process, prioritization, resourcing, and integration of materiel warfighting requirements.
- establishing and validating Army priorities throughout PPBES to include RDA programs.
- coordinating force modernization activities, develop modernization plans, and monitor the impact of force modernization planning and execution for the total Army, with the assistance of ASA(RDA).
- conducting force feasibility reviews (FFRs) to assess supportability and affordability for structure, manpower, equipment, dollars, facilities and training.
- serving as the co-proponent, with the ASA(RDA), for the Army RDA Plan.
- assisting the ASA(RDA) in preparing acquisition program documentation, and adjustments for programming and budgeting.

- forwarding MNS for potential ACAT I programs to the JROC for validation. Forwards ACAT I ORDs to JROC for validation of key performance parameters (KPPs) and assignment of approval authority.
- establishing policy and guidance for cost, schedule, and performance trade-off analyses.
- establishing DA policy and guidance for and validating and approving field commander's ONSs.
- assigning catalog of approved requirements documents (CARDS) reference number, and maintaining and publishing CARDS.
- co-chairing the WRAP ASARC.
- reviewing and evaluating requirements based on issues raised by other Services, the Joint staff, and OSD and recommending changes to CDR, TRADOC.
- serving as the Army advocate on JROC issues. Providing coordination, liaison, and integration across the ARSTAF, MACOMs, the Joint Staff, and CINC representatives for the Army JROC effort.
- providing ARSTAF oversight of the development of the operational architecture (OA) IT and requirements as well as synchronizing the technical and systems architectures.
- ensuring horizontal technology integration (HTI) policies and procedures are implemented and followed in the requirements prioritization process.

- providing representative to the Army science and technology reviews and management teams.

Within ODCSOPS, the Systems Integrator (SI) is the focal point for materiel requirements and the CBTDEV's primary representative and point of conduct (POC) in the Pentagon. The SI provides the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the integration of new warfighting materiel systems into Army organizations. SIs are appointed by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans-Force Development (ADCSOPS-FD) during the first phase of the acquisition system management process.

The SI integrates operational, training, doctrinal, organizational, personnel, logistical, and test and evaluation aspects to ensure the fielding of a complete, coordinated, and supportable system. The SI ensures that systems are doctrinally based and that they are properly reflected in approved Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). SI's duties include developing a DA position on proposed materiel requirement documents and Basis of Issue Plans (BOIPs) and identifying, in coordination with Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), the required operational and force development tests.

The SI monitors the progress of an assigned system throughout its developmental process to ensure that approved materiel requirements are staffed and satisfied. In addition, the SI ensures necessary logistical support, manpower spaces, and training packages are available when and where the system enters the inventory. The overall objective is to meet the First Unit Equipped (FUE) / Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates with an operationally suitable, reliable,

maintainable, and economically obtainable system. The FUE is the date when the system and associated equipment is fielded (in operational quantities complete with logistical support, and training support) to the IOC unit and new equipment training (NET) is accomplished. The IOC is the first attainment of warfighting capability of MTOE and supporting elements to operate and support a fielded RDA system.

The SI is also responsible for the management of requirements which result from the introduction of a system. Budget constraints and manpower ceilings make effective management of those requirements imperative. Identifying, monitoring, recording, and coordinating the data connected with force structure requirements is a complex task which requires a thorough understanding of the procedures, techniques, methods, and various management systems used in the requirements process. The SI works in close cooperation and coordination with his counterparts at TRADOC and the HQDA Staff.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). The DCSLOG assesses the logistical supportability of materiel systems during the system acquisition process through management of the ILS program. DCSLOG participates in all phases of the RDA management process to ensure equipment is logistically reliable, supportable, and maintainable. DCSLOG is also responsible for secondary item requirements including secondary item war reserve requirements. The DCSLOG is a regular member of the HQDA Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

The DA Logistics Support Officer (DALSO) is the HQDA representative of the logistics community, providing logistics coordination. The DALSO monitors the progress of the assigned system and ensures that all elements of ILS, as outlined in *AR 700-127,* are satisfactorily completed. Because of the interrelationships of assigned responsibilities in materiel acquisition, close and continuous coordination and cooperation is essential between the DALSO and his counterparts at TRADOC, AMC, and the HQDA Staff.

In addition to new items of equipment, DALSOs also have responsibility for existing weapons and materiel systems in the Army force structure. This responsibility covers all phases of logistics support to include readiness, redistribution, and disposal.

The DALSO's primary mission is to provide HQDA general staff supervision over the ILS management of assigned commodity materiel/weapons systems from concept to disposal. Other responsibilities include:

- taking ARSTAF responsibility for logistical acceptability and supportability of materiel systems, interoperability, ILS, materiel release, and logistics R&D programs for the Army;
- establishing the HQDA logistic position concerning acceptability, deployability, and supportability for all acquisition programs;
- serving as the logistician in the materiel acquisition process for other than medical equipment, and conduct surveillance over logistics aspects of materiel acquisition and modification programs to ensure supportable systems;
- providing policy guidance for logistics for medical and engineer materiel acquisition.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). The DCSPER has ARSTAF responsibility for personnel management. DCSPER monitors planning for the manpower and personnel aspects of new systems. Also, the DCSPER is the proponent and has primary ARSTAF responsibility for the DOD Human Systems Integration (HSI) program (called the Manpower and Integration (MANPRINT) program in the Army). The emphasis of the MANPRINT program is to enhance total system performance (soldier in the loop) and to conserve the Army's manpower, personnel and training (MPT) resources. The DCSPER is a regular member of the ASARC.

The DA Personnel Staff Officer (PERSSO) is the ARSTAF representative of the personnel community. He provides for the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the smooth integration of new equipment, materiel systems, and new organizations. The PERSSO responsibilities include, but are not limited to: preparing and justifying force structure requests in conjunction with the organization integrator (OI) and SI; reviewing and coordinating the development of force structure changes; personnel supportability architecture, officer and enlisted issues related to new organizational concepts and doctrine; and ensuring programming and budgeting of manpower spaces. The PERSSO participates in all HQDA actions to develop the staff position on CBTDEV proposals for new major systems (mission need determination), the designation of a proposed system as major or nonmajor, the recommendations on the elements of system fielding including the proposed Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP), the Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ), the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO), and the proposed Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information (QQPRI). The PERSSO represents the DCSPER at force modernization-related, HQDA-sponsored conferences, forums, and meetings on issues of supportability concerning the introduction of new and/or reorganized existing TOE/TDA units.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) provides scientific and technical intelligence and threat projections in support of all aspects of the Army RDA programs.

In addition, a Threat Integration Staff Officer (TISO) is designated by the DCSINT to function as the HQDA threat integration coordinator for designated mission areas, programs, and systems. The TISO represents the DCSINT on all aspects of threat support throughout the system life-cycle or study process. The TISO system complements the ODCSOPS SI and is designed to foster closer coordination among the intelligence community, MACOMs, and ARSTAF agencies to ensure the timely integration of the threat into the materiel acquisition process. The TISO system supplements existing management procedures but does not relieve ARSTAF agencies and MACOMs of established responsibilities. The DCSINT is the approving authority for either establishing or ending TISO monitorship of systems. Generally, all programs designated as Army major or non-major systems will be assigned to a TISO for monitorship on an as-required basis with approval of the DCSINT.

The Surgeon General (TSG). TSG has ARSTAF responsibility for medical research, development, test and evaluation, and is the Army medical MATDEV. The TSG is also responsible for the medical aspects of all other development and acquisition programs ensuring mission area

interface with CBTDEVs. The TSG serves as a member of the ASARC and MAISRC for medical issues, including health hazard assessment, personnel safety, and hazards remediation. Other responsibilities include:

- developing policy, responsibilities, and procedures to ensure implementation of systems acquisition policy as it applies to combat medical systems, medical readiness and health care programs, and other assigned Army and joint service requirements;
- assigning support responsibilities for medical materiel development and acquisition to agencies and activities under TSG command and control;
- recommending to TRADOC materiel requirements and associated priorities for medical readiness and health care programs; and
- establishing mission area interface with TRADOC for all medical programs, ensuring that requirements and interests of each participating service are provided full consideration in medical programs for which the Army has lead agency or executive agency responsibility.

Chief of Engineers (COE). The COE monitors requirements and research and development necessary to provide construction design criteria, construction techniques, and construction material for the Army, Air Force, and other government agencies. The COE provides fixed-facility concealment, camouflage, and deception; real estate management techniques; and engineering support for maintenance of installation and facilities. It is the COE's mission to preserve and improve environmental quality associated with construction and facilities and Army environmental quality and R&D activities covering atmospheric, terrestrial, and topographical sciences. The COE is also responsible, under the general direction of the AAE, for the RDTE of fixed and floating power systems, and high voltage generation applications (to include nuclear applications).

The COE reviews all emerging Army systems for digital terrain data requirements and environmental effects such as climate, terrain, or weather. The review also includes minimization of toxic and hazardous wastes and those hazardous wastes associated with normal system test, operation, use, and maintenance.

The General Counsel (GC). The GC advises the AAE and the ASARC on any legal issue which arises during the acquisition of a weapon or materiel system. The GC reviews all Army acquisition policy and supervises all attorneys providing legal advice relating to programs within the Army RDA management system. He is also responsible for all legal advice in the negotiation, oversight, and review of international cooperative RDA programs.

Army Digitization Office (ADO). The Director, Army Digitization Office (ADO) responsibilities include:

- overseeing and coordinating the integration of Army Battlefield activities;
- providing to the Army leadership guidance and assistance in acquisition matters relating to digitization;
- overseeing migration of all programs to compliance with the

Army Technical Architecture (ATA);

− developing, maintaining, and publishing the Army Digitization Master Plan (ADMP);

− recommending, maintaining, and updating planned digitization program funding by use of a digitization MDEP consistent with the ADMP;

− advising the AAE and the VCSA on all matters concerning integration of digitization across the force.

Major Commands (MACOMs).

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). MTMC provides transportability engineering advice and analyses to the MATDEV, CBTDEV and TNGDEV; provides item, unit, and system transportability assessments for MDR; provides transportability approval or identify corrective actions required to obtain approval for all transportability problem items; and reviews all materiel requirements documents to assess adequacy of transportability.

U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM). MEDCOM is the medical CBTDEV, TNGDEV, trainer, user representative, and operational tester. MEDCOM conducts medical combat and training development activities as assigned by CG, TRADOC and TSG; reviews and evaluates materiel and TADSS requirements documents to identify and assure that adequate consideration is given to the prevention of health hazards from operating or maintaining materiel systems, and conduct the health hazard assessment (HHA) program, as required; conducts and supports

assigned operational T&E; and forwards all medical warfighting concepts and requirements documents to TRADOC for review and approval.

U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). INSCOM is the CBTDEV for strategic signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems and INSCOM sole-user intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) systems used for formulating doctrine, concepts, organization, materiel requirements, and objectives. INSCOM will:

− prepare requirements documents and serve as the Army CBTDEV during development and fielding of new SIGINT and information security (INFOSEC) systems under the purview of the National Security Agency (NSA) and having sole application to U.S. SIGINT and INFOSEC systems. INSCOM forwards warfighting concepts and requirements documents to TRADOC for review and approval.

− coordinate with the PEO or MATDEV on matters pertaining to acquisition of INSCOM sole-user SIGINT and intelligence, security and electronic warfare (ISEW) systems.

− coordinate with the CG, TRADOC, on requirements determination for other INSCOM sole user ISEW systems and conduct combat and training developments for these Army systems when directed by HQDA, and/or Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), or at the request of CG, TRADOC.

− ensure documentation of requirements for training support

products, system TADSS, and/or embedded training for INSCOM systems.

- provide threat documentation to TRADOC as validated and approved by HQDA DCSINT.
- recommend to CG, TRADOC materiel requirements and associated priorities for strategic intelligence and security readiness.

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). AMC performs assigned materiel and related functions for research and development, developmental test and evaluation (DT&E), acquisition and logistics support of materiel systems, and other materiel acquisition management functions required by DA. AMC is a principal MATDEV in the Army. The CG, AMC is a regular member of the ASARC. The AMC mission, in support of RDA, is to:

- equip and sustain a trained, ready Army.
- provide development and acquisition support to MATDEVs (PEO and PM).
- provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance Program.
- develop and acquire non-major systems and equipment.
- define, develop, and acquire superior technologies.
- maintain the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army in emergencies.
- conduct developmental tests for Army materiel systems; verify system safety; develop test technology; support operational test and evaluation; and

participate in the continuous evaluation process.

- exercise delegated authority, under ASA(RDA) oversight, in the following areas: metrication; design to cost; production readiness reviews; manufacturing technology, standardization; acquisition streamlining; reliability, availability, and maintainability; quality; risk management; value engineering; parts control; and industrial modernization improvement.
- provide survivability, vulnerability, or lethality assessments and survivability enhancement expertise for all Army materiel programs.
- evaluate and recommend improvements to the industrial base.
- as a MATDEV, be responsible for the RDTE, the acquisition, and logistics support of assigned materiel in response to approved materiel requirements.
- plan, coordinate, and provide functional support to PEOs and PMs. Support includes, but is not limited to, procurement and contracting, legal, managerial accounting, cost estimating, systems engineering, conducting system TADSS and embedded training concept formulation, developmental test, logistics support analyses, MANPRINT, environmental, intelligence and threat support, configuration management, and conducting various independent assessments and analyses.
- provide overall management of the Army's technology base (less

Class VIII), including identification of maturing technologies necessary to support acquisition of warfighting materiel systems.

– provide RDA science and infrastructure information to HQDA for the Army RDA Plan.

– conduct a crosswalk, with the CBTDEV (TNGDEV for TADSS), of the ORD to the request for proposal (RFP) to verify that the RFP, to include system specification or purchase description and the statement of work (SOW), accurately reflects the operational requirements stated in the ORD for all programs. The MATDEV and CBTDEV (MATDEV and TNGDEV for TADSS) will formally certify that the RFP has been crosswalked with the ORD and is in agreement prior to the ASARC or program review.

– provide initial and updated cost and system performance estimates for battlefield and peacetime operations as inputs to supporting analysis and program decisions.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC is the Army's primary "user representative" in the materiel acquisition process. TRADOC performs assigned materiel and related functions for operations research and analysis, evaluation of products of the requirements determination process, operational and organizational planning, logistics support planning, and quantitative and performance requirement specifications for materiel systems, and other combat development functions required by DA. As the Army's principal CBTDEV, TRADOC guides, coordinates, and integrates the total combat development effort of the Army. Combat developments are a major component of force development and encompass the formulation of concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel objectives, requirements, and operational test and evaluations (OT&E) of products of the requirements determination process.

The CG, TRADOC is a regular member of the ASARC. As the Army's primary CBTDEV/TNGDEV, TRADOC is the Army's architect for the future and is charged to chart the course for the Army. In doing this, he:

- guides and disciplines the requirements determination process by:

  – providing requirements determination and documentation procedures and process guidance for the entire Army;

  – establishing and implementing horizontal requirements integration (HRI) policy;

  – approving all Army warfighting requirements prior to their submission to HQDA;

  – approving integrated concept team (ICT) minutes or reports containing proposing solution sets for future operational capabilities (FOCs); and,

  – approving MNSs and ORDs produced by the Army community and forward to DCSOPS for prioritization and resourcing.

- assists DA to prioritize and justify warfighting requirements by:
  - determining applicability of ONS to future Army-wide requirements and assign to a proponent for requirement documentation;
  - providing insights and descriptive information for materiel programs; and
  - supporting ODCSOPS by presenting documents and information to the JROC and JWCA and assisting in issue resolution.
- coordinates and integrates the total combat/training developments efforts of the Army by:
  - providing, with appropriate support from other MACOMs, the future warfighting vision, overarching warfighting concept and FOCs, the start point for requirements determination process;
  - developing and maintaining the C4I operational architecture (OA);
  - being the primary source for determining need for and preparing requirements and requirements documents for TADSS and embedded training; and
  - determining need for and obtain CSA approval for the conduct of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs).
- conducts AoA for ACAT I, IA, II, and IIA programs when

required by HQDA. When required by the MDA, conduct AoA for all other ACAT programs.
- serves as member of the Army S&T Advisory Group (ASTAG).
- provides representative to Army S&T reviews and management teams.

TRADOC is organized into integrating centers and mission area schools and centers. The principal integrating centers in the materiel acquisition process are the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, and the Combined Army Support Command (CASCOM), Fort Lee. The mission area schools and centers are the branch schools and centers for Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, etc. The Directorates of Combat Developments (DCDs) at the TRADOC mission area school and centers work very closely with the PEO community and the AMC "commodity" MSCs in the RDA management process.

The TRADOC counterpart to the PM, the TRADOC System Manager (TSM), is a central figure in the RDA process and a key member of the MATDEV/CBTDEV team. The TSM is chartered by the CG, TRADOC to function as focal point for coordination of the CBTDEV/TNGDEV efforts in the development and acquisition of the system. The TSM is responsible to synchronize all DTLOS domains that are impacted by the fielding of a materiel system. TSMs are appointed for selected major and non-major programs. In some cases, a single TSM may be appointed for a family of systems such as special electronic mission aircraft systems. A TSM is appointed early in the development cycle, normally at the same time as the PM. He is usually located at the

proponent school and center. For systems without an assigned TSM, the DCD at the proponent school and center serves as the focal point.

NOTE: C4I operational architecture (OA) contains text, graphic models to show functions and information required, graphic representations of how the Army organizes and equips to execute C4 processes, and a database to provide detailed characteristics about information exchanges, such as format voice/data/imagery, speed of service, and criticality. The OA shows relationships among organizations and functions in terms of the information they need, use, and exchange.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). In support of materiel systems RDA management, USASOC establishes mission area interface with TRADOC for all programs, ensuring that requirements and interests of each participating agency are provided full consideration in programs for which the Army has lead agency or executive responsibility, and serves as the special operations trainer and user representative. In addition, USASOC will:

– forward all non-SOC unique warfighting capability requirements and documents to CG, TRADOC for approval.
– forward SOC unique requirements documents to CG, TRADOC for review.
– monitor TRADOC projects and identify needs that affect the USASOC mission and responsibility.
– support TRADOC field activities, conduct and support testing, and monitor RDA

projects to include potential force standardization and interoperability.
– participate in warfighting experiments, as appropriate.

Other DA Agencies.

Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC). OPTEC is a field operating agency (FOA) under the CSA. The CG, OPTEC is responsible for management of the Army's operational testing and evaluation, and Army participation in joint test and evaluation. Their evaluations of materiel systems operation effectiveness and suitability are independent of the CBTDEV/MATDEV and are reported directly to the MDR body. CG, OPTEC is a member of the ASARC and Chairman of the Test Schedule and Review Committee (TSARC). The TSARC is the HQDA centralized management forum for user (operational) T&E resources. OPTEC is assuming some of AMC's developmental evaluation missions and responsibilities as part of the Army's redesign efforts. OPTEC provides advice and assistance to the CSA, the VCSA, other members of the ARSTAF, and other elements of DA in regard to Army operational test and evaluation. Other responsibilities are to:

- Review all draft materiel requirements documents for T&E implications.
- Assist TRADOC (CBTDEV/ TNGDEV) in developing evaluatable, operationally relevant, and totally system focused critical operational issues and criteria (COICs). Provide advice concerning methods and measures to evaluate the system against the COIC and advise on

the resources and ability to test and evaluate the system.

- Support the TRADOC AWE program and Concept Experimentation Program (CEP).

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). USASMDC is the principal assistant and advisor to the SA and the CSA for all matters pertaining to space and strategic defense. The USASMDC is responsible for technology development programs related to strategic and tactical missile defense, space defense, and satellite technology. The command conducts missile defense technology base research and development activities in support of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), assures transfer of technology between BMDO and Army systems, and provides matrix support to PEO Missile Defense. USASMDC, is also chartered by CSA to be the operational advocate and focal point for theater missile defense (TMD) at Army level. The CG, USASMDC, assists in the development of Army TMD positions, reflective of work being done in TRADOC, and represents those positions at HQDA, OSD, BMDO, Joint Staff, Congressional, and other high-level forums.

U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC). USAMRMC is the medical MATDEV, logistician, and developmental tester and is responsible for RDTE, the acquisition, and logistic support of assigned materiel in response to approved materiel requirements. In addition, USAMRMC will:

- plan, program, budget, and execute medical RDTE tasks that support system RDA to include required system training support

products, TADSS, and/or embedded training.

- plan, coordinate, and provide functional support to USAMRMC organizations. Support includes, but is not limited to, procurement and contracting, legal, managerial accounting, cost estimating, systems engineering, conducting system TADSS and embedded training concept formulation, developmental T&E, ILS, MANPRINT, environmental management, configuration management, and conducting various independent assessments and analyses.
- assist the medical CBTDEV/ TNGDEV in the requirement determination process.
- review requirement documents to determine their adequacy and feasibility and for logistical support aspects of materiel systems to include ILS.
- develop and maintain the physiological, psychological, and medical data base to support the HHA, system safety assessments (SSA), and human factors engineering analysis (HFEA).
- evaluate and manage the materiel readiness functions in the medical materiel acquisition process.
- function as TSG agency for the materiel acquisition of medical nondevelopmental items (NDI), commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, and sets, kits, and outfits.

U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S). AMEDDC&S is the medical CBTDEV,

TNGDEV, doctrine developer, and operational tester and evaluator. In addition, AMEDDC&S develops doctrine, organizations, and systems requirements within the guidelines established by the CG, TRADOC and in accordance with Army health care standards established by TSG.

MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

Policy.

DODD 5000.1 and DOD Regulation 5000.2R provide mandatory DOD acquisition policy and procedures including materiel requirements documentation and approval guidance for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) for both materiel and automated information systems (AIS). *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01* mandates policy and procedural guidance for the requirements generation system to include guidance on key performance parameters (KPPs), measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). *AR 70-1* provides Army acquisition guidance for materiel and information systems. *AR 71-9* provides Army requirements determination and documentation policies and responsibilities implementing *DODD 5000.1, DOD Regulation 5000.2R and MOP 77* supporting all Army acquisitions categories (ACAT) I through IV materiel and information systems. ACATs are shown in figure 11-4.

NOTE: The terms materiel and materiel system in this chapter apply to materiel and information systems unless specifically identified otherwise.

The main governing policies are summarized below:

- The requirements determination process provides a current and future Army capable of success in any contingency from humanitarian assistance to full tactical operations in joint and combined environments. The process will be responsive to the urgent materiel requirements of the deployed warfighter as well as project the full set of doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) requirements for the Army to be mission capable in near-, mid, and far-term operations.
    - Field Commanders document and submit their urgent warfighting and training operational requirements and obtain support via the operational needs statements (ONS) process discussed in AR 71-9, *TRADOC Black Book #3 and TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9.*
    - Commanders with combat developments missions conduct continuing analyses to identify and define near- through far-term DTLOMS requirements.
- Future operational requirements for all DTLOMS domains will be related to the TRADOC approved overarching operational

concept and associated lower level operational concepts. The current approved overarching warfighting concept for the Army is Force XXI. Requirements not related to these warfighting concepts are not provided resources. TRADOC's integrated and approved listing of future operational capabilities (FOCs) from these concepts serve as a process control mechanism; authority for supporting studies and experimentation; and a device for linkage between requirements documentation and the concepts. FOCs are listed annually in *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66*.

- Requirements determination is the work of ICTs, made up of people from multiple disciplines. Their efforts may include concept development or materiel operational requirements development and documentation. DTLOMS solution sets are documented in ICT minutes or reports. ICTs operate on principals similar to acquisition IPTs in *DOD 5000.2R* to identify and resolve issues early. An ICT includes representatives of Army requirements process stake-holders and other principal contributors, including academia and industry, when appropriate. OSD, other services, CINCs, and Joint Staff are invited to send representatives, as appropriate, when their interest is known or suspected.

- A materiel requirement is developed for an approved FOC only after all other possible doctrine, training, leader development, or organizational solutions are deemed unable to solve the FOC. The priority order of consideration is doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, and finally materiel. MNSs are prepared in accordance with CJCSI 3170.01 format guidelines for those materiel operational requirements with ACAT I or IA program potential and other programs representing a new Army mission or a potential program using a significant leap-ahead technology. ORDs are prepared in accordance with *DOD 5000.2R* format guidance.

- All ACAT I, IA, II, IIA, III, and IIIA materiel programs have an ORD. ACAT IV materiel programs have ORDs, except ACAT IV base operations materiel that are not warfighting requirements. They can be procured following MACOM standard acquisition procedures.

- All IT products must comply with the Army's operations, systems, and technical architectures. MACOM information management offices review and ensure compliance with architectures.

- Standardization is a key focus of CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs throughout the requirements determination and acquisition management process. Properly applied, standardization can significantly reduce life-cycle costs, schedules, and risks, while

improving quality and logistic support.

- Close coordination is maintained between CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs and the science and technology (S&T) community to ensure that technology investments are appropriately focusing on identified FOCs. Periodic reviews are conducted with program offices, laboratories, users, and maintainers to assess the technical status, emerging performance, affordability, and remaining technology shortfalls. Modeling and simulation are used to preclude unnecessary and impractical development.

- All system developments have many capability characteristics that are defined in requirements documentation. KPPs are those system characteristics that define whether or not a system will be capable of mission accomplishment. KPPs are, by definition, characteristics that can cause a concept or system to be reevaluated and a program to be reassessed for restructuring or termination. All requirements documentation will contain KPPs which will in turn be documented in the system acquisition program baseline (APB). For ACAT I systems, KPPs are validated and approved by the JROC even if the authority for the requirements document has been delegated to the component. TRADOC validates and approves other KPPs.

- When developing system characteristics and performance

parameters, cost must be considered on an equal level. In other words, cost is treated as an independent variable along with others used to define a system. This concept — cost as an independent variable (CAIV) — does not preclude consideration and evaluation of a new high potential, leap-ahead but expensive DTLOMS technology.

Army Science And Technology.

The ultimate goal of the Army's S&T program is to provide the soldier with a winning edge on the battlefield. The accelerating pace of technological change continues to offer significant opportunities to enhance the survivability, lethality, deployability, and versatility of Army forces. High technology research and development is, and will remain, a central feature of the Army's modernization strategy. Key to this modernization strategy is the planned transition of promising technology developments into tomorrow's operational capabilities. This transition is accomplished by technology demonstrations (discussed later) which evolve into systems and system upgrades incorporated in the *Army Modernization Plan (AMP)*.

The Army's Science and Technology (S&T) program is an integral part of materiel acquisition. The S&T program consists of three stages — basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3). The identifiers — 6.1, 6.2, etc. — are commonly used for identifying funds; but they are also used as a shorthand technique by members of the R&D community to identify levels of research development. For example, instead of referring to some project as being "in applied research," it is often referred to as being

"6.2". The 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 categories are known as the "tech base". (A MNS is not required for 6.1, 6.2 programs, regardless of size.). Basic research (6.1) includes all efforts of scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields related to long-term national security needs. Applied research (6.2) includes all efforts directed to the solution of specific military problems, short of major development projects. Advanced technology development (6.3) includes all efforts directed toward projects which have moved into the development of hardware for testing of operational feasibility. Recent initiatives, such as the DOD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD), (discussed later in the chapter) obscure the distinction between S&T and development — pre-and post-milestone I activities.

The Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP) is the strategic plan for the Army's S&T program. It is approved by the SA and the CSA. It is our S&T roadmap for achieving Force XXI. This plan is provided to government, industry, and academia to convey the Army's S&T vision, objectives, priorities, and corresponding strategy. This document is explicit, resource-constrained DA guidance to drive funding priorities and the S&T program as a whole. The ASTMP provides "top down" guidance from HQDA to all S&T organizations. It also provides a vital link between DOD technology planning and the Army's major commands and laboratories. The core of DOD's S&T strategy is to fuel and exploit the information technology explosion; conduct extensive and realistic demonstrations of new technology applications; and provide for early, extensive and continued involvement of warfighters in S&T demonstration programs. S&T programs

must be responsive to numerous national security considerations.

A mainstay of the Army strategy for military technology is a viable in-house research capability. Laboratories and research, development, engineering centers (RDECs) are the key organizations responsible for technical leadership, scientific advancements and support for the acquisition process. Activities of these organizations range from basic research to the correction of deficiencies in field systems. Academia and industry as well as hands-on bench work contribute to the S&T mission. Technology insertion into major systems is accomplished via the flow of patents, data, design criteria, and other information into Technology Demonstrations (TDs) and Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs), new designs, and fielded systems.

The Army is streamlining the in-house research infrastructure through laboratory consolidation and placing significantly greater reliance on other Services S&T investments. In an effort to make the Army's 21st century research and development efforts more efficient and effective the Lab 21 study was initiated. One of the key elements of Lab 21 was the creation of a world class "flagship" laboratory called the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). Independent Army laboratories have been consolidated into technical directorates under the ARL management umbrella. ARL is currently being converted to a federated laboratory system, aligning our researchers with the best that industry and academia have to offer to support Force XXI.

Overall, the Army's Science and Technology Strategy and programs are committed to the maintenance of technological superiority, while preserving the flexibility to cope with a wide array of

possible threat, technology, and budget environments. The Army's investment in S&T is paramount and is playing a greater role in acquisition than ever, particularly since the advent of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).

A series of reviews of current and proposed S&T activities guide focused research. The first is an annual assessment of all proposed Army-funded S&T projects. It is conducted based on an appreciation of current capabilities, ongoing S&T activities and their applicability to the FOCs described earlier in the chapter in *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66.* Building from the basic S&T project review, a list of the top 200 Army Science and Technology Objectives (STO) candidates—the Army's most important S&T projects—is generated. Based on formal developmental milestones and achievement measures, the Army Science and Technology Working Group (ASTWG) approves each STO, which is then listed in the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP). The ASTMP and the AMP provide the basis for ATDs which showcase a variety of advanced technologies and their potential military merit. In addition to advancing the technology, all of this in-house S&T activity assists the ICTs to better understand the "art of the possible" and refine the many requirements associated with them.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66 also guides independent research & development (IR&D) efforts. By providing the private sector an unclassified, descriptive list of desired FOCs, the Army is able to tap into a wealth of information and new ideas on different means to achieve those capabilities. The Army encourages industry to share these ideas with appropriate CBTDEV and TNGDEV organizations.

A special program — Advanced Concept and Technology II (ACT II) program — encourages the application/ demonstration of mature technologies, non-developmental items (NDI), and/or prototypes to address highest priority FOC needs. ACT II funds proposed TDs which, if successful and compelling, may be selected for expedited acquisition or funded through the normal Army acquisition process. ACT II projects are funded at a maximum of $1.5 million with a planned period of performance not exceeding twelve months. The program is focused on applying mature technologies and unconventional concepts and approaches to address specific FOCs which are solicited annually through a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA). This approach shortens the acquisition cycle and reduces developmental costs. ACT II is sponsored by the CSA and ASA(RDA). TRADOC, AMC, and the Army Research Office (ARO) collaborate to build ACT II partnerships between the Army, industry, and the academic community.

As with some concepts, S&T research occasionally produces an item that is recognizable as a defined requirement that should be documented and resourced. Most S&T products must be evaluated in warfighting experiments before a decision is made to document them as materiel requirements.

Army Science and Technology Oversight

MEMBERSHIPS

ASTAG

ASA(RDA) / VCSA	CG, TRADOC
CG, AMC	DAS
DCSOPS	DCSPER
DCSINT	DCSLOG
DISC4	CG, SSDC
CG, USAMC	CG, USACE
DUSA(OR)	DAS(R&T)

ASTWG

DAS(R&T) / ADCSOPS	TRADOC (HQ)
AMC HQ	ODCSPER
ODCSINT	ODCSLOG
ODISC4	USACE
SSDC	PAE
ARO/ ARL / RDEC TDs	JFKSWCS
ADO	CG, MRMC

ARMY

☆☆☆☆

ASA(RDA) / VCSA

ASTAG

• Provide Leadership Oversight

☆☆

SARD - ZT
DAMO - FD

ASTWG

• Recommend ASTMP
• Approve ATDs
• Approve STOs

Figure 11-6

Oversight of the S&T program is provided by the Army Science and Technology Advisory Group (ASTAG), which is co-chaired by the AAE and the VCSA (see figure 11-6). The ASTWG, is co-chaired by the Army S&T executive (the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology) and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Force Development). The ASTWG provides general officer level resolution of pressing S&T issues prior to meetings of the ASTAG; recommends to the ASTAG revisions to the Army's S&T vision, strategy, principles, and priorities; and reviews and approves ATDs and STOs.

Technology Transition Strategy.

The basic strategy of the S&T program is to transition mature technologies into operational systems that satisfy approved warfighting materiel requirements. Key to this strategy are demonstrations. TDs, ATDs, ACTDs exploit technologies derived from applied research (6.2), which in turn build on new knowledge derived from basic research (6.1) programs. These TDs, ATDs, and ACTDs provide the basis for new systems, system upgrades, or advance concepts which are further out in time. The critical challenge is to tie these programs together in an efficient and effective way.

TDs are not new. What is new is the scope and depth of the technology demonstrations, the increased importance of their role in the acquisition process, and the increased emphasis on user involvement to permit an early and meaningful evaluation of overall military capability. The following sections provide an explanation of TDs, ATDs, ACTDs, as well as systems/system upgrades.

Technology Demonstrations (TDs). The primary focus of TDs is to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of a technology for solving specific military requirements. They are incorporated during the various stages of the 6.2 and 6.3 development process and encourage technical competition. They are most often conducted in a non-operational (lab or field) environment. These demonstrations provide information that reduces uncertainties and subsequent engineering cost, while simultaneously providing valuable development and requirements data.

Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs). Within each of the 10 DOD Technology Area Plans (DTAPs), previously discussed, specific ATDs are being structured to meet established goals. Detailed roadmaps to guide their progress are being developed, as well as exit criteria to define their goals. ATDs are risk reducing, integrated, "proof of principle" demonstrations designed to assist near-term system developments in satisfying specific operational capability needs. The ATD approach has been promoted by the Defense Science Board (DSB) and the Army Science Board (ASB) as a means of accelerating the introduction of new technologies into operational systems. They are principally funded with advanced technology development (6.3) funds. ATDs facilitate the

integration of proposed technologies into full system program definition and risk reduction (6.4) or engineering and manufacturing development (6.5) prototype systems. As such, they provide the link between the technology developer, PM, PEO, and the Army user. The criteria for establishing an ATD are:

- execution at the system or major subsystem level in an operational rather than a laboratory environment;
- potential for new or enhanced military operational capability or cost effectiveness;
- duration of three to five years;
- transition plan in place for known and/or potential applications;
- active participation by TRADOC battle Lab and user proponents;
- participation by the MATDEV (PM);
- use of simulation to assess doctrine/tactical payoffs; and
- exit criteria established with user interaction/concurrence.

As of this update, the Army has 23 ATDs which have been approved by the ASTWG. More detailed information including exit criteria for each ATD can be found in the ASTMP previously discussed.

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). The newest initiative in the DOD acquisition strategy is the ACTD. The DOD ACTD initiative, grew from the 1986 Packard Commission recommendation for rapid prototyping. ACTDs are joint Service in nature, featuring CINC sponsorship and provide as much as two years of leave-behind (residual) capability in the field. ACTDs apply advanced technologies to joint warfighting

requirements to provide an advanced capability in a limited timeframe. The ACTD is an integrated effort to assemble and demonstrate a significant new military capability, based upon maturing advanced technology(s), in a real-time operation at a scale adequate to clearly establish operational utility and system integrity. ACTDs are jointly sponsored and implemented by the operational user, and MATDEV communities, with approval and oversight guidance from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology (DUSD[AT]).

The ACTD concept is a cornerstone in the new acquisition strategy that relies on prototyping and demonstration programs to maintain the U.S. military technological edge in the face of declining procurement budgets. ACTDs are a more mature phase of the ATDs. They are two- to four-year efforts in which new weapons and technologies are developed, prototyped, and then tested by the soldiers in the field for up to two years before being procured.

ACTDs are not new programs, but tend to be a combination of previously identified ATDs, TDs, or concepts already begun. They include high level management and oversight to transform disparate technology development efforts conducted by the various military services into prototype systems that can be tested and eventually fielded. The ACTD becomes the last step in determining whether the military needs and can afford the new technology.

Systems and System Upgrades. The development of the next set of materiel systems requires prior demonstration of the feasibility of employing new technologies. "New-start" systems are those next in line after the ones currently fielded or in production. For these systems, most

technical barriers to the new capability have been overcome. Generally, these systems can enter engineering and manufacturing development (acquisition system management process phase II) relatively quickly as a result of the successful demonstration of enabling technologies. Based on current funding guidance, the number of "new-start" systems is in a sharp decline.

In the absence of "new-start" systems, the Army is pursuing incremental improvements to existing systems to maintain its technological edge, and capabilities. As defined in the ASTMP, these improvements are designated as systems upgrades. System upgrades are brought about through technology insertion programs (discussed in detail later), service life extension programs (SLEPs), preplanned product improvements (P3I), and block improvement programs. These upgrades are based primarily on the success of funded 6.3 ATDs/TDs. The 6.3 ATDs/TDs either are the basis for the system upgrade or have a high probability of forming the basis for the system upgrade.

Warfighting Experiments.

Warfighting experiments are the heart of DOD/Army's warfighting requirements determination process. Progressive and iterative mixes of high fidelity constructive, virtual and live simulations using real soldiers and units in relevant, tactically competitive scenarios provide Army leaders with FOC insights. Warfighting experiments are conducted to gain understanding about some aspect of future warfighting. Capability insights from warfighting experiments are "way points" used by the Army to plot it's future course to Force XXI. There are three main categories of warfighting experiments—concept experiments,

advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs), and joint warfighting experiments (JWEs).

Concept Experiments. The overwhelming majority are concept experiments pertaining to TRADOC individual operations or branches. Most concept experiments are conducted as part of the TRADOC Experimentation Program (CEP). CEP is a separately funded TRADOC initiative that provides quick reaction assessments of the military utility/potential for new or revised doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, or soldier (DTLOMS) concepts. They are a means to "model-experiment-model" possible requirements and are the building blocks in the "progressive and interactive mix" of simulations. Additionally, they are usually small enough to support the detailed planning and data collection required by the test and evaluation communities. A concept proponent conducts the experiment or requests a battle lab to sponsor it. They either resource it in in-house or request resources from HQ, TRADOC.

Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs). AWEs are the Army's capstone Force XXI experimentation events focused on a major increase in warfighting capability across multiple branches and the full DTLOMS spectrum. Any concept proponent recommends the AWE, the TRADOC Commander sponsors it, and the CSA approves and resources it.

Today, most AWEs employ live simulations—soldiers and units in field environments. However, live simulations are very expensive, and if they involve new materiel, may occur late in the materiel development cycle. Future warfighting experiments will use a comprehensive suite of reconfigurable simulators and simulations in addition to live simulations. Distributed interactive simulations (DIS) connected by the Defense Simulations Internet (DSI) will create a synthetic theater of war (STOW) that enables Army leaders to quickly model, evaluate and change different requirements from any of the DTLOMS domains. Thus, future warfighting experiments will leverage relatively low-cost models to explore requirements across the DTLOMS spectrum, reserving expensive field exercises for the final defining event in the requirements determination process.

Joint Warfighting Experiments (JWEs). JWEs are a mechanism for experimenting with systems or systems involving advanced technologies prior to commitment to acquisition programs. They are conducted as part of joint warfighting exercises (JWE). A JWE is a snapshot in time when prototypes from ATDs, ACTDs, development programs and technology base efforts are integrated to permit the warfighter to evaluate their combined potential and gain insight into future advanced joint warfighting concepts. JWEs are DOD-wide efforts to support the horizontal integration and synchronization of advanced technologies from ACTDs, ATDs, and advanced distributed simulation products for experimentation in joint warfighting exercises, such as the 1995 Roving Sands theater missile defense joint warfighting experiment sponsored by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command.

Warfighting experiments provide DOD and the Army an unsurpassed means to understand future warfighting requirements. Planned and executed with the entire combined arms team and appropriate other Service elements, warfighting experiments open the "windows to the

future". Understanding the cost and benefits of change across the force and in all domains allows us to "maintain the edge" and conserve resources at the same time.

MATERIEL SYSTEMS ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS

The materiel acquisition (RDA) process is initiated as a result of output—the approved warfighting materiel requirements—from the requirements determination process efforts of the CBTDEV.

Identified materiel requirements are first assessed to determine if they can be satisfied by nonmateriel solutions. Nonmateriel solutions include changes in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and soldiers (DTLOS).

Only if these nonmateriel solutions will not satisfactorily overcome the deficiency is a new development materiel program initiated. A hierarchy of potential materiel alternatives (strategies) must be considered before committing to a new start acquisition program. In order of preference, the materiel alternatives are:

- use or modification of an existing U.S. military system;
- use or modification of an existing commercially-developed or allied system that fosters a nondevelopmental acquisition strategy;
- a cooperative research and development program with one or more allied nations;
- a new joint-Service development program; and
- a new Service-unique development program.

In the broad sense, the acquisition process consists of a series of sequential management decisions made in DOD or the Army as the development of a materiel system progresses from a stated materiel requirement to a fielded system. Product improvements (PIs) to existing systems or acquisition of nondevelopmental items (NDI) usually occurs through acquisition streamlining (discussed later in the chapter). The framework that is used in the materiel acquisition process is shown in figure 11-7.

A key aspect of the materiel acquisition process is that it is divided into four distinct phases: Concept Exploration; Program Definition and Risk Reduction; Engineering and Manufacturing Development; and Production, Fielding, Deployment/ Operational Support. Entry into each of these phases is controlled by four decision points, called milestones (MS).

Before the phases of the materiel acquisition process and its various support processes can be discussed in detail, it is useful to review how the RDA system links initially to the Total Army management system as shown in Chapter 2 (figure 2-4).

Standard Systems Development - "Cradle to Grave"

Materiel Acquisition Oversight and Review Process

Figure 11-7

Determining and Documenting Materiel Requirements.

All acquisition programs are based on identified future operational materiel needs. Determination of these needs is a result of continuing assessments of current and projected capabilities in the context of military threat and national military policy. A mission need may address: (1) a new operational capability, (2) improvement of an existing capability, or (3) a desire to exploit promising technologies. Mission needs can be identified by Unified Commands, the Military Departments, OSD, or the Joint Staff. In theory, mission need identification should first exhaust all nonmaterial solutions such as, doctrine, training, or organizational changes. When a need is identified that could

potentially result in the establishment of a new acquisition program, a MNS is prepared that is a nonsystem-specific statement of operational capability. The MNS can be prepared by any DOD Component which has identified a specific mission area materiel requirement or need.

Acquisition Categories.

When the materiel requirement and manner of acquisition have been identified, the acquisition is designated as acquisition category (ACAT) I-IV. This category determines the level of review, and who will make the milestone decisions. The ACAT is determined by dollar criteria and visibility of the potential program. There are four

acquisition categories, as shown in figure 11-4.

Acquisition Strategies and Program Plans.

An Acquisition Strategy (AS) is the framework for planning, directing, and managing an acquisition program to satisfy an approved materiel requirement. Acquisition strategies and their supporting program plans are tailored to accomplish established program objectives and to control risk. They must also provide the information essential for milestone decisions. In this regard, acquisition strategies are event-driven and explicitly link major contractual commitments and milestone decisions to demonstrated accomplishments in development and testing.

Program plans provide for a systems engineering approach to the simultaneous design of the product and its associated manufacturing, test, and support processes. This concurrent engineering approach is essential to achieving a careful balance among system design requirements (for example, operational performance, producibility, reliability, maintainability, logistics and human factors engineering, safety, survivability, interoperability, and standardization). Maximum practicable use is made of commercial and other nondevelopmental items. The Army's first preference is to use performance specifications, the next is to use non-government standards (NGS), and as a last resort military specifications and standards (MILSPECs/STDs) may be used. Use of MILSPECs/STDs requires a waiver. Additionally, changes to *DOD Regulation 5000.2R* resulting from the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASTA) of 1994 state the AS should be tailored to the extent feasible to employ commercial

practices when purchasing commercial products or other nondevelopmental items.

Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). CAIV is the DOD cost reduction methodology utilized throughout the entire life-cycle of a programs acquisition process to ensure operational capability of the total force is maximized for the given modernization investment. In other words, cost is treated as an independent variable along with others used to define a system. Cost performance analysis is conducted on a continuous basis throughout the life-cycle. CAIV directly impacts the preparation of a program's requirements documents (MNS and ORD), as well as acquisition documents (AS and APB).

NOTE: CAIV does not preclude consideration and evaluation of a new high potential, leap-ahead but expensive DTLOMS technology.

Environmental Considerations.

Environmental impact is always considered in Defense acquisitions. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 mandates documentation of the environmental effects of proposed federal actions. Because of lax enforcement of NEPA by DOD, Congress directed DOD in the FY95 Defense Appropriations Act to place greater emphasis on environmental policy. The Act requires initiation of NEPA compliance before development begins; environmental analysis for each milestone decision; accounting for all direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts before production starts, and analysis of life-cycle environmental costs. The environmental documentation process can be lengthy and costly. Early consideration of environmental impacts and NEPA

requirements will protect not only the environment, but cost and schedule as well.

Risk Assessment and Management.

Program risks and risk management plans are explicitly assessed at each milestone decision point prior to granting approval to proceed into the next acquisition phase. Risks must be well understood, and risk management approaches developed, before MDAs can authorize a program to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. To assess and manage risk, MATDEVs use a variety of techniques, including TDs, prototyping, and T&E. Risk management encompasses identification, mitigation, and continuous tracking, and control procedures that feed back through the program assessment process to decision authorities to ensure an equitable and sensible allocation of risk between government and industry. PMs, and other MATDEVs develop a contracting approach appropriate to the type system being developed and acquired.

ACQUISITION PHASES AND MILESTONES

All acquisition programs accomplish certain core activities described *in DODD 5000.1 and DOD Regulation 5000.2R.* How these activities are conducted is tailored to minimize the time it takes to satisfy an identified need consistent with common sense and sound business practice. Tailoring gives full consideration to applicable statutes. The number of phases and milestones are tailored to meet the specific needs of the individual PMs, based on objective assessments of a program's category status, risks, and adequacy of proposed risk management plans, and the urgency of the user's need. Tailored

acquisition strategies may vary in which core activities are to be conducted, the formality of reviews and documentation, and the need for other supporting activities.

Milestone 0 — Approval to Conduct Concept Studies.

Milestone 0 marks the initial formal interface between the requirements determination and the acquisition management systems. At this decision point it is decided what action will be taken on a MNS. If the MNS is validated, studies of a minimum set of materiel alternative concepts are authorized. Approval for studies, however, does not establish a new acquisition program. Instead, it merely reflects approval to proceed with studies of alternative concepts that could satisfy the identified mission need. These studies may be done by in-house or contract efforts, or by a combination of both. At MS 0 the MDA normally considers the following:

− a validated MNS,
− satisfying the need with a nonmateriel solution,
− whether the need is sufficiently important to warrant funding of study efforts,
− Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) support requirement (see *DOD 5000.2R, Part 2.2.1*), and
− an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for ACAT IA programs.

The MS 0 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) approves entry into Phase 0 and should: define the minimum set of alternative concepts to be examined,

identify a lead organization for study efforts, and identify funding/source for study efforts.

Phase 0—Concept Exploration.

The purpose of this phase is to determine if a new system is required and if so, to document system characteristics and performance parameters, including cost. Competitive, parallel, short term studies by the Government and/or industry will normally be used during this phase. Key outputs during this phase are development and approval of the initial ORD with proposed KPPs, the AS, and the development of the concept APB, as well as, advise the MS I MDR principals on whether a new program is warranted. Key to this effort is the synchronization and linkage of the requirements trade-off/operational analyses, concept studies, cost-schedule-performance trade-offs and AoA.

- An CBTDEV-led ICT manages an approved warfighting materiel requirement during the concept exploration phase. The ICT conducts analyses, ensures inclusion of all alternatives in the analyses, monitors experimentation, or undertakes other tasks that may require the concentration of special expertise for a short duration. An ICT is normally chartered and under the supervision of TRADOC. The director of the ICT manages the approved materiel requirement prior to MS I or designation of the MATDEV PM.
- Concept studies. The MATDEV, in coordination with the ICT, conducts concept studies to examine the feasibility of different technology solutions and to refine technology concepts. These studies develop rough performance estimates to permit first-cut, rough trade-offs among system performance, operational capability, requirements and costs. These studies identify potential system concept alternatives and result in initial broad objectives for cost, schedule, performance, software, requirements, and opportunities for trade-offs.
- Requirements trade-offs/operational analysis. Requirements trade-offs and operational analysis are conducted by the ICT to support development of the initial ORD and decisions regarding which materiel alternative (for example, modified current system, program systems, NDI [conceptual]) should be pursued to satisfy the ORD. The initial ORD should include system performance thresholds and objectives that are consistent with initial broad statements of operational capability. The MATDEV conducts trade-off analyses to support the ICT, to support the development of the concept APB, and provides the basis for initial cost targets provided to the MDA and Cost Performance Integrated Product Team (CPIPT). These MATDEV analyses explore the relationships between the cost and performance of anticipated system characteristics.

Key activities in this phase normally include the following:

- Development of the program AS. The AS is a key document which describes alternatives to be pursued later in the program life-cycle, and portrays overall plans for program development.
- Development of the ORD and KPPs.
- Development and validation of a Program Office Estimate (POE). The ICT develops the POE in Phase 0. CEAC develops the independent Component Cost Analysis (CCA) for major systems. The POE and CCA must be developed in parallel with the development activity to preclude lengthening the acquisition cycle.
- Convene the Army Cost Review Board (CRB) to recommend the ACP to the ASA(FM&C) for approval and presentation to Army leadership, assisting their role in making programming and budgeting decisions at MDRs.
- Completion of an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA provides information to the decision authority at the MS I review to assist in determining whether any of proposed alternatives to an existing system offer sufficient military and/or economic benefit to be worth the cost.
- For each system alternative, development of employment concept, training concept, logistics support concept, contracting concept, and test and evaluation concept.
- Development of a Standardization and Interoperability (S&I) plan.

- Development of a System MANPRINT Management Plan (SMMP) to formalize the work of the MANPRINT Joint Working Group (MJWG) and ensure an effective MANPRINT program is implemented.
- Charter the Test Integration Working Group (TIWG).
- Initial development of the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).

Milestone I — Approval to Begin a New Acquisition Program.

MS I marks the first direct interaction between the planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition management systems. The primary documents produced during the planning phase of the PPBS form the basis for such assessments. These documents are the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Services long range modernization and investment plans. Cost as an independent variable (CAIV) life-cycle based objectives are normally established at this MS and refined and updated at subsequent MSs. The purpose of the MS I decision is to determine if the results of phase 0 warrant establishing a new acquisition program and to approve entry into Phase I, Program Definition and Risk Reduction. At MS I, the MDA normally considers the items below:

- Threat assessment*
- Aquisition strategy (AS)
- CAIV life cycle-based objectives
- Phase 0 exit criteria status and Phase I exit criteria plans
- Concept APB
- AoA and studies supporting need for new program
- Environmental consequences*

- Adequacy of resources (manpower and funding)
- Hierarchy of materiel alternatives*
- Affordability assessment
- Updated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) support requirement

* *Normally not applicable to ACAT IA programs.*

At MS I, the MDA's ADM approves the program AS, CAIV objectives, the concept APB, and phase I exit criteria (program-specific results required in the next phase).

Phase I — Program Definition and Risk Reduction.

During this phase program risk is identified and reduced as much as possible before making the crucial decision on selecting a feasible workable solution that best meets program objectives and whether to enter Phase II — Engineering and Manufacturing Development with the intent eventually to field/deploy. This phase focuses on defining critical design characteristics (to include manpower, personnel, and training constraints), addressing manufacturing technologic deficiencies, and assessing production feasibility. Analysis, simulation models, or prototypes are used to optimize design and resolve problems. Mission effectiveness and life-cycle cost depend upon integrated system/subsystem relationship and trade-offs; therefore no subsystems are designed or prototyped independently of the prime system.

Consistent with evolutionary requirements definition, the PM works with the CBTDEV or CBTDEV's representative to: establish proposed performance objectives, identify production rate requirements for peacetime, contingency support, and reconstitution objectives, and develop proposed cost-schedule-performance trade-offs for decision at MS II.

Detailed work on the ILS begins during this phase, so that these activities do not pace fielding. DT&E and Early User Test and Experimentation (EUTE) generally are conducted in this phase to support a milestone decision. T&E is conducted, as appropriate, with training simulators, test equipment tools, and other subsystems. Detailed work is continued in MANPRINT.

The POE and the AoA are updated by the PM, and CEAC updates the CCA. The CRB convenes to recommend the ACP to the ASA(FM&C) for approval and presentation to Army leadership at MS II. A formal risk analysis is also completed. The ORD is updated supporting work to be undertaken in phase II. The updated ADM records the decisions and provides an audit trail for future use.

Milestone II — Approval to Enter Engineering and Manufacturing Development.

The purpose of the MS II decision point is to determine if the results of phase I warrant continuation of the program and to approve entry into Phase II - Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The MDA rigorously assesses affordability, program risks, and risk management at this decision MS. This is critical because of the significant resource commitment that is associated with this decision. Establishing the development APB requires effective interaction among the

requirements determination, acquisition management, and PPBS/PPBES systems. The low-rate initial production (LRIP) strategy is normally considered at this MS. At MS II, the MDA normally considers the following items:

- Acquisition strategy (AS)
- CAIV progress
- Development APB
- Phase I exit criteria status and phase II exit criteria plans
- LRIP quantities*
- Validated threat assessment*
- Prototyping/demonstration results
- Potential environmental consequences
- Adequacy of resources (manpower and funding)
- Independent cost and manpower estimates
- Updated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) support requirement

Normally not applicable to ACAT IA programs; a favorable LRIP decision authorizes the PM to commence LRIP only. The PM is only authorized to commence full-scale production with further approval of the MDA.

At this decision point, the MDA's ADM approves the AS, CAIV objectives, the development APB, phase II exit criteria, and LRIP quantities.

Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Development approval typically involves a consideration of LRIP quantities which must be identified by the MDA for all ACAT I programs. If early production

indicates higher costs than estimated, the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) may need to consider CAIV issues regarding problematic cost drivers. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) determines the quantity of LRIP systems required for operational testing. For ACAT I programs, authority to proceed with LRIP normally requires a separate program review and MDA approval at a point specified in the MS II decision. For ACAT ID programs there is normally no more than one decision (i.e. either LRIP or full production) at the DAB level.

The MDA should consider the following in making the LRIP quantity determination: the fabrication complexity of the system, the relatively small number to be procured and high unit cost, the length of the production period, the need to preserve the industrial base for the system, and the AS that is most advantageous to the Government. For programs past MS II, but not past LRIP, the determination of LRIP quantity should be made as soon as reasonably possible. LRIP quantities for ACAT II, III, and IV programs are determined using the requirements for ACAT I programs as guidelines. At the LRIP decision, the MDA normally considers the following items:

- Acquisition strategy (AS)*
- APB*
- Phase II exit criteria*
- Threat assessment*
- Test results*
- Initial production experience*
- Environmental consequences*
- CAIV progress
- Adequacy of resources (manpower and funding)*
- Updated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) support requirement

- Independent cost and manpower estimates

* Normally not applicable to ACAT IA programs

Phase II — Engineering and Manufacturing Development.

The purpose of Engineering and Manufacturing Development is to design, fabricate, test, and evaluate a complete system. This includes the principal items necessary for its production, operation, and support. RAM design, testing, and evaluation of components should be integrated into the earliest part of this phase. When making design trade-offs, it is not standard practice to design either to the performance floor or to the cost ceiling. Trade-offs are done in a manner which gives optimal overall system cost-effectiveness. Simplicity is emphasized as opposed to sophistication. High priority is placed on ensuring adequate quantities of equipment can be afforded. The PM has the authority to make trade-offs within the bounds of the ORD, the last ADM, and any special conditions imposed by the MDA. Producibility engineering and planning are completed to include development and validation of a complete Technical Data Package (TDP), and specification and "prove out" of the required production resources. The ILS is fully developed and it is tested in technical and user tests via a System Support Package (SSP) which includes the logistics support elements including training materiel, training ammunition, training devices, and automated test equipment. The MANPRINT program is now geared to validate what are the manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) requirements, what MPT

are available, and what are the appropriate trade-offs.

Production Qualification Test and Evaluation (PQT&E) is conducted by policy, and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) is conducted by law and must be conducted before a production decision. Again, the POE is updated by the PM, while CEAC updates the CCA. The CRB again convenes to recommend an updated ACP to the ASA(FM&C) for approval and presentation to Army leadership at MS III. The AoA will be updated, if required, using updated threat data, test data, and more detailed cost estimates. The TEMP and S&I plan are updated as necessary. The ADM is updated to reflect decisions that change the program baseline. A production readiness review is conducted. The ORD is updated as necessary. Coordination continues, as appropriate, with TSG, COE, and Office of the General Counsel (OGC).

Milestone III — Production or Fielding/Deployment Approval.

The purpose of this MS III decision point is to authorize program production and fielding. A favorable decision at this MS represents a commitment to build, deploy, and support the system. The MDA should confirm the affordability of the proposed system, determine that the materiel item is approved for Service use as part of the production approval process, ensure that the design is stable and producible, and that production processes have been proofed. At this MS, the MDA's ADM approves the AS, a realistic production APB, and phase III exit criteria, if appropriate.

The decision to proceed beyond LRIP cannot be finalized for ACAT I programs until the DOT&E Beyond LRIP and LFT&E reports are received by

Congress. At MS III, the MDA normally considers the following items.

- Acquisition strategy (AS)
- Production APB
- Phase II exit criteria
- Threat assessment*
- Test results
- Initial production experience*
- Environmental consequences*
- CAIV progress
- Adequacy of resources (manpower and funding)
- Independent cost and manpower estimates
- Updated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) support requirement

Normally not applicable to ACAT IA programs

Phase III — Production, Fielding/Deployment, and Operational Support.

System performance and quality is normally monitored by follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) during this phase. Program budget execution status is periodically reviewed by both the planning, programming, and budgeting and acquisition management systems. The results of field experience to include operational readiness rates are continuously monitored, particularly during the early stages of this phase. The objectives are to assess the ability of the system to perform as intended, identify and incorporate into production lots minor engineering change proposals to meet required capabilities, and identify the need for major upgrades or modifications. Support plans should be implemented to ensure support resources are acquired and deployed with the system.

Successful completion of DT&E, OT&E, and MS III approval permit production at rates based on manufacturing efficiency, operational demand, and resource availability. Initial production items are used for production test and follow-on evaluation as necessary. Production will not, however, be suppressed to await completion of FOT&E. Deployment does not await conclusion of this evaluation. A validated Technical Data Package (TDP) is essential for use in competitive procurement. Therefore, initial production normally will be conducted by the MATDEV. Production rights ordinarily are obtained by the government. Where economies can be achieved, second production sources are established at the earliest possible date, after a proven TDP is available.

Additional Considerations.

The above discussion examined the activities performed in each phase of the nominal life-cycle of an acquisition system according to the current *DODD 5000.1, DOD Regulation 5000.2R, and AR 70-1*. This is not to imply that all system developments <u>must</u> follow this exact sequencing of life-cycle phases and activities. On the contrary, *DOD Regulation 5000.2R* specifically authorizes and encourages a PM to devise program structures and acquisition strategies to fit the particulars of a program, an approach called "tailoring." Additionally, where justified (for example, a nondevelopmental item (NDI) acquisition), milestones and phases may be omitted or combined, a procedure called "streamlining." Other aspects of acquisition planning and strategy; for example, involving preplanned product improvement (P3I) and technology insertion can also be accommodated under

the broad guidance and direction contained in *DODD 5000.1 and DOD Regulation 5000.2*. What remains constant is the task to develop and deliver combat-capable, cost-effective, and supportable systems to our Armed Forces.

ACQUISITION DOCUMENTATION

Acquisition management documentation is designed to support the management process as the life-cycle development of a materiel system progresses. In addition, the decisions of the MDA are articulated in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).

Materiel Requirements Documents.

Materiel requirements documents establish the need for a materiel acquisition program, how the materiel will be employed, and what the materiel must be capable of doing. As the acquisition program progresses, statements of required performance and design specifications become more and more specific. The MNS is the document that initiates the acquisition system management process. The ORD is the document that defines the system capabilities needed to satisfy an approved MNS, and is developed during Phase 0, Concept Exploration.

Mission Need Statement (MNS). The MNS is a nonsystem-specific statement of operational capability need. Mission needs may be identified by the Unified and Specified Commands, the Military Departments, OSD, or the Joint Staff. The CBTDEV is the proponent for the development of the MNS, but other participants in the process include the MATDEV, manpower and personnel planners, the TNGDEV, and the logistician.

In preparing the MNS, mission needs are identified as a direct result of continuing assessments of current and projected capabilities in the context of changing military threats and national defense policy. The MNS reflects an evaluation that a nonmateriel solution is not a viable consideration. Potential materiel alternatives such as commercial systems, or known systems or programs addressing similar needs that are deployed or are in development or in production by any of the Services or allied nations are identified in the document. The MNS describes key boundary conditions related to infrastructure support that may impact on satisfying the need: logistics support; transportation; mapping, charting, and geodesy support; manpower, personnel, and training constraints; command control, communications, and intelligence interfaces; security; and standardization or interoperability within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or with other allies or DOD components. The document also contains a description of operational environments (including conventional; initial nuclear weapon effects; nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination; electronic; and natural) in which the developing system is expected to operate. The MNS is a one-term document which is not revised. Potential ACAT I / IA MNSs format and content is in CJCSI 3170.01 , Enclosure A.

MNSs that could potentially result in the initiation of new ACAT I programs are forwarded to the JROC for review and confirmation that the mission cannot be satisfied by a nonmateriel solution. The JROC determines the validity of the identified need, assigns a joint priority as appropriate, and forwards the MNS to the USD(A&T) for approval. For approved MNSs, a subordinate OIPT of the DAB

reviews them for materiel alternatives and recommended study efforts prior to the DAB convening for a MS 0, Concept Studies Approval, review.

Operational Requirements Document (ORD). Each concept proposed at MS I is described in an initial ORD in terms of minimum acceptable requirements (thresholds) that defines the system capabilities needed to satisfy a MNS. When appropriate, objectives for each parameter representing a measurable, beneficial increment in operational capability or operations and support are established. Objectives should not be stated if they cannot be supported with operational rationale.

ACAT ID and IAM ORDs are approved by the JROC unless previously delegated. All other Army-generated ORDs are approved by the CG, TRADOC. ORDs are updated and expanded for MS II to include thresholds and objectives for more detailed and refined performance capabilities and characteristics based on the results of trade-off studies and testing conducted during phase I. After MS II, ORDs are only modified when there is a change in the mission need or the CBTDEV/TNGDEV determines a need to significantly change the performance envelope represented by the ORD minimum acceptable value (threshold) requirements. The MATDEV uses the ORD to develop system performance requirements for contract specifications during each acquisition phase.

ORDs specify at least two levels of performance characteristics, minimum acceptable value (threshold) requirement and objective requirement *(DOD Regulation 5000.2R and CJCSI 3170.01).* The objective requirement for parameters is provided only when the CBTDEV/TNGDEV desire a relevant and operationally significant capability above the threshold requirement. ORDs identify recommended KPPs to appropriately focus the acquisition effort and decision making. ORDs are adjusted only after the CBTDEV or TNGDEV, as appropriate, and the MATDEV agree that such changes are necessary to authorize development of the system or TADSS to the required capability. ORD format and content is in *DOD Regulation 5000.2R.*

Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs). CRDs can be a combination of two or more MNS/ORDs/programs, which, when considered together form a system-of-systems. The CRD identifies systems requirements to define a mission area and serves as a guide for ORD development. The CRD is the bridge between the MNS and program ORDs. It is appropriate when a mission area requires more than one ORD and provides guidance to support ORD development. The CRD should be developed after the MNS is validated and prior to MS 0. The CRD may identify common requirements that must be included in all program ORDs. Approval authorities may add or delete KPPs to ensure program ORDs are consistent with the CRD. The CRD is not an ORD and is not intended to be testable. It is a living document that reflects changes in threat or technologies.

Operational Need Statement (ONS). Operational field commanders use an ONS to document the urgent need for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment. The ONS provides an opportunity to the field commander, outside of the acquisition and CBTDEV/ TNGDEV communities, to initiate the requirements determination process. The ONS is not a

materiel requirements document. The CBTDEV, TNGDEV or MATDEV communities do not initiate or develop an ONS.

Response to an ONS varies depending on the criticality of the need for the proposed item. Response can range from a HQDA directed requirement and fielding of a materiel system to the forwarding of the action to TRADOC for review and routine action. HQDA may decline to favorably consider an ONS for a variety of reasons, including conflicting needs, higher priorities for funding, existence of a similar system, or nonconcurrence of the criticality of the need. The response to an ONS is based on an ARSTAF validation supported by TRADOC, AMC, and MATDEV reviews. ODCSOPS determines validity of the need, availability of technology, and source of resources to fill this requirement. If the need is determined to be urgent, critical, and can be resourced (at least for the present situation) a directed requirement may result. If no solution is available or if the need is not urgent or critical the ONS will be turned over to CBTDEVs, TNGDEVs and MATDEVs to find solution. All ONS are reviewed by the CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs to determine applicability to future requirements or continuing need for which a standard requirement (ORD) and acquisition is needed. If validation of the ONS indicates that the concept has potential for Army-wide application and development of a new system is appropriate, TRADOC will initiate a MNS and/or ORD as appropriate. If validation indicates that there exists a specific limited but necessary critical need, HQDA may issue a directed requirement for ONS having Army-wide application; however, tailored development and standard documentation should be used in this instance.

The ONS process may shorten NDI acquisition by shortcutting the requirements determination process enroute to a buy decision; however; the ONS is more important to users because it starts the requirements determination process moving in the absence of any other impetus.

Other Service Requirements.

The CBTDEV/TNGDEV reviews other Service warfighting capability requirements documents for potential Army interest. When the Army chooses to participate in the RDA of another Service program, HQDA initiates action to validate and approve the documentation. When another Service requirement document, to include an approved production RFP, adequately describes an Army requirement, the document may be approved as the Army requirement, that is, an ORD. The Army may also acquire other Service equipment with an national stock number (NSN) that has been identified through the MATDEV market investigation and meets an approved Army need. For joint programs, requirements documents are prepared and processed in accordance with the lead services procedures. Service peculiar requirements may be documented in the other Service's ORDs and other requirement documents.

Catalog of Approved Requirements Documents (CARDS).

CARDS is an unclassified DCSOPS publication that provides information on the status of approved requirements documents. It includes both active and inactive documents. An active document or assignment of a CARDS reference number does not automatically authorize the expenditure of funds. Each program must compete for funds in the Army prioritization

and programming process. ODCSOPS assigns a CARDS reference number to each requirements document after approval and prior to publication and distribution.

Program Review Documentation and Program Plans.

The MDA is responsible for identifying the minimum amount of documentation necessary for milestone review purposes. Only those mandatory formats called for by *DOD Regulation 5000.2R* are required. All other formats are used as guidance only.

Program plans are a description of the detailed activities necessary for executing the acquisition strategy. Program plans belong to the PM and are used by the PM to manage program execution throughout the life-cycle of the program. The PM, in coordination with the PEO, determines the type and number of program plans. Program plans, excluding the TEMP, are <u>not</u> required in support of milestone decisions and are not required to be used as milestone documentation or as periodic reports. Some of the typical program plans used to support the execution of a program's AS are:

System Threat Assessment Report (STAR). The STAR is the basic authoritative threat assessment that supports the development and acquisition of a particular ACAT I or II system. The STAR contains an integrated assessment of projected enemy capabilities (doctrine, tactics, hardware, organization and forces) at initial operational capability (IOC) and IOC plus 10 years, to limit, neutralize or destroy the system. It explicitly identifies critical intelligence category (CICs) which are a series of threat capabilities, or thresholds established by the program which could critically impact the effectiveness and

survivability of the program. The STAR is a dynamic document that is continually updated and refined as a program develops. It is approved and validated in support of ASARC/DAB reviews. This report is the primary threat reference for the ORD, the integrated program summary (IPS), the AoA, and the TEMP developed in support of a MDR. The STAR is approved by DCSINT and validated by the DIA for all ACAT I programs at MS I and updated for all ACAT ID programs at MS II and MS III. It is prepared for DCSINT review and approval for ACAT II and III programs, to include highly sensitive classified programs unless specifically waived by the MDA.

Modified Integrated Program Summary (MIPS). The MIPS, with its annexes, is the primary Army decision document used to facilitate top-level acquisition milestone decisionmaking. It provides a comprehensive summary of program structure, status, assessment, plans, and recommendations by the PM and the PEO. The primary functions of the MIPS include a summary of where the program is versus where it should be; a description of where the program is going and how it will get there; an identification of program risk areas and plans for closing risks; and a basis for establishing explicit program cost, schedule, and performance objectives and thresholds in the stand-alone APB and program-specific exit criteria for the next acquisition phase. The MIPS provides answers to the following five key MDR core issues:

1. Is the system still needed?
2. Does the system work (from the viewpoints of the user, functional staffs, and the PM)?
3. Are major risks identified and manageable?

Acquisition Strategy

Functional | Strategies

- **Logistical Strategies**
  - Integrated Logistical Support Plan
  - Materiel Fielding Plan
  - Computer Resource Management Plan
- **Contracting Strategy**
  - Acquisition Plan
- **Test and Evaluation Strategy**
  - Test and Evaluation Master Plan
- **Other * Strategies**
  - Other Plans

Program Management Documents

*Other Strategies Include Industrial Preparedness, Environmental, Standardization, Interoperability, Affordability, and Non-Developmental Item Utilization

Figure 11-8

4. Is the program affordable (is adequate programming in the POM)?
5. Has the system been subjected to CAIV analysis?

NOTE: *For ACAT ID/IAM MDRs the Army MIPS is sometimes called a Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP).*

Acquisition Strategy (AS). The AS is the framework for planning, directing, and managing a materiel acquisition program. It states the concepts and objectives that direct and control overall program execution from program initiation through post-production support. An AS is required for all Army acquisition programs. The AS documents how the acquisition program will be tailored and identifies risks and plans to reduce or eliminate risks. The AS, prepared by the MATDEV/CBTDEV team, is a living document that matures throughout the program. It provides fundamental guidance to the functional elements of the MATDEV/CBTDEV organizations. Individual functional strategies leading to the preparation of detailed program plans are required to implement the AS as depicted in figure 11-8.

Environmental Analysis. This is a Congressionally mandated analysis of the potential environmental impacts of weapons systems. It identifies land, sea or air space requirements of the most promising alternatives and describes the potential effects on the land, sea, and air environment. It also describes the potential impacts on public health and safety by the development,

test manufacturing, basing operation, and support of the proposed system. The environmental impact data is weighed against system cost, schedule, and performance in deciding how to best minimize environmental harm.

Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP documents the overall structure and objectives of the test and evaluation program. It provides a framework within which to generate detailed test and evaluation plans and it documents schedule and resource implications associated with the test and evaluation program. The TEMP identifies the necessary developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) and operational test and evaluation (OT&E) activities. It relates program schedule, test management strategy and structure, and required resources to critical operational issues; critical technical parameters; minimum acceptable operational performance requirements; evaluation criteria; and milestone decisions points. The TEMP is developed in phase 0 to support MS I and is updated before each MS review, or whenever there is a major change to the program or a baseline breach. Detailed mandatory procedures and format for the TEMP are at *Appendix III, DOD Regulation 5000.2R.*

Project Office Estimate (POE) and Component Cost Analysis (CCA). These documents are prepared in support of MS I and all subsequent MS reviews. The cost estimates are explicitly based on the program objectives, operational requirements, and contract specifications for the system, including plans for such matters as peacetime utilization rates and the maintenance concept. The estimates identify all elements of additional cost that would be entailed by a decision to proceed with development,

production, and operation of the system. They are based on a careful assessment of risks and reflect a realistic appraisal of the level of cost most likely to be realized. Two cost estimates are prepared. The POE is done by the TRADOC-led ICT in support of MS I, and the program office in support of MS II and all subsequent milestones. The other estimate is prepared by an organization that does not report through the acquisition chain. In the Army, this cost analysis, entitled CCA, is prepared by CEAC for major systems.

Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA provides information to the decision authority at the MS I review to assist in determining whether any of proposed alternatives to an existing system offer sufficient military and/or economic benefit to be worth the cost.

The AoA focuses on broad operational capabilities, potential technology concepts, and materiel solutions that could satisfy the MNS. It examines the full range of materiel alternatives (including those identified in the MS 0 ADM). AoAs illuminate the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternatives being considered by identifying sensitivities of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions (for example, threat) or variables (for example, selected performance capabilities). The AoA provides insights regarding KPPs for preferred alternatives and indicates how these parameters contribute to increases in operational capability. It identifies opportunities for trade-offs among performance, cost, and schedule; and determines operational effectiveness and costs (including estimates of training and logistics impacts) for all alternatives.

If a new program is approved, the AoA may be useful for identifying

alternatives that will be refined by cost performance trade-off studies during Phase I - Program Definition and Risk Reduction. It should be useful for limiting the number of alternatives to be considered during phase I. The MDA may direct updates to the AoA for subsequent decision points, if conditions warrant. For example, AoA may be useful for examining cost-performance trade-offs at MS II.

Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). The APBs consist of the concept baseline, the development baseline, and the production baseline approved at MS I, II, and III, respectively. The purpose of the baselines is to enhance program stability and to provide a critical reference point for measuring and reporting the status of program implementation. Each baseline contains objectives for key cost, schedule, and performance parameters. The APB must track with the program's approved ORD performance parameters. Key parameters must meet minimum acceptable requirements, known as thresholds, at each milestone decision point. The thresholds establish deviation limits from which a PM may not trade-off cost or performance without authorization from the MDA. Failure to meet the threshold requires a reevaluation of alternative concepts or design approaches. APBs and deviation reporting are required for all acquisition categories.

Manpower Estimate Report (MER). This report documents the total number of personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) that are or will be needed to operate, maintain, support, and train for a ACAT ID program upon full operational deployment. The validity of the MER is dependent upon force structure, personnel management, and

readiness requirements, as well as on the acquisition decision on the size of the buy.

Typical Waivers and Reports.

Live-Fire Test and Evaluation Waiver. This certifies to Congress when live-fire survivability testing of a covered major system would be unreasonably expensive and impractical.

Developmental Test and Evaluation Report. This provides the results of developmental tests and evaluation to include live-fire test results and reports.

Early Operational Assessment Report. This provides information to support Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision with exit criteria at MS II.

Operational Test and Evaluation Report. This provides the results of initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E).

Live-Fire Test and Evaluation Report This an independent OSD report to Congress that provides test results and assessment of tests on a covered major system or product improvement program realistic survivability testing, and a major munitions or missile program realistic lethality testing. This report is mandated by Congress.

Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production Report. This provides Congress with an assessment of the adequacy of initial test and evaluation and whether the test results confirm the items are effective and suitable for combat prior to the MS III decision to proceed beyond low-rate initial production. This report is mandated by Congress.

Other Documentation.

Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM). The ADM documents the milestone decision authority's decision on the program's AS goals, thresholds, and the exit criteria for the next phase of the program. The ADM is used to document the decision for all ACAT programs.

Integrated Program Assessment (IPA). Information derived from the PM's MIPS allows the DOD OIPT to develop the IPA for program MDR. The IPA summarizes the DOD independent assessment of the PM's program. It identifies critical areas, issues, and recommendations for the MDA. For ACAT ID and IAM programs the IPA is prepared by the OIPT, approved by the OIPT leader, and submitted to the USD(A&T) or ASD(C3I), as appropriate.

ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW (O&R) PROCESS

The materiel acquisition process is controlled by decisions made as the result of various acquisition program MDRs conducted by appropriate management levels at program milestones. The reviews are the mechanism for checking program progress against approved plans and for developing revised APBs. Approval of APBs and plans in these reviews does not constitute program funding approval; allocation of funds in the PPBS process is required.

Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD).

As part of recent acquisition reform efforts, *DODD 5000.1* directed the DOD acquisition community to apply the concept of IPPD throughout the acquisition process to the maximum extent practicable. IPPD is a management technique that integrates all acquisition activities starting with requirements definition through production, fielding/deployment and operational support in order to optimize the design, manufacturing, business, and supportability processes. At the core of IPPD implementation are the Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). The IPT is composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines working together with a team leader to build successful and balanced programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and timely recommendations to facilitate decisionmaking. There are two general levels of IPTs: Overarching IPTs (OIPTs) focus on strategic guidance, program assessment, and issue resolution. Working level IPTs (WIPTs) identify and resolve program issues, determine program status, and seek opportunities for acquisition reform.

Overarching Integrated Product Teams (OIPTs). In support of all ACAT ID and IAM programs, an OIPT is formed to provide assistance, oversight, and review as that program proceeds through its acquisition life-cycle. The OIPT for ACAT ID programs is led by the appropriate OSD Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). The DASD (C3I Acquisition) designates the OIPT Leader for each ACAT IAM. Program OIPTs are composed of the PM, PEO, Component Staff, Joint Staff, USD (A&T) staff, and the OSD staff principals or their representatives, involved in oversight and review of a particular ACAT ID or IAM program.

In the Army, an OIPT is established at the direction of the MDA for ACAT IC, IAC, II, IIA, III, IIIA and IV programs. The

OIPT is a team of DA staff action officers and the PM/PEO/TSM responsible for integration of oversight issues to be raised to the DAB/ASARC/MAISRC/IPR review forums.

The secretary/facilitator of the OIPT for ACAT I and II programs is the OASA(RDA) or ODISC4 DASC (depending where ARSTAF system coordination resides) for that specific program. OIPT membership consist of empowered individuals appointed by ASARC members (ACAT IC, or II programs), by MAISRC members (ACAT IAC and IIA programs) and the MDA for ACAT III and IV programs. Team membership is tailored based on the needs and level of oversight for the individual program. Typical Army OIPT responsibilities include:

- meeting together and individually with the PM/PEO throughout the program progress to raise and resolve issues early, providing recommendations for tailoring and streamlining the program;
- linking vertically with the PM's WIPTs;
- helping the PM successfully achieve a milestone decision;
- developing a memorandum documenting the issues/risks to be raised to the MDA with a recommendation to the MDA as to whether an actual ASARC, Army MAISRC, or IPR needs to be convened, or a "paper ASARC/MAISRC/IPR" can be held; and,
- providing an independent assessment for the MDA in preparation of the MDR.

The OIPT, at all levels, generally follow the general procedures which are described below for a typical ACAT ID and IAM program. Initially the OIPT meets to determine the extent of Working Integrated Products Team (WIPT) support needed for the potential program, who shall be members of the WIPTs, the appropriate MS for program initiation, and the minimum information needed for the program initiation review. The OIPT Leader is responsible for taking action to resolve issues when requested by any member of the OIPT or when directed by MDA. The goal is to resolve as many issues and concerns at the lowest level possible, and to expeditiously escalate issues that need resolution at a higher level, bringing only the highest level issues to the MDA for decision. The OIPT meets as necessary over the life of a program.

In support of a planned MDR by the DAB or DOD MAISRC, the OIPT normally convenes two weeks in advance of the anticipated review to assess information and recommendations being provided to the MDA. Additionally, at that meeting, the PM will propose the WIPT structure, documentation, and strategy for the next acquisition phase, for approval by the MDA. The OIPT Leader, in coordination with the component acquisition executive, recommends to the MDA whether the anticipated review should go forward as planned.

The OIPT leader provides an integrated program assessment (IPA), previously discussed, to the DAB or DOD MAISRC at major program reviews or MDRs using data gathered through the IPT process. The OIPT Leader's assessment focuses on core acquisition management issues and takes account of independent assessments that are normally prepared by OIPT members.

Working Level Integrated Product Teams (WIPTs). WIPTs are established for all acquisition programs. The number and membership of the WIPTs are tailored to each acquisition developmental phase based on the level of oversight and the program needs. They are comprised of DA and/or Service/functional action officers and normally chaired by the PM or designee. WIPTs provide advice to the PM and help prepare program strategies and plans. Each WIPT focuses on a particular topic(s), such as test, cost/performance (CAIV), risk management (both programmatic and safety), etc. When necessary, an Integrating IPT (IIPT), a type of WIPT, is initiated by the PM to coordinate all WIPT efforts and cover all topics not otherwise assigned to another WIPT.

The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).

The function of the DAB is to review DOD ACAT ID programs to ensure that they are ready for transition from one program phase to the next. The DAB is the DOD senior level forum for advising the USD(A&T) on critical decisions concerning ACAT ID programs. The DAB is composed of DOD senior acquisition officials. The board is chaired by the USD(A&T). The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) serves as the vice chairman. Other principal members of the DAB include the Principal Deputy USD(A&T); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements); the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E); Acquisition Executives (SAEs) of the Army, Navy, Air Force; the cognizant Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Leader; the cognizant PEOs and PMs; and the DAB Secretary.

Approximately one week prior to the DAB review, a DAB Readiness Meeting (DRM) meets to pre-brief the USD(A&T), VCJCS, and other DAB participants, to include cognizant PEO(s) and PM(s). The purpose of the meeting is to update the USD(A&T) on the latest status of the program and to inform the senior acquisition officials of any outstanding issues. Normally the OIPT leader briefs the DRM. If outstanding issues are resolved at the DRM, the USD(A&T) may decide that a formal DAB meeting is not required and issue the ADM following the DRM.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviews all deficiencies that may necessitate development of major systems prior to any consideration by the DAB or, as appropriate, DOD MAISRC at MS I. The JROC validates an identified mission need, assigns a joint potential designator for meeting the need, and forwards the MNS with JROC recommendations to the USD(A&T). In addition, the JROC continues a role in validation of KPPs in program baselines prior to a scheduled DAB, or where applicable, DOD MAISRC, reviews for ACAT I and ACAT IA programs prior to all successive MDRs.

The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) reviews the program office and component cost analysis life-cycle cost estimates, to include the Component cost position, prior to the scheduled DAB/DOD MAISRC and determines if additional analysis is required. The product is an independent cost position assessment and recommendations based on its independent review of the life-cycle cost estimate(s), validation of the methology used to make the cost estimate(s), and determination if additional analysis or studies is required.

Major Program (ACAT ID) Review Process

Figure 11-9

A formal DAB review is the last step of the DAB review process. Following presentations by the OIPT and a full discussion, the USD(A&T) as DAE decides to continue, alter, or terminate the program. This decision is published as an ADM. The oversight & review process flow for an ACAT ID program is at figure 11-9. With the approval of the USD(A&T), other committee reviews may be held for special purposes, such as to develop recommendations for the Under Secretary on decisions other than milestone or program reviews (for example, release of "withhold funds," baseline changes, AS changes).

The DOD Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC).

The MAISRC is the DOD senior level forum for advising DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) on critical decisions concerning ACAT IAM programs.

The MAISRC is chaired by the CIO . Principal members of the MAISRC include representatives from the offices of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); Director, Test, Systems Engineering & Evaluation (DTSEE); Director of Acquisition Program Integration (API); The Deputy ASD(C3I);

User representatives; and Component CIO or Acquisition Executive(s), as appropriate. The Deputy ASD(C3I Acquisition) is the MAISRC Executive Secretary and either leads or designates the leader of the OIPT.

The Army Systems Acquisitions Review Council (ASARC).

The ASARC is the Army's senior-level advisory body for ACAT IC and II programs and ACAT ID programs (DAB managed) prior to a DAB. The ASARC convenes at formal milestones to determine a program or system's readiness to enter the next phase of the materiel acquisition cycle, and makes recommendations to the AAE on those programs for which the AAE is the MDA. An ASARC may also be convened at any time to review the status of a program. The ASARC is co-chaired by the AAE and the VCSA.

The HQDA Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC).

The MAISRC is the Army's senior-level advisory body supporting the AAE and DISC4 (CIO) in their acquisition oversight role of ACAT IAC and IIA programs. The purpose of the oversight is to assist managers in resolving major issues supporting information requirements. The MAISRC is co-chaired by the DISC4 and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement (as delegated by the AAE).

ASARC/MAISRC membership includes the DUSA(OR); DUSA(IA); ASA(FM&C); ASA(IL&E); ASA(MRA); CG, AMC; CG, TRADOC; General Counsel; DISC4; DCSLOG; DCSOPS; DCSPER; DCSINT; Chief, Army Reserve; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Chief, Legislative Liaison; Military Deputy to the ASA(RDA);

Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; CG, OPTEC and the Army IG (non-voting member). The following organizations are invited to attend if a significant issue is identified within their area of responsibility: The Chief of Engineers; Surgeon General; CG, Military Traffic Management Command; CG, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command; Commander, Safety Center; and the Chief of Public Affairs. The AAE makes the final decision as to attendance at the ASARC or MAISRC.

The effectiveness of the ASARC/ MAISRC review process results from presentation of thorough analysis of all relevant issues and face-to-face discussion among the principals from the Army Secretariat, ARSTAF, and Major Commands (AMC and TRADOC).

The Executive Secretary for the ASARC or MAISRC is responsible for the administrative control of the ASARC or MAISRC meeting. In addition the ASARC/ MAISRC Executive Secretary coordinates Army participation in the DAB/MAISRC meetings.

In-Process Review (IPR).

The IPR is a formal review forum for ACAT III, IIIA and IV programs. General policies for reviews for IPR programs are the same as for ACAT I and II programs. Reviews are conducted at milestones and at other times deemed necessary by the MDA. The MDA or designee chairs the IPR.

The IPR brings together representatives of the MATDEV, the CBTDEV, the trainer, the logistician, and the independent evaluators for a joint review and decision on proceeding to the next phase of development. Their purpose is to provide recommendations, with supporting rationale, as a basis for system concept, system development, type classification, and

production decisions by the appropriate level of authority. They are the forums where agencies responsible for participating in the materiel acquisition process can present their views and ensure that those views are considered during development, test, evaluation, and production. Unless informed otherwise, the MATDEV is delegated IPR authority for the system. Participation is extended to the appropriate testing agencies, HQDA representatives, and to such others as the IPR Chairman designates.

TESTING AND EVALUATION

There are three major subprocesses that support the overall management process of a materiel acquisition system. The first major subprocess is testing and evaluation (T&E). All Army acquisition programs must be supported by a T&E strategy reflecting an adequate and efficient T&E program. The primary purpose of all T&E is to identify, assess, and reduce program risk (cost, schedule, technical). The T&E process consists of comparing the system or components against user requirements and specifications through testing, and evaluating the results to assess progress of design, performance, and supportability. The primary product of the T&E process is information (hard facts) for the MDA that makes a direct contribution to the timely development, production, and fielding of systems that meet the CBTDEV's requirements and are operationally effective and suitable.

The planning, programming, and budgeting for T&E begins early in the materiel acquisition process, concurrent with coordination of the draft MNS and ORD. Early integration is accomplished through the use of the Test Integration Working Group (TIWG). The primary purpose of the TIWG is to optimize the use of the appropriate T&E expertise, instrumentation, targets, facilities, simulations, and models to implement test integration, thereby reducing costs to the Army. A Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), previously discussed, is the basic planning document for all life-cycle T&E related to a particular acquisition system. It is initially prepared by the ICT in phase 0, to support a MS I decision; and updated for each subsequent milestone review, when the APB has been breached, or on other occasions when the program has changed significantly. The DUSA(OR) is the TEMP approval authority for all ACAT I programs on the OSD T&E oversight list. TEMP format and content is in *DOD Regulation 5000.2R*.

A continuous evaluation process (CEP) is used to provide a continuous flow of T&E information. The data generated in early development phases is visible and maintained as the system moves into the formal testing activities, thereby avoiding duplication of testing. This process is continued through a system's post deployment activities to ensure responsible, timely, and effective assessment of the status of the system.

There are two broad categories of acquisition T&E: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). General characteristics of DT&E and OT&E are shown in figure 11-10.

Characteristics of Developmental and Operational Testing & Evaluation

Developmental T&E

- Technicians
- Laboratories
- Proving Grounds
- Developer's Perspective
- Technical Specifications
- **Army Materiel Command (AMC)**

  -- Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) - Developmental Tester

Operational T&E

- Troops
- Realistic Environment
- Tactical Operations
- User Views
- User Issues
- **Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC)**

  -- Evaluation Analysis Center (EAC) - Developmental Evaluator

  -- Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) - Operational Tester

  -- Operational Evaluation Command (OEC) - Operational Evaluator

Figure 11-10

DT&E is conducted to measure progress, usually of components/ subsystems; assist the engineering design and development process in verifying attainment of technical performance specifications and objectives; and prior to the first major production decision, demonstrate that all significant design problems (compatibility, interoperability, reliability, availability, maintainability, and supportability) have been identified and that solutions to the known problems are in hand. DT&E is usually conducted under controlled or laboratory conditions. Developmental Testing (DT) determines system safety and human factors performance. DT generally requires instrumentation and measurements and is accomplished in factory, laboratory, and proving ground environments. DT is planned, conducted, and monitored by the developing materiel agency (normally AMC).

The Test and Evaluation Command, (TECOM) is the developmental tester for AMC.

NOTE: As of the date of preparation of this chapter, the AMC's missions, functions, responsibilities, and resources for independent developmental evaluation, assessment, and associated analysis are being realigned under OPTEC as part of the Army's OPTEC XXI reengineering process. IN FY99, all independent developmental and operational evaluation, assessment, and associated analysis efforts will be consolidated under OPTEC in the Army Evaluation Command (AEC).

OT&E consists of field tests of any item (or key component) of weapons, equipment, or munitions for the purpose of determining the effectiveness, suitability, and

supportability for use in combat by typical military users, and the evaluation of the results of such tests. OT&E is conducted in realistic operational environments, with users that are representative of those expected to operate and maintain the system when fielded or deployed. Two examples of OT&E activities are:

- *Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E).* IOT&E is conducted before the production decision (MS III) to provide a credible estimate of operational effectiveness and suitability; and
- *Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E).* FOT&E is conducted on the deployed system to determine if required operational effectiveness and suitability are attained.

Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), was established on November 5, 1990 as a FOA of the Office of the CSA in response to a 1989 Defense Management Review (DMR). OPTEC, as the Army's independent operational tester and evaluator, is responsible for planning, conducting, and integrating all operational tests (OTs) and independent operational evaluations. OPTEC is chartered to be the Army's "honest broker" for determining systems operational effectiveness and suitability. OPTEC reports directly to the Army's most senior leadership for acquisition decisions.

The Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) is the operational tester for OPTEC. OPTEC's operational evaluator is the Operational Evaluation Command (OEC). OPTEC Test and Evaluation Coordination Offices (TECOs) provide on-site liaison between OPTEC and TRADOC schools/proponent centers/

commanders providing operational T&E expertise and assistance to the proponent activities. TECOs are located at Fort Benning, GA; Fort Gordon, GA; Fort Knox, KY; Fort Monroe, VA; Fort Lee, VA; Fort Leonard Wood, MO; Fort Rucker, AL; and Fort Leavenworth, KS.

OT&E (and DT&E events requiring soldiers) are funded through the Army's Test Schedule and Review Committee (TSARC) process. The TSARC is a HQDA GO/SES centralize management forum that meets semiannually to review and coordinate the resources required to support the tests to be included in the Army's Five-Year Test Program (FYTP). The TSARC is chaired by CG, OPTEC. The TSARC process operates under *AR 15-38*. When approved for inclusion in the FYTP, a program's outline test plan (OTP) becomes authority for tasking in the current and budget years. The OTP is an acquisition program's formal resource planning and tasking document.

INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS)

The second major subprocess in support of acquisition system management is Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). ILS is a disciplined, unified, and interactive approach to the management and technical activities necessary to integrate support considerations into system and equipment design; develop support requirements that are related consistently to readiness objectives, to design, and to each other; acquire the required support; and provide the required support during the operational phase at minimum cost.

ILS considerations are integrated into the system design effort throughout the acquisition management process. The objective is to ensure that the developed systems are reliable, maintainable,

transportable, and supportable. Concurrently, the required support resources must be developed, acquired, tested, evaluated, and deployed as an integral part of the materiel acquisition process. The 10 principal elements of ILS related to the overall system life-cycle are:

- design interface;
- maintenance planning;
- manpower and personnel;
- supply support;
- support equipment;
- training and training support;
- technical data;
- computer resources support;
- packaging, handling, storage and transportation; and
- facilities.

Logistics supportability is a subset of cost, schedule, and performance. A continuous interface between the program management office and the manpower and logistics communities should be maintained throughout the acquisition process. ILS plans and programs, including NATO or bilateral allied support, should be structured to meet peacetime readiness and wartime employment objectives and tailored to the specific system. Innovative manpower and support concepts should be considered early in the development process, primarily to influence the design of the system being acquired. Alternative support concepts should be assessed during the requirements and concept formulation phases and at other appropriate points of the acquisition system management process. ILS is described in detail in *AR 700-127*.

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL INTEGRATION (MANPRINT) PROGRAM

The third major subprocess in support of acquisition system management is the MANPRINT Program. MANPRINT is the Army's application of the DOD Human System Integration (HSI) requirements in systems acquisition *(DODD 5000.1 and DOD Regulation 5000.2R),* in compliance with *Title 10, USC*. MANPRINT, described in detail in *AR 602-2*, is a comprehensive management and technical program designed to improve total system (soldier and equipment) performance by focusing on the human requirements for optimal system performance. This is achieved by the continuous integration of Personnel Capabilities, Manpower, Training, Human Factors Engineering, System Safety, Health Hazards and Soldier Survivability considerations throughout the system acquisition process. Each consideration is called a "domain." A brief explanation of each domain is given below:

- Personnel Capabilities: The cognitive and physical capabilities required to be able to train for, operate, maintain, and sustain materiel and information systems.
- Manpower: The number of military and civilian personnel required and potentially available to operate, maintain, sustain, and provide training for systems.
- Training: The instruction or education, and on-the-job or unit training required to provide personnel their essential job skills, knowledge, values and attitudes.
- Human Factors Engineering (HFE): The integration of human

characteristics into system definition, design, development, and evaluation to optimize human-machine performance under operational conditions.

- System Safety (SS): The design features and operating characteristics of a system that serve to minimize the potential for human or machine errors or failures that cause injurious accidents.

- Health Hazards (HH): The design features and operating characteristics of a system that create significant risks of bodily injury or death; prominent sources of health hazards include loud noise, chemical and biological substances, extreme temperatures, and radiation energy.

- Soldier Survivability (SSv): The characteristics of a system that can reduce fratricide, detectability, and probability of being attacked, as well as minimize system damage, soldier injury, and cognitive and physical fatigue.

In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, it became very evident that incidents of attack from friendly units (fratricide) had to be reduced. It was also evident that increases in enemy detection and recognition capabilities, coupled with the expanding lethality and range of modern weaponry, could seriously limit the ability of the U.S. soldier to survive future battles. The then CSA, General Gordon R. Sullivan, stated that the Army could not accept casualties that could be prevented by proper research, development, and acquisition (RDA). Thus

much needed attention has been focused on soldier survivability.

Soldier survivability is defined in terms of the soldier and system:

- Soldier: Those system characteristics that enable soldiers to withstand (or avoid) adverse military action (both friend and foe) or the effects of natural phenomena (heat, cold, deep water, etc.) that could result in a loss of life or capability to continue effective performance of the prescribed mission.

- System: Those characteristics that promote reduced:
  - fratricide;
  - detectability of the system;
  - probability of attack on the system, if detected;
  - vulnerability, if attacked.

The Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate (SLAD) of AMC's Army Research Laboratory (ARL) has been designated as Army focal point for technical advice and consultation on vulnerability and lethality analysis and integrated technical analysis of the survivability of all Army systems. To accomplish that role SLAD compiles and analyzes the relevant survivability data and publishes *The Army Systems Survivability Strategy (TASSS). TASSS*, published in December 1996, serves as the single source document for Army systems survivability issues and solutions. Among its many users are the requirements developers at the TRADOC battle labs and Service schools who use it to focus their operational experimentation on system survivability shortfalls. It is used by the PEO's and RDEC's as they go through the full materiel acquisition process or achieve

greater survivability through system design updates. It is also used by the scientists and researchers of the Army's "tech base" to develop broad based survivability technologies for horizontal integration across the Army and the DOD S&T programs. Army systems survivability is discussed in more detail in *AR 70-75*.

ACQUISITION STREAMLINING

Radical changes in the U.S. and global industrial bases, decreasing new technology development cycles, and declining defense budgets drive the need to streamline the materiel acquisition process. The globalization of industries means that many "systems" can no longer be manufactured and assembled solely in the U.S. The rapidly decreasing development cycle for new technologies means that state-of-the-art weapons systems cannot be fielded by an acquisition process that nominally takes years to develop and field a system. Declining defense budgets mean that doing "business" the "government way" is no longer affordable. Maintaining separate military and commercial industrial sectors is no longer feasible.

Today the Army's acquisition process must be agile and responsive enough to "turn inside the technology development cycle," be unburdened of non-value-added unique government requirements, and rely more frequently on commercial standards, products, and business practices.

Acquisition strategies and program plans must be implemented early in the life of the program. Concurrent engineering and development strategies have proven to produce weapon systems with fewer schedule delays and reduced risks. Integration of design with systems concept and design with the planning of the manufacturing, deployment, support, and

disposal processes not only reduce the acquisition cycle time, but can also reduce cost and technical risks. This functional integration improves the acquisition processes while streamlining the overall program.

In support of acquisition streamlining, the Army's current modernization strategy focuses on increased capabilities rather than on new systems. *The Army Modernization Plan (AMP)* reflects the process required to acquire the Army's vision for the 21st century—Force XXI. Real-time, shared, situational awareness will enable Force XXI to observe, decide, and act faster and more precisely than any enemy. Five information age capabilities have been identified as essential to Force XXI:

- winning the information war;
- dominating maneuver;
- conducting precision strikes;
- sustaining the force; and
- protecting the force.

These modernization objectives reflect the changed strategic environment and the changing nature of warfare. These modernization efforts will enable future forces to leverage their shared situational awareness to pick the time, place and manner in which the enemy is defeated or destroyed. Although the Army is not buying new systems, it is leveraging advances in technology to address the future warfighting requirements. Through the use of new and emerging information technologies, the Army is improving its existing systems to ensure the nation has an Army capable of establishing and maintaining land force dominance.

The Army's requirements and modernization processes must be an efficient, effective, and flexible force coping with the rapid changing technology and socio-

political environments to provide the warfighter timely, innovative solutions providing or maintaining the edge in all missions. Today, the Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) program is the Army's primary modernization initiative providing a holistic approach to requirements determination; early enjoinment of the requirements, acquisition, and user communities in a team effort; and aggressive exploitation of leading edge technologies.

Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI).

HTI is the Army's modernization strategy for the future—upgrading existing weapon systems instead of developing new ones. Through HTI, the Army upgrades the force, maintains its technological edge on the battlefield, and enhances its combat power through the synergy of applying synchronized and common technologies across the force rather than to one or a few systems. HTI breaks away from the traditional "mission specific" modernization approach. Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) capability, Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS), Battlefield Digitization, Survivability Enhancement Systems, Combat Identification Dismounted Soldier System (CIDSS), Driver's Vision Enhancement (DVE), and Thermal Weapons Sight (TWS) are the major HTI efforts underway at this time. These seven programs provide capabilities that, when combined, enable the Army to reduce fratricide, improve situational awareness, firepower effectiveness, and command and control.

HTI is defined as the application of common enabling technologies across multiple systems to improve the overall warfighting capability of the force; lowering research and development costs and development time; and obtaining lower unit production costs by procuring larger quantities of the same subsystem for different weapons systems. The Army also benefits from a common logistics base for the same subsystems on multiple platforms. Above all, HTI provides the warfighter with the necessary improvements in lethality, survivability, and tempo to defeat any threat on the 21st century battlefield. HTI depends upon the use of CBTDEV-led ICTs for horizontal requirements integration and MATDEV-led IPTs for program development and execution.

HTI Management and Implementation. HTI is implemented within the framework of existing acquisition processes, structures and organizations. A HQDA general officer working group (GOWG) is the central authority for all formal Army HTI initiatives and programs. The GOWG is co-chaired by the ADCSOPS-FD and the ASA(RDA) Deputy for Systems Management. GOWG members include HQDA representatives from ODCSOPS, ASA(RDA), ASA(FM&C), DISC4, and PA&E, along with TRADOC, AMC, and OPTEC representatives. They establish the HTI "blueprint", synchronize and prioritize efforts, provide specific guidance, resolve issues, and provide general officer-level direction, guidance, and oversight. In addition, the ASA(RDA) Deputy for Systems Management acts as the Army HTI executive agent and determines, coordinates, and issues specific guidance for HTI programs implemented across multiple PEO/PM structures and organizations.

The HTI process begins with an operational concept, FOC, or system requirement. The appropriate management structure is then chartered to implement an HTI initiative through the application of specific programs. HTI initiatives follow

established acquisition management procedures. The ASA(RDA) ensures the technology insertion is completely synchronized through management oversight of the respective Army laboratory, Army research, development and engineering centers (RDECs), PEOs and PMs. The individual HTI efforts are managed as a part of planned S&T objectives (STOs), new system developments, and/or system modifications. This increased management focus ensures that the technology development plan or weapon system acquisition strategies/plans are designed with an overall horizontal approach to development and execution. This includes possible joint service, allied nation or industry applications. HTI initiatives are resourced through individual MDEPs on a case by case basis. There is an MDEP established to provide funding for both common, government-furnished hardware, and for the actual insertion and integration of the common hardware onto the designated weapon systems. As a process, HTI supports an integrated battlefield architecture that exploits the capabilities of combat, materiel and training developers, national laboratories, industry and academia to achieve total force synergism. Its purpose is to provide increased modernization efficiency and responsiveness while enhancing overall force warfighting effectiveness. As the HTI process matures, the need to create centralized funding lines, specific charters and requirements documents, along with creating specific task forces or PM organizations, are addressed.

Some potential challenges or disadvantages to using an HTI acquisition approach are acknowledged. Realigning program schedules, changing technical approaches, and altering funding strategies in order to horizontally insert technology or implement product improvements could result in higher up-front costs. Major modifications of certain older generation systems may also be required for those systems to accept newer technology. Additionally, funding the technology insertion for several different systems must be consistent and executable. HTI needs to be a basic part of program development and planning. However, HTI principles are applied only where it makes sense for total force efficiency and effectiveness. *AR 70-1* provides more detailed information on HTI planning and execution.

ACQUISITION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

The "Color of money," or kind of appropriation, is an important factor in acquisition management. In general, a particular appropriation can be expended only for specified activities, and money cannot be changed from one appropriation to another. Acquisition management involves at least two appropriations, and may involve four. The two year RDTE appropriation provides funds for research, design engineering, prototype production, and test and evaluation activities in the course of developing a materiel system. The three year Procurement appropriation provides funds for procuring materiel that has been fully tested and type classified. Procurement funds are also used to procure low-rate initial production (LRIP) systems for operational testing, initial spares, and support and training equipment. The Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation provides funds for retiring and retrograding the old equipment being replaced, for repairing systems after fielding, for fuel and ammunition for training and operations, for periodic system rebuild, for training both system operators and maintainers, except

new equipment training, and, in general, anything else to keep a system in the field and operating. Some systems may require Military Construction, Army (MCA) appropriated funds for the construction of special facilities required for fielding that system.

Funds of the correct amount and appropriation must be planned and programmed into the Army budget, in general, two years before they are needed. In the program and budget process, fund requests are initiated or reviewed annually. Congress appropriates funds for RDTE (Title V) and Procurement (Title IV) as part of the "Defense Appropriation Act." The RDTE and Procurement Appropriations must first be approved by DOD, submitted to Congress by the President, and then be authorized and appropriated in two separate congressional actions before any money can be spent. In the year of budget execution, the Army may reprogram funds, except for congressional interest items, within an appropriation subject to limits, or with prior congressional approval. Up to $4 million of RDTE and $10 million of Procurement may be reprogrammed into a program without prior congressional approval. The MATDEV is responsible for planning and programming the RDTE and Procurement funds to cover a program, and the MCA, when needed. The MATDEV is responsible for programming all life-cycle system costs for the system while the system remains under his management control. This includes programming for outyear sustaining resources as well as RDTE and Procurement. Once the management responsibility transitions to the managing AMC "commodity command", it then becomes that command's responsibility to continue the depot-level sustaining program. The field user MACOM is responsible to

program day-to-day system below-depot operational support. The field user MACOM is responsible for planning and programming the OMA funds needed to ensure continued readiness of the fielded system. Responsibility for planning and programming funds for product improvements and sustaining supply spare parts is complex and divided between the MATDEV and the field MACOM.

RDTE Appropriation — 6 Categories.

To assist in the overall planning, programming, budgeting, and managing of the various R&D activities, the RDTE program is divided into six R&D categories. These categories are used throughout DOD. In November 1993, OSD realigned the Program Category as the Budget Activity and deleted the old Budget Activity. This change became effective for FY95. The current RDT&E Budget Activities are as follows.

Budget Activity 1—Basic Research. Basic research efforts provide fundamental knowledge for the solution of identified military problems. Includes all efforts of scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life sciences related to long-term national security needs. It provides farsighted, high payoff research, including critical enabling technologies that provide the basis for technological progress. It forms a part of the base for (a) subsequent applied and advanced developments in Defense-related technologies, and (b) new and improved military functional capabilities in areas such as communications, detection, tracking, surveillance, propulsion, mobility, guidance and control, navigation, energy conversion, materials and structures, and

personnel support. Basic research efforts precede the system specific research described in the ASTMP.

Budget Activity 2—Applied Research. This activity translates promising basic research into solutions for broadly defined military needs, short of major development projects, with a view to developing and evaluating technical feasibility. This type of effort may vary from fairly fundamental applied research to sophisticated breadboard hardware, study, programming and planning efforts that establish the initial feasibility and practicality of proposed solutions to technological challenges. It should thus include studies, investigation, and nonsystem specific development effort. The dominant characteristic of this category of effort is that it be pointed toward specific military FOCs with a view toward developing and evaluating the feasibility and practicability of proposed solutions and determining their parameters. Program control of the applied research element will normally be exercised by general level of effort. Applied research precedes the system specific research described in the *ASTMP*.

Budget Activity 3—Advanced Technology Development. This activity includes all efforts which have moved into the development and integration of hardware and other technology products for field experiments and tests. The results of this type of effort are proof of technological feasibility and assessment of operability and producibility that could lead to the development of hardware for Service use. It also includes advanced technology demonstrations (ATDs) that help expedite technology transition from the laboratory to operational use. Projects in this category have a direct relevance to identified military

needs. Advanced technology development may include concept exploration as described in the *ASTMP*, but is nonsystem specific.

Budget Activity 4—Demonstration and Validation. Includes all efforts associated with advanced technology development used to demonstrate the general military utility or cost reduction potential of technology when applied to different types of military equipment or techniques. It includes evaluation, synthetic environment, prototypes, and proof-of-principle demonstrations in field exercises to evaluate system upgrades or provide new operational capabilities. The demonstrations evaluate integrated technologies in as realistic an operating environment as possible to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of advanced technology. It may include concept exploration as well as program definition and risk reduction as described in *DODD 5000.1*, but is system specific.

NOTE: DODD 5000.1 changed the acquisition phase name (phase I) that BA 4 supports from Demonstration and Validation to Program Definition And Risk Reduction.

Budget Activity 5—Engineering and Manufacturing Development. Includes those projects in engineering and manufacturing development for Service use. This area is characterized by major line item projects and program control is exercised by review of individual projects. Includes engineering and manufacturing development projects as described in *DODD 5000.1*, and may include OT&E.

Budget Activity 6—RDT&E Management and Support. Includes efforts directed toward support of RDT&E installations or operations required for use in

general research and development (R&D) and not allocable to specific R&D missions. Included are technical integration efforts, technical information activities, space programs, major test ranges, test facilities and general test instrumentation, target development, support of operational tests, international cooperative R&D, and R&D support.

Budget Activity 7—Operational System Development. Includes R&D effort directed toward development, engineering, and test of changes to fielded systems or systems already in procurement which alter the performance envelopes. Operational system development may include OT&E costs. FY 97 R&D support to miscellaneous operational efforts include: Manufacturing Technology, Combat Vehicle Product Improvement Program (PIP), MLRS PIP, Communications Security Equipment, Horizontal Battlefield Digitization, Satellite Communication Ground Environment, etc. Program control is exercised by review of individual projects.

Procurement Appropriations.

The Procurement Appropriation funds the procurement of materiel systems that has been fully tested and type classified. The Army budget includes five separate procurement appropriations listed as: (1) Aircraft, (2) Missiles, (3) Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV), (4) Ammunition, and (5) Other Procurement, Army (OPA).

Aircraft Appropriation. Aircraft procurement includes the procurement of aircraft, aircraft modifications, spares, repair parts, and related support equipment and facilities.

Missiles Appropriation. Missile procurement includes the procurement of missiles, missiles modifications, spares, repair parts, and related support equipment and facilities.

Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV) Appropriation. Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV) procurement includes tracked and combat vehicles, weapons, other combat vehicles, and repair parts.

Ammunition Appropriation. Ammunition procurement includes procurement of ammunition end items, ammunition production base support, and ammunition demilitarization.

Other Procurement, Army (OPA) Appropriation. OPA covers three major categories: (1) tactical and support vehicles, (2) communications and electronic equipment, and (3) other support equipment

Program Stability.

Achieving early program objective consensus and following a good investment strategy will yield a stable program, clearly showing where we are today and where we want to be when we bring on the new system. To be successful, acquisition programs for new systems must be developed and acquired in a timely and economical manner. Life-cycle cost estimates and changes to programs and schedules must be controlled. Changes to programs affecting established goals will be fully documented in the program management documentation, providing the justification for change (for example, budget cut, design change). After entering Phase II -

Engineering and Manufacturing Development, design changes in system components that are meeting the approved requirement are discouraged and must be individually justified. The design should be frozen in sufficient time prior to DT&E and OT&E to provide an adequate system support package for testing. Changes to programs as a result of DT&E/OT&E must be of the "objective" nature to satisfy the requirement and not a "threshold" type of change, unless it can be demonstrated that the change will not have a significantly negative impact on the cost, schedule, producibility, and ILS aspects of the program—for instance, a value-engineering change which reduces cost while increasing reliability.

ACQUISITION REFORM

With a wide range of missions, global uncertainty, increased global technology transfer, and limited RDA resources, the Army has been a leader in acquisition reform. For example, the TRADOC Battle Labs and the Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) have shown to be critical in simulating, experimenting, and assessing advanced technologies and concepts, thereby accelerating and improving both the requirement determination and acquisition processes. Every ATD is required to be sponsored by a TRADOC Battle Lab and have at least one experiment performed at a Battle Lab. The ACT II program, previously discussed, is funding competitively selected proposals from industry to demonstrate promising technology and prototypes of keen interest to all the Battle Labs in satisfying priority FOCs. The OSD ACTD initiative allows rapid prototyping of promising technologies that provide real capabilities for the joint warfighting customer to evaluate.

A new partnership has been established among warfighter, Army acquisition, and industry organizations to identify technology options more quickly, establish the best technical approaches, conduct solid price-benefit trade studies, develop performance requirements, program the funding needed, and issue concise solicitations consistent with the foregoing. The Battle Labs, HTI ICTs, and team efforts such as Team Comanche and Team Crusader are examples of the power of IPPD and IPTs that bring the stakeholders together to solve tough acquisition and requirements tasks concurrently and quickly. The Army continues to overcome organizational stovepipes and is mastering HTI and information technology in a timely and affordable manner.

Another consideration in the acquisition reform process is how the Army deals with industry. Through performance specifications and streamlined, tailored, page-limited solicitations, the Army gives them maximum flexibility by telling them what it wants as an end item and not how to do it or how to get there. Furthermore, the Army leverages commercial technologies, products, and processes and establishes open architectures that facilitate future upgrades, using to advantage the commercial information technology revolution and rapid advances in computers. These initiatives have shortened acquisition times for quality upgrades, reduced life-cycle costs, and allowed the acquisition community to easily integrate exciting new technologies as they become available. A highly successful process to focus and leverage all of our acquisition reform initiatives in support of Army XXI is the Acquisition Reform Reinvention Centers and Laboratories.

Army XXI Reinvention Centers.

In the past several years, the SA has delegated far reaching authorities to Army XXI Reinvention Centers in order to reengineer processes and redesign organizations to support core competencies required for the U.S. Army in the 21st century. To accomplish the Army's missions in an era of declining resources, it must complete a plan that will make it a more flexible organization that can reach out to both the fighting and sustaining elements of Army XXI with the best concepts and technologies available in the future. The Reinvention Center designation allows the Army to mass ongoing initiatives to overpower many current restraints impacting the Army's mission. The SA has designated three reinvention centers: FORSCOM, TRADOC, and HQDA. The authorities delegated by the SA to these three reinvention centers in pursuing reinvention efforts are:

- *Coordination Authority*: permission to deal directly with OSD and other reinvention centers or laboratories without having to go through the DA staff first.
- *Authority Regulatory Waiver*: permission to waive DOD, DA, and MACOM regulations, directives, instructions, and/or publications, with certain limitations.
- *Legislative Change Proposal Authority*: permission to submit proposed legislative changes directly to the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) without having to filter through the DA staff.

- *Lab and Prototype Authority*: Permission to designate reinvention center laboratories and prototypes, as needed, with no reporting requirements outside of the reinvention center.

Army XXI Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory.

The Army XXI Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory was approved by the SA and CSA on July 1, 1996. The Reinvention Lab's focused goal is to identify, test, procure, and field technically advanced systems and equipment for Army XXI by the year 2000. The Reinvention Lab process will enable the Army to use acquisition reforms effectively, to take high value technologies from prototype status following TF XXI AWE and convert them into fieldable materiel systems and equipment in time to field the first Army XXI digitized Division by September 30, 2001 and the first Army XXI Corps by September 30, 2005.

The Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory is a conglomerate of 94 acquisition reform initiatives involving everything from lower staff levels at brigade headquarters to new software, hardware, acquisition processes and paperwork reduction. It takes advantage of every acquisition time and cost cutting initiative given to the Army by Congress and DOD, including simplifying procedures, using commercial practices, streamlining processes, and using commercial credit cards and electronic commerce. The Reinvention Lab is responsible for making efficient and effective all processes involved in the acquisition and fielding of equipment for Army XXI. The Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) is the primary streamlining process used by the Reinvention

Laboratory to accomplish it's Army XXI goals.

Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). The WRAP was established on April 11, 1996 primarily to accelerate fielding of systems and technology that emerge from TRADOC battle lab warfighting experiments. WRAP applies to AWEs, CEPs, ATDs, ACTDs and similar experiments where a TRADOC ICT supported by a TRADOC battle lab are directly involved. Normally, such systems and technology emerge from the experimentation process as unfinanced "new starts." If an approved new start cannot be acquired under existing MDA authorities and funding, the CG, TRADOC can initiate a WRAP ASARC to obtain approval of candidates based on compelling experimentation success and urgency of need. Supporting criteria include: technical merit and maturity, criticality and priority to warfighting requirements, affordability, effectiveness, and supportability and sustainability into the next Army POM. Successful WRAP candidates are ranked by priority and receive funding for operational prototypes in priority order.

The WRAP ASARC is normally scheduled in the March-April and August-September time frames, to identify what projects to fund and to accommodate PPBES actions. A WRAP ASARC can be held at other times if appropriate. When convened by the CG, TRADOC the WRAP ASARC:

- reviews requirements and urgency;
- reviews affordability;
- reviews experimentation results;
- approves the AS;
- assigns management responsibility to an AMC advanced concepts manager (ACM) or designates PEO/PM;
- assigns a milestone entry point, as appropriate; and,
- approves a funding strategy.

WRAP Documentation. The MNS is the normal document needed to support TRADOC AWEs. A MNS is not required if an FOC list can support the WRAP requirement traceability. For candidates selected for rapid acquisition, a streamlined operational requirement statement is sufficient to support the WRAP ASARC and for documentation during the two years before regular programming begins. Items not approved for rapid acquisition will convert to normal documentation over a set time period. The operational requirement statement for rapid acquisition is not a requirements document. The format is provided in Appendix C, *AR 71-9*. Supplementary WRAP documentation normally includes: urgency of need statement, experimentation results documenting compelling success, proposed acquisition strategy, and a budget estimate for the proposed program.

WRAP Funding. In the FY 97 Appropriation Act, Congress approved an Army budget line ($50 million) for Force XXI initiatives. Financing from this line will be used to jump start technology programs and field limited quantities of approved requirements emerging from the Force XXI process as quickly as possible, without having to reprogram funds from other budget lines. Financing from this initiatives line is limited to providing enough funds only to bridge the gap (normally two years) until the total funding requirements for a new start can be budgeted. WRAP initiatives can also be funded through reprioritization or

reprogramming activities. The execution of Force XXI initiatives funding is subject to approval from the WRAP ASARC, which oversees WRAP efforts.

The ASA(RDA) directs and controls the Army XXI Acquisition Reform efforts through the Deputy for Systems Management, who functions as the Director of the Reinvention Laboratory.

NOTE: It should be noted that the Army XXI Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory is not a single organization. It is a "virtual" Laboratory for integrating, improving, and controlling all the cross-functional processes performed by those organizations supporting the materiel acquisition for Army XXI.

FAST TRACK

Fast Track is an initiative of the Science and Technology community which formalizes a method to promote the effective, timely transition of high value, high priority technology into the acquisition process. As such, it is a minor change, but an important contribution to Acquisition Reform. The intent is to avoid program and funding gaps and duplication of effort. In most cases a more robust S&T program precludes the need for a Program Definition and Risk Reduction life-cycle phase I.

The Fast Track Acquisition Process implements two step acquisition, as recommended by the Army Science Board. It provides up front designation to a select few Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) that have a good chance of successful transition to the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase II. The designation is essential in obtaining increased management attention from stakeholders and justifying the expenditure of additional S&T funds preparing for program transition to the EMD phase. Fast

Track is closely linked to Army force modernization, focusing on developing critical capabilities which address future warfighting needs, and delivering timely and affordable technologies that support the upgrading of existing systems and the fielding of next generation and future systems

The Fast Track process applies to a few selected technology demonstrations which, as a result of earlier S&T efforts, appear to be sufficiently mature that:

1. they can be demonstrated during a 6.3 ATD program with moderate risk, and
2. there is a reasonable likelihood of skipping the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Phase I and transitioning directly to the EMD phase II which is already funded in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which results in measurable ime and cost savings.

The Fast Track process is applicable to all Acquisition Categories (ACATs) subject to ASARC, Army MAISRC, or IPR oversight.

SUMMARY

This chapter provided a basic introduction to the management process, organization, and structure of research, development, and acquisition. Through the chapter description, the reader should gain an appreciation of the logic of the process, its organization and management, and selected aspects of the industrial production base. This chapter also highlights the current basic policies for materiel acquisition, recently updated DOD and Army policies for materiel systems, the Army's acquisition objectives, and descriptions of acquisition managers.

Difficult decisions, a scarcity of dollar resources, and honest differences of

opinion cause disruptions and delays. It is unlikely that there will be total agreement on the best technical approach to satisfy a need—or, indeed, on the need itself. The annual budget cycle and budget constraints almost ensure that some projects will not be funded at the level desired—if at all. Tests are not always successful—at least not to the satisfaction of all. Estimates of time, costs, effectiveness, and technical feasibility are often wide of the mark for complex systems. After all, they are estimates which are projected well into the future based on sketchy data. These real-world problems reinforce the fact that research, development, and acquisition (RDA) management is a complex task of great importance to national defense. RDA can be a wellspring of new and effective weapons systems where effective management and professionalism can make the difference on any future battlefield. As with any activity involving the use of scarce resources to meet organizational goals and objectives, the people involved—the acquisition managers and the soldier users and maintainers—constitute the most vital link to mission accomplishment.

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CHAPTER 12

MATERIEL SYSTEM—LOGISTICS POLICY AND PROCEDURE

"The three-year period from June 1940, when American rearmament began in earnest, to the spring of 1943 was, in the logistical sphere, essentially one of preparation for the mass application of American military power in the last two years of World War II."

Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945
Center of Military History, U.S. Army

INTRODUCTION

The logistical lessons of World War II and subsequent wars and missions have taught us that the luxury of time is not always available and that planning and preparedness pays off in logistics as it does in all other operations.

The concept of a Force Projection Army rather than a forward deployed force coupled with a reduced size has significant logistic implications requiring a smaller OCONUS footprint while being more responsive to the troops in the field.

The basic mission of the logistics system is to support the soldier in the field and in the garrison with what is needed, when, where, and in the condition and quantity required, at optimum expenditure of resources. This is the common thread which connects all logistics activity.

This chapter provides an overview of the Army's logistics system from the Department of the Army (DA) and U.S.

Army Materiel Command (USAMC) levels. This chapter addresses:

- Logistics tasks and roles of major commands and agencies;
- Management, organization, and functions of Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DA DCSLOG) and U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC);
- Standard systems;
- Funding procedures; and
- Security assistance.

Definitions.

The following terms are fundamental to the issues and activities discussed in this chapter.

Army logistics includes those activities that support the movement and sustainment of a combat force. There are five functional elements of logistics.

- *Supply:* the acquisition, distribution (including the distribution of wholesale stocks through the national Defense Distribution Regions operated by the Defense Logistics Agency), maintenance while in storage (also known as Care of Supplies in Storage (COSIS)), and salvage of supplies.
- *Maintenance:* the function of sustaining materiel in an operational status, restoring it to a serviceable condition, or updating and upgrading its functional utility through modification.
- *Transportation:* those services related to the movement of persons and things to meet the Army's requirements and commitments and as assigned for the Navy, Air Force, State Department, and other governmental agencies.
- *Services:* support functions such as food services, water support, laundries, dry cleaning, clothing sales stores, fumigation and bath, property disposal, and mortuary services.
- *Facilities:* real property programs and real property maintenance activities pertaining to the operation of utilities, maintenance of real property, minor construction, and other engineering support.

The logistics system is a corporate entity consisting of personnel, procedures, and machines working within established policy toward the mission of planning, moving, and maintaining U.S. Army forces and other Military Services or allies, as designated.

Logistics doctrine is a body of fundamental principles that guides commanders and logistics staff planners and operators in their support of military forces. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.

Levels of logistics are determined by the type of work accomplished. There are two major levels of logistics support.

- *Wholesale:* includes the National Inventory Control Points (NICPs); National Maintenance Points (NMPs); depots, arsenals, data banks, plants and factories associated with USAMC activities; and special activities under DA control. Examples of organizations with wholesale responsibilities include: U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC), General Services Administration (GSA), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Wholesale functions are generally performed in CONUS.
- *Retail:* includes non-wholesale functions subdivided into three types:
  - *General Support (GS):* This includes both Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Tables of Distribution Allowance (TDA) units which perform GS-level logistical functions. GS-level functions are normally performed in

support of the theater–level logistics system.

- *Direct Support (DS):* This includes both MTOE and TDA units which perform DS-level logistics directly in support of user units/activities.
- *User:* This includes MTOE and TDA units in the field which perform unit and operator maintenance on organic equipment, and unit supply functions.

LOGISTICS TASKS AND ROLES

Logistics Tasks.

The Secretary of Defense issues logistics guidance to the military Services as part of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Within this broad guidance, the Services develop their own programs. The Army's logistics tasks stem from its primary mission, "...to organize, equip, and train Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land." The implied logistics tasks are to:

- equip Army forces;
- sustain combat operations on land;
- establish reserves of equipment and supplies and provide for expansion of peacetime components;
- formulate logistics doctrine and support procedures; and,
- develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations.

Logistics Roles.

Logistics roles evolve from the organization adopted to perform the tasks at each major level of logistics activity. At Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), staff supervision is exercised by:

- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment);
- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition);
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG);
- Chief of Engineers;
- The Surgeon General; and
- Chief, National Guard Bureau.

Below DA, logistics responsibilities are fulfilled by:

- Major Army Commands (MACOMs);
- Field Operating Agencies (FOA);
- Army National Guard Bureau; and
- Non-Army Agencies.

Role of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. As the Army's principal logistics command, USAMC has a very different role from that of any other Army command functioning to support the soldier in the field. USAMC is responsible for the materiel function of research, development, acquisition, and sustainment.

USAMC's function is carried out by thousands of people, working in approximate 350 locations in over 40 states and more than a dozen foreign countries. The U.S. Army Materiel Command operates through major subcommands and directs the activities of its depots, laboratories, arsenals, manufacturing facilities, maintenance shops,

proving grounds, test ranges, and procurement offices throughout the world. Its complex missions range from the development of sophisticated weapon systems, to laser research, to the distribution of spare parts.

USAMC has many challenges and problems which are similar to business operations in the private sector. It manages inventory accounts worth tens of billions of dollars and ranks in business volume with the top ten corporations in the United States. To develop, buy, and maintain materiel for the Army and other Services, USAMC works closely with industry, as well as colleges and universities to ensure that state-of-the-art technology is integrated for the defense of the nation. Soldiers, many with highly developed specialties in weapons development and logistics, work side-by-side with a large civilian work force: scientists, engineers, systems analysts, accountants, computer programmers, and others who make up over a quarter of the civilians working for the Army.

USAMC provides management direction and technical guidance in services such as laundry, dry cleaning, clothing initial issue points, central issue facilities, field laundry and bath, fumigation, demilitarization, and disposal direction.

USAMC also provides the Army's wholesale-level supply and maintenance support for items of materiel used by the Army. USAMC serves as the executive agent for: the implementation of the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) business practice throughout the Army; Security Assistance; the Direct Support System–Air Line of Communications (DSS–ALOC); the Logistics Intelligence File which forms an integral segment of DSS-ALOC; and serves as the DOD Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. USAMC also has responsibility for Army War Reserves (AWR) - less Class VIII, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), operational projects stocks, sustainment stocks, and War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA). The term Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) is no longer used. Additionally, USAMC develops and promulgatesdoctrine for all the above functions.

USAMC, along with CASCOM and DLA, provides a rapidly deployable pool of highly skilled and properly equipped technicians, to provide early flexible sustainment support capabilities to a combatant command. The U.S. Army Support Group developed and deployed to Southwest Asia in 1990 provides the framework for the contingency/mobilization theater-level Logistics Support Element (LSE). The LSE can support a deployed contingency corps or augment or increase a theater of operations capability to optimize readiness of the deployed/employed forces.

Along these same lines, USAMC is also the executive agent for the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The LOGCAP proponent within HQDA is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG). LOGCAP is a program designed to obtain civilian contractual assistance in peacetime to meet U.S. Army crisis and wartime support requirements worldwide through the advanced identification, planned acquisition and use of global corporate assets. Since 1992, LOGCAP has responded to several unplanned, ad hoc crises by providing adequate and timely Combat Support / Combat Service Support (CS/CSS). LOGCAP complements the organic force structure and outsourcing (e.g., wartime host nation support, mutual support logistics,

etc.) capabilities and is NOT intended to be a replacement for any support force alternatives.

Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Designated a Major Army Command on 16 June 1979, the Corps of Engineers plays a major role in the Army's overall logistics system. The USACE performs military construction, installation support, real estate, research and development, and civil works missions in peacetime. It provides a base for rapid conversion of its resources to support general war and other national emergency conditions. The six components of the USACE mission are:

(1) Manage and execute engineering, construction, and real estate programs for the U.S. Army and Air Force and perform research and development (R&D) in support of these programs.

(2) Manage and execute installation support programs for Army installations.

(3) Manage and execute civil works programs, including the design, planning, engineering, construction, and R&D functions in support of this program.

(4) Perform R&D through nonsystem-specific advanced development in systems, specialized equipment, procedures, and techniques relevant to engineer support of combat operations.

(5) Develop and maintain a capability to mobilize readily in response to national security emergencies, domestic emergencies, and emergency water planning programs.

(6) Develop technology, and design and construct facilities and structures in support of Army space initiatives.

Role of Other Major Army Commands - Continental United States (CONUS).

The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) manages all individual schooling; formulates concepts, doctrine, organization, and materiel objectives and requirements for Army forces in CONUS and overseas; and develops and promulgates doctrine for the user, direct support, and general support levels of logistics. *U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (USACASCOM)*, a subordinate command of TRADOC, has the mission to develop, test, integrate, and disseminate combat service support (CSS) doctrine and systems for CONUS Army installations and for forces deployed overseas. There are five major functions performed by USACASCOM.

(1) It develops and evaluates combat service support (CSS) concepts, doctrine, organizations, systems, and materiel concepts and requirements, and planning factors for the Army. It ensures the personnel service support, supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and facilities systems designed for the Army in the field and the CONUS retail logistics systems are compatible with the sustaining base system.

(2) It acts as TRADOC proponent for CSS training and monitors and evaluates CSS training at TRADOC schools. It ensures CSS course content is consistent with approved doctrine. It

assesses the training evaluation process at associated schools.

(3) It conducts CSS exercises and manages the development of CSS training materials for Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) units.

(4) It serves as a principal adviser to DA, TRADOC, and USAMC on all CSS matters.

(5) It provides direction, guidance, and taskings to assigned combat development activities, associated schools, MACOMs, and HQDA staff agencies for their contribution to CSS development and training.

Forces Command (FORSCOM) is responsible for all operational Army forces in CONUS and, as such, provides retail-level logistics support to all assigned units and to those activities which are tenants of its installation.

The U.S. Army Health Services Command (USAHSC) provides a single manager for all medical activities in CONUS.

The U.S. Army Signal Command (USASC) commands all assigned communications organizations supporting MACOMs and, as such, provides intermediate/user-level maintenance for communication and electronic equipment in the defense communication system. It provides GS/DS communication security logistics support in a theater of operations to the Army component of unified commands as tasked.

The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), as the Department of Defense's single traffic manager, provides traffic management, transportation engineering, and common-user terminal services to all DOD customers. As a jointly staffed major Army command under the CINC, U.S. Transportation Command, MTMC's primary mission is executing the nation's first leg of strategic mobility. In this capacity, it ensures the safe, secure, and economical worldwide movement of DOD units, personnel, and materiel. It is also responsible for the movement of personal property for Service members, DOD civilians, and other government agency members, and manages the contract city-pair airfare, commercial bus, federal rental car, and the Army's commercial travel program.

MTMC's Transportation Engineering Agency provides the scientific engineering and transportation expertise to analyze and improve the transportability of military equipment, the deployability of Army units, and the effectiveness of the DOD transportation programs for national defense.

To accomplish its vital role in a period of declining resources, MTMC is developing and fielding a number of information systems dedicated to the improvement of global transportation. These include the Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TCACCIS) which provides automation of Army unit deployments and peacetime transportation functions at U.S. and overseas mobilization stations. The CONUS Freight Management (CFM) System provides automated techniques for the managing, rating, and routing of DOD freight movements within CONUS. It will increase the efficiency and accuracy of general cargo GBL preparation. The Worldwide Ports System (WPS) will support MTMC's terminal management and cargo documentation mission during peace and war. The Strategic Deployment System

(STRADS) will be MTMC's command and control system for peacetime planning and wartime execution support. The Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) automates and standardizes the personal property movement, storage, and management functions at DOD transportation offices worldwide.

Role of Major Army Command (Theater of Operations). Logistics in the theater of operations is tailored to support the combat force requirements for each situation. Consideration is given to the variety of missions which tend to make each logistics requirement different in terms of amounts and types of supplies, maintenance, transportation, and services needed. Consequently, the organizations cover the full spectrum of possibilities from a large theater of operations involving one or more corps to that support required by a division or separate brigade.

The Theater Army commander is responsible for providing logistics support to all Army units in the theater. He executes this responsibility through one or more subordinate Theater Army Area Commands and such functional commands as appropriate; personnel, transportation, medical, and engineer. He manages theater logistics support by establishing broad policies, allocating critical supplies, and assigning missions. Additionally, he manages and controls selected items through the Theater Army Materiel Management Center (MMC) and provides for centralized movements control for U.S. Army forces through the Transportation Movement Control Agency (TMCA).

The Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) is an intermediate command under Theater Army, and its area of operations is located in the Communications Zone (COMMZ). In peacetime and during hostilities, the TAACOM provides direct and general supply and maintenance support to all theater units in the COMMZ to include non-corps units, joint elements, allied forces, and units passing through the COMMZ. The TAACOM MMC manages the supply and maintenance support within the communications zone.

The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) provides maintenance, supply, transportation, health services, and field services support to an Army corps. Within the corps zone, nondivisional units receive supply and maintenance support from the COSCOM. Additionally, the COSCOM provides backup support to the divisional units. Its functional centers, the Materiel Management Center (MMC) and Movement Control Center (MCC), perform the major tasks of managing the supply, maintenance, and transportation functions.

The Division Support Command (DISCOM) provides direct support maintenance, supply, transportation, health services, and field service support to an Army division.

Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES). AAFES is the provider of supply Class VI (personal demand items) for the Army and Air Force; it is a joint command of the Departments of the Army and Air Force. The AAFES commander is a general officer responsible to the AAFES Board of Directors (BOD). In turn, the Board is responsible to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through their respective chiefs of staff. The chairmanship of the BOD alternates between the two Services approximately every three years. AAFES

commander and vice commander positions also alternate between the Army and the Air Force. Primarily a civilian-run organization under military leadership, AAFES employs about 71,000 people, and operates over 12,000 facilities worldwide. AAFES worldwide headquarters is located in Dallas, Texas; two subordinate headquarters manage operations within the Europe and Pacific Regions.

The mission of AAFES is to provide merchandise and services of necessity and convenience to authorized patrons at uniformly low prices, and to generate funds to supplement appropriated funds for the support of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs. AAFES does this in peace and wartime. To accomplish its mission, AAFES:

- operates retail, food, personal service, vending centers, theaters, automotive facilities, the military clothing sales stores (MCSS), etc., on military installations.
- provides basic exchange support to military personnel engaged in contingency operations or field exercises by establishing military-run tactical field exchanges (TFEs) where regular AAFES operations are not possible. Class VI support in the field can be limited to basic health and hygiene needs or expanded to include food, beverages, and other comfort items based upon the requested needs of the theater commander.
- generates earnings that support MWR programs. AAFES pays dividends to the Army which in turn allocates funds to specific programs and installations. The Army MWR Board of Directors,

which is formed under the Army Community and Family Support Center, controls the allocation of AAFES-generated MWR funds within the Army.

Role of Non-Army Agencies. The General Services Administration (GSA) provides general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the government. The GSA has multimission responsibility to manage the varied business activities of the Federal Government. GSA provides an extensive amount of supply support to the DOD for such commonly used items as office furniture and supplies, machine and hand tools, photo supplies, etc.

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The DLA provides logistics support to the Army in three areas: supply support, logistics services, and Defense contract administration services.

- *Supply Support.* DLA manages, stores, and distributes over 3.2 million DLA-managed items from supply depots and the defense distribution centers in support of the military Services and other customers. While many of the items may be common to more than one Service, the majority of them are used by a single customer.
- *Logistics Services.* DLA functions include the responsibility for administration and supervision of: the Federal Catalog Program; the Defense Personal Property Reutilization Program including worldwide disposal of excess personal property, precious metals recovery, and disposal of hazardous wastes; the DOD

Industrial Plant Equipment Program; and the DOD-wide Program for Redistribution/Reutilization of excess Government-Owned and Rented Automatic Data Processing Equipment.

- *Defense Contract Administration Services*. DLA's Defense Contract Management Command (DCMD) provides contract administration services in support of all the DOD components, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, other designated Federal and State agencies, and foreign governments. These services include contract management, pre–award surveys, quality assurance, payment to contractors, support to small business and labor surplus areas, transportation and packaging assistance, and surveillance of contractor progress to ensure timely delivery of materiel.

The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA). The DeCA was established in May 1990 and assumed full operational control of Army commissary operations, formerly performed by the Troop Support Agency (TSA), in October 1991. DeCA is an agency of the Department of Defense operating under the direction and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) (ASD [P&L]) who is subject to the supervision of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (USD[A]). DeCA is organized with a director and headquarters staff with subordinate levels: six CONUS regions; three CONUS districts; two CONUS service centers; a European region;

eight overseas districts; and a DOD Liaison Office located in Washington, DC. The DOD Liaison Office is administratively assigned to the Director, Defense Commissary Agency. DeCA's primary mission is to:

- provide an efficient and effective worldwide system of commissaries for the resale of groceries and household supplies at the lowest practical price to members of the military Services, their families, and other authorized patrons, while maintaining high standards for quality facilities, products, and service consistent with standards similar to those in commercial food stores.
- operate commissaries as appropriated fund activities as an integral element of the military pay and benefits package. Provide an income-effect benefit through savings on food and household items necessary to subsist and maintain the household of the military member.
- provide peacetime training facilities for food supply logisticians needed in wartime and provide troop issue subsistence support to military dining facilities (Air Force only) consistent with individual Service needs.

The Defense Commissary Board (DB). The DB serves as a forum for the discussion and resolution of issues concerning the commissary services provided by DeCA and makes related policy recommendations to the ASD (P&L).

Responsibility for the design and plans for operation of Active Army and Reserve Component dining facilities, field feeding, Class I operations, field bakeries, and all Troop Issue Subsistence Activities (TISA) worldwide is vested in the Army Center of Excellence–Subsistence (ACES), Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia.

MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

As previously stated, the major objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of logistics management from DA DCSLOG and USAMC levels. This is best accomplished by beginning with the mission, organization, and management functions of these activities. Because there are other chapters dealing with the organization of HQDA and its overall management activity, only specific functions of DCSLOG will be highlighted. USAMC functions will be covered in some detail to aid in overall understanding of the Army's logistics system.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS

Figure 12-1

Mission, Organization, and Functions of DCSLOG.

Mission. The ODCSLOG has General Staff responsibility for Total Army and international logistics concepts, policies, programs, plans, and systems. This responsibility is focused on the core logistics functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, soldier support, and security assistance. It promotes the sustainability, supportability, and logistics readiness of the total force. It assesses and continually improves logistics performances. It serves as the Army's advocate for logistics resources, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, and materiel.

Organization. An organizational chart for DCSLOG is at Figure 12-1.

Logistics Integration Agency. The Logistics Integration Agency (LIA) is a Field Operating Agency as shown in Figure 12-1. The mission of the LIA is to identify, develop, and recommend logistics concepts, policy, programs, plans, and systems. This

responsibility includes assessing logistics readiness and sustainability and recommending improvements in the Total Army logistics performance; evaluating logistics aspects of contingency plans and force structure; executing and monitoring selected DCSLOG programs; serving as the DCSLOG functional proponent for the development and extension of selected standard automated supply, maintenance, transportation, and troop support systems; and providing technical guidance and assistance to MACOMs and units.

Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity. Based on a Memorandum of Agreement with HQDA DCSLOG, HQ USAMC, OPTEC, and LIA, AMSAA (an USAMC organization) serves as the independent logistician for the DCSLOG on acquisition programs. AMSAA has responsibility for providing the HQDA DCSLOG with an assessment of each Integrated Logistical Support (ILS) consideration to ensure supportability of the materiel system when fielded. Consider AMSAA also as an independent logistician

to influence product definition as a member of the Integrated Product Team beginning with Phase 0.

DCSLOG Functions. The DCSLOG has Army Staff responsibility for the management of DA logistical activities. The DCSLOG is responsible for the development and supervision of Army logistics organization, operations, and systems worldwide, including logistics readiness, planning, policies, doctrine, resource determination and allocation, objectives, force structure, and standards. His major functions include supply, maintenance, transportation, the Army energy program, troop support activities, and acting as the principal Army Staff representative and focal point for security assistance matters. The DCSLOG participates in and contributes to all phases of the research, development, and acquisition process (concept through deployment) and is responsible for support of materiel systems from production output through disposal. The DCSLOG exercises General Staff supervision over The Surgeon General as pertains to Army class management for medical materiel, and over the Chief of Engineers as pertains to the logistics portion of contingency plans and base development requirements. A complete list of DCSLOG responsibilities is contained in *AR 10-5*.

Logistics Readiness. The basic ingredients of military readiness are adequate, well-trained personnel in particular skills, possessing proper equipment in a combat-ready condition. Logistics readiness deals in large part with equipment and is measured by equipment on hand compared to that which is authorized, and equipment status in terms of serviceability.

The DCSLOG has overall DA Staff responsibility to improve the logistics readiness and sustainability of the Army in the field.

Logistics sustainability projects the future availability and serviceability of equipment by examining the requirement for, and availability of, repair parts and other supplies; issue/turnaround times; storage and transportation; and related facilities.

Logistics Integration Agency (LIA). The LIA is the focal point for the Command Logistics Review Program (CLRP). This is an assessment and assistance visit (not an inspection) during which a MACOM-led review team takes a vertical look at unit and/or installation logistics status. The objective is to identify problems adversely affecting readiness and the command or installation logistics posture, and the activity which can assist in the resolution of these problems. A Command Logistics Review Team–Expanded (CLRT–X) is a team augmented by a tailored group of DA or LIA specialists to evaluate items of special interest to the DA DCSLOG, perform special studies, evaluate force modernization systems, and assess unique problems that correspond to the DCSLOG areas of responsibility. The LIA is responsible to ensure timely follow-up action is taken on those observations requiring resolution above the MACOM level.

Logistics Planning and Operations. Logistics planning focuses on the transition from peacetime to wartime. The Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) is the major tool used by the unified commanders to request forces to support their Operation Plans (OPLANs). In determining the adequacy of the logistics support for the TPFDL, the major factors considered are:

- strategic lift;
- sustainability;
- prepositioned war reserve stocks;
- force shortfalls; and,
- warning time.

The U.S. continues to rely on allies for logistical support, in both peacetime and wartime, primarily for rear area requirements. This Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) supplements the organic support capabilities of U.S. units. WHNS capabilities are used in such areas as transportation, maintenance, construction, civilian labor, communications, facilities, utilities, air/seaport operations, rear area security, and the movement of U.S. forces and materiel between the ports of debarkation and combat areas.

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is also considered as an alternative to complement organic force and WHNS capabilities. LOGCAP may be used if shortfalls are identified from other support sources, or if the other sources are not considered in the best interests (e.g., operational, fiscal, political) of the U.S. Government. The ODCSLOG, HQDA, is the LOGCAP proponent for program policy, guidance and sources. USAMC is the executive agent for LOGCAP planning, exercises and other crisis or contingency operations.

Logistics Organizations and Systems. A major DCSLOG concern with respect to organizations is the effectiveness of the support structure in wartime and an answer to the question, "Can we support major contingency plans?" Increases in the combat-to-support ratio or "tooth-to-tail" have placed a greater reliance on Reserve Components and Host Nation Support to provide combat service support during an emergency.

The proliferation of ADP systems and the problems of interface between these systems have complicated logistics systems development. Current efforts are aimed at the reduction of the number of logistics systems and a concurrent simplification of new and existing systems and procedures. A vertically integrated Single Stock Fund (SSF) and a seamless supply system are essential to this effort. The SSF end-state is being designed to achieve one obligation authority for both Army managed and non-Army managed items; capitalization of all assets transitioning into the Supply Management, Army (SMA) activity group; de-linking credit from OPTEMPO; and linking local repairs to national need. Ultimately, the Integrated Combat Service Support System (ICS3) will provide an integrated, evolutionary enterprise information system for the Army's Combat Service Support (CSS) functions.

Supply. Supplies include all items or materiel necessary for the equipping, maintenance, and operation of a military command. The level of supply requirements, usually expressed in days of supply, is the quantity of materiel authorized or directed to be held in anticipation of future demands. DCSLOG prescribes levels of supply authorized to be on hand or on requisition. Levels are based on usage factors and experience data.

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) are prepositioned in overseas theaters and afloat based upon worldwide strategic requirements and the recommendations of the CINCs. Additionally, the theater holds those stocks which are excess to the direct support/user echelon and are within DOD retention criteria.

Stocks held by direct support/general support (DS/GS) units, when consisting of demand-supported items, mission-essential items, and initial-provisioning items, comprise an Authorized Stockage List (ASL). Inventory at the DS/GS level is used to support consuming organizations.

A using unit's Prescribed Load List (PLL) consists of demand-supported and mission-essential items to support unit maintenance and initial-provisioning items. Materiel authorized for unit stockage (PLL Stocks) must be on hand or on order; that is, it is replaced as consumed.

DCSLOG goals for the establishment of retail stockage policy consider:

- optimum stockage for each class of supply;
- best trade-off between economics and readiness;
- simplicity in application and accuracy in determination of requirements;
- conformation with automated systems;
- the method of distribution (Air or Surface); and,
- essentiality.

Increasing emphasis is being placed on the means to reduce the generation of excess stockage and the reexamination of materiel-returns programs which move the excess materiel from the retail to the wholesale level. The pace of force modernization, continuing changes, ASL turbulence, and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) stockage computations all contribute to the growth of excesses and hamper efforts to keep forward stockages lean and effective. Several actions are underway to reduce the accumulation of serviceable and unserviceable excess and ensure its economical return for repair and reuse.

Automated and transportation processes are being changed and expanded to provide visibility and increase movement of stocks in the initial distribution and redistribution stages from wholesale to Direct Support level. The Single Stock Fund (SSF) will assist in this area by improving the management of stocks through increased visibility, improved forecasting and the reduction of excess. The overall objective is to make the materiel returns and redistribution system as effective and efficient as the distribution system. Class IX (repair part) doctrinal, policy and procedural revisions to the supply system are being developed by the Logistics Integration Agency, USAMC, and TRADOC in an effort to reduce inventory and operating costs.

Also included under the supply class designation are the following troop support division-managed programs: The Army food program (subsistence, troop issue, wholesale subsistence supply, and garrison and field food service), laundry and dry cleaning program, clothing sales/initial-issue activities programs, organizational clothing and individual equipment items program, field laundry, bath and bakery programs, and the graves registration program.

The Director for Plans and Operations, ODCSLOG, serves as the Army representative on the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). A separate entity under the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JMPAB is charged to establish materiel priorities and the allocation of resources in those instances when such issues cannot be resolved by the Services or CINCs. The Army member, along with the flag/general officer members from the other Services and the Joint Staff, functions to:

- establish, modify, or recommend priorities of allocation of materiel assets for the fulfillment of

logistics requirements of U.S. and allied forces.

  - review and act upon requests for modifications in force/activity designators.
  - review the Master Urgency List (MUL), as requested by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), and review and act on other recommendations to establish or change the priorities in the MUL.
  - prepare recommendations for approval for the CJCS on priorities and allocation matters that must be referred to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

Maintenance. Materiel maintenance is all required actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition, restore it to serviceability, or upgrade its functional utility through modification. As a general policy, maintenance is performed at the location of the equipment operation or failure to the maximum extent consistent with the tactical situation and the cost- effective use of maintenance resources.

The current framework within which maintenance (less aviation) is performed contains four levels of progressive complexity: unit, direct support (DS), general support (GS), and depot. Aviation maintenance, however, is performed at three levels: Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM) is a combination of organizational and limited DS maintenance; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) is a combination of the remaining DS and limited GS maintenance capabilities. The third level is depot and this includes some maintenance previously performed at GS level. Maintenance levels are described below.

- *Unit*. Unit-level maintenance is performed by the user and is characterized by quick turnaround based on repair by replacement and minor repair (adjust, clean, lubricate, and tighten). The cornerstone of unit maintenance is performing preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).

- *Direct Support*. This level is organized with direct support units assigned at division, corps, and theater level. DS is characterized by high mobility, a forward orientation, and repair by replacement. Divisional maintenance units will support maneuver elements while nondivisional units will provide area support and reinforcing support to the division. Direct support units will be organized on a modular team basis to support specific systems and their auxiliary equipment, for example, Tank Battalion Team, Engineer Battalion Team. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) teams will be assigned to the nondivisional maintenance units.

- *General Support*. General support maintenance will be characterized by semifixed facilities assigned at theater level. GS represents a deployable sustaining maintenance capability. Its fundamental purpose is to support the theater supply system through repair of components. Maintenance at this level will be job or production line operations as appropriate, and will be performed by modular units composed of commodity-oriented

platoons. A GS maintenance unit may work as a theater special repair activity.

- _Depot_. Maintenance at this level will support the wholesale supply system. It will be production-line oriented, and will be performed by USAMC depots, and contractor personnel.

The structure described above does not represent revolutionary change but rather a natural evolution based upon past studies and experiences in both peace and war. The structure will support both conventional and unconventional warfare on any continent, in multiple scenarios, with both Active Army and Reserve Component participation. The desirability of this approach has been proven by its application to the aviation and strategic communication commodities as well as select Communications/ Electronics (COMMEL) and missile equipment. The tri-level maintenance structure recognizes that all equipment does not need all the levels all of the time. Use of two or even one level is permitted, indeed encouraged, if it will provide the necessary support at the best life-cycle cost. The geographic positioning of units in the theater can also be altered to meet operational needs.

Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) is a business practice change that is being implemented Army-wide to optimize regional and national level repair capacity and capability. Sustainment maintenance refers to all maintenance conducted above the Direct Support (DS) level. ISM optimizes the Total Army sustainment maintenance capability to support the full spectrum of Army missions by centralizing management of resources and workloading, decentralizing execution of maintenance requirements, and synchronizing of personnel and equipment. Assigned at Echelons Above Corps (EAC), sustainment maintenance organizations provide General Support (GS) maintenance, depot-level maintenance, and limited backup support to DS maintenance units. ISM relies on a developmental management information system to integrate maintenance management at local, regional and national levels and to support MACOM-level oversight of ISM operations.

The maintenance allocation chart (MAC) remains the primary tool for assigning tasks. Equipment design will support the maintenance priorities which are: first, discard; second, repair forward; and third, evacuate. Greater use of Built-In-Test/Built-In-Test Equipment (BIT/BITE), modularity, common tools and hardware, and discard of components and selected small end items will facilitate improved forward maintenance to the user.

Other major policies (principles) are:

- Maintenance is a command responsibility;
- Unserviceable materiel that cannot be repaired because of the authorized level of repair assigned is to be promptly evacuated and a replacement item issued; and
- Unserviceable materiel being evacuated should have the same movement priority as serviceable materiel.

Vertical maintenance management in the Army is functionalized with a commodity/weapons systems-oriented structure. It provides a direct link from HQDA to the ultimate user through the commodity management chain. Wholesale support responsibility is centralized at USAMC. Vertical management techniques

are used to obtain cost-effective operation and responsive improvements. The Army approach to vertical management relies on standardization of management systems, improvement of asset reporting and control for better asset knowledge and visibility, and streamlining of the Army logistics support structure to conserve resources.

Maintenance management within the Army is organized by commodity groups, for example, missiles or aircraft. Within commodity groups, management effort is predicated upon cost and item essentiality. High cost and high demand result in a greater degree of management, although management by exception is done when deviations from normal occur.

Currently, the Army's key maintenance management thrusts are:

- Assure that logistics policies and doctrine support warfighting doctrine.
- Execute the Maintenance Management Program (MMP).
- Implement an improved concept for Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) calibration and repair.
- Review and improve maintenance float policies and procedures.
- Improve retail/wholesale maintenance support of repairable secondary items.
- Improve wholesale maintenance management.
- Modernize the Army's worldwide maintenance facilities.
- Implement Integrated Sustainment Maintenance.
- Establish vertical maintenance management as Army policy.

Transportation. The primary DCSLOG transportation functions are strategic movement and mobility, ship modernization, transportation programs, development of transportation policy for DA-sponsored cargo and passenger movements, and management of Army responsibilities for the DOD Military Customs Inspection Program.

The Director of Transportation, Energy, and Troop Support, ODCSLOG, is the Army member of the Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The JTB is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the effective employment of common-user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD. The director is also the ARSTAF member of the Mobility Studies Steering Group and the Army member of the Joint Intermodal Steering Group. Three divisions in the directorate manage the transportation program: the Strategic Mobility Division, the Transportation Management Division and Transportation Distribution Division.

Strategic mobility is defined as the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. The DOD concept for strategic mobility includes airlift, sealift, and overseas prepositioning of materiel. The Strategic Mobility Division exercises General Staff supervision over strategic mobility aspects of war, contingency plans, and mobilization and deployment exercises; transportation concepts, doctrine, and force structure; strategic transportation resources; wartime transportation policy; transportability; and transportation assets (rail and watercraft). The Chief, Strategic Mobility Division, serves as the Army member of the Joint Surface Movements Board (JSMB), and the JTB secretariat, and serves as the logistics focal point for the

Army Strategic Mobility Program   The Transportation Management Division develops Army policy, procedures, and guidance on transportation and transportation services for DA-sponsored cargo shipments; passenger travel and personal property movements; movement forecasts; and nontactical vehicles. The division exercises ODCSLOG Executive Agency responsibilities for the DOD Military Customs Inspection Program.

The development of containerized shipping techniques permits the rapid surface movement of materiel. The Direct Support System (DSS), a standard system, is designed to take advantage of this capability and to deliver materiel directly to the user. Although airlift capabilities have increased, the Army still relies on surface movement for the bulk of its cargo.

Management of the transportation program focuses on the maintenance of a wartime lift capability in a peacetime environment to ensure a continuous movement of supplies to deployed forces. To develop and maintain this capability, the most responsive transportation systems are incorporated into the transportation program. Containerization, intermodalism, electronic data interchange (EDI) systems, and the Air Lines of Communication (ALOC) concept are all being developed fully to improve transportation services during peace and war.

The Air Line of Communications (ALOC) concept provides for the rapid movement of Army repair parts by air and is designed to capitalize on technological advances in communications and transportation systems permitting rapid movement of materiel. This concept is designed to conserve resources, reduce inventories, improve management, and increase responsiveness. The U.S. Army Logistics Support Activity is the Army airlift clearance authority, with responsibility for validating and controlling the flow of Army air eligible cargo into the airlift system.

The Transportation Distribution Division represents the Army in developing the requirements and the knowledge-based architecture and systems needed to support the Army's logistics mission. The Division is also responsible for synchronizing Army efforts by linking strategic, operational and tactical transportation distribution systems with other Army logistics systems to form a seamless distribution process with integrated automated systems. As part of this effort, the Distribution Division provides policy and guidance, spearheads the Army's participation in the Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management migration process, and acts as the ODCSLOG focal point for transportation aspects of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and Joint Deployment System (JDS)

Tactical Water Management. The Army is designated the DOD Executive Agent for land-based water resources. The Army established a water office in ODCSLOG (DALO–TSE) to carry out the following primary duties: in coordination with the other military Department Secretaries, develop and implement policy concerning joint plans, procedures, and requirements for water resources in support of land-based forces; advise the ASA(IL&E) of water resource requirements and significant developments in connection with water resource research, equipment acquisition, and doctrine; establish procedures for coordination of all DOD Component regulatory documents and plans affecting water resource planning for joint employment and support, R&D, and

equipment acquisition; develop, in coordination with appropriate DOD components, joint doctrine for the employment of water resources; develop an improved, expanded, and automated water resources intelligence data base for the rapid retrieval of information on an area or point basis to assist commanders in making water support logistics decisions; provide the data to the Defense Mapping Agency for incorporation into its terrain analysis program; and establish a water resources management action group (WRMAG) as a mechanism to coordinate and resolve joint water support issues.

Energy Management. Staff responsibility for Army energy management resides with the DCSLOG. The Army Energy Office (AEO) in the Directorate for Transportation, Energy, and Troop Support, supported by the U.S. Army Logistics Integration Agency (LIA), is charged with overall responsibility for supervising and coordinating the Army Energy Program. Assisting the DCSLOG in his energy responsibility is the Army Advisory Group on Energy composed of representatives from the Army Staff agencies. The Secretary of the Army has appointed a Special Assistant for Energy on his staff to represent him on energy matters. The Special Assistant is the Deputy for Logistics in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment) (ASA[IL&E]).

The cost of energy makes energy management one of the foremost challenges for commanders and staff personnel at all levels. In order to meet this challenge effectively, the AEO manages a comprehensive energy program which addresses both facilities and mobility energy usage. The program is implemented by the Army Energy Resources Management Plan which provides the necessary direction and guidance to meet National, DOD, and Army goals and objectives through the year 2000. The purpose of the Army Energy Resources Management Plan is to ensure that the Army maintains a high state of readiness in an uncertain energy environment. The plan anticipates the energy future, is designed to incorporate newly developed technologies into the program, and also provides the methodology and specific information required by MACOMs and installations to develop comprehensive and consistent energy programs.

Because facilities' energy use represents more than 80 percent of total Army consumption, projects related to reducing energy consumption comprise a significant portion of the program dollars. In order to ensure the most efficient expenditure of these dollars, the AEO works in close coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management (ACSIM).

Given the total Army energy goals, MACOMs are assigned individual goals within that framework. The recommended MACOM goals are based on past performance and the ability of the MACOM to reduce energy consumption while maintaining the requisite state of readiness.

Petroleum Logistics Management. The DCSLOG has Army Staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to petroleum and packaged petroleum logistics. The primary functions are as follows: develops and implements policies for bulk petroleum supply, distribution and accountability; develops and implements policy for the Single Fuel on the Battlefield concept; assists in the development of prepositioned war reserve policies, guidance, stock levels and computation factors for bulk petroleum

products worldwide; participates in planning and development of force structure for petroleum units; establishes policy for DA quality surveillance programs for fuels and lubricants, provides liaison with other government agencies and military departments with respect to bulk petroleum matters; coordinates with the Air Force and the Navy in the joint development of equipment requirements; chairs the Petroleum Advisory Group (PAG) to coordinate and direct the Army's effort to improve bulk petroleum receipt, storage and distribution capabilities; serves as the proponent for the Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) Operational Project, which is a HQDA owned project.

Troop Support. ODCSLOG staff responsibility for soldier support policy resides with the Troop Support Division. The primary troop support programs are food, clothing and individual equipment, and the field service support. To achieve management of these programs, the Troop Support Division is comprised of three separate teams; the Subsistence Team, the Clothing and Individual Equipment (CIE) Team, and the Field Service Systems Team.

The Chief, Troop Support Division serves as the Army member of the Department of Defense (DOD) Food Planning Board, the DOD Joint Formulation Board of Food and Nutrition Research and the Joint Service Operational Ration Forum. The Troop Support Division also provides the Army representative on the DOD Steering Committee for the demonstration of Prime Vendor Delivery of Subsistence, ODCSLOG members on the Tri-Annual Airdrop Malfunction Review and Safety Analysis Group, and the Joint Committee for Tactical Shelters; as well as the executive secretary for the Army Uniform Board and the Subsistence Review Committee and the Co-chair for the Army Nutrition Planning Committee.

The Subsistence Team provides management for the Army Installation Food Service Program and the Field Feeding Program. The Subsistence Team is responsible for developing plans and formulating policy for management for the Army Food Program; including:

- development of plans, programs and standards, and reviewing doctrine for management of the installation food service programs.
- development of plans and formulation of policy to support Army field feeding concepts, force structure, testing, and introduction of new equipment and rations.
- developing nutrition policies and programs for dining facilities consistent with the Surgeon General's nutrition policies.
- serving as the Army-wide program analyst for the Subsistence-In-Kind budget.
- monitoring the Defense Commissary Agency's support to Army personnel and families.

The Subsistence Team also serves as the DA functional proponent for:

- military construction and minor construction programs regarding the designing and equipping of installation dining facilities and troop subsistence activities.
- the Army Food Management Information System (AFMIS) and automated headcount.
- Class I tactical automation.

− recognition of excellence in the Army Food Program to include the Philip A. Connelly Award for Excellence in Food Service and the Culinary Arts Program.

The Clothing and Individual Equipment Team. Clothing and Individual Equipment (CIE) is defined as organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), clothing bag (personal), and optional clothing items. The CIE Team is responsible for developing plans and formulating policies for management of Class II CIE (with the exception of chemical protective clothing) and Army Military Clothing Sales Stores (USAMCSS), Clothing Initial Issue Points, and Central Issue Facilities. The CIE Team serves as DA functional proponent for concept approval and type classification of CIE and Class II (CIE) secondary items requirements included in Common Table of Allowance (CTA) 50-900. The CIE team also serves as the HQDA interface on CIE and USAMCSS issues with DOD, other Services, other federal and civilian agencies, Army Major Commands, and Reserve Components and as HQDA functional interface for DOD standardization and modernization of OCIE.

The Field Service Systems Team is responsible for developing plans, formulating policies and procedures, and providing functional oversight of the Installation Laundry and Drycleaning facilities and material and selected TACOM Class VII supplies and equipment. Specific areas of concern include Aerial Delivery and Airdrop Systems and Equipment, Topographic equipment and Map material, Special Forces Operational Equipment (diving equipment and rubber tactical boats), Mobile Electric Power Systems, Bridging Systems, Aircraft Landing Mats, and Collective Support Systems (rigid and softwall shelters, Force

Provider, field laundries, field clothing repair equipment, laundries, latrines, showers and mortuary affairs equipment).

Mission, Organization, and Functions of the Army Materiel Command (USAMC).

Mission. USAMC is the principal Army wholesale logistics command. USAMC's complex and vital missions can be summarized as:

- Equip and sustain a trained, ready army.
- Provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance Program.
- Develop and acquire non-major systems and equipment.
- Provide development and acquisition support to program managers.
- Define, develop, and acquire superior technologies.
- Executive agent for the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
- Maintain the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army.
- Continue to improve productivity and quality of life.

USAMC's mission can be summarized this way: first, the acquisition of materiel; second, the responsibility for supporting the readiness of that materiel while in the user's hands; and third, provide materiel disposal direction.

Organization. The present USAMC organization includes 10 major subordinate commands (MSCs) and 29 separate reporting activities (SRAs). The MSCs include the U.S. Army Research Laboratory,

U. S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC)

Figure 12-2

concerned with research and development missions; the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, supporting developmental missions; the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command, supporting manufacturing, ammunition and maintenance missions; the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, concerned with security assistance programs to include Foreign Military Sales; the U.S. Army Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation Command, providing training and test simulation, simulator, target, and instrumentation products and services; and the five remaining MSCs which are commodity oriented and perform life-cycle management over the accomplishment of research, development, engineering, initial and follow-on procurement, and materiel readiness functions for items and weapon systems in support of the Army in the field.

Figure 12-2 shows the major elements of USAMC.

– *Industrial Operations Command (IOC)*, with headquarters at Rock Island, Illinois, provides logistical support to American and allied soldiers through manufacturing, remanufacturing, and maintaining go-to-war weapons systems; providing cradle-to-grave management of Defense Department conventional ammunition; Single Manager for Conventional

Ammunition (SMCA) and Joint Munitions Transportation Coordinating Activity (JMTCA) missions; maintaining Army War Reserve stocks required for power projection; and responsibly stewarding the Nation's environmental, fiscal, and human resources. IOC commands all Army depots, depot activities, arsenals, ammunition plants, and other industrial activities.

– *Communications/Electronics Command (CECOM)*, with headquarters at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is responsible for research, development, procurement and materiel readiness for communications, avionics, radar, radiac, automatic data processing (ADP), meteorology, night vision, combat surveillance, target acquisition, air traffic management, navigation, electronic warfare equipment/ systems, engine generators, intrusion detection, physical security equipment and environmental control equip- ment. CECOM also has the responsibility for administering the USAMC worldwide LOGCAP umbrella contract and command of Tobyhanna Army Depot. In addition, the Army's Central Design activities- Soft- ware Development Center- Lee (SDC-L), SDC - Washington (SDC-W), Logistics Systems Support Center (LSSC), Industrial Logistics Systems Center (ILSC), Fire Support Software Engineering (FSSE) Center, and Life Cycle Software Support Center (LSSC) -- assigned to CECOM on 1 October 1997, are organized under the CECOM Software Engineering Center.

– *Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)*, with headquarters at Warren, Michigan, is responsible for research, development, procurement and materiel readiness for wheeled and tracked vehicles, construction equipment, and Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE), armaments, small arms, mines, countermines, bridging and stream crossing equipment, water supply equipment and fuels distribution equipment.

– *Aviation & Missile Command AMCOM*, with headquarters at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is responsible for research, development, and materiel readiness for Army aviation and missile systems. The Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Activity remains as a separate activity on Redstone Arsenal AMCOM.

– *Army Research Laboratory (ARL)*, with headquarters at Adelphi, Maryland, is the USAMC corporate laboratory responsible for basic and exploratory research to provide the key technologies necessary to assure supremacy in future land warfare and provide the technology base for USAMC's research, development and

engineering centers (RDECs) and the Army Program Executive Officers and Project Managers.

- *Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM),* is headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. At its four subordinate installations and six other subordinate test centers/sites, TECOM plans and conducts developmental tests and live-fire tests of materiel systems and hardware and software subsystems throughout the materiel life cycle; verifies system safety, and supports operational testing. TECOM performs independent developmental assessments of non-major systems, develops new testing technology, and executes the international development test standardization program for USAMC.

- *Security Assistance Command (USASAC),* its headquarters collocated with USAMC headquarters, performs USAMC's role as the Army's executive agent for security assistance. As such, USASAC is responsible for the execution of the Army's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and exercising direction over the International Logistics/Security Assistance Management Directorates at the USAMC commodity MSCs. This encompasses (1) developing fully supported and sustainable equipment sales offers, (2) delivering high-quality equipment and training on time and within the cost estimates contained in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), (3) developing the U.S. Army position on commercial export licenses for military equipment and technology, (4) negotiating co-production agreements with other nations, and (5) developing plans for transition to war.

- *Army Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM),* with headquarters in Orlando, Florida, is responsible for providing centralized management and direction for all Army simulation, training, and test requirements for Distributed Interactive Simulation. Responsibilities include cradle-to-grave life-cycle acquisition, beginning with technical base programs and following through with each phase of the acquisition process.

- *Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM)* was established on 1 October 1993 with headquarters at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The elements of CBDCOM exist under two complementary process areas: Research, Development, and Acquisition; and Remediation. The former includes the Edgewood RDE Center, PM for Smoke/ Obscurants, PM for NBC Defense, and Program Director for Biological Defense. The latter includes the PM for Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Executive Agent for Treaty Compliance, and the Chemical

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program.

- *Soldier Systems Command (SSCOM)* was activated in November,1994, with headquarters in Natick, Massachusetts. The SSCOM mission is to use basic and applied research to develop, integrate, acquire and sustain soldier and soldier-related support systems in an effort to modernize, balance and improve the soldier's war fighting capabilities, performance and quality of life. In developing quipment and clothing, SSCOM is taking a revolutionary approach to the oldest and most basic item of warfare by looking at the individual soldier as a complete weapons platform. To support this mission, SSCOM has 3 major subordinate activities: the U.S. Army Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center (NRDEC) in Natick, MA; the Project Manager-Soldier (PM-Soldier) at Fort Belvoir, VA; and the Clothing and Textile Branch (CTB) in Philadelphia, PA.

- *U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA)* is a logistics products and services organization providing support to a diverse array of customers on a world-wide scale. LOGSA was created in 1993 through the consolidation of numerous Army logistics information centers and support activities as part of Army compliance with federally

mandated base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions, implementation of Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRDs), and Army management decisions to maintain support levels with declining resources. The intended result is to provide the customers with logistics information and services at reduced cost. The LOGSA mission is to provide logistics information and management support to the Department of Army and other services in the broad areas of logistics: integrated logistics support; logistics field support/ contingency planning; materiel distribution management, procedures and systems; packaging, storage and containerization policy and procedures; and Army cataloging policy, operations, data management and distribution. Currently, LOGSA owns and maintains 66 data bases or automated file applications. Integrating and consolidating these products and data bases into easy-to-use formats and media, using state-of-the-art automation and communications technology is a key Force XXI objective. The LOGSA objective of achieving a seamless logistics system operating in a common operating environment is evident in the development of the following products and services:

- Logistics Integrated Data Base (LIDB) The Logistics Integrated Data Base (LIDB) initiative is LOGSA's strategic plan to

bring all LOGSA databases under one architecture / umbrella. The LIDB will be the single authoritative source of information in support of managers and decision-makers at various echelons in user communities thoughout the Army.

To achieve this goal, LIDB software engineers evaluate and re-engineer Army "business processes" that produce the raw logistics data. Utilizing commercial off-the-shelf information management software and state-of-the-art object - relational database middle ware, the LIDB team will construct the unified database and "migrate" the information housed in all of the independent legacy databases and data files into one logical, streamlined data system. The LIDB program will also deliver powerful front-end graphical user interface (GUI) tools to access and manipulate data for diagnostic, prognostic and decision support functions.

- LIDB uses data from existing sources of force structure, weapons systems, asset visibility, readiness, maintenance, cataloging, packaging,

and Interchangeability and Substitutability (I&S) data without creating any additional reporting requirements. The resulting system prohibits access to redundant data, improves the accuracy of the information base, and delivers useful information distilled from the vast expanse of stored data. In a relatively short period of time, the user has all the pertinent information required for decision support, information-driven activity.-

- Electronic Technical Manuals/Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (ETM/IETM) - The AMC/LOGSA Technical Manual (TM) Digitization initiative will convert 3.5 million TM pages from paper to digital format and place those converted TMs on Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD-ROM). Some of the benefits of ETMs include monetary savings associated with distribution, storage and updates as well as enabling a lighter, easier deployment. The proliferation of ETM/IETM will also prove beneficial to readiness reporting, in that current Preventive

Maintenance Checks and Services lists with "Not Ready If" column can aid the soldier in determining the exact status of the item of equipment. This information, provided to the ULLS-G and ULLS-A systems with the Army Materiel Status System (AMSS), will result in more accurate and timely equipment readiness status reporting for reportable Army equipment.

LOGSA is on the World Wide Web (WWW) with a home page. The WWW provides the most efficient and effective method to provide some types of unclassified logistics information. When security and funding issues are resolved, all LOGSA logistics information will be available via the Internet through the WWW. This will render better service for customers at all levels -- strategic, tactical and operational -- by providing timely, accurate information and powerful on-line data manipulation, graphics and reporting capabilities. The software will be updated automatically and will be available around-the-clock and around-the-world.

– *Logistics Support Element (LSE)*. - The LSE is a multifunctional, highly mobile, tailorable TDA organization of logistics technicians, military and civilian, which can be deployed anywhere in the world in support of U.S. Forces in a contingency operation. The LSE can be tailored to meet the requirements of the theater commander. A deployed LSE provides resources to fill gaps in functions where deployed military units may need technical or logistical assistance(e.g., maintenance support, supply support, etc.).. The primary mission is to enhance readiness through unified and integrated application of logistics power projection of CONUS-base capabilities. The footprint the LSE places in a theater is based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time (METT-T) and the desires of the CINC. With the usage of LOGCAP, which is controlled by the LSE,, the LSE can perform any logistical support mission assigned. The LSE can function in a variety of scenarios ranging from a hostile environment, such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-Herzegovina), to Operations Other Than War (OOTW), such as disaster/humanitarian relief, for example, the cleanup in Florida following Hurricane Andrew, the Mississippi River floods, fire fighting in the Pacific Northwest, or supporting United Nations relief efforts in Rwanda or Somalia.

Functions. USAMC functions include materiel management, maintenance management, Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), development of equipment, wholesale maintenance, and operation of wholesale depots. USAMC through LOGSA also provides management of operational policies, programs, objectives, and resources

associated with its worldwide Logistics Assistance Program. An overview of these functions follows. Emphasis is placed on wholesale supply since this function has great impact on the units and activities supported by USAMC.

National Maintenance Point Functions. The maintenance functions of the Commodity Commands are accomplished by a National Maintenance Point (NMP). Each Commodity Command has a NMP for maintenance management of those items in its commodity grouping. The functions of the NMP are:

– technical control of depot overhaul and repair programs.
– configuration management including equipment configuration baseline (specifications), management of techniques for changing the baseline (engineering change proposals), and configuration status reporting (modifications applied).
– development of maintenance publications such as technical manuals, modification work orders, technical bulletins, maintenance digests, etc..
– determination of repair parts to be provisioned as items are initially issued to troop units.
– cataloging functions.
– evaluation of equipment improvement recommendations.
– new equipment training.

National Inventory Control Point Functions. The supply functions of the Commodity Commands are accomplished by a National Inventory Control Point (NICP).

Each Commodity Command has an NICP to manage those items in a commodity grouping. The functions of the NICP are:

– requirements computation;
– cataloging direction;
– procurement direction;
– distribution management;
– establish overhaul/rebuild direction; and
– materiel disposal direction/ reutilization.

An explanation of these functions will provide a better understanding of USAMC's supply responsibility. The procedures that follow are applicable to most items. You should be aware that procedures used for the management of specialized commodities like ammunition are similar, but not identical. Because of their use or unique characteristics, other management procedures may be used instead of, or in addition to, those described here.

Requirements Computation. In computing requirements, materiel is separated into major and secondary items. A major item is a final combination of parts and/or materiels ready for its intended use and of such importance that it is subject to continuing, centralized (HQDA), individual item authorization and management throughout all command and support echelons. For major Class VII equipment and Class V missile items, the Army Acquisition Objective process, as executed in the Force Builder data base, is the process used to compare the total Army requirements needed by the force structure and the Army's on-hand inventory, both in storage and in the hands of troops, to determine the shortage or net equipment-on-hand (EOH) to meet force requirements (also considering due-in assets and projected losses). The resulting

procurement program is developed on a commodity approach and reflects the various line items of equipment that are to be purchased to support Army requirements. The basic source calculations identifying overall procurement objectives are derived from the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) concept.

The AAO is the quantity of an item of equipment or ammunition required to equip the approved U.S. Army force and sustain that force, together with specified allies, in wartime from D-Day through the period prescribed in the latest OSD Defense Planning Guidance. The AAO can be described as the Gross Quantity/Total Amount of equipment, by individual Line Item Number (LIN), the Army is required to have in order to execute peace time missions as well as mobilize and execute the war time mission(s) prescribed in the DPG. The AAO consists of and is the sum of the following elements. These elements consist of the DCSOPS intensively managed Class VII equipment and Class V munitions—missiles only.

- *Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ)*. The IIQ is derived from the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS) and is computed based on the Master (M) Force of the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), as developed through the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and MACOM command plans (see Chapter 5). It contains all of the TOE/MTOE/TDA requirements for each item as modified by Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP). The IIQ is a tabulation of all of the TOE/TDA requirements for that item in the Army's force structure. This

portion also includes the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS).
- *Operational Projects* The Army has contingency missions other than the general wartime scenarios provided in the OSD guidance. Equipment stocks to support these missions are approved at Department of the Army (DA) and become a specific component of the total requirement.
- *Sustainment Stocks)*. This component of the AAO defines the unadjusted amount of war reserve stocks necessary for execution of the OSD wartime scenarios. This requirement is arrived at by use of a computer model that deploys forces on a time-phased deployment schedule, utilizing a specified scenario length and applying predetermined inter-theater and intra-theater attrition factors. It should be noted that Sustainment Stocks is reduced by an amount equal to IIQ left behind by units that deploy overseas and draw APS.
- *War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA)*. If the OSD scenarios involve allied forces that the Army must be prepared to support, their estimated losses are computed and included in this component of the gross requirement.
- *Maintenance Floats*. The maintenance system requires that additional equipment be available for issue while repair and maintenance of unit equipment is being performed. Two types of floats are included in this

component of the AAO—Operational Readiness Float (ORF) for unit and intermediate levels and Repair Cycle Float (RCF) for depot maintenance.

– *Munitions/Class V—Missile requirements only.* Missile requirements are based on the force structure that resides in the LOGSACS data base. This requirement includes unit basic loads, war reserve sustainment stocks, war fighting requirements developed from projections, training requirements and testing requirements. The remaining Class V requirements are developed by the Single Item Manager for Conventional Ammunition of the Army Materiel Command with a different data base.

The Class VII requirements developed above added together represent the AAO and are the gross/grand total equipment requirements for the Army.

Adjustments to the AAO are calculated to arrive at the Army Procurement Requirement (APR). Basically, the APR is developed by subtracting on hand assets and due in quantities, while projected peace time losses are added to the AAO to develop the APR.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) is responsible for the system used to calculate AAOs, the administration associated with the process.

Force Builder is a computer program used to develop the AAO. The U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency maintains the program used to compute the AAO and the resulting product. To compute the AAO, Force Builder must utilize and capture data from many other data base sources, such as TAADS, SAMAS, CTU files, TAEDP, CBS-X, and SB 700-20. The Force Development Directorate is responsible for coordinating with the appropriate agencies to ensure correct up to date information is obtained to develop an accurate AAO calculation.

The ASA(RDA) is the proponent for the Standard Study Numbering (SSN) system which groups similar items into levels of aggregation (for example, 5-ton trucks, all body types) suitable for DA-Staff analysis of requirements and formulation of program/budget requests. The SSN system enables HQDA to generate IIQ requirements for components of major items in their own right (for example, radios). The SSN system is actually maintained and operated by Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA)

When the AAO computations are completed, the requirements are analyzed to assist in the development of the procurement plan phased throughout the budget cycle. During this process, careful attention is given to ensure that the eight factors listed below are incorporated:

(1) Fiscal guidance
(2) DA, OSD, OMB, congressional decisions
(3) User (ODCSOPS, TRADOC) priorities
(4) Current asset positions/projected loss data including Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
(5) Product improvement programs
(6) Secondary item requirements (those procured within procurement appropriations—engines, transmissions, etc.)
(7) Production base status and capabilities

(8) Interface of modernization programs (new products) with current procurement programs.

Development of the procurement plan requires attention to these and other factors while attempting to achieve the AAOs in a balanced and progressive manner that will enhance Army readiness at the end of each Funded Delivery Period (FDP). The FDP data is reviewed and adjusted by the acquisition PEO/PM and the Army Staff in terms of overall Army requirements and changed to accommodate new guidance and/or priorities and to assure the materiel program is fully integrated into, and supported by, other appropriations. Articulation of Army requirements and recommended procurement programs and budget are the responsibility of the ASA(RDA) in coordination with the DCSOPS and DCSLOG.

The AAO is, in the final analysis, the Army's stated gross requirement for an item of materiel and is used to justify budgets and programs submitted to OSD/OMB and Congress in order to obtain funding. The component parts of the AAO computation system are clearly definable and aid in the explanation of the total requirement. Tentative conclusions can be drawn about Army readiness by comparing current asset data to the AAO. AAO data are used repeatedly by the leadership of the Army in explaining the Army's need for procurement funds.

There are about 307,700 secondary items, about 90% of which have an annual demand value of $5,000 or less. Because of the large number and dollar value, it is not feasible to manage each item separately using the IIQ, AAO, AMP concept. Secondary items are classified in four categories for application of varying degrees of management. These categories are based on the annual dollar value of demands, not the unit cost of the item. (The higher-dollar value, the greater the management application.) These categories are:
(1) low dollar value (up to $25,000)
(2) medium dollar value (up to $100,000)
(3) high dollar value (up to $1,000,000)
(4) very high dollar value (over $1,000,000).

Computers are used extensively to assist in the management of these items. At least annually and at most monthly, each item is reviewed to determine if the item's inventory has reached either a reorder point or a maximum retention level. As the reorder point is reached, the computer produces a supply control study which recomputes recommended stock levels. Based upon controls set in the computer, these new levels may be automatically accepted or reviewed by the item manager and modified. When an item becomes critical, either in short supply or affecting mission-essential end items, management is modified. This takes the form of moving the item from the low dollar value category to medium or high dollar so that it receives more frequent and thorough analysis or direct management by the item manager.

The key to requirements computation is a good knowledge of future needs. For secondary items, there are two methods used to estimate future requirements. The first is to project historical trends into the future. Past demands are recorded automatically by the computer and are projected into the future by a variety of mathematical means. The second method, while preferred, is more difficult. This method uses planned activities of the supported forces and their equipment; for example, major exercises, changes in end

item density, and applied consumption and failure rates to project future needs. Normally the first method is used and program change factors are applied to combine human judgment with historical trends. The computer constantly measures trends and alerts the item manager to trend changes. Once future requirements are determined, the next step is to obtain the required items.

Cataloging Direction. Within disciplines established by the Federal Catalog System (a Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] administered system), this process develops a Federal Item Identification to describe an item-of-supply and acquires a National Stock Number (NSN) to establish and fix the unique identity of the item.

The NSN is a 13-digit number used in all materiel management functions. The first four digits are the Federal Supply Classification Class (FSC) Code. The FSC relates like items of supply and, conversely, separates unlike items of supply. For example, in the FSC 5305, the 53 indicates that the item falls within the group "Hardware and Abrasives," and the 05 indicates that the item falls within the class of screws. The last nine digits of the NSN are called the National Item Identification Number (NIIN). Each NIIN is permanently assigned to only one item-of-supply and remains with the item as long as it is used in the government supply system. The first two digits of the NIIN also identify the country of origin; 00 and 01 indicate the United States.

The USAMC Logistics Support Activity maintains a consolidated Army Master Data File of all National Stock Numbers that the Army uses or manages. This file contains coded item management data, nomenclature, packaging, freight classification information, interchangeable/substitutable data, component references, and historical records on stock numbers. This information is disseminated throughout the Army with changes made monthly.

Procurement Direction. Much of the administrative burden of initiating a purchase request is done by computer. As a by-product of the supply control study, the computer provides a Procurement Work Directive (PWD) containing available technical specification data needed for the pre-award phase of a procurement contract. Depending upon a variety of factors including dollar value of the procurement, this request may be reviewed by the item manager and supervisory personnel or it may be forwarded automatically for procurement without review. Secondary items have an economic order quantity (EOQ) computed using a modified EOQ algorithm. Typically, secondary items are procured in quantities ranging from three months' to three years' supply, depending on the cost to buy versus the cost to store the item. When procurement is solicited, the prospective contractors are told where the item is to be delivered. This decision is made based on transportation costs, storage requirements, and the geographical location of the ultimate user.

Distribution Management of Major Items. Distribution management is primarily a three-fold process: accounting for existing assets through the Continuing Balance System–Expanded (CBS–X), projecting the distribution of equipment against planned force structure utilizing the Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), and executing the equipment distribution program through the use of the Requisition

WHO GETS WHAT?

DEPT OF THE ARMY MASTER PRIORITY LIST

(DAMPL)

Figure 12-2

Validation Report (REQVAL) and the Equipment Release Priority System (ERPS).

Accounting for Assets. The Continuing Balance System, Expanded (CBS–X) is a transaction accounting system operated and maintained by LOGSA that provides worldwide asset visibility for the Army's reportable items. It covers approximately 14,500 National Stock Numbers which are primarily major end items, but also includes other selected items (medical and secondary) on which worldwide visibility is required. CBS–X is updated monthly to reflect on-hand assets in units, storage, and in transit. The system is reconciled with property books and stock record accounts at least annually. CBS–X

data is used by MACOMs, USAMC, and HQDA to assess the overall preparedness of the force, as the source of on-hand asset data in the Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP) and, when merged with unit equipment authorization data, the determinant in honoring requisitions. For ammunition, retail/wholesale visibility is accomplished by the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System (WARS). The WARS data is used as a baseline for requirements computation, procurement, distribution, maintenance direction, and disposal. Unique item tracking provides visibility of small arms, controlled cryptographic and radioactive test and tracking systems.

PROJECTING DISTRIBUTION

CBS-X (ASSETS)

DELIVERIES (PROCUREMENT)

LOGSACS (REQUIREMENTS)

ERC-A/DAMPL (PRIORITIES)

TAEDP

DISTRIBUTION & DOCUMENTATION PLANNING

Figure 12-3

Projecting Equipment Distribution. TAEDP is a program which projects distribution requirements and priorities using on-hand assets and projected deliveries to produce an equipment distribution program for the current, budget, and program years. The data source for requirements is the LOGSACS which incorporates near-term authorizations from The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) with planned force structure as depicted in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS). Requirements are prioritized by ODCSOPS through the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in conjunction with Equipment Readiness Codes (ERCs) as stated in TOEs (see Figure 12-3). Current assets as reported in CBS–X are used as the baseline from which projected distribution of deliveries begins. Deliveries consist of new procurement, depot maintenance returns, and redistribution of displaced systems or assets generated through force structure changes. Figure 12-4 depicts the merging of the inputs in order to create the projected distribution plan.

The distribution is generally accomplished in ERC/DAMPL sequence which maximizes the distribution to readiness policy. TAEDP can, and does, reflect directed priorities, like Light Infantry Divisions, when determined by ODCSOPS. TAEDP projects distribution to all claimants including TOE, TDA, Army War Reserves (AWR), Operational Projects (OP PROJECTS), Operational Readiness Float (ORF), Army Reserves, etc. The TAEDP is normally processed to align with the PPBES process.

Executing the Distribution Plan. The REQVAL and ERPS reports are used to validate requisitions and release equipment. The REQVAL matches current equipment

authorizations as stated in TAADS against assets reported in CBS–X in order to validate requisitions (see Figure 12-5).

ERPS takes the process one step further and overlays out-of-DAMPL or special initiative priorities as reflected in the planning system (TAEDP). ERPS tells the NICP item manager which units are to receive equipment and in what order. The Major Item Requisition Validation (MIRV) system compares ERPS and item manager equipment backorder files, validates requirements, and provides the proper equipment distribution sequence in an automated product (see Figure 12-6).

The management of equipment distribution is a complicated process primarily used for allocating equipment, analyzing force capability, programming, budgeting, and as the link to correctly "growing" Army documentation. For ammunition, distribution planning for items in short supply is accomplished by the Committee for Ammunition Logistic Support (CALS), co-chaired by ODCSLOG and ODCSOPS. Distribution is generally accomplished in DAMPL sequence. The CALS meets twice each year and allocates supplies to the MACOMs for the upcoming six-month period. The MACOMs in turn suballocate down to the retail level.

EXECUTING DISTRIBUTION

REQUISITION VALIDATION
(REQVAL)

```
┌──────────┐              ┌──────────┐
│  CBS-X   │              │  TAADS   │
└──────────┘              └──────────┘
        ╲                  ╱
         ╲                ╱
          ▼              ▼
        ┌──────────────────┐
        │     REQVAL       │
        └──────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
            ☁ NICP ☁
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
Figure 12-4

Total Asset Visibility (TAV). TAV is one of several initiatives created by Logistics Integration Agency (LIA), formerly Strategic Logistics Agency (SLA)in response to the Defense Management Review Study of 1988. The design and development process was assigned to LOGSA and began in 1989. TAV is a capability, not a system. The focus in the design effort was not to create another reporting requirement, but to provide a single, authoritative source of asset information in support of managers/decision makers at various echelons within various user communities throughout the Army. TAV is an assimilator of data: when a user submits a query to TAV it assimilates data from as many as 42 databases, as necessary to provide the user with a correct and complete response. TAV interfaces with Automated Identification Technology (AIT) such as Radio Frequency Tag (RF Tag). TAV uses data from existing sources of force structure, weapons systems, cataloging, and asset data rather than creating additional reporting requirements. TAV provides users with the following categories of information: Assets, Authorizations, Intransit Visibility, Weapon System, BOIPFD/QQPRI (Basis of Issue Plan Feeder Data and Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Information), Item Information, Force

EXECUTING DISTRIBUTION
Equipment Release Priority System
(ERPS)

Figure 12-5

Structure, Army War Reserve/Operational Projects, Manpower Requirements Criteria and PM Support Module. Ultimately, TAV will become an interactive network of computers, gateways, and data bases. Centrally stored force structure, weapon system and cataloging information is supplemented by asset data obtained via reach-through approach using gateway technology.

Oil Analysis Standard Interservice System (OASIS). OASIS is the laboratory automated system used within the Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP). The OASIS includes chronological equipment data on a fleet-wide basis, unit of assignment, OPTEMPO, and major secondary item information. Data also includes automatic and manual input from laboratory test instruments. Laboratory findings are provided to the soldier in the field in real-time and in monthly computer reports. Data are used by materiel developers to improve reliability and validate resource consumption rates. Data are also used by The Army Maintenance Management System to collect end-item usage information for the US Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC) to validate funding line computations, and by installation commanders as validation information for filing Federal Excise Tax refund claims with the Internal Revenue Service.

Overhaul Direction. Overhaul of existing unserviceable stocks is the most economical method of supplying equipment to the field. In computing requirements for overhaul of major items, the NICP, in coordination with the NMP, considers those unserviceable items that are available for overhaul and required for issue. In

forecasting overhaul requirements, consideration is given to unserviceable, economically repairable equipment that has been turned in and is on hand at the depots, and to equipment that is expected to become unserviceable based on engineering factors such as operating or flying hours constraints or shelf-life limitations. The quantity that can be scheduled and accomplished is determined considering the availability of repairable items and repair parts, capability of the maintenance depots and contractors, funding guidance for that category of equipment, and priority of the items.

Materiel Disposal Direction. Ideally, each item has a computed retention level which is the total quantity that is authorized to be held in stock. The retention level includes war reserves, quantities to support ongoing operations, and safety levels. Any stock over the sum of these quantities is Army excess. Such excesses occur as a result of demand forecasts that do not fully materialize and equipment obsolescence. Prior to identifying an item as excess, efforts are make to fill all possible needs. For example, assemblies may be disassembled to generate repair parts that are in short supply or excesses may be provided to a contractor as government-furnished equipment, for example, excess engines to be installed in vehicles being procured.

The actual physical disposal of property is handled for the military Services by the Defense Logistics Agency through their Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO). Items that are worn to the point that their repair would be uneconomical, items damaged beyond repair, and excess serviceable items are turned over to DRMO. The DLA screens other military and government agencies to include Security Assistance requirements prior to offering serviceable items for bid by prospective commercial civilian purchasers. Prior to a serviceable item being turned in to DRMO, the same intensive screening must occur.

Depot Operations. The NICP determines the inventory quantity, procures items, and distributes them among depots. The NICP also orders the shipment of supplies in response to requisitions received from customers. Depots support the NICPs by responding to their direction. Distribution depot operations include receiving, storing, and shipping.

As shipments arrive at the depot, they are counted, their condition verified, and then placed in storage. The storage location is recorded and the receipt is reported to the NICP. The depot inspects, maintains, and preserves items in storage to prevent deterioration under a program called Care Of Supplies In Storage (COSIS). Items in storage are inventoried based on various criteria. One is the order-of-merit list. This computerized process lists items according to the frequency of demands during the fiscal year. Those items with the highest frequency of demands are inventoried first because the probability of error in the records increases in direct proportion to the activity of the item. Another criterion is based on mismatches when comparing the NICP accountable record to the depot custodial record. This comparison is performed quarterly. If the mismatch cannot be otherwise resolved (for example, intransit materiel release order [MRO]), the item is inventoried. Inventories are also conducted annually on controlled items, semiannually on Category I nonnuclear missiles and rockets, and upon the request of the item manager.

When a Materiel Release Order (MRO) is received from the NICP, the depot

determines the storage location, picks the item from storage, consolidates supplies by requisitioner, and packs and ships them by the mode of transportation that will meet the required delivery date and the requisition priority time frame.

Beginning in 1990, the distribution functions of the supply depots were consolidated under a single manager—DLA. The prototype site for consolidation was the San Francisco Bay area. On 24 June 1990, DLA assumed control of Sharpe Army Depot and the distribution functions of Sacramento Army Depot, McClellan Air Logistics Center, and Naval Supply Center Oakland. The remaining DOD distribution functions were transferred to DLA between February 1991 and March 1992 as implementation of *Defense Management Review Decision 902 (Consolidation of Defense Supply Depots)* was completed. This consolidation will permit the Defense Department to position stock more efficiently, develop a single integrated ADP system, consolidate transportation functions and facilities, and reduce administrative costs. The Defense Logistics Agency's consolidation of all DOD distribution functions was completed in June 1993. USAMC will retain the maintenance and ammunition missions.

Maintenance depots execute the overhaul/rebuild program developed by the NICP and NMP. When the overhaul program is finalized, the NMP transmits it to IOC which is responsible for workloading each depot, to include the allocation of funds. IOC advises each depot of the items and quantities that it will overhaul during the fiscal year. Overhaul is normally accomplished on an assembly-line basis. Rebuilt items are issued or placed in depot stock as directed by the NICP.

The commodity-oriented USAMC Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) maintain Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs) under the Logistics Assistance Program and other personnel to assure the continued serviceability of equipment in the hands of the troops. As directed by the MSC, IOC maintenance depots supplement these efforts by providing technical assistance and training. To facilitate provision of this assistance, 24-hour maintenance "hotlines" have been set up at all maintenance depots.

To ensure that new equipment is properly supported and turned over to the user, USAMC initiates a tailored Materiel Fielding Plan (MFP) with one or more Major Army Commands for each new item of equipment to be fielded. The MFP contains the plans, schedules, procedures, and command actions necessary to successfully deprocess, deploy, and sustain the new equipment. The Total Package Fielding (TPF) concept, when utilized, is to be covered in the MFP.

The TPF method provides gaining commands significant relief from much of the initial burden associated with force modernization fielding. Under the total package concept, USAMC fielding commands provide the user with USAMC-prepared, free-issue materiel packages.

STANDARD SYSTEMS

Defense Standard Systems.

There are a number of defense standard systems necessitated by the ever-increasing language of codes and formats readable by the computer, the supporting communications equipment, and the human operator. Items requisitioned by a single Army unit may be supplied by GSA, DLA, the Commodity Commands of USAMC or

any of the other military departments, thus the need for standard codes and formats. DLA has been assigned the responsibility for administering the 10 DOD Standard Systems generally referred to as the Military Standard Logistics System (MILS).

Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP). These procedures prescribe the uniform code and data elements to be used in requisitioning and issuing supplies. Within the Department of Defense, a single line item requisition is used. Each requisition is for one specific item. The form and format are fixed, but some of the data elements may be manipulated and other data elements added may produce a variety of documents essential to supply operations. Common documents thus produced are requisitions, cancellations, supply status, shipment status, follow-up answers, materiel release orders, confirmations, and denials. Much of the information contained in these documents is the same. For example, each document contains the National Stock Number, quantity, requisitioner, priority, funding data, etc. These procedures permit the requisitioner to say what he wants, and provides the supply system with the necessary documents for processing the request.

Uniform Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). In the issue and movement of supplies it is necessary to determine the relative importance of competing requisitions. Two factors play a part in determining the priority: the Force Activity Designator and the Urgency of Need. Each unit in the Army is assigned a Force Activity Designator based upon its relative position on the Department of the Army Master Priority List

and its present deployment, that is, positioned for combat, in combat, in support of troops in combat, etc. The Urgency of Need refers to the unit's need for the particular item being requisitioned, that is, a repair part to get equipment off deadline, stock replenishment, etc. The application of these two factors produces a total of 15 priorities. UMMIPS establishes time standards based on priority. From requisition to receipt, the standards are:

Priority	Requisitioning Unit Location	
	United States	Overseas
01-03	7 days	11-12 days
04-08	11 days	15-16 days
09-15	28 days	67-82 days

These time standards are further subdivided for each activity involved in the supply and movement of materiel, that is, NICP, depot, transportation agencies, etc.

Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP). This system is designed to manage, control, and document materiel (including personal property, exchange, and commissary) moving in the Defense Transportation System and clearly define the responsibilities of shipping, clearance, terminal, and receiving activities. MILSTAMP is structured to interface directly with MILSTRIP and to support the movement criteria prescribed by UMMIPS. It functions through a discipline of uniform documentation procedures, formats, data elements and codes, and data transmission time standards. It also supports the performance-assessment requirements of MILSTEP through in-transit data collection and the inventory visibility requirements of the Services and agencies.

Military Supply and Transportation Evaluation Procedures (MILSTEP). The basic tools for evaluating the wholesale system are the MILSTEP reports. This system of reporting uses the uniform data elements produced by MILSTRIP and MILSTAMP as a data base to produce the various MILSTEP supply and transportation reports. To produce these reports, a reduced version of the computer history file for each Commodity Command is extracted onto tape and forwarded to the Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA). These tapes, along with in-transit data tapes from the Central Data Collection Point at Defense Depot, Tracy, California, are used by LOGSA to produce a series of monthly supply and transportation pipeline reports using UMMIPS standards which indicate where delays in the pipeline are occurring. The supply effectiveness reports display such things as: the percentages of requisitions on which stock was available, the number and age of back-ordered requisitions, and the number of stock numbers causing back orders. Using this same data base, other reports are generated to evaluate depots, NICPs, and USAMC's overall performance in key functional areas.

Department of the Army Standard Systems.

Just as it is necessary for Department of Defense to establish military standard systems to be used by all of the military departments, the Army establishes standard systems for use by its various elements. The overall concept for Standard Army Logistics Systems (SALS) embodies standard systems in every functional area. Many systems that will be included under the SALS concept are currently being developed and tested. There are two standard systems developed and used by USAMC that are a part of SALS.

They are the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS), which is used to support the NICPs; and the Standard Depot System (SDS), used to support depot operations.

Direct Support System (DSS). USAMC serves as executive agent for the Direct Support System (DSS). The Air Line of Communications (ALOC) is a refinement of DSS and is used to airlift selected repair parts to designated overseas units. DSS was developed with the following objectives:

– reduce intermediate stock levels overseas and at CONUS installations;
– reduce the value of stock in the pipeline;
– maintain or improve supply responsiveness and expend fewer resources through use of improved computer, communications, and container technology;
– change existing procedures as little as possible; and
– maintain readiness.

DSS–ALOC provides for direct supply of materiel from the wholesale distribution depot to the DSU, bypassing overseas general support and break-bulk points and CONUS installation supply activities. The DSU requisition is passed to the wholesale supplier through the intermediate level and the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS).

DAAS is a worldwide computerized activity that acts as a message center. It automatically routes supply documents between requisitioners and the various supply activities. This routing is done on a near real-time basis and rarely is a supply document delayed more than a few minutes. The requisition is routed to the NICP who

orders the appropriate distribution depot to ship the item. The distribution depot moves the item to the Consolidation/ Containerization Point (CCP), located at the distribution depot, for consolidation with other supplies destined for the same DSU. Depending on volume, consolidation point personnel load a container for one unit or a number of units situated in the same geographic area. The container is loaded for ease of unloading and once closed at the CCP is not opened until it arrives at its destination. If all supplies in the container are for one DSU, the destination is that DSU. If supplies are for multiple DSUs, the destination is a drop point (a designated unit) within the geographical area and other units come to this point and pick up their supplies.

Continuing Balance System– Expanded. (CBS–X). The CBS–X is the official Army asset position for selected Army equipment. The objective is to provide accurate, timely, and auditable worldwide asset positions at property book level of major end items of equipment and furnish the Army with an official inventory figure for equipment procurement and distribution decisions.

Logistics Intelligence File (LIF). The LIF, maintained by the USAMC Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA), is the Army's only data base that consolidates worldwide supply and transportation pipeline data. It was originally created to monitor the performance of DSS–ALOC, but has evolved into the primary source for up to date logistic management information. It provides visibility of individual requisitions and shipments as they move through the logistics resupply channels. All Army requisitions on the wholesale system (USAMC, DLA, GSA, and other military departments) are recorded in the LIF except bulk petroleum products. Customers can access LIF records using remote query procedures or by other conventional communication means. The LIF incorporates Unit Movement Visibility (UMV), Battlefield Distribution System (BDS), and interfaces with Automated Identification Technology (AIT) such as Radio Frequency Tag (RF Tag). Transportation information and RF Tag data is received from the source and posted to LIF data base. Requisition and all other MILSTRIP documentation that flows through DAAS are routed to LOGSA for posting to LIF. This includes status documents, materiel release orders, confirmations, and backorders, etc. Each month a complete performance evaluation of DSS-ALOC is prepared and distributed world wide. It contains individual unit activity performance reports as well as summary data for overseas commands, CONUS and MACOMs. LOGSA also maintains the Army-wide Materiel Returns Data Base, Central Demand Data Base and the Airlift Clearance File. Information contained in these data bases is readily available as special and recurring reports.

The Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) has been designed for the management of Class V conventional ammunition to include guided missiles and large rockets. The SAAS Level 1/3 system is operational at the theater level in USAREUR and USARPAC and provides theater management information and input through the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System to the wholesale and national levels. The SAAS Level 3 system provides Class V management information to the corps materiel management center (MMC) and other stock control activities. The SAAS Level 4 system provides an accounting and

management information system to the ammunition supply point and other Class V storage locations. SAAS–DAO provides automated support to assist the Division Ammunition Officer in performing divisional ammunition management.

The Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS) is the DA logistics management information system encompassing the function of materiel maintenance which will provide for uniformity and standardization within the three levels of maintenance management ; national (HQDA); wholesale (USAMC); and retail (operator/crew, organizational, intermediate DS and GS operations, and the headquarters supervising their operations). The overall objective of SAMS is to establish a standard uniform maintenance management and information system in support of the materiel maintenance operations of the field commander, the materiel developer, and the national authorities. The primary source of information concerning materiel operational performance and maintenance operations performance is at the intermediate category of maintenance. Recognizing this, SAMS establishes its primary data bank and its most judicious data gathering and manipulations at this level. Subsequently, SAMS integrates all outputs vertically and horizontally to meet the information requirements of the Army in the field, and of the wholesale, and the national levels of the logistics system. SAMS operates on the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) and interfaces with SARSS-1 (I), ULLS, and Desktop DS4. The Standard Army Maintenance System–Installation/Table of Distribution and Analysis (SAMS–I/TDA) is being fielded to TDA maintenance sites in CONUS and OCONUS replacing command unique systems and will operate on

nondevelopmental item (NDI) computers utilizing Local Area Networks (LANs).

Standard Army Retail Supply System–Level 1 (SARSS–1) is an interactive, real-time supply system operating on the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) hardware and Burroughs Twenty Operating System (BTOS). SARSS–1 provides automation to Direct Support Units (DSUs) in customer service and warehouse sections by performing the functions of transaction source data entry, transaction edit, interactive issue, directed issue, receiving, storing, and accounting for supplies as a custodial record when operating as a subsystem of the Direct Support Unit Standard Supply System (DS4). It is a user-friendly system designed for use by functional personnel without the assistance of computer specialists. It interfaces with DS4 as its higher supply source and has the capability of interfacing with the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS) when authorized. It supports manual customers as well as interfacing with automated customers using the Standard Army Maintenance System–Level 1 (SAMS–1), Standard Property Book System–Redesign (SPBS–R), and Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS). SARSS–1 operates at the GSU/DSU/installation level; SARSS–2A operates at division and separate installations; and SARSS–2B operates at corps and Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), theater Army, and installations. SARSS (Objective) will replace DS4 and SAILS.

Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) is an interactive, near real-time supply and maintenance management system which operates at the unit (company/battery/troop) and battalion level on the Z248/286 interim

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hardware. ULLS automates the entire range of supply functions associated with the maintenance of unit PLL (for example, request for issue, receipt, and turn-in of repair parts, demand analysis, and maintenance of the document control register) as well as the TAMMS functions at the unit motor pool (that is, operational records and dispatch procedures; Army Oil Analysis Program for ground equipment; and historical records). ULLS interfaces with SARSS–1 (I), DS4, and SAMS–1/2.

The Army Food Management Information System (AFMIS) automates management of food service and subsistence supply operations at the Troop Issue Subsistence Activity (TISA), Installation Food Advisor (IFA), and the Dining Facility Operations (DFO). The TISA module assists in issues, receipts, sales, reorders, and storage. The IFA module produces reports on dining facility operation and menus. The DFO module assists the dining facility manager in menu planning, production scheduling, inventories, headcount, and requisitioning. AFMIS currently interfaces with DISMS and STARFIARS.

Standard Property Book System–Redesign (SPBS–R) is an interactive, on-line property accountability system which operates on the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) in the TOE environment and on the MS/DOS-based Zenith Z248 computer in the installation environment. The functional application provides property accountability and/or asset visibility at battalion and higher levels in the tactical environment, and at the installation/TDA levels in the nontactical environment. It provides automated interfaces with Supply Support Activities (SSA) for request and receipt of equipment,

Continuing Balance System–Expanded (CBS–X) for worldwide asset reporting, Asset Control System (ACS) for authorization data, and Department of Defense Small Arms Serialization Program (DODSASP) for small arms and Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) reporting. It provides on-line management information and automated reporting procedures for the Property Book Officer, and produces updated company-level hand receipts when needed. External reports may be produced via magnetic media, radio, or hard copy.

Direct Support Unit Standard Supply System (DS4) is a desktop automated supply management system designed as a wartime and peacetime standard Army Direct Support (DS)-level system. It automates, to the maximum extent feasible, the routine supply management functions of supply control (that is, controlling materiel and documentation) and stock control (that is, maintaining current asset and transaction data for accountability and visibility purposes). Desktop DS4 maintains single-source baselines for multi-DSU applications which operate on DAS3 (Model A) hardware. DAS3 vans are being replaced by Desktop III systems. Desktop DS4 interfaces with ULLS, SPBS–R, SARSS–1(I), SAMS–2, SAILS, and TUFMIS.

Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System (SAILS) is a management information system designed to accomplish all stock control, supply management, and related financial management functions, and interfaces at the general support level between the CONUS wholesale and direct support unit-level systems for supply Classes II, III (packaged), IV, VII, VIII, and IX.

DAMMS–R is divided into seven modules/subsystems: shipment management module (SMM), to include controlled movements; MCT operations subsystem; mode operations subsystem; highway regulation subsystem; convoy planning subsystem; operational movement programming subsystem; and transportation addressing subsystem (TAS). DAMMS-R will operate on nondevelopmental item (NDI) computers. DAMMS-R will no longer generate intransit data (TK6 & TK9) input to the LIF.

Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) is a joint Service system which has the capabilities to automate, streamline, and coordinate virtually every aspect of handling personal property shipments to include counseling, outbound, inbound, nontemporary storage, and quality assurance, and ends duplication of effort and documentation. The system is a network of computer systems located at a personal property shipment office (PPSO). Each site has a telecommunications link to central switching (SWITCHER), a site at Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Falls Church, Virginia that serves as a data-sorting and distribution point.

FUNDING

The intent of this section is to provide a brief overview of selected funding procedures used within the logistics system. Congressionally-approved funds and the Army budget structure are divided into appropriations which support both the Active Army and Reserve Components.

For logistics management purposes, these appropriations can be addressed in two categories; Procurement Appropriations and Operations and Maintenance Appropriations.

Procurement Appropriations are used to buy all major items and other selected end items. Selected end items with a unit price in excess of $25,000 are purchased with Procurement Appropriations.

The Operations and Maintenance Appropriation supports day-to-day operations. It pays for such things as training; spare and repair parts; selected end items with a unit value of less than $3,000; unit and major item depot maintenance; and administrative and associated activities (wholesale logistics operations support costs for secondary items are funded by the Army Working Capital Fund [AWCF].) The Operations and Maintenance Appropriation is allocated by Department of Army to Army commands based upon their mission and the importance of that mission to the Army. These funds are referred to as consumer funds. Between consumer funds and the procurement appropriations, the field commander purchases all of his secondary items.

The AWCF was established by OSD beginning in FY 92. (It was then called the Defense Business Capital Fund [DBOF].) It incorporates the commercial or business operations that were previously managed within the individual revolving funds (Stock Funds and the Industrial Funds) into a single revolving or business operations fund. The AWCF is broken out into "business areas." These are:

– Supply Management
– Distribution Depots
– Depot Maintenance
– Transportation

The Supply Management–Army (SMA) business area is used to purchase all secondary items from industry as well as

repair secondary Depot Level Reparable items that will ultimately be purchased with consumer funds by field commanders. In addition, it funds the inventory control point logistics support expenses. The prices for items purchased by the consumer cover the acquisition cost plus the cost of supply operations and transportation. On a fiscal year basis, the SMA has a total Operating Cost Authority (OCA) which limits the total amount of supplies and equipment that can be purchased and/or repaired. That OCA is earned at wholesale through sales to consumers. The SMA incorporates the funding procedures needed to purchase supplies in advance from industry for stockage so that items are available upon requisition.

To illustrate the operations of the AWCF-SMA revolving fund concept, let us follow the funding of a requisition from an Army unit through the system. The unit, the 1st infantry Division, submits a requisition to Fort Riley. This requisition contains a fund code which indicates that consumer funds are available to pay for the item requested. When the item is issued, the consumer funds cited are transferred to the Retail AWCF; the Retail AWCF reimburses the Wholesale AWCF. The Single Stock Fund (SSF) will eliminate the Retail AWCF, thus reducing an operational element that currently is completely independent (as this organizational layering is inherently inefficient).

The AWCF is designed to provide a more effective means for controlling the costs of goods and services and a more flexible way of financing and accounting for those costs; to create and recognize contractual relationships between the activity and its customers; to enhance the effective acquisition and use of manpower, materiels, and other resources; and to support the performance budgeting concept by facilitating budgeting, reporting, and control of costs of secondary items. Simply, this means that the cost of providing a product or service—the cost of materiel and logistics support—is passed on to the customer, as in private industry. The payments by Army and other DOD customers (and other government agencies and private concerns as authorized) provide the capital to replenish the AWCF.

The Conventional Ammunition Working Capital Fund (CAWCF) is a financial mechanism—a revolving fund which temporarily finances procurement of ammunition components and the assembly into end rounds of ammunition. Like an Industrial Fund, the CAWCF begins its procurement function after a funded order for wholesale customer services. The CAWCF differs from Revolving Stock Funds in that there is no contract authority on anticipated orders to finance the lead time.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security Assistance (SA) is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961; the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended; and other related statutes. These programs include: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program which are grants; and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, which is cash or financed purchases. Through these programs, the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other related services to allied and friendly foreign countries in furtherance of national security.

The Secretary of State is responsible for the overall supervision and general direction of the SA program. The primary responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is

to determine military equipment and training requirements, and to procure and supervise the use of equipment by each recipient country. The military departments execute and manage their portion of the SA program under the general direction of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). They also provide technical support and information for use in negotiations on acquisition and co-production agreements that will ultimately affect their plans and programs.

The President determines which foreign countries are eligible to purchase defense articles, training, and other services from United States' sources. Purchase requests from foreign countries of major items of equipment are sent to the U.S. Embassy in-country with copies to Department of State, DSAA, and the military departments. Purchases of parts and other nonmajor items can be addressed directly with the military departments. Congress must be notified of any offer to sell defense articles and services valued at $50,000,000 or more, major defense equipment valued at $14,000,000 or more, and design and construction services valued at $200,000,000 or more.

The Army Staff SA responsibilities are to develop and issue overall policy and program guidance. Operations are assigned to Army MACOMs. The major SA policy player in the Army Staff is the DCSLOG. He coordinates the development and issuance of Army-wide SA policy in coordination with the DCSOPS, DCSPER, DCSINT, USACE, JAG, and the various agencies within the Army Secretariat.

The security assistance responsibilities of the various DA Staff elements are focused on overall program guidance with coordination of the various functional areas a prime responsibility of the Director for Security Assistance. The operational aspects of the Security Assistance Program including management of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) are assigned to MACOMs. USAMC, as the Army's Executive Agent, is responsible for the operational aspects of approved FMF (except training and design and construction services) and MAP programs. TRADOC manages the operational aspects of FMS training at CONUS/OCONUS schools, and IMET programs.

The Director for Security Assistance (DALO-SAZ) is the principal Army Staff spokesman and Army Staff proponent for Security Assistance (SA). He is responsible for SA policy and procedural guidance. He has direct access to and interacts with the VCSA, the Under Secretary of the Army, the other members of the Army Secretariat, OSD, other Military Departments, agencies, commands, and activities relative to SA matters. He has Chief of Staff tasking authority over all Army Staff agencies, MACOMs, and field activities on matters pertaining to security assistance. As the DA Staff spokesman for Security Assistance, he is responsible for providing policy and guidance to the Army Executive Agent and other agencies or MACOMs for security assistance when required.

USAMC is the Army's principal agent for supplying FMS materiel, fulfilling its responsibilities through the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). USASAC, working with other USAMC elements, develops the necessary data to consummate sales and supervise their execution. This operational responsibility extends from the initial long-range planning, which involves the development of

requirements for materiel and services, to the signing of agreements, coordination of all aspects of support, delivery of the goods and services, and completion of final accounting. USASAC is the focal point between the U.S. Army and friendly nations, ensuring that actions remain on course throughout the life cycle of the security assistance process.

In addition, USASAC oversees USAMC's participation in the Munitions Control Program. This program involves the development of Army positions on commercial export license applications for the export of military items, technical data, and services to foreign countries. Export license applications, commonly called munitions cases, pertain to the export of defense articles and services, or technical data, described in the U.S. Munitions List contained in the Department of State's International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The Department of State and the Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy (ODUSD/TSP) refer certain export license applications to the Army for evaluation. The objectives of this evaluation are: (1) to control the export of classified or critical technology for which the United States has the technological lead, and which has the potential to significantly threaten U.S. national security if provided to certain foreign governments; (2) to provide the Army position on the effect of proposed exports on national security; and (3) to control export sales that could interfere with Army programs. Through coordination with appropriate USAMC technical elements, USASAC provides a recommended position on whether particular export license applications should be approved.

Another facet of USASAC's Security Assistance responsibilities is coproduction, which encompasses any program which enables an eligible foreign governmental organization, or designated commercial producer, to acquire substantial "know-how" to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain, and operate a specific system or individual military item. The "know-how" furnished by the U.S. is on a reimbursable basis and may include research, development, production data, and/or subassemblies, managerial skills, procurement assistance, or quality control procedures. Co-production may be limited to the assembly of a few end items with a small input of in-country produced parts, or it may extend to a major manufacturing effort requiring the build-up of capital industries. As in the case of conventional military sales and associated supply support arrangements, the co-production programs perpetuate utilization of items common to U.S. forces, thereby promoting rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

SUMMARY

This chapter addressed the nature and structure of the Army logistics system. It is a large, complex system that must be properly orchestrated if it is to perform to expectations. The DCSLOG is the conductor, with overall responsibility to assure that the individual pieces fit together and operate in harmony, one with the other. To do this, the DCSLOG establishes broad policies and procedures, and monitors and guides the development of standard logistics systems for use at all echelons.

The Army's wholesale logistics system is operated by the USAMC through its MSCs to fulfill the Army's need for wholesale support. The Army's materiel requirements are divided into commodity groupings with each Commodity Command assigned one or more of these groupings. The Commodity Commands collectively determine the Army's requirement, procure

or overhaul necessary assets, position them in the appropriate depots, and issue in response to the Army's needs. Their principal organizational elements for accomplishing these tasks are the NICPs and NMPs.

Because of the complexity of the logistics system and the opportunity presented by computer technology, the Department of Defense has adopted many standard logistics management information systems to provide standard language for use by all military departments. The Army's systems include standard equipment, computer programs, and procedures. The extensive use of computers provides an abundance of information which permits evaluation, in varying levels of detail, of the total system or any of its parts. MILSTEP is the DOD system for evaluating the wholesale system. The Army has developed the Logistics Intelligence File to better evaluate the support received by units in the field.

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CHAPTER 13

MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

"Treat others as you would have them treat you. This is a simple statement of the golden rule - but a critical issue. Every soldier must feel that he is being treated fairly and that you care and are making an honest attempt to ensure he or she reaches full potential. Initiative will be stifled and creativity destroyed unless soldiers feel they have been given a fair chance to mature and grow."

General Dennis J. Reimer, CSA
in *Military Review*, January - February 1996

INTRODUCTION

The Army's personnel management goal is to practice what the CSA espouses; fulfill the Army's personnel needs while treating soldiers fairly, and helping them mature, grow and reach their full potential. It does this through its procurement, distribution and assignment, professional development and motivational, and transition and separation systems and processes. The management of soldiers and the positions they occupy is exciting, challenging, and complex. The personnel management arena has become even more so during this period in which the Army, as well as the other Services, adapts in order to accommodate the realities of our nation's changing National Military Strategy for this and the next century. As the Army evolves, it will also become more deployable, versatile, and lethal. Critical personnel issues include: timely fill of changing force structure

requirements; recruiting and retaining quality soldiers; maintaining quality-of-life programs; deployability of soldiers in special circumstances; changing demographics; and the timely placement of soldiers with the proper skills and experience to operate new systems.

The overriding principles associated with personnel management are to protect quality, sustain readiness, and treat separating soldiers with care, compassion, and common sense. Because of the ever-changing, dynamic nature of the personnel management arena today, no effort will be made here to examine current issues. Rather, the focus will be on the current system with its component parts.

MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The term "Military Personnel Management System" has different meanings

to different people as it is used at various levels of the Army. In a broad sense, it performs the essential functions of planning, organizing, directing, and supervising effective procedures necessary in administration and operation of personnel life-cycle management functions of structure acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development, and separation.

In a narrower sense, military personnel management describes the process of managing people. It subdivides into a number of military personnel management systems and functions that operate in an integrated fashion at all management operation levels within the military personnel management architecture. These basic elements operate throughout the Army to integrate the requirements of personnel policy and operating procedures for the Active Army and Reserve Components.

Army Regulation 600-8 establishes the military personnel management system. It describes the functional structure of the system and sets forth the organizational structures that direct, integrate, and coordinate the execution of the system.

Field Manual 12-6 describes the Army's Personnel Doctrine and how it fits into the Army's current operational concept, as well as how it supports unit commanders and soldiers. It encompasses the management concepts of personnel information and readiness; replacement, casualty, and postal operations; personnel accounting and strength reporting, and other essential personnel services.

This military personnel management system is one of three (Civilian Personnel, Military Personnel, and Community and Family Support) for which the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) of the Army has overall responsibility.

Military Personnel (MILPER) Functions.

The functions are listed below by the personnel management life-cycle category primarily supported:

- Acquisition: Recruiting and Retention; Officer Procurement.
- Distribution and Development: Enlisted Management; Officer Management.
- Development: Enlisted Evaluations; Enlisted Promotions and Reductions; Officer Evaluations; Officer Promotions.
- Sustainment: Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting; MILPER Data Base Management; Reassignment; Sponsorship; Awards and Decorations; Casualty Operations; Flagging; Identification Documents; Leaves and Passes; Line of Duty; Postal Operations; Band Operations.
- Separation: Career Planning and Retiree Support; Enlisted Transfers and Discharges; Officer Transfers and Discharges; Survivor Benefits; Transition Processing.

Military Personnel (MILPER) Multifunctional Programs.

The programs are listed below, also by the personnel management life-cycle category primarily supported:

- Acquisition: Soldier Reception.
- Distribution: Exceptional Family Members; Replacement Operations; Special Pay Program; Strength

Management; Trainee and Student Support; Unit Manning.

- Deployment: Manpower Mobilization.
- Sustainment: Battalion S1 Management; Casualty Management; Orders; MILPER Automation; MILPER Information Management; MILPER Integration; Personnel Processing; Soldier Applications; Quality Assurance.
- Separation: Transition Management.

Military Personnel Systems and Functions.

At present, there are eight critical systems and a number of subsystems that operate at the tactical and operational level, 27 functions, and 17 multifunctional programs within the military personnel management system. These systems and functions operate in an integrated fashion from ODCSPER to all operating levels in the field, down to and including the Unit/Battalion S1.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), as the Army's personnel proponent, determines the broad objectives of the military personnel management system. The DCSPER establishes policy for and exercises ARSTAF proponent supervision of the system's functions and programs.

The CG, Personnel Command (PERSCOM) is the Army's functional proponent for the military personnel management system and operates the Army's active component system within the objectives set by the DCSPER.

The CG, United States Army Soldier Support Institute (USASSI) develops and coordinates operational concepts, materiel requirements, organization and force design requirements, and integrates training in military personnel management into courses of instruction at the Adjutant General School.

The CG, PERSCOM supports the military personnel system's automation requirements in the design, development, and maintenance of personnel data bases and automation systems.

The Army's military personnel management system and its supporting force structure are organized for war. Modifications have only been made to accommodate the requirements of peacetime stationing of the force. Personnel units actually perform their wartime missions in peacetime. As the Army transitions to war, only the focus of personnel work changes to match the volume, the difficulty of execution, and the level of hostilities encountered. Despite the change in focus, however, the basic personnel mission remains unchanged.

Later in this chapter some of the Military Personnel Management System's major subsystems and functional responsibilities will be presented in greater detail.

Definition of Terms

End Strength (ES). The total number of personnel authorized by the Congress to be in the Army on the last day of the Fiscal Year (30 September). This is normally provided in the Defense Authorization Act.

Force Structure Allowance (FSA). The sum of authorized spaces contained in all MTOE units and TDA type organizations. The FSA is derived from the End Strength less the projected size of the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account.

Total Strength. The total of all personnel in the Army, including both those soldiers in units and organizations and in the TTHS.

Operating Strength (OS). Those soldiers available to fill spaces in MTOE units and TDA organizations.

Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS). Those personnel that comprise the Army's overhead and are otherwise unavailable to fill spaces in units. Included are new soldiers in training and soldiers in school, hospital or in transit between assignments.

The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). The manpower program is produced as monthly updates and as decision programs for the POM, OSD Budget Submission, and President's Budget. It is the report produced by the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model–Computation of Manpower Program by Linear Programming (ELIM–COMPLIP) System. Inputs are the latest available strength, gains, and losses. Vital data for the AAMMP comes from (or will come from) several manpower systems, most of which are discussed later in this chapter. These systems include the Officer Projection Aggregate Level System (OPALS); MOS Level System (MOSLS); the TTHS Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) Forecasting System; and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). It also carries six years of historical loss behavior to use as a projective (predictive) data base. Using a linear program, ELIM–COMPLIP operates within constraints such as end strengths, manyears, and recruiting capability to develop an Operating Strength that matches the Force Structure Allowance as closely as possible. Its report (the AAMMP) records and/or projects strength of the Army; losses and gains; Force Structure Allowance; training inputs; the officer, cadet, and female programs; and the TTHS Account.

Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD). The PMAD is built from annual updates of the force structure reflected in the HQDA ODCSOPS Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and TAADS files. In between Management of Change (MOC) windows, decisions are often made which cause significant changes to authorizations. An Updated Authorizations Document (UAD) which makes adjustments to PMAD authorizations is produced periodically to capture such changes. The personnel community uses PMAD and its most current UAD as the sole source of Active Army authorizations to Unit Identification Code (UIC), MOS, grade, and Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) level of detail for the current and budget years. The focus of the PMAD and UAD is on detail for near-term distribution. The PMAD is the basis for decisions regarding accessions, training, force alignment, promotions, and distribution of personnel. Throughout this text the term PMAD refers to the PMAD itself or its most current UAD. When a Notional Force is not published the PMAD is used for authorizations through the POM years.

Notional Force System (NOF). TAADS, SAMAS, and, therefore, PMAD provide affordable MOS and grade requirements only in the execution and budget years. For personnel planning through the POM years, ODCSPER has

developed a Notional Force that converts broad force structure guidance into MOS and grade projections. The NOF modifies the PMAD to make force structure changes that have been envisioned by ODCSOPS but have not been decided or coordinated. The NOF then generates data at MACOM, Type Code (TYPCO) (MTOE, TDA, AUGTDA), MOS, and grade level of detail. The NOF does not generate UIC level of detail. The output from the NOF is available to users of the HQDA decision support system. Reports are from a menu-driven Management Information System and report writer.

In contrast to the PMAD which is focused on the execution and budget years, the NOF is focused on the program years. Combined with the PMAD the NOF provides a clear picture of affordable authorizations for the Active Army.

When a NOF is not published, for example, because all force structure changes are not announced, the PMAD is the sole document for the execution, budget and POM years. NOFs are built to examine supportability of special projects, specifically the Total Army Analysis programs (TAA).

Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB). Automated, standardized data base(s) containing military personnel data to fully support manning and sustaining functions during peacetime and under mobilization. Personnel information on individual enlisted personnel, formerly maintained in the Enlisted Master File (EMF), is now contained in the TAPDB–Active Enlisted (TAPDB–AE). Information on individual commissioned and warrant officers, formerly in the Officer Master File (OMF), is contained in the TAPDB–Active Officer (TAPDB–AO).

Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS). This automated personnel information system is the Army's primary personnel strength management system. SIDPERS provides commanders with management information reports; performs automated field records maintenance; and provides automated personnel information to the TAPDB–AE and TAPDB–AO. In fulfilling these functions, SIDPERS acts as a decentralized extension of these data bases.

Currently, SIDPERS exists in different versions for the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. SIDPERS-3 is a major Army objective to achieve a total personnel information management system. SIDPERS-3 is a standard information management system (STAMIS) being developed under the proponency of the DCSPER. It will consist of hardware, software, and communications to support information about soldiers and units. SIDPERS-3 will replace all previous active Army versions and will eliminate mainframe processing in the field.

SIDPERS-3 will feature an electronic record on soldiers. There will be multiple data bases where a soldier's automated record is located (installation MPDs, division/brigade/battalion G/S1s, personnel service battalions, personnel groups/corps AG, and theater PERSCOMs). All echelons of command from units to HQDA will have access to information about soldiers and unit status within hours of change. Personnel changes such as gains/ losses will pass through command channels and update each data base in the process to ensure that commanders have current information to support their decision making processes.

Initially, SIDPERS-3 will be limited to external interface between TAPDB, the Defense Finance Accounting System

(DFAS), and the Reception Battalion Automated Support System (RECBASS). The personnel automation sections (PAS) of either a personnel service battalion or installation MPD will communicate over Defense Data Network (DDN) on a daily basis with the Hoffman Director of Information Management (DOIM) and DFAS mailboxes to pass update transactions and receive downloads of top-fed transactions for the supported population. Eventually, SIDPERS will perform interface requirements with other STAMISs.

During split operations, information on personnel in deployed units will flow from the theater operations back to the rear sustaining base of operations. The forward personnel element will be responsible for synchronizing data bases in the theater and for transmitting to and receiving updates from the supporting home station.

MOS (Military Occupation System) Level System (MOSLS). This is part of the HQDA decision support system. It is a personnel planning optimization model that computes recommended MOS and grade mix, enlisted accessions, training to support accessions, and in-service reclassification/ reenlistment and promotions to maintain force alignment through the POM cycle.

The Officer Projection Aggregate Level System (OPALS)*.* This is part of the HQDA personnel decision support system. It uses goal-linear programming, inventory simulation, and other mathematical techniques to produce forecasts of total strength, operating strength, TTHS, gains, losses, and other information for commissioned and warrant officers by grade, year of service, and competitive category. It maintains force alignment by minimizing the difference between the desired and projected operating strength in each competitive category and grade. The major inputs are authorizations data, inventory data, transactions data, and OPALS output data (total/by grade/TTHS). The model's output data can be displayed using full-color graphics, spreadsheet-type tables, or customized reports. The OPALS model supports program and budget development, policy analysis, and other management activities. It produces the officer portion of the AAMMP, the official Army officer loss report, and other routine and ad-hoc information. Planned enhancements include the addition of gender and other demographic data and additional data dimensions.

Active Army Strength Forecaster (A2SF)*.* This system, currently under development by ODCSPER, will replace ELIM-COMPLIP, MOSLS, TTHS Forecasting System, and OPALS, in forecasting both officer and enlisted strengths, gains, losses, and force manning. The redesign will occur in four phases, the last to be completed in March 2000. As new processing functionality is developed over this period, it will incrementally replace similar functions performed by the current systems. The enhanced and integrated system will incorporate new capabilities, but, at the same time, will achieve many efficiencies by reducing or eliminating much duplicative processing contained in the current separate systems. Using updated methodologies, the object-oriented design of the new system is expected to provide more accurate and timely forecasting, as well as significantly enhanced detail (rates for specific populations, gender, etc.) to support ODSCPER decisions. Like the current systems, it will draw upon TAPDB for personnel source data and will produce the AAMMP as one of its primary reports.

Officer Systems Interactive Data Bases. These are part of the HQDA personnel decision support system. The end-user accessed portion consists of end-of-month snapshots of the Officer Master File for the end of the last FY and currently active promotion lists, and previously exhausted promotion lists. Users access the databases using one of two related data-base technologies. The most popular is *Intellect*. Through the use of a user-trainable lexicon and a user-transparent link to the data base via *Interactive Structured Query Language (ISQL)*, plain-English questions can be asked ("How many officers are there?"; "Where are they?"; etc.) and responses are displayed on a screen in a table or graph, or made into a custom-made report to run right away or at a later time. ISQL is also used to query data bases. It uses standardized programming commands to generate ad-hoc and customized reports. Query Management Facility (QMF) is an interactive report/graphics generator. It uses ISQL queries to retrieve data used to generate reports. Queries can be stored for future use.

The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). ATRRS is an automated information system that provides input to training management information for HQDA, MACOMs, schools, and training centers. The system contains information at the course level of detail on all courses taught by and for the Army. A major product of ATRRS is the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT).

The Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) Process. The ARPRINT is a mission document that provides officer and enlisted training requirements, objectives, and programs for the Active Army, Army Reserve Components, DA civilians, other U.S. Services, and foreign military. Training is planned and executed on a fiscal year basis and the goal is to train sufficient numbers in each MOS/branch and functional area so that the total trained personnel in each MOS/branch and functional area equals the projected authorization as of the end of the fiscal year.

The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP). The ACAP orchestrates a broad spectrum of programs and services designed to assist soldiers in making critical career and transition decisions. These highly organized and professional services are available from 70 operating locations in 26 states and five countries. ACAP provides transition services to soldiers, Department of the Army Civilians and their family members. Reserve component personnel are also eligible to receive ACAP services upon serving a minimum of 180 consecutive days of active duty immediately prior to separation.

ACAP is not a job placement service but instead a program through which a wide range of services are made available to users through a combination of Department of Defense, Department of Labor, Department of Veteran Affairs, U.S. Army and contractor provided services. Transition counseling and career planning are the cornerstone services that assist the user to properly focus on their career path and the value of their experience should they remain on active duty or transition to civilian life. Individuals using ACAP services have access to an abundance of reference materials and a wealth of information about benefits, civilian employment opportunities, career planning and services available through many federal, state and local government agencies.

Participation in ACAP is mandatory for all active duty soldiers who are separating or retiring. Individuals are encouraged to start using ACAP services 180 days before their separation date. Eligible individuals may continue to use ACAP for up to 90 days after separation. Referral to ACAP is mandatory for civilians who are departing because of force alignments, reductions in force or base closures. ACAP participation is optimal for transition of family members and eligible reserve component soldiers.

ACAP establishes a strong partnership between the Army and the private sector, creates a recruiting multiplier, improves employment prospects for transitioning personnel, reduces unemployment compensation costs to the Army and allows career soldiers to concentrate on their mission. ACAP is an enduring program, institutionalized into the Army culture and life cycle functions.

Army Retirement Services Program. The Department of the Army has a worldwide network of Retirement Services Offices to assist retiring soldiers and their families make a smooth and successful transition into retirement. Each major Army installation has a full-time, paid employee, called a Retirement Services Officer (RSO), to administer this program. The program prepares soldiers and family members for retirement by providing assistance and information on their benefits and entitlements. These services are available to the surviving spouses of retired soldiers.

The RSO conducts a periodic preretirement briefing which covers subjects from computation of retired pay to survivor benefits. Soldiers must attend a preretirement briefing between submission of their retirement application, but no less than 120 days before retirement. Spouses are encouraged to attend. The RSO also provides mandatory Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) counseling to these individuals. By law, retired pay stops with a soldier's death unless the soldier is enrolled in SBP. The soldier makes the SBP decision before retirement. In addition to SBP counseling, the RSO provides a printout comparing SBP to commercial insurance. The RSO has videos on preparing for retirement and SBP that may be borrowed by soldiers or their spouses.

The DA Retirement Services Office provides policy guidance to the installation RSOs and is also responsible for publishing "Army Echoes," the quarterly newsletter sent to all retirees and retirement eligible active duty personnel; administering the Chief of Staff's Retiree Council and the Survivor Benefit Plan Program; and monitoring the operation of the Armed Forces Retirement Homes.

Retiring from the Army constitutes a significant lifestyle change. If not prepared for properly, retirement can be extremely difficult. The RSO is the soldier's tool to assist in making the transition easier and more enjoyable.

Army Casualty System. The Army Casualty System includes casualty reporting, casualty notification, next of kin assistance, mortuary affairs, burial honors, escorts, disposition of remains and personal effects processing, Line of Duty determination, and missing persons act determinations. The reporting system records, reports, verifies and processes casualty information from unit level to HQDA. Casualty information flows up, across and down the command and medical reporting chains to help account for soldiers and reportable civilians. Each management level in the casualty reporting

chain verifies information as necessary to meet the 100 percent accuracy standard.

The Army Casualty Information Processing System (ACIPS) is the HQDA level management system designed to track the flow of casualty information and the status of required actions from the place of incident through final disposition. ACIPS is accessible to Casualty Area Commands, personal effects depots, and port mortuaries via modem. Units prepare and submit initial and supplemental casualty reports using ACIPS-Light, a field deployable software package, which allows units to produce casualty reports. Commanders, soldiers, and deployed civilians must ensure that casualty information is processed only through official channels as For Official Use Only information until notification of next of kin has been verified.

Army Continuing Education System (ACES). ACES is a critical element in the recruitment and retention of a quality force. The ACES exists to ensure soldiers have the opportunities for personal and professional self-development. Education opportunities are offered through Army Education Centers and Army Learning Centers located worldwide. Educational programs include:

- on-duty Functional Academic Skills Training, which provides job-related instruction in the academic areas of reading, mathematics and English grammar at no cost to the soldier;
- high school completion programs for soldiers without a high school diploma;
- undergraduate and graduate college courses and programs which provide financial assistance such as the Tuition Assistance Program;

- foreign language programs for qualified Army linguists assigned overseas;
- skill development programs to prepare non-commissioned officers for Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) training;
- counseling to establish challenging yet attainable short and long-term goals; academic testing through the Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (DANTES);
- Army Personnel Testing; and training support services such as Military Occupational Specialty reference libraries and language and computer laboratories.

In addition, the Servicemembers Opportunity College Army Degree system of college and university networks promoting credit transferability and the American Council on Education/Army Registry Transcript System documenting recommended credit for soldier training and experience help soldiers earn degrees despite frequent transfers and rotations. The ACES, focused on soldiers, yet available to Department of the Army Civilians and adult family members, represents a primary quality of life program.

ACTIVITY	DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT
CONGRESS OMB / OPM OSD OSA DA PERSCOM ARPERCEN MACOM INSTALLATION UNIT	**MANPOWER MANAGEMENT** **PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

Figure 13-1

Manpower vs. Personnel Management.

Chapter 5 addresses unit structure and force planning. It describes how the force is sized and configured and how that force is accounted for in the documentation system. This chapter, which should be viewed as an extension of Chapter 5, will focus on how the Army manages manpower and personnel once the force is configured and sized.

Manpower management is the function of determining requirements and allocating resources. It includes the determination of minimum-essential requirements, alternative means of providing resources, and policies to be followed in utilization of manpower. It involves the development and evaluation of organizational structure and review of utilization. It includes soldiers in the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves, Army civilian manpower assets, and certain contractor assets when a requirement is satisfied by contractual services rather than by Army military or civilian personnel.

Manpower managers deal with human resource requirements from the perspective of the organizational structure in which they will be most efficiently and economically used. First, they focus on requirements demanding explicit grades and skills to perform specific tasks. Then, they focus on determining which requirements will be supported with authorizations ("spaces"). Finally, they combine force structure authorizations with requirements in the TTHS Account, also referred to as the Individuals Account, to determine the needs of the Army by grade and skill within constraints that exist.

Personnel managers, on the other hand, focus on supporting requirements through the acquisition, training, and assignment of personnel ("faces") to authorized positions. Manpower management and personnel management interface and overlap at many points. Figure 13-1 portrays the relative degree to which activities are involved in either manpower or personnel management functions.

The Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the

Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) are not directly involved in the management of people. They do, however, establish policies that restrict the availability of this resource or limit the management latitude available to those involved in personnel management. For example, policies which limit permanent changes of station (PCS), establish tour lengths, set officer grade limitations, or place a ceiling on the hire of local national personnel can severely limit the flexibility of personnel managers. OSD and, to a more limited extent, OMB, are involved in the force-structuring process. At the federal level, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is totally immersed and is a driving force in civilian personnel management.

The curved line in Figure 13-1 used to portray the degree of involvement is arbitrary. It serves only to illustrate the fact that managers above the DA level are concerned primarily with the management of spaces, while at descending levels below HQDA they are increasingly concerned with the management of people. Whenever the force-structure changes, or MTOE/TDA are altered to meet changing missions, ripples are created throughout all personnel management subsystems.

Manpower/Personnel Interface.

In managing the interface between manpower and personnel at the macro level, the key measurement used by personnel managers is the Operating Strength Deviation (OSD). OSD is a measurement of how much the Operating Strength (faces) is deviating from the force structure allowance (spaces). The Operating Strength (OS) must not be confused with the FSA. However, the anticipated size of the OS gives a good idea as to how large a structure can realistically be manned. Throughout the year there can

be many causes for these deviations, such as unpredicted changes in retention rates and seasonal surges in acquisitions. Personnel managers must constantly monitor the OSD and adjust personnel policies to ensure the Army has an optimum match of faces to spaces. At the same time, the Army must comply with the Congressional mandate to be at the authorized end strength on the last day of each fiscal year.

Although the goal is to minimize the difference (delta) or deviation between the FSA and the Operating Strength, some deviation, the OSD, almost always exists. A positive deviation (Operating Strength greater than FSA) means personnel are present in units in excess of structure requirements. A negative deviation (FSA exceeds Operating Strength) means the structure is larger than the quantity of personnel available to fill it or "Hollow Army". The Operating Strength is easily computed by subtracting TTHS personnel from the total strength. The Operating Strength Deviation is computed by subtracting the FSA from the Operating Strength.

The size of the Operating Strength is affected by fluctuations in the two elements employed in its calculation: the total strength ("End Strength" at year end) and total TTHS at any particular time. Changes in the Operating Strength over time and the magnitude of the FSA affect the Operating Strength Deviation. Either could potentially be adjusted to minimize the deviation. Often these quantities are compared only at the end of the fiscal year (end strength). However, it is often much more meaningful to view the situation on an average throughout the year by calculating manyear values for each of these quantities. This provides more information than the frequently atypical and skewed end strength picture, which

STRENGTH RELATIONSHIPS
TOTAL STRENGTH = TTHS + OP STR
OR
TOTAL STRENGTH = TTHS + FSA + OSD
OPERATING STR = TOTAL STR - TTHS
OSD = OP STR - FSA

Figure 13-2

represents only one day in the entire year. Figure 13-2 illustrates the relationships between the components of the force just discussed.

The total number of personnel in TTHS will fluctuate considerably throughout the year due to a variety of reasons, such as the seasonal increase in transients during the summer and in trainees during the fall and winter (except December). Past experience and estimates of the effects of policy changes, make the number of personnel in this account fairly predictable. In the recent past it has averaged about 13% of the total strength.

By knowing the TTHS and total strength projections, manpower planners can easily determine the size of the Operating Strength and use that as a basis for developing an FSA for building authorized units. TTHS, FSA, and OSD projections are all contained in the Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP).

The number of personnel in the TTHS is often directly attributable to the personnel policies in effect. Professional development decisions, tour length decisions, and training policies are but a few examples of policies which affect the size of TTHS. Since TTHS has a direct effect on the faces available for FSA manning, these same policies have a direct impact on the number of units and organizations which the Army can field. Thus, manpower and personnel managers face a constant challenge to ensure a balance exists between the use of authorized spaces and the acquisition, training, and distribution of personnel assets to meet the needs of the Army. The stated personnel needs of the Army as expressed in its various organizational documents change on a daily basis as different units and organizations are activated, inactivated, or changed. However, the process of providing personnel to meet these changing needs is much slower.

Military Force Alignment.

Force alignment is "managing changing faces and spaces" simultaneously by grade level and career management field/

military occupational specialty (CMF/ MOS)—reshaping a force today to also meet tomorrow's needs. The always changing AAMMP, PMAD, and budget are intensively managed monthly for the PPBES six-year cycle (see Chapter 9), ensuring military personnel strength is skill-qualified and available for distribution. Force alignment strives to synchronize military personnel programs: promotions, recruiting, accessions, training, reenlistment, reclassification, and special and incentive discretionary pay. Simultaneously, every effort is made to provide professional career development consistent with Army force manning levels for qualified soldiers. Management forums are the Functional Area Assessment (FAA), Functional Review (FR), Personnel Functional Assessment (PFA), Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR), and quarterly Career Management Field (CMF) Reviews. Representation in shaping the officer and enlisted forces involves the entire personnel community in varying degrees of programming and execution. MOSLS is a major planning tool for enlisted force alignment analysis. The goal—to achieve a PMAD grade-CMF/MOS match to Operating Strength for the current year, budget year, and program years.

Personnel Proponency.

Governed by *AR 600-3*, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Force Integration, and Analysis (DCSPLANS), PERSCOM, manages the Personnel Proponent System. DCSPLANS designates personnel proponents, assigns their basic responsibilities, and defines the eight personnel life-cycle management functions.

The objectives of the personnel proponent system are:
– identify a single agent (proponent) responsible for all personnel matters for each career field (officer, warrant, enlisted, and civilian).
– fix responsibility for all career field-related matters.
– ensure that the civilian work force is integrated into the personnel proponent system.
– ensure personnel management policies and programs established by HQDA incorporate career field-related considerations.
– foster awareness and achievement of the objectives of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS), the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS), and the Civilian Integration into the Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS).

The functions of Personnel Proponency are accomplished through 52 Personnel Proponent offices in conjunction with the PERSCOM. Together the Proponents assist the DCSPER in all personnel-related matters.

The framework for proponency consists of the eight life-cycle management functions: structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development, and separation. The Personnel Proponent System serves as the "honest broker" ensuring fairness, completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of all aspects of the personnel system.

Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS).

The MOCS system translates manpower requirements into specific skills

ENLISTED PROCUREMENT

Figure 13-3

and grade levels. This system is set forth in a combined publication, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure UPDATE*, which is a combination of *AR 611-1, -101, -112, and -201*. It is published annually by PERSCOM and contains classification and structure guidance for commissioned officer, warrant officer, and enlisted. All changes resulting from the MOCS cycles (1 Dec - 31 May and 1 Jun - 30 Nov) are included. Reclassification guidance is provided through publication of a *DA 611 series Circular* in April and October of each year.

Within PERSCOM, the DCSPLANS manages and controls the system. Changes to occupational identifiers, e.g., MOS, within the MOCS system are generally driven by the Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS) (see Chapter 11). Personal proponents submit proposed changes to the system in accordance with responsibilities in *AR 600-3* for recommending classification criteria. The Personnel Occupational Specialty Code Edit (POSC-Edit) System, an

automated system maintained by PERSCOM DCSPLANS, is the official military occupational edit file used to edit and update data on authorized automated personnel systems. The file is updated based on approved revisions to the MOCS. It contains a listing of all authorized commissioned officer, warrant officer, and enlisted identifiers; grades associated with those identifiers; and other personnel information.

THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

Enlisted Procurement.

Based on input from the PMAD (authorizations by skill and grade), the TAPDB–AE (skills and grades on hand), and the AAMMP (projected accessions in the aggregate), the MOSLS projects the numbers and training requirements for the various MOSs. This in turn is used to develop the Annual Program (ANNPRO) and the ARPRINT and feeds the training

information management system (ATRRS) which is linked to the recruiting and training reservation system (REQUEST) and the reenlistment reservation system (RETAIN). See figure 13-3.

The mission of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is to obtain the quantity and quality of recruits to meet both Active Army and USAR requirements. Enlistment options provide the vehicle by which Army applicants are attracted. The option packages vary and contain such incentives for applicants as training guarantees, unit/station of choice assignments, guaranteed periods of stabilization in a specific unit or area, and payment of bonuses or education incentives for enlisting for a particular skill. Additionally, the length of the enlistment period varies for certain options and skills.

Quality Constraints. The recruiter is constrained by quality standards which must be met. A potential enlistee is classified as a result of an Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) which has 10 aptitude areas. Aptitude battery results place individuals into test score categories and determine both basic enlistment and specific MOS eligibility. Both law and Army policy constrain the number of certain test categories the recruiting force may enlist. The Army non-prior service (NPS) accession quality program achieves the maximum number of high school diploma graduates and those in the upper test score categories, with a ceiling established for the lower test score categories.

MOS Training Targets. Title 10, United States Code, requires that all new soldiers receive twelve weeks of Initial Entry Training (IET) prior to becoming available for deployment. All new soldiers recruited by

USAREC contract for a specific MOS which is supported by a resourced training seat. Using projections from MOSLS, PERSCOM projects annual IET requirements for new soldiers in the Annual Program (ANNPRO) for each MOS. These requirements then feed into the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). In ATRRS, IET requirements combine with professional development and other training requirements and are presented at the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) for resourcing. Once resourced by the Army leadership, all resourced training requirements are identified in the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) (Chapter 15).

Management of Recruiting Objectives. The Recruit Quota System (REQUEST) is an enlistment and training space management system designed to support the Army's recruiting and Reserve Component retention missions. The system is a worldwide, real-time, interactive system and is the controlling element for recruiters and Reserve Component Retention NCOs in translating aggregate mission objectives to the MOS needs of the Army. It uses a worldwide telecommunications network with remote data terminals accessing a common data bank containing the Army's training requirements determined by the ARPRINT. The system provides reservation processing for enlistment options, accession controls, and management information reports from remote data terminals.

REQUEST, designed to enhance the efficiency of Army recruiting, provides the Army with a means of allocating training resources to accessions. Enlistment options during periods of nonmobilization result from a review of the applicant's qualifications based on the ASVAB, physical testing, individual preference, and Army

MOS requirements. An automated matching algorithm aligns the applicant's qualifications and aptitudes to the Army's needs. Qualification checks and other features of the system preclude erroneous enlistments into skills for which the applicant does not qualify.

The REQUEST Unit Distribution Program (RUDIST) adds a unit vacancy and distribution guidance file to the REQUEST System. A portion of the training spaces for those MOSs available under an enlistment option that guarantees a first assignment is allocated to specific units and stations. Allocations of first assignment are based upon projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

The REQUEST System is the controlling element for recruiters in translating aggregate recruiting objectives to the MOS needs of the Army.

Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). Once the recruiter has determined the applicant's desire to enlist and his areas of interest, he can administer an Enlistment Screening Test which gives an informal indication of how the applicant might fare on the ASVAB. If the applicant continues his interest, he goes to a MEPS for further processing.

The MEPS is a jointly-staffed Service activity charged with aptitude testing, medical examination, moral evaluation, and administrative processing of applicants for the Armed Forces. DA is the DOD Executive Agent for the MEPS. The Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) commands and controls the MEPS.

Warrant Officer Procurement.

Warrant Officers are single-specialty, system-oriented officers appointed based on technical competence to perform in a single function for an entire career. USAREC procures Warrant Officer candidates for the Active. ODCSPER develops a recruiting goal by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for each fiscal year. USAREC uses this and an internally created lead refinement list, to direct recruiting efforts, especially for hard-skill MOSs with existing or projected critical shortages. Most applicants come from the Active Army enlisted ranks, primarily SGT-SSG. Applicants also come from other sources such as enlisted personnel from other Services, commissioned officers, and members of the Reserve Components.

Applications of all eligible individuals are evaluated by a HQDA selection board. USAREC conducts the selection board which is composed of a field grade officer Board President and warrant officer members from each branch with applicants to be considered. Those recommended by the board are slated to attend, in a candidate status, the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS). Upon completion of WOCS, candidates receive conditional appointment to the grade of WO1. Each WO1 attends the appropriate Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) to complete certification training and upon graduation their appointment becomes permanent.

The recruitment, application processing, and selection of warrant officers for the Army Reserve is performed in a similar manner as the Active Component. However, USAREC recruits warrant officer candidates against specific Army Reserve unit vacancies. In addition, USAREC accepts and processes applications for AGR, IMA, and IRR vacancies. The Army Reserve uses boarding and school-slating procedures similar to those used by the Active Component. The Army National Guard solicits applications through announcement of vacancies through an internal recruiting

effort. The boarding and school-slating procedures are as determined by each individual state's Adjutant General. All reserve component WO applicants attend WOCS and WOBC. A reserve component version of WOCS and most WOBCs is available.

Commissioned Officer Procurement.

The PMAD is the basis for projecting officer requirements while the ARPRINT projects the FY officer training needs of the Army by career field. This projection is based on an analysis of the current inventory and the known losses as determined by PERSCOM and the Special Branches (Chaplain, Judge Advocate General, and Army Medical Department). There are some very important constraints associated with the management of officer end strength. First, OSD, with the consent of Congress, mandates officer strength ceilings. Second, *Title 10, U.S.C.* restricts the numbers of officers serving in the grade of major or higher. Third, enough new officers must be brought into the Army each year to ensure an adequate number of trained individuals by grade, branch, functional area, and skill are available, assuming normal attrition, to meet Army requirements over the life cycle of the year group. There is a definite floor below which failure to procure enough officers in a given year will result in a future shortage by grade.

Officer Sources. Sources of officer procurement for Basic Branch officers include the Officer Candidate School (OCS), Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and United States Military Academy (USMA). Approximately 1,000 officers are commissioned annually from USMA and about 400 from OCS. Additional FY requirements are determined by DCSPER

and filled through ROTC programs and Special Branch Programs. To supplement the above precommissioning programs, a few officers may be accessed each year through direct appointments, recall of reserve officers, recall of retired officers, and the reinstatement of temporary disability retirees.

OCS. OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia, trains and commissions officers for the Active and Reserve Components. Active Component OCS graduates receive a U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) appointment and incur a three-year active service obligation. Reserve Component graduates receive a USAR appointment and revert to Reserve status after completing Officer Basic Course (OBC).

In-service candidates are enlisted soldiers serving on active duty. Semiannual selection boards at PERSCOM select qualified soldier applicants for OCS. Branches are assigned based on the needs of the Army and soldier qualifications and preferences.

ROTC. The majority of new officer accessions each year are commissioned through ROTC which trains and commissions officers for both the Active and Reserve Components. Cadets receive a U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) appointment. They may serve in the Active Component as an other than RA (OTRA) officer. Reserve Component duty is limited to USAR/ARNG officers. Branching is accomplished through a HQDA board based on the needs of the Army and the cadet's qualifications and individual preferences. All ROTC commissioned officers incur an eight-year service obligation and fulfill it in one of the following ways:

- *Active Component.* Scholarship cadets have a four-year active-duty

obligation, while nonscholarship cadets have a three-year obligation. The remainder of the eight-year obligation is served in the Reserve Components.

- *Reserve Components.* Scholarship cadets must serve in a Troop Program Unit (TPU) all eight years, while nonscholarship cadets must serve at least six years in a TPU. The remaining two years may be spent in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

USMA. The USMA trains and commissions officers for active duty. A formal branch selection procedure based on branch quotas established by HQDA is conducted at West Point during the cadets' senior year. Effective with the Class of 1996, the active duty service obligation for USMA graduates was increased from five to six years, and they receive other-than-RA (OTRA) commissions.

Special Branches. The Special Branches generally procure officers through their individual programs, and service obligations vary depending upon the program. Recently, Medical and Chaplain officer procurement has been assigned to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

DISTRIBUTION AND ASSIGNMENT

Enlisted Distribution and Assignment.

Distribution Challenge. In theory, the distribution planning and assignment processes place the right soldier in the right skill at the right place at the right time. In fact, the system does a very creditable job for those MOSs and grades which are nearly balanced, those for which the overseas-to-sustaining base ratio is supportable, and for those in which there is a high density of personnel in substitutable skills. The problem arises in the MOS where these conditions do not exist, and a sharing of shortages is required for all commands. When certain commands, or organizations, are exempted from the "shortage-sharing" requirements based upon special guidance, it compounds shortages to be shared by the organizations lower in priority. However, the readiness cost of this compounded "shortage-sharing" comes to light when each organization must assess its mission capable status in the monthly Unit Status Report (USR).

The USR displays an objective and subjective evaluation by the commander as to what degree of readiness his unit has achieved for the past month. To provide documented backup to his evaluation, the commander begins the manipulation of personnel: cross-leveling of unit strengths by MOS, filling critical vacancies with qualified personnel despite MOS considerations, and, where appropriate, initiating reclassification actions. The resultant impacts are MOS mismatch, misuse, and turbulence for the people involved—all adverse impacts in the areas of promotion, specialty pay, and career development. Granted many of these moves are mission essential, but many are precipitated solely by the pressures of monthly status reporting.

In an effort to fix this problem, *AR 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* states: "In preparation for computation of personnel data, commanders are discouraged from moving soldiers from one unit to another; in effect breaking up cohesive groups solely to cross-level for unit status reporting purposes." Enlisted personnel distribution is a very complex business, replete with pitfalls and shortcomings because of the rapidly changing variables which exist—force structure changes, recruiting success,

training attrition rates, retention rates, military personnel authorizations, dollar constraints, and most of all, the unpredictability of the individual soldier, his health, and his family. All of these variables point up the critical factors which govern successful distribution—the accuracy and timeliness of the data bases being used for analysis. Authorizations not approved and posted expeditiously to PMAD and individual change data not properly reported for posting on the TAPDB-AE make the already complicated distribution system less responsive.

Distribution Planning and Priorities. The basic document which defines priorities for the distribution of enlisted personnel to all units/activities is the FY HQDA Active Component Enlisted Distribution Policy. ODCSPER publishes and distributes this guidance to PERSCOM and to MACOMs for implementation to unit level. The policy encompasses initial assignments, Permanent Change-of-Station (PCS) reassignments, reassignments within commands, and unit moves. Distribution is driven by requirements to man approved authorizations documented in PMAD/UAD, Directed Military Overstrengths (DMO), Space Imbalanced MOS (SIMOS) overstrengths, and overstrength in specific high priority units. Distribution is affected by recruiting and retention goal achievement; unprogrammed losses; and fiscal constraints affecting promotions, PCS movements, and end strength. Priorities are derived from Personnel Priority Group (PPG) codes in the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL). Also, special priorities are based on operational and training requirements for special skills, such as Ranger and linguists, which do not correspond to PPG.

The enlisted force is currently being distributed against three fill priorities established by DA DCSPER. For Fill Priority 1 units and excepted positions, fill will be 100% of authorizations by grade and MOS. Fill Priority 1 encompasses PPG 1 and PPG 2 units, recruiting, drill sergeant and instructor positions, prison guards, the Operations Groups at NTC and JRTC, Battle Command Training Program, the Old Guard, the Active Component to Reserve Component (AC to RC) Program, and several other special management commands. Fill Priority 2 units, which are composed of the contingency force (1st Cav, 3rd ACR, 3rd ID(M), 82d Abn, 101st AA), select fire support packages and the 2nd ID(M), are to be filled 100-98% of authorizations in the aggregate. Fill Priority 3, the rest of the Army, is filled with the balance of the enlisted force.

The Enlisted Distribution Target Model (EDTM) uses the Enlisted Distribution Policy, authorizations, and available inventory together to produce enlisted strength targets for the force.

Specific Distribution Guidance. To meet national security and preeminent Army objectives, the contingency force, the 2nd ID, and specific early-deploying forces are manned at near steady-state levels. European Troop Strength (Western and Southern Europe) is governed by Congressional mandates, OSD ceilings, Program Budget Guidance, Military Manpower Strength Projection Report by region and country, Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), and NATO Guideline Areas (NGA). PERSCOM manages the aggregate enlisted strength against PMAD authorizations. Fill will be "fair share" consistent with its fill priority. The management of Northeast Asia Troop Strength (NEATS), which includes Army

MACRO OF THE ENLISTED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

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┌─────────────────────┐                      ┌─────────────────────┐
│   STATUS OF          │                      │  ALL OTHER ENLISTED │
│   RESOURCES TRAINING │                      │  SYSTEMS WITHIN      │
│   SYSTEM (SORTS)     │                      │  PERSCOM            │
└─────────────────────┘                      └─────────────────────┘
           │                                             │
┌─────────────────────┐                      ┌─────────────────────┐
│  PERSCOM ORGANIZATION│                      │  PERSCOM EDIT AND    │
│  DATA UPDATE         │                      │  DATA INFORMATION    │
│  SYSTEM (PODUS)      │                      │  SYSTEMS             │
└─────────────────────┘                      │  (PEDS & PERDIS)     │
           │                                  └─────────────────────┘
           │                                             │
           └──────────────────┬──────────────────────────┘
                  ┌─────────────────────┐
                  │  TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL│
                  │  DATABASE ACTIVE     │
                  │  ENLISTED (TAPDB-AE) │
                  └─────────────────────┘
```

Figure 13-4

forces in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, is against a DOD ceiling. This targeted ceiling cannot be exceeded as of the end of the fiscal year. Certain units in FORSCOM and SOCOM are maintained at a higher level of fill than other forces. Whenever a unit is deliberately overmanned, another unit has to pay the bill by going short of PMAD authorizations.

Enlisted Distribution Target Model (EDTM). The EDTM is an automated system which creates enlisted distribution targets by MOS, grade and UIC. The model fills each UIC reflected in the PMAD with projected available inventory from the MOS Level System (MOSLS) in accordance with the DCSPER Distribution Policy. This results in an optimum distribution of scarce resources consistent with distribution policy fill priorities. The EDTM constrains the assignment process to coincide with the projected operating strength targets. It represents the assets the Army realistically expects to be available for distribution.

The EDTM is maintained by the Enlisted Distribution Division, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, PERSCOM. The targets are produced monthly. EDTM targets for grade bands E1-4, E5-8 and E9 for months Calendar Month (CM) +6 through CM+12 are visible to field personnel managers via PERNET using the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System.

Management Systems. PERSCOM uses several state-of-the-art, automated data-processing systems to distribute, manage, and develop active duty enlisted personnel. These new systems described below were implemented between May 1990 and September 1991 (see Figure 13-4).

Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) is the heart of the overall system. It consists of three logical components containing personnel, requisition, and organizational data. The personnel component (PER DB) contains personnel information on every active duty soldier in the U.S. Army. PERSCOM and ODCSPER use this information to determine the Army's readiness, strength, promotion eligibles, reassignable personnel, and training requirements. The requisition component (REQ DB) contains information on requirements to move individuals and information on those who have been directed to move (assignments). The organization component (ORG DB) contains information on location and status of U.S. Army units; it does not contain any authorization or unit strength information.

PERSCOM Enlisted Personnel Data Update System (PEPDUS) is one of the major systems used to update the data on the TAPDB. It consists of two components, a batch component and an on-line, interactive component that allows managers worldwide to query and update personnel data.

The batch component receives transactions daily from other systems. The primary source is SIDPERS, but other sources such as the Centralized Promotion System and the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) submit transactions. PEPDUS is also designed to support mobilization. During a mobilization scenario it is able to process over 500,000 transactions daily. As PEPDUS updates the TAPDB, it also creates transactions that are passed back to SIDPERS (receipt notices, update transactions, DA error notices, etc.), transactions to update the TAPDB Mobilization Data Base (TAPDB–MOB), and feedback to other systems. It also creates a file every week which is used by the ODCSPER for strength accountability and projections.

The on-line interactive component allows EPMD managers to update data items on the PER DB. Some examples are CONUS and OCONUS assignment preferences, assignment eligibility, and date eligible for return from overseas (DEROS). As EPMD managers update, PEPDUS creates and sends update transactions to the SIDPERS Personnel File.

Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) is an on-line system which allows EPMD managers to review and update requisition and assignment data. It also provides reports for those managers for strength management of the force. It has several batch programs that exchange information with external systems. Currently, EDAS processes millions of on-line queries/updates each month, and over 95% are processed in less than two seconds each.

EDAS allows EPMD distribution and assignment managers to work with one collection of information on the same computer. Under previous systems, updates to information occurred only during the weekend; updates are now instantaneous. Consequently, decisions made by one manager are immediately available to all other managers. Moreover, EDAS provides field users the capability to view and in some cases update the same information that distribution and assignment managers use to make decisions. Finally, EDAS reduces the time to validate a requirement, select a soldier to fill the requirement, and transmit the assignment instructions to the field. A more detailed explanation on how EDAS is used in distributing and assigning soldiers is presented in a subsequent section.

PERSCOM Edit System (PEDS). One of the major undertakings associated with the development of TAPDB, EDAS, and PEPDUS was the standardization of all data fields used in the system. In order to properly exchange data with nonstandardized systems, such as SIDPERS, numerous conversion rules were developed and stored in a central repository called PEDS. PEDS is an active dictionary which provides information about data fields, codes, and conversion data. PEPDUS and EDAS access PEDS to obtain the rules for editing and converting data.

These systems, and others not described here, establish a new standard for on-line, interactive, data base-oriented, automated data processing within the personnel community. They not only support peacetime requirements, but also support mobilization scenarios. The TAPDB–AE provides a central source for all data. PEPDUS reduces the time to process SIDPERS transactions from days to less than 24 hours and provides for on-line, immediate update of select data fields. With EDAS, personnel managers can expeditiously create a requisition, determine who is best qualified to fill the requisition, and make the assignment on a single system.

Assignment of Newly Trained Personnel. Permanent unit assignments are based on input to PERSCOM from basic and advanced individual training centers via the Student/Trainee Management System–Enlisted (STRAMS–E), a module within the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). Information is passed by ATRRS to the Automated Control of Trainees (ACT) system which processes newly trained personnel for assignment.

If an individual has an enlistment agreement for a unit in an area, he/she is assigned according to the enlistment contract upon satisfactory completion of training. Soldiers who have no unit/area options are assigned against requirements in accordance with a distribution plan prepared by PERSCOM. Assignment instructions are generated by ACT and sent directly to losing commands via ADTRANS. The transaction is also processed through EDAS and is posted to the TAPDB. EDAS advises the gaining command of the assignment by ADTRANS.

Enlisted Distribution Management. PERSCOM Enlisted Distribution Division manages the strengths of Major Overseas Commands, FORSCOM and TRADOC installations in CONUS, and Special Management and Functional Commands worldwide. Strength managers at PERSCOM project the assigned strength of an activity ranging from the current month's strength out to 12 months, and determine how many soldiers are needed each month to ensure the commands meet targets established by the FY Enlisted Distribution Policy. These aggregate totals (arranged by individual rank and rank bands, i.e., PVT-SPC, SGT-SSG, SFC-SGM, and SGT-SGM) are the basis for transition into individual MOS requirements. These "Top of the System" strength managers then determine how many requisitions for replacements should be submitted by field commanders.

Overseas Requisitions. Requirements for Korea, USAREUR, USARSO and USARPAC are analyzed 10 months into the future (8 months for USARPAC). Using the EDTM targets, distribution managers allocate requisitions to each command at the

4-character MOS level, allowing commands 2 weeks to submit requisitions at the 9-character MOS level, including any other special requirements.

CONUS Requisitions. For CONUS installations, requisitioning is partially constrained through a process known as Requisition Allocation Plan–CONUS (RAP–C). Since fill of vacancies in CONUS commands is based on eligible overseas returnees, RAP–C keys on Date of Expected Return from Overseas Assignment (DEROS) data in the TAPDB–AE and calculates the number of soldiers in an MOS and grade who are expected to return to CONUS in a requisition month (two months after DEROS month). CONUS requisitions are normally validated 12 months out. Distributors at PERSCOM, using the Enlisted Distribution Target Model (EDTM), allocate these soldiers. If the EDTM requires more requisitions than soldiers returning from overseas, additional requisitions are loaded, which will require CONUS-to-CONUS moves.

The next effort for HQDA distribution managers is validation, whether for CONUS or OCONUS. If an apparent over or under requisitioning exists, the manager attempts to resolve the discrepancy with the command/installation prior to making a decision to validate, or not validate, requisitions. Discrepancies in the two projections may be caused by a proponent-approved authorization change at the unit level not yet recorded in PERSACS, or by more current authorizations data available to PERSCOM through the use of the PMAD, or by more current gain and loss data. The problem is resolved prior to the submission of the validated requisitions for assignment processing in the EDAS.

Distribution managers continually monitor command and installation strength projections and adjust accordingly. Deletions, authorization changes, and other variables may create need for top loading or cancelling requisitions.

Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS). EDAS (generally described in an earlier section) consists of several major subsystems: Management Information, Requisition, Policy, Nomination, Assignment, and Personnel are the Major Subsystems.

EPMD distribution managers use the Management Information Subsystem to determine an organization's authorized, assigned, and projected strength. Managers can obtain this information by MOS, skill, CMF, grade, Special Qualification Identifier (SQI), Additional Skill Identifier (ASI), language, location (installation, state, country), command, requisition activity code, TPSN, and/or UIC. As described in the preceding paragraphs, this information is used to determine the number of valid requisitions needed to maintain that organization at an acceptable strength level.

After the distribution managers determine the number of valid requisitions, the assignment managers must fill them. The Policy and Nomination Subsystems assist assignment managers by recommending which soldier should be assigned to each requisition and also provide alternate recommendations.

The Policy Subsystem allows EPMD managers to enter assignment policies into EDAS. For example, soldiers with Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program (HAAP) agreements can only be recommended for assignments which fulfill HAAP agreements.

The Nomination Subsystem determines the eligibility of soldiers for particular requisitions and recommends (nominates) the best qualified soldier for each specific requisition. The assignment manager reviews the nomination using the Nomination Review module in the Assignment Subsystem. If the manager concurs with the nomination, it is converted into an assignment. Upon acceptance of the nomination, assignment instructions are stored in the requisition data base and electronically transmitted to the field. If the manager nonconcurs with the nomination, he/she can obtain alternate recommendations from the system.

In addition to making assignments, the Assignment Subsystem provides the capability to delete or defer soldiers. If field users have the authority to approve a deletion or deferment, they can complete the action interactively through the Assignment Subsystem as an alternative to submitting it through SIDPERS. If field users do not have the authority to approve the action, they can request a deletion or deferment electronically through EDAS. The request is sent to a deletion/deferment manager who can act on the request or forward the request to the responsible assignment manager for comments. The assignment manager can electronically annotate his/her concurrence or nonconcurrence on the request and attach comments back to the deletion/deferment manager who then makes the final determination. Throughout this entire process, the field user can interactively monitor the current status of the request.

One important aspect of EDAS is that the system tightly controls access and what the user can do in the system. Some modules allow users to query data, while others allow updates. EDAS controls access by individual user and provides system managers with audit trails which can be used to determine who accessed or changed data in the system. Additionally, EDAS controls which records a user can query and/or update. For example, system managers can limit personnel clerks at Fort Hood to viewing information only on soldiers assigned to Fort Hood. Likewise, the system managers can limit the same personnel clerks to creating requisitions only for units stationed at Fort Hood.

The EDAS Promotion Points Update Module allows field personnel managers to post promotion point data for soldiers in grades E4 and E5 directly to the TAPDB. This function allows personnel managers to review and update the information that is resident on the TAPDB. This information is then used by PERSCOM to determine the numbers of promotions for each month by MOS. By using the Promotion Subsystem, field managers can see those soldiers, by name, who were considered eligible for promotion when the calculations were performed. If the data on the soldiers is incomplete or in error, field managers use the EDAS promotion point update and promotion update functions to update the data, promote the soldier, or alert PERSCOM managers as to why soldiers will not be promoted. EDAS returns the promotion on the soldier to SIDPERS which then updates local data bases and the Joint Defense Military Pay System.

EDAS fully supports mobilization scenarios. First of all, the Policy Subsystem can store and maintain any number of scenarios (peace, limited mobilization, full mobilization, etc.) and the user can invoke any one of the scenarios in seconds. Second, the System can evaluate "what if" questions.

The RETAIN System. RETAIN (Reenlistment, Reclassification, and

Assignment System) is a real-time automated system that identifies and reserves training spaces or assignment vacancies for potential reenlistees and determines MOS availability for soldiers undergoing reclassification based upon the individual's qualifications and the needs of the Army. It is also used to process enlisted soldiers for reenlistment or reclassification assignments. Soldier's preferences are considered only within the Army's priorities and needs.

If the soldier is requesting an MOS training space, RETAIN accesses the REQUEST system to determine if there are any Active Army in-service quotas available for the school the soldier desires. If the seat is available, it allows the Retention NCO or reclassification authority to make a reservation and puts the record on the RETAIN Wait List for an ultimate assignment in the new MOS upon completion of training. One hundred twenty days prior to the start date of the school, the Wait List manager is required to give the soldier an ultimate assignment. RETAIN is also used to process potential reenlistees for assignments. RETAIN will determine if there are any vacancies available for the installation/overseas area the soldier desires. If a vacancy exists, it will be offered to the soldier. If a vacancy does not exist, the soldier may elect to be put on the RETAIN Wait List.

The RETAIN Wait List is for those soldiers desiring an installation/overseas area which was not available and no other area/location was available at the time of entry into RETAIN. Each week, after an update from EDAS, the RETAIN system attempts to match soldiers on the Wait List to the place they desire to go. After this process, the Wait List is printed with the remaining soldiers. The printed Wait List is given to the Wait List Manager in the Reenlistment Management Branch for processing.

RETAIN is a valuable tool that commanders, career counselors, and personnel service centers use in counseling soldiers for reenlistment and reclassification. Since RETAIN is a real-time automated system it can provide valuable, accurate information to the potential reenlistee or soldier involved in reclassification.

Reclassification. RETAIN also addresses reclassification. Reclassification is a process which provides for migration from one MOS to another. It supports policies and goals to reduce MOS overstrength and alleviate shortages. In addition to individual voluntary requests, mandatory reclassifications are necessary when a soldier loses qualification, for example, loss of clearance, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) disqualification, contracts a medical condition. (Referral of soldiers to the Disability System may be directed when it is determined there are no requirements for those MOSs in which the soldier may be qualified.) Special reclassification programs, such as "Fast Track," realigns MOS overages through reenlistment and reclassification. Soldiers possessing the overstrength MOS may be allowed to reclassify or reenlist for retraining without regard to ETS.

Officer Distribution and Assignment.

The Army is rarely in a position where its officer assets by career field and grade equal the sum total found in authorization documents. This is because these documents are continually amended to reflect changes in mission requirements. Moreover, documentation is generally 5-12 months behind the latest budget and force structure decisions.

OFFICER DISTRIBUTION

Figure 13-5

Distribution Planning. The officer distribution planners and managers at PERSCOM are influenced by three principal factors in doing their job: officer assets, authorizations, and priorities. All three are in a constant state of change. Therefore, there is a need for a master distribution plan which will ensure that all commands, agencies, and activities receive, according to priority, an appropriate share of the available officer assets/inventory. The foundation of this master plan is a management tool known as the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). The ODP brings assets/inventory, authorizations, and priorities into balance and is one of the Army's most important documents for officer distribution planning.

The ODP Process. The ODP is produced annually based on a projected inventory of officers to the end of the budget year compared to projected PMAD authorizations. If the available officer assets

matched the requirements identified through the PMAD, by branch, functional area, and grade, officers would simply be assigned against authorizations. However, this is never the case. As with most resources, particularly in peacetime, there is always a greater demand than there is a supply, and officer shortages result. Some system of priorities is needed to help manage these shortages. That system is the Personnel Priority Group (PPG) portion of the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). After the officer inventory has been compared with the authorizations in the PMAD, a computer system called the Personnel Priority Model (PPM) is used to resolve the differences identified. By use of the PPM, officer assets are apportioned out to the appropriate commands based on the DAMPL and any special distribution guidance as determined by HQDA (Figure 13-5).

Officer Requisition System. The Officer Requisition System is designed to fill the officer requirements of all major commands and activities.

<u>*Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS).*</u> This is a fully integrated management information system which supports the officer management process within PERSCOM and at worldwide requisitioning activities. TOPMIS is composed of seven operational modules:

(1) The Control module provides security of access and updating, creates individual user profiles, and provides on-line electronic mail service to all TOPMIS users.

(2) The Strength module displays operating and projected strength down to the career management field (CMF) level for MACOMs and requisitioning activities in various report formats.

(3) The Goaling and Monitoring module displays assignment goals for the fiscal year by grade and CMF. It is also used to plan the ODP and monitor its progress.

(4) The Requisition module allows distribution managers and the requisition activity managers to generate, edit, validate (based on the ODP), and update requisitions. This module generates and maintains requisitions based on projected strength. The final product is requisitions for career managers to fill.

(5) The Asset/ORB module provides an on-line version of the Officer Record Brief (ORB) and the capability for on-line updating of ORB fields by career managers.

This module also provides access to by-name reports of officers assigned and/or on orders.

(6) The Assignment module provides access to personnel, requisition, and organization data; provides on–line extract/update capability from the Total Army Personnel Data Base–Active Officer (TAPDB–AO); and processes assignments generated by PERSCOM managers in the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD). Assignment instructions are transmitted electronically on a daily basis to the gaining and losing requisition activity.

(7) The User Assistance module allows users to review data name definitions and tables of valid codes used in officer management.

TOPMIS interacts with the TAPDB–AO and is used by assignment and distribution managers of the basic branches, medical department branches, and the Chief of Chaplains and Judge Advocate General's offices. Worldwide requisition/officer management activities can access TOPMIS through the Defense Data Network or a variety of MACOM/HQDA host-to-host systems.

<u>*Requisition Cycles.*</u> Officer requisitions are generated on an alternating bimonthly basis for either overseas or CONUS. Overseas requisitions are validated so that officers will arrive nine or ten months after validation; CONUS officers arrive five to six months after validation. As a normal rule, overseas returnees and school requirements drive the assignment system because these officers must move on time. This is largely

due to tour length policies and graduation dates. Others are assigned to replace these personnel and the cycle continues.

Assignment Challenge. Assignment officers within the divisions and branches of OPMD must take into consideration a wide variety of competing factors in the process of identifying the right officers to fill valid requisitions. Some, but by no means all, of these factors are listed below. They are in no particular order, because each assignment action is unique.

- Army Requirements
- Gaining and Losing Organizations' Requirements
- Tour Equity (CONUS vs OCONUS)
- Time-on-Station
- Professional Development
- Officer Preference
- Joint Domicile
- Compassionate Situations
- Combat Training Center (CTC) Experience
- Joint Duty/Title IV Provisions

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MOTIVATION

There must be a way of developing leadership, evaluating and rewarding those who do well, and eliminating those who do not measure up. This section will address some of the programs designed to accomplish these tasks and to create an environment which will motivate men and women to become career officers and NCOs.

Enlisted Development.

Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). The Enlisted Personnel Management System provides a logical career path from PVT to SGM, career-long training, and performance-oriented evaluation. Additionally, it is designed to eliminate promotion bottlenecks, provide all soldiers of the same grade with equal promotion opportunities, make assignments more flexible, and provide greater challenge by decreasing the number of MOSs.

A key feature of EPMS is to associate five standardized skill levels for the enlisted ranks, with PVT-SPC having Skill Level 1 and MSG-SGM having Skill Level 5.

Another major feature of EPMS is the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) which is discussed in detail in Chapter 15 of this text. EPMS and NCOES are part of the same continuum. EPMS skill levels were selected so that the vital middle-grade NCOs would be distinct and visible for management purposes.

Enlisted Evaluation System (EES). At the heart of EPMS is the Enlisted Evaluation System. It is used to assist in the identification of soldiers for assignment, promotion, reenlistment, reclassification, special training, elimination, and other personnel management actions.

The EES consists of Academic Evaluation Reports, and an NCO Evaluation Report (NCOER) for SGT and above. The NCOER is important in that it impacts on the Army's ability to maintain a career enlisted force of high quality. It is the official evaluation of duty performance and an estimate of the NCO's potential.

The NCO Leader Self-Development Career Models. The NCO Leader Self-Development Career Model provides enlisted soldiers a guide in the selection of self-development activities recommended by CMF proponents. Career models have been developed by subject matter experts for each

CMF and will be published in *DA Pamphlet 600-25.*

The career models correspond to the Army's Leader Development process relating self-development activities to institutional training and operational assignments. The models can help soldiers establish planned, progressive, and sequential self-development programs which enhance and sustain the nine military competencies as well as required skills, knowledge, and aptitudes (SKAs). The career models also contain CMF-proponent recommended goals, e.g., licensure, certification, or academic degree, and allow soldiers to combine experience and training with self-development activities for career progression as well as goal achievement.

Activities and goals are recommendations, not requirements, and do not preclude mission assignments and training. Completion does not guarantee advancement. The career models are tools for use by supervisors and professional education counselors to help guide soldiers in their professional and personal growth. They also may be used to help soldiers prepare for NCOES and NCO functional resident courses.

The elements in the leader development process—education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement—create a dynamic synergy to prepare soldiers for increasing responsibilities. Self-development is the only aspect of that process over which the soldier has direct control. The career model can stimulate involvement in this vital imperative, which should be the goal of every career soldier. To foster this desire requires close cooperation between commanders, supervisors, education counselors, and the soldier.

Promotions. The objectives of the enlisted promotion system are to ensure advancement of the best qualified soldiers, to provide career incentive, to promote soldiers based on potential rather than as a reward for past service, and to identify and preclude promotion of soldiers who are nonproductive and ineffective. Three programs make up the promotion system. They include: the decentralized program which controls advancements to PV2 through SPC; the semicentralized program which controls promotions to SGT through SSG; and the centralized program which controls promotions to SFC through SGM/CSM.

Under the decentralized program, authority to appoint and promote soldiers is delegated to local commanders, but there must be compliance with standard policies and procedures established by HQDA. Promotion boards are not required.

Authority to promote soldiers under the semicentralized program is delegated to field commanders who are serving in an authorized LTC or above command position in accordance with guidance from HQDA. In this case, eligible soldiers compete Army-wide on the basis of relative standings by points attained on a standardized point system. Soldiers recommended for promotion are required to appear in person for evaluation by a selection board. Names of soldiers selected for promotion by the board are placed on a locally maintained recommended list and grouped by MOS in an order of merit based on the total points attained under the point system. HQDA controls the number of soldiers who can be promoted in each MOS by establishing cut-off scores according to the needs of the Army. Soldiers whose scores equal or exceed the announced cut-off scores are promoted without regard to assignment. Those not immediately promoted remain on the recommended list until promoted, unless they are removed for administrative reasons

or for cause. Soldiers on a recommended list may request reevaluation to improve their standing.

Promotions to SFC through SGM are centralized and selections are made by a board convened by HQDA. Selections are based on the "whole person concept." No one single factor should be considered disqualifying, but rather an individual's entire record is given careful consideration. Selections are made on a best-qualified basis in conjunction with Army needs.

Command Sergeants Major Program. The objective of this program is to ensure the selection and assignment of the best-qualified sergeants major, first sergeants, and master sergeants for command sergeant major positions. These positions are designated as the principal enlisted assistant to commanders of an organization with enlisted troop strength equivalent to a battalion or higher level and commanded by a lieutenant colonel or above. This is the final step on the enlisted career progression ladder, and it should be the goal of every career soldier. Selections are made by boards convened by HQDA. A list of those selected is published and maintained within PERSCOM for use in appointing personnel to fill vacancies. Command sergeants major are assigned only to positions which have been designated by the DCSPER.

Total Army Retention Program. This program consists of the Active Component (AC) Retention and Reserve Component (RC) Transition Programs. It is responsible for assisting in manning the force with quality soldiers by achieving and maintaining a balanced career content in the Regular Army enlisted force; improving the quality of the Army through the retention of trained, qualified, and experienced enlisted soldiers and leaders; attaining enlisted MOS and grade balance; and providing qualified, highly motivated transitioning active soldiers at Expiration Term of Service (ETS) to RC units in or near their anticipated civilian hometown. The AC Retention and RC Transition Program objectives are assigned to the major commands by ODCSPER while PERSCOM provides overall program and personnel management of the programs. Personnel and fiscal support of the RC Transition Program is provided by the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve.

Qualitative Management Program (QMP). This program was developed as a means of improving the enlisted career force and consists of two subprograms— Qualitative Retention and Qualitative Screening.

The Qualitative Retention subprogram specifies that a soldier cannot reenlist beyond the time-in-service limits established for the soldier's rank. These limits are called Retention Control Points (RCPs).

The Qualitative Screening subprogram is the DA bar to reenlistment aspect of the QMP. Regularly scheduled, centralized promotion/selection boards for SFC, MSG, SGM/CSM select individuals for promotion or retention in grade, as well as those soldiers to be barred. These boards consider the soldier's entire record using the "whole person concept," not just his/her current job or term of service. Soldiers separated with a DA bar receive a reenlistment eligibility code of "4" (no further military service authorized, any branch of Service).

Bars to reenlistment were designed as a personnel management tool to assist commanders in denying further service to soldiers whose separation under administrative procedures is not warranted, but where

service beyond current ETS is not in the best interest of the Army. There are two types of Bars to Reenlistment: field imposed and DA imposed (QMP).

These two programs are governed by Chapters 8 and 10, *AR 601-280,* respectively. (Note: Locally-imposed bars and DA-imposed Bars to Reenlistment are two distinct and separate actions. Imposition of one does not preclude imposition of the other.)

Reenlistment is deemed a privilege and not a right. It is the responsibility of commanders, at all levels, to ensure that only those soldiers of high moral character, personal competence, and demonstrated performance be reenlisted in the regular Army. The objectives of both programs are to: enhance the quality of the enlisted force; selectively retain only the best qualified; and deny continued service to nonprogressive and nonproductive soldiers.

Under QMP, commanders must initiate separation actions not later than 60 days following the date the soldier is notified of the bar unless the soldier elects to retire, appeal, or requests voluntary discharge. If an appeal is denied, commanders will initiate separation action not later than 60 days from the date of notification of denial. Appeals must be submitted within 90 days of completion of the option statement. Soldiers who have less than 90 days to ETS and who submit appeals may be extended until results of the appeal have been received from CG, PERSCOM.

Soldiers who have a DA-imposed Bar to Reenlistment must separate within 90 days of decision not to appeal or denial of appeal. Soldiers who have 18 but less than 20 years of service on that date may remain on active duty to attain retirement eligibility.

Warrant Officer Development.

Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS). The implementation of the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS) in 1986, the Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) in 1991, the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) in 1992, and the Warrant Offcer Education System (WOES) in 1993 have had a major impact on the management and professional development of warrant officers. Under TWOS the Army recruits warrant officers earlier in their careers, trains them better, and retains them longer.

Every warrant officer position in the Active Army has been classified by rank based on the skills, knowledge, abilities, and experience needed in that position. Formerly there was no rank differentiation in warrant officer positions. When the review of warrant officer positions in the Reserve Components is completed, all position requirements will be ranked into one of four levels. The levels are "Entry": which includes WO1 and CW2; "Advanced" for CW3, "Senior" for CW4; and "Master" for CW5.

Warrant officer recruiting, education, and training will change to support this new requirements-based system of warrant officer management. Each year about 1,000 soldiers are selected for appointment as warrant officers. Some come directly from civilian life into warrant officer candidate training, but most come from the NCO ranks and already have several years of military service.

In the past, this enlisted service was included in personnel management decisions affecting warrant officer careers. About half of all warrants retired after 23 years of combined (enlisted and warrant officer) active federal service.

Under WOMA, decisions on promotions, training, and assignments are

based on years of Warrant Officer Service (WOS). A careerist will have an opportunity to serve 30 years of warrant officer service if selected for W5. All others will have an opportunity to serve up to 24 years of warrant officer service unless twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade.

Warrant Officer Education System (WOES). WOES is based on a select-train-utilize concept, where warrant officers receive the training required to serve in the next higher grade only after selection for promotion. WOES consists of the following courses: Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS); Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) (MEL 7); Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) (MEL 6); Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC) (MEL 4); and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC) (MEL 1).

The WOAC is a combination of common core and MOS proponent training that prepares warrant officers to serve in CW3 level positions. WOAC is provided in two phases: a non-resident common core phase and a resident phase which includes a common core module and an MOS specific module. Career status is required for enrollment in the non-resident phase and selection for CW3 is a prerequisite for attendance at the resident phase.

The WOSC is a resident MOS/branch immaterial course to prepare warrant officers to serve in CW4 positions. Selection for CW4 is a prerequisite for attendance.

The WOSSC is a resident MOS/branch immaterial course to prepare warrant officers to serve in CW5 positions up to the HQDA staff level. Selection for CW5 is a prerequisite for attendance.

Constructive or equivalent credit is permitted for courses that generate a change to the warrant officer's MEL code. Credit may be granted for active duty experience, service school faculty service, or for attendance at equivalent schools.

Warrant officers complete civilian schooling and MOS functional training as required.

The proponent for WOES is the Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The WOCC serves as the TRADOC executive agent for the WOES. The WOCC evaluates Common Core instruction within the proponent specific program of instruction for WOBC and WOAC.

Warrant Officer Promotions. The active Army includes both Regular Army (RA) and Other Than Regular Army (OTRA) warrant officers. Warrant officers are promoted under a single permanent promotion system similar to the commissioned officer system under DOPMA.

Promotions to CW3, CW4 and CW5 for warrant officers on the Active Duty List (ADL) are administered at HQDA. Promotion authority to CW2 is delegated to commanders in the rank of LTC and above. Warrant officers may be promoted to CW2 after completion of 24 months in the grade of WO1 under current policy. WOMA allows CW2 promotion consideration after 18 months in grade. Promotions to CW3, CW4 and CW5 occur at approximately six year intervals which may be adjusted to meet grade and end strength requirements. WOMA allows chief warrant officers to be considered for promotion after the completion of three years in their current grade.

The promotion opportunities for warrant officers, based on the first time considered (primary zone) population, and the ideal TWOS pin on point for warrant

TWOS PROMOTION GOALS

TO GRADE	PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY	YEARS AWOS
W2	FULLY QUALIFIED	2
W3	80%	8 +1/-0
W4	76%	14 +/- 1
*W5	44%	20 +/- 1

*BY LAW THE NUMBER OF CW5s IS LIMITED TO 5% OF THE WARRANT OFFICER FORCE.

Figure 13-6

officer promotions are depicted at Figure 13-6. These may be adjusted to meet end strength requirements.

Warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade will be discharged or retired unless selectively continued on active duty to meet a valid Army requirement.

Warrant Officer Retention Programs. Currently, Voluntary Indefinite (VI) status is offered in conjunction with promotion to CW2 to those warrant officers whose end of current service agreement (ECUR) is subsequent to 1 Oct 93. The Warrant Officer VI Board will be re-established in FY 98 to consider warrant officers for VI in their fourth year of warrant officer service.

Regular Army (RA) integration is concurrent with promotion to CW3. Officers who decline RA integration will not be promoted and shall be separated 90 days after the declination date or upon completion of any Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO), whichever is later.

Warrant officers appointed prior to 1 Oct 87 may decline RA integration in writing, when promoted to CW3, and remain on active duty until completion of 20 years active federal service or until their mandatory release date. Retirement eligible officers who decline RA integration when promoted to CW3 will be separated after completing any ADSO, including promotion, unless earlier release is required to meet the needs of the Army.

Separate RA Integration Boards were discontinued during the Army drawdown. Future boards are planned to only consider exceptions; for example, a USAR CW3 who requests and is called to active duty to fill a valid requirement.

Warrant officers are released from active duty after being twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade unless they are selectively continued in their current grade.

Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA). WOMA was enacted on 1 February 1993. It provides a comprehensive and uniform personnel management system, similar to DOPMA, for warrant officer appointments, promotions, separations, and retirements.

The key provisions of WOMA include:

- Authorized the grade of CW5, to include pay and allowances. Maximum number of CW5s on active duty is limited to five percent of the total number of warrant officers on active duty.
- Eliminated the dual promotion system and established a DOPMA style promotion system for warrant officers.
- Established minimum time in grade (TIG) requirement for consideration for promotion.
- Established authority to convene Selective Retirement Boards (SRB) to consider retirement eligible warrant officers for involuntary retirement.
- Established the management of warrant officers by years of Warrant Officer Service (WOS) rather than by Active Federal Service (AFS). A CW5 may serve for 30 years WOS. Retirement eligibility at 20 years AFS remains unchanged.
- Established Selective Continuation for warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion. Very limited use and normally in shortage skills.
- Modified the involuntary separation date from 60 days to the first day of the seventh month. This provision applies to warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion and those selected for involuntary retirement.

WOMA modernized warrant officer life cycle management, offers all warrant officers the potential for a full career, provides tools to shape the force, and enhances readiness by providing the Army with a highly qualified and experienced Warrant Officer Corps.

Officer Development.

Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). OPMS provides a framework within which the careers of all commissioned officers, except those assigned to The Surgeon General, Chief of Chaplains, and The Judge Advocate General, are managed. OPMS consists of three major and interrelated subsystems: strength management, professional development, and evaluation (Figure 13-7).

To ensure that the Army develops the required number of officers with the necessary skills, a framework for professional development has been established. This framework consists of all OPMS career fields, with each one being a grouping of duty positions whose skill, knowledge, and job requirements are mutually supportive in the development of officers to successfully perform in the career field. Each career field contains sufficient duty positions to support progression to the grade of colonel. Military and civilian educational opportunities are also geared to the officer's career field. Army requirements and an individual's qualifications and preference are the major considerations in determining the designation of career fields.

In late 1984, the CSA approved implementation of several changes in OPMS as a result of the recommendations of the OPMS Study Group. Major changes include the following:

Single Branch Development. Officers are developed in only one branch, and the branch will remain primary for most officers. Officers are designated in only one branch at a time. However, some officers have been "grandfathered" as a result of a dual

OPMS

STRENGTH MANAGEMENT

CENTRALIZED SELECTION

P
R
O
C
E
S
S

EVALUATION

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Figure 13-7

designation board conducted in the Summer/Fall 1986 and will continue to be

managed and developed with two branches or two functional areas. The term specialty has been eliminated. Each branch now has only one numerical designation.

Functional Areas. Incorporating what are referred to as Nonaccession Specialties, functional areas provide a management and development system to effectively use the vast talents of a diverse officer corps. Functional areas are not related to any branch.

Multiple Career Tracks. There are a variety of career patterns (dual and single tracking) available to the officer corps to provide the flexibility to develop individual officers with different abilities based upon Army needs. Officers are managed,

developed, and promoted by branch and/or functional area.

Branch Transfers. Requests for branch transfers from an overstrength branch to an understrength branch from about the third to the eighth year of service are considered. Branch transfers requested after the eighth year of service from an overstrength branch are normally approved.

Document Coding. A total review of all authorization documents was conducted to accurately code all commissioned officer positions in accordance with the revised classification system and to incorporate the three immaterial codes (01A—branch immaterial; 02A—combat arms immaterial; and 04A—personnel immaterial). Centralized approval at HQDA is required on document coding changes to control the amount and frequency of changes.

Revised Officer Classification System. Officers are no longer classified by specialties formerly called INSPECs and ADSPECs, but are classified by branch, functional area, area of concentration, and skill.

Branch Detail Program. The Branch Detail Program, beginning with FY 90 accessions, takes lieutenants from Signal, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Transportation, and Finance branches and details them to combat arms branches for two years. Military Intelligence and Adjutant General Corps officers are detailed for four years. Chemical Corps officers are not detailed. The two-year detail is designed to provide an officer with combat arms experience in Infantry, Field Artillery, Armor, or Air Defense, followed by an assignment in his/her basic branch while still a lieutenant. The program eliminates PCS costs by assigning detailed officers only to installations which can provide both experiences. Technical training (a short TDY course) is provided by proponent schools prior to the detailed officer assuming duties in his/her basic branch. Volunteers are requested. If insufficient officers volunteer, the Accessions and Branching Board selects officers to be detailed. Additionally, all USMA graduates, beginning with the Class of '90, commissioned into a Combat Service Support or Combat Support Arms branch are detailed.

Centralized Selection for Command Positions. As a part of OPMS, a centralized command selection system was developed to identify and select those officers best qualified to command organizations on the DA Command Designated Position List (CDPL). The system determines which officers within a career field or functional area will be selected to command CDPL units. Officers eligible to be selected for both lieutenant colonel and colonel CDPL commands must be in the appropriate grade or on a current promotion list.

HQDA Command Selection Boards normally convene annually to select those officers eligible to fill command vacancies during the forthcoming FY. Separate selection boards are convened for combat arms, combat support, combat service support, project/product manager, TRADOC Systems Manager, and medical/medical service corps positions. Officers will be considered for command in the category for which they are eligible based on the career fields and/or functional areas they hold.

The Centralized Command Selection System encompasses only specifically designated positions as approved by the CG, PERSCOM. As such, not all lieutenant colonel and colonel command positions are supported by the Centralized Command Selection System.

Army Acquisition Corps. The mission of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) is to create a corps of dedicated military and civilian acquisition managers which capitalizes on the operational experience of the military officers and the technical skills of the civilians. Successful weapon system development and all the support activities required throughout its life cycle requires a balance between keen regard for current operational realities and technical knowledge.

The AAC program develops world-class acquisition specialists to fill approximately 850 military and 3,000 Army civilian critical positions. Critical positions require the level of education, training, and experience stated in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act and the DOD

implementing instructions. The positions include program managers (PMs), program executive officers (PEOs) (general officer/ senior executive service level), deputy or assistant PEOs/PMs, senior contracting officials, and selected positions in procurement commands, matrix support commands, and headquarters staffs.

The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) (the ASA [RD&A] is dual-hatted as the AAE), acting for the Secretary of the Army through established structure, implements DOD Acquisition Workforce policy and tailors the Army program. The Director, Acquisition Career Management (military deputy to the AAE), provides requirements to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).

DCSPER provides personnel policy management for the AAC as for the rest of the Army. The Army Acquisition Corps Management Office (AACMO), Officer Personnel Management Directorate, PERSCOM, centrally manages all officer and civilian AAC members. The AACMO consists of a Military Acquisition Management Branch and a Civilian Acquisition Management Branch. Each branch manages members of its component from accession through the members' entire career life cycle.

Only qualified officers and civilians may fill critical positions. The AAC targets branch-qualified captains and civilians in grade GS-13 as candidates for competitive entry into the AAC. Once accessed into the AAC, members attend schooling and obtain acquisition experience to meet acquisition certification requirements for critical positions.

The Army Acquisition Corps encompasses three functional areas (FAs) and 11 civilian career programs (CPs). For officers this includes: FA 51, Research, Development, and Acquisition; FA 53, Systems Automation; and FA 97, Contracting & Industrial Management. For selected civilians from the following CPs: CP 11, Comptroller; CP 13, Supply Management; CP 14, Contracting & Acquisition; CP 15, Quality & Reliability Assurance; CP 17, Materiel & Maintenance Management; CP 18, Engineers & Scientists; CP 23, Automatic Data Processing; CP 24, Transportation; CP 25, Communications; and CP 33, Ammunition Management.

Recognizing the difficulty in pursuing branch qualification for battalion and brigade command and at the same time achieving the acquisition requirements, AAC members are precluded from TOE command. AAC officers compete for acquisition-related TDA commands and product manager (battalion-level command equivalent) and project manager (brigade-level command equivalent) positions.

Department of the Army Acquisition Selection Boards select AAC commanders, and product and project managers. Commanders normally serve three-year tours and product/project managers serve four-year tours.

AAC TDA commands include the Research & Development Centers and Laboratories, and Procurement and Contracting Offices. Product/Project managers are charged with managing and executing the day-to-day activities for development, production, and fielding of a system in accordance with approved performance, schedule, and cost requirements.

DA Pamphlet 600-3 details the professional development requirements for commissioned officers within the AAC. *AR 690-950* and The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) lists requirements for civilians in the AAC.

Officer Evaluation System. The Officer Evaluation System is the Army's method of identifying those officers most qualified for advancement and assignment to positions of increased responsibility. The system includes assessments of officer performance and potential accomplished in the organizational duty environment; in an academic environment, both military and civilian; and at Department of the Army.

The Department of the Army potential assessment of an officer is a subjective judgment as to the officer's capability to perform at a specified level of responsibility, authority, or sensitivity. Although potential is normally associated with the capability to perform at a higher grade, judgments are also made by DA on retention and increased responsibility within a specified grade. The assessment is based on three major factors: the Army's officer requirements, the individual officer's qualifications, and a summation of the individual officer's performance.

The performance assessment by DA differs significantly from that accomplished in the organizational duty environment. Whereas the organizational duty assessment involves a personal knowledge of the situations surrounding a specific period of time, DA assessment is accomplished by an after-the-fact assessment of a series of reports on performance over a variety of duty positions and covering the officer's entire career.

Officer Evaluation Reporting System. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System is a subsystem of the Officer Evaluation System. It includes the methods and procedures for organizational evaluation and assessment of an officer's performance and an estimation of potential for future service based on the manner of that performance. The official documentation of these assessments is the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) and the Academic Evaluation Report (AER).

The primary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to provide information from the organizational chain to be used by DA for officer personnel decisions. The information contained in the OER is correlated with the Army's needs and individual officer qualifications in order to provide the basis for officer personnel actions such as promotion, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction in force, command designation, school selection, assignment, career field designation, and RA integration.

A secondary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to encourage the professional development of the officer corps. To enhance accomplishment of this secondary function, emphasis is placed on the responsibility of senior officers to counsel their subordinates. While this has always been a major aspect of leadership, continual reemphasis is necessary. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System contributes significantly by providing a natural impetus to continual two-way communication between senior and subordinate. It is through this communication that the rated officer is made aware of the specific nature of his duties and is provided an opportunity to participate in the organizational planning process. The rater uses the communication to give direction to and develop his subordinates, to obtain information as to the status and progress of his organization, and to plan systematically for the accomplishment of the mission. The senior/subordinate communication process also facilitates the dissemination of career development information, advice, and

CAREER PROGRESSION PATTERN

TO GRADE	PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY	DOPMA PHASE POINT
FIRST LIEUTENANT	FULLY QUALIFIED	13 MOS TIS MINIMUM TIG
CAPTAIN	90%	NOT LESS THAN 2 YEARS TIG
MAJOR	80%	10 +/- 1 YEAR
LIEUTENANT COLONEL	70%	16 +/- 1 YEAR
COLONEL	50%	22 +/- 1 YEAR

Opportunity and TIS are set by policy. TIG for promotion to 1LT and CPT is set by law.

Figure 13-8

guidance to the rated officer. This enables the rated officer to take advantage of the superior's experience when making career field or assignment-related decisions.

Promotions. As of 15 September 1981, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) amended *Title 10, United States Code*, for officer promotions. DOPMA, as implemented, is applicable to all officers on the active duty list. It does not apply to warrant officers. The act provides for a single active duty promotion system for all officers (RA and Other than RA), thus eliminating the previous dual (AUS/RA or AUS/USAR) system of promotions. The intent is for promotions to be made within fairly uniform promotion timing and opportunity goals, as vacancies occur. Eligibility for consideration for promotions based on minimum time in grade (TIG) and time in service (TIS) with the below-the-zone selection rate established at a maximum of 10% (or 15% when so authorized by SECDEF) of the list for any grade above captain. DOPMA goals for promotion opportunity and phase point (i.e., TIS when most officers are promoted) are listed in Figure 13-8.

Officer Quality Management. The goal of the Officer Management Program is to ensure that only those individuals demonstrating satisfactory performance and possessing acceptable moral and professional traits be allowed to serve on active duty, retain their commissions, and remain on DA promotion lists.

Commanders and DA agencies are continually striving to maintain the quality of the officer corps by identifying and processing for involuntary separation those officers whose performance or professional or moral traits are deficient. To this end, the records of Other than Regular Army Officers (OTRA) are screened continually to identify officers whose degree of efficiency and manner of performance and/or misconduct, moral or professional dereliction require separation. Records selected under this program are referred to a DA Active Duty Board (DAADB), and selection by this board results in a release from active duty.

Records of RA officers are also screened but go before a Show Cause Board rather than the DAADB. In both the DAADB and Show Cause proceeding, the

officer is afforded the opportunity to resign in lieu of undergoing the entire process.

Similarly, DA agencies are tasked to review promotion and command selection lists to ensure that no officer is promoted or allowed to command who has become mentally, physically, morally, or professionally disqualified after being selected. The records of officers whose fitness for promotion or command has become suspect are referred to a DA Promotion/Command Review Board which will recommend to the Secretary of the Army whether the officer should be retained on or removed from the promotion/command selection list.

The promotion system also serves as a qualitative management tool through the mandatory separation from active duty of officers who fail to be selected for promotion to certain grade levels. Additionally, reserve officers serving under an initial service obligation must demonstrate acceptable performance, professional and moral traits, in order to qualify for voluntary indefinite status.

No person has an inherent right to continue service as an officer. The privilege of service is his/hers only as long as he/she performs in a satisfactory manner. Responsibility for leadership and example requires officers accomplish their duties effectively and conduct themselves in an exemplary manner at all times.

Officer Strength Management.

When manpower cuts are necessitated by congressional budget constraints and reduced strength ceilings, the Army has measures to reduce the number of officers on active duty. When possible, reductions are accomplished through normal attrition and voluntary release programs coupled with reduced officer accessions. Because Congress directed the Services to include senior as well as junior officers when implementing officer strength cuts, Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs) and Reductions-In-Force (RIFs) may be implemented when required. RIFs target mid-career officers by year while SERBs select a fixed number of retirement-eligible officers, not to exceed 30 percent of the eligible population, for involuntary early retirement. RIFs and SERBs are quantitative measures that are qualitatively administered.

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).

DOPMA evolved from the continued inability of the Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947, as changed by the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954, to solve the active duty officer management problem. The intent of DOPMA was to provide all Services with an equitable, effective, and efficient system to manage their officer corps below the brigadier general level through revision of *Title 10, United States Code*.

The management objective is to provide consistent career and promotion opportunities across all Services in order to attract and retain high-caliber officers, and promote them at a point in service conducive to effective performance. The integration into a single promotion and grade authorization system of the old dual-track RA/Reserve system mandated by OGLA and OPA provides a favorable environment in which to achieve this goal. DOPMA does not mandate, per se, the creation of a regular force at the 11th year of TIS. It merely enlarges the RA officer corps. The current policy is to tender an RA appointment to all active duty captains upon promotion to major; however, this policy is subject to review.

The provisions for selective continuation of captains and majors,

combined with the capability to instruct promotion boards on skill needs, provides a mechanism through which specialty needs can be filled, while enhancing an officer's opportunity to stay on active duty until retirement. Under DOPMA, a first lieutenant who twice fails to be selected for promotion to captain is mandatorily released from active duty. By law, captains and majors may be selectively continued to remain on active duty until 20 and 24 years respectively; however, current Army policy and strength constraints preclude the continuation of captains and restricts continuation of majors based on the needs of the Army. Effective during FY97 we will return to the pre-drawdown policy to continue two time nonselected Army Competitive Category (ACC) majors to their retirement eligibility date (20 years of service). Officers not promoted and not selected for continuation will be retired or separated as appropriate. Additionally, DOPMA establishes uniform, general constructive provisions for all Services, thus recognizing that special skills acquired prior to service are essential for effective performance in special branches. This provision impacts most on AMEDD, Chaplain, and the JAG Corps accessed after the effective date of the act.

DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.
The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act has had significant impact on the assignment of officers throughout the Army. The congressional goal is to improve the performance of officers in joint duty positions by establishing management procedures for their selection, education, assignment, and promotion. Key provisions of the law are listed below.

Assignments. The qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments will be such that they are expected to meet certain specified promotion rates comparable to their Service headquarters and the overall board selection rate. Officers assigned to joint duty assignments will be assigned in anticipation that they will serve the prescribed tour length for their grade: two years for general officers and three years for others. Assignments for officers possessing critical occupational specialties, which for the Army are defined as the combat arms branches, may be curtailed to a minimum of 24 months under certain conditions. All graduates of Professional Joint Education (i.e., National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, etc.) who are designated as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO), and a high proportion (greater than 50%) of those graduates not designated as JSO will be assigned to a joint duty assignment for the next assignment after graduation.

Promotions. Selection boards considering officers serving in, or who have served in, joint duty assignments will include at least one officer designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) who is currently serving in a joint duty assignment. The letter of instruction for selection boards include the following guidance: "You will give appropriate consideration to the performance in joint duty assignments of officers who are serving in, or who have served in such assignments." Prior to approval by the Secretary of the Department, the results of selection boards considering officers who are serving in, or who have served in, joint duty assignments will be forwarded by the Secretary to the CJCS. The CJCS will review the results to determine whether appropriate consideration was given to performance in joint duty assignments.

Reports. Each Secretary of a Military Department must provide periodic progress reports on their promotion rates in relation to the promotion objectives specified above.

General/Flag Officer Actions. In the absence of a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, officers selected to the grade of 0-7 subsequent to 1 January 1994 must have completed a full joint duty assignment before selection, or their first assignment as a general/flag officer will be in a joint duty assignment. A Capstone Military Education course has been created and all newly promoted general/flag officers must attend this course within two years after selection, unless such attendance is waived by the Secretary of Defense.

TRANSITION AND SEPARATION

Separation includes voluntary and involuntary release from active duty, discharge, nondisability retirement, and physical disability retirement.

Because the type of discharge and character of service are of such great significance to the Service member, it must accurately reflect the nature of service performed. Eligibility for veterans' benefits provided by law, eligibility for reentry into service, and acceptability for employment in the civilian community may be affected by these determinations.

Enlisted Separation.

An enlisted soldier may be separated upon expiration of term of service (ETS) or prior to ETS by reason of physical disability (see below), sentence of general or special court-martial, or one of the administrative separation programs prescribed in *AR 635-200*. Both voluntary and involuntary administrative separation actions are outlined in *AR 635-200*.

Voluntary separations are initiated by the soldier. Reasons include hardship/ dependency, surviving family members, acceptance into an ROTC program, orders to active duty as an officer or warrant officer, defective enlistment, pregnancy, for the good of the service in lieu of trial by court-martial, and early separation when denied reenlistment. Soldiers who have tested positive for the HIV antibody may request discharge under Secretarial authority. Soldiers may also be allowed to separate early to further their education.

Commanders may initiate involuntary separation proceedings for parenthood, personality disorder, concealment of an arrest record, fraudulent or erroneous entry, alcohol or drug abuse rehabilitation failure, failure to meet body composition/weight control standards, entry-level performance and conduct, unsatisfactory performance, misconduct, or homosexual conduct. To separate a soldier involuntarily, the unit commander must notify the soldier in writing. Any involuntary separation action involving a soldier with six or more years of total active and reserve military service entitles the soldier to a hearing by an administrative separation board. If the soldier has 18 or more years, the board is mandatory and cannot be waived. Administrative discharges of soldiers with 18 or more years of Active Federal Service (AFS) must be approved at the Secretariat level.

Discharge certificates are furnished only to soldiers who are honorably discharged or discharged under honorable conditions. All soldiers leaving active duty are issued a DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty. The DD Form 214 documents the characterization of service, except when a soldier is separated

while in an entry-level status. Entry-level separations normally have service described as "uncharacterized." Honorable, general, and under other than honorable conditions characters of service are assigned administratively. Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges are issued upon conviction by a court-martial.

Enlisted Nondisability Retirement System.

To qualify for voluntary retirement, an enlisted soldier must be on active duty and have completed 20 or more years of AFS on the retirement date. A soldier who has completed 20 years, but less than 30 years AFS and who has completed all required service obligations may be retired at his or her request. Enlisted soldiers who have completed 30 years AFS have the vested right under law to retire and may not be denied. DA policy requires that all service obligations incurred by promotion, schooling, or PCS be completed prior to approval of voluntary retirement of soldiers with less than 30 years' service. However, a soldier may request waiver of a service obligation, and approval would depend upon whether the best interests of the Service are involved or whether a substantial hardship might exist should retirement be denied. Enlisted retirements are normally approved by field commanders of general officer rank. Enlisted soldiers retire in the grade they hold on the date of retirement unless they have 10 years active commissioned service. Additionally, enlisted soldiers who have completed 30 years combined active and retired list service may be eligible for advancement on the retired list to the highest grade held satisfactorily. Requests for grade determination are acted upon by HQDA.

Officer Nondisability Retirement System.

There are two types of retirement—voluntary and mandatory. To qualify for voluntary retirement, officers must have completed at least 20 years' AFS on their retirement date. All Service obligations incurred must be completed unless waived by HQDA. Mandatory retirement dates are established by law and only in very rare cases are individuals retained on active duty beyond these dates. LTCs and COLs may remain until 28 and 30 years respectively, unless involuntarily retired through the selective early retirement (SERB) process.

While MAJs and below must have served six months in their grade to retire at that grade, LTCs and COLs must normally serve three years in grade to retire in that grade. Some programs like the Voluntary Early Release and Retirement Program (VERRP) can waive one year of the three-year obligation, subject to a 2% limitation imposed by Congress. Officers who are selected by SERB retain their grade regardless of time held.

Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA).

The FY93 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the FY94 NDAA extended through FY99 a temporary additional management tool to draw down the force. TERA allowed members on active duty with 15 but less than 20 years service to retire early. This authority was used extensively during the drawdown, primarily for nonselect officers and those in overstrength skills or specialties.

Physical Disability Separation.

The laws governing physical disability separation from a military Service

provide for the retirement or separation with severance pay of a member who is determined to be unfit by reason of physical disability to perform the duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating. When a member, at the time of separation, is considered fit to perform his duties, he must be separated or retired under programs already discussed. It is possible, of course, to receive a nondisability separation and still have physical disabilities which could affect potential for civilian employment. In this instance, one may qualify for compensation for those disabilities from the Department of Veteran Affairs.

ARMY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

The thrust of the Army Equal Opportunity Program is firmly embedded in fundamental American values and the basic philosophical tenet on which effective leadership and the exercise of command is built. Army equal opportunity is resonant in leadership that is rooted in taking care of soldiers and is crucial to unit cohesion, readiness, and mission accomplishment.

Ensuring soldiers are treated with fairness, justice, and equity is central to an Army culture dedicated to the highest professional and personal standards, and to sustaining our most important resource—people. It is an underlying responsibility of leaders to ensure that soldiers and their families receive equal opportunity and treatment, without regard to race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, and are provided an environment free of sexual harassment.

Leaders are assisted in sustaining Army equal opportunity (EO) goals and objectives by an Equal Opportunity Adviser (EOA) at brigade level and above, and EO representatives (EOR) at battalion and company level. The EOA is a specially trained officer or NCO whose role is technical adviser to the commander. EOA positions are filled by NCOs/officers possessing the skills and knowledge characteristic of the units they will serve. EOAs are soldiers who possess military occupational specialties (MOSs) found in the brigade or installation to which they are assigned. Soldiers selected as EOAs receive 15 weeks of intensive training at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), receive a Skill Qualification Identifier or "Q", and then serve one special duty tour as an EOA, similar to that of a drill sergeant or recruiter. The EOA provides the commander a valuable subject matter resource for sustaining EO programs, training, and developing remedies to eliminate discriminatory practices or treatment.

SUMMARY

The primary purpose of the Military Personnel Management System is to satisfy valid Army requirements and, insofar as practicable, accommodate the legitimate needs of its members. The system is a complex, dynamic, multifaceted mosaic of interacting subsystems which interface in a variety of ways with all other major Army systems. A tremendous state of flux and uncertainty exists today as the Army transitions to a smaller, more flexible force. During this period of significant change, personnel decisions must be based on careful, comprehensive review and analyses from a holistic perspective. If this concept is not followed, serious, far-reaching second- and third-order effects could impact very negatively on the people in the Army, as well as the readiness of the force.

The processes designed to structure, acquire, train, educate, distribute, sustain, professionally develop, and separate soldiers

must be continuously evaluated and refined to ensure they support current and future Army requirements. The subsystems within these processes must have the flexibility to meet the needs of the Army not only as the force reduces in size, but also if expansion is required. Whether the Army is reducing or expanding, there are a few critical operating principles to guide decision makers as they choose between difficult, challenging options in either scenario: maintain force readiness at the prescribed levels; maintain quality in recruiting, retention, and development programs; make changes in a balanced and orderly way throughout all grades and specialties, both officer and enlisted; maintain current board selection functions to continue to build on the best; additionally, use boards to reduce the force as well as to offer recall; rely on Reserve Components; protect quality of life; and, finally, in order to reduce uncertainty, ensure there is an understandable, comprehensive plan.

This chapter was designed to provide a broad overview of the personnel management system in order to describe how the major processes are designed to interact. During the next several years the policies, functions, and processes within every one of the personnel management subsystems will be continuously challenged to ensure Army requirements are satisfied and to take care of its most important resource—people.

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CHAPTER 14

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The Total Army is more than a phrase; it is a fact. More and more, the Army has come to recognize how dependent mission performance is upon the Army civilian workforce. In September, 1996, for example, there were approximately 400 emergency-essential Army civilians deployed and working in Bosnia. In the words of the Honorable Sarah E. Lister, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs: "State-of-the-art technology and the downsizing of the Army force structure will increase the deployment of civilian employees in support of military missions."

Recent changes to the Civilian personnel management system are designed to better care for that important segment of the Total Army.

INTRODUCTION

The most important factor in effectively and efficiently managing the Army's soldiers and civilians is quality leadership. During the decade of the '90s the leaders of United States Army, military and civilian, are dealing with a host of personnel management and administrative challenges resulting from advancing technologies, force restructuring, declining resources, and many other significant issues. Civilians are an integral part of the Total Army team, comprising almost 22% of the active force. Commanders at all levels are responsible for leading them and accountable for their effective use.

Continued changes to the Civilian Personnel Management System will ensure (1) that the system more effectively supports commanders and (2) that the Army maintains a quality, balanced and representative work force, capable of meeting the challenges of an increasingly complex environment. These changes require commitment, innovation, vision, and a willingness to explore new ideas.

No attempt will be made in this chapter to examine all of the impending system changes. Rather the chapter presents the civilian personnel management system as it exists today and the merit principles upon which it is based.

One of the key changes in personnel administration is the concept of regionalizing civilian personnel servicing. It will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. This concept does not require any changes in the personnel management of civilians by their leaders.

U. S. ARMY

National Guard - 375,000

Local National Civilian - 27,000

US Civilian - 296,000

Reserve - 241,000

Active - 509,000

As of September 1996

TOTAL:
1.45 MILLION

Figure 14-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (DA) CIVILIANS

Civilians have been employed by the Army since the Revolutionary War. They are an integral part of the force utilized to accomplish today's multiple, complex missions. DA civilians include both appropriated and nonappropriated fund employees. As of September 1996, there were over 296,000 U.S. citizen and 27,000 foreign national employees paid from both appropriated and nonappropriated funds (Figure 14-1). Those civilians are employed in over 550 different occupations with the highest concentrations in logistics, research and development, and base operations functions. Civilians are excluded from positions which require military incumbents by law or for reasons of security, maintenance of military morale and discipline, combat readiness, or military training.

In order to better understand the management and administrative environment within which civilian personnel management systems operate, an understanding of the types of employees and

the rules and regulations that govern each of them is necessary. Because of different fund sources, laws, and regulations, personnel policies and practices differ for the various types of Army civilian employees.

Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilians.

The term appropriated fund (APF) refers to funds appropriated by the Congress of the United States. U.S. citizen employees paid from appropriated funds are managed within a structure of federal civil service laws. APF employees are further divided into two categories based on the nature of work performed. Military-function civilians perform support duties associated directly with the Army's National Military Strategy objectives. Civil-function civilians perform duties associated with the Army's Civil Works program. This program includes planning, design, construction, and operation and maintenance of projects to improve the nation's water resource infrastructure, e.g., navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power, plus other civil functions prescribed by law. The laws governing APF employees are administered by the Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Civilians.

NAF employees are paid from funds generated from sales, fees, and charges to authorized patrons. They are U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, usually from the local labor market, and U.S. forces' enlisted personnel working part-time during off-duty hours. All compete for employment on the basis of merit.

NAF employees play an important role in providing morale and recreation services to military personnel and their family members. Army clubs, guest houses, child care centers, craft shops, bowling centers, swimming pools, gymnasiums, and many other NAF activities employ a considerable number of employees at most Army installations.

AR 215-3: NAF - Personnel Policies and Procedures provides essential guidance applicable to DA NAF employees. Recently revised policies and procedures give line managers greater flexibility, maximum authority and responsibility to recruit, establish and determine qualifications (with limited exceptions), set pay, reward employees based on performance, and effect other personnel management actions. These include work force realignment, promotions, and discipline outside the traditional practices previously followed. Under these procedures, some authorities and responsibilities previously exercised by the civilian personnel officer shifted to line management with the former retaining advisory responsibility. Commanders are responsible to ensure the prudent and judicious use of any new authorities delegated to their line managers.

Foreign National Civilians.

The Army also employs local nationals in both APF and NAF positions in overseas areas. Federal law and Department of Defense (DOD) policy are consistent with requirements of the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) that form the basis of the employment systems for those employees. Within this framework, administration must be consistent with host country practice, U.S. law, and the management needs of the Army.

Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS).

CIPMS employees are U.S. citizens paid from appropriated funds. Unlike most other appropriated fund civilians, they are managed through an excepted personnel service administered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. CIPMS is a tri-Service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) personnel management system. There are currently approximately 3,700 civilians in the Army under this personnel system. The Army has included in CIPMS all employees in series and specialties with clear ties to intelligence wherever they are found. Good examples are Intelligence Specialists in the GS-132 and Security Specialists in the GS-080 series. The Army has also included all employees (except local nationals) in Commands that have a primary intelligence mission. Therefore you will find most professional and administrative career programs, as well as many of the administrative, technical and support series, represented in CIPMS in such commands as the Intelligence and Security Command. CIPMS is considered a part of the Army's overall civilian personnel program and has tested innovative personnel management features for the Army and the Department of Defense. *AR 690-13, Civilian*

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SYSTEM

MILITARY	CIVILIAN
• TITLE 10, USC	• TITLE 5, USC
• RANK IN PERSON	• RANK IN JOB
• RECRUITING-FILL FORCE STRUCTURE:	• RECRUITING-FILL FORCE POSITION VACANCY:
USAREC ROTC USMA	CDR/SUPERVISOR/CPO
• PROMOTION FROM WITHIN	• PROMOTION FROM WITHIN PLUS EXTERNAL RECRUITMENT
• CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT	• DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT
• MANDATORY MOBILITY	• VOLUNTARY MOBILITY (GENERALLY)
• TRAINING PRIMARILY FOR LEADERSHIP AND MILITARY SKILLS	• TRAINING PRIMARILY OCCUPATIONALLY ORIENTED

Figure 14-2

Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) Policies and Procedures is the controlling Army document for this system.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

DA civilians are recruited, utilized, developed, and sustained on a decentralized basis. There are approximately 111 Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers (CPACs), headed by a civilian personnel officer, supporting these functions at Army activities located throughout the world. In addition, there are 10 regional Civilian Personnel Operations Centers (CPOCs) and several Major Command (MACOM) staff personnel offices. In some cases civilian personnel may work for one command but receive personnel services from a CPAC/CPOC belonging to another command. Decentralized management of civilians is very different from the centralized management of military personnel (see Figure 14-2).

Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilians.

The Congress, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OSD, and HQDA establish and modify manpower controls on civilian employees. The type of control used at a given time is dictated by legislation or administrative directive. Prior to FY 85, Congress assigned DOD a civilian end strength ceiling which limited the number of civilians that could be employed on the last day of the fiscal year. The most significant problem inherent in end strength management was the inefficient practice of removing employees near the end of the fiscal year and rehiring them at the beginning of the new fiscal year. To eliminate this practice, Congress prohibited end strength ceiling management in DOD in FY 85, but was quite clear in stating its desire that DOD

closely manage the number of civilians employed.

During the budget year, supervisors have broad choices in determining the types of civilian employees that will be hired. They may hire employees on a permanent appointment, or on a temporary appointment. The latter may be terminated at any time or extended in one-year increments up to four years depending on workload requirements. Permanent or temporary employees may be hired on work schedules ranging from full-time (40 hours per week) to part-time (16-32 hours per week) or intermittent (as needed). While most civilians are full-time employees with permanent appointments, the variety of appointments and work schedules enables the supervisor to tailor his/her civilian workforce to unique workload situations.

Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Civilians.

NAF staffing controls are based solely on the ability to pay the number of positions deemed necessary to ensure successful mission accomplishment. Under this concept, the local activity manager develops and maintains a NAF Personnel Requirements Document (PRD). The PRD, which requires both labor and costs schedules, is also aligned with the annual operating budget process. Approved positions and attendant funding become the basis for supervisors to fill vacant positions.

There are only two appointment categories, regular and flexible, and NAF supervisors have broad choices in determining the types of employees that will be hired. They may hire employees in continuing positions on a regular full-time or part-time appointment, with the latter group working a minimum 20-hour week. They may also hire employees in indefinite positions on a flexible appointment on either a scheduled or an as-needed basis. There are no upper limits to the number of hours a flexible employee may work.

Supervisors may also designate regular full-time and part-time positions as "limited tenure" in order to facilitate meeting special work requirements that are expected to last a minimum of one year, are known to be non-permanent, and will cease to be needed upon completion of the project or a projected period of time.

FEDERAL AND ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Department of the Army.

The President has delegated authority to agency heads under *Executive Order (EO) 9830* to act in civilian personnel matters in accordance with policies, program requirements, standards, and instructions. This authority is delegated from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army (SA) and includes all aspects of civilian personnel management, e.g., appointment, placement, and promotion, separation, performance appraisal, position management and classification, training and development, conduct and discipline, grievances, leave, relationships with employee organizations, employee services and working conditions, incentive awards, career management, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), and mobilization planning. The SA has assigned full responsibility for civilian personnel management within the Army to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, ASA(M&RA).

Figure 14-3

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy)(DASA [CPP]).

Responsibility for developing and implementing Army civilian personnel policy and program guidance is assigned to the DASA (CPP), Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA[MRA]), per AR 10-20. (See Figure 14-3)

The U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency (USACPEA).

USACPEA is a field operating agency of the ASA(M&RA) responsible for conducting civilian personnel management and administration and EEO program surveys and special reviews Army-wide. The purpose of these surveys and special reviews is to fulfill the Secretary of the Army's oversight responsibility by assessing program effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance. These actions are carried out throughout the Army in both the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.

Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

OPM is the central personnel agency of the Executive Branch with delegation of authority from the President to administer most federal laws and Executive Orders dealing with all aspects of personnel administration and related subjects. Some laws and Executive Orders place certain

personnel management responsibilities directly on agency/department heads, subject to OPM policy and review. In other cases, OPM has authority by statute or delegation to establish specific program standards and regulate and control the means of carrying out major aspects of agency/department personnel management.

OPM develops proposals for federal personnel legislation and Executive Orders; develops and publishes specific policies, procedures, and regulations implementing federal personnel laws and Presidential Directives; provides testing, evaluation, and referral of job applicants to agencies; evaluates agency personnel management systems; provides advice and assistance to agencies in developing effective personnel management programs; develops standards by which jobs are classified (title, job series, and grade); administers retirement, health, and life insurance programs; and adjudicates position classification appeals.

Merit guides OPM and the Army, in policy development and operational support within the personnel system. Nine merit principles governing all personnel practices are in the law:

- Recruitment from all segments of society, and selection and advancement determined solely on the basis of ability, knowledge and skills after fair and open competition.
- Fair and equitable treatment of all employees and applicants in all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or disabling condition and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights.
- Equal pay for substantially equal work within each local pay area, in keeping with work and performance distinctions.
- High standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest.
- Efficient and effective use of federal employees. Retention of employees based on the adequacy of their performance.
- Effective education and training when it would result in better organizational and individual performance.
- Protection against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes. Prohibition against employees using their official authority or influence to interfere with elections or nominations for election.
- Protection against reprisal for lawful disclosures of information on violations of laws, and/or mismanagement ("whistleblower" protection).

OPM executes, administers, and enforces civil service rules and regulations through audits, reviews and inspections. Failure on the part of agencies to observe the prescribed standards, requirements, and instructions may result in the withdrawal of personnel management authority delegated by OPM.

In addition to internal OPM controls and procedures, three separate, independent federal agencies provide oversight to ensure that the principles of merit, labor relations guarantees, and equal employment rights are adhered to.

U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB monitors the civil service system and hears and decides appeals of adverse actions. It can order corrective and disciplinary actions against an agency or an employee when it finds abuse of the merit principles.

The Office of Special Counsel serves as an investigator and prosecutor before the MSPB for statutorily defined prohibited personnel practices and Hatch Act violations. It also provides a secure channel through which information evidencing a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety may be disclosed without fear of retaliation and without disclosure of identity except with the employee's consent (whistleblower allegations).

Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA administers the federal service labor-management relations program; resolves questions of union representation of employees; prosecutes and adjudicates allegations of unfair labor practices; decides questions of what is or is not negotiable, and reviews certain kinds of decisions of arbitrators on appeal.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) develops guidance for and monitors federal agencies in development and implementation of affirmative action employment programs to increase the representation of minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities; develops policy and provides guidance to federal agencies on the processing of EEO complaints; conducts hearings on complaints of discrimination; issues recommended decisions to agencies; and evaluates program effectiveness. EEOC has implemented the EEO program by issuing policies and guidelines setting forth the responsibilities of individual agencies.

DOD Office of Complaint Investigation (OCI).

OCI investigates and recommends resolutions to EEO complaints and formal employee grievances not covered by negotiated grievance procedures which have not been resolved at the installation/activity level. Upon request, OCI can serve as a third party appellate review level for nonappropriated fund employees in NAF EEO cases. In a complex formal grievance of an NAF employee, or a formal grievance of an APF employee under the Administrative Grievance System, the deciding official may elect to purchase the service of the OCI to review the facts and make recommendations to him.

Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC).

CFSC is a field operating agency of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), HQDA. CFSC's mission is to develop and administer systems and programs for the Army family and community activities, including morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities and child development centers. The CFSC administers a central referral program for specified MWR managerial jobs (both APF and NAF).

Intelligence Personnel Management Office (IPMO).

The IPMO is a subordinate office of the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT), Headquarters,

Department of the Army. It serves as the focal point in the Army for the management of the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) and reports jointly to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy). It maintains liaison with the rest of the federal intelligence and civilian personnel management communities on civilian personnel management issues, develops policies and programs, and develops and provides civilian personnel management training and guidance. The IPMO also provides personnel management advice and assistance to the approximately eighty operating civilian personnel offices, Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers and Civilian Personnel Operations Centers that, in turn, provide personnel servicing to CIPMS organizations.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT REGIONALIZATION

Two major changes in the management of Army Civilians became necessary because: the status quo was unaffordable; there were extensive workplace reductions and commitment to the need to streamline/economize operations; customer service needed to improve more; and automation capability needed to be maximized. These two changes, regionalization and automation, are co-dependent. Regionalization will not be successful without responsive automation systems.

Two acronyms are used extensively in regionalization. The terms "Civilian Personnel Operating Centers" (CPOCs) and "Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers" (CPACs) taken together describe the delivery systems for civilian personnel management and administration. The functional split between CPOC/CPAC typically is: advisory functions requiring face-to-face interaction between personnel specialists and managers/employees reside at the CPAC (installation/activity); and processing/automation-intensive functions are centralized at the CPOC (region).

The important point to remember is that the Commander/Manager/Supervisor responsibility for personnel management is unchanged. Only the administrative support functions have been moved. With that as a backdrop, the following will describe the organization for service delivery and some of the automation initiatives supporting Regionalization and Systems Modernization.

The Army has established 10 geographically based regions. The regional service centers are "Civilian Personnel Operations Centers" (CPOCs) and the customer service units are "Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers" (CPACs). Three Army regions are outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) and seven are in the Continental United States. The CPOC OCONUS locations are: Europe Region-Seckenheim, Germany; Pacific Region-Fort Richardson, Alaska; and Korea Region-Taegu, Korea. Seven regions are in the Continental United States (CONUS): Southeast Region-Fort Benning, Georgia; National Capital Region-Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Southwest Region-Fort Riley, Kansas; Northeast Region-Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; North Central Region-Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; South Central Region-Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and, the Western Region, location to be announced. The Army's ten regions will include approximately 111 CPACs. This number does not include excepted locations such as control sites. The final number may differ based on variables such as base realignments and closures (BRAC).

The OCONUS CPOCs and CPACs currently remain the assets of the overseas Army Major Commands (MACOMs). The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)(ASA(M&RA)) owns and controls the CONUS CPOCs. MACOM/installation commanders own/control CONUS CPACs. Traditionally, civilian personnel administration responsibilities in the Army have been carried out by installation civilian personnel officers designated to "act for" commanders who have delegated personnel management and appointing authority. Under Regionalization, the CPAC and CPOC chiefs exercise the "act for" authority with respect to all functions for which they are responsible in accordance with the approved regional transition plan and operating procedures, subject to any limitations or conditions that remain in effect in a servicing or support agreement.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION

As stated earlier, the regionalization of civilian personnel administration is dependent on the successful implementation of an integrated suite and regional applications of automated systems. The key applications are:

- PERSACTION which initiates, transports, and completes personnel actions. It replaces a mostly manual process. It was designed to electronically transport and track the requests for personnel action (SF 52s) from the manager through all review and approval stops to the CPOC where the action is processed and updated. Normal users would be those offices through which a paper SF 52

passes: managers, budget office, manpower office, security office, CPOC and CPAC. PERSACTION tracks each SF 52 so that the current status of each action can be monitored, and it provides consolidated management information reports to measure program effectiveness. After all coordinations and approvals, PERSACTION prepares a personnel action (SF 50) to document the personnel action taken and provides updated personnel action data to the central file.

- COREDOC is a desktop computer application that produces a single core document that integrates a position description, a performance plan, basic training competencies, and knowledge skills and abilities (KSAs) for recruitment. Its primary focus is on providing managerial access to a centrally controlled repository of occupational information which allows the manager to classify positions, develop recruitment criteria (KSAs), establish training requirements, and create performance plans.

- TRAIN which is the application for the management and administration of DOD civilian workforce training and development programs. TRAIN is an interactive computer application that electronically flows training requests to predetermined stops thus eliminating the need for manual processing and transmission of

the request. TRAIN's current automated capabilities include initiating training requests, scheduling training from an automated course catalog, certifying training completions and evaluating completed training by both the supervisor and employee. TRAIN also provides users capability to generate on-line training accomplishment reports. Although TRAIN is designed to initiate payment for the training, the interface with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) has not yet been developed.

- The Regional Application Module of the Integrated Suite is the central data repository and source each of the functional areas will use to obtain information about employees and positions within their assigned access levels. This application contains information about awards, training, pay and leave, benefits, and all position and personal employee data normally found in the Official Personnel Folder (OPF). The operational concept is that the OPF can remain on the shelf and the CPOC, CPAC, managers and employees can gain access to the data they require without actually going to the paper file.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AT INSTALLATION/ACTIVITY LEVEL

Day-to-day leadership of Army Civilians resides primarily at installations and activities. Within the framework described in the preceding paragraphs, the SA has delegated personnel management authority to major commanders with authority to further delegate to commanders of independent field activities. Thus, the actual management of DA civilians is decentralized to installation/activity commanders and local managers.

Commander's Responsibilities.

Installation commanders are responsible for leading and managing civilian employees, and are accountable through the chain of command (MACOMs) for their effective use. Responsible commanders develop and utilize subordinate supervisors, managers, and the CPAC staff to establish a work environment for positive employee motivation and high performance. Specific responsibilities of the Commanders are to:

- provide the civilian personnel service and assistance necessary to obtain, compensate, develop, use, and retain an effective civilian work force,
- guarantee equality of opportunity in the organizational units serviced,
- develop and maintain a local civilian personnel program implementing OPM, DOD, Department of the Army, command and installation policies, programs, and legal and other regulatory requirements,
- coordinate personnel management requirements and needs of the organizations serviced,
- provide information and staff assistance and guidance to managers and supervisors to assist them in obtaining the most effective use of civilians through

improved management, and,

– create labor-management partnerships by forming labor-management committees or councils at appropriate levels, provide systematic training of appropriate agency employees, including union representatives who are federal employees, in consensual methods of dispute resolution, such as alternate dispute resolution techniques and interest-based bargaining approaches.

SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES.

Commanders delegate authority for leading and managing civilian employees to subordinate managers and supervisors. This carries with it specific responsibilities:

- Manage positions by structure and work assignments.
- Recruit, select, and assign employees.
- Evaluate employee performance, and train and develop employees.
- Administer award and incentive programs.
- Maintain management-employee communications.
- Administer constructive discipline.
- Maintain a positive labor-management relations program.

Supervisor responsibilities in each of these areas and the system established to assist them in carrying out these responsibilities are described below.

While the Army has no formal civilian mentoring program the mentoring of civilians is encouraged at all levels. Mentoring in the context of civilian employee development focuses on enhancing the employee's career competitive status and on developing the skills, knowledge and abilities required by the organization to carry out assigned missions and functions. Mentoring can enhance the career of the one being mentored, but also has a beneficial effect on the mentor.

Manage Positions by Structure and Work Assignments.

Position Structures. The supervisor is responsible for designing position structures that provide the most effective mix of skills and grade levels necessary to accomplish assigned missions and functions. A key factor in this process is the need to achieve economical structures, e.g., concentrating higher-level duties in the fewest possible positions and establishing a proper ratio of support positions to professional positions. The key is quality and long-term mission accomplishment. Through effective design, the employee is satisfied and the mission is accomplished, thereby ensuring the organization gets the most for the investment.

Position Classification and Pay for APF Positions. Individual positions are classified by comparison with the appropriate classification standards or guides. These are developed by OPM, based on comprehensive occupational studies of representative work found in the federal service. The general principle underlying the standards system and classification is that of "equal pay for substantially equal work." Because Army regulations assign responsibility for maintaining accurate job descriptions to supervisors, DA issues standard job descriptions for common positions throughout the Army for use if they adequately describe locally assigned duties.

Differences in pay must be attributed to differences in the difficulty, responsibility, and skill requirements of jobs.

Most positions are covered by the following pay systems: General Schedule (GS), covers white-collar workers in professional, administrative, technical, clerical, and protective occupations; and, Federal Wage System (FWS) covers blue-collar workers in trades, crafts, labor, and similar occupations. Salary rates for most GS positions are based on nationwide locality surveys conducted by the Department of Labor. For positions with unusual recruitment and retention problems, OPM can authorize special salary rates. Federal Wage System rates are established based on locality wage surveys of private industry conducted by federal agencies in accordance with OPM policies.

Position Classification and Pay for NAF Positions. The DOD NAF pay band system is a major difference in the APF and NAF rules that govern employee classification and pay. It is easier for managers to reward high performing NAF employees, both financially and professionally. The DOD pay band system includes all NAF clerical, administrative, sales, technical, managerial, executive, professional, and personal service positions, exclusive of child caregiving and crafts and trades positions.

The DOD pay band system does not use discrete standards to allocate duties to a pay level. Qualification requirements, however, are developed by supervisors and incorporated in standard position/grade guides. While OPM, DOD, and other classification standards may be used as guides, the use of OPM Qualifications Handbook is mandatory for those pay band positions that have a positive education requirement. Similarly, supervisors may not develop separate qualification requirements for crafts and trades positions listed in the governing Army regulation, or child caregiving personnel positions governed by the Army caregiving personnel pay program (described later in this section).

The six pay bands, referred to as pay levels and identified using codes NF-1 through NF-6, have minimum and maximum pay rates that are overlapping. The minimum and maximum rates for the first two levels and minimum only for level NF-3 are determined by locality-based wage surveys of comparable private sector jobs. Conversely, the maximum rates for NF-3 and rates for NF-4 through NF-6 are related to the Federal schedule (GS) and Senior Executive Service (SES) pay range.

Child caregiving pay band positions are covered by a separate pay band system implemented in consonance with the DA caregiving personnel pay program. There are two pay bands, also referred to as pay levels, and they are distinctly identified through use of terms "Pay Band I" or "Pay Band II." The range in pay for child caregiving pay band positions is equal to the hourly rate of pay for a GS-2, Step 1, through GS-5, Step 10, and pay rates prescribed for GS child caregiving positions also apply.

Crafts and trades positions are not affected by pay banding. Pay is determined through the prevailing rate system used for those positions covered under the Federal Wage System (FWS).

Position Classification and pay for Foreign national positions. These Positions are generally not included in either of the pay systems described above. Employees in these positions are paid under local host-nation pay scales and conditions.

Recruit, Select, and Assign Employees.

All personnel selection decisions must be made without regard to political, religious, or labor organization affiliations, marital status, race, color, sex, national origin, non-disqualifying physical disability, or age. Decisions must be based solely on job-related criteria identified through job analysis. Managers filling the jobs participate with CPAC staffs in identifying the knowledge, skills, and abilities which candidates must possess to be considered for placement into the position.

Before an activity can recruit for a vacancy through a merit promotion vacancy announcement, checks must be made to determine if there are any employees entitled to statutory or priority placement rights to the vacancy, e.g., employees who are scheduled to be or have been separated through reduction in force procedures. If such an employee is available and fully qualified for the vacancy, he/she usually must be offered the position. Provided there are no fully qualified priority candidates, normal recruitment may proceed.

The area in which the activity makes a search for eligible candidates in a specific promotion action must be sufficiently broad to ensure the availability of high-quality candidates. Moreover, all candidates must meet minimum qualification standards.

Management has the right to consider candidates from all appropriate sources, including merit promotion, reinstatement and transfer eligibles, Veterans Readjustment Appointment Authority eligibles, individuals with severe physical or mental disabilities, family member eligibles under EO 12721, and those certified as eligible for appointment by OPM or under a delegated examining authority. In deciding which sources to tap, consideration should be given to those which are expected to produce candidates who will meet the agency's mission requirements, contribute new ideas and viewpoints, and meet the agency's affirmative action goals. Recruitment sources also encompass special employment programs, e.g., summer employment, cooperative education, upward mobility, and stay-in-school programs.

The Civilian Personnel Operations Center (CPOC) maintains certain records and furnishes necessary information to employees and the public, while protecting the individual's right to privacy. These records are sufficient for the total reconstruction of all merit promotion actions and are retained for five years. These records form the basis for MACOM, HQDA, or OPM evaluation of activity promotion programs, and are vital in investigations of grievances/EEO complaints and evaluation of affirmative action progress.

CPAC's in conjunction with managers and supervisors, develop and maintain professional civilian staffing programs designed to: ensure the systematic selection of candidates according to merit and EEO principles; implement policies and procedures to ensure a search for and identification of the best qualified candidates; and ensure technical competence of everyone involved in all phases of the candidate evaluation process.

Evaluate Employee Performance and Administer Awards/Incentives Programs.

Managers and supervisors use performance management to improve organizational effectiveness in accomplishing mission and goals through highly-motivated, well-informed, technically-competent individuals. The following Army civilian performance

management programs assist in this endeavor:

- Performance planning and evaluation programs for SES, GS, FWS, and NAF employees.
- Base pay adjustment policy and procedures for all civilian employees. (SES pay increase; GS and FWS within-grade increase; NAF pay increase.)
- Cash and honorary awards programs to recognize significant individual and group contributions. (SES performance bonus; GS and FWS performance award; GS Quality Step Increase; Time off and honorary awards set forth in the Army Incentive Awards regulation, AR 672-20.)
- Policy and procedures for dealing with employees who fail to meet performance expectations.

As with the military performance evaluation systems, the civilian evaluation process is designed to enhance supervisory/employee communications and day-to-day relationships to improve total Army performance. At the beginning of each rating period, the rating chain and the employee agree to job requirements and develop a performance plan for the year. The performance plan should reflect the organization's mission and goals and the duties and responsibilities set forth in the individual position description. The performance plan may change during the year with changes in mission and priorities. At the end of the rating period, the rating chain compares the individual's contributions to the requirements in the performance plan and renders an overall summary rating. Another tool which may be used is rating as a team member. The summary rating is used to adjust base pay (SES only), make promotion and training decisions, document justification for performance-based cash awards, and give additional years' service credit in a reduction in force. The evaluation process is also used to assist employees who experience performance problems to improve to an expected level or to document removal from the position if the employee fails to improve after being given a formal opportunity to do so. The keys to successful performance management are frequent, two-way communication and timely, appropriate action to either recognize superior contributions or correct inferior performance.

Train and Develop Employees.

Managers and supervisors working with the CPAC, define training requirements. Based on these requirements, the CPOC develops and maintains training programs that involve all types of training activities in support of employee and organizational performance and mission accomplishment, upward mobility, managerial capability, and career development. The CPOC, in coordination with CPAC and management, also develops, coordinates, and administers training and development programs responsive to the immediate and long-range needs and goals of the activity, the major command, and Department of the Army.

Training Programs. Training categories cover a broad field from "executive and management" to "adult basic education." Within these, training can be classified as either short- or long-term (120 days or more). Training needs can be met in

Civilian Career Program Strength
As of September 30, 1996

Phys Security 505

Safety Mgmt: 966

Information Mission Area: 12037

Ammo Surv: 494

Ammo Mgmt: 896

Trans Mgmt: 1071

Housing Mgmt: 497

EEO: 425

Manpower & Force Mgmt: 1837

Education Svcs: 665

Q&RA: 932

Intell: 2149

Public Affairs: 822

Engr & Sci (RC): 16474

91,390

Training: 4389

Comptroller: 10300

Civ Pers Admin: 2403

Control&Acq: 5903

Engr & Sci (NC): 16030

Material Maint Mgmt: 6766

Supply Mgmt: 5829

Figure 14-4

a variety of ways to include use of on-the-job training at local activities, Army schools, DOD schools, interagency schools, formal schools, and a host of other government and nongovernment sources. AR 215-1 through AR 215-3 establish training requirements for morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities, inclusive of NAF personnel, which can be met largely through training courses sponsored or conducted by the CFSC Training Center.

Career Management System. To establish basic policies and program requirements for the intake, assignment, training, and development of employees in designated occupations, the Army developed a civilian career management system (AR 690-950). This system supports supervisors in recruiting candidates for long-term career opportunities and insuring a steady flow of capable, fully-qualified, and trained personnel for Army positions in more than 20 civilian career professional, technical, and administrative fields. The relative strength in these fields is shown in Figure 14-4.

The career management system provides clear lines of progression to successively more responsible positions and a coordinated training and development program for occupational specialties, using both Army and outside facilities. Procedures are provided for counseling employees; planning individual development programs;

and appraising employee knowledges, skills, and abilities for advancement.

New employees participate in planned work or rotational assignments designed to develop technical and leadership competencies to prepare for future managerial responsibilities. A central inventory of career program registrants is maintained at HQDA and specified MACOMs to provide referral consideration to employees at the DA-wide mandatory referral level (generally for vacancies at grades GS-12 through GS-15). Inventories for vacancies below the DA-wide mandatory referral level may also be maintained at designated MACOM headquarters (generally for GS-11 vacancies). The central referral system provides selecting officials with the names and necessary information about employees who can be considered for selection to fill a career program position.

The above procedures apply to APF personnel and includes APF MWR personnel. A somewhat simplified central referral program is in effect for other NAF personnel. CFSC is the Executive Agent for maintaining a central roster of NAF pay band employees eligible for level NF-3 and above positions. Outside applicants may also register in the program. This central referral system also provides selecting officials with names and information about employees who are interested in being considered for a given NAF position.

Army Personnel Proponent System (Civilians). The Army Personnel Proponent System integrates civilians into pertinent career fields and aligns them with appropriate Personnel Proponents. The Personnel Proponents are responsible for the overall personnel life-cycle management of their respective career fields. The life-cycle structure includes the following functions:

structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development, and separation. The initiative was approved for implementation in three phases. The final phase encompassed the publication of AR 600-3 and Army-wide incorporation of civilians into the system.

Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS). ACTEDS is a relatively new career management initiative. This system blends progressive and sequential work assignments and formal training for the Army's civilian employees as they progress from entry to senior-level positions. It provides a structured approach to technical, professional, and leadership training similar to that currently used by the military. ACTEDS has been implemented in all existing career programs (approximately 91,000 civilians).

In FY 97 ACTEDS plans will be available to Army civilians via the World Wide Web. As existing plans are updated, they will be replaced on the web and newly created plans will be added. ACTEDS plans are being automated presently so that all Army installations will have access to them. With this road map and easy access to it, supervisors will know what training and development a civilian employee should have for future progression and when it should be provided.

Operational Assignments. As the Army begins to adjust to the results of its downsizing efforts, it becomes even more essential that graduates of training, especially long-term training, are assigned to positions which most fully utilize those newly acquired or enhanced skills, knowledge, and abilities. The Army is developing an assignment

system which seeks to match the skills of graduating senior service college students with appropriate vacancies Army-wide.

Communication, Discipline, and Labor-Management relations. Supervisors are responsible for participating fully in the development and implementation of policies in these areas: contributing to the negotiations and administration of labor-management agreements; communicating management objectives, decisions, and viewpoints to their subordinates; and communicating their subordinates' views to higher-level management. Supervisors must analyze problems, develop solutions, and evaluate the results of decisions. The CPAC is responsible for assisting management in day-to-day relations with regard to employee performance, discipline, individual adverse actions, effective use of recognition and awards, labor-management-employee communications, administration of leave, hours of work, and monitoring of health and safety conditions.

If an employee believes that his or her rights have been denied, or that improper procedures have been followed, or that an action taken by management is unwarranted, he or she may utilize appropriate forums for relief. MSPB may be used for adverse actions (except a short suspension, i.e., 14 days or less) and subsequently the Courts may be used. Short suspensions and reprimands may be contested through the Army grievance system (*AR 690-700, Chap 771*) or negotiated grievance procedures.

The grievance procedure sets forth specific steps to be followed for resolving employee dissatisfaction with any aspect of working conditions, working relationships, or employment status. Army policy encourages timely resolution locally; however, grievances can be escalated in the local chain of command to a factfinder, or, if under a negotiated grievance procedure, to arbitration.

Negotiated grievance procedures are outlined in labor contracts which are jointly developed by management and the local labor union that is granted exclusive recognition to represent all employees in the unit (whether the employees are union members or not). The legal basis for the labor-management relations program for federal employees is *Chapter 71, 5 U.S.C.*. The law states that labor organizations (unions) and collective bargaining are in the public interest and establishes the rights and obligations of employees, unions, and agency management. *AR 215-3* provides the framework for addressing labor-management relations for NAF employees.

Supervisors are obliged to maintain a willingness to bargain collectively with labor organizations. Despite earnest efforts, there may be a time when an impasse will result, and if both parties fail to resolve their differences, the law provides for a neutral third party to resolve the impasse. This is the job of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP). The FMCS assists the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement. Failing this, the FSIP may impose a settlement on the parties.

Executive Order 12871, Labor-Management Partnerships, signed by President Clinton on 1 October 1993, among other things, requires agencies to establish partnerships at appropriate levels; involve employees and their union representatives as full partners with management to identify problems and craft solutions to better serve the agency's customers and mission; train employees and union representatives in alternative dispute resolution and interest-based bargaining techniques; and negotiate

over the formerly permissive subjects set forth in *5 U.S.C., 7106(b)(1)* of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. Management should strive to ensure that nonadversarial labor-management relationships are nurtured so mission accomplishment is enhanced rather than inhibited by the labor relations process. Although the Executive Order requires that agencies bargain over these permissive subjects, the reserved management rights contained in *5 U.S.C., 7106(a)* may not be bargained away. Specific guidance concerning the bargaining obligation should be obtained from the CPAC.

Management is also responsible for:

- negotiating in good faith regarding conditions of employment (i.e., personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions);
- furnishing official time to union representatives for negotiating collective-bargaining agreements and for other representational purposes as provided for by negotiated agreement;
- deducting union dues from the pay of eligible employees who authorize such deductions and allotting those deductions to recognized unions;
- notifying recognized unions and giving them the opportunity to be present at formal discussions between management and one or more employees; and
- allowing the union the opportunity to be represented at any examination of an employee pursuant to an investigation if the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action and if the

employee requests representation (*Weingarten Right*).

Certain ground rules are established to safeguard the basic intent of the law. The previously discussed FLRA is an independent regulatory agency headed by three members appointed by the President. The Authority is the central policymaking body of the federal labor-management relations program. It decides representation questions (whether a union should represent certain groups of employees), hears negotiability appeals (whether there is an obligation to negotiate on certain matters), adjudicates Unfair Labor Practices (ULPs) (a violation of the provisions of Title VII), and hears some appeals of arbitrators' awards.

Civilian Personnel Officer (CPO) Responsibilities. The CPO is the designee of the installation/activity commander and as head of the CPAC, is responsible for administering the civilian personnel management program (see Figure 14-5). This does not include the commander's overall responsibility for leadership. The Civilian Personnel Officer has the responsibility for development, implementation, maintenance, and evaluation of personnel programs designed to assist supervisors with their personnel management responsibilities and achieve activity mission objectives. The CPO interprets personnel policies and regulations and provides guidance and assistance in personnel matters in his or her assigned areas of responsibility. The CPO must seek to ensure that management actions affecting civilian employees will enhance the Army's reputation as a good and fair employer, ensure employee productivity, support EEO, and maintain effective community relations. Within this framework, the CPO is responsible for technical reviews

Figure 14-5

to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. In addition to the above, the CPO advises management and employees on benefits, e.g., health insurance, life insurance, and retirement; prepares reports; provides information support; and administers the compensation program.

These responsibilities would also apply to NAF activities at installations where commanders opted to more closely monitor those activities. However, for many functions, e.g., recruitment, classification and pay, etc., the CPO's role would be more advisory in nature at installations where commanders opted to delegate more authority and accountability for these functions to line managers.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

While it has long been the policy of the Federal Government to provide EEO on the basis of merit and fitness, the *EEO Act of 1972 (as amended), Public Law 1614,* and the *Civil Rights Act of 1991* placed federal employees and agencies under the equal employment provisions of *Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*. The *EEO Act of 1972* made it unlawful to discriminate in federal employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The *Equal Pay Act of 1963* made it unlawful to pay a different rate to members of either sex for equal work on jobs that require substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. The *Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967* prohibits discrimination based on age. The *Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990* prohibits discrimination based on mental or physical disability in an employment situation.

The authority for EEO in the Army is delegated to the SA who has designated the ASA(M&RA) as the Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. On the staff of the Assistant Secretary are two agencies responsible for separate aspects of the EEO program for civilians. The Equal Employment Opportunity Agency (EEOA) is responsible for developing DA policy,

guidance, and management of the affirmative action program, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review Agency (EEOCCRA) develops and administers DA EEO complaints decisions and ensures compliance with the DA complaints policy and regulations as well as DA and EEOC complaints decisions.

Commanders are provided advice and assistance for program implementation by an EEO Officer. Army activities are responsible for development of Affirmative Employment Program (AEP) plans for minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities in accordance with guidance provided by the EEOC and DA. The CPAC normally takes the lead in development of the AEP plan at an installation for individuals with disabilities, and the EEO Officer takes the lead in the development of the plan for minorities and women. Commanders are responsible for leadership of affirmative action programs for minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities and for the administration of the discrimination complaint system for all serviced and tenant organizations.

The Discrimination Complaint Process. Complaints may be filed by an employee or applicant who believes he or she has been discriminated against because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, physical or mental handicap, age, and/or reprisal in an employment matter subject to control in DA. Complaints may also be filed in DA by employees from other federal agencies receiving Army support through a servicing agreement (Figure 14-6).

Commanders should understand that the commander's decision-making options are essentially removed as soon as a formal complaint is filed. Once a complaint of discrimination has been filed, the only option available is to resolve the complaint or allow the investigation to proceed. The investigative process requires that investigative results be provided to Department of the Army, Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review Agency (EEOCCRA). The EEOCCRA makes the determination on whether to accept the recommendation by the investigative agency (i.e., Department of Defense, Office of Complaints Investigation (OCI) or the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently directs the installation commander to initiate any necessary corrective actions.

The procedure does not apply to employees or applicants of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service or to non-United States' citizens employed by DA outside the United States. Specific procedures are described in *AR 690-600: Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints.*

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established on July 13, 1979 and brought to fruition over 40 years of efforts to create a separate system for top civilian executives within the federal civilian service. Members of the SES are not in the competitive service like most other civilians. The SES was designed to ensure that the executive management of the government is responsive to the needs, policies, and goals of the nation.

INDIVIDUAL DISCRIMINATION
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
(AR 690-600 Complaint Process)

within 45 days } Incident giving rise to complaint.
*complainant contacts EEO counselor. (2-2a.) [1]

within 5 working days } *EEO counselor provided to complainant. (2-2a.(2))

within 30 days } *Counseling terminated [2] (2-2d.(1))   If successful --- { case closed

{ up to 60 days } Counseling period extended (2-2d.(1))

within 15 days } *Complainant files formal complaint with the Army after receipt of Rights Notice. (2-3a.)

{ within 15 days } Complainant responds to EEO Officer's request for specificity (2-6a.(1))

within 5 days } *Complaint accepted or rejected. (2-6a.(5))   If rejected--- { case closed

within 3 days } EEO Officer requests assignment of OCI investigator. (2-7a.)

within 120 days } *Investigation undertaken. OCI issues Report of Investigation. (2-9a.)

within 3 work days or 180 days from filing } *EEO Officer forwards Notice and Investigative File to complainant. (2-9a.)

within 30 days } *Complainant elects EEOC hearing.

(If complainant fails to elect, case forwarded to 36th day to EEOCCRA.) (2-12c.)   final decision --- (2-12a. and b.)   { within 60 days final Army decision

within 5 days } Request EEOC Administrator Judge (2-13a.)
*Administrative Law Judge appointed.

within 180 days } *Personal appearance hearing.
*Findings and recommended decision by EEOC AJ to EEOCCRA. (29 C.F.R. 1614.109(g))

within 60 days } *Final Army decision issued after receipt form EEOC AJ. (2-15a.(2))

* Indicates points where complainant is advised of complaint status.
1 References are to appropriate paragraph of revised edition of AR 690-600.
2 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) may be inserted here.

Figure 14-6

The Office of Personnel Management establishes the policies and quotas for SES positions. OSD and DA request quotas and use the allocated spaces. Army has 254 spaces for FY 96. This quota system does not limit the number of civilian positions that are needed, but limits the number of positions which may be filled at the SES level. SES positions are positions above the GS-15 level and salaries are in the same range as General Officer salaries.

The Army's authorized SES positions include a broad range of occupational series. Fifty-eight percent are in the fields of engineering and science. Command distribution of SES members shows that AMC, having the largest civilian population in the Army, also has the largest population of SES members, 36%; the Secretariat has 18%; USACE has 15%; the ARSTAF has 11%; and other MACOMs combined have 20% (see Figure 14-7) About half of the Army's SES positions are located in the National Capital Region. In the last two years, over 90% of the appointees to the Army's SES positions were current Army employees.

The Secretary of the Army delegated responsibility for the SES program to ASA (M&RA) who is assisted by a Civilian Executive Resources Board (CERB), committee of Secretary and ARSTAF-level executives and General Officers. By law and regulation, the CERB must be involved in hiring, promotion, and executive development. In the Army it has taken on broad policy and program management and oversight. A CERB Operations Committee (CERBOC) gives operational and procedural support to the CERB in SES matters and assists in developing the Army's programs for major issues involving civilian employees in grades GS-13 to 15. The CERBOC members are principal deputies to the CERB members, or represent the ARSTAF and MACOMs with the majority of SES members and program emphasis areas. The Army SES Office, on the staff of the ASA (M&RA), develops policy for CERB approval and is the primary action office for coordination of all SES selections, executive development, and implementation of policies governing the SES.

There are five managerial competencies that all potential SES members must possess. These are: (1) Strategic Vision: seeing that key national and agency-wide goals, priorities, values, and other issues are considered in exercising leadership; (2) Human Resource Management: designing human resource strategies to meet the agency vision and goals; (3) Program Development and Evaluation: establishing program and policy goals and the structure and processes necessary to implement the agency's strategic vision; (4) Resource Planning and Management: knowledge of the Federal processes for acquiring and administering financial, material, and information resources; and (5) Organizational Representation and Liaison: explaining, advocating, and negotiating with individuals and groups within/outside of the agency.

The executive development of people in GS-14 and 15 grade levels is an important command responsibility. SES members are expected to possess leadership competencies that parallel those of Army general officers. Therefore, attendance at a Senior Service College program is a highly desirable experience for civilians who aspire to SES positions. Appointment to an SES position marks achievement of the highest nonpolitical civilian executive position. These positions are given protocol precedence equivalent to Lieutenant General, Major General, and Brigadier General. Thus,

Department of the Army Senior Executive Service (SES)

(As of April 1996)

MACOM pie chart labels: AMC 90, OSA 49, OTHER 25, ARSTAFF 30, OTSG 11, USACE 44

OCCUPATION pie chart labels: LEGAL 12, PER 4, PEO 5, PROC 8, E&S (C) 30, COMP 27, OTHER 37, LOG 19, E&S (NC) 112

MACOM   **OCCUPATION**

Figure 14-7

in the TDA Army, SES positions are often inter-changeable with General Officer positions.

In an effort to attract and retain outstanding scientists and engineers, the Army established a nonmanagerial career path to positions paid on a pay scale as high as SES pay. The Scientific/ Technical (ST) track is one of three career tracks available. The other two are managerial tracks to positions as senior executives in scientific and engineering management or to PM/PEO positions within the Army Acquisition Corps. ST positions are directly involved with research and development in the physical, biological, medical, or engineering sciences, or a closely related field; exceed the GS-15 level grade criteria; are nonmanagerial; and require qualifications that resulted in outstanding attainments in the field of research or consultation.

MOBILIZATION PLANNING

DA civilians are an essential part of the Total Army team and contribute significantly to the Army's efforts to accomplish its mission in times of peace and war.

Considering the ultimate Army mission-readiness, it becomes obvious that plans for military readiness must be matched with equally well-developed and integrated plans for civilian readiness. With this goal in mind, the Army includes mobilization planning as an essential element of the total civilian personnel program. In those operations involving civilians in overseas areas where the potential for hostilities exist, management's planning includes identification, training, equipping, deploying, utilizing, and redeploying emergency-essential personnel.

AR 690-11 and AR 215-2 provide guidance for civilian personnel mobilization

planning and management for APF and NAF personnel, respectively. Based on these regulations, managers, with the assistance of CPAC staffs, develop and maintain appropriate emergency plans, procedures, standby emergency implementation documents, and the organizational and staffing arrangements required to plan, mobilize, and manage their civilian employees.

CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIPMS).

CIPMS began its implementation in FY 90 as a statutorily required alternative personnel management system for intelligence personnel. It reflects a version of civilian proponency under *AR 690-3* where responsibility has to be delegated for a functional area (intelligence) and for additional personnel management authorities. CIPMS, for instance, is exempt from Title 5 job classification provisions and has adopted the use of the National Security Agency's classification system to better align grades with the rest of the intelligence community. It is also exempt from many OPM hiring provisions, and can directly consider applications from nongovernment employees through its own merit system. Additionally, it is testing a number of innovations in staffing and compensation, to include broader authority to noncompetitively promote employees and the option for a bigger adjustment to base pay for exceptional performance than is otherwise provided for in the competitive service. CIPMS retains flexibility to further alter itself to meet the needs of management and will remain a significant test bed for innovation in the Army.

The *DOD Authorization Act of 1997* is further changing CIPMS. A provision of that Act, known as the *Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996*, combines all civilian personnel management systems for intelligence components in DOD into one broad excepted service system. The legislation, and a number of additional Administration initiatives, strive to create a broad common architecture of policies, systems and standards while protecting individual Service prerogatives. A common performance management and skills analysis architecture is planned along with inter-community rotational and development programs. Legislation has also provided new tools for hiring time-limited appointees and for force realignment.

SUMMARY

The purpose of the Army Civilian Personnel Management System is to provide a motivated, technically-qualified work force in order to fulfill Army requirements. There is no doubt that the civilian work force is an integral part of the Army team. It fully supports military missions and shares in their accomplishment. The Army employs civilians because they possess unique skills, ensure operational continuity, are more economical, and permit military personnel to perform military duties. Because the principal customer of the system is the line manager, the overriding philosophy is to delegate management decisions to the lowest practicable level.

The majority of civilian positions are bargaining unit positions represented by labor unions. It is imperative that managers are aware and understand fully their labor relations responsibilities and statutory obligations. As the Army transitions to a smaller, more flexible, lethal force, the importance of the civilian work force and the

role of the local union representatives will significantly increase.

A tremendous state of flux and uncertainty exists today as the Army enters a period of significant force structure changes. As the force downsizes, more and more civilians will assume key roles in headquarters and support activities, schools and training centers, and base operations. For many of these critical positions, it may not be possible to hire people with the necessary skills; therefore, the Army must develop civilians within the system to fill them. Moreover, the ongoing efforts to simplify civilian personnel management through the regionalization and other modernization initiatives will contribute immeasurably during this period of significant change.

This chapter was designed to provide only a broad overview of the Civilian Personnel Management System in order to describe how the major processes are designed to support Army leaders. It is important to understand the legal basis for the Federal Civil Service and how the Army's system works within that system, and also the regulatory basis and practices for the Army's NAF Personnel System. Furthermore, commanders and managers at all levels must have a clear understanding of the decentralized nature of civilian personnel management and their responsibilities for civilian leadership and management. Department of the Army civilians are part of an Army team comprised of a blend of people dedicated to doing the best job possible to ensure Army missions are accomplished effectively. The challenge to Army leaders (civilian and military) is to lead civilians effectively under the current system and to guide the Total Army as it transitions to a more modernized system.

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CHAPTER 15

ARMY TRAINING

"The tactics of the patrol (Infantry Rifle Squad) is all that is necessary in the way of tactical training. All that replacements need to know about attack and defense of units, they will know if they are proficient in scouting and patrolling. Unit training is not essential."

MG Charles W. Ryder CG, 34th Division, 1944

INTRODUCTION

The Training Goal.

Much has changed since General Ryder voiced what was then a popular and accepted view regarding the training requirements of Infantry soldiers. What has not changed is the Army's primary mission; to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations—to achieve and sustain the capability to deter and when necessary to fight and win America's wars.

The Army is trained and ready today. Senior Army officials predict that the explosive growth of commercial information sharing networks and other technologies will fundamentally change the way the Army conducts much of its training both at the soldier and the unit levels. Through training, it must remain ready while preparing to fight and win the battles of the future . . . wherever they occur, and whenever called on by the nation.

The three pillars of the Army training system are institutional training, unit training, and self development. Each serves one underlying purpose, to enhance the ability of units to perform their missions. Unit readiness is the objective of all Army training.

- *Institutional Training*. Provide institutional centers of excellence in military knowledge and progressive resident training and education to enhance individual potential, initiative, and competence in warfighting skills.

- *Unit Training*. Provide soldier and leader collective training to ensure the tactical and technical expertise necessary for success on a modern battlefield.

- *Self Development*. Provide the Army with qualified noncommissioned officers, commissioned officers, and Department of the Army civilians. Self development includes all classes, courses and schools that a person takes to enhance personal qualifications in technical, managerial, and professional skills and

competencies necessary for Army mission accomplishment.

The Training and Readiness Challenge.

On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they are trained. Training to high standards is essential in both peace and war. Army forces must train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. Every commander, soldier and unit in a force-projection army must be trained and ready to deploy. A leader's most solemn responsibility is to train subordinates

Chapter Organization.

This chapter examines Total Army training by systems. The discussion is presented in seven sections:
- The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing System.
- The Training Development System.
- The Training in Schools System.
- The System of Training in Units.
- The Training Support System.
- Training Issues.

ARMY TRAINING OVERVIEW

Army Training.

The Army Training System is shown in Figure 15-1. Over the years there has been little change in the desired output, but the basic concepts, techniques of training, and methods of measuring and evaluating training are constantly evolving. *FM 25-100: Training the Force (*Nov 88) and FM 25-101: *Battle-Focused Training* (Sep 90) contains the Army's standardized training doctrine applicable throughout the force. They provide the necessary guidelines on how to plan, execute, and assess training at all levels. The manuals provide authoritative foundations for soldier, leader, and collective training.

The three major components of the training system—training in schools, training in units, and training support—also reflect the mutually supporting role and close balance needed within the system. Because the Army's ultimate purpose is to prepare combat-ready units that can, and will, mobilize, deploy, fight, and win, the goals and standards incorporated in the Army Training System apply to the Total Army.

Training does not operate in a vacuum. It is related to all other Army management systems, including personnel, research and development, resourcing, and logistics. References will be made to the appropriate chapters that describe these systems and how the systems interface.

Combined Arms Training Strategy.

CATS is a training management program that uses proponent developed strategies to support training to standard both in the units and in the schoolhouse. CATS is the overarching concept supplying training strategies for America's Army. This concept is designed to be a flexible process, providing menus of events and associated resources necessary to plan and manage training.
- Service schools are intrinsically involved in developing both current and future strategies following the principles in FM 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training. CATS objective is to produce soldiers, leaders and units trained to standard. These training strategies describe how the Army trains now. Future

ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM

INPUT **PROCESS** **OUTPUT**

**People, Time, and Dollars
Training Guidance
Training Development**

TRAINING IN SCHOOLS

Soldier/Leader Training &Collective Training

TRAINING IN UNITS

Soldier/Leader and Collective

TRAINING SUPPORT

Products & Services

FEEDBACK

Combat Ready Units

XX

XX

+

Improved Training Base

Figure 15-1

CATS identify required training resources in years to come. These training strategies reflect changes in threat, technology, and mission. Separate strategies are developed for the institution, the individual, and the unit. CATS characteristics include:

- Unit strategies which describe a sequence of training events that enable leaders to build and sustain proficiency in unit mission essential tasks.
- Unit strategies with specific gates (training events) that must be successfully executed prior to proceeding to other more difficult, costly, or challenging training events.
- Strategies which enumerate training resources needed to execute listed training events.

- Institutional strategies that are similar in concept, and specify specific tasks to be trained that prescriptive in nature.
- New training strategies that form the basis for unit training schedules, allowing units to more objectively evaluate their training readiness, and to update training related expenses, thereby establishing the linkage between training readiness reporting and training resourcing.
- To the extent possible, the Army resources training using CATS. Service schools develop unit strategies by type battalion. These strategies are descriptive, serving as a guide for unit commanders. Unit strategies establish a sequence of representative events that sustain a unit's proficiency in

mission essential tasks. Models calculate total training costs based on historical data of operational costs for specific training requirements (example: miles expended by the primary vehicles necessary to execute a training event such as a field training exercise (FTX). To allocate sufficient resources, the Army uses these planned training requirements in the planning, programming, budgeting and execution process.

Future Army Training

To meet the challenge of the future, the Army is in the process of implementing a Distance Learning (DL) system consisting of a network of information architectures and linkages to support all audiences—individuals, schools and units. The Distance Learning network will serve as the conduit through which soldiers, leaders, and units receive information and courseware, tailored to their specific needs to train and prepare for a broad spectrum of global contingencies. The use of DL technologies doesn't change performance standards expected of soldiers. The Army's DL vision is to transition from the current training framework into a 21st century model. DL does not fundamentally change the way the Army trains, it enhances the way it goes about training by using current and emerging technologies for delivery of training to the soldier when and where it is needed. Soldiers in the field, at units, institutions, and at home will train by accessing informational databases and tuning in to, rather than attending, traditional platform instruction. AC/RC units will select training options (resident and non-resident) based upon their need, time available to train, distance from the "on-site" training

site, and other resource constraints. Reliance on traditional training methods will continue, but will be enhanced by the availability and use communications power of the commercial World Wide Web, Internet, and other information transfer systems. Exploiting these technologies takes the classroom to the unit, and the unit to the classroom, providing training in a worldwide virtual trainingenvironment.

To attain this vision the Army has three primary initiatives, Distance Learning (DL), Classroom XXI, and the Army Training Digital Library (ATDL).

- Distance Learning is a concept for the delivery of training to the soldier when and where needed; it makes Classroom XXI achievable. The Army Distance Learning Plan (ADPL), approved by the CSA, makes extensive use of the worldwide corporate and government electronic networks providing a range of capabilities for distributing information in either a synchronous/real time or asynchronous mode, from simple text transmissions to video teleconferencing. Implementation of the ADLP program is funded through 2003. It includes partial reconfiguration to DL formats of Non-Commissioned Officer Education System Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and Officer Advanced Courses. Officer Basic and Command and General Staff Officer Courses are not included at this time. The Army Distance Learning Plan is available on the Internet.
- Classroom XXI is another major effort that will lead TRADOC

into the 21st Century. It focuses on the leveraging of technology to use information in a variety of ways so as to increase the Army's warfighting capability. Classroom XXI is the environment in which the 21st Century soldier will train. It is an environment which optimizes individual learning and is unrestricted by time, walls, distance, or location. Communication links will be made within and between schools, combat training centers, and units. Video teletraining (VTT)/ video teleconferencing (VTC) and fiber optic networks will be established for both fixed and mobile sites. The instructor will be capable of reaching beyond the installation electronically and retrieve digitized archival information from numerous sources, including the "Army Training Digital Library." Our plans are to establish at least two classrooms per TRADOC school in the near term with the infrastructure to ensure connectivity throughout TRADOC and key Army, DOD, and civilian agencies. The TRADOC Classroom XXI Installation Master Plan is available on the Internet.

- Army Training Digital Library (ATDL) is the information foundation to support Army XXI. It will provides an interactive and seamless "library without walls" for trainers, training and combat developers, resource managers, and active and reserve component soldiers world wide. Our goal is

to have all training and doctrinal information stored digitally in a virtual warehouse. These products will support training on demand, individual soldier self development, and individual and collective training. The Army Training Support Center has digitized many training and doctrinal products. The completed products are available on the Internet at the ATDL Home Page.

THE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND RESOURCING SYSTEM

General.

The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing System is displayed in Figure 15-2. Input is provided by manpower programs (Chapter 5), force structure changes (Chapters 4, 6, and 7), and resourcing actions (Chapters 9, and 10). Training activities draw Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation funds from Budget Activity 3 (Training), and Budget Activity 2 (General Purpose Forces). Other contributing appropriations are: National Guard Personnel, Army; Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard; Reserve Personnel, Army; and Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve.

Organization.

In October 1978, the Training Directorate was formed in ODCSOPS. The Training Directorate combines the functions of institutional and unit training and training support. It provides the Army a single point of contact for all issues which have training impact. Other DA staff elements which have

THE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND RESOURCE SYSTEM

```
        INPUT                    PROCESS                    OUTPUT

    ┌─────────────┐          ┌─────────────┐          ┌─────────────┐
    │  PROGRAMS   │          │  TRAINING   │          │  TRAINING   │
    │  Manpower   │   ▶      │  Policy(s)  │   ▶      │  Army Plan  │
    │ Force Structure &      │ Requirements│          │ Army Regs (Tng) │
    │ Modernization          │   (ATRRS)   │          │   ARPRINT   │
    │  Resourcing │          │  Resourcing │          │  POM Input  │
    │             │          │    SMDR     │          │     PBG     │
    └─────────────┘          └─────────────┘          └─────────────┘
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*CBE—MDEP—POM—**FEEDBACK**—PPBES—TRAP*

ARPRINT - ARMY PROGRAM FOR INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
ATRRS - ARMY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES SYSTEM
CBE - COMMAND BUDGET ESTIMATE
MDEP - MANAGEMENT DECISION AND EVALUATION PACKAGE
POM - PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM
PPBES - PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM
PBG - PROGRAM AND BUDGET GUIDANCE
TRAP - TRAINING RESOURCES ARBITRATION PANEL

Figure 15-2

a direct or indirect impact on the training systems are:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (OASA[MRA]). OASA(MRA) has a training division to assist in the development, implementation, and review of policies and programs related to achieving the Army goal of effective and efficient training and education for the Total Army.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). The DCSPER is responsible for administering precommissioning programs for officers (USMA, ROTC, and OCS); civilian personnel training; and training for equal opportunity, and alcohol and drug abuse (Chapters 13 and 14). ODCSPER also manages the system that supports the Army's institutional training management process

[Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT)].

U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Objective is to obtain the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet Army requirements (Chapter 13).

Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). Projects training requirements for the AC, both officer and enlisted, by fiscal year. ODCSOPS allocates training spaces for AC officers and enlisted based on projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). Commands and controls all Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members. Provides individual training management to the IRR, both officer and enlisted (Chapter 7). It is responsible for OPMS-USAR and

EPMS-USAR, and projects training requirements for USAR, both officer and enlisted, by fiscal year. ARPERCEN allocates training spaces for USAR officers and enlisted based on projected training requirements.

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management). Formulates the Army budget, issues manpower and dollar guidance, distributes funds to commands and agencies, and monitors obligation rates and reprogramming actions (Chapter 9).

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition). Manages the life cycle of materiel and nonmateriel items used by individuals and units in mission performance (Chapter 11).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). Responsible for logistics readiness of Army forces, to include supportability/maintainability of equipment in troop units (Chapter 12).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). Responsible for Opposing Force program and assisting ODCSOPS on intelligence training policy (Chapter 18).

Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). Projects training requirements and allocates course spaces internal to AMEDD.

Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). The National Guard Bureau promulgates training policy for Army National Guard units through *National Guard Regulation (NGR) 350-1.* CNGB also programs the resources for NG training and allocates training spaces to the states. National Guard unit commanders are responsible for their units' training. FORSCOM establishes training criteria and supervises training of Army National Guard (ARNG) units. Policy and guidance are contained in *FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.*

Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). The CAR programs training resources for the Army Reserve and monitors USAR training activities. The CAR manages professional development training for USAR officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers through ARPERCEN (Chapter 7).

Policy.

DA training management guidance defines policy and provides a detailed discussion on topics such as training responsibilities, resources, evaluations, literature, aids, devices, and simulations. Emphasis on training-for-results is highlighted, with performance-oriented training stressed as the best approach. The principal source documents for DA training policy are *AR 350-1, AR 350-10, AR 350-38, AR 350-41,* and *AR 351-1.* They provide policy guidance for Army training and are the bases to develop appropriate Field Manuals which implement those policies. Training regulations at all levels include objectives, policies, guidance, and general responsibilities for the conduct and management of training.

Requirements and Resourcing.

Training Program Evaluation Groups (PEG). As one of the Army's six Title X Program Evaluation Groups (PEG), the Training PEG programs approximately $7.8B of Army resources each year. The PEG manages all aspects of training dollars within all components, individual through unit. The Training PEG has 260 Management Decision Packages (MDEPs). The Training PEG is chaired by the Director of Training, ODCSOPS and the ASA

(M&RA). MDEP managers articulate and defend resource requirements to the PEG during the building of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). MDEP managers use various costing models to determine requirements.

Army Training Requirements and Resourcing System (ATRRS). The Army Training Requirements and Resourcing System (ATRRS) process consists of three major steps. They are: (1) records the Army's institutional training program; (2) displays class schedules, individual training seat reservations, and; (3) course statistical information (input and graduation data). ATRRS allows resource managers to develop individual training requirements, resource courses, and execute training programs based on its scheduling, reservation and statistical information.

Development of Individual Training Requirements.

The development of individual training requirements (Figure 15-3) for the AC begins with the identification of force structure authorizations from the Personnel Management Authorizations Document (PMAD) and Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). PMAD is produced semiannually, usually in August and January. PMAD displays authorizations at the MOS and grade level. The AAMMP is produced as required, but at least monthly, and contains manning data such as Active Army end strength, monthly recruiting requirements, and inputs to training by components for seven fiscal years. ODCSPER designates the AAMMP to be used in developing training requirements.

Using the PMAD, the Military Occupational Specialty Level System (MOSLS) process predicts Active Army (enlisted) skill requirements. MOSLS compares MOS and grade inventory, aged to the fiscal year under consideration by applying gain, loss, and promotion factors. The difference between the authorizations and the aged (to the fiscal year) inventory constitutes the number of trained soldiers, by skill, that must be produced from the training base (output). Applying training attrition rates at the skill level to the number provides the number required to begin training (input).

While PERSCOM, through the use of MOSLS, is developing Active Army training requirements, the Reserve Components develop their skill requirements using similar automated systems. USAR uses the Training Requirements Generator (TRG) and the ARNG uses their Automated Program to Project AIT Training Spaces (APPATS). TRG and APPATS compute training requirements using their authorizations and current inventory. The inputs to training by skill produced by MOSLS, TRG, and APPATS are the Total Army accession-driven training requirements and are provided to ODCSPER and ODCSOPS during annual Structure Manning Decision Reviews (SMDR) for consideration of inclusion in the ARPRINT. Officer accession-driven training requirements and noncommissioned officer training requirements are also provided.

Other training requirements are identified by PERSCOM for officer and enlisted in-service personnel who require training to support professional development, reenlistment or reclassification programs, and mission requirements. Additionally, PERSCOM solicits in-service training requirements from other MACOMs, State Adjutants General, and other Services and agencies via the Total Army Centralized Individual Training Solicitations (TACITS). The TACITS survey is conducted twice

DEVELOPING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCING THE TRAINING BASE

Figure 15-3

Figure 15-2

annually. The accession-driven, in-service, and other skill training requirements are combined as total raw training requirements within the ATRRS. The ATRRS' automated data base includes a list of Army skill training courses that includes length, capacity, frequency, and location. It also includes other Services' courses attended by Army personnel. The skill requirements are translated into course requirements and become the total Army's training requirements at the course level of detail by component and fiscal year.

Resourcing Required Courses.

After the training requirements for courses are developed, the next major task in the process is the development of the training program for each MOS.

The first step in establishing a training program is the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR), co-chaired by ODCSPER and ODCSOPS. It includes representatives from ODCSPER, ODCSOPS, OTSG, TRADOC, AMC, Army Medical Department Center and School, PERSCOM, ARPERCEN, FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR, USAREC, ODCSLOG, OCE, other services, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), IMET (International Military Education and Training), and the individual proponent school. The purpose of the SMDR (Figure 15-4) is to reach a consensus within the Army for the institutional training program for the first POM year and any major changes for the upcoming budget year. The purpose of the SMDR (Figure 15-4) is to validate training requirements, compare

STRUCTURE MANNING DECISION REVIEW (SMDR)

Figure 15-3

training requirements with school house current resource capabilities (facilities, billeting, manpower), and adjust training requirements or training resources to form recommended training programs. The SMDR is conducted annually in September or October. Training requirements are initially established for the third POM year, validated for the second POM year (the primary focus of the SMDR), and "fine tuned" for the first POM year.

The SMDR categorizes each course. The first category is composed of those courses where the total training requirement can be trained with available resources. The second category consists of courses where the requirements exceed the resourced capability of the training base, but either resources can be provided or the requirements reduced to the resourced level

without significant impact on the manning program. The third category is those courses where the requirement exceeds the capacity, requires significant resources, and cannot be reduced without significant impact on the manning program. These courses are termed "constrained." The results of the SMDR are briefed to a "Council of Colonels" which attempts to confirm category two adjustments/resources and move as many courses as possible from category three to category two.

All courses in categories two and three are then referred to a General Officer Manning/Training Review. At that review, the general officers take action on the recommendations of the "Council of Colonels." Each course remaining constrained is reviewed as to current authorizations, projected operating strength,

training requirements, training capability, source of constraint, resources required to eliminate the constraint, availability of required resources, and a recommended course of action. That review results in a resourced training requirement which is called an approved training *program* for each course for that fiscal year.

After the General Officer Manning/Training Review is completed, both the training requirement and the training program are published by ODCSPER in the ARPRINT. The ARPRINT is a mission document for the training base as well as the Army in terms of recruitment and professional development education. The ARPRINT identifies, by fiscal year, projected individual training requirements for established courses and for skills where new courses are required. Based on identified training requirements, subsequent actions are taken to provide resources (manpower, money, facilities, ammunition, and equipment) to train the required number of soldiers. The flow of soldiers into the schools and training centers develops class schedules to support the ARPRINT for each course. The class schedules are entered into ATRRS. TRADOC reviews the class schedules to ensure that they support the ARPRINT requirement and TRADOC scheduling policy.

Mobilization Planning System (MPS).

MPS is a subsystem of ATRRS and is designed to give training managers, at or above installation level, prompt access to information necessary to plan for implementation of the mobilization of the Army training base. MPS is used to produce the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) which provides a projection of trainee and student inputs by skill course to satisfy

postmobilization requirements for trained manpower as determined by MOB-PERSACS. Also included in ATRRS is the Mobilization Training Resource Arbitration Panel (MOBTRAP) module. This module manages the flow of soldiers through the training base during mobilization including the trainup for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

THE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

Organization.

The Training Development System is managed by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Figure 15-5 shows the organization of Headquarters TRADOC.

General.

TRADOC is responsible for developing training and providing support for individual and unit training. This responsibility includes determining requirements for range, ammunition and target guidance, and training devices and facilities, as well as training courses, products, and programs.

The single manager for training in TRADOC is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST). Within TRADOC, the DCST interfaces with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support (DCSBOS); Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat developments (DCSCD); Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC); Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM); and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM) in resource validation, safety and environment, battlefield organization and systems development, doctrine, and management information system areas,

HEADQUARTERS, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

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                        ┌─────────────────────────┐
                        │   COMMANDING GENERAL    │
                        └─────────────────────────┘
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DCG/CDR Combined Arms Center (CAC)		DCG/CDR Comb Arms Spt Cmd (CASCOM)
DCG for USAR		DCG for ARNG
Inspector General		

	DCG & CofS	
DCS Base Ops Spt	DCS Combat Developments	DCS Doctrine
DCS Training	DCS Resource Mgt	DCS Analysis
DCS Information Mgt	Chief of Public Affairs (PA)	Staff Judge Advocate
DCS Internal Rev & Audit Compliance	Command Historian	Post Commander (Ft. Monroe, VA)
Tenant Activities	ROTC Cadet Command	TRADOC Field Element

Figure 15-4

respectively. The DCST coordinates with PERSCOM for management of trainee accessions.

The DCST has the following directorates and activities to manage the TRADOC training program: Individual Training Directorate (ITD), Combat Training Center Directorate (CTC), Training Development and Analysis Activity (TDAA), Program Management Directorate (PMD), Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA), TRADOC Coordinating Element (TCE), and Security Assistance Training Directorate (SATD).

The DCST has general staff supervision of the Army Training Support Center (ATSC), a field operating agency of TRADOC, that provides training support services for the planning and integration of products and programs that support individual and collective training in the Active Army and to the Reserve Components.

HQDA authorizes direct communication between MACOMs and TRADOC; moreover, HQDA authorizes TRADOC to task non-TRADOC commands, schools, and agencies (except the Army Medical Center and School) to provide specialized subject materials for instruction with the Total Army School System (TASS).

The TRADOC service schools have a central role in the Training Development System. They are the primary source of doctrine and they develop training materials within their proponent areas for Army-wide use (for example — Infantry, Field Artillery, Armor, Ordnance, and so on).

Systems Approach to Training (SAT) Model

Trained Units

Trained Soldiers

DTLOMS

- Imple-mentation
- *Evaluation*
- Development
- *Evaluation*
- Design
- *Evaluation*
- Analysis
- *Evaluation*

Evaluation

Resource Constraints

Figure 15-5

Training Development.

The Systems Approach to Training (SAT). The SAT is a disciplined, logical approach to making decisions about collective, individual, and self-development training for the total Army. The approach, based on the model shown at Figure 15-6, helps users decide whether or not training is needed. Users then apply (Figure 15-7) the approach to determine what to train, who to train, how to train, what training support and resources are required, and how to assess training effectiveness as described in TRADOC Regulation 350-70. The systems approach makes certain that critical performance requirements of the Army establish the content of training in the training base and in the fielded force. The

SAT involves five training-related phases: evaluation, analysis, design, development, and implementation.

SAT Phases. SAT phase functions and requirements are as shown at Figure 15-7.

THE TRAINING IN SCHOOLS SYSTEM

General.

Training in schools is individual or collective training in the training base which uses approved programs of instruction and includes a curriculum which is structured, developed, and supported by a Service school, Service training center, or any educational institution under DOD sanction.

SAT Phases

Phase	Requirements
Evaluation determines— • **How well** the training takes place, • **How well** soldiers/units perform, and • **How well** products support training.	• Formulate school evaluation policy. • Develop evaluation plans. • Design and validate evaluation instuments. • Conduct internal evaluation (collect data). • Conduct external evaluation (collect data). • Conduct accreditation evaluations. • Accredit Total Army School System (TASS) schools. • Analyze data. • Identify deficiencies; report evaluation results; ensure corrections.

Phase		Requirements	
Analysis identifies— • **Need** for training. • **Who** gets the training. • **What** tasks (collective and individual [including leader] tasks) and supporting skills and knowledge are **critical.** *Note: A* critical task is a collective or individual task a unit or individual must perform to accomplish their mission and duties and to survive on the battlefield and in OOTW.	There are different types of analysis:		
	Type	**Identify—**	
	Needs analysis	• Performance deficiency solutions (training non-training). • Training/TD requirement.	
	Mission analysis	• Unit missions. • Critical collective tasks for mission accomplishment.	
	Collective critical task analysis	• Collective task performance specifications, including task performance standards. • Supporting individual tasks.	
	Job analysis	• Critical individual tasks for job accomplishment. • Supported collective task(s).	
	Individual critical task analysis	• Individual task performance specifications, including task performance standards • Supported and supporting individual tasks.	

Phase	Requirements
Design determines— • **When, where** and **how** the training takes place. • Training **resource requirements** (instructors, equipment, ammo, ranges, facilities)	• Establish unit/individual long-range training strategies/milestones, including Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). • Establish short-range unit/individual training strategies/milestones. • Design training media/TADSS. • Design individual training courses. • Produce student performance measurement documents (tests; exercises).
Development produces validated training/ training products.	• Write the training material (lessons plans, TSPs). • Produce training media/TADSS. • Validate the training material, including tests. • Prepare material for reproduction. • Reproduce the training material. • Acquire training resources. • Train instructor, training management, staff, faculty, and cadre. • Prepare facilities and equipment.
Implementation executes— • Standardized training at resident and unit training sites. • Distribution of training products. • Use of training products.	• Distribute the training material. • Schedule the training. • Train the students/soldiers/units. • Administer the tests/exercises. • Counsel students/soldiers. • Conduct After-Action Reviews (AARs). • Maintain student records.

Figure 15-6

THE TRAINING IN SCHOOLS SYSTEM

INPUT	PROCESS	OUTPUT
People Time Facilities Equipment Money	SAT IET NCOES WOES Officer Training	**TRAINED SOLDIERS**

INTERNAL/EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS ——**FEEDBACK**——*CT / LA / OFS / ARTEP*

ARTEP - ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
CT - COMMON TASKS
IET - INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING
LA - LEADER'S ASSESSMENT
NCOES - NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM
SAT - SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING
WOES - WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Figure 15-7

The Training in Schools System (Figure 15-8), through centers and schools, must provide recruits, noncommissioned officers, and officers with a solid foundation of individual skills and standards with which they can become fully effective members of units. The peacetime and mobilization training base is part of an overall system that produces a well-trained, modern, mission-capable Army.

Input.

The Training in Schools System uses input from the Training Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing System, and the Training Development System.

Output.

The output of the Training in Schools System is trained soldiers.

The Process.

The SAT process helps identify training tasks and assists training developers to decide where the tasks should be taught *for the first time* (the training base or the unit). Generally, the most critical individual tasks are taught within the training base, but there is not enough time or resources to teach all of the critical individual tasks. Training in units expands on training received in the training base. Those critical individual tasks not trained in the training

IET TRAINING MODES

One Station Unit Training (OSUT)
Combat Arms and Selected Combat Support

← 12 - 17 Weeks →

BCT	AIT

Basic Combat Tng/Advanced Individual Tng (BCT/AIT)
Combat Support and Combat Service Support

← 8 Weeks →	← 4 - 51 Weeks →

BCT	AIT

Figure 15-9

base, and virtually all critical collective tasks are taught in units.

Enlisted Initial Entry Training.

The Concept. Initial Entry Training (IET) is the introductory training (Figure 15-9) given to all personnel on initial entry into the Army. It provides an orderly transition from civilian to military life, motivation to become a dedicated and productive member of the Army, introduction to the basic skills required by all members of the Army, and training to the apprentice level in those critical skills taught in the training base at Skill Level 1.

At Department of the Army, the DCSOPS exercises general staff supervision of initial entry-level training except for AMEDD personnel. The CG, TRADOC is responsible for conducting initial entry training, and accomplishes that task through the Commandants of the TRADOC schools and Commanders of the U.S. Army Training

Centers (USATCs). Field units are encouraged to provide feedback and subject matter expertise to assist the schools and USATCs in continuing training development. The Army Medical Department Center and School performs this function for AMEDD personnel.

Basic Combat Training (BCT). BCT is eight weeks of training in basic military skills given to all newly enlisted personnel who have no or limited prior military service. BCT provides a logical progression of training to transition civilians into soldiers who are well-disciplined, motivated, physically fit, and proficient in basic combat survivability skills. To successfully complete BCT soldiers must qualify with their individual weapon, receive at least 50 points on each event of the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), and demonstrate the ability to become a productive member of a unit.

ENLISTED TRAINING PROGRAM

RANK	SKILL LEVEL	COURSES	TRAINING LEVEL AND LOCATION
SGM	5	SGTS MAJOR COURSE	SR (SERVICE SCHOOLS)
MSG/ISG	5	1SGS COURSE	SR (SERVICE SCHOOLS)
SFC	4	ANCOC	ADVANCED (NCOA)
SSG	3	BNCOC	BASIC (NCOA)
CPL/SPC	2	PLDC	PRIMARY (NCOA)
PVT	1	OSUT (GA) OR BCT/AIT (CS/CSS)	INITIAL ENTRY (ATC & SERVICE SCHOOLS)

NOTE: PLDC, BNCOC, AND ANCOC RC CONFIGURED COURSES
TAUGHT AT ARNG ACADEMIES/SCHOOLS AND USARF

Figure 15-10

Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Advanced Individual Training occurs after completion of BCT. AIT builds on the soldierization skills acquired in BCT while developing each soldier to the level of proficiency required for the award of an MOS.

Soldiers take one of three AIT paths: MOS training at a USATC, MOS training at a school, or MOS training through supervised on-the-job training at their units. Supervised OJT programs provide training in a small number of very low-density MOSs for which formal courses of instruction would not be cost-effective. A formal training and testing plan and school-trained tutors are required.

In addition to the BCT/AIT modes of training described, soldiers can take One Station Unit Training (OSUT) or Split Training Option (STO) to complete initial entry training(Figure 15-10).

One Station Unit Training (OSUT). OSUT is conducted at one installation, in the same company-size unit, with the same cadre, and with one program of instruction. The OSUT mode is used for most combat arms MOSs (except Aviation) and selected combat support MOSs. OSUT integrates common skill and MOS-specific training in a single program.

Split Training Option (STO). STO permits selected individuals to enlist in the Army National Guard (ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and complete Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) in two phases separated by a period of not more than 12 months. The program is designed to

attract students and seasonal workers to enlist in the ARNG or USAR by minimizing the lost time from education or employment. Upon completion of Phase I of the STO program, the soldier is released from IADT and returns to his ARNG or USAR unit for unit training between STO phases. STO soldiers are in a paid status at unit training assemblies between phases of IADT. Within one year of release from Phase I, the soldier must complete MOS qualification during Phase II. During Phase II they are in IADT status to comply with statutory training requirements (12 week active duty).

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

Institutional training is the primary source of the formal military training and education noncommissioned officers receive. It is here that NCOs train to perform critical tasks by learning skills, knowledges, and attitudes (SKAs) that are essential to high-quality leadership. When these same SKAs are tested, reinforced, and strengthened by follow-on operational assignments and meaningful self-development programs, noncommissioned officers attain and sustain true competency in the profession of arms. Institutional training provides the solid foundation upon which all future development rests. NCOES and other functional courses make up the institutional training pillar of NCO leader development. It provides progressive and sequential training for NCOs through four levels of schooling: primary leader development training for promotion to Sergeant; basic and advanced (branch) training for promotion to Staff Sergeant and Sergeant First Class, respectively; and senior-level training for promotion to Sergeant Major. Functional courses are generally based on specific skills required for special assignments or duties.

Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC). The primary-level training course for NCOs is Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC). This is a non-MOS-specific, field-oriented leadership course built around basic soldier skills. PLDC is taught at NCO academies throughout the Army, and training focuses on the SKAs needed for team-leader level of leadership responsibilities at the rank of Sergeant. Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) NCOs on Active Guard Reserve (AGR) status attend an active four-week resident course. Other RC NCOs attend either an active four-week course (ADT), or the RC course during their two-week annual training (AT). Completion of PLDC is required for promotion to Sergeant.

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). The basic-level course of NCOES is Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). It is taught using small-group instruction (SGI) with courses ranging from 9 to 22 weeks depending on the soldier's career management field (CMF). BNCOC consists of two phases. Phase I covers common leader training (CLT) which includes the theories and principles used to teach NCOs the battle-focused common leadership and warfighting skills required to lead a squad-sized element. Phase II is "hands-on" and performance-oriented training. It incorporates as much common leader training as possible into existing MOS-specific training. BNCOC for combat arms NCOs is taught at local NCO academies whereas combat support and combat service support NCOs attend proponent resident service schools. Training at BNCOC progressively and sequentially builds upon the instruction received in

PLDC. As with PLDC, both AC and RC NCOs on AGR status must attend active courses. Other RC NCOs attend either an active course (AT or ADT), or an RC course—Phase I during three weekend drills IDT or one-week ADT, and Phase II normally during a follow-on two-week ADT/IDT. Completion of BNCOC is required for promotion to Staff Sergeant.

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). The advanced-level course of NCOES is Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). ANCOC is structured in two phases like BNCOC. Small-group instruction is also used to prepare NCOs to assume the duties and responsibilities needed to lead a platoon-sized element. ANCOC has a common leadership core as well as hands-on and performance-oriented training to emphasize warfighting skills. ANCOC is conducted at resident service schools and class length is based on career management field (CMF). As with PLDC and BNCOC, AC and RC NCOs on AGR status must attend AC courses. Other RC NCOs attend an AC course (ADT), or an RC course—Phase I during six weekend drills (IDT) or a twelve-day ADT, and Phase II normally during a later two-week ADT/IDT. Completion of ANCOC is required for promotion to Sergeant First Class.

U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course (USASMC). The Sergeants Major Course (SMC) is the capstone of NCOES. It prepares selected Sergeants Major and Master Sergeants for both troop and staff assignments. SMC is a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant major and appointment to the duty position of Command Sergeant Major. For both AC and RC NCOs, this senior-level training is obtained through a permanent change-of-station (PCS) resident course taught at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas, or through the two-year Corresponding Studies Program. AC NCOs are selected by an Army selection board. National Guard NCOs are chosen by a board commanded by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. AC or Reserve Component NCOs may also attend the Corresponding Studies version of the course when selected by a centralized selection board conducted by DA, ARNG, or ARPERCEN.

Noncommissioned Officer functional courses provide training for individuals selected for Command Sergeant Major, First Sergeant, and staff assignments.

Command Sergeants Major Course (CSMC). This is a one-week, task-based course designed to prepare Master Sergeants (promotable) and Sergeants Major to perform the duties and execute the responsibilities of a Battalion Command Sergeant Major. Selectees include active duty personnel in the pay grade of E-8/E-9 who have attended the Sergeants Major Course and are HQDA CSM selectees. The CSM selectees should be within 120 days of assumption of a CSM position.

First Sergeant Course (FSC). The AC FSC is a four-week mandatory branch immaterial course conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas. It is a TDY and return or TDY enroute to PCS course. PERSCOM selects NCOs for TDY while enroute, and MACOM commanders select NCOs for TDY and return attendance. NCOs selected for attendance must be assigned or scheduled for assignment to First Sergeant positions. Selectees must be a First Sergeant, Master Sergeant, or Sergeant First Class. Selectees must have served less than 18 months in First

Sergeant positions. First-time First Sergeants are required to attend FSC prior to holding a First Sergeant position.

Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course (BSNCOC). The BSNCOC is a six-week branch immaterial course conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas. The BSNCOC is a TDY and return or TDY while enroute to PCS course. PERSCOM selects NCOs for TDY while enroute to PCS attendance, and MACOM commanders select NCOs for TDY and return attendance. Selectees must be Staff Sergeants or higher rank and be graduates of NCOES courses required for their grade

The Reserve Component Noncommissioned Officer Education System (RC-NCOES).

Recognizing the need to standardize Army NCO training systems as much as possible and considering the time and money constraints affecting the RC, the1985 Noncommissioned Officers Professional Development Study (NCOPDS) recommended implementation of an RC-NCOES to parallel its AC counterpart. RC-NCOES now provides leader and MOS skill training modeled after AC-NCOES. The training strategy adds MOS-specific training in the form of RC-configured courses, exportable for instruction at Reserve Component Training Institutions with either component sending students to the courses in their geographical area. RC-configured courses are to be concurrently developed and updated with the AC versions. RC-NCOES courses are now mandatory for promotion to the grades of SGT (PLDC), SSG (BNCOC), and SFC (ANCOC), respectively. BNCOC and ANCOC courses are normally taught in two phases: Phase I common core during weekend Inactive Duty for Training (IDT), and Phase II hands-on MOS-specific tasks during a single two-week Active Duty for Training (ADT).

Warrant Officer Training.

Concept. Warrant Officers are appointed by warrant by the Secretary of the Army and are commissioned upon promotion to Chief Warrant Officer Two. The warrant officer is the highly-specialized expert and trainer who, by gaining progressive levels of expertise and leadership, operates, maintains, administers, and manages the Army's equipment, support activities, technical systems, or specialized functions for an entire career. Warrant officers exercise leadership and managerial skills in specific technical areas. They lead and supervise enlisted, warrant officer, and civilian personnel in the technical and tactical aspects of operations and organizations related to their own specialties. Their schooling is directed primarily toward specialty training in depth.

Warrant Officer Education and Training. The Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) established in 1993, is configured as shown in Figure 15-11. This system is the result of the February 1992, Chief of Staff, Army approval of the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) which called for a complete review and revision of the former Warrant Officer Training System (WOTS). The Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) located at Fort Rucker, Alabama, is the Executive Agent for all common warrant officer training. The WOCC exercises command and control over the Warrant Officer Candidate School as well as the Warrant Officer Staff Course and Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course. In addition to a revised education system, the WOLDAP resulted in the expansion of warrant officer

WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Entry Level	Advanced Level	Senior Level	Master Level

• Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) (Branch certification)

• Mandatory - Active Army & Reserve Component

• Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) Phase-I
   – ACCP at 6 yrs WO Service
• WOAC Phase II (Resident)
   – MOS Specific Proponent Course, with Army Common Core
   – At CW3 selection

• Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC)
   – Army Common at Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC)
   – Upon CW4 selection

• Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC)
   – Army Common at Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC)
   – Upon CW5 selection

Pre-appointment
• Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS)

Figure 15-8

position coding by rank (WO1/CW2, CW3, CW4, and CW5). Expanded position coding is intended to eliminate assignments of warrant officers without regard to grade.

Applicants for preappointment submit their files to the respective DA MOS proponent office for determination of eligibility. The evaluation/training process of qualified applicants requires; (1) selection by a centralized selection board (USAREC and State Adjutants General), and (2) successful completion of Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), but no later than two years after appointment. The WOCS is a six-week course that provides standardized training to warrant officer candidates. Content includes leadership and ethics, communicative skills, military history, structure of the Army, land navigation, support functions, and other common military subjects required by all warrant officer MOSs. The WOCS is taught in a high stress environment where candidates are subjectively evaluated by Training, Advising, and Counseling (TAC) Officers and academically evaluated through written examinations. All AC and RC candidates attend WOCS in residence at the WOCC. RC-configured WOCS is available for the USAR and ARNG candidates. As a result of a WOLDAP initiative, warrant officer candidates are appointed to WO1 upon graduation from WOCS.

Immediately following WOCS, newly appointed warrant officers attend their Branch Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) to be certified as MOS qualified. Courses vary in length from 4 to 39 weeks depending on the technical nature of the MOS. Many WOBCs are RC-configured or may be challenged through test based alternative certification programs. Some WO

certification training, such as flight training, is available only in resident mode.

At six year warrant officer service (five years for ARNG), warrant officers are automatically enrolled in the nonresident Phase I of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC). Phase I, WOAC, similar to the CAS3 nonresident phase, is administered by the WOCC, and is a prerequisite to resident attendance at a Branch WOAC resident Phase II. Upon selection for promotion to CW3 (three years time in grade for ARNG), warrant officers are scheduled to attend Phase II, WOAC at their respective branch schools.

Upon selection to CW4, warrant officers are scheduled to attend the Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC). The WOSC, a five-week common course at the WOCC, Fort Rucker, Alabama, is intended to prepare warrant officers for higher-level assignments requiring broadened staff and technical skills.

CW4s selected for promotion to the grade of CW5 are scheduled to attend the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC). The WOSSC is a two-week Army common training course at the WOCC, Fort Rucker, Alabama, which provides the most senior Army warrant officers with broad "how the Army runs: knowledge to operate effectively at the highest organizational levels of the Army. (Course completion of WOAC/WOSC/ WOSSC is required for promotion in ARNG).

WOES is a progressive and sequential training system based on the "select, train, utilize" concept. It is designed to support the Army's new warrant officer career system to retain the best and most technically qualified warrant officers for up to 30 years of warrant officer service.

Warrant Officer Career Development. Warrant officer career development relies on the systematic application of institutional training, operational assignments in progressively more challenging positions, and self-development. It prepares warrant officers and provides the Army the opportunity to effectively use warrant officer leadership and technical expertise for a full 30-year career as a warrant officer. It allows each individual the chance for a full career and professional development in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and complexity up to maximum potential. The warrant officer career development concept provides for a career plan based on a maximum of 30 years of warrant officer service for those reaching the CW5 grade. A full spectrum of personnel management tools and voluntary separation procedures (including retirement at 20 years active federal service) provide for career satisfaction and changing Army requirements.

Enactment of the Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) in 1991 has resulted in a warrant officer management system similar to DOPMA-based commissioned officer management. The WOMA created the CW5 grade to replace the designation of Master Warrant Officer that has been phased out through attrition. The WOMA also established management of warrant officers by years of warrant officer service in lieu of active federal service, established a single WO promotion system, established mandatory grade-based retirement points, and authorized selective early retirement of WOs. Continuing WOMA and WOLDAP implementation promises to improve warrant officer training and management to better support the Army as it moves into the 21st century.

Commissioned Officer Training.

Concept. Officer training is in transition as a result of four initiatives: the adoption of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), the FY 79 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), the 1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS), and the 1988 Leader Development Study. OPMS provided a significant change in officer training philosophy. Commissioned Officer Training is based on the three pillars of leader development: training in schools, training in operational assignments, and self-development. The officer training program is depicted in Figure 15-12, and described below.

A new RC officer education system was implemented 1 October 1992. It includes a shortened OAC, RC-CAS[3], and a shortened and repackaged CGSOC.

Officer Training.

The goal of officer education, training, and development is to produce a corps of broadly-based professionals who are fully competent in technical, tactical, leadership, and training skills; are knowledgeable of "how the Army runs"; and demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility. The vehicle used for achieving this goal is the TRADOC Common Core Subjects. It provides a blueprint to integrate training efforts of proponent service schools, the unit commander, and the individual officer. It documents the training strategy of the proponent, provides a detailed list of resident and unit training requirements, and serves as a professional development and continuing education system for individual officer training from precommissioning, through company grade to field grade. The TRADOC

common core subjects are horizontally integrated into the officer, warrant officer and noncommissioned officer training systems.

Lieutenants' Training. Lieutenants' training consists of the Officer Basic Course (OBC) conducted by the Officer's Basic Branch School and other required resident functional training. OBC will focus on the

lieutenant's first assignment and will prepare him or her to lead, train, sustain, and fight as a part of a unit. POIs are structured to provide a mix of training and education in leadership and ethics, tactics, training the soldier, equipment maintenance, unit logistics, and specialty-unique subjects. OBC students are trained to supervise enlisted soldiers through Skill Level 4 and warrant officers, as applicable. Graduation requires certification of in-resident requirements for the core subjects and for specialty-unique subjects. The Army requires all newly commissioned officers to attend resident OBC at their branch school.

Captains' Training. Training for captains includes Officer Advanced Course (OAC); resident and nonresident functional training, as required; skill training; and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS[3]).

The mission of OAC is to produce technically and tactically competent officers who are professionally qualified for their next assignment (especially command) and prepared for future development. OAC contains a core of common and branch-specific tasks which all students study and a series of modules which are individually selected for each student based on an area of concentration, experience, or professional development requirements. Additional

OFFICER TRAINING SYSTEM

Pre-commissioning	Company Grade Training	Field Grade Training	General Officer Training

Pre-commissioning
- USMA
- ROTC
- OCS

Company Grade Training
- 10-24 WK — Officer Basic Course
- 20 WK — Officer Advanced Course
- 6 WK — MOD
- MOD
- MOD
- 6 WK — CAS^3

Field Grade Training
- 9 M — CGSOC
- 9 M — AMSP
- 3-11 WK — BN/BDE PCC
- 9 M/CSC — SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE

General Officer Training
- GEN OFF PCC
- SENIOR MGMT COLLEGE

AMSP - ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM
CAS^3 - COMBINED ARMS AND SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL
CGSOC - COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF OFFICER COURSE
CSC - CORRESPONDING STUDIES COURSE (2YR PROGRAM)
MOD - MODULE
OAC - OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE
OBC - OFFICER BASIC COURSE
OCS - OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL
PCC - PRE-COMMAND COURSE

Figure 15-9

modules of up to six weeks are available to provide training for the next assignment.

The common component of the OAC core consists of five weeks of leadership training, combined arms, combat service support, and other mandatory instruction directed by HQDA and HQ TRADOC. The branch component of the core consists of those tasks required by all captains in the branch. Length and content is determined by each commandant and varies by branch. Commandants also determine the number and length of modules within the 20-week OAC and the number and type of add-on modules which provide intensive training for the next assignment. In the Combat Service Support (CSS) branches, the OAC curriculum includes five weeks of branch training, seven weeks of common core, and eight weeks of multifunctional material. Multifunctional tasks are those shared tasks which are common to the CSS grouping.

Under the new RC OES, the RC OAC will have only one Inactive Duty Training (IDT) phase and one resident Active Duty for Training (ADT) phase which will be taught by the branch school rather than United States Army Reserve Force (USARF) schools.

The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) provides training for captains in staff skills required at battalion, brigade, division, and installation level and serves as a transition to field grade responsibilities. It emphasizes staff interaction and develops skills in thinking, analyzing, decision making, and defending

decisions in an intense small-group environment. Subject matter includes logistics, training management, budget, mobilization, deployment, and combat operations. A nonresident phase and exam are prerequisites for entering the resident phase of CAS[3]. All OPMD officers from year 1979 and on, and selected special branch officers will attend CAS[3]. Under the new RC OAC all captains are required to complete CAS[3] to be eligible for selection for promotion to Major.

Field Grade Training. Training for field grade officers consists of Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) or equivalent, Battalion and Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC), Senior Service College (SSC), and other resident and nonresident functional training, as required.

The CGSOC mission is to prepare officers for field grade command and principal staff positions. It concentrates instruction on command and staff skills required to plan and to implement the AirLand Operations doctrine at division level and above in the field Army and on skills needed for high-level TDA assignments. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) provides selected officers enhanced professional development in staff skills required in the tactical and operational employment of combined arms formations. Officers are selected during their year tour as a student in the Command and General Staff Officers' Course. In the additional year of study in the AMSP, these students participate in a course that provides enrichment, depth, and broadening education in tactical judgment, develops analytical and conceptual skills, and refines communicative skills and innovative thinking. Students concentrate their studies in maneuver, planning, command and control, close air support, and logistics at the division and corps level. Following graduation from AMSP, Army students are assigned to operational duties at division and corps headquarters.

The Army is working closely with the Joint Staff to ensure that its intermediate and senior command and staff colleges receive full accreditation for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Army is implementing changes in military and faculty mix and course curriculum to meet joint professional military education requirements. Once an officer has completed this phase of his military education, he is then qualified in Phase I of JPME. Selected officers will then attend a special 9 or 11-week course at the restructured Armed Forces Staff College. Graduates of this course will be qualified in Phase II of JPME.

Active and Reserve Component commanders selected for battalion and brigade command attend the Pre-Command Course (PCC) prior to assuming their assignments. Officers attend a one to two-week course conducted by their branch. Here, the command designees receive necessary branch technical and tactical training. The designees then attend a one-week course conducted at Fort Leavenworth that includes Command Team training for the commander and spouse. Selected command designees are then enrolled in the two-week Tactical Commanders' Development Program, a course that focuses on synchronization on the battlefield. Designees may also attend legal, logistics, and language training as they believe their requirements dictate.

The Army War College prepares officers for senior leadership in the Army, Defense, and related departments and agencies by professional military education in national security affairs, with emphasis on

the development and employment of military forces in land warfare. The resident course lasts 44 weeks. Its parallel is a corresponding studies version which takes two years and includes two two-week resident phases.

General officer training has historically not been formalized. Preparation has been through varied assignments over the course of a career. General officer training now consists of various functional and assignment-specific courses. Initiatives to institutionalize training (some as a result of the Professional Development of Officers Study) include: (1) The "CAPSTONE" seven-week course through the National Defense University, which includes visits to MACOMs and Services to enhance understanding of key factors influencing planning for and employment of U.S. forces in joint and combined operations; (2) Brigadier General transition ("charm school"), eight days; (3) Army Force Management GO/SES Course; (4) Leadership Development Program through several accredited civilian institutions; (5) Division/Assistant Division Commander Course at Fort Leavenworth, one week; and (6) Joint Warfighting Course conducted jointly by the U.S. Army War College and Air War College at Maxwell AFB, two weeks, on campaign planning and employment of Services and joint forces.

Mobilization Training Base.

The mobilization training base is tasked to ensure that soldiers arrive in-theater, ready to fight as teams or individual replacements. It must provide combat-ready soldiers who are proficient in those skills that ensure their immediate contribution and survival as members of teams/crews/units in a theater of operations.

The training base will accomplish its task by planned expansion geared to varying levels of mobilization. During Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) and partial mobilization, existing USATCs and Service Schools are augmented by elements of USAR Divisions(IT). Reserve Reception Battalions are also activated during phased mobilization to augment reception stations. USAR assets scheduled to expand or augment the training base are under the peacetime control of FORSCOM, but placed under the command of TRADOC during the establishment and execution of the mobilization training base. Primary planning emphasis for mobilization expansion of the training base is on partial mobilization, with pre-deployment MOS/AOC certification of mobilized Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members the primary mission.

During PSRC and Partial Mobilization, all peacetime training programs continue, with the IRR in-processing certification training mission being added.

Detailed planning guidance for mobilization is contained in the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) and TRADOC's Mobilization, Planning, and Execution System (TMOPES).

THE SYSTEM OF TRAINING IN UNITS

General.

The System of Training in Units includes individual and collective systems-oriented training in units, combined arms and support training, joint and combined operations and interoperability training, and training in the TDA Army. A model of the system is at Figure 15-13.

The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime. The training focus

is on the Army's wartime missions. The Army's program for Training in Units is explained in *FM 25-100*: *Training the Force*, 15 November 1988, and *FM 25-101*: *Battle-Focused Training* 30 September 1990.

Battle focus is an approach used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Battle focus is a process to guide the planning, execution, and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure they train as they are going to fight. Battle focus is critical throughout the entire training process and is used by commanders to allocate resources for training based on wartime mission requirements. The implementation of this concept enables commanders at all levels and their staffs to structure a training program which copes with nonmission-related requirements while focusing on mission-essential training activities. Battle focus is a recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraints. However, a successful training program is achievable by consciously narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment.

Input.

Forces training uses input from the Training Development System and the Training Support System.

Organization for Training in Units.

Training and Doctrine Command. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for conducting initial-entry training, developing combat-leader training, and supports unit training to include doctrinal literature, training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations. Additionally, TRADOC provides guidance for ranges, targets, and ammunition.

The Army Training Support Center (ATSC), a TRADOC field operating agency located at Fort Eustis, Virginia, is the Army's headquarters for the management and distribution of training support products. The mission of ATSC is to manage the production, procurement, warehousing, and delivery of training support products in support of individual and collective training in America's Army.

Central Command (CENTCOM) Forces Command (FORSCOM); U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR); Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA); U.S. Army, South (USARSO); U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USARSOC); and U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC). All are tasked to organize, equip, station, train, and maintain the readiness of assigned units.

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). The training mission for AMC is directed toward specialized training of personnel in the materiel area, to include New Equipment Training (NET) in coordination with FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other field commands. AMC is further tasked to assist TRADOC and FORSCOM on matters associated with supply and maintenance concepts, doctrine, and training.

The U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) provides health services for the Army in CONUS, Panama, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories in the Pacific, and professional education and training for Army Medical Department (AMEDD) and other personnel as directed. The AMEDD center and school is responsible for the execution of the training management function for the AMEDD. It provides

THE FORCES TRAINING SYSTEM

INPUT	PROCESS	OUTPUT
Literature	Home Station Tng:	**Trained Units**
Audiovisual Aids	Soldier	**Trained Soldiers**
Simulations	Leader	
Simulators	Collective	
Devices	Combined Arms	
Facilities	Deplymts for Tng:	
Ranges	JCS Exercise Pgm	
Ammunition	CTs	
Time	JRTC/NTC	
School-Trained	Training Mgmt:	
Soldiers	FM 25-100–Training the Force	
	FM 25-101–Battle Focused Training	

*UNITS—SCHOOLS/CENTERS —***FEEDBACK***—CT/LA/ARTEP/TEA*

ARTEP - ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM   LA - LEADER'S ASSESSMENT
CTs - COMMON TASKS   TEA - TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

Figure 15-10

training and education to all AMEDD personnel, on a worldwide basis.

Training of Soldiers and Leaders in Units.

Concept. Enlisted members learn common tasks and a selected portion of their MOS critical tasks in the training base and are then transferred to field units. Unit commanders are responsible for integrating training tasks under the battle-focus concept.

The goal of unit training is to develop and sustain capability to deploy rapidly and fight effectively in a variety of environments as combined arms teams. Unit training includes the requirement to teach those tasks

not trained in IET as well as sustaining unit mission-related tasks which were taught. Also included in unit training is the development of unit leaders as well as the development of the interdependencies and teamwork that make up team performance (collective training).

Individual training gives soldiers the skills and knowledge they need to do their jobs. As described in *FM 25-100: Training the Force*, the commander's primary responsibility must be preparation for wartime. His training priorities must be on the collective and individual tasks related to the unit's wartime mission. Soldiers newly assigned to a unit must be initially trained on

those wartime tasks since the TRADOC school and/or NCO Education System cannot train all tasks in the resident mode. The commander must define his mission-essential task list and relate his training program to it. This focus will provide the trainer with the definition of what collective and individual training must be performed. The unit's individual training program is a major portion of daily training and must be intensely managed.

The system for training soldiers and leaders in units is depicted at Figure 15-14. Training of soldiers in units depends on qualified noncommissioned officer trainers. NCOs have the task of continuing the training new soldiers began in the training base. Soldier Training Publications (STPs) consisting of soldier's manuals and training guides support this training in units.

Soldier's Manual (SM). Soldier's Manuals support training of common, shared, and MOS-specific critical tasks in both the training base and in the unit. Each task summary describes the minimum acceptable standard and the conditions under which the task must be performed, lists the references soldiers need to master the task, and provides a guide to evaluate hands-on performance. Proponent schools develop MOS-specific SMs that provide conditions, standards, and performance information to support training and evaluation of tasks at each skill level. The U.S. Army Training Support Center publishes two Soldier's Manuals of Common Tasks (SMCT) that provide similar information for the Skill Levels 1-4 common tasks. These are tasks that soldiers must know to fight, survive, and win on the battlefield.

Trainer's Guide (TG). The Trainer's Guide is a tool to guide the unit trainers in establishing an individual training plan for the soldier. The TG for each MOS identifies tasks which should be trained or sustained in the unit. The TG suggests training support materials to be used for each task. TG may be published separately but is normally in the SM for Skill Level 3.

Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP).

NCODP involves the full range of training, education, and other experiences received throughout a career. It is the leader training an NCO receives while a member of a unit. NCODP is the commander's formal program for developing leadership skills and professional attributes of the unit's enlisted leaders. It is a program that encompasses all forms of leader training from individual coaching and counseling to formal instruction for groups of NCOs. It is a program tailored to the unique requirements of the unit and its NCOs.

NCODP objectives are to:
− develop and strengthen leadership skills and professional attributes within the NCO corps.
− provide guidance in the continuing development of noncommissioned officers.
− increase the confidence of the NCO.
− realize the full potential of the NCO support channel.
− improve unit effectiveness.

SYSTEM FOR INDIVIDUAL TRAINING IN UNITS

INPUT	PROCESS	OUTPUT
TRADOC Schools: Training Support Doctrine Standards School-Trained Soldiers HQDA: Policy	Soldier's Manuals Trainer's Guide Leader Book NCODP	Trained Soldiers and Trained Leaders

*CT—LA—***FEEDBACK***—ARTEP*

ARTEP - ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
CT - COMMON TASKS
LA - LEADER'S ASSESSMENT

Figure 15-11

NCODP builds upon the contributions of the Army's Enlisted Personnel Management System and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System. These two systems provide a valuable foundation for the development of noncommissioned officers; however, it is through the practical application of skills in the individual unit that soldiers achieve their goal of becoming a truly professional noncommissioned officer.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) exercises general staff supervision over policies, regulations, initiatives, and programs relating to NCODP.

Common Tasks (CT). The CT are basic critical combat and survival skills. The CT (also known as TRADOC Common Core Subjects) are given to all soldiers in Skill Levels 1 through 4, regardless of MOS and duty assignment. CT are contained in the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks

The CT may be taught at any time in conjunction with other training and competitive events such as stations in a battlefield course, military stakes, drill evaluations, ARTEP, or other collective training.

Leader's Assessment (LA). Leaders' assessments provide the unit commander with an assessment of individual proficiency on tasks critical to the unit's mission. The focus of the leader's assessment is on the individual tasks derived from the analysis of the mission and METL. Using procedures and guides contained in Soldier's Manuals, units evaluate hands-on performance of MOS-specific tasks and common tasks. The

SYSTEM FOR HOME STATION TRAINING

INPUT **PROCESS**

OUTPUT

```
HQDA:    PROGRAM
         POLICY
         RESOURCES
TRADOC:  SCHOOL-TRAINED
         SOLDIERS/LEADERS
           TRAINING SUPPORT
         DOCTRINE
         STANDARDIZATION
AMC:     HARDWARE
           DEVELOPMENT
         NEW EQUIPMENT
           TRAINING
MACOM:   EXECUTION
         EVALUATION
```

```
SOLDIER TRAINING
   SM BASIS
   LEADER ASSESSMENT
   COMMON TASKS
   COMMON MILITARY TNG REQ
LEADER TRAINING
   COMMON TASKS
   COMMON MILITARY TNG REQ
COLLECTIVE TRAINING
   MPT BASIS
LIVE FIRE/MANEUVER
   MIX OF TADSS AND FIELD TNG
   EXEVAL OF COMBINED ARMS
      BATTLE TASKS
   ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
FM 25-100–TRAINING THE FORCE
FM 25-101–BATTLE-FOCUSED
   TRAINING
```

TRAINED CREWS

AND

TRAINED UNITS

*CT—EXEVAL—MTP—*FEEDBACK*—SM—TADSS*

```
CT - COMMON TASKS
EXEVAL - EXERCISE EVALUATION (EXTERNAL EVALUATION)
MTP - MISSION TRAINING PLANS
SM - SOLDIER'S MANUAL
TADSS - TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS AND SIMULATIONS
```

Figure 15-12

leader's assessment is conducted in accordance with Appendix B, *FM 25-101.*

Collective Training.

Collective training refers to developing in a group of soldiers those interdependencies and teamwork that go to make up team performance. The terms "collective training" and "unit training" cannot be used interchangeably. Unit training includes collective training and the training of soldiers and leaders. The primary features of collective training are that it is decentralized and performance-oriented. Performance-oriented collective training is training units to do the same tasks or missions that they will do in wartime, and to do them well enough to ensure success on the battlefield. The performance objective is the basis of the performance-oriented

approach. Training is conducted to attain the objective. Included within the training objective are the tasks, conditions, and evaluation standards. The standards are used to determine the unit's ability to accomplish the task and are measured in GO/NO GO terms. The evaluation is designed to be used to develop timely remedial training programs. Figures 15-15 and 15-16 describe Collective Training in Units.

Training Safety.

The training mission cannot be considered fully successful if it is not accomplished safely. The principles of integration and risk management have special relevance to the training situation. Commanders must integrate safety as a training management factor from the moment the mission is defined and the mission-

15-31

SYSTEM FOR DEPLOYMENTS FOR TRAINING

INPUT   **PROCESS**

OUTPUT

```
HQDA:     PROGRAM
          POLICY
          RESOURCES
TRADOC: SCHOOL-TRAINED
          SOLDIERS/LEADERS
            TRAINING SUPPORT
          DOCTRINE
          STANDARDIZATION
AMC:      HARDWARE
            DEVELOPMENT
          NEW EQUIPMENT
            TRAINING
MACOM:  EXECUTION
          EVALUATION
```

```
JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM
   JOINT/COMBINED TRAINING
CTC (NTC, JRTC, CMTC)
   HIGH REALISM
   LIVE FIRE/MANEUVER TRAINING
     FOR BN/BDE
BCTP
   LEADER/STAFF TRAINING
   DIVISION, CORPS
SPECIALTY TRAINING
   JOTC
   NWTC
UNIT EXCHANGES WITH OTHER
  COUNTRIES
FM 25-100–TRAINING THE FORCE
FM 25-101–BATTLE-FOCUSED
   TRAINING
```

TRAINED CREWS

AND

TRAINED UNITS

*BCTP—CMTC—JRTC—***FEEDBACK***—NTC—JOTC—NWTC*

CMTC - COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER   JOTC - JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER
CTC - COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS   NTC - NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
JRTC - JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER   NWTC - NORTHERN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER

Figure 15-13

essential task list (METL) is developed. When safety is realistically integrated in training, the benefits extend to the garrison environment, off-duty activities, and most importantly, to the combat arena.

Training to standard and enforcing the standard provides a sound foundation for safe training.

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).

Using ARTEP manuals, which include battle drills and MTPs, commanders evaluate and develop collective training based on unit weaknesses, then train to overcome those weaknesses and reevaluate. During training, the unit leadership continuously evaluates the performance of individuals and units against the prescribed standards. This "train-evaluate-train" philosophy acknowledges that observed deficiencies are noted by the commander and become the focus of follow-on training.

ARTEP Mission Training Plans (MTPs) and Drills. There are MTPs for each type TOE/MTOE platoon, company, battalion, combined arms task forces, and brigade, division, and corps staffs. The MTPs provide a clear description of "what" and "how" to train to achieve critical wartime mission proficiency for each unit echelon. Each MTP contains mission outlines, situational and field training

exercises (STXs and FTXs), and comprehensive detailed training and evaluation outlines. MTPs provide other training management aids such as leader training tasks, resource requirements, and evaluation methods. Included are matrices linking collective tasks to missions, references to collective tasks, drills/

collective tasks to individual tasks, and STXs to missions. The MTP is based on the training principles listed in *FM 25-100:*

Train as combined arms and services team. Leaders must regularly practice the cross attachment of the full wartime spectrum of combat support units. When committed to battle, each unit must be prepared to execute combined arms and services operations without additional training or lengthy adjustment periods.

Train as the unit will fight. Units will fight as they are trained. Soldiers will remember the last way they performed a task, right or wrong. It is imperative that soldiers and units perform to established standards and that these standards are rigidly enforced by leaders.

Train using published Army doctrine. The MTP and supporting materials conform to published doctrine.

Use performance-oriented training. Units become proficient in the performance of critical tasks and missions by practicing the tasks and missions. Soldiers learn by doing, with coaching and critiquing by the leaders, and good after-action reviews.

Train to challenge. Challenging training builds competence and confidence by developing and honing skills. It inspires excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to learn.

Train to sustain proficiency. The cornerstone of the ARTEP is the concept of sustaining proficiency (train-evaluate-train). Sustainment requires practice and repetition. Evaluation illuminates training weaknesses. Emphasis is on sustaining skills and correcting

identified weaknesses simultaneously. The mission outlines and sequentially smaller training components allow selection of tasks and groups of tasks to facilitate this process and reduce planning time.

Train using multiechelon techniques. Simultaneously train individuals, leaders, and units at each echelon in the organization during training events.

Train to maintain. Maintenance training designed to keep equipment in the fight is of equal importance to being expert in its use.

Commanders are the primary trainers. Leaders at all levels are responsible for the training and performance of their soldiers and units. Their personal involvement is essential to training and battlefield success.

Mission Training Plans (MTP) Consist of:

Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs). T&EOs are the foundation of the MTP. They provide measurable, objective performance standards which form the bases for training and internal and external evaluations to assist commanders in identifying specific training strengths and weaknesses. T&EOs are developed for each collective task and placed in Chapter 5 of the MTP.

Situational Training Exercises (STX). STX are short, scenario-driven, mission-oriented tactical exercises to train a group of closely related collective tasks and drills. STX provide preconstructed, short-term exercises that are central to sustainment training for tactical mission proficiency. STX support training at company, platoon, and

staff section level. STX provide the leader a method to train using doctrinally-approved tactics and techniques, but unlike a battle drill, do not establish the method of execution as doctrine. STX may be modified based on local METT-T. This method provides for a degree of standardization without stereotyping training. Fully developed STX reduce the amount of time required to plan training by providing detailed information on resource requirements, recommended preliminary (drill, leader, and soldier) training, OPFOR requirements, etc. The STX should be supported by doctrinal graphics and clear illustrations which assist the leaders in the conduct of the exercise. STX will be outlined for all platoon and company level missions. Fully developed STX, consisting of groupings of T&EOs (collective tasks and battle drills) for at least one mission, are placed in Chapter 4 of the MTP. Outlined STX are placed in Chapter 3.

Field Training Exercises (FTX). Each MTP will contain one or more fully-developed FTX for critical wartime missions identified for the unit and approved by the school review board (if only one, it will be for the most difficult mission). This requirement is optional for platoon-level MTPs. FTX are the highest-level exercises used by a platoon, company, or battalion to train to mission proficiency at its level.

Training Matrices. Training matrices are designed to aid the leader in using MTP to plan training. Leaders are required constantly to identify and prioritize missions, collective tasks, leader tasks, and individual tasks that are required based on known contingency plans and the mission training guidance provided by their commanders. Training matrices provide an organized set of

relationships which make the leader's job easier.

Mission Outlines. Mission outlines are graphic portrayals of the relationship between critical wartime missions and the subordinate tasks inherent in those missions. Mission outlines are designed to provide the commander with a visual outline of his unit's critical wartime missions in a format which facilitates the planning and management of training at his level. Mission outlines will be prepared for all critical platoon, company, and battalion wartime missions using the same general format.

Drill Books. Drill books are separate documents developed for squads and platoons, or equivalent units, squads, and teams. They provide a limited number of DA standard methods for executing selected standard critical collective tasks that have been identified as vital to the success of a unit in combat. MTPs and drills do not change the Army's training and evaluation program. However, they do standardize many innovations found in units and provide leaders detailed procedures to orchestrate training programs and evaluate training effectiveness.

Drill Training.

A unit's ability to accomplish its mission frequently depends on the ability of its soldiers to execute key actions instinctively as immediate reactions to a situation or order. The ability to do this is fundamental to survival on the battlefield. Drills are designed to focus on a limited number of key actions that every like unit in the Army must master. Drills do several important things:

− They allow squads and platoons to perform critical tasks instantly

because they have been practiced repetitively.
- They reduce the communications requirements because soldiers know what they have to do.
- They build teamwork.
- They save time, energy, and lives.
- Drills may be trained using a talk-through, walk-through, and run-through method.

Combat Training Center (CTC) Program.

The Combat Training Center Program consists of the National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

The Combat Training Center (CTC) Program. The CTC Program has had the most significant influence on Army training, doctrine, and combat readiness of any program in recent years. The objective of the CTC Program is to provide highly realistic and stressful joint, and combined arms training according to Army doctrine. This training simulates combat. Specifically, the CTC Program was established to: (1) increase unit readiness for deployment and warfighting; (2) produce bold, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and operational exercises; (3) embed doctrine throughout the Army; (4) provide feedback to Army and joint/combined participants; and (5) provide a data source for lessons learned to improve doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel focused on soldiers.

The Combat Training Center program is central to the Army's strategy to prepare units of the Army to win in any type of conflict. The program provides training for Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units from squad/crew through corps staff levels. The level of realism achieved at CTCs has established a new standard of training excellence that has permeated units Army-wide.

The BCTP, located at Fort Leavenworth, mission is to train corps, division, major subordinate commanders, and selected brigade commanders and battle staffs, to conduct full range of military operations with focus on combat operations, and to prepare selected Army organizations to operate in a joint/combined environment as Army Component or nucleus to JTF.

The BCTP provides division and corps commanders and their battle staffs advanced combat training opportunities through the medium of state-of-the-art automated battle simulations. The BCTP consists of four operations groups, a standardized professional threat MTT known as the "World Class OPFOR," and a comprehensive after-action review (AAR) package supported by the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS). The program is conducted in two phases, generally within the first six months of a new commander's tour. Phase I is the commander's seminar, which focuses on team-building. The seminar lasts five days and enables the commander and his battle staff to participate in AirLand Operations discussions, threat doctrine/force structure updates, decision exercises, and training simulation familiarization. Phase II, called the WARFIGHTER, is an intensive five-day command post exercise, which puts the division or corps against a "thinking" OPFOR, who fights to win. The BCTP provides a seminar and warfighter exercise every two years to each corps and division headquarters, that both Active and Reserve

Components use. Also, increased emphasis will be placed on the integration of SOF, CSS, and public affairs operations into all BCTP training scenarios.

The CMTC at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany mission is to provide forward deployed organizations an environment to train up to a brigade combat team, and selected division maneuver assets, to conduct and rehearse operations across the spectrum of conflict from high intensity combat to peace support operations. The CMTC is designed to provide force-on-force training benefits for USAREUR maneuver battalion task forces. The CMTC provides an annual opportunity for USAREUR battalions to train in a realistic battlefield environment. Through integration of instrumentation and observer/controllers, the CMTC gathers valuable information for unit after-action reviews and Army lessons learned. Procedures similar to those used at the NTC are used to enhance training at the CMTC. CMTC has a permanent OPFOR and a fully operational instrumentation system. Increased emphasis is placed on full brigade operations while maintaining the training focus at the maneuver battalion task force level. Force reductions in Europe enable conduct of annual training rotations for units that remain. The brigade headquarters is presented an excellent opportunity to evaluate its ability to synchronize the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) on the battlefield with a combination of units operating force-on-force and in simulation. CMTC's current continuous combat model has two battalion task forces operating in the maneuver box simultaneously for two of the seven days simulated combat each battalion task force receives. Currently, CMTC conducts 15 battalion-size task force rotations each year. Additionally, CMTC devotes 52 days a year to German Army unit training.

The mission of the JRTC is to provide an advanced level of joint training for Air Force and Army contingency forces exercising an Infantry Brigade Task Force and Joint Special Operations Forces under tough, realistic conditions ranging from stability and support operations (SASO) to war in deployment and tactical operations under realistic conditions. All light (non-mechanized) maneuver battalions will be afforded the opportunity to train at the JRTC during standard rotations. The goal is for each AC brigade to train at the JRTC or another Combat Training Center (CTC) once every 24 months while RC battalions will train at a CTC once every 48 months. The JRTC is located at Fort Polk, Louisiana. JRTC rotations are brigade rotations consisting of two battalions (force-on-force) plus a CPX battalion. JRTC conducts 10 rotations per year. One rotation is reserved for a National Guard separate brigade and one for a USASOC battalion during each fiscal year. Every other year, a rotation is reserved for brigade-level Partnership for Peace (PFP). The Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) activities are planned and conducted by elements of a RC Corps Support Group (CSG) or Area Support Groups (ASG), which provide a range of services from Joint PSYOPS/Civil Affairs units to Replacement Detachments. Approximately 6,500 RC soldiers participate in training at the JRTC annually. Joint and combined arms operations are the norm at JRTC. Air Force elements from Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command participate in every rotation. USMC ANGLICO teams and close air support aircraft participate frequently. Most rotations include Army Special Forces units, often with augmentation from Air

Force Special Operations and Navy SEAL personnel. Most rotations also include the attachment of an armor or mechanized company/team to the light brigade. Initiatives incorporated at the JRTC include civilians and media on the battlefield, terrorist events, host nation operations, civil-military operations, and nogovernmental organization (NGO) integration allowing allied nations to send units to exercise as Foreign Internal Defense elements (FID) during rotations, and the development of peace operations scenarios for rotational units.

The NTC, located at Fort Irwin, California, provides tough, combined arms and services training in accordance with Joint/Airland operations doctrine for brigade combat teams and regiments in a mid- to high-intensity environment, while retaining the training feedback and analysis focus at battalion task force level. Additionally, the NTC provides a lessons-learned data source for training, doctrine, organization, and equipment improvements. Comprised of 636,300 acres in the California Mohave Desert with sophisticated targetry and fully instrumented battlefield, the NTC maneuver space allows for doctrinal array of high-speed armored forces with realistic movement and engagement distances. Currently, the NTC conducts (12) 28-day rotations, training over 50,000 active and reserve component soldiers per year. Rotation training units include two battalion task forces in a brigade combat team (-), with some rotations exercising mixed mobility by adding a light, airborne, or air assault infantry battalion task force in brigade operations. The rotation strategy now includes the heavy division cavalry squadrons and aviation brigades (-). Additionally, RC CS/CSS units are routinely integrated into rotational support operations.

Training scenarios are based on the battalion/brigade's Mission Essential Task List (METL) while conducting continuous operations. Training units face two major challenges by conducting live fire operations at the battalion task force level, and force-on-force using MILES up to brigade level. Full-time Observers/Controllers are provided to train, coach, and monitor their counterparts, and also observe/control the training. This is enhanced by a fully instrumented battlefield to provide the visual and computerized graphic after-action review process unique to the NTC. A dedicated, trained Opposing Force (OPFOR) with representative uniforms, equipment, weapons, and tactics to replicate a motorized rifle regiment provide units a realistic tactical environment

CTC Summary

In combination, these centers will provide state-of-the-art, multiechelon, combined-arms training in joint and combined environments for the full spectrum of forces. This strategy will allow the Army to enhance standards, train leaders, train units, standardize doctrine, and provide critical feedback through after-action reviews and comprehensive take-home packages. The goal of this combat readiness training strategy is to provide the environment to achieve and sustain enhanced levels of combat readiness for America's Army.

Training Management.

The Army must prepare to cope with the future demands the year 2000 and beyond. Training management will be complicated by constrained resources, force restructuring, the introduction of new doctrine and organizational concepts related to it, and the continuing requirement for

individual training in the unit. Effective training programs and exercises must be designed to get the most use from available resources.

Training management is the process commanders and their staffs use to plan training and to identify the related resources needed to conduct and evaluate training. It involves all echelons and applies to any unit in the Army regardless of strength, mission, organization, or equipment. Training management must work in unison with other unit programs to achieve the common goal— a well-trained unit. *FM 25-100: Training the Force* was approved in November 1988. This manual has application for leaders at all levels and for every type organization. The principal focus is on active and reserve battalion equivalent and higher-level commanders, their Command Sergeants Major, and staff. TRADOC (CAC-TNG) has developed *FM 25-101: Battle-Focused Training* that complements *FM 25-100* on the importance of battle focus in training and applies to battalion and company soldiers, leaders, and units. This *FM* provides practical "how to" guidelines for officers and NCOs, including techniques and procedures for planning, executing, and assessing training.

The *FM 25 Series* manuals and *AR 350-41*: *Training in Units* establish the system and policy for Army training management. The manuals provide commanders with a management system they can use to plan training; take necessary resource actions; and evaluate soldier and unit proficiency, training, and training management. They describe long-range, short-range, and near-term planning and the related resource actions. Execution of training, evaluation, and organizational assessment are also described. The methods and examples presented in these manuals have proved successful in units throughout the Army.

Standard Army Training System (SATS). SATS provides unit commanders with automation support to facilitate the execution of the training management process described in *FM 25-100: Training the Force*, and related documents. It accomplishes this by enabling unit commanders to use their existing office automation systems to:

- access relevant training management documents and records, such as Mission Training Plans (MTPs);
- perform nearly all analyses inherent in the training management process, such as ammunition forecasts and assessments;
- identify resource requirements for training activities;
- prepare and print required schedules, calendars, and reports.

SATS integrates key management functions which support developing the Mission Essential Task List (METL) to determine training requirements, planning, resourcing, scheduling, and assessing training in units. It will assist the management of training from company through corps, and serve as the Army's single, standard training management tool.

The system operates on any IBM-compatible system, using an MS-DOS operating system and a dot matrix printer. The SATS program and the associated data bases are provided on diskettes. The system is unclassified and is designed to be operated by commanders and training managers. The battalion permanently loads SATS onto the computer's hard disk. Each battalion and

each company has its own data base diskettes containing its unique MTP, Soldiers' Training Publication (STP), and other mission-related data and resource information.

The End User Manual is aligned with the Training Management Cycle described in *FM-100.* The three main functions of the software are METL Development, Planning, and Execution/Assessment. A brief overview of these three functions follows.

METL Development. METL development begins with a review of all wartime plans, external directives, and other material from which commanders identify those tasks which are essential for accomplishing wartime missions. Sources of tasks include MTPs, STPs, and SIWT. Tasks from MTPs and STPs have been incorporated into unique data bases which automatically provide conditions and standards for each task, show collective-to-individual task crosswalks, and allow the establishment of Commander's Evaluation (CE) training tasks. Training managers can use SATS to develop their unit's METL, obtain approval from the next higher wartime headquarters, and designate Battle Tasks. This process can be performed directly on the computer screen or on computer-generated mission-to-task worksheets. SATS also provides the capability for a unit to add missions, tasks, conditions, and standards which it considers essential but are not contained in other documents, and to modify MTP task conditions.

Planning. Planning is based on the approved METL and training assessments. The planning function is composed of six subfunctions: training assessment; short- and long-range plans; calendars; schedules; resource management; and coordination activities.

Training assessments compare an organization's current levels of proficiency with desired levels of proficiency. SATS allows sequential and subjective assessment of all METL tasks, their supported missions, and their associated Battlefield Operating System (BOS). Based on assessments of unit proficiency, commanders can then assign training priorities for each METL task, mission, and BOS. SATS then helps commanders develop a training strategy by allowing them to select the type of training event (classroom, CPX, FTX, etc.) through which they desire METL tasks to be trained.

Short- and long-range training plans, calendars, and schedules assemble the prioritized tasks, missions, BOS, and strategy to produce a logical training plan for up to 24 months. SATS also provides weekly training highlights and reminders to ensure timely coordination for needed facilities, equipment, and ammunition.

Scheduled events must be properly resourced with sufficient funds, equipment, facilities, and ammunition in order for valid and effective training to be carried out. The SATS resource management subfunction allocates, reconciles, and monitors these items.

The coordination activities subfunction allows the planner to make pre- and post-execution checks. For example, it provides a list of activities which must be accomplished before and after an event is executed and a sequential list of activities to support a plan.

Execution and Assessment. As organizations execute training, evaluations are made from which assessments of proficiency are derived. Assessments are a continuing process. SATS produces checklists, in the form of METL Training

and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) and Squad Books, which can be used to gather evaluation data. Based on evaluation feedback, observation, and subjective judgments, the commander makes an assessment of training proficiency by recording Trained (T), Needs Practice (P), or Untrained (U) for each task. The composite of those tasks can then be summarized to assess mission and BOS proficiency.

The Execution and Assessment section also provides the capability to monitor allocated resources that are consumed during execution of training. SATS allows immediate review of essential information regarding OPTEMPO, fuel, ammunition, and internal and external support requirements.

Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS). RCAS is to be an automated information system that supports the decision making needs of all commanders, staffs, and functional managers responsible for Reserve Component forces. The RCAS uses state-of-the-art office automation, telecommunications, data bases, and processing capability to provide timely and accurate information for planning, preparation, and execution of mobilization and to improve the accomplishment of routine administrative demands. It is a self-sufficient system capable of exchanging data with related information systems. The RCAS will link all Army Reserve Component (ARNG and USAR) units, Mobilization Stations, and MACOMs. The Training Management portion of RCAS will be designed like SATS and will automate training management for the RC. It will be able to interface with SATS and ATRRS.

Army's Standardization Program (ASP). This program was designed to counter the effects of turbulence by eliminating or reducing the requirement for soldiers to be retrained on joining a new unit. The objective was to standardize procedures used by soldiers to operate, maintain, and fight major systems.

The ASP was established by a letter from the Army Chief of Staff on 10 June 1980. It was formalized by Chapter 5 of *AR 350-1: Army Training*, 1 August 1981. A 1982 DAIG inspection revealed ASP has not been implemented effectively throughout the Army. The dilemma was how to standardize without stifling initiative. HQDA produced a capstone regulation, *AR 34-4: Army Standardization Policy*, which makes each ARSTAF agency responsible for standardization within its own functional area.

Army Modernization Training (AMT).

Overview. *AR 350-35: Army Modernization Training (AMT)* provides policy and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the planning and execution of new systems training. The regulation provides a process for the expeditious integration of equipment into the force structure through New Equipment Training (NET), Displaced Equipment Training (DET), Doctrine and Tactics Training (DTT), and Sustainment Training (ST).

NET is designed to support force integration and modernization through identification of personnel, training, and training devices required to support new or improved equipment; by planning for the orderly transfer of knowledge from the materiel developer to the trainer, user, and supporter by documenting requirements in NET Plans (NETPs); and the deployment of

NET Teams (NETT) to train soldiers to operate, maintain, and provide instruction on modernized equipment. NET is tied to the RDA Life-Cycle System Management Model (LCSMM) (Chapter 11). The interface of NET and LCSMM is shown in Figure 15-17.

DET applies to systems that are being replaced by new equipment, but remain in the inventory. Planning for and executing DET is similar to the process used in NET; the objectives of both training programs are the same. Responsibility for DET planning differs: FORSCOM and USARPAC, as applicable, are responsible for planning DET for the USAR, CNGB for the Army National Guard, and TRADOC for the Active Component.

DTT is conducted in conjunction with NET or DET. DTT provides commanders, battle staffs, operators, and trainers with a doctrinal basis for employment of new or displaced materiel. ST is a command responsibility. The training base shares the responsibility for ST by assuring that a pool of trained replacements is established to support the sustainment effort. The ultimate responsibility for ST, however, remains with the commander.

The Players. NET management in the commodity commands is addressed by an organic NET management division, not the designated system Project/Program Manager (PM). While the majority of NET managers are assigned to AMC, NET managers also are assigned to Information Systems Command and U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency for the management of information and medical systems, respectively.

The Process. NETPs are the linchpins of the modernization process. NETPs document the training requirements, schedules, and resources required to train units receiving new systems. Materiel developers produce, coordinate, publish, and distribute NETPs. This assures that resources programmed in support of NET are synchronized with the PM's developmental milestones

NETPs are living documents, initiated by the materiel developer, and coordinated with the combat and training developers, to define training strategies. NETPs change as materiel development, operations, maintenance, and fielding concepts evolve. Revised NETPs are routinely reviewed and approved at the semiannual HQDA Consolidated Training Support Work Group (CTSWG) Conference. The CTSWG provides the forum for identification and resolution of potential problems that might impact the efficient execution of NET or DET. MACOM attendance at CTSWG conferences is essential to the meaningful review of proposed NET strategies for all new systems to be fielded to affected commands. Joint development of acceptable plans that can economically assure success in the proliferation of new system training must be achieved early.

NET strategies include: institutional training, exportable training material, leader training, key personnel training, organizational training, and total unit training. Validation and verification of the NET program of instruction are conducted by both materiel and training developers. The NET manager also provides training for depot maintenance personnel, Logistics Assistance Representatives, NETT members, and training base instructor personnel. Instructor and key personnel training is more technical than that required by operators/users but produces the expertise required to support the logistics and training base requirements.

NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING: PLANNING PROCESS (LIFE CYCLE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT MODEL)

	Phase 0	Phase I	Phase II	P III	Post Field
Determination Of Need	**Concept Exploration**	**Program Definition & Risk Reduction**	**Engineering & Manufacturing Development**	**Prod, Fielding / Deployment &**	**Opn'l Supt**

Mile-stone 0 — MNS APPV'D

Mile-stone I — ORD APPV'D

Mile-stone II — DEVELOP-MENT

Mile-stone III — Prod, Field / Depl

Post Fielding — MAJOR MOD

MNS   STRAP   ORD   IKPT   QQPRI   BOIP   AS REQUIRED

BOIP FEEDER DATA

NET PLAN

NMIBT
NETT

BOIP - BASIS OF ISSUE PLAN
IKPT - INSTRUCTOR AND KEY PERSONNEL TRAINING
MNS - MISSION NEEDS STATEMENT
NET - NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING
NETT - NET TEAM

NMIBT - NEW MATERIEL INFORMATION BRIEFING TEAM
ORD - OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT
QQPRI - QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE PERSONNEL
REQUIREMENTS INFORMATION
STRAP - SYSTEM TRAINING PLAN

Figure 15-14

Automation. The Army Modernization Training Automation System (AMTAS) provides the capability for automated preparation, review, distribution, and storage of the existing 700+ NETPs. The AMTAS is a fully integrated, automated system with capability for interactive development, updating, staffing, and distribution of NETPs. The AMTAS data base is used to electronically publish NETPs and can provide updated versions instantaneously. All MACOMs, as well as all MSCs of AMC and TRADOC, have access to AMTAS. It is the only official data base for all Army NET plans. The Army's extensive modernization effort demands that all commands continue to work closely to provide the best training on new systems, first through NET/DET and then through effective sustainment programs.

The Security Assistance Training Program (SATP).

The Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) consists of U.S. military training assistance to eligible countries. Security assistance includes all training of international military personnel conducted within Department of Defense (DOD) activities under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as amended. The two components of the SATP are:

- International Military Education and Training (IMET) (under FAA). IMET represents education and training provided for which the military departments are

reimbursed from foreign assistance appropriations.

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (under AECA). FMS covers the sale of defense articles, services, and training to eligible foreign governments and international organizations. These sales are reimbursed as required by law.

CG, TRADOC has been designated as HQDA executive agent for security assistance training provided by the U.S. Army. He discharges these responsibilities through the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, the Security Assistance Training Field Activity, and the Security Assistance Training Management Office at Fort Bragg, NC.

Objectives of the SATP are as follows:

− Develop skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.
− Assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management and operation of its defense establishment.
− Foster the foreign country's development of its own professional and technical training capability.
− Promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country.
− Promote democratic ideals such as civilian control of the military and establishment of effective military justice system.
− Promote better understanding of the United States, its people,

political system, institutions, and way of life through a DOD-sponsored Information Program.

− Increase the international military student's awareness of the U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

CONUS Resident Training. Resident training requirements are based on procedures executed under the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS). The IMET program concentrates on professional leadership and management training, while FMS emphasizes technical training in support of equipment and weapons sales.

OCONUS Training. CG, TRADOC is also responsible for activities associated with forming, preparing, and deploying Security Assistance Teams from DOD resources. The responsibilities for carrying out training team requirements have been delegated to the Director, Security Assistance Training Management Office, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC.

System Training Plan (STRAP).

The STRAP is the master training plan for a new/improved system. It accomplishes the following functions:

− Documents the results of early training analyses covering specifically who requires training, what tasks need training, and when, where, and how proponents will conduct training.
− Starts the planning process for all necessary courses and course revisions, training products, and

training support required for the new system.

- Sets milestones to ensure timely development of training and training support to permit testing and fielding of total systems.
- Identifies resource requirements which require programming and budgeting.
- Communicates training and resource requirements within and between TRADOC schools and centers and HQ TRADOC, materiel developers, user MACOM, and HQDA.
- Establishes the basis for assessment of training subsystem progress in support of: (1) requirement review committee reviews, (2) ILS reviews, (3) Training Test Support Packages, (4) TRADOC Materiel Evaluation Committee, (5) IPR, and (6) milestone decision reviews (MDR). Proponent schools will submit the initial STRAP to HQ TRADOC not later than 90 days prior to Milestone I. STRAP updates or revisions are due not later than 90 days prior to Milestone Decision Reviews II or III, respectively.

In summary, the STRAP is the key training programmatic document for new/improved systems.

THE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM

General.

Training support provides the foundation on which the Army training system runs. That foundation includes training management, training facilities, ranges, advanced collective training facilities, troop schools, equipment and supplies, training land, ammunition, devices and simulators, simulations, resident course materials, extension training materials, publications, visual information materials, learning centers, video teletraining, correspondence courses, and evaluation/ standardization. This foundation enables the training system to meet Total Army training needs with trained individuals and units. The system model is at Figure 15-18.

Input.

The Training Support System relies on input from the PPBES (Chapter 8), the Training Policy and Resourcing System, and the Training Development System.

Organization for Training Support.

The Army Training Support Center (ATSC) at Fort Eustis, VA, a field operating activity of TRADOC, is a key organization for training support. ATSC is tasked to standardize, publish, and distribute the bulk of training support products, which are developed at the Service schools as described earlier.

Process.

THE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM

INPUT	PROCESS	OUTPUT

RESOURCES
DOCTRINE
PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION (POI)
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PLAN (ITP)
STRAC
STRAP

ARMY-WIDE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM

DSS TRAINING STRATEGIES
LITERATURE
VISUAL INFORMATION
FACILITIES
RANGES
AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS
TRAINING MANUALS
TADSS
RC3
MULTIMEDIA PRODUCTS

IVD	ICW	CDI
TVI	CAI	DVI
VTT	CBI	TVT
	CD-ROM	

STAFF VISITS—**FEEDBACK**— *STAFF VISITS*

CAI - COMPUTER ASSISTED INSTRUCTION
CBI - COMPUTER BASED INSTRUCTION
CD-ROM - COMPACT DISK-READ ONLY MEMORY
CDI - COMPACT DISK INTERACTIVE
ICW - INTERACTIVE COURSE WARE
IVD - INTERACTIVE VIDEO DISC
RC3 - RESERVE COMPONENT COURSE CONFIGURATION

STRAC - STANDARDS IN TRAINING COMMISSION
STRAP - SYSTEM TRAINING PLAN
TADSS - TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATIONS, AND SIMULATORS
TVT - TELEVISION TAPES
VTT - VIDEO TELETRAINING

Figure 15-15

The Training Support System provides training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs including resident training. It provides the processes as well as the manuals, visual information aids, simulators, devices, real estate, ranges, ammunition, and other tools necessary to conduct training in units and institutions. It is a multibillion dollar program.

The need for extension training materials (ETM) may be identified in the TRAS documents (ITP, POI), the STRAP, collective training plans, and unit MOS Training Plans. The Training Development Workload Planner-Automated Systems Approach to Training (TDWP-ASAT) is an interactive management information system which automates the integration of training requirements and products into the Army training inventory and the maintenance of a centralized ETM data base.

These plans are the commandant's basic means of identifying products that will provide field commanders and trainers with the exportable training materials necessary to support training outside the U.S. Army service schools. Exportable training includes both collective and individual training and is based on tasks, conditions, and standards. It is specifically designed for use in the field or garrison training environments to bring both individuals and units to the desired level of training. The MACOM and operational units, like TRADOC, also get involved in the preparation of training materials, but on a limited scale. The remainder of this section

will examine the principal training support available.

RC3 Courseware.

ATSC provides centralized management of reproduction and distribution of standardized training support packages to Reserve Component Training Institutions (RCTIs). These packages train critical tasks for MOS qualification and reclassification, NCOES, Officer and Warrant Officer training as well as sustainment, transition, and additional skill identifier training, and regional training sites for maintenance and medical courses.

Simulators and simulations.

The use of high technology is revolutionizing Army training. The Army uses the full spectrum of simulations to mitigate restrictions due to environmental and affordability concerns. These simulations allow the Army to fully exercise the battlefield capabilities of increasingly complex warfighting systems. Simulations are playing a rapidly increasing role throughout the Army, shaping training, research and development, and force development decisions. Simulations are the basis for the Army's future training strategy. Live simulations augment field training with realism and provide invaluable feedback to commanders. Virtual simulations allow repetitive, low-cost training while simultaneously raising individual and crew proficiency. Constructive simulations provide tough, challenging command and staff training at all echelons, including joint operations.

The Department of the Army agency responsible for managing Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS) is Office Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Training Systems Division (DAMO-TRS).

Family of Simulations (FAMSIM). TRADOC's National Simulation Center is the Army's FAMSIM training developer and has responsibility to employ computer-based war games to support multi-corps through company-level leadership training. FAMSIM is the general term for the overall command and control synchronization training simulations program. It includes combat, combat support, and combat service support systems (hardware and software) and the network/ communications for interactive simulations, both computer-assisted and fully computerized, through which command and staff elements are trained to perform their wartime mission-essential tasks. The National Simulation Center at TRADOC's Combined Arms Command–Training (CAC–TNG) is the Army's FAMSIM training developer and has the responsibility in establishing the total Army requirement for state-of-the-art, cost-effective simulations. AMC's Simulations Training and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) is FAMSIM's materiel developer and acts as TRADOC's partner with the responsibility to test, field, and sustain FAMSIM throughout its entire life cycle. A brief examination of on-board and programmed FAMSIM simulations illustrates their utility. Figure 15-19 displays the FAMSIM products by echelons.

Variable Intensity Computerized Training System (VICTORS). VICTORS is a desktop personal computer (PC)-based model. VICTORS can support the training of commanders and their staffs at battalion through division level. VICTORS will assist in training across the operation continuum and military operations other than war. Emphasis is placed on interaction of civil

affairs and psychological operations. Future modules will be available for combat support/combat service support, disaster relief, humanitarian missions, special operations, and strategic, national, and host-nation assistance.

BATTLE SIMULATIONS

ECHELON	COMPUTER-SUPPORTED SIMULATIONS
CORPS	CBS CSSTSS VICTORS
DIV	CBS CSSTSS VICTORS
BDE/GP	CBS CSSTSS* VICTORS
BN	CBS CSSTSS* VICTORS
CO	JANUS
PLT	JANUS

BBS - BDE/BN SIMULATION
CBS - CORPS BATTLE SIMULATION
CSSTSS - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING
   SIMULATION SYSTEM
VICTORS - VARIABLE INTENSITY COMPUTERIZED TRAINING
   SYSTEM
* CSSTSS TRAINS BDE/GP/BN AS PART OF THE
   COSCOM/DISCOM IN A CSS DIVISION EXERCISE

Figure 15-19

JANUS. JANUS is the Army's battle-focused trainer for company through team battle synchronization and leader seminar training. JANUS 5.0 runs on 8 or 16 microcomputer workstations with a capability of training up to 32 leaders in maneuver and battlefield operating system synchronization. JANUS is fielded to all division and corps battle simulation centers and to institutions. JANUS is used at the Tactical Commanders Development Course/ Pre-Command Course, Fort Leavenworth, as a course of action analyzer and synchronization tool for end-of-course exercise.

Brigade/Battalion Simulation (BBS). BBS is a second generation system that operates on FAMSIM-compatible hardware. BBS incorporates the training features of ARTBASS, plus the added capability of being able to link to multiple sites for longer exercises. BBS supports training of combat maneuver commanders and staffs at battalion and brigade. BBS models direct and indirect fires, movement, mobility/ countermobility, air defense, army aviation and close air support, chemical and nuclear effects, combat service support, and airborne/airmobile operations. BBS can play individual soldier/weapon systems up to brigade-size units.

Combat Service Support Training Simulation System (CSSTSS). CSSTSS is simulation system designed to support command and staff training at the corps support command (COSCOM), theater army area command (TAACOM), and theater army command service support command levels in a CPX mode. The system is fielded at the U.S. Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) only where it is used primarily to support FPLX (LOGEX). The system uses map boards, and may be remoted to units via long haul networking.

Corps Battle Simulation (CBS). CBS is a fully automated simulation system designed to support, command, and staff training requirements at the corps, division, and separate brigade levels in a CPX mode. The non-collocated divisional installation systems are driven by aligned corps

computer mainframes. Units may train on-site or at home stations via long-haul networking. Although CBS uses the same computer hardware as BBS, the systems do not interact. CBS will be replaced by the second generation of the model, Warfighters' Simulation (WARSIM) 2000. WARSIM is the Army's Concept Future Battle Command and Staff training simulation for battalion through Echelons Above Corps (EAC) levels to include linkages to simulators and other Services' simulations. For large scale joint exercises, CBS can be linked to the Air Force model AWSIM, and the Navy model RESA. CBS supports training of commanders and staff officers at the joint, corps, and division levels. CBS models ground movement and combat, army aviation and tactical air support, air defense artillery, field artillery, engineers, logistics, and NBC. Units are generally modeled down to battalion level. Friendly and OPFOR air forces are modeled down to squadron level. OPFOR ground forces are usually modeled as regiments. Specialized activities such as engineer and air defense artillery can be modeled at lower levels. CBS currently operates in an area up to three UTM zones. This will be expanded to 3-5 zones in the future.

Tactical Simulator (TACSIM). TACSIM is a classified, SCI-level system that provides an interactive computer-based simulation to support intelligence training, MI brigade through EAC. TACSIM simulates the tasking, collecting, and reporting functions of selected reconnaissance assets. The primary output of TACSIM is sensor product reports in standardized formats. Distribution of the product report is made directly to various intelligence processors. In addition,

TACSIM is used in the development and testing of ATCCS and IEW systems.

Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES) Training System. In early 1993, HQDA approved a comprehensive TES Training System Master Plan (TES-MP) that establishes a baseline and articulates future TES Training System resource requirements in support of the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). The TES-MP defines the TES Training System. It provides guidance and direction to the training community in developing TES Training System doctrine, techniques, and applications. It also provides guidance to the research, development, and acquisition community in exploiting emerging technologies for TES Training System applications and incorporating TES training devices in acquisition plans for Army materiel systems. The TES-MP provides a management plan for acquiring TES Training System resources required to support institutional and unit training strategies prepared for the Combined Arms Training Strategy.

The TES Training System consists of the three subsystems described in the following paragraphs. Optimal training value is achieved only when all three TES Training System subsystems are employed together.

The Simulator Subsystem includes actual equipment, TADSS, and supporting procedures to simulate the casualty-producing effects of weapon systems in real time. The simulation occurs during two-sided, free-play, force-on-force, field training exercise (FTX). The subsystem lets soldiers know the results of their actions immediately. Soldiers remain alive when they perform correctly and get killed when they do not. In a larger sense, the subsystem helps to train the unit commander. The commander's success in maintaining control,

applying doctrine, and executing proper tactics, techniques, and procedures relates directly to the rate at which casualties occur in his unit. Interactive TADSS include, among others, MILES, the MILES Air Ground Engagement System/Air Defense (AGES/AD), the Simulated Area Weapons Effects-Radio Frequency (SAWE-RF), fire marker teams, and mine engagement simulators.

The Control Subsystem consists of a staff of trained observers/controllers (O/C) who referee, record events, report actions, and ensure realism during exercises. They interact with the Management Subsystem in after-action reviews (AAR). The Control Subsystem allows participants to gain knowledge from the learning points stressed in the AARs. The Control Subsystem may also include computers and an instrumentation system to collect and analyze training performance data and to assist in the preparation and presentation of AARs and preparation of unit take-home packages (THPs).

The Management Subsystem includes activities to plan, schedule, conduct, and evaluate TES training. The Subsystem provides maximum training value for the resources expended. It ensures that multiple repetitions are conducted to support the training of battle-focused mission-essential tasks to standard. It identifies training resources for remedial training to correct deficiencies discovered during the FTXs.

The TES Training System trains soldiers and leaders to fight and win against potential threat forces with the employment of a doctrinally-correct opposing force (OPFOR). In addition, it simulates the violent engagement of two forces. The TES Training System adds variety and realism by causing and assessing simulated casualties and reinforcing the basic battlefield techniques of camouflage, cover, concealment, target acquisition and engagement, fire control, suppression, and tactics. The TES Training System provides training performance feedback to the staffs and commanders of participating units in real time. The TES Training System also fosters unit cohesion through the bonding of soldier and leader skills as they collectively achieve mission essential tasks. TES Training System TADSS are versatile tools to help maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of battle-focused training conducted at Army schools, the unit's home station, and the CTCs.

The Army Training Support Center, serves as the executive agent for the Army TES Training System. The directorate is the TRADOC integrator for all requirements documents that involve force-on-force or TES TADSS. The directorate reviews and staffs engagement simulation-related requirements documents, reviews Program of Instruction (POI) to ensure that TES has been adequately addressed, and develops training materials and methodologies for TES Training System for both Active and Reserve Component units. The Director, Collective Training, Instruments, and Engagement System (CTIES) hosts an annual TES Training System conference. The conference serves as the principal source for the worldwide exchange of information on developments in TES for the military.

New Training Technology.

Simulations. OPTEMPO and ammunition costs are expected to continue to increase for the foreseeable future. This coupled with a decline in maneuver and range land will warrant the continued expansion and integration of simulations into the training base. Embedded or strap-on simulation systems in the future will provide the leaders and operators with realistic training within units by training on the actual

equipment. Seamless simulation technologies can expand training horizons available beyond the confines of a unit.

Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS). This concept calls for the linking of all types of unit training into the same network. The capability would permit the wide-scale integration of various simulation systems and live training without regard to geographical constraints. Thus, an early-deploying RC unit could play the same scenario as its forward-deploying counterpart. The tactical, operational, and strategic battlefield operating systems can provide the common skeletal foundation for this linkage. This linkage will provide the foundation for even larger scale simulations involving joint and combined exercises in the late 1990s.

One of the first steps taken toward achieving this concept was the development and fielding of Simulation Networking Technology. This proof of principle demonstration of technology, jointly developed and fielded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army showed that large numbers of simulators could participate in a virtual battlefield.

In the decade of the nineties, the Army will build upon this concept by developing Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) programs. CATT is a part-task trainer that builds upon the networked simulation technology currently in use with SIMNET. CATT, in combination with maneuver training in the field, contributes to that portion of the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) that deals with collective task training at the crew through battalion echelons. CATT addresses maneuver, synchronization, and command and control.

Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is the lead CATT program. Based upon training transfer demonstrated in the company/team CCTT, the Army may expand this trainer to meet battalion/task force FTX training requirements. The Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT) is undergoing contractor proposal assessment for its Engineering/ Manufacturing Design (EMD) phase. FSCATT will be fielded in two phases. Phase I will evolve to a full crew virtual system which will provide full combined arms training environment for artillery platoons and batteries. Three other branch trainers— Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ADCATT), and Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ENCATT)—are in the requirements development process. Other Army proponent branches may develop networked simulation training requirements. CATT trainers will be fielded with common software and protocols so that they can use open architecture and operate with each other. Each CATT program benefits from software/hardware developments of the preceding programs.

CATT trainers are developed and fielded to meet stand-alone proponent training requirements. Through the use of Semi-Automated Forces (SAFOR) and emulator workstations, proponent training is conducted in a combined arms battlefield environment. Each proponent determines its mixture of simulation and field training.

Simulators. Looking at simulators in a historical perspective, early attempts in the '70s employed audiovisual and video technologies to depict what was difficult or impossible to bring into the classroom. Obviously, they involved little or no soldier interaction with the simulated environment.

The '80s gave rise to computer simulators which provided a high degree of interaction and fidelity. Their use was prompted by the high cost and lack of tactical equipment for training, safety, OPTEMPO, ammunition, range, and target constraints. Today simulators range in complexity from the simple flat panel paper mock-ups to those capable of training a crew in a simulated tactical environment. Current trainers range from flight to driving simulators. Each has the capability to train operators/crews on proper operations of their respective systems. Some additional simulators currently being sought within the U.S. Army are to support strategic deployment requirements. The Vessel Bridge Simulator will be a full mission trainer that simulates the operation and handling characteristics of Army water craft. The Crane Simulator will provide a state-of-the-art computerized training system. Students/operators can train to on-load/off-load equipment and materiel required to accomplish the mission during deployment/mobilization operations. Maintenance simulators that replicate actual systems greatly enhance training required by the maintainers. These simulators with fault insertion capabilities are used for skill development to include systems operation, fault diagnosis, trouble shooting adjustments, removal/replace, and repair tasks. Research has shown that the seasoned combat veteran is less likely to get killed than is the "green" recruit. For instance, the United States Air Force has shown that if a pilot survives his first 10 combat missions, the probability of his getting shot down is reduced to chance which they define as roughly 2% losses. If that premise is even partially true, then the number of aircraft being shot down can be decreased and can duplicate the training value of 10 missions in a nonhostile environment. This example illustrates one of the values of simulators not as a cost savings/avoidance means, as the Army has traditionally tried to justify them, but as a force multiplier. As digital/optical storage technologies increase in capacity and decrease in cost, simulators will become more readily available. They will ultimately be augmented by embedded training systems which turn the actual tactical equipment into the simulator so that a soldier trains on the actual equipment in the functional context of the job. This trend will increase the shift in training focus from Service school to unit training.

Embedded Training. Embedded training is a concept that involves a number of discrete technologies. It will focus on system-peculiar tasks. Hardware will be configured either as an integral part of the tactical system or as a strap-on. Embedded training will allow the weapon system to be used as an individual and crew trainer. Ultimately networking of embedded systems will permit crews to interact with other crews as required in an actual tactical scenario (as MILES does today). Embedded training, like distributed training, will dramatically change the way the Army is organized to train. From both a training and cost-effectiveness perspective, more training will shift to the unit as tools like embedded training become the rule rather than the exception. Embedded training capabilities support the power projection concepts outlined in FM 100-5, Operations. Deploying units will not waste space with training devices. Training devices will be embedded in every new combat system.

Virtual Reality. Psychologists have long known that the sense of sight can dominate the other senses. Theme parks, such as Disney World, have capitalized on

this dominance. For example, wide-screen, stereophonic presentations of roller coaster rides create the physical sensations of the actual rides. The same phenomenon is observable in high-fidelity flight simulations which create sensations of nausea or vertigo especially in the novice. Until recently training applications have been limited. Virtual reality is a new and emerging technology that melds the real world with a computer-generated world. It is an outgrowth of research and development efforts by NASA to simulate space conditions and to link human beings with robots so that complex repairs and maintenance can be performed without humans leaving the confines of the space craft. Virtual reality can be used to insert the individual into a world which is too hostile, too expensive, or too remote to duplicate in a training environment. Furthermore, the computer could simulate interaction with these images. Thus, the prospect of surrogate travel exists to permit a tank commander to perform in a virtual battlefield. For example, if tank crew members were wearing virtual reality helmet visor systems, computer imaging could turn an open field into a city which the tank commander could drive through. This technology coupled with an embedded training system which would allow the fighting of a realistic battle without ever leaving the motor pool.

Voice Input/Output. One of the current hindrances associated with computers in training is the reliance on either a keyboard or mouse to input commands. This severely restricts their use to a "clean environment." It also adds another dimension to the training—the ability to type affects student completion times. The rapidly maturing technology of voice recognition

may eliminate some of these hindrances. Voice-recognition systems coupled with dial-up testing will make language sustainment and certification more effective by minimizing the need for a trained linguist. Visor miniature screen monitors and voice commands will allow maintenance personnel to use computer technologies without leaving a "dirty environment."

Artificial Intelligence (AI). Like the other technologies discussed, AI will greatly alter the way the Army currently trains, maintains, and fights on the battlefield. Industry has found that by utilizing AI technologies in diagnostic equipment they could reduce training time for a journeyman from three years to three months with improved on-the-job performance. Since AI will provide round-the-clock expertise to unit-level maintenance, it should cause a restructuring of the current maintenance echelon structure. This will add credence to shifting the training focus from predominantly service school to a unit orientation in the future. AI will also have a great impact in improving target acquisition, engagement, and command and control. It will minimize human interaction and the chance for human error during periods of combat stress. It will be the precursor of passive engagement systems which identify and engage targets automatically. As in maintenance training, these technologies will reduce training time associated with mastering gunnery/operator/maintainer military occupational specialty.

Paperless Technical Manuals. The complexity of a weapons system is directly reflected by the amount of paper required for its technical documentation. For instance, it is estimated that the Abrams tank has seven linear feet of paper materials related to its

maintenance and operation. The logical question arises, where can this information be stored for access by operators and maintainers in the field? And, assuming it could be stored, how can it be efficiently accessed? These questions are answered by the rapidly maturing optical storage technologies. One compact optical disc can store roughly 200,000 pages of text. This equates to a hundred volume encyclopedia. Reproduction cost per compact disc is approximately $3 per disc. The obvious cost savings are coupled with increased capabilities. The same disc which stores text can also store audio and video information. Random access and key word search features provide instant access to troubleshooting and maintenance procedures. Coupled with visor-mounted miniature monitors, the soldier of the future will be able to access and carry with him all the technical documentation available on a given system.

Army Master Range Plan.

Development of the Army Master Range Plan (AMRP) is necessary to ensure that training requirements can be met for fielding new weapons system and organizations. The AMRP is the training investment strategy intended on balancing the demand for increased training intensity due to new equipment fielding, stationing consolidations, and force structure with well designed ranges and training areas. It represents a review and prioritization process that evaluates and assesses the adequacy of existing training assets to accommodate changes to training strategies, missions, standards, and conditions necessary to accommodate evolutionary (modernization) and revolutionary (Force XXI) change in the Army. Priorities are established to synchronize fielding schedules or plans to ensure ranges and training areas are ready to

support training needs while simultaneously making those investment decisions which fosters efficient use of existing ranges and training land. TC 25-8: Training Ranges and the DM 1110-1-series of standard design provides the guidelines, criterion, and standards for trainers and installation commanders to assess current and projected facility upgrades (technology insertion), modifications (reconfiguration), or construction requirements (OMA or MCA). Expanded range requirements to accommodate increased weapon system capabilities or tactics and limited range or training land availability will require the development, where feasible, of multipurpose ranges and multiuse or regional training areas which will have to be carefully planned and engineered. Installation development of Range and Training Land Program Development Plans (RDPs) and MACOM Training Investment Strategies (TIS) provide the foundation for the master plan which is used by the Training Directorate, ODCSOPS, HQDA for programming and resourcing AMRP actions to meet Army requirements. Each year, the Requirements Review and Prioritization Board (RRPB) reviews, prioritizes, and consolidates MACOM TIS and installation RDP into a DA investment strategy in the form of the AMRP.

Department of the Army Range and Training Land Program.

The Army Range and Training Land Program (RTLP) is a multi-agency, multi-disciplined program. Initiated in 1982 as the Army Range Modernization Program, the program has matured into a consistent, comprehensive, and effective management process for standardizing and fielding training ranges. In its current structure, the RTLP process incorporates the needs of several functional processes (e.g., training,

engineering, environmental, and safety). Specifically, the program provides the facilities to "set the conditions" to conduct realistic and challenging live-fire and maneuver training at affordable O&S rates. The criterion and standards used in these type of facility configurations are constantly updated to accommodate modernization of weapon systems, implementation of doctrine and tactics, and/or changes to organizational compositions/missions. The essential theme of the RTLP is to provide enhanced, instrumented ranges at home station; reconfigurable and expedient facility designs equipped with low-cost/low-maintenance portable equipment for deployed forces; and a consistent decision support environment.

The RTLP also addresses live-fire integration with the other training domains as well as support to CTCs as a vital link to identifying potential weaknesses that have been identified in the course of joint exercise participation and/or rotation through a CTC. Many aspects of the RTLP (e.g., standard designs and decision support tools) have been adopted for use by and in support of USMC ground forces training. A major thrust of the RTLP are ongoing initiatives to integrate the Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) and Real Property Management and Planning processes.

The Multipurpose Range Complex (MPRC). The MPRC is designed to provide a facility capable of conducting collective and combined training. The MPRC design provides the flexibility to accommodate multiple weapons, multiple levels of training, and multiple training scenarios on a single complex. There are two MPRC configurations (target types, arrays, presentation, and density) which are focused on either mounted warfare standards (MPRC-Heavy - tanks, fighting vehicles, and attack helicopters) or dismounted warfare standards (MPRC-Light - infantry, airborne, air assault, and attack helicopters). While both designs can accommodate a mix of mounted and dismounted "packages", the level of flexibility in scenario development and execution is affected (e.g., size of mounted forces an MPRC-L can accommodate is smaller than an MPRC-H). Both facility types meet all published gunnery standards with multiple presentations and can accommodate indirect fire support when sited in conjunction with appropriate firing points and impact areas. While capable of accommodating crew and team level proficiency training, each MPRC is intended to be supported with a series of "feeder" ranges (e.g., Multipurpose Training Range, Infantry Platoon/Squad Battle Courses) which are focused on crew or team level training thereby maximizing throughput availability/capacity of the MPRCs.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Complex. The standard MOUT Complex consists of two subelements: The MOUT Assault Course (MAC) and the Collective Training Facility (CTF). The complex supports individual, crew, team, collective and combined training of dismounted units in an urban environment. The MAC is the live-fire facility oriented to individual and small group training consisting of eight stations which replicate building or facades and incorporating infantry targets. The CTF is provided in two configurations: A platoon-sized CTF (16 buildings) or company-sized CTF (32 buildings) in a mix of single story and multi-story buildings. In both configurations, half the buildings are intact and half are rubbeled. In practice, an installation with a division normally has a MAC and company-sized CTF, and an installation with a separate brigade or

brigade equivalent normally has a MAC with platoon-sized CTF. The modularity of the MOUT complex standard can accommodate a varying mix of CTF facilities where the mission training throughput or force mix at an installation does not fit the normal practice. The MOUT Complex serves as the baseline configuration for accommodating certain specialized applications of urban warfare such as CTC scenarios, special operations and/or mounted warfare.

Small Arms Range Modernization/ Standardization. In conjunction with major range standardization initiatives, the Army is modernizing its individual and crew-served ranges to support small- caliber weapons training. These ranges are designed, for the most part, to initially qualify and sustain individual rifle marksmanship skills. Inclusive in this category are facilities to support weapons ranging from pistols through machine-gun. Multipurpose variants are also provided which generally accommodates geographical or topographical constraints, Operations and Support (O&S) efficiencies, and/or throughput requirements. These facility types are also constantly reviewed for adequacy and effectiveness in addressing both training and environmental considerations as they represent a great preponderance of the number of qualification ranges in the Army inventory.

Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM).

ITAM is the Army's program for maintaining its major training and testing land holdings in an environmentally sound manner to support future training and testing needs. ITAM was initiated in the mid-1980s, and encompasses a management and decision-making process which balances

training requirements with sound environmental practices. The program consists of the following four components:

- Land Condition Trend Analysis (LCTA). LCTA provides for the surveying and monitoring of natural and cultural resource conditions on an installation.
- Training Requirements Integration (TRI). TRI is the means by which training and other mission requirements are integrated with natural and cultural resource conditions at an installation.
- Land Restoration/Rehabilitation and Maintenance (LRAM). LRAM provides for repair of maneuver damage and other training related impacts on natural and cultural resources.
- Environmental Awareness (EA). EA is a multi-media command information program which encourages practices to minimize negative impacts on natural and cultural resources.

Effective FY 95, ITAM proponency was transferred from the Environmental Programs Directorate, OACSIM, to the Training Directorate, ODCSOPS. The purpose of that transfer was to closely align the Army's training land management program with the Army's training programs, such as OPTEMPO. Under ODCSOPS proponency, Army ITAM policy specifies training land management is conducted in operations/training channels at HQDA, MACOM and installation level. However, policy recognizes and emphasizes the need for a close partnership among the operations and training, environmental, and real property management staffs at all echelons. Current ODCSOPS policy envisions

resourcing ITAM through a training land management model similar to the Training Resources Model (TRM) for units. Such a model will ensure that resources are programmed reflecting the priority installations are assigned by MACOMs, and in keeping with the relative training tempo among installations.

The Training Ammunition Management System (TAMS).

Under TAMS, training ammunition requirements and fiscal year authorizations are developed using training strategies established in the *DA Pam 350-38: Standards in Weapons Training* and *DA Pam 350-39: Standards in Weapons Training (Special Operations Forces)*. Ammunition is then authorized on the basis of these projections: Programs of Instruction (POI) requirements, war reserve requirements, procurement programs (what's available), and Army priorities. TAMS authorizations and actual expenditures are accounted for by the Training Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS). TAMS permits the Army to justify training ammunition requirements to the Congress and provides flexibility to cross-level within the commands.

The Automated Instructional Management System (AIMS).

The Automated Instructional Management System (AIMS) is the TRADOC standard resident instructional management system. It is operational at all TRADOC schools and training centers except the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, CA, and the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. The system consists of the processes required to control and manage courses, classes, students, academic records, and administrative actions supporting those processes. AIMS contains data on individual students and their academic performance; course and class schedules; enrollment, graduation, recycle, and attrition data; training events (program of instruction); test validation and administration; student/course/exam effectiveness evaluation; and historical personnel and academic data.

TRAINING ISSUES

Common Military Training. Common Military Training is used to describe training requirements imposed by higher headquarters from DA on down. Studies by the Army Research Institute indicated that over 60 Army regulations prescribed training requirements of some form. The requirements were, in turn, multiplied or expanded by intervening headquarters. The result is not only a massive headache for the unit commander, but also a loss of time for unit training. This is an area in which centralized management can actually free more time for the commander. At DA steps were taken to do that. They include:

- Establishment of ODCSOPS as the central clearing house for all regulations which prescribe training requirements.
- Establishment of policy which will require most combat-related training requirements emanating from DA to be incorporated into ARTEPs and STPs (enlisted and officer). Directives which prescribe noncombat requirements, such as safety training, will clearly designate target audience,

training objectives, and outline training plans.

Training Ammunition. Training ammunition is computed for MTOE units on the basis of DA Pam 350-38: Standards in Weapons Training and DA Pam 350-39: Standards in Weapons Training (Special Operations Forces). Program of Instruction requirements, force modernization, and force structure changes are incorporated into computation of the command training ammunition requirements. The pamphlets are the products of the Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) which was chartered to determine the quantities and types of munitions essential for soldiers, crews, and units to attain and sustain weapons proficiency relative to readiness levels, making maximum use of aids, devices, simulators, simulations, and subcaliber firing. The STRAC program is managed by the ATSC's STRAC Strategies Team, Combat Training Support Directorate (CTSD). Revisions to specific training standards, strategies, and ammunition requirements have been incorporated in the latest update of the pamphlet based on the evaluations. The programs will be revised as new weapon systems, training devices, and simulators are fielded.

Training-Unique Ammunition. Training-unique ammunition is ammunition for which there is no battlefield or operational purpose. It is designed specifically to be used for selected marksmanship/ gunnery training, and tactical training events. These items may be either short, limited, or reduced range ammunitions with a no hazard, or smoke signature projectile. The term is not limited to those items fired from weapon systems or subcaliber devices. It includes items thrown

(grenades) or placed (mines, smoke pots). Also considered training-unique ammunition is dummy and inert ammunition. These items are completely inert (contain no explosive, pyrotechnic, or chemical agent) and simulates the service item in most other respects.

Force Modernization. Modern weapons systems are being integrated into the force at an unprecedented rate. The management of that modernization is a major challenge for the Army. Army trainers are trying to forecast the impact that the introduction of new equipment will have on individual and collective training, ammunition, ranges, and the training support system.

Impacts begin with the identification of individual and collective training requirements and the formulation of an initial training concept in the STRAP. The STRAP triggers changes to the Individual Training Plans (ITPs) which identify strategies to satisfy training requirements for specific enlisted MOS and officer specialties. Introduction of new equipment requires the ITP to be revised, resulting in redesigned training programs. Ideally, the ITP and associated programs are based upon a job-task analysis for each duty position. As new job data are generated, the analysis is updated to reflect additional skills related to new systems. This job and task analysis data is then used to revise existing courses of instruction and other training programs and materials.

In some cases, new equipment systems are sufficiently different to require a new MOS. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle requires a crew trained in the operation of a complex turret and required establishment of a discrete MOS for these crewmen. Other systems which do not generate a new MOS

may require discrete new courses of instruction.

Force Modernization causes Initial Entry Training (IET) costs to be increased by two factors. First, when a new system is fielded, the force has a mix of old and new, both of which must be trained. Often this is not just adding tasks but also running two different courses simultaneously. Second, duty assignment uncertainties require overtraining when more than one equipment system relates to an MOS. NCOES courses will also require revision. In certain cases, the introduction of more complex equipment or a reallocation of tasks among the skill levels may require the development of new NCOES courses.

Soldier Training Publications also have to be written and distributed to the field along with delivery of the new equipment systems. At the same time, exportable training materials must be available for unit training programs and individual study. In conjunction with the revision of Soldier's Manuals, the Service schools will revise self-development tests for the MOS. The increased resources required to support training loads associated with modernization have yet to be determined. One problem is programming of all older systems for the ARNG/USAR. This creates inefficiencies in the training base which must train old and new systems concurrently.

Modernization also generates large-scale revisions in collective training programs. ARTEPs must be revised to incorporate characteristics of the new systems and the new tactical doctrine. Additionally, the supporting "How-to-Fight" and "How-to-Train" publications, upon which unit training programs depend, must be updated.

Resources to support training developments for many of the major new equipment systems have been programmed, but competing Army programs precluded programming sufficient resources to satisfy all requirements identified. This iterative programming hinders long-range planning and makes the program less credible to senior reviewers. The Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS), which was explained earlier, assists in determining total development and training costs associated with Army modernization.

The modernization efforts also generated new training support challenges. Because modernization means, in some cases, that more tasks and more complicated tasks need to be learned, greater pressures will be felt on existing range facilities. Costs associated with ammunition and the operation and maintenance of new systems will affect the way the Army trains.

Training-unique ammunition offers considerable potential for continuing effective training within the constraints of time, space, fuel, and money. At the same time, this ammunition should help to increase crew proficiency and expand the number of ranges available for training and the types of systems which can utilize existing ranges. Other benefits expected include increasing the useful life of range targets, and decreasing costs for land acquisition and range construction.

This does not mean that existing ranges will suffice to the year 2000. On the contrary, the Army Master Range Plan will correlate range design and construction with fielding of new weapon systems. Standard, multi-use ranges also will help absorb the impact of modernization.

Training devices have also taken on new significance as a result of modernization. They offer safe or less expensive training on dangerous or expensive tasks. They can reduce

consumption of equipment in units, and the diversion of equipment to training. Training devices also help address the range and ammunition impacts of modernization. Subcaliber and laser devices, simulators, and other training equipment can help reduce training ammunition expenditures and enable effective gunner training which would otherwise be restricted by ammunition costs, nonavailability of weapon systems, or range dimensions.

To maintain readiness as Active and Reserve Component units receive new equipment, special attention will be given to transition training and the sustainment training necessary to ensure complete assimilation of the new system capabilities. The extent, location, and timing of transition training will be determined jointly by the commands affected.

Mobilization Training. The transition from training in peacetime to training after mobilization is an issue that is growing rapidly in importance. Chapter 6 presents definitions, factors, and planning steps pertaining to mobilization. This section deals with training aspects of mobilization, most in the form of probable impacts on the training base. These impacts do not even scratch the surface.

Mobilization will pose problems for the installation staff. Post staff officers will turn to the civilian community for contracted food service, buses and other transportation, telephones, engineer support, and others. The civilian community may also provide training material such as four-wheel drive vehicles for scout training. Local workers will be hired to expand base operations support.

Training will be accelerated with longer days and weeks. The ratio of students to equipment will increase—more students,

less equipment. There will be increased reliance on subcaliber and simulators due to ammunition shortages. Shortages may cause substitution of older weapons, vehicles, and personal equipment during training. For example, commercial four-wheel drive vehicles may replace personnel carriers for teaching mounted reconnaissance techniques. A key publication which addresses mobilization training challenges is FM 25-5: Training for Mobilization and War.

SUMMARY

As stated in *FM 25-100*: *Training the Force*, and *FM 25-101*: *Battle-Focused Training*, the Army's capstone training manuals, the Army's training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime. The training focus is on the wartime missions. The top priority is training. Realistic, sustained, multi-echelon, totally-integrated combined arms training must be continuously stressed at all levels. Every soldier, leader, and unit training program must be carefully planned, aggressively executed, and thoroughly assessed.

Battle focus is the concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Battle focus guides the planning, execution, and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure its members train as they are going to fight. Battle focus is critical throughout the entire training process and is used by commanders to allocate resources for training based on wartime mission requirements. Its implementation enables commanders at all levels and their staffs to structure training programs which cope with nonmission-related requirements while focusing on mission-essential training activities.

This chapter discussed five training systems: Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing; Training Development; Training in Schools; Training in Units; and Training Support. Training policy, requirements, and resourcing are the responsibility of HQDA ODCSOPS, specifically the Director of Training. Resourcing necessitates some interesting interfaces with other systems. The ARPRINT, for example, relies on input from ODCSPER as well as ODCSOPS.

TRADOC is the center for Army training worldwide and as such provides ongoing resident/nonresident training to Active Component and Reserve Component alike. Forces training includes training conducted in units and collective training following the guidance set forth in *FM 25-100: Training the Force*, and *FM 25-101: Battle Focused Training*

Training support is the foundation of Army training. It manages training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs. It is a multibillion dollar enterprise managed by TRADOC through the U.S. Army Training Support Center. Probably the single biggest current training challenge is establishing a cost-effective training strategy as the budget and size of the force become smaller. More so than ever before, the challenge to commanders at all levels will be to execute efficient, meaningful training that ensures trained individuals and units that are ready to meet the country's military requirements worldwide.

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CHAPTER 16

ARMY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

"We must have Information Security: The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."

<div align="right">

Army Vision 2010
Headquarters Department of the Army

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"The incorporation of digital technology across all of our battlefield systems will give commanders and soldiers unprecedented capability to gather and share tactical information."

<div align="right">

Army XXI...America's Army of the 21st Century
Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

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INTRODUCTION

The Army has entered a new era dominated by a greater reliance on information technology to leverage new or enhanced warfighting capabilities. The Army Enterprise Strategy (AES) has been developed to ensure the focused use of information technology on the battlefield to obtain information dominance.

Today communications are better characterized by what they deliver, *information*, than by what they are, methods and devices. To achieve this enhanced characterization the Army has crafted the AES.

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO)

On 10 February 1996, the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA) became law as Division E of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Public Law 104-106. The law was later redesignated the Clinger-Cohen Act. ITMRA had a Government-wide effective date of August 8, 1996. ITMRA mandated a CIO for each executive agency, e.g., Military Departments, who would report directly to the head of the agency. ITMRA increased the Secretary of the Army's responsibility, authority, and accountability for the use of information technology (IT) and other information resources in performing Army missions. National Security Systems were added to the CIO's responsibilities. In this context any telecommunications or information system operated by the US Government, the function, operation or use of which involves: intelligence activities; cryptologic activities related to national

security; command and control of military forces; or, equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system are included in the act; i.e., the spectrum of systems which are referred to as IT/C4I. The act emphasized the importance of completing effective planning and process improvements before applying IT/C4I solutions.

ITMRA also provided mechanisms to increase the effectiveness of the Army's use of information resources and to improve the Army's IT/C4I project management performance to levels comparable with the best achieved in the private sector. It mandated that programs provide a value added to the Army's mission (results oriented or outcome vs output oriented).

The SA designated the DISC4 and Vice DISC4 as the CIO and Deputy CIO respectively. The Army CIO Implementation Plan, dated 13 January 1997, defines the CIO's roles, responsibilities, and procedures.

ARMY ENTERPRISE STRATEGY

The AES focuses on the *information* needs of the Army. It provides the emphasis for achieving the seamless information environment necessary to support the Army warfighters into the 21st Century. This strategy supports the objectives of Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), Army Vision 2010 (AV 2010), and the Joint Staff's Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) for the Warrior and defines what the Army must do to "win the battlefield information war." Some of the initiatives that fundamentally support this Vision are the efforts of the Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) initiative and the Army digitization to shape Army XXI.

The AES is a holistic view of the information systems and interconnections required to enable the operation of a Force Projection Army. The continuing implementation of the Enterprise Strategy serves as an enabling strategy to attain information dominance, an objective of JV 2010. It addresses the requirements to organize, train, and equip the force, as well as those necessary to operate as a component of the Joint and Combined community. Finally, it identifies the functional requirements for sustaining the force from home base to the foxhole from both the tactical and business perspectives.

Components of the AES.

The Army Enterprise Strategy consists of two documents, the AES Vision and the Enterprise Implementation Plan (EIP).

The AES Vision. This Vision describes the principles necessary to ensure the warfighter has information technology superiority over any opponent. These principles are:

- focus on the warfighter,
- ensure joint interoperability,
- capitalize on space-based assets,
- digitize the battlefield,
- modernize power projections platforms,
- optimize the information technology environment,
- implement multilevel security,
- acquire integrated systems using commercial technology,
- focus on information security, and,
- exploit modeling and simulation.

The Enterprise Implementation Plan. The EIP provides a plan that shapes an Information Technology Command, Control, Communications, Computers and

The Army Enterprise Architecture And Its Constituents

Figure 16-1

Intelligence (IT/C4I) investment strategy, as described by a set of implementation tasks approved by the Enterprise General Officer Steering Committee (EGOSC). EGOSC tasks the development of a IT/C4I architecture and a common set of evaluation criteria to analyze, assess, and prioritize future information systems.

The Army is currently institutionalizing the ten principles outlined in the Vision, ensuring the EIP tasks guide future information technology through a sound, architecture-based foundation and ensure that efforts are closely tied to similar initiatives of the Joint Staff and DOD.

Major Participants in the Process. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (SARDA), the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA [FM&C]), the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communication, and Computers (DISC4), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) co-sponsor the Enterprise Strategy. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as the requirements generator and approval authority, is also a major player, as are other functional proponents.

ARCHITECTURE

ITMRA mandates that the CIO develop, maintain, and facilitate implementation of a sound and integrated information technology architecture, i.e., Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA). Governed by the AES, the AEA is a disciplined, structured, comprehensive and

integrated framework and methodology that encompasses all Army information requirements, technical standards and systems descriptions regardless of the information systems use (i.e., in Army information or functional systems, C4I systems, administrative or weapons systems). The AEA transforms operational visions and associated required capabilities of the warfighters into a blueprint for an integrated and interoperable set of information systems, that implement horizontal information technology insertion, cutting across the traditional Army functional "stovepipes" and Service boundaries. This architectural blueprint is the basis for an information technology investment strategy that ensures a consistent and effective design and evolution of the Army's information systems. It also supports requirements generation, interoperability, standard data element definition and maintenance, common component identification, and force development planning.

The DISC4, as CIO, has been designated the Army Enterprise Architect and the Army Systems Architect. The CIO accomplishes the AEA through the aggregation of the following architecture components:

The AEA consists of the three constituent element architectures that capture the multiplicity of views necessary to construct the blueprint, as shown in Figure 16-1.

- **Army Operational Architecture (AOA).** The AOA is a description (often graphical) of the operational elements, assigned tasks, and information flows required to support the warfighter. It defines the type of information, the frequency and

timeliness of the exchange, and what tasks are supported by these information exchanges. An operational architecture has been described as the total aggregation of missions, functions, tasks, information requirements, and business rules.

TRADOC, as the Army's Operational Architect, develops and maintains the AOA. AOA products will be forwarded to the CIO proponent for review, integration and inclusion in the Joint Operational Architecture. DCSOPS, as the designated DA staff proponent for the AOA, will be given CIO coordinated support and guidance throughout the AOA process.

- **Army Systems Architecture (ASA).** The ASA is a description, including graphics, of systems and interconnections that implement the requirement found in the operational architecture. The ASA defines the physical connection, location, and identification of the key nodes, circuits, networks, warfighting platforms, etc., associated with information exchange and specifies system performance parameters. The ASA is constructed to satisfy Operational Architecture requirements per the standards defined in the Technical Architecture. A systems architecture has been described as a physical implementation of the operational architecture, the layout and relationship of systems

and communications. The CIO is the Army Systems Architect, responsible for developing and maintaining the Army Systems Architecture.

- **Army Technical Architecture (ATA).** A technical architecture has been described as the "building code" upon which systems are based. The ATA is a minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the parts or elements of a system which ensures that a compliant system satisfies a specified set of requirements. It identifies services, interfaces, standards, and their relationships. It provides the framework, thus guiding the implementation of systems, upon which engineering specifications are based, common building blocks are built, and product lines are developed. These technical rules, or the building code, are based on Operational Architecture requirements and will constrain Systems Architecture development.

    With the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) designated the Technical Architect, the CIO proponent already develops and maintains the ATA. The ATA is the basis for the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA). The ATA serves as the Army's implementation of the JTA because of its broader application beyond C4I systems to all systems utilizing it.

The current Army position is to institutionalize the Army-wide use of AEA principles, methods, and products; to enforce compliance of the ATA to all systems which send or receive information electronically; and to ensure that efforts are closely tied to similar initiatives in DOD.

BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING (BPR)

The CIO is the DA Technical Review and Approval Authority for any BPR with IT/C4I impact. ITMRA mandates that the CIO will be responsible for "promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of all major information resources management processes for the executive agency, including improvements to work processes of the executive agency." It also mandates that the head of the executive agency analyze the missions of the executive agency and based on the analysis, revise the executive agency's mission-related processes and administrative processes, as appropriate, before making significant investments in information technology.

The CIO proponent will ensure that a BPR has been completed before submitting an IT/C4I requirement through the TRADOC process. The BPR function also involves working with other HQDA agencies and MACOM representatives to develop BPR policy, procedures, plans and standards for the Army. The CIO's participation will provide a value added to HQDA functional proponents and MACOM commanders by means of a clearinghouse function which has been established on the CIO Website of the DISC4 homepage. This will facilitate the BPR process and assist in the elimination of redundancy.

ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The Army's information management structure has recently undergone major organizational changes as part of the Institutional Army Redesign for Force XXI. On 16 September 1996, the US Army Information Systems Command (ISC) was redesignated as the Army Signal Command (ASC) and then reassigned under US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) on 1 October 1996 as a worldwide operational Echelons Above Corps (EAC) and Strategic Command. By this action ISC was discontinued as a Major Command (MACOM). The decision evolved from a year-long Signal Organization and Mission Alignment (SOMA) study and the Information Management Functional Area Assessment (IM FAA) on how best to provide information services support to the Force XXI warfighter.

The IM FAA also determined that the Army should realign information systems engineering and acquisition to a single process owner. On 1 October 1996 these functions were realigned within the US Army Materiel Command (AMC) under the US Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM). Consequently, CECOM gains broader responsibility for the Army's information systems development, engineering and procurement in support of the warfighter. The following realignments occurred:

- US Army Information Systems Engineering Command (ISEC), US Army Information Systems Management Activity (ISMA), US Army Information Systems Command Contracting Office (ISCCO) and Program Executive Officer, Standard Army Management Information Systems (PEO STAMIS) transferred to AMC CECOM.
- Research, Development and Acquisition Information Systems Activity (RDAISA) transferred to SARDA.
- Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM) transferred to Personnel Command (PERSCOM).
- US Army Publishing and Printing Command (USAPPC) was temporarily reassigned to DISC4 as a FOA.

INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC) POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES

The CIO has been designated Information Security (INFOSEC) functional proponent. These responsibilities are addressed through the Army Information System Security Program; Army management of the Defensive Information Warfare and Command and Control (C2) Protect Program; the Computer Security Program; training for operations and system administrators, network security managers and information systems security officers throughout the Army; and accreditation authority for Army multilevel security systems.

Policy.

INFOSEC policy is well defined in public law and in a number of Army regulations. In addition, the CIO proponent is developing, in conjunction with the ODCSINT and ODCSOPS, the C2 protect library of policy and plans for management, training, implementation, resource

management, threats and vulnerabilities, and protection of Army IT/C4I Systems. The CIO proponent has already developed Army multilevel security policy.

Procedures.

The CIO proponent will continue to develop these procedures together with its executive agent, CECOM's Communications Security Logistics Activity (CSLA).

Other Security Requirements.

CSLA and the CIO proponent will manage the weapons systems security, firewalls/secure network servers/in-line networks, encryptors, non-Defense Message Systems, and Multilevel Security Information Systems Security Initiative products for Army business systems. The CIO proponents for architecture development and security architecture will work together to ensure an integrated, synchronized product.

SUMMARY

Information management is a dynamic field characterized by rapid new advances in technology policy, procedures and concepts. Responding to these opportunities and exploiting them to the benefit of future warfighters is both demanding and rewarding.

REFERENCES

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(3) U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 25-3: Information System Life Cycle Management,* 27 November 1989. (Expected to be rescinded and the relevant information will be included in an updated version of AR 70-1: *Weapons Systems Acquisition*, which is currently being staffed).
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CHAPTER 17

INSTALLATION COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

"Since the early 1970s, the efficient management of our bases has become critical in light of shrinking resources, Congressional scrutiny, and increasingly complex regulatory controls."

<div align="right">

Functional Life Cycle of the Army
Prepared by the Department of the Army Inspector General, 1 Mar 1983

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INTRODUCTION

The 1983 observation by the Inspector General, cited above, remains true. The importance of proper installation management takes on even more importance today. The Army's environment is changing. The United States Army today is a power projection force capable of responding rapidly to threats against national interests anywhere in the world. Army installations are transitioning into power projection bases, power projection support bases, and sustaining bases. However, they all have one important aspect in common - they must continue to provide an adequate living and working environment for our quality people. Quality of life for our soldiers, civilian employees and family members is an integral part of sustaining the force.

The Army, now largely based in the continental United States (CONUS), continues to refine and enhance its power projection and sustainment capabilities. Base realignments and closures, the return of some overseas forces and declining budgets are focusing renewed attention on effective installation management. Installations are undergoing significant changes in order to support the U.S. Army today and into the 21st Century. As we move forward, the Army will be a smaller, CONUS-based, power projection force required to maintain a 360 degree view of the world.

What is an installation? An installation is defined as an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DOD) or a state, the District of Columbia, territory, commonwealth, or possession, controlled by and at which an Army unit or activity (Active, USAR, or ARNG) is permanently assigned. Installations reflect a diversity of organizations, tasks, and missions - all of which challenge the ability to command and manage. Within the Army, an installation may be referred to as a post, camp, station, fort, subpost, depot, arsenal, proving ground,

base, laboratory, or ammunition plant. Army installations vary in mission, size and location - no two installations are exactly the same.

Installations are big business. For FY 95, the Assistant Chief of Installation Management (ACSIM), Headquarters, Department of the Army, (HQDA), managed Defense and Army resources in excess of $9 billion. Approximately 123,000 (FY 94) persons, paid by military funds, appropriated funds, and non-appropriated funds, perform installation management functions. Installations maintain nearly 200,000 buildings. Combined, these structures cover more than one billion square feet (the area of 166 Pentagons). Army facilities represent a replacement value of more than $160 billion. The annual maintenance budget for buildings and grounds ($5 billion) exceeds the annual budgets of 22 states.

Most importantly, installations are home to the force, and home to the Army family - where the Army lives, works, trains, sustains and prepares to meet tomorrow's challenges. Army posts and surrounding communities are home to well over one million service members and their families. Installations house half (150,000) of Army families, and nearly 200,000 single soldiers. Army posts are where a quarter of a million civilian employees, and tens of thousands of contract employees, come to work every morning.

MAJOR COMMAND (MACOM) INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

While all MACOMs exercise some sort of installation management, installation management at the MACOM level is usually associated with the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM uses

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Installation Management (DCSPIM), while TRADOC uses the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations (DCSBOS) to manage their installations. Both concepts combine most base operations under a single organization. Army Materiel Command installations are typically depots, proving grounds, arsenals, laboratories, and ammunition plants. The industrial nature of these installations differs from the troop environment typically found at TRADOC and FORSCOM installations.

The Army uses a concept of subinstallations and subcommunities to enhance the effectiveness of operations. For example, in CONUS the Army uses this concept where multiple installations are assigned to a given MACOM located in or near the same geographical location. The Army also uses the concept OCONUS to enhance the effectiveness of operations where a given mission element is stationed at multiple locations.

Functional Groupings of Organizations.

The basic installation organization consists of a command element and four functional groupings of organizations, discussed below:

The Mission Element. The mission element is the primary organizations(s) of the installation. It is the installation's reason for being. An example of a mission element would be III Corps headquarters at Fort Hood, Texas, or the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. There is no single mission element at installations established solely to support tenants.

Non-Supporting Tenants. Non-supporting tenants are present at most Army installations. These are organizations that

contribute to neither the primary mission nor specific support function of the installation. An example is the Military Traffic Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, located near Fort Eustis, Virginia.

Supporting Tenants. There is a relatively standard group of supporting tenants at most Army installations. These are organizations assigned to MACOMs other than the installation's MACOM. They are located at the installation to provide a particular service. Examples are health services, criminal investigations, exchange and commissary services, the Corps of Engineers, and dependent schools outside of CONUS (OCONUS) locations.

U.S. Army Garrisons. These may include area support groups or installation support activities in some MACOMS. The garrison organization operates the installation and provides supporting services.

KEY INSTALLATION POSITIONS

Installation Commander.

The installation commander is usually the senior Army commander on the installation. The installation commander has responsibility for the real estate, facilities, operations, activities and personnel on an installation. Commanders of depots, arsenals, proving grounds, and Army divisions and corps are also considered installation commanders. Commanders of divisions or corps must consider that in most cases they will deploy with the force. Therefore, garrison or installation support activity commanders provide the continuity of the installation command when the installation commander deploys.

Garrison Commander and Installation Support Activity Commander.

Garrison commanders are centrally selected for command. The garrison and installation support activity commanders are responsible for day-to-day operations. They are responsible for the comprehensive planning necessary to achieve and maintain excellent living and working conditions for all personnel on an installation. They are also responsible for supporting local mobilization plans. During deployment they remain at the installation to receive follow-on reserve components. They also care for the families and civilians left behind and sustain other critical post missions. The installation commander may assign other missions for the garrison and installation support activity commander to accomplish, as required. For example, on some installations the garrison commander is assigned the additional duty of being the installation chief of staff. The garrison commander may be assisted in all aspects of base operations management (except in instances of commander authority) by a civilian Executive Assistant (BASOPS).

Area Support Group (ASG) Commander.

The Army uses the area support group to manage multiple, geographically dispersed installations in locations other than the United States or its territories. In some cases, this is in addition to the ASG's normal mission of providing combat service support. Central selection boards select the commanders for these groups. These officers are usually colonels or lieutenant colonels (promotable). Area support group commanders execute the day-to-day management of installations under their control in much the same way garrison and installation support activity commanders perform within CONUS.

Base Support Battalion (BSB) Commander.

The Army may use the base support battalion to manage garrisons OCONUS. Usually these base support battalion commanders operate under the command of an ASG. They perform their functions in much the same way garrison and installation support activity commanders do at a CONUS subinstallation. Their primary focus is the delivery of services with policy and management oversight provided by the ASG. OCONUS ASGs and BSBs use the concept of Area Support Teams to manage subinstallations. These are small activities of service providers who operate under the command and control of either the ASG or BSB.

Executive Assistant (Base Operations).

The Executive Assistant (Base Operations or BASOPS) is a civilian position which functions as the deputy to the garrison commander in CONUS, or ASG/BSB commander OCONUS. The incumbent may act in the absence of the commander on all matters except for those involving command authority. An executive assistant is generally responsible for the overall administrative management within the garrison, coordination of requirements and activities between the garrison commander and the multiple clientele, and assistance to the commander in implementing all policies, programs and services in support of base operations. This position may serve as a target for base operations civilian employees engaged in cross-functional professional development.

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Additional Skill Indicator (ASI) 6Y (Installation Management).

The complexity of installation management presents a challenge to the managerial expertise of military garrison staff officers. Officers having performed effectively in their BASOPS capacity may be recommended by the garrison commander for ASI 6Y validation. The installation commander is the certifying official for awarding of the 6Y skill identifier at the installation level. This ASI identifies positions requiring personnel trained in installation functions such as resource management, engineering management, logistical management, contract management, plans and training management, and community and family support management. This personnel designation may lead to BASOPS assignments as an installation commander, garrison commander, deputy garrison commander, chief of staff, installation manager at a MACOM or HQDA, or as a principal garrison staff officer.

Garrison Pre-Command Course (GPC).

This course is conducted by the Army Management Staff College, with a target population of centrally selected garrison commanders at the colonel and lieutenant colonel levels. The course is also available to civilian Executive Assistants (BASOPS). It is an intensive 2½ week coverage of personnel, financial, facility engineering, environmental, morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) practices/issues, as well as other related topics. It is taught in small group seminars, which focus on real-world issues, problems, options and

relationships. Hands-on experience is achieved through field trips, staff walks and roundtable discussions with current garrison commanders. In addition, presentations are made by the ACSIM and Deputy ACSIM.

General Officer Installation Commander's Course (GOICC).

The Community and Family Support Center (CFSC), in conjunction with the Army Management Staff College offers this 4½ day course for general officer installation commanders which focuses on installation management and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) functions. The Chief of Staff, Army, has designated the course as mandatory for all installation commanders, deputy installation commanders, and MACOM staff principals with installation responsibilities. The course is delivered as a small group seminar and requires active participation by the attendees. The course utilizes group processes and case study techniques to challenge values and assumptions and provide important information and tools enabling attendees to excel in executing their BASOPS and MWR program responsibilities.

Course material explores all the major elements of base operations, including environmental management, personnel and financial management, public affairs and construction topics. MWR topics include NAF resource management, personnel, NAF program planning, recreation, business operations and family program delivery and evaluation. Commanders with extensive combat arms career assignments who are about to take command of an installation will find this course especially valuable.

Executive Assistant (BASOPS).

All Executive Assistant (BASOPS), Deputy Commander, and similar garrison manager position vacancies are centrally announced through the Department of the Army Central Announcement Distribution System (DACADS) under civilian Career Field 29. Civilian Personnel Offices are required to distribute vacancy announcements for these positions through DACADS, and to expand the area of consideration Army-wide. This ensures all eligible candidates registered in DACADS CF 29 are made aware of the Army positions, and are given an opportunity to be considered.

The current Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) plan for Executive Assistant (BASOPS), Career Field 29, is under review. The next revision will focus on providing a mechanism for cross-functional civilian career development throughout the base operations environment. This would facilitate the critical versatility and cross-functional familiarization necessary to perform effectively in the role of an executive assistant. An understanding of the Army and its role in the National Military Strategy is a pre-requisite. Army Management Staff College or Army War College attendance would be beneficial to the professional development of base operations managers aspiring to become executive assistants.

Installation Special and Personal Staff.

The commander appoints and specifies the duties of the installation special and personal staff. The staff size and composition will vary by installation based on its mission and the impact of ongoing consolidation and regionalization efforts. The

positions are listed below; and FM 100-22 provides descriptions of their responsibilities.

- Inspector General (IG)
- Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
- Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC)
- Command Historian
- Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
- Installation Chaplain

Garrison/Area Support Group/Installation Support Activity.

The installation/area support group/installation support activity staff provides the garrison commander assistance and functional expertise in assigned areas of responsibility. These functional areas are listed below; please refer to the functional descriptions in FM 100-22 as a guideline for organizational structure considerations.

- Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM)
- Directorate of Counterintelligence and Security (DCSINT/SEC)
- Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO)
- Installation Safety Office (ISO)
- Director of Health Services (DHS)/Director of Dental Services (DDS)
- Headquarters Commandant
- Office of the Provost Marshal (PM)
- Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA)
- Directorate of Resource Management (DRM)
- Directorate of Logistics (DOL)
- Directorate of Public Works (DPW)
- Directorate of Installation Support (DIS)
- Directorate of Information Management (DOIM)
- Directorate of Contracting (DOC)

Installation Management Personnel Designations.

AR 600-3, The Army *Personnel Proponent System*, reflects the following career designations for Army installation management proponency:

- Additional skill identifier (ASI) 6Y, Installation Management
- Career Field 29, Executive Assistant (BASOPS)
- Career Program 27, Housing Management
- Career Field 51, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
- Career Program 18, Engineers and Scientists (Resources and Construction) (limited to facilities engineering and environmental management responsibilities)

INSTALLATION STRATEGY

In December 1992, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army, endorsed the then recently published *Installations: A Strategy for the 21st Century*. This document is the result of a HQDA cross-functional effort which developed an installation vision, eight strategic goals (listed below), and broad guidance for installation-related actions. It represents a shared view among the functional elements of what must be done to achieve the desired end state, world class power projection platforms. It also serves as a lens to focus the efforts of the diverse programs, organizations, and offices involved in managing and supporting our installations. The intent is to achieve these

goals, obtain the requisite commitment and programming of resources, and support the required changes in business practices and policies to accommodate the needs of installation commanders.

With the strategy in place, work at HQDA shifted to developing specific planning and programming objectives for *The Army Plan (FY 1996-2011)* and subsequent POM and budget efforts. Each MACOM and installation is expected to refine the strategic goals and develop its own specific plans to attain the Army's vision for installations. Each installation faces unique challenges, has different priorities, and undoubtedly will proceed at different rates in implementing the practices; it is important that all echelons are working toward the desired endstate.

Strategic Goals.

Eight strategic goals have been established to guide accomplishment of the installation strategy.

Goal 1: Reshape installations to meet power projection specifications.

Goal 2: Formulate soldier and civilian employee programs to enhance Quality of Life, and improve the living and working environment for soldiers, families and civilians.

Goal 3: Achieve total integration of environmental stewardship into installation operations.

Goal 4: Establish and resource an "Investment Plan" for our enduring installations to revitalize or replace installation infrastructure operations.

Goal 5: Complete installation-level business process and functional design to offset the impact of downsizing and continuing resource constraints, improve

service, and reduce costs of running installations; incorporate modernized telecommunications network to support voice, data and image services.

Goal 6: Achieve community, interservice partnerships for facilities and services to improve operations, customer service, and fiscal effectiveness and efficiency.

Goal 7: Attain resource management flexibility for the Garrison Commander through policy, procedures, and systems changes that will enable installations to operate as business activities and maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of resources.

Goal 8: Transform the Army's Human Resource programs to build a participative committed, installation management team capable of meeting the uncertainties and technological complexities of a constantly changing environment.

HQDA Reorganization.

Beginning in the 1970s significant changes in the political, economic and social climates complicated management of installations and pointed to the need for central focus and direction at the HQDA level. Despite extraordinary efforts, installation and garrison commanders were ill-equipped to deal with the flood of environmental legislation, social issues such as child care and spousal abuse, and dramatic resource reductions and base closures.

Response to Change. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s a host of studies identified serious disconnects and inefficiencies in installation management, and a lack of emphasis by HQDA. The fact-finding efforts included the studies *CONCISE, STEADFAST, ROBUST*, and

VANGUARD, a survey of garrison commanders, the Installation Management Strategy Team, the HQDA Transformation Group, and a 1991 DA Inspector General *Special Inspection of Installation Management.*

It was determined that the Army was not optimally managing its installations for efficiency and effectiveness. A common finding throughout these efforts was the absence of a DA-level proponent with knowledge of functional policies and requirements, and the authority to coordinate and integrate the two. They cited the lack of installation management doctrine and failure to adequately prepare garrison commanders for the complex business of effective installation mission. It was concluded that installations must not only serve as foundations for the trained and ready force, but must also be capable of maintaining, mobilizing, stationing, deploying and reconstituting an expandable Army. Recommendations to correct the cited systemic deficiencies varied from establishing a Base Operations Command to creating a single organization on the Army Staff.

Given the weight of political, economic and social factors affecting installations, Army senior leadership decided to establish a Army Staff agency to facilitate more effective Army installation management. *General Order No. 15* formally established the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), effective 1 July 1993, located at the Pentagon. The ACSIM is responsible for the promulgation of policy and integration of doctrine pertaining to the planning, programming, execution, and operation of Army installations.

The start-up of ACSIM resulted from the realignment of DA staff, staff support agency (SSA) and field operating agency

(FOA) functions and resources critical to installation management at the HQDA level. The major changes are outlined below.

- Installation Management policy and resourcing functions of the Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army (OCSA) were reassigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.

- Selected installation and environmental policy functions of the Chief of Engineers were reassigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.

- The Interservice, Intradepartmental, and Interagency Support functions of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics were reassigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.

- The Base Realignment and Closure Office (SSA) of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army was realigned to the ACSIM.

- The U.S. Army Commercial Activities Management Agency (FOA) of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army was redesignated as a part of the U.S. Army Installation Support Management Activity under ACSIM.

- The Internal Support Modules functions of the Decision Systems Management Agency, OCSA (FOA) was redesignated as a part of U.S. Army Installation Support Management Activity under ACSIM.

- The U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center (FOA) of

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel was realigned to ACSIM.

- The U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (FOA) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was redesignated the U.S. Army Environmental Center under ACSIM.
- The natural and cultural resources functions of the former U.S. Army Engineering and Housing Support Center (now U.S. Army Center for Public Works)(FOA), was reassigned to the U.S. Army Environmental Center under the ACSIM.
- The U.S. Army Environmental Office (SSA) was realigned from the Chief of Engineers to the ACSIM.
- The housing and facilities policy functions of the former U.S. Army Engineering and Housing Support Center (now U.S. Army Center for Public Works)(FOA), was redesignated a part of the U.S. Army Installation Support Management Activity under ACSIM.

As a result of the above changes, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management organizational structure is comprised of the DA staff office, two staff support agencies and three field operating agencies. Effective 1 October 1996 it reorganized to become even more effective in executing its mission.

The Installation Strategy which resulted in the above changes continues to serve as a blueprint for achieving efficiencies as it executes its mission in a climate of increased resource constraints. The ACSIM recognizes that in the 21st Century Army "installation readiness" must be viewed as an integral component of force readiness. Integration of cross-functional, and sometimes conflicting, HQDA policies concerning the operation of Army installations is essential.

MAJOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS

The Installation Management Steering Committee (IMSC), co-chaired by the Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics & Environment) and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, meets periodically to review proposed initiatives that could enable installation and garrison commanders and their staff to manage base operations more effectively and efficiently. This committee includes general officer representatives from HQDA Secretariat and ARSTAF offices with installation management interests. MACOMs and other HQDA organizations are invited to attend meetings. The charter of the IMSC is to investigate all ways and means to improve installation operations and provide recommendations to Army senior leadership. The IMSC goal is a daily process of integrating policy, fostering installation management initiatives, resolving issues, eliminating bureaucratic roadblocks, and a commitment to ensuring positive changes in installation operations are instituted.

As the ARSTAF installation "Force Integrator", the ACSIM consolidates, processes and resolves those initiatives that can be satisfied at that level. Those issues of greater significance not resolvable at the IMSC level are further elevated, with recommendations, to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. As of the Fiscal Quarter 2/96, 80% of

MACOM initiatives reviewed at HQDA have been approved.

ACSIM makes every effort to keep garrison commanders and other members of the BASOPS community informed. ACSIM publishes a quarterly newsletter to communicate installations' initiatives, new programs, effective BASOPS management practices, and upcoming events. Additionally, ACSIM has established a home page site on the internet's worldwide web (**http://www.hqda.army.mil/ webs/acsimweb/**) which provides news of current initiatives, commentary from the ACSIM, and an on-line version of the quarterly newsletter, as well as links to OACSIM division sites, to MACOMs, to posts, and to other BASOPS-related web sites.

Numerous initiatives have been undertaken by ACSIM in support of more effective management of base operations within the Army, as listed below.

Doctrine.

The ACSIM established installation management doctrine with the publication of *FM 100-22* on 11 October 1994; it is key to organizing and performing installation management functions in support of the Army. The doctrine describes how installations support the Army's role in the National Military Strategy and warfighting doctrine. As it reaches maturity, it will serve as the authoritative foundation for organizing, structuring and managing garrison operations. The scope of this doctrine will provide the impetus for change in how installations are managed. Its publication gave commanders the flexibility to organize their garrison structure to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible within resources. Consequently, *AR*

5-3, Installation Management and Organization, was rescinded.

Privatization and Outsourcing.

Outsourcing is a powerful tool which the Army has available to re-engineer, streamline, become more business-oriented, and ultimately make better use of resources. Outsourcing is defined as the transfer of a function previously performed in-house to an outside provider. Privatization is a subset of outsourcing which involves the transfer or sale of government assets to the private sector.

Privatization and outsourcing provide opportunities to leverage technology and achieve cost savings. These management tools can assist in increasing the share of resources applied to other Army priorities, such as modernization. The installations conducting the studies and implementing the initiatives are key to the success or failure of the effort. Installations should take the broadest possible view of outsourcing, one that explores innovative partnerships with both private enterprise and the public sector, i.e., state/local governments, other DOD/Federal entities, and non-profit agencies. If outsourcing is narrowly defined as simply contracting out in-house functions, other opportunities for economies and efficiencies will be missed. As privatization and outsourcing opportunities continue to be examined, risks and capabilities must be assessed before taking action.

Current Privatization and Outsourcing Initiatives. Private industry support is embedded in many of the Army's functions today. Army training, maintenance and other logistics functions, research and development, manufacturing, and base level services are all carried out with substantial industry support. The current Army

outsourcing focus is on the Department of Defense effort to address and implement Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommendations in the areas of depot maintenance, materiel management, housing, base commercial activities, education and training, data centers, and finance and accounting. The Army is researching and implementing solutions to problems and constraints through greater reliance on private industry in other areas as well.

Specific initiatives are cited below.

- Housing and utilities are the Army's top priorities for privatization. The Army is taking full advantage of new Capital Venture Initiatives (CVI) authorities in the FY 96 DOD Authorization Act, to attract private interest and investment capital through guarantees and direct loans, commitments such as leases or differential payments, and investments such as limited partnerships and equity or debt instruments. It is anticipated that all projects will leverage scarce Army housing resources and provide housing more quickly than conventional military construction. OSD and the Services also have been working on legislation authorizing Military Housing Corporations (MHC) for each of the Services. These MHCs are envisioned to be private not-for-profit Corporations. MHCs will be permissive in nature, i.e., the Services may choose to participate. The Army is actively planning for Army-wide implementation of this broader authority.

- Utilities privatization frees the Army of ownership responsibilities and leverages the financial, technical, and professional capabilities of utilities companies. The Army goal is privatize 75 percent of all utility systems by FY 00. The capital investment necessary to renovate existing CONUS systems is estimated to be in excess of $3B. To date, ten utility systems have been privatized; five systems were approved in the Fiscal Year 1996 DOD Authorization Act; and seven systems were submitted to Congress for inclusion in the FY 97 bill. Over 40 additional studies have been initiated.

- During FY 96, DOD significantly revitalized the Commercial Activities (CA) program. During FY 97-99, the Army plans to subject more base commerical activities to competition with the private sector than it has in any previous three years. This cost competition process is described in the next section.

Commercial Activities.

The Army had an active Commercial Activities Program in the early 1980's. Directorates of Logistics (DOL), Directorates of Public Works (DPW), and other functions were under serious study for outsourcing at many CONUS installations. Studies are conducted, typically at installation level, under the guidance of *OMB Circular A-76 (Commercial Activities)*. The Circular provides for competition between the government and commercial sources and

specifies how to conduct cost comparisons. Under A-76, agencies:

– Solicit bids or proposals from private firms.
– Streamline the in-house organization into a Most Efficient Organization (MEO).
– Develop an "in-house bid" based on the MEO (following detailed costing rules) and have it reviewed by an auditing organization.
– Select the lowest bid or best value proposal from the solicitation, and add 10% of personnel-related in-house costs to account for intangible transition costs.
– If the result is lower than the "in-house bid," privatize; if the result is higher, reorganize into the MEO.

Since FY 83, the Army completed 331 A-76 cost competitions covering over 20,000 manpower positions. This included many entire DOLs and DPWs, as well as other functions and activities such as motor pools, visual information, custodial services, laundry, and food services. The results achieved include:

– 154 in-house decisions and 177 contract decisions.
– in-house work forces reduced by over 4,000 positions (20%) through streamlining before competition.
– over 9,300 positions converted to contract.
– over 200 positions converted from contract to in-house operations in A-76 studies of contract operations.

– total dollar savings averaged 29% (comparing pre-study in-house cost, estimated using A-76 costing procedures, to the winning bid, whether in-house or contract). (These A-76 calculations include non-agency costs.)

The above facts highlight the effect that competition has on the cost of performing a function.

Over time, the laws and rules associated with contracting-out have become more specific and constraining. While these may inhibit outsourcing decisions and implementation, only a limited number of absolute prohibitions to contracting exists. For example, firefighter and security guard services may not be contracted within the Department of Defense (DOD), unless they were already contracted as of September 24, 1983. *Title 10, U.S.Code, Chapter 146*, provides most of the legal foundation for reporting and conducting the studies of commercial activities. Of primary concern is the impact of contracting-out on Federal employees.

Army Regulation 5-20 and *DA Pamphlet 5-20* provide the Army's policy and instructions for meeting the statutory and other regulatory guidelines. The Army and DOD understand the problems associated with the Commercial Activities Program and are working to change laws, remove barriers, and streamline the processes to facilitate outsourcing where it makes good business sense. Commanders have a variety of lessons-learned and other documented experience, audit and inspection reports, and standard study and contracting documents that can help reduce the work of the study process so that efficiencies and economies can still be achieved in the near-term.

Environmental Compliance Program.

This program focuses on activities designed to ensure that current operations at Army installations and activities (including civil works project sites) meet or exceed Federal, state and local environmental requirements, as well as the applicable Final Governing Standards (FGS) overseas. These requirements include statutes, case law, Presidential Executive Orders, regulations, policies and directives principally in the areas of air quality, radon, asbestos, environmental noise, safe drinking water, wastewater, hazardous and munitions waste, underground storage tanks (USTs), and the *National Environmental Policy Act*. This makes full compliance a very challenging and sometimes elusive goal. Nevertheless, the Army continues to make progress in this area as reflected by the gradual decline (beginning in FY 92) in the overall violation rate and number of enforcement actions received. The greatest challenge for the Army will be to continue to improve its compliance posture, and at the same time, effectively transition to the prevention mode of operation.

Hazardous Substances Management System (HSMS).

In January 1996, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) signed a message mandating pharmacy-like centralized hazardous materials management systems be established at all Army Materiel Command (AMC) installations not already utilizing that practice. While many installations have implemented pharmacies on their own initiative, the DCSLOG guidance requires the pharmacy be formally tested at one FORSCOM and TRADOC installation. Concurrently, the ACSIM began initial fielding of the Hazardous Substances Management System (HSMS) as the Army

standard management information system (MIS) supporting the business practice of centralized hazardous materials management. The HSMS is an MIS designated by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management. It provides installation-level cradle-to-grave management of hazardous materials and hazardous waste, as well as preparing many required environmental reports for the installation.

Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Reduction Strategy.

Executive Order 12856 required Army installations to inventory their toxic releases beginning calendar year 1994. Facilities exceeding certain toxic chemical release thresholds must report these amounts to EPA. The Army must reduce agency-wide releases 50% by 1999 against the calendar year 1994 baseline. The Army is analyzing the data to identify the underlying systems or industrial processes to evaluate how the 50% reduction will impact operations and readiness. This analysis will lead to an Army-wide TRI Reduction Strategy maximizing cost savings and eliminating sources of pollution, while minimizing the investment of required Army resources.

Installation Pollution Prevention Plans.

Each Army CONUS installation prepared a pollution prevention plan by December 1995 in response to *Executive Order 12856*. These plans are supportive of the overall Army Pollution Prevention Strategy and focus on meeting all the pollution prevention measures of merit, including the 50% TRI reduction. POM 98-03 will begin funding the implementation of these plans.

Army Installation Restoration Program (IRP).

The Army's IRP is a comprehensive program to identify, investigate and clean-up contamination at active Army installations (including off-post migration). The program focuses on clean-up of contamination associated with *past* Army activities. The IRP is part of the DOD *Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP)* which was formally established by Congress in 1984 under *Title 10 U.S.C. 2701-2707* and *2810*. The IRP provides centralized management for clean-up of hazardous waste sites consistent with provisions of the *Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)*.

The objective of the IRP is to clean-up contaminated sites with the following goals: (1) to protect the health and safety of installation personnel and the public; and (2) to restore the quality of the environment. The IRP is funded by the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA), established by *Section 211* of the *Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)*. The IRP complies with state, regional and local requirements applicable to the clean-up of hazardous materials contamination.

Military Construction Army (MCA) Process.

Installation commanders may see military construction (MILCON) projects completed and occupied on their installations, but the projects will likely have been initiated by one of his predecessors. Normally an installation command will be planning and programming projects which he won't see completed during that assignment. Identifying the point in time when DA and the MACOM issue programming guidance to the installation as "day one", it will likely be more than 36 months from day one before construction of a MILCON project would begin, and another 18 to 24 months for construction to be completed.

In an ideal and simplified situation events will unfold as follows over a period of four years.

- During the first year the installation will develop the DD Form 1391 based on the using agency's requirements and submit proposed projects to the MACOM. The MACOM will submit proposed projects to HQDA and concept designs will start, with installation participation.
- During the second year concept designs will be completed and final designs started, with installation participation. HQDA will submit proposed projects to OSD for next year's budget submission.
- During the third year OSD submits a budget to Congress that includes MILCON projects, final designs will be completed, and projects will be prepared for advertisement for construction.
- At the start of the fourth year Congress approves the budget and funds, and authorizes the MILCON projects. Projects are advertised for construction, and bids are opened and projects awarded for construction.

The list of projects submitted by the installations to the MACOMs is pared down by the MACOMs before the list is submitted to HQDA. In turn, that list is pared down by HQDA before it is sent to OSD, and again

the list is pared down by OSD before being submitted to Congress.

Because of the length of time involved in the process, and because of the competitiveness of the process, the installation commander must be farsighted and determined, especially in the current fiscal atmosphere. He must be farsighted in order to plan and program years ahead of the true requirement, and be determined in order to fully justify and support a project through the planning and programming years.

Utilities Privatization Program.

The Army has found that it is very difficult to properly operate and maintain installation utility systems due to work force reductions, shrinking maintenance budgets, and stringent environmental regulations. Funding for a complete utilities modernization program is not attainable in the foreseeable future. These circumstances have made privatization of Army-owned utility systems a logical and cost effective option. Privatization is also consistent with Army and DOD policy to outsource all but the Army's core missions and functions. A goal of 75 percent of natural gas systems by the year 2000 has been established. Based on the results of a review of alternatives, determination of feasibility, and a review of a life cycle cost (LCC) analysis, a decision is made by the installation commander to transfer ownership, operation and maintenance to either a public, municipal, or regional utility. A transfer of ownership in which the Army retains the land, such as natural gas or electrical distribution lines, may be approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment). When the utility system and the associated land are transferred, Congressional authorizing legislation is required.

Facility Reduction Program.

The ACSIM has extended the program to reduce our facility base in order to improve funding of installation facilities requirements. MACOMs are required to dispose of one square foot of temporary facilities for each square foot of new construction. This requirement began in FY92 and seeks to prevent the facilities inventory from growing. Most Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and chemical demilitarization construction are exempted from this requirement. The Facility Reduction Program includes three elements: improved utilization of permanent facilities; consolidation into the best facilities; and disposal of the worst facilities. Reduction targets have been disseminated to each of the MACOMs with major landholdings. Through FY95 31.0 million square feet was disposed of or placed under contract for disposal. Goals for the POM period are pending approval.

Revitalization.

Revitalization is the cornerstone of our vision to provide excellent facilities. We must continue in a systematic way to repair, upgrade, or replace our infrastructure to modern standards. The ACSIM has developed two programs to focus the scarce revitalization resources where the greatest benefit is achieved thus increasing the quality of life of our soldiers and their families.

Whole Barracks Renewal. Starting in FY94, the Whole Barracks Renewal Program began to upgrade housing standards for unaccompanied personnel. The new Army barracks design standards are: a private room with 118 net square feet (NSF) of living/sleeping area for every Private through Specialist and a 22 NSF walk-in

closet; a semi-private bath per room; a washer and dryer for every 15 soldiers; temperature controls in each room module; a telephone and a cable television jack per soldier; parking spaces for 100% of the occupancy capacity; and no administrative, dining or supply facilities located within and/or attached to barracks. Currently, this program is planned to revitalize over 80,000 spaces world-wide, although not all barracks overseas will be revitalized to the new standard.

Whole Neighborhood Revitalization. For Family Housing, the Whole Neighborhood Revitalization Program assists in bringing Army homes to modern standards. Whole Neighborhood Revitalization takes a holistic approach to renewing whole neighborhoods and includes revitalization of dwelling units, neighborhood infrastructure and neighborhood amenities accomplished at one time, thereby eliminating the piece-meal approach.

Installation Status Report (ISR).

In 1992, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the United States Military Academy Operations Research Center (ORCEN), and MACOM Commanders jointly developed a decision support system, the Installation Status Report. The ISR is designed to assist installation commanders with installation management. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) also participated in ISR's development and field testing. The effort has been guided by an executive steering committee and working group comprised of representatives from HQDA functional offices, OACSIM and MACOMs.

The ISR assists the installation commanders in determining the readiness of installations much like the Unit Status Report indicates readiness. ISR Part I-Infrastructure estimates facility resource needs, assists in prioritizing programs and projects, assists in resource allocation, and then measures progress. ISR Part I was fielded in CONUS in FY 95 and OCONUS in FY 96. ISR Part II-Environment captures macro-level status of installations' environmental programs and improves the justification/prioritization of limited resources. ISR Part II was fielded in CONUS in FY 96; OCONUS fielding will be tested in FY 97, with full OCONUS fielding scheduled for FY 98. ISR Part III-Services is currently under development, with objectives of measuring and communicating the quantity, quality and cost of all installation support services performed by or available at Army installations.

The ISR program will provide an overall picture of an installation's status, and show how deficiencies in installation condition effect the environment and mission performance. It provides information which links installation conditions, priorities and resources to readiness. While serving the needs of different customers such as HQDA, MACOMs, and installations, the ISR is also the installation commander's opportunity to influence the Army's strategy. The ISR provides a common standard and language for the Army to speak with one voice.

Improved Business Practices.

Today's fiscal restraints make it imperative that the Army go even further in doing business differently. We must be innovative in setting new standards for financial management, in implementing good business practices and in seeking every opportunity to "make money" in order to

provide quality base services. Normally installations are precluded by law from using assets which are supported with appropriated funds to generate revenues to offset costs. Unless specifically authorized by law to retain revenues, those proceeds or "profits" from installation operations or sale of assets must be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. However, recently, Congress demonstrated some willingness to consider limited, amendatory legislation to use proceeds from the sale or outlease of property for the specific purposes of maintenance and repair and environmental restoration. Specifically, the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act included two new authorities that were initially authored by the Army. Sections 2805 and 2806 of Public Law 101-510 provide DOD the authority to retain revenues generated from the sale or transfer of excess non-base realignment and closure (BRAC) real property and the outlease of non-excess real and personal property, respectively. Any funds earned by an installation through these authorities would not be off-set by a reduction elsewhere in the installations budget. The Resource Recovery and Recycling Program, under which installations with a "qualified Recycling Program" market recyclable materials through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) or through direct sales, provides that all proceeds go to the generating installation. Proceeds will first cover program operating costs and of the remaining amount, up to 50% can be used for environmental, energy, or safety programs with all other proceeds used for MWR activities.

Civilian Inmate Labor Program.

In pursuing new/more economical methods of providing services, several installations have sought minimum security civilian inmates as an alternative source of labor. Such an arrangement benefits both the Army and correctional facilities. Civilian inmates accomplish tasks not otherwise possible under current manning and funding constraints. Correctional facilities benefit because the Army provides meaningful work for inmates, and in some cases additional space to relieve overcrowding. Except for nominal operating costs, this labor pool has no direct labor cost to the Army. An evaluation of initial test cases revealed that under certain circumstances this arrangement can be very beneficial to the Army. Cost-avoidance has been significant. A civilian inmate labor program can be implemented on an installation simply with the installation inmate labor plan and a HQDA approved Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the commander and the warden.

Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE).

Since 1988, the Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE) process has focused on readiness, people, and pride to make continuous improvements in customer service, facilities, and environment. ACOE has been the commander's tool for setting standards, performing self assessments, and rewarding, and celebrating excellence for the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Self assessment is a key tool for commanders with a focus on the expectations of customers, soldiers, civilians and their families, as well as the community's ability to meet their needs. The adoption of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award criteria into the ACOE process in 1995 further contributed to the reshaping, reinventing, and reengineering of the Army. The Baldrige criteria provides a comprehensive and integrated change

management framework that results in continuous improvement.

SUMMARY

At the outset, the installation management process was identified as a very complicated but essential process with which too few Army officers are familiar. The importance of vigorous, innovative management at the installation level has become more critical as the combined effects of resource limitations and escalating costs squeeze the Army's capability to support existing structure and maintain essential readiness through training. It therefore becomes abundantly clear that the challenge of wringing maximum utility, efficiency, and productivity from each available dollar is the professional obligation not only of the Director of Resource Management, but also of the installation

commander, the garrison commander, directorate staff, subordinate commanders, and responsible people at all levels. Sound, efficient installation management contributes directly and materially to fundamental mission accomplishment and, therefore, becomes an area of genuine interest to all soldiers. The garrison commander and his staff are comparable to the mayor and department heads operating a large city with all the associated challenges: providing the best possible quality of life to soldiers and families; protecting the environment; using allocated funds and other resources wisely and legally; and maintaining good relations with surrounding communities, to name just a few. It is imperative, therefore, that our "military cities," the places where our soldiers, family members, civilians, and retirees train, work, live, and play, be maintained at the highest levels of readiness,

capable of projecting the power necessary to win the next war.

Army installations are:
- home to the force;
- serving our nation in peace and war;
- continuously improving communities of quality facilities and excellent services;
- valued neighbors, trusted community partners, and recognized leaders in city management and public administration;
- environmental stewards for present and future generations; and,
- world-class strategic power projection and sustainment bases.

The installations of the U.S. Army are changing to meet the demands of training highly technical forces within limited geographical and physical assets; mobilizing and frequently deploying and recovering operating forces; and providing sustainment and support services beyond the installation boundaries. The ability to deploy forces rapidly from within the U.S. is central to the Army's role in the National Military Strategy. Army installations today face tougher challenges than ever before, as years of underfunding have caused infrastructure deterioration. As the Army's budget continues to decline, the efficient and effective management of installations becomes even more critical. Yet, in facing these tough challenges, Army installations must continue to make every effort to provide the quality of life that soldiers, families and workers deserve.

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CHAPTER 18

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

"No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story."

General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS
1991

INTRODUCTION

The new National Military Strategy now delineates a regional conflict emphasis—a marked change from a 40-year focus on the former Soviet Union as the threat. This emphasis and additional changes to national priorities are not only having a major impact on force structure, but also are changing the requirements for intelligence. As a result, continual changes in intelligence organizations and functions are occurring within the Army. As these occur, they will be outlined in future editions of this text.

This chapter defines intelligence and provides an overview of the need for intelligence by decision makers. It includes the composition and responsibilities of the various intelligence organizations at national, Department of Defense (DOD), non-DOD, and Service (including HQDA) levels. It describes intelligence as a fundamental support tool in the emerging doctrine of Information Operations. It also describes the Army concepts for management of all-source

intelligence, or providing intelligence support to commanders; Operations Security support; Electronic Warfare at the operational and tactical levels of combat; and the need for effective national-tactical intelligence interface.

Intelligence is the product obtained from the systematic collection, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, and assessment of available information on virtually any topic, area, or individual. This chapter addresses the management of this effort.

President Reagan signed *Executive Order (EO) 12333* on 4 December 1981. The *EO* provides for the effective conduct of U.S. intelligence activities and the protection of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. *EO 12333* superseded *EO 12036*, which regulated U.S. intelligence activities during the Carter Administration. The original *Executive Order* on the subject was *11905*, signed by President Ford. EO 12333 has not been superseded under the current Administration.

NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE

Timely, relevant, accurate and synchronized information addressing the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign leaders and their governments is needed to develop sound national security and foreign policies. It is critical to international negotiations and to the development and monitoring of international agreements. Within the DOD, planners and managers responsible for the development of weapons systems and force structure need accurate, long-range projections of the combat capabilities of foreign powers as the basis for their recommendations and decisions. The ability of U.S. forces to deter or defend against attack requires detailed knowledge of the current deployment and capabilities of potential adversaries and their future plans. At the operational and tactical levels of warfare, intelligence must provide a commander with an accurate picture of the battlefield so that he can position and employ his forces successfully to accomplish the assigned mission. Finally, as our focus shifts to additional missions, forces involved in military operations other than war (MOOTW) will require detailed information on the cultural, historical, economical, and political milieu of the area in which they will deploy. Intelligence support to force projection operations will require a tremendous amount of information to ensure mission accomplishment with minimal casualties and limited collateral damage.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

Intelligence products may be categorized in several ways depending on the needs of the intended recipients as well as the scope, level of detail, and the perishability of the product. The distinctions between these types of intelligence products are becoming less pronounced as the nature of conflict, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance overlap. Additionally, technology facilitates the development, acquisition, and integration of all-source intelligence through a "seamless" architecture from the national to the tactical levels. Examples include the U.S. Army's All Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), NSA's interactive geographic database (OILSTOCK), and other similar types of multi-dimensional systems and capabilities.

Categories.

National Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence coordinated by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). It covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency.

Departmental Intelligence is intelligence that any department or agency of the Federal Government requires to execute its own mission. This may include any or all of the following: National Security Council (NSC) Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State and its Intelligence and Research (I&R) staff, Department of the Treasury (Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms [BATF], Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]), Department of Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard [USCG]); the National Drug Enforcement Office; and the DOD and its agencies to include the Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), National Reconnaissance Office, and the Armed Forces.

Levels.

Strategic Intelligence is intelligence required for the formulation of strategy policy and military plans and operations at the international, national, and theater levels.

Operational Intelligence is the intelligence required for planning and conducting of campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

Tactical Intelligence is intelligence required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

Types of Intelligence.

Basic Intelligence is encyclopedic type information which is not time-sensitive and describes all aspects of a nation — physical, social, economic, political, geographical, cultural, and military which is used as a base for intelligence products in support of planning, policymaking, and military operations.

Current Intelligence includes all types and forms of perishable, time-sensitive, information of immediate value and interest to specific consumers. It may be disseminated without complete evaluation, interpretation, analyses, or integration.

Estimative Intelligence is that intelligence which projects forward in time and is predictive in nature.

Crisis Intelligence is comprised of specific types and forms of very perishable, time-sensitive information of immediate value, and usually intense interest at the international, national, and theater levels. It is narrowly focused on a precise area, individual(s), or event which is closely monitored until termination or closure. Usually after 30 days, this type of intelligence becomes Current Intelligence and eventually Basic Intelligence.

Combat Information is data obtained through intelligence collection sources and methods which are passed rapidly to the user without benefit of analysis, interpretation, or integration. A sensor-to-shooter system transmitting highly perishable, possibly targeting data, is an example of this data. Tactical commanders often must make decisions based on the immediate access to and availability of combat information.

INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (Joint Pub 1-02) as opposed to technical sources. HUMINT includes such overt activities as attaché duty, liaison functions, interrogation of POWs, debriefing of displaced persons/refugees/evacuees/and line crossers, solicitation of information from indigenous persons, document exploitation, and controlled collection operations such as covert or clandestine operations.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).

IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual

photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media (Joint Pub 1-02). The resulting imagery may be analyzed in either hard-copy (photographic) or soft-copy (electronic display) format for distribution. The result of collected products of photographic interpretation, classified and evaluated for intelligence use is Photographic Intelligence (PHOTINT). (Joint Pub 1-02).

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

SIGINT is intelligence obtained through the exploitation and analysis of electromagnetic emissions and includes Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT).

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

MASINT is that scientific and technical intelligence which is directed toward the identification of remotely-sensed, distinctive characteristics of a device or system which can facilitate subsequent identification.

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT).

TECHINT is a multidiscipline function which supports commanders by either identifying or countering an enemy's momentary technological advantage, or by maintaining a friendly technological advantage. The two parts of TECHINT are Battlefield TECHINT and Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI)

Counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence is that intelligence which deals with the information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or terrorist activities. Operations Security (OPSEC) Support, a subset of command and control (C2) Force Protection, is the counterintelligence assessment of the vulnerability of specific U.S. forces, areas, or activities to foreign intelligence collection.

Open Source Intelligence. (OSINT)

Open source intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of information which is unclassified and largely in the public domain. Open source intelligence may cut across other disciplines to include broadcast, imagery and mixed media sources.

OTHER USES OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence must quickly reach, or be accessible to leaders and their staffs who require it in the preparation of plans and orders. Commanders, J2s/G2s/N2s, actions officers, and managers must develop a broad understanding of what intelligence they need; what can be reasonably obtained; and how it can be beneficial in the development of their programs. They must clearly state, and if possible prioritize, their intelligence requirements to the appropriate organization.

The following are a few examples of program areas in which intelligence can have a significant impact.

Organizational Design and Force Structure.

Force structure designers must consider the multiplicity of the threats and must also include nonthreat factors such as the deployment capabilities and limitations of allied forces. There must also be balance between the greatest threat or enemy capability and the most imminent threat or intention in the development of a force structure. The force planner must include intelligence participation in every phase of his planning and decision making. To do this, he must be aware of the intelligence support available and how to task the system.

Materiel Acquisition and Force Modernization.

The product/project/program manager must consider technical developments in foreign countries, new foreign weapons systems and countermeasures developments and future developments, as well as terrain and weather considerations. This includes an assessment of how an adversary may react to the development of a new, friendly system. The adversary reaction may include development of a totally new piece of equipment to counter a specific threat. The project manager must have the latest intelligence available which could affect his program. He must make the intelligence systems aware of his intelligence needs.

The combat developer must also be aware of technical developments and must work closely with the materiel developer to ensure that a project/program will counter or surpass assessed threat capabilities. Both must be prepared to amend a program prior to its completion to counter a new threat capability. Intelligence requirements are not limited to hostile forces.

Technological breakthroughs in friendly or neutral nations must also be factored into U.S. materiel acquisition planning. Managers of systems of breakthrough technology must use available intelligence support to protect characteristics of the developing system as a measure of OPSEC in the R&D arena.

In addition to the intelligence needs stated, the program/project/product manager must also have high quality up-to-date intelligence on the foreign collection threat directed at his program/project/product. Threats from both foreign government and non-government sponsored collection make up this category. These threats must be identified, collected upon, and neutralized by Army Counterintelligence assets on behalf of the materiel developer. It is important to keep the Army materiel development community continually aware of and safe from technological loss from foreign directed and controlled collection service. This strengthens the Army's technical base against illegal technology transfer and markedly improves the Army's ability to maintain technological superiority.

Other factors that should be taken into account in these processes include long-range planning and consideration of opponent's strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. As the rate of technological growth continues to increase and as the threat becomes harder to define, material developers lean toward generic threats defined in technical terms, thereby avoiding the potential trap of being locked to a specific adversary or region.

Training Systems Development.

Doctrine and training decisions must be based on sound intelligence. Foreign military capabilities and deployments are dynamic, and U.S. doctrine and training

decisions must be equally dynamic. To be effective in battle, U.S. soldiers must know the enemy, including his doctrine, tactics, equipment, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, and if possible, his intentions. Training development and implementation must be closely tied to materiel systems management. Training to operate in a hostile information warfare environment anywhere in the world places a heavy emphasis on learning about a broad range of technical command and control capabilities. Future adversaries may employ combinations of Red, Blue, and Grey command and control systems, as well as commercial products.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

The goal of the U.S. intelligence effort is to provide the President and the National Security Council information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of U.S. interests from foreign threats. To reach this goal, the intelligence system is organized as shown at Figure 18-1. While not a member of the Intelligence Community (IC), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides program and budget guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence for development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) as part of the Federal Budget.

Composition of the NFIP

The NFIP provides funds for the bulk of all national-level intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance activities of the CIA, Defense Department, and all civilian federal agencies and departments, as well as the Intelligence Community management structure. The

program is comprised of two major components - national level intelligence programs within the Defense Department and those in federal departments and agencies outside DOD. The Defense programs include the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), the Consolidated Cryptologic Intelligence Program (CCP), The DOD Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and specialized DOD Reconnaissance Activities. The Program Manager for the GDIP is the Director, DIA; Program Manager for the CCP is the Director, NSA; Program Manger for the FCIP is the Director of Counterintelligence and Security Programs who is subordinate to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, under the ASD (C3I); Program Manager for the NIMAP is the Director, NIMA, Program Manager for the NRP is the Director, NRO.

Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)

TIARA accounts provide funding for timely intelligence support primarily to tactical operations of military forces. The TIARA accounts are designed, built and operated by the military Services and defense agencies and compete for funding with the combat and combat-support programs they support. As defined by the Congress, TIARA funds represent those portions of the DOD budget devoted to activities outside the NFIP. TIARA is an aggregation of all portions of the DOD budget that provide intelligence and related support to military operations. In contrast to the NFIP, the TIARA assets are managed by countless military commanders and defense agency

ORGANIZATION OF
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM UNDER EO 12333

Figure 18-1

officials on a decentralized basis. The single DOD focal point for intelligence management is the ASD (C3I).

Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP)

The JMIP focuses on joint, defense-wide initiatives, activities and programs that predominantly provide intelligence information and support to multiple defense consumers; bridge existing programmatic divisions across Service, departmental and national intelligence lines to provide more effective and coherent intelligence programmatic decisionmaking; and ultimately support military intelligence consumers, i.e. warfighters, policymakers,

and force modernization planners. JMIP encompasses the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP), Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMP), the Defense Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program (DMC & GP), and the General Defense Intelligence and Applications Program (GDIAP).

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

The PFIAB reports directly to the President and advises him concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities of the agencies of the Intelligence Community. In

addition to the President, the DCI, the CIA, or other Government agencies engaged in intelligence activities can request PFIAB recommendations concerning ways to achieve increased effectiveness in meeting national intelligence needs.

By *Executive Order 12863*, September 13, 1993, the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) was established as a standing committee of the PFIAB. The IOB is required to report through the PFIAB to inform the President of intelligence activities that any member of the Board believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, Executive Orders, or Presidential directives; to forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning intelligence activities that the Board believes may be unlawful; to review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence Community concerning the lawfulness of intelligence activities; to review the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting intelligence activities that may be unlawful or contrary to an Executive Order or Presidential directive; and to conduct such investigations as the Board deems necessary to carry out its functions under this order.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).

The SSCI and HPSCI have key roles in the conduct of Intelligence Oversight. These roles are specified by law, and require that they (the committees) be kept fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any department; that they be furnished any information or material concerning intelligence activities requested in order to carry out authorized responsibilities; and that the committees be informed in a timely fashion of any illegal intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and any corrective action.

Within the Department of Defense the officer responsible for the oversight of intelligence activities is the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD-IO). *DOD Directive 5148.12* , dated 20 July 1989, established the position and assigned its responsibilities. The ATSD-IO had been designated as the sole conduit between the Department of Defense and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. In addition, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the coordinator of the National Security Council Staff and the senior executive officer for national security issues.

The National Security Council (NSC)

The NSC reviews, guides, and directs the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, special activities, and attendant policies and programs. Within the NSC, the Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence formulates policy, monitors decisions, and evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of collection efforts.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

The DCI is concurrently Director, CIA, and is directly responsible to the President and the National Security Council. He is the primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and is the intelligence system's principal spokesman to Congress. He develops objectives and prepares guidance for the IC to enhance its capabilities for responding to

expected future needs for foreign national intelligence, formulates policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign governments, and coordinates intelligence arrangements between agencies of the IC and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments. The DCI is responsible for the development, presentation, and justification of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. A complete list of DCI responsibilities is contained in *EO 12333*.

Other senior officials are responsible for contributing, within their areas of capability, to the national foreign intelligence collection effort and for cooperating with other IC members to achieve efficiency and provide mutual assistance. In addition, they are responsible for management of the collection of departmental intelligence.

Pursuant to *EO 12333*, the DCI establishes boards, councils, committees, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community. Three such organizations are shown on Figure 18-1.

The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).

The NFIB advises the DCI on production, review, and coordination of foreign national intelligence; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; protection of intelligence sources and methods; activities of common concern; and other matters referred to it by the DCI. Although not mentioned in *EO 12333*, the DCI continued the NFIB but removed from its charter responsibility for addressing resource issues. Those responsibilities were assigned to the National Foreign Intelligence Council.

The National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC).

The NFIC advises the DCI on priorities and objectives for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and any other such matters referred to it by the DCI.

Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC).

The IR&DC advises the DCI on research and development strategy and technologies that will best contribute to the attainment of national intelligence objectives.

CIA responsibilities, under the direction of the NSC, include the collection of foreign intelligence and the development, conduct, or provision of support for technical and other programs which collect national foreign intelligence. The CIA is responsible for the conduct of counterintelligence activities conducted abroad by other members of the IC. In contrast, the FBI is responsible for domestic counterintelligence activities. The CIA is also responsible for coordinating collection of intelligence information outside the United States. The CIA conducts special activities approved by the President and conducts services of common concern for the IC as directed by the NSC. Special activities are defined in *EO 12333* as: *activities in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities but which are not intended to influence U.S. political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.*

The CIA produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to the national

security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological intelligence required to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other elements of the U.S. Government. The CIA also produces and disseminates counterintelligence studies and reports on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. Recently established in the CIA is the Office of Military Support (OMS). The OMS provides a single point of contact to the military departments to facilitate coordination with the CIA.

The responsibilities of all agencies depicted in Figure 18-2 are detailed in *EO 12333.*

THE MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

The National Security Council provides overall Executive Branch guidance, direction, and review for all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The NSC has special committees within its framework which deal with its intelligence responsibilities.

In addition to the management of the individual agencies or elements thereof which constitute the intelligence system, management of intelligence focuses mainly on intelligence resources, requirements, collection-tasking, collection, analysis, production and dissemination.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

The DOD is the nation's largest user of intelligence information and the largest investor in intelligence programs. DOD has a particular responsibility to support commanders at all levels. Defense Intelligence, as part of the Intelligence Community (IC), is faced with a growing number of challenges to the successful accomplishment of its Defense intelligence mission.

The international environment has grown more complex. Changing political alignments and instability, growing economic interdependence, ethnic rivalries, increased international terrorism, and international narcotics trade have resulted in more diverse intelligence requirements. A significant challenge is presented by trying to attack targets protected by relatively sophisticated command, control and communications systems which are readily available to even the poorest countries

Effective performance of Department of Defense missions depends upon the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of timely, relevant, accurate, synchronized, and predictive intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers.

To strengthen the Department's performance of its intelligence functions, on 15 March 1991 the Secretary of Defense approved a plan for restructuring Defense Intelligence. The DOD reorganization of Defense intelligence resulted in a structure to:

- Ensure the quality, relevance, and timeliness of defense intelligence in support of national and international defense and foreign policies, plans, and programs through establishment of a Defense Intelligence Policy Council to assist the ASD(C3I) and the IC
- Strengthen the intelligence support to the Combatant Commanders and enhance "jointness" through consolidation of existing Unified and Major or Joint Combatant Commands and component

intelligence processing, analysis, and production activities into Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs); reshape the CINC and Service component staffs into small, high quality groups that can provide focused intelligence evaluation support to the Combatant Commander; establish dedicated elements within DIA and to serve as a focus for all intelligence activities supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

− Increase efficiency in Defense Intelligence by consolidating and streamlining to eliminate unnecessary duplication and enhance efficiency and effectiveness through reduction of management overhead; reduction of overseas operating locations; consolidation of the various intelligence commands, agencies, and elements into a single intelligence command/agency within each Service; reduction of subordinate Service and Agency intelligence headquarters while maintaining intelligence production centers of excellence; establishment of stronger management of all Defense Intelligence production to eliminate overlap and unnecessary duplication; establishment of joint Regional SIGINT Operations Centers (RSOCs); zero-based review and reordering of Defense Intelligence requirements to reflect a worldwide, rather than a Soviet/Warsaw Pact focus; and examination of the centralization of order of battle production and of common intelligence support functions. Strengthen the role and performance

of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a Combat Support Agency and improve the quality of the defense intelligence product through streamlining and reconfiguring DIA to improve its estimative intelligence; strengthening DIA's management of intelligence production and analysis; taking appropriate manpower management steps to ensure a strong military focus within DIA; and assigning DIA the responsibility to perform/oversee basic encyclopedic data base production.

− Ensure an independent intelligence input in the acquisition process by establishing within DIA a capability to validate threat information, to include the target data base, and the procedures the DOD Component intelligence commands or agencies will use in preparing system threat reports for Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, II, III, and IV acquisition programs, and for highly-sensitive classified programs.

− Strengthen the counterintelligence (CI) functions of the Department of Defense through the consolidation of counterintelligence and security activities with existing OASD(C3I) intelligence, security countermeasures and telecommunications, and information system security activities.

− Improve support to OSD through establishment within DIA of a Policy Issues Office, capable of obtaining tailored information and support across the intelligence community, with primary responsibility for focused response to OSD-generated intelligence questions and issues.

- Improve DOD's ability to provide centralized resource management and improve the integration of national and tactical intelligence, including Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA), through focusing of OASD(C3I) staff responsibility for planning, policy development, congressional interface, functional management, and budgeting by consolidating existing OSD and General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) management, centralizing Defense-wide intelligence policy and resource management; establishing an Intelligence Program Support Group (IPSG), renamed in FY96 the C4I Integration Support Activity, to consolidate the review of national and tactical programs, develop a DOD-wide architecture, and assess customer satisfaction; and transferring responsibility for the (GDIP) management to the OASD(C3I).
- Restructure and refocus the use of Reserve and National Guard resources to improve support to Defense Intelligence during contingencies through establishment within the OASD(C3I) of a management focus for the use of intelligence reserves and reserve intelligence production, and by tasking the Services and Agencies to develop specific plans for the use of these reserve resources in contingency situations.

Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare (IW/C2W), a field that has increased in significance as a result of lessons learned during The Gulf War, applies to a wide range of plans and actions designed to afford the United States and coalition forces a decisive information advantage across the full spectrum of military operations. The capability to execute IW/C2W places an increased demand on intelligence to rapidly and accurately identify both friendly and enemy vulnerabilities. Intelligence in an integral part of the IW/C2W planning and execution actions that will degrade an adversary's use of information while protecting those of friendly forces.

In FY95, the Army organized and activated the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) under the direction of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to assist both Army and USMC, deal with the complexities of Command and Control Warfare planning and execution. The LIWA is patterned after the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) to deploy tailored field support teams (FST) to specific land component commands during exercises, contingency planning, and operations. LIWA provides technical expertise and operational connectivity with other organizations and agencies supporting C2W operations.

Defense Intelligence organization under this plan is graphically shown in Figure 18-2.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

The Director, DIA is responsible for satisfying the foreign military requirements (less cryptologic) of the SECDEF, OSD, CJCS, OJCS, Joint Staff, CINCs, major DOD components, and other US Government agencies, allied governments, and coalition partners (when required), and has been designated by the CJCS as a DOD *Combat Support Agency*. DIA provides defense intelligence contributions to national intelligence estimates and production

capabilities. The Director, DIA is a member of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC) and is the DCI's executive agent for MASINT as well as the DOD MASINT collection manager. DIA produces or, through tasking and coordination, ensures the production of foreign military and military-related intelligence. The Director, DIA works extensively with the Services to provide support that meets a wide variety of needs. To provide daily support to the Unified Commands and U.S. Forces Korea, NATO, and SHAPE, DIA initiated on-site liaison elements managed by an experienced senior civilian intelligence officer. These liaison elements, called Defense Intelligence Support Offices (ISO), expedite actions and communications between and among the Agency and the commands. To provide tailored support to a Joint Force Commander, DIA can deploy National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) composed of DIA, NSA, CIA and personnel as well as personnel from other organizations, as required. The NIST deploys with its organic support capability and provides critical on-site intelligence connectivity between the supported command and Washington to ensure receipt of national-level intelligence. Cooperative Service efforts go into the GDIP and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), providing a broad range of recommendations to improve future intelligence capabilities. DIA also shares or provides intelligence support to the President, National Security Council Staff, National Warning Staff (NWS), Departments of Energy/State/ Treasury/ and Commerce, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The Agency provides central management for the Defense Attaché System and operates the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC).

The Military Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director of the DIA and composed of the senior intelligence officers of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps, advises the Secretary of Defense and Defense agencies on matters pertaining to military intelligence. The concerns of the Unified Commands are represented by DIA's Directorate for Intelligence which functions as the J2, Joint Staff. The MIB is the most senior corporate intelligence organization in DOD and advises the SECDEF, CJCS, Military Service Chiefs, CINCs, and Defense agencies on matters pertaining to military intelligence across the broad spectrum of national requirements. The Director DIA, as the unofficial chief of Military Intelligence, seeks consensus across the intelligence community through the MIB process.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Figure 18-2

The DIA supervises the DOD Indication and Warning System and provides support to the National Military Command Center through the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. The DIA has the responsibility to satisfy the DOD intelligence collection requirements; to coordinate and review activities of the DOD collection resources not assigned to the DIA; and to operate the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS).

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)

The NIMA was established on 1 October, 1996 to consolidate to the extent practicable all functions of the Defense Mapping Agency which includes defense mapping, charting, and geodetic operations. These include production, source data storage and retrieval, and management of distribution facilities, and supervision of the Hydrographics/Topographic Center, and the Defense Mapping School. NIMA also

incorporated all functions of the Central Imagery Office (CIO). NIMA develops and makes recommendations on national imagery policy and is chartered to ensure responsive imagery support to the DOD, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal Government departments. The NIMA tasks and evaluates imagery elements of the DOD in meeting national intelligence requirements and ensures imagery systems are exercised to support military forces. Within the DOD, the NIMA establishes the architectures for imagery tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. The NIMA has responsibility for establishing standards for imagery systems for which the DOD has responsibility, and ensures compatibility and interoperability of these systems. Standards for training of personnel performing imagery tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions are established by the NIMA. The NIMA also supports and conducts research and development activities related to these imagery function. The NIMA serves as the functional manager for the Consolidated Imagery Program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program and for the Tactical Imagery Program (Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities). The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are advised by the NIMA on future needs for imagery systems.

National Security Agency (NSA) AND Central Security Service (CSS).

The Director of the NSA is also the Chief of the Central Security Service and manages the largest single program in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. He is responsible for the operations of an effective unified organization for SIGINT activity. This responsibility requires extensive interaction, coordination, and cooperation with the Services and other national intelligence agencies. No other department or agency may engage in such activity without a delegation of authority by SECDEF. NSA's SIGINT activities are extremely sensitive and are normally handles in special channels available to specifically designated personnel in direct support of military commanders, operations, and national foreign intelligence collection requirements. The NSA's SIGINT collection, processing, and dissemination activities involve both positive and counterintelligence information and are in direct support of military commanders and military operations and responsive to national foreign intelligence requirements. The Director of the NSA is responsible for the research and development required to meet the needs for SIGINT and Communications Security (COMSEC). He is the executive agent for executing the responsibilities of the SECDEF for the COMSEC of the Government. He also has oversight of the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP) that lies outside the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and is responsible for providing cryptologic training and training support to the Services. In addition, NSA has been given the additional mission of Information Security (INFOSEC) which, in turn, has two components— Communications Security (COMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC).

Defense Investigative Service (DIS).

The Defense Investigative Service was established in 1972 to consolidate all DOD personnel security investigations and industrial security oversight within one agency and thereby reduce resource requirements, increase managerial efficiency, and provide a more prompt response to overall defense needs for personnel security investigations.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Figure 18-3

ARMY INTELLIGENCE

The Secretary of the Army has delegated to the Under Secretary of the Army responsibility for the general supervision of the intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, and intelligence oversight activities of the Army. See Figure 18-3 for a simplified organization of the Army Intelligence System.

The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military Services are responsible for the planning, direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of military and military-related intelligence, including information on indications and warnings, foreign capabilities, plans and weapons systems, and scientific and technical developments. The conduct of counterintelligence activities and the production and dissemination of counterintelligence studies and reports is a Service responsibility as are the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment; the conduct of related research, development, and test and evaluation

activities; the development of intelligence doctrine; and the training of intelligence personnel.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).

The DCSINT is the senior intelligence officer in the U.S. Army and is responsible to the Chief of Staff for the policy formulation, planning, programming and budgeting (shared with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) for TIARA programs), management, propriety and overall coordination of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Army. He has general staff responsibility for intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence automation, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, censorship, threat validation, intelligence collection, security, meteorological, topographic, and space activities. He monitors Army intelligence training, force structure, and readiness for both the Active and Reserve Components. The DCSINT, under the general guidance and tasking of DIA, exercises general staff supervision over Army and Army-supported Intelligence Data Handling System resources and over all-source intelligence production within the Army. He is the Director for Army Budget Program 3I (Intelligence); is responsible for the Army's input into the DOD Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP); the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP); the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP); and the Army Security and Intelligence Activities Program (S&IA); and is the Army SIGINT focal point. The DCSINT participates in Army POM building by providing advice to Senior Program Managers on ranking of intelligence requirements. Moreover, the DCSINT coordinates top intelligence requirements with MACOMs during submission of POM

Assessment. The DCSINT also shares management, in the Department of the Army, with the DCSPER for the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS). CIPMS is a tri-Service, Excepted Service personnel management system for the management of intelligence and intelligence-related civilian personnel in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The baseline document for the management of IEW within the Army is the Army Intelligence Electronic Warfare Master Plan (AIMP). The AIMP is a requirements-based, threat- and technology-driven, comprehensive developmental strategy for the future. It is not, per se, constrained by fiscal or force structure resources. The AIMP, supported by the ASA(RDA)-developed IEW Program Plan for the research, development, and acquisition of IEW systems, provides the basis for the development of the force structure and the fiscally-constrained IEW Modernization Plan by the DCSOPS, DA. The IEW Modernization Plan implements the Army's force modernization principles and is the key planning document in providing long-term continuity of effort within the IEW functional area. Responsibility for the oversight of intelligence activities within the Army is shared by the General Counsel and the Inspector General.

Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

INSCOM, currently a Major Army Command, provides a single commander for those Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) units which operate at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). INSCOM units, which are located both in CONUS and at many overseas locations, support requirements which cross the operational continuum. The operations of INSCOM units include:

planning and direction, collection, processing, production and dissemination of all-source, multi-discipline intelligence. In each major overseas area, a Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade/Group provides multi-disciplined IEW support to Army EAC and joint commanders in theater, reinforces MI units organic to operational and tactical commands at the Echelon Corps and Below (ECB), and satisfies tasking from national and departmental authorities for SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, MASINT, and counterintelligence operations in response to strategic, operational, and tactical requirements. This concept is being replaced with one which employs multidisciplined Force Projection Brigades, one oriented to the East and the other West. In CONUS, single and multi-discipline INSCOM MI brigade units and other organizations, some of them strategically deployable for contingencies, provide a wide range of collection capabilities as well as threat analysis, security, and OPSEC support to national and departmental agencies, contractors for sensitive projects and systems, and CONUS-based tactical consumers, including FORSCOM units and the Army component of United States Central Command. INSCOM also plays a significant role in training at the National Training Center and with its REDTRAIN program which supports maintenance and development of intelligence skills in EAC and ECB MI units. Finally, INSCOM supports TRADOC in the EAC IEW combat-development process with doctrinal and force structure input, and is a materiel developer for certain specialized types of intelligence-related materiel.

U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) is located in Charlottesville, Virginia, with elements at the Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; Fort Meade, Maryland; and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. As the Army's Production Center for the DOD IPP community, the NGIC provides basic ground intelligence to U.S. Government Agencies and decision makers. NGIC produces all-source scientific, technical, and general military intelligence on foreign ground forces capabilities and systems in support of Army Title X requirements. This intelligence supports customers at all echelons, including Army and DOD force planners, wargamers, doctrinal developers, force modernizers, warfighters and theater joint intelligence centers with a wide range of futures-oriented threat assessments. Key products and production programs include order-of-battle and tables of organization and equipment for foreign ground forces, projection out 20 years; detailed assessments of future threats tactical/operational capabilities; conflict scenarios; and forecast of future regions of conflict of interest to US force planners; and provides threat documentation for Army R&D and procurement programs. These products and programs require collection (MASINT and Multi-Disciplinary collection); all-source analysis, production integration; and requirements management.

Information Operations.

Information Operations is the Army doctrine that implements Information Warfare through continuous military actions that enable, enhance, and protect the commander's decision cycle while degrading that of the enemy to achieve an information

advantage. An information advantage can be exploited to enable the commander to operate within the enemy's decision cycle. Command and Control Warfare (C2W), comprising C2-Attack and C2-Protect, is the Army's principal means of conducting Information Operations. Intelligence acquires, manages, and uses information to identify enemy C2W weaknesses for possible exploitation. Counterintelligence concentrates on finding friendly C2 weaknesses that may be exploited by an enemy force. Supporting C2-Attack and C2-Protect requires that both intelligence and counterintelligence remain abreast of current and emerging command and control technology in both the commercial and military arenas.

Commanders use IEW support to anticipate the battle, understand the battlefield, and influence the outcome of operations. The preeminent function of Army Intelligence is to support the tactical commanders decisionmaking process. The tactical commander drives the Army intelligence effort, the ACofS, G2/S2, is the individual responsible for planning and directing, collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence within the command. At corps, division, ACR/separate brigade, and Special Operations Forces group/battalion, an MI unit is organic to the command, as shown in Figure 18-3. The MI unit commander provides the G2/S2 with the resources to accomplish the intelligence mission by training, maintaining, and employing the organic intelligence assets of the command. These assets are at adjacent and augmented echelons. Additional assets leverage national, theater, sister Service, and other intelligence systems to provide intelligence to the tactical commanders at all echelons. *FM 34-1: IEW Operations*, the keystone intelligence manual, expands upon

FM 100-5: Operations, and provides detail on the doctrinal foundations for IEW operations and the employment of tactical MI units.

Reserve Component (RC) Support.

The Reserve Components (RC) participates with Active Component (AC) MI units at all echelons and are involved in virtually every aspect of military intelligence operations. In certain areas, USAR MI capabilities, i.e. scientific & technical analysis, political-military estimates, substantive basic intelligence, are equal to, or even exceed, those in the active force. This phenomenon can be attributable to the fact that many MI reservists, officer and enlisted, are professional civilian intelligence employees of the national intelligence and reconnaissance agencies, the Services' intelligence departments and agencies, federally funded research centers, colleges and universities, and other US Government departments performing similar activities. Consequently, their exposure to, and involvement in, intelligence operations on a daily basis rivals their uniformed counterparts. The RC's contributions to filling the Army's linguist requirements is critical. The RC MI force is in the process of increasing its capacity for timely response to intelligence production requirements. RC MI centers across the country are being connected to DOD telecommunications networks. This connectivity allows RC MI units and soldiers to receive tasks from Active Component (AC) intelligence organizations, perform research and analysis within DOD data bases, and file production reports back to the AC organization—all within a relatively short time. RC MI is moving rapidly to a force architecture that will integrate it more fully into the

operational capabilities of the AC, making the Reserve an increasingly valuable partner.

Resource Management.

The primary means for resource management within the intelligence community is the National Foreign Intelligence Program. It includes the programs of the CIA, certain intelligence programs of the DOD, and other programs of agencies designated by the DCI, a department head, or by the President as constituting the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The DCI has authority for approval of the NFIP budget submitted to the President through the OMB, and must present and justify the budget to the Congress. The DCI provides guidance for program and budget development to program managers and heads of departments and agencies. The Executive Director for Intel Community Affairs is the principal adviser to the DCI on all matters relating to the NFIP budget prior to its presentation to the President and Congress.

The Army participates in three of the programs of the NFIP: the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The Program Manager for the CCP is the Director, National Security Agency. The CCP includes resources for SIGINT projects and activities. The Director DIA is the program manager for the GDIP, and funds collection, production and infrastructure which includes funds for DIA, Technical Reconnaissance (MASINT), some intelligence activities of the unified commands, and the FCIP, which provides resources for some CI activities. DOD FCIP Program Manager is Director of CI and Security, OASD(C3I). Program and budget information is prepared by each of the Services and is forwarded through program managers to the DCI.

In addition to the NFIP budget, many intelligence resources are included in the DOD Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program. This program includes most intelligence resources directly supporting operational commanders.

Unified Commanders now formally participate in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process for intelligence resources. Through the Command Intelligence Architecture Program (CIAP), Unified Commanders identify their intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination resource requirements. The CIAP has become the driving force for acquiring the requisite military intelligence capabilities through the 1990s.

Collection Management.

The intelligence cycle begins and ends with the consumer. A consumer's needs are passed to the producer for fulfillment. If the producer cannot satisfy the consumer's needs, the producer levies the requirement on the collector. The user must be able to state clearly his intelligence interests or needs (requirements) in addition to those that are already satisfied by existing finished intelligence. Requirements compete for limited collection resources at the national, departmental, strategic, and tactical levels. Requirements are prioritized in accordance with the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP). The military commander must make his case for the priority of his requirement if resources not assigned or organic to his command are needed to fulfill the requirement.

The DIA, in its support role to the JCS, prepares a listing of intelligence priorities for strategic planning for JCS publication and validates the intelligence

requirements of the military Services. A prioritized list of both long-term and short-term national interests is established by the NSC and passed to the CIA. There a determination is made as to whether sufficient intelligence exists to fulfill the requirement or whether additional intelligence is needed. If it is, detailed prioritized requirements are passed to the DCI's Community Management Staff (CMS) for collection tasking.

All collection operations are conducted in response to validated requirements for the production of finished intelligence. The CMS tasks its members for collection to fulfill prioritized requirements. The selection of the specific collection resource rests with the department or the program manager. The management aspects of collection involve ensuring that the assets selected are the most cost-effective that can fulfill the requirement on a timely basis.

Collection operations tasked by the DIA in response to DOD-generated requirements are normally conducted on an all-source, common-service basis. Conduct of intelligence operations at the tactical level to directly support the commander's immediate needs is usually accomplished by assigned or supporting intelligence organizations. Tactical commanders obtain most information on their areas of operation from assigned or supporting assets including MI units, artillery, cavalry, aviation, and maneuver units in contact. Tactical commanders leverage national capabilities by placing small numbers of tactical force intelligence soldiers at key nodes in the intelligence system to provide direct response to supported commanders' requirements.Additional information and intelligence on the area of interest is provided from higher echelons.

Analysis and Production Management.

National intelligence production is the responsibility of the DCI and is exercised through the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, which establishes schedules and priorities for all national intelligence production. Further, the directorate retains the resources and capability to produce intelligence assessments which are not coordinated with other elements of the Intelligence Community.

The Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence is the principal adviser to the DCI on the production of national intelligence, both as to the manner in which it is accomplished and what it contains. He is responsible for organizing national efforts to assess and evaluate foreign intelligence data in support of intelligence objectives established by the NSC. He is the head of the Directorate of Intelligence and oversees production generated in response to standing requirements, new requirements, or as the need is perceived.

No single intelligence product format meets the needs of all consumers. It is necessary to have a continuing dialogue between the consumer and the producer of intelligence while assuring that the consumer does not influence the conclusions of the final product.

The most prestigious intelligence product is the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which is prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence for DCI approval and forwarding to the President. The PDB may be considered as the DCI's principal daily report to the President. Other national reports include the National Intelligence Brief and the Military Intelligence Digest. National Intelligence Estimates and similar publications are reviewed by the NFIB prior

to submission to the DCI for approval and subsequent dissemination.

Individual departments and agencies establish their own production schedules and priorities for the production of departmental intelligence. The DIA establishes production schedules in the DOD and distributes responsibilities among the unified and specified commands.

DIA's Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI), formerly called the National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC), produces, or manages the production of, all-source military intelligence to support the policy, planning, and operational requirements of OSD, JCS, the Services, and the Unified Commands. As the DOD Production Functional Manager, DI ensures that DOD intelligence production requirements are articulated; resources are programmed and executed in compliance with national and DOD guidance; and programs are re-evaluated as missions, technical capabilities, and threat environment change.

SUMMARY

Intelligence is vital to the national security of the United States, but the importance of intelligence in various program and planning areas is not always fully recognized. Resources should be used as efficiently as possible, but concentration should be on intelligence production.

The National Foreign Intelligence Program, under the supervision of the DCI, includes CIA programs, major DOD programs, and programs within other U.S. Government agencies. The National Foreign Intelligence Program provides overall review, guidance, and direction for all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

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CHAPTER 19

THE ARMY HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT SYSTEM

The Army Medical Department was established on 27 July 1775 when the Continental Congress created a Hospital Department headed by a Director-General who also bore the title of Chief Physician to the Army. Since then, the medical services have enjoyed and suffered from the same events which affected the rest of the Army. These events range from disbandment after the American Revolution, to employing the latest revolution - the electronic revolution - to make telemedicine possible. The history of the Army and the Medical Department is a history of ever-improving rapid response to sickness and injury, ever-lower death rates, and ever-faster recovery.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1775 innovations in technology, the development of new treatment modalities and the evolution of human goals have revolutionized the practice of military medicine. Military medicine has, in turn, made a dedicated effort to keep pace with the constantly changing battlefield doctrine to meet the needs of both commanders and soldiers. The current military health services support system is based on the Joint Health Service Support Strategy which directly supports the National Military Strategy by:

- delivering a fit force,
- preventing disease and non-battle injury, and
- caring for and managing casualties.

The health services support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health professional care from the policy and decisionmaking level to the combat medic in the field. The command and management of health service resources within the Army is directed and monitored by the Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG) through the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) and its principal operating command, the U.S. Army Medical Command. Hand in hand with the total Army management system, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) conducts various programs specifically designed to meet the force modernization, unit readiness, research and development, preventive medicine, and patient care missions for the armed forces.

Medical and dental benefits for the Army family are an important element of the overall employment compensation package

and retention of a quality force. The provision of comprehensive, quality health care benefits to military personnel is required by law. Retiree and family members are entitled to, upon request, medical and dental care subject to availability of space, facilities, and medical and dental staff as defined by *Title 10, U.S. Code*, and other regulatory requirements. The provision of such benefits to family members is an "implied contract" of the government as the result of tradition and the expectation of military members. The instillation of confidence in American soldiers by the fact that they are supported on the battlefield by a superb medical evacuation and treatment system, and the fact that they and their family members will receive high quality health care, are essential factors in motivating them to serve in the military and perform in combat.

This chapter identifies the functions and responsibilities of the Army Medical Department as related to the total Army management system. In this regard, the Army Medical Department has developed various management systems specifically designed to enhance the development and control of resources associated with the health services support system. Great emphasis has been dedicated to improving health service personnel management, materiel procurement, medical research and development, health promotion, disease surveillance, preventive medicine, health services automation, health facilities construction, and the education and training of health care professionals.

MEDICAL READINESS

U.S. Army commanders are responsible for the health and physical fitness of their soldiers. The Army Medical Department is the proponent for developing doctrine, advising commanders, and for carrying out command policy in the area of health services support. The Army Medical Department staff, medical and dental commanders, and command surgeons:

- advise the command of those measures to take to assure the health, fitness, and vigor of all members of the U.S. Army,
- where directed, act as the proponent to provide those measures needed to assure health and fitness, and
- develop, train, and maintain those forces necessary to medically support the U.S. Army in a wartime environment.

The importance of the medical system on the battlefield is paramount. It supports the prevention of disease and non-battle injury to ensure maximum warfighting capability. When casualties occur, the medical system provides for the rapid evacuation of casualties to medical treatment facilities. The prompt evacuation of combat casualties is not only essential for the preservation of life, but also assists the combat commander in continuing to fight the battle by clearing the battlefield of wounded soldiers.

THE MISSION

The mission of the Army Medical Department is to "maintain the health of members of the Army, to conserve the fighting strength, to provide health care for eligible personnel, and to prepare health support to members of the Army in time of war, international conflict, or natural disaster."

This mission has two facets, both of which relate directly to the combat readiness of the U.S. Army. First, the Army Medical

Department is responsible for maintaining the clinical, technical, and combat readiness of medical units and personnel to support U.S. Army forces in the theater of operations. This facet of the mission is carried out by the deployable Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) medical units of the U.S. Army which are assigned to the U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) theater commands around the world, to include the Reserve Components. The TOE medical units are directly supported by the fixed installation Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) hospitals, medical centers and training centers, which are assigned to U.S. Army Medical Command.

This component of the Army Medical Department mission includes the delivery of specialized medical care to soldiers and dependents, research and development, and the education and training of health care personnel.

Central to the maintenance of a high quality, combat ready health services support force is the recruitment and retention of health care professionals and sustainment of their skills. This essential function can only be accomplished through the practice of medicine and its related disciplines in a patient care environment. In peacetime, the vast majority of health care professionals and technical support personnel who would deploy with medical units are employed within the U.S. Army's fixed hospitals, medical centers and other health care facilities. The day-to-day practice of health care professionals in these environments is the basis for maintaining the clinical skills necessary to care for sick and wounded soldiers during combat operations.

The second, but equally important, aspect of the Army Medical Department mission is to help maintain the personnel readiness of the entire U.S. Army by maintaining the health of individual soldiers and their families. Physical readiness, good health and the knowledge that family members will be cared for are essential to the ability of each soldier to deploy and perform his or her function in the combat environment. This component of the Army Medical Department mission is the responsibility of the U.S. Army Medical Command and its eight subordinate Health Service Support Areas. It is accomplished through the delivery of patient care, health promotion, preventive medicine activities, training, and medical research and development.

THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SYSTEM

Functional Relationships.

The Surgeon General (TSG) is responsible for development, policy direction, organization, and overall management of an integrated Army-wide health service system and is the medical materiel developer for the Army. Inherent to these responsibilities is the formulation of policy and regulations on health service support, health hazards assessment, the establishment of health standards, and medical materiel development. The Surgeon General also has proponency for personnel management within the Army Medical Department. In executing those responsibilities, the Surgeon General relies on organizations to fulfill functions discussed blow.

Army Medical Department (AMEDD) is comprised of the special branches of the Army that are under the supervision and management of The Surgeon General. Specifically, these special branches are the Medical Corps (MC), Dental Corps

(DC), Veterinary Corps (VC), Medical Service Corps (MS), Army Nurse Corps (AN), and Army Medical Specialist Corps (SP). Also included within the AMEDD are those medically-related Career Management Field (CMF) soldiers (e.g., CMF 91) and DA civilians employed within AMEDD organizations and activities.

Health Services are all services performed, provided, or arranged for (regardless of location) which promote, improve, conserve, or restore the physical or mental well-being of individuals or groups, and those services which contribute to the maintenance or restoration of a healthy environment. Health Services include, but are not limited to, preventive, curative, and restorative health measures; medical department doctrine; medical aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense; health promotion; assessment of medical threats and countermeasures; medical operations planning; health professional education and training; health-related research; transportation of the sick and wounded; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; health care administration, supply, and maintenance; and the delivery of medical, nursing, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optical, and other specialized health care services.

Health Standards are all measures, criteria, or bases of comparison, either developed or obtained, which help to determine the content, extent, value, quality, and other characteristics of health services or the state of health of an individual or community. This includes, but is not limited to, the establishment of physical and mental fitness standards for military duty; then collection and evaluation of epidemiological, demographic, and related data; and the establishment of normative baselines for comparative purposes.

Medical Research is the search for and discovery of systems, technologies, and techniques which keep the soldiers' performance at an acceptable level. U.S. Army medical research is geared to address specific problems which may cause the soldier to become ineffective by means of physical, psychological, or environmental influences encountered on the battlefield.

Staff Relationships.

In establishing health services and health standards necessary to maintain the Army's fighting strength, the AMEDD crosses all staff boundaries within the Department of Defense (DOD). The following functional relationships exist:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD[HA]). The ASD(HA) has statutory responsibility for overall supervision of the health affairs of DOD and is the principal staff assistant and adviser to SECDEF for all DOD health policies, programs, and activities.

The Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG) has Army staff responsibility for:
- assisting the Secretary of the Army (SA) and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) in discharging Title 10 responsibility for health services for the Army and other agencies and organizations entitled to military health services.
- representing the Army to the Executive Branch, Congress, DOD agencies, and other

organizations on all health policies affecting the Army.

- advising and assisting the SA and CSA and other principal officials on all policy issues pertaining to the military health service system to include the following seven areas:
  - (1) policies and regulations concerning the health aspects of Army environmental programs.
  - (2) health professional education and training for the Army, to include training programs for all health care specialty areas in medical, nursing, dental, and veterinary practice.
  - (3) research and development activities for nutrition and wholesomeness in support of the DOD Food Service Programs.
  - (4) medical materiel life-cycle management.
  - (5) medical materiel concepts, requirements, validity and viability.
  - (6) technical review and evaluation of medical and nonmedical materiel to determine the existence of possible health hazards.
  - (7) program management for Army health care automation.
- Army execution of the Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC).
- medical aspects of the Security Assistance Program.

- program Sponsor for Operations and Maintenance, Army– Program 84 (Medical).
- executive agent of the Secretary of the Army for all DOD Veterinary Services.

COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

In 1992 the AMEDD began a reorganization effort designed to ensure the ability to accomplish the health care mission well into the 21st century. The reorganization focus was a streamlined command and control system with missions and functional areas linked to the organizational structure, with the mental complexity of the work to be performed linked to organizational level, and with command authority and accountability congruent throughout the organization.

The AMEDD vision of "a world class system for total quality health care in support of America's Army at home and abroad, accessible to the total Army family, accountable to America's people" served as the basis for the reorganization. Based on a power-down concept, the objectives for this reorganization included the creation and sustainment of a fully integrated Army medical department poised to provide cost-effective, high-quality health care services. It also included a full integration of medical units in the Active and Reserve components in both the TOE and TDA command elements.

U.S. Army Medical Command.

The major subordinate commands of the U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) include:
- eight Health Service Support Areas (HSSAs),

- seven regional HSSAs in CONUS,
- one HSSA in Europe,
- the AMEDD Center and School,
- the Dental Command,
- the Veterinary Command,
- the Research and Material Command, and,
- and the Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine Command.

The consolidation of worldwide medical assets under the USAMEDCOM when it was fully activated in 1994 greatly enhanced command and control efficiency as the AMEDD strives to meet the health care needs of the U.S. Army of the 21st century.

USAMEDCOM is the center for AMEDD policy, planning, and operations worldwide with a focus on strategic business planning. Its mission is to:

- provide the vision, direction, and long-range planning for the AMEDD.
- develop and integrate doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel for the Army health service system.
- allocate resources, analyze health services utilization, and conduct assessments of performance worldwide.
- coordinate and manage graduate medical education programs at the Army medical centers.

Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC).

The mission of USAMRMC is to discover and develop medical solutions which will protect and sustain the health and performance of the force across the continuum of operations. Mission responsibilities include:

- serving as materiel developer and logistican for Medical Materiel (Class VIII).
- conducting basic research, exploratory testing, engineering development and deployment development for medical materiel systems.
- performing research, development, testing, and evaluation in five critical areas:
  (1) infectious disease
  (2) combat casualty care
  (3) operational medicine
  (4) medical biological defense
  (5) medical chemical defense
- performing as DOD/Joint Services Lead Agent for medical research and development in the areas of biological and chemical defense, infectious diseases, combat dentistry and nutrition.
- planning and executing medical logistics mobilization support and management of the Medical War Reserves Materiel Program.
- operating the National Maintenance Point for Medical Equipment.
- providing the Army Service Item Control Center for medical, dental, and veterinary equipment and supplies.

Dental Command.

The mission of the Dental Command is to assist in maintaining the readiness of the U.S. Army by:

- serving as the proponent for meeting the dental health needs of

the Total Army family and eligible beneficiaries, and,
- maintaining graduate dental education, leader development and research programs to support readiness requirements.

Veterinary Command.

The mission of the Veterinary Command is to:
- provide military veterinary services in support of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense operations worldwide, and,
- serve as Department of Defense Executive Agent for veterinary services.

U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine.

A Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) was fully activated on October 1, 1995. This new organization is an outgrowth of the former U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency.

The mission of the USACHPPM is to provide worldwide technical support for implementing preventive medicine, public health, health promotion, and individual wellness services in all parts of the U.S. Army and the Army community.

AMEDD Center and School.

The mission of the AMEDD Center and School is to:
- develop, integrate, coordinate, implement, and sustain training and training products for Active duty and Reserve medical and allied health officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilian personnel worldwide.

- analyze, develop, integrate, test, and validate concepts, emerging doctrine and medical systems, and doctrine and training literature.
- conduct all officer, enlisted, and civilian proponency functions, force structure development, personnel inventories, and life-cycle management of all AMEDD career fields.
- develop concepts and systems for combat health services support of the Army.
- serve as the integration center for all doctrine and training requirements; systematically develop courses, training devices, manuals and sustainment materials to ensure medical readiness.
- provide training, education, and evaluation of Army Medical Department personnel.
- test and evaluate new and replacement items of equipment having medical implications.
- act as the proponent for combat medical support, theater medical services, and medical logistics force design.
- conduct healthcare studies to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Army Medical Department.

Health Service Support Areas.

The Health Service Support Areas (HSSAs) were designed to provide overall command and control of health care operations within a defined geographical region, with each Army Medical Center and Army Medical Activity in a region

responsible for the day-to-day delivery of health care services. Mission responsibilities include:

- regional command and control of an affordable, multidisciplinary, customer-focused, quality military health service system,
- supporting the readiness requirement of the U.S. Army,
- developing and sustaining technical health care and leader skills in support of USAMEDCOM readiness goals, and
- allocating resources, analyzing utilization, and assessing performance across the HSSA.

As the primary integrator of medical readiness, the HSSA is responsible for:

- daily utilization of TOE-TDA medical assets, integrating Active and Reserve training, and development of mobilization requirements,
- budgeting, defending, and allocating readiness costs and funding,
- preplanning the medical treatment facility (MTF) professional backfill requirements during deployment by expanding network coverage, shifting HSSA assets, and coordinating Reserve Component Coverage,
- ensuring that Army medical readiness requirements are fully integrated into the activities of DOD health care regions,
- conducting training exercises in MTF mobilization, professional backfill activities, and deployment actions,

- providing medical planning and preparation programs for worldwide contingency operations, and
- sponsoring readiness-based clinical research.

Combat Service Support Units of the U.S. Army Medical Department.

In addition to its fixed health care facilities, the U.S. Army maintains medical units with a combat service support (CSS) mission within all deployable commands. These medical units work in concert with logistics units to form the CSS core for Army forces. The deployable medical assets consist of TOE units in both the Active and Reserve Components. The Active Component medical units are integral to U.S. Forces Command, the Seventh and Eighth U.S. Armies, the U.S. Army South, and the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). Deployable medical units range in size, scope of mission, and capacity from small medical detachments to large general hospitals. Collectively they provide an integrated continuum of medical evacuation and treatment from the maneuver battalion level to the theater Army level.

In the event of mobilization, AMEDD Reserve Component medical units will augment the deployable U.S. Army commands destined for theaters of operation as well as the U.S. Army Medical Command in expanding the CONUS base. Active Component fixed health care facilities will provide a large portion of the professional personnel, on a predesignated basis, to units deploying to and already stationed in the theater of operations under the Professional Filler System (PROFIS). Well-trained and combat ready Reserve Component medical units are absolutely essential for insuring that the health services support missions of the

Army are accomplished during periods of mobilization.

Staff Surgeons.

The senior Medical Corps officer present for duty with a headquarters (other than medical) will be officially titled:
- the "Command Surgeon" of the Army component commands.
- the "Surgeon" of the field command (e.g. Corps, CONUSA).
- the "Chief Surgeon" of the overseas major Army command.
- the "Director of Health Services (DHS)" at the installation level.

The Surgeon and DHS are responsible for the staff supervision of all health matters and policies, except dental matters. The Director of Health Services (DHS) and the Director of Dental Services (DDS) will serve on the installation commander's staff. Normally, the commander of the medical center (MEDCEN) or Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC) is the DHS, and the commander of the U.S. Army Dental Activity (DENTAC) is the DDS.

Medical Materiel at the Installation Level.

As a matter of policy, medical materiel management is a function of the Army health care system and is directed by The Office of The Surgeon General within the framework of the overall Army logistics system. Accountability policy is prescribed and approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Medical logistics is a technical function. It concerns items that are used for the treatment of patients. These items are generally procured, stored, and distributed differently from other types of supply items. They present difficult problems of deterioration and obsolescence. For these reasons, medical materiel must be managed by persons with extensive knowledge of the current utility of medical supply items in light of continuing advances and improvements in the techniques of medical science.

At the wholesale level, medical materiel is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). However, once shipped by DLA to an installation, it comes under the control of the Surgeon/DHS.

SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the mission, organization, functions, and staff relationships of the Army Medical Department. The health services support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health professional care from the policy and decisionmaking level to the combat medic in the field. The command and management of health service resources within the Army is directed and monitored by the Office of The Surgeon General through the Army Medical Department. Hand in hand with the total Army management system, the Army Medical Department conducts various programs specifically designed to meet the force modernization, combat readiness, research and development, preventive medicine and patient care missions for the armed forces.

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CHAPTER 20

MANAGEMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS

"The law. It has honored us. May we honor it."
Daniel Webster's toast at the Charleston Bar Dinner; 1847

INTRODUCTION

Legal issues affect nearly every facet of command. The Army's legal system and the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) provide timely legal advice to soldiers and commanders at all levels of command. Commanders should understand the general organization and functions of the servicing Staff or Command Judge Advocate (SJA/CJA) office to use its varied resources effectively. This chapter reviews the following functional areas essential to judge advocate operations: administrative and civil law (including legal assistance and claims); military justice; international/operational law; and contract/fiscal law.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL LAW

The term "Administrative and Civil Law" describes the law applicable to the commander's management of people, money, and resources in the accomplishment of the mission. Administrative Law concerns the legal aspects of mission accomplishment; Civil Law encompasses the legal relationships of the Army and its soldiers and civilians to people and organizations outside the Department of Defense.

In the area of Administrative Law, a commander is faced with decisions regarding the status, promotion, discipline, reduction, and elimination of both enlisted and officer personnel. The legal aspects of these command concerns are collectively known as Military Personnel Law. Similarly, Civilian Personnel Law (including Law of Federal Employment) and Federal Labor Relations cover the status, promotion, discipline, and unionization of our civilian work force.

Legal Basis of Command concerns the commander's authority to control access to and activities on the installation, often to the exclusion of state and local governments. Related areas include Environmental Law, Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities, and Military Aid to Civilian Law Enforcement.

Finally, Administrative Law includes a broad range of "housekeeping" provisions with legal implications. These include the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, Letters of Indebtedness, Reports of Survey, Senior-Subordinate Relationships/Fraternization, and Standards of Conduct.

Corrective Administrative Personnel Actions.

Even in the Army's finest units, a few soldiers occupy an inordinate amount of the commander's time. Some of these soldiers cannot or will not perform their duties. Some are constant "troublemakers." Others are beset with personal problems. These soldiers often require guidance, corrective action, or disciplinary action. The company commander cannot simply "fire" the problem soldier, thereby washing his hands of the matter. For minor deficiencies, there should be an attempt to correct the problems and turn the problem soldier into a productive one.

A number of administrative options are available to assist the commander in handling the nonproductive soldier. Some corrective administrative actions are not "adverse," but are intended to educate, train, rehabilitate, or correct without adverse consequences. Other administrative options are adverse in nature and implicate important legal rights of the individuals concerned. The procedures and grounds specified in the Army regulations governing the use of these adverse actions are designed to protect both the legal rights of the soldier and the Army's interest in ensuring that adverse actions are imposed only on soldiers who deserve them.

Corrective, Nonpunitive Actions Short of Separation. Commanders at all levels are confronted with noncriminal problems that impact adversely on the soldier's duty performance or on the morale and discipline of the unit. In many instances, the commander wants his or her response to the problem to motivate the soldier to improve duty performance, to achieve more efficient use of unit personnel, or to ensure that accomplishment of the unit's mission is not jeopardized in the future. A number of useful administrative actions are available to deal with the problem soldier whose conduct or performance does not warrant action under the *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 United States Code (USC) §§ 801-946*, or separation from the Service. These include: counseling, extra training, written or oral reprimands, bars to reenlistment, adverse performance evaluation reports, relief for cause, suspension or revocation of security clearance, suspension or revocation of on-post driving and other privileges, MOS reclassification, and administrative reduction for misconduct or for inefficiency.

Adverse Administrative Separations. The Army makes a substantial investment in training, time, equipment, and manpower when persons enter the Service. Separation prior to completion of the enlistee's obligated term of service results in a loss of investment and a requirement for replacement. Additionally, the impact of an adverse separation on the soldier can be severe, as some separations can result in discharges under other than honorable conditions. Substantive and procedural protections are provided in *AR 635-200: Enlisted Personnel Management System,* and *AR 600-8-24: Officer Transfers and Discharges*, the Army regulations governing administrative enlisted and officer separations. Senior commanders should understand separation actions, to include when each is appropriate, the specific grounds for each, and the procedural requirements. Official roles in the accomplishment of administrative separations will vary. In some, commanders will review the action and forward the file to the separation authority with

recommendations. In others, they will be the decision maker on separation. In addition to exercising official roles in these actions, commanders should advise and educate their subordinates who may seek command advice on the separation of their problem soldiers.

Fraternization and Improper Superior-Subordinate Relationships.

A distinction must be drawn between the criminal offense of fraternization and the regulatory policy against improper superior-subordinate relationships. While this may seem like a difference without a distinction, the term "fraternization" is now reserved for describing those activities that violate the UCMJ. In all other cases, the Army simply defines what is an improper superior-subordinate relationship.

Improper Superior-Subordinate Relationships.

The Army's policy on improper superior-subordinate relationships is set forth in *para. 4-14, AR 600-20: Army Command Policy*. Relationships between soldiers of different rank that involve, or give the appearance of partiality, preferential treatment, or the improper use of rank or position for personal gain, are prejudicial to good order, discipline, and high unit morale. It is Army policy that such relationships will be avoided. Commanders and superiors will counsel those involved or take other action, as appropriate, if relationships between soldiers of different rank:

- cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness;
- involve the improper use of rank or position for personal gain; or
- create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, or morale.

This regulated conduct is considerably broader than the specific offense of fraternization under the UCMJ. The policy makes it clear that there is nothing inherently wrong with most forms of unofficial interaction among soldiers of different rank. The policy applies to all ranks and both sexes. When the relationship involves one of the three additional factors, however, it is improper. Obviously, adverse effects will be much more apparent where there is direct command or supervisory relationship between the individuals, or where the superior has the capability to influence personnel or disciplinary actions, assignments, or other benefits or privileges.

A commander's adverse action must address the behavior that results from the relationship, or the actual or clearly predictable results of the relationship, and not merely the relationship itself. While there are a variety of administrative options available to the commander, the appropriate action will depend upon the type of relationship that existed between the soldiers and the adverse impact flowing from that relationship. The commander should usually counsel the soldiers first. Other actions such as orders to terminate improper relationships, reassignment, oral or written reprimands, adverse OERs or NCOERs, bars to reenlistment, relief from duty, and even administrative separations may also be appropriate.

Fraternization, Article 134, UCMJ.

With the revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial in 1984, fraternization became a specifically listed criminal offense. The maximum punishment is dismissal, total forfeitures, and confinement for two years. The gist of this

offense is a violation of the custom of the Armed Forces against fraternization between officers and enlisted service members. As with improper superior-subordinate relationships, not all contact or association between officers and enlisted persons is an offense under the UCMJ.

Whether the contact or association in question is an offense depends on the surrounding circumstances. Factors to be considered include whether the conduct has compromised the chain of command; resulted in actual or apparent partiality; or otherwise undermined good order, discipline, authority, or morale. The acts and circumstances must be such as to lead a reasonable person experienced in the problems of military leadership to conclude that the good order and discipline of the Armed Forces have been prejudiced by a loss of the respect of enlisted persons for the professionalism, integrity, and obligations of an officer.

Although the elements of the offense in the Manual for Courts-Martial refer to officers or warrant officers fraternizing with enlisted members, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals has upheld convictions for officer-officer and enlisted-enlisted fraternization under Article 134, UCMJ.

Standards of Conduct.

Ethics continues to receive heightened emphasis in the Federal Government. Ethical violations can impair not only the trust and confidence placed in an officer by his or her superiors and subordinates, but also the trust and confidence of the general public. Accordingly, commanders at all levels must be aware of the standards of conduct applicable to DA personnel. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE), *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,* went into effect on 3 February 1993, and are reprinted and supplemented by DOD in the

Joint Ethics Regulations (JER), DOD 5500.7-R. The JER also reprints other OGE regulations that govern the conduct of DOD personnel, provides additional guidance, and provides additional regulations concerning related matters, such as acceptance of travel benefits from non-federal sources.

Commanders should have ready access to, and be familiar with, the JER and attend available training so that they are sensitive to the issues. The JER has established standards of conduct as a command responsibility. Commanders should ensure that all personnel are properly trained and are fully aware of expected ethical conduct. The first commanding officer or supervisor above the grade of GS-11 in the chain of command or supervision of an employee serves as an "agency designee" under the JER, with responsibilities that may include:

- making determinations and giving approval under the standards of conduct;
- making certain written findings of agency interest;
- requiring written disqualification of subordinates in resolving conflicting financial interest;
- ensuring that financial disclosure reports are timely filed.
- waiving conflicts which are not likely to affect the integrity of the Government; and
- determining that an individual employee may not acquire or hold a specific financial interest.

The Army General Counsel is the Army's Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO). The Chief, Army Standards of

Conduct Office (DA SOCO) is responsible for overseeing the Army's ethics program and for ethics support for HQDA. Every Army command, installation, and organization is expected to have an assigned Ethics Counselor. Commanders should know when to consult their Ethics Counselor for ethics advice and counsel.

Ethics Counselors should advise and assist with common ethics problem areas, such as gifts to superiors, acceptance of gratuities and benefits from outside sources; use of government facilities, property, and personnel for unofficial purposes; improper use of benefits received as a result of official travel; post-Government employment restrictions, and commercial solicitations. Ethics Counselors represent the Army, and there is no attorney-client relationship or privilege with the individuals counseled by the Ethics Counselor.

Standards of conduct violations strike at the heart of discipline, esprit de corps, and morale. They cannot be treated lightly if our soldiers and the public are to retain their trust and confidence in the integrity of Army leadership.

Legal Basis of Command.

Command is the responsibility of the senior, regularly assigned officer present for duty, unless the individual is ineligible for command under Army regulations or preempted by the authority of the President. The term "command" has two distinct connotations: (1) it describes the authority of military officers over troops in their charge; and (2) it describes the legal aspects of the actions of a post commander as a manager of real property and activities occurring upon that property. While this section will concentrate on the legal considerations operative in the management of military installations and the day-to-day activities on the installations, many of the principles discussed have equal application to the troop commander in regulating activities of individual soldiers or groups of soldiers.

Command Authority. Commanders are vested with the authority to command by virtue of their office. Commanders have the responsibility for the welfare of their command and the success of its mission, and the right to demand obedience to lawful orders.

The lawfulness of an order is determined by the U.S. Constitution, statutes, and regulations of higher authority. Courts have described a commander's authority as "inherent" and "broad," and will defer to a commander's decision in an appropriate exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, the courts will insist that decisions be rationally based, not arbitrary or capricious, and consistent with law and regulation.

Maintenance of Law, Order, and Discipline on Post. A commander may maintain law and order in relation to civilians by the use of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 USC § 13, and the Federal Trespass Law, 18 USC § 1382.

In the Assimilative Crimes Act, Congress directed that where a crime is committed on an installation over which the United States exercises legislative jurisdiction, and where Congress has not specifically passed a law describing the conduct as a federal crime, the state criminal law will apply. Thus, state statutes describing certain conduct as criminal and providing punishment by fine or imprisonment are enforceable in federal court under the Assimilative Crimes Act, for conduct committed on a military installation under either exclusive or concurrent legislative jurisdiction.

Another law enforcement tool is the Federal Trespass Law. A post commander may bar an individual from the installation when that person has committed a crime or has violated a post regulation. Once barred and properly notified in writing by the post commander, a person who reenters the installation may be punished, after trial in a federal court, by a fine of not more than $500 or not more than six months' imprisonment, or both.

Free Speech and Dissent by Civilians. Most military installations are not considered public forums for First Amendment activity. The courts have recognized the right of a commander to prohibit demonstrations and similar protests by civilians on military installations. On the other hand, commanders can allow some speech, such as a talk by a drug abuse lecturer, without opening the door to all speakers. As long as the command can articulate a rational basis for distinguishing between speakers (e.g., the drug lecture supports the mission; a lecture on ending U.S. military involvement overseas may not), the courts will uphold it.

Free Speech and Dissent by Soldiers. The courts would apply a similar analysis when reviewing command authority over a soldier's exercise of free speech. Although the courts have not adopted an "area" approach in determining the extent of a commander's authority to limit a soldier's political activities, they have insisted that any regulatory prohibitions specifically describe the prohibited activity. *AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 5-3d,* currently describes prohibited activities of soldiers in the following manner:

"Taking part in partisan or nonpartisan political meetings or rallies, picket lines or any other public demonstrations may imply Army sanction of the cause for which the demonstration or meeting is conducted. Unless sanctioned by competent authority, soldiers will be prohibited from taking part—

    (1) during the hours they are required to be present for duty.
    (2) when they are in uniform, on a military reservation, or in a foreign country.
    (3) when their activities constitute a breach of law and order.
    (4) when violence is reasonably likely to result."

Distribution of Literature on the Installation. Unlike demonstrations and protest activities, Army policy makes our installations open forums for news publications, even those critical of government policies or officials. The general rule is that literature is allowed on the installation, rather than kept off. Installation commanders will not take action to control or restrict dissemination of publications, unless a publication constitutes a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale because soldiers are entitled to the same free access to publications as are other citizens. However, an installation commander may, at his or her discretion, require that distribution of printed media not be made except through regularly established and approved distribution outlets, unless prior approval is obtained from the commander or authorized representative.

Note that a commander must weigh literature restrictions against the standard of "clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale." If it appears that a publication presents a "clear danger" to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of soldiers, the installation commander may delay distribution subject to review for final

decision by HQDA. Often words such as "clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale" are challenged as vague because they fail to give adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited, and are therefore in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. But the Supreme Court recognizes a difference between freedom of expression in the military and in the civilian sector.

The Commander's Regulatory Authority. The courts are willing to defer to a commander's assessment of the military necessity for a particular program or action where the commander delineates a reasonable basis for the activity proscribed. This delineation should include not only the conduct prohibited but the necessity for the proscription. Commanders may publish regulations and policies necessary to the functioning of their commands, so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.

Environmental Law.

Environmental protection poses a pervasive challenge for military leadership. Environmental laws have been written to control *all* sources of pollution, and to protect many natural and cultural resources. Today, the Army is as much a member of the regulated community as any corporation. Thus, commanders must integrate the federal, state, and local environmental requirements within the defense mission.

Environmental Regulation of Military Installations. Until 1970, the most that Congress mandated for the military in the area of environmental protection was an effort to implement whatever measures were feasible in light of our mission and resources. States were the operative agencies for cleaning up pollution, and the Constitution insulated federal entities from most states' efforts to enforce their laws.

Starting with the *National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 USC §4321, et seq.,* this isolation from environmental laws changed. This legislation directed the Department of Defense (and all other federal agencies) to identify, quantify, and evaluate the environmental impacts attendant to any federal undertaking before deciding to proceed, and to consider alternative courses of action. NEPA was more an environmental awareness statute than a protection device, however, and it has generated only a moderate impact on military operations.

A further, more dramatic shift occurred in 1970 when Congress amended the *Clean Air Act, 42 USC §7401, et seq.,* to require federal agency compliance with state-mandated air pollution control measures. These new provisions conferred upon state officials the authority to dictate the use of air pollution control devices at military installations. The early amendments to the 1970 Clean Air Act did not completely subject military officials to state control, however. For example, installations were not required to obtain state operating permits for sources of air pollution.

Predictably, states continued to complain that this special treatment accorded federal agencies was unwarranted. They pushed for even greater control, and they got it. The *Clean Water Act, 33 USC §1261, et seq.,* eventually was amended to require federal agencies to adhere fully to all aspects of state water pollution laws, including permit, record keeping, and reporting requirements. The Clean Air Act was again amended, adopting provisions even stronger than

those found in the Clean Water Act. Moreover, virtually every ensuing major federal pollution control law has followed the same pattern, incorporating broad waivers of federal supremacy in favor of state regulation, coupled with waivers of sovereign immunity that expose federal agencies to lawsuits if they fail to implement state laws. Recent changes to the Clean Air Act require all major sources of air pollutants within the United States, including most Army installations, to obtain a state-issued facility-wide operating permit, or cease to operate without a Presidential exemption. Army installations must submit detailed permit applications, which commanders must certify as true, accurate, and complete. Installation Commanders should work closely with their legal advisors to ensure the application completely and accurately describes the installation's compliance status and future compliance plans.

Today, almost all Federal environmental statutes require the Army to comply with an extensive complex of federal, state and local laws in each of the following areas:

- Installation, operation, and maintenance of air and water pollution control technology.
- Quantitative and qualitative limitations on air and water emissions.
- Pollution monitoring, record keeping, and reporting requirements.
- Operating permits for pollution sources and the payment of reasonable permit fees.
- Handling, transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste.
- Reporting and cleanup of spills.
- Monitoring virtually all underground storage tanks for leaks.

- Noise control.
- Cleanup of active and closed hazardous waste disposal sites.
- Conservation of endangered and threatened species and wetlands.

Compliance. In the past, Army compliance with environmental laws and regulations was largely voluntary. Although environmental laws required federal agencies to comply with federal and state requirements, courts stopped short of interpreting this language as a waiver of sovereign immunity when it came to assessing fines and penalties for noncompliance. In response, Congress passed, and the President signed, the *Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCA) of 1992*. The FFCA expanded the waiver of sovereign immunity under *the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 USC §6901, et seq.,* to allow the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state regulators to assess punitive fines against Federal agencies, including the military departments, for violations of federal, state, interstate, and local solid and hazardous waste laws and regulations. Recent amendments to the *Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 42, USC §300f,* make it the second major environmental statute to waive the Federal government's sovereign immunity to punitive fines. In addition to punitive RCRA and SDWA fines, installations are subject to court imposed penalties for failure to comply with court orders or court-approved consent decrees under other environmental laws. Given Congress' clear statement in the FFCA regarding the need for federal facility compliance and accountability, expansion of the waivers of

sovereign immunity under other statutes is likely.

Today, not only are the laws themselves pervasive, affecting a huge portion of daily activities at military installations, but enforcement of the laws is strengthening. Several installations have been assessed penalties in excess of $1 million for violations of environmental regulations. Over 130 fines and penalties totaling over $11 million have been assessed against Army installations through the third quarter of fiscal year 1996. Moreover, federal environmental statutes specifically authorize individual citizens to act as private attorneys general by initiating lawsuits to force compliance through injunctions and fines. Finally, the threat of criminal liability for anyone, including federal employees and military officers, who commits an environmental crime should not be taken lightly. Several federal officials already have been convicted, and one has been sentenced to eight months in prison.

Although the FFCA is silent on the source of payment of the fines and penalties, DOD and DA policies state that fines will be paid from installation or activity operational accounts of those most directly responsible for the violation. The policies are intended to put incentives for compliance at the lowest level.

Clearly, there is the potential for substantial disruption of crucial training activities if environmental matters are not handled in a skillful manner. From a broader perspective, recent history shows that omission of environmental protection strategies as a fundamental aspect of planning can result in injunctions that prohibit mission accomplishment. From a fiscal viewpoint, even relatively minor compliance problems can be quite costly. Millions of dollars are at stake each year if the Army fails to identify and implement applicable environmental laws.

Pollution Prevention and Conservation. In addition to environmental compliance, the President, Congress, EPA, and DOD also stress pollution prevention and hazardous material minimization. DOD policy is that ongoing operations should incorporate practices to reduce pollution and the use of hazardous materials. This approach should reduce overall costs to the Army, and also promotes environmental compliance.

Finally, commanders are increasingly required to ensure that mission activities are consistent with the conservation of natural resources on Army installations. The *Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 USC §1531, et seq*., requires all federal agencies to carry out programs for the conservation of federally-listed endangered and threatened species. The ESA prohibits taking any federal action that is likely to jeopardize listed species. Moreover, actions that may affect such species are subject to formal consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries. Commanders must also protect the quality and quantity of the installation water supply, conserve the water source, and seek to preserve wetlands which provide important habitat for fish and wildlife.

This overview of the Army's challenges regarding environmental compliance underscores three important points. First, environmental laws affect virtually every important function at military installations. Second, the Army is obligated to comply with these environmental laws and may be subject to costly fines and penalties for violations, particularly under RCRA and SDWA, but also under other environmental statutes. Compliance is the key to avoiding fines and penalties. Finally, command

emphasis is the key to compliance. Commanders and leaders must promote and ensure environmental compliance at the lowest levels of their organizations.

Federal Labor Relations and the Role of the Labor Counselor.

Many federal nonsupervisory employees within the Department of the Army are represented by unions. Every commander must be sensitive to the laws and regulations relating to labor organizations. Federal labor law requires the unions be notified before changes in working conditions are implemented. Working conditions include but are not limited to: changes in office hours, changes in shifts, major task/objective changes for the division/directorate, and extensive shifts in personnel. The installation labor relations specialists and labor counselor should be consulted on all matters concerning unions to ensure compliance with the existing negotiated labor agreement and the applicable laws and regulations.

A good relationship between management and unions is an asset to the Army's fulfillment of its mission. Through *Executive Order 12871, Labor-Management Partnerships*, the President charged each executive agency to create labor-management partnerships by forming labor-management committees and councils, and by providing partnership training. In recent years, DOD installations have successfully dealt with a wide range of issues through labor-management partnerships, including: compressed workweek schedules, child care, downsizing, reduction in force, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems.

The installation labor counselor, who is a JAGC officer, or a civilian attorney, is the primary adviser to the commander, supervisor, and the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) on legal aspects of civilian personnel and labor

relations. The labor counselor plays an important role in labor-management relations. Duties include: review of proposed adverse civilian personnel actions; participating in contract negotiations with labor unions, particularly when attorneys are involved; representing management in third-party proceedings, such as bargaining unit determinations, unfair labor practice complaint proceedings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearings, Merit System Protection Board hearings, and arbitration hearings; advising activity negotiating committees; and advising on interpretation and application of negotiated labor agreements. Installation labor counselors are also designated by *AR 27-40: Litigation,* as the activity liaison officers for Office of Special Counsel investigations concerning allegations of prohibited personnel practices and whistle blower reprisal. Commanders should ensure compliance with employment law, personnel law, and labor-management relations regulations.

In that commanders will supervise and work with numerous federal civilian employees, it is important for commanders to have a basic understanding of the administrative disciplinary tool that may be used against civilians. The Army's regulation on civilian employee discipline, *AR 690-700: Personnel Relations and Services* (Chapter 751), establishes two categories of disciplinary actions. The first is informal disciplinary actions and includes oral admonishments, oral counseling, and written warnings. The second category is formal disciplinary actions, and includes letters of reprimand, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and removal. Similarly, employee conduct requiring discipline falls into two categories:

behavioral offenses for which progressive discipline aimed at correcting the behavior is appropriate; and offenses relating to violation of regulations or laws for which punitive actions are required. Although most civilian employees are exemplary, informal and formal disciplinary actions are a useful tool for the commander in maintaining a high quality, mission-focused work force.

Informal discipline is most appropriate for minor unacceptable behavior. Supervisors take informal action on their own initiative, and should advise the employee that continued misbehavior will result in formal disciplinary action.

Formal disciplinary action is appropriate when the severity of conduct warrants such action or when the employee's minor misbehavior has not been corrected through informal discipline. The CPO, as well as the legal office, will provide supervisors with advice and assistance on appropriate penalties and other pertinent concerns. As the regulations governing civilian discipline require the supervisor proposing and the official making the final decision to follow specific procedures, it is important that the supervisor utilize the expertise in the civilian personnel office and the legal office.

Civilian personnel laws and regulations also permit supervisors to remove or reduce in grade employees whose job performance is unacceptable. Specific procedures must also be followed in performance actions; therefore, it is necessary for the supervisor to work closely with both the personnel office and the legal office before implementing such an action.

The severity of the imposed penalty and the status and union affiliation of an employee determine the appeal rights available to the disciplined employee. If the employee raises an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint in conjunction with the appealed action, the appeal rights may vary. The Army defends disciplinary and performance actions in administrative hearings and federal court.

Finally, recent experience involving deployment of our military forces has shown that our civilian employee work force is vital to mission accomplishment not only in garrison, but also in deploying with our soldiers to sites around the world. Commanders must understand that the increased reliance our military forces must have on civilian employees is an integral factor which must be taken into account in mobilization planning. An additional subset of legal considerations come into play that should not be overlooked.

Legal Assistance.

The legal assistance program is designed to meet the continuing legal needs of Service members and their families. Legal assistance also helps to support military readiness, high morale, discipline, and recruiting and retaining a quality force.

Mission. The mission of the legal assistance program, as stated in *AR 27-3: The Army Legal Assistance Program,* is to assist those eligible for legal assistance with their personal legal affairs in a timely and professional manner by:

- meeting their needs for information on personal legal matters.
- resolving their personal legal problems whenever possible.

The first part of the mission is preventive in nature. Soldiers and their families need to be informed of legal issues and services so that their actions or inactions do not cause them legal

difficulties or unnecessary expense. The second part of this mission involves the legal assistance services that are provided directly to eligible clients who have personal legal problems and needs.

Readiness. One of the lessons learned from the Grenada, Panama, Persian Gulf, and Bosnia experiences is that too often there were soldiers who failed to have their personal legal affairs in order. Troops were still requesting wills and powers of attorney as they initially boarded aircraft and again as they later waited in staging areas. Although automation has assisted attorneys in meeting such challenges, commanders must ensure that troops are ready to deploy. The legal needs of soldiers that are capable of being satisfied well before deployment should be handled beforehand during routine legal assistance appointments. Predeployment preparation is an ongoing effort, and is most successful when integrated as a routine part of the training schedule.

Client Eligibility. Statutory authorization for providing legal assistance in connection with personal legal affairs for active Army and retired service members and their family members is found in *10 USC § 1044, Legal Assistance*. The authorization is subject to availability of legal resources. *AR 27-3* indicates which persons are eligible to receive legal assistance and the limitations on the assistance that may be provided. Those persons and the applicable limitations are summarized as follows:

- Active Component (AC) service members and their family members.
- Reserve Component (RC) service members who:
  - are serving on active duty for more than 29 days and their family members;

- are serving for 29 days or less and their family members subject to the availability of resources; or
- are undergoing premobilization legal preparation, or whose legal problems and needs have arisen or been aggravated by mobilization.
- All other RC service members receive legal assistance from RC judge advocates. This legal assistance is subject to the availability of expertise and resources.
- AC and RC service members who are receiving military retirement or disability pay and their family members.
- Surviving family members of AC, RC, and retired service members who would be eligible for legal assistance if the service or retired member were alive.
- DOD civilian employees (including DA employees):
  - on reports of survey; or
  - oho are serving with the Armed Forces of the United States in a foreign country and their family members who either accompany them or seek assistance for deployment related legal problems.
- DA civilian employees being deployed outside the U.S. on matters related to deployment.
- Primary next of kin of AC or RC soldiers who die while in a military duty status and U.S.

civilian employees of the Armed Forces who die while serving outside the U.S.

- Members of other military forces while serving in the United States and their family members who accompany them.
- Prisoners who, although discharged from military service, still remain confined within a U.S. military confinement facility.

Client Services. Legal assistance is provided on family law matters (*e.g.*, divorce, annulment, paternity, child custody, nonsupport); estates (*e.g.*, wills); real and personal property matters (*e.g.*, leases, contracts, powers of attorney); disputes with creditors; veteran reemployment rights; torts (*e.g.,* accident law); estate, inheritance, property, and income taxes; and military administrative law matters (*e.g.,* appeals from adverse efficiency reports or reports of survey findings).

Legal assistance services on these matters include notary services, legal counseling, telephone calls and letters on behalf of clients, and legal document preparation. With command support, attorneys working in conjunction with unit tax preparers and Army Community Service (ACS) volunteers assist soldiers with preparing their Federal and state income tax returns and also may provide electronic income tax return filing services. At some installations, clients are also provided help on proceedings in court without an attorney on uncontested or simple legal matters (*e.g.*, adoptions, uncontested divorces, small claims). Eligibility for in-court representation generally is limited to E-4s and below.

All legal assistance cases handled—and the legal services provided—are free of charge. When the legal problem or need of a client cannot be handled by a legal assistance attorney, the client may be assisted in retaining a civilian lawyer who can provide the assistance required. More frequently than ever, clients are referred to RC judge advocates who provide this assistance for retirement points without cost to the client. Each SJA office can be supplemented by RC judge advocates, either as individual attorneys or as a unit.

Preventive Law. Legal assistance attorneys can best identify when and where widespread personal legal problems develop. Their preventive law mission under *AR 27-3* is to educate service members and their family members so they can avoid personal legal problems. This is accomplished in several ways:

- Presenting classes for soldiers on local consumer problems, such as businesses that charge excessive interest or sell shoddy merchandise.
- Speaking at commanders' calls and NCO meetings to alert leaders to local problems, legal assistance resources available, and solutions.
- Speaking to spouses' clubs and other groups to explain legal rights and obligations and to spread the message on how to avoid legal pitfalls.
- Preparing articles for installation newspapers.
- Participating in installation and community activities.

Direct action against unscrupulous merchants is another effective method of solving widespread problems. The local Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board can recommend placing establishments off-

limits for a variety of reasons, including the fact that unscrupulous business practices have an adverse effect on health, discipline, or morale. The mere threat of an off-limits sanction is frequently enough to cause businesses to treat soldiers fairly. In less serious cases, systemic problems may be addressed through cooperation between the command and the local Chamber of Commerce and Better Business Bureau. Legal assistance attorneys can and should take the lead in identifying problem areas and initiating corrective actions.

Commander's Program. Legal assistance is a commander's program. Commanders of each military installation or other activity having one or more attorneys assigned to their staff or under their command who are providing legal assistance on either a full or a part-time basis as part of their duties or job description, may limit legal assistance services to soldiers and other eligible clients. The commander decides whether legal assistance will be provided, and if so, the scope of the legal assistance services that will be provided, by his or her decisions on the authorization and staffing of legal assistance military and civilian personnel positions and the allocation of other resources (e.g., building space, money) within the command.

The degree of success in meeting soldiers' legal needs depends to a considerable extent on the level of command involvement in the program. Commanders should take an active interest in legal assistance by coordinating the scope of legal assistance services with Staff Judge Advocates, by monitoring program achievements, and by visiting legal assistance offices to observe the condition of the facilities and to emphasize the importance of providing quality legal services for soldiers and their family members in a courteous manner.

Army Claims System.

The Army Claims System is designed to economically and expeditiously process, investigate, settle, and pay for personal injury or property damage claims against the. Army, or to initiate collection action for such claims in favor of the Army, under authority conferred by statutes, regulations, and international agreements. The Army's implementing regulation is *AR 27-20: The Army Claims System.*

The Army Claims System is managed by the U.S. Army Claims Service, a field operating agency of The Judge Advocate General, responsible for the administrative settlement of claims worldwide. Command claims services, area claims offices, and claims processing offices are found throughout the world staffed by claims judge advocates and civilian claims attorneys, with varying authority to process and settle claims in their jurisdiction, either on an area, command or agency basis.

Overseas, commanders need to be aware that DOD has assigned single service responsibility for the settlement of certain claims (e.g., claims under the Foreign Claims Act, Military Claims Act, and NATO Status of Forces Agreement) in specified foreign countries. On an interim basis, the appropriate unified and specified commander may, when necessary to implement contingency plans, assign single service responsibility to the Army or other Armed Service for processing claims in countries where such assignment has not already been made.

Personnel claims are processed under *Chapter 11, AR 27-20*, which authorizes the payment of claims for loss, damage or destruction of personal property

of military personnel or civilian employees incident to their service. Payable personnel claims include losses in quarters or other authorized places, losses arising from Government provided transportation of household goods or personal vehicles, and losses due to enemy action. Prompt reimbursement for such personal losses can have a positive impact on morale.

Army claims offices world wide process claims for death, personal injury, or damage to or loss of property caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of military personnel or civilian employees while acting within the scope of their employment. Commanders should ensure that all incidents that could give rise to potential claims are reported promptly to the servicing claims office. Commanders should appoint a unit claims officer to investigate incidents which give rise to potential claims (see *Chapter 2, AR 27-20*).

Through a number of Federal statutes, claims judge advocates and claims attorneys may assert claims on behalf of the Army to recover for damages to Army property, the cost of medical care provided, and lost wages of Army personnel resulting from circumstances creating tort liability on some third person. Money recovered from damaged household goods shipments may be returned to the Army Claims System for use to pay additional personnel claims. Certain medical care recovery funds may be returned to the medical treatment facility that provided the medical care for the injured party. Reimbursement for lost wages may be returned to the local operations account. Other money recovered through the affirmative claims program is deposited in the Federal treasury.

Command Authority and Judicial Review of Military Activities.

The federal courts have consistently taken the position that control and operation of the military establishment is essentially an executive and legislative branch function. Notwithstanding this fundamental judicial and political philosophy, our system of law considers that no individual or organization is above the law.

Senior officers in important positions of leadership and management in the Army must appreciate the scope of judicial review of military activities. Specifically, what kinds of military decisions and activities are subject to review by the federal courts? To what extent do the courts continue to recognize the unique requirements and conditions of command? Must a commander comply with a court order? What internal procedure does the command have to assure proper handling of court orders and other legal process? What requirement does Department of the Army impose when a command becomes involved in litigation?

Scope of Judicial Review.

Courts defer to the military. The U.S. Supreme Court stated the following in Parker v. Levy:

"While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which

would be constitutionally impermissible outside it...."

When a function is clearly committed by the Constitution to the Executive or Legislative branches of government, the courts generally will refrain from reviewing the merits of a controversy. This flows from the concern that one branch of government should not interfere with the activities of another branch that the writers of the Constitution thought ought to be wholly up to that branch. An example is an early 1970's lawsuit which asked the federal courts to review the training, equipment, and rules of engagement of the Ohio National Guard after the Kent State killings. The Supreme Court held that how our military forces are trained, equipped, and employed are not issues with which the courts should be involved, because the Constitution leaves these issues to Congress and the President.

Even where there is no Constitutional commitment to the Congress or the President, courts are still reluctant to become involved in questions about the military. Most courts ask first whether a violation of regulation, statute, or constitutional provision is alleged. Even where one is alleged, not all violations will be reviewed. Rather, the court will consider the nature and strength of the plaintiff's case, the potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused, the extent to which review would affect the functioning of the military, and the extent to which review would interfere with the discretion of military officers. Hence, when the military is sued, the first line of defense is to argue at the outset that the court should not review the case.

Failure to follow military regulations and statutes may result in judicial sanctions. Often courts decline to review claims that a regulation has been violated. Nevertheless, numerous decisions establish the principle that military officials may not legally ignore Army regulations in carrying out their mission. Failure to follow regulations in managing military personnel has been the single greatest cause of litigation involving the Army. Generally, violations of a regulation written for the benefit of the government will be harmless, but actions which violate regulations intended for the benefit of an individual will be overturned. An action which violates a statute will almost always be reviewed and reversed.

Denial of a soldier's constitutional rights usually leads to judicial intervention. While it is well recognized by the courts that soldiers are subject to disciplinary standards and a code of justice different from those that apply to civilians, it is equally well recognized that when one assumes military status one does not waive all the protections of the Constitution. Violations by the Army of a soldier's right to a limited form of free speech or the entitlement to due process of law in courts-martial and administrative adverse personnel actions have led to numerous lawsuits against commanders and other military officials. Most violations of constitutional rights will be reviewed by the courts.

Commanders may face individual liability for their acts. People usually sue the government to force it to take action or to reverse an action previously taken. Increasingly, people sue individual government officers who make the decisions on which a lawsuit against the government would otherwise be based. Frequently, these lawsuits allege that the decision maker violated the person's constitutional rights. A personal liability

lawsuit seeks money damages from the government officer being sued.

The Department of Justice represents most government defendants who act within the scope of assigned duties. Officers who are personally sued must notify their servicing judge advocate whenever they receive notice of a lawsuit, both to obtain Justice Department representation and to meet court deadlines.

Generally, military personnel cannot sue other military personnel for money damages arising out of duty-related situations. In part, this is based on the fear that discipline would suffer if suits were allowed every time a soldier had a complaint. Officers may be absolutely immune from suits or may be entitled to a qualified immunity from suits by civilians. Officers sued for common law torts, such as assault and battery, are entitled to absolute immunity so long as they were acting in the scope of their duties at the time. Officers who are sued for alleged constitutional violations generally only receive a qualified immunity. In cases involving constitutional violations, qualified immunity applies if constitutional guidelines are not clearly established or a reasonable person would not know that clearly established guidelines exist.

Response to Litigation. There are strict requirements for complying with federal court orders, notifying the Department of the Army when a lawsuit involving the command is filed, and preparing litigation reports at the command level to be forwarded to the Army Litigation Division. *AR 27-40: Litigation,* is the governing regulation. The command's Staff Judge Advocate is well versed in litigation procedures. The primary objectives of judge advocates in litigation are early dismissal of lawsuits, minimization of interference with command activities by ongoing lawsuits, and insulation of official defendants against suits

for money damages. Many lawsuits continue for several years and require an enormous expenditure of command time and resources.

This review of Administrative and Civil Law underscores the legal complexity of the senior officer's assigned duties and the need for close liaison between commanders and judge advocates in all areas of Army activities.

MILITARY JUSTICE

The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States. Military law is derived from the Constitution of the United States, statutes governing the military establishment, regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent authority of military commanders.

The military justice system has changed significantly since World War II. In 1950, Congress passed the *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)* to provide uniform rules for each Service. Major changes were then enacted in 1968, 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1986. The *Uniform Code of Military Justice* is found at *Title 10, United States Code, Sections 801-946*, but the sections are commonly referred to as Article 1 through Article 146 of the UCMJ. In 1984, the President signed an Executive Order creating the current *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States*. The Manual for Courts-Martial consists of a Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, the Punitive Articles, and the Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures. The Army's

implementing regulation is *AR 27-10, Military Justice*.

Active Duty Jurisdiction.

In 1987, the Supreme Court decided the case of Solorio v. United States. The Court held that jurisdiction of a court-martial depends solely on the accused's status as a member of the Armed Forces, and not on whether the offense is service-connected. The case overruled the "service-connection test" established in 1969 by the Supreme Court in O'Callahan v. Parker. Now, as before 1969, criminal jurisdiction can be established by simply showing that the accused is a member of the Armed Forces.

The Solorio ruling creates a situation where both the military and civilian authorities may have jurisdiction over a soldier and the offense, as when the offense is committed off post. This is commonly referred to as concurrent jurisdiction. The SJA coordinates with the local civilian prosecutor to determine who will try the case. Army policy is not to prosecute like offenses which are prosecuted by civilian authorities. Informal memoranda of understanding may help avoid conflicts in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over Reservists.

As a part of the Military Justice Amendments of 1986, Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to extend jurisdiction over members of the reserve components during both active duty and inactive duty training. In short, Reservists are subject to UCMJ actions for crimes committed during the training period. One significant change allows the military more flexibility to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over Reservists who commit crimes during weekend drill (Inactive Duty Training or IDT) and over

members of the National Guard of the United States when in Federal Service.

Recognizing that IDT periods are brief, usually lasting only one weekend, the amendments provide for continuing jurisdiction during the entire period of IDT, including those short periods when the soldier is not physically present at the IDT site. Additionally, the government can involuntarily order to active duty (for Article 32 investigations, courts-martial, and nonjudicial punishment) those Reservists who violate the UCMJ during a training period.

Active duty convening authorities must be familiar with the changes in Reserve Component jurisdiction, because all general and special courts-martial will be tried at the active duty post which supports the Reserve Component unit (including National Guard units when federalized). In addition, only the Active Duty General Court-Martial Convening Authority can authorize an involuntary recall to active duty of a Reservist for UCMJ action. Secretarial preapproval is required if pretrial restraint will be imposed or if there is a possibility of confinement as the result of a court-martial sentence.

The Commander's Role.

The Commander's Prosecutorial Discretion. One of the commander's greatest powers in the administration of military justice is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—deciding whether a case will be resolved administratively, or if referred to a trial, what level of court-martial is appropriate, or what the charge will be. The Manual for Courts-Martial gives little guidance in exercising this discretion, except mandating that cases be resolved at the lowest possible level consistent with the

seriousness of the offense. Although further advice should be sought from the SJA—and an investigative report will be available in some instances—the commander must ultimately decide. This responsibility rests with commanders at every level of command, starting with the service member's immediate commander. Cases should be resolved at the lowest level appropriate for the offense and the offender.

Decisions should be made with an understanding of the alternatives and the consequences. Military justice procedures are not always the best way to dispose of disciplinary problems. Short of military justice remedies, a variety of administrative alternatives exist, including:

- counseling;
- written or oral reprimands and admonitions;
- withdrawal of pass privileges;
- extra training;
- withdrawal or limitation of privileges—commissary, PX, on-post driving, etc.;
- alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs;
- administrative separations;
- NCOER and OER;
- MOS reclassification;
- reduction for inefficiency;
- bar to reenlistment; and
- reassignment or transfer.

In the case of a minor incident, the commander exercising prosecutorial discretion should first decide that none of the varied administrative remedies is sufficient before resorting to punitive options.

The decision to refer offenses to a court-martial is often difficult. Occasionally the decision is made for the wrong reasons. When an apparently serious offense occurs, there is great pressure on a commander to "do something." Congressional inquiries and expressions of interest in the incident from higher command tempt some to refer cases to trial to settle the matter. A case should not be referred to trial unless the convening authority finds or is advised by a judge advocate that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense triable by court-martial has been committed, that the accused committed it, that the specification alleges an offense, and that a court -martial is warranted (*Rules for Court-Martial 601(d)(1)*). If the crime is minor in nature, nonjudicial proceedings or administrative alternatives are generally a first consideration, before referral to a court-martial.

The standard for referral does not conflict with the lawful presumption of innocence surrounding the accused at a court-martial. The perceptive commander will find occasions when the accused's conduct satisfies the legal elements of a crime, but for reasons of compassion, interests of justice, or other considerations, punitive action is not required. Similarly, commanders must resist the temptation to avoid use of the military justice system in order to create a rosy statistical picture of morale and discipline; serious crime is an unfortunate but inevitable facet of human conduct and should be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

The Commander and the Defense Function. Commanders, particularly convening authorities, should understand that defense counsel are required by our Constitution, laws, and regulations, as well as by ethical codes, to represent their clients fully and zealously within the bounds of ethics and the law.

Any suggestion by a commander that defense counsel "ease off," or do less than should be done to ensure a just disposition, is improper and may lead to loss of convening authority and to adverse action. The defense counsel who does not fully and vigorously represent a client is professionally derelict under the UCMJ, the Manual for Courts-Martial, judicial precedent, The Army Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers (*AR 27-26*), and the professional standards of his or her licensing state. Wise commanders will develop positive and professional working relationships not only with trial counsel from the SJA Office, but also with military defense counsel.

Options Available to the Commander.

At every level of command, a number of options are available to a commander who is confronted by a military justice problem. This section discusses the various measures for dealing with an accused prior to trial as well as an examination of the various forums and administrative measures which a commander may use.

Pretrial Restraint. What do you do with a soldier pending court-martial? The short answer is "[a]n accused pending charges should ordinarily continue the performance of normal duties within the accused's organization while awaiting trial" (*AR 27-10*, para. 5-13a). If required to ensure the soldier's presence at trial or to prevent further serious criminal misconduct, the Manual for Courts-Martial allows for a soldier to be placed under pretrial restraint. As the soldier is presumed innocent until convicted, and there is no bail system in the military, pretrial restraint is not punishment and may not be more restrictive than necessary under the circumstances.

Nonjudicial Punishment (Art. 15, UCMJ). One of the most valuable disciplinary tools available to the commander is nonjudicial punishment. This option is proper in cases of minor offenses for which administrative measures are considered inadequate or inappropriate, unless it is clear that nonjudicial punishment is not sufficient to meet the ends of justice. There are three levels of nonjudicial punishment, each with increasing severity of punishment: Summarized, Formal Company Grade, and Formal Field Grade. Maximum punishments are listed in Table 3-1, *AR 27-10*. A soldier may demand trial by court-martial at any time before punishment is imposed under Article 15.

General Considerations in Referring Charges to a Court-Martial.

Be Objective. A court will consider the case objectively on its merits; thus, a commander must also objectively consider the case.

Handle Expeditiously. A commander must insist upon expeditious handling of charges by subordinates within the command. An unexplained delay in the administrative processing of charges by subordinate units may result in the dismissal of the charges due to the lack of a speedy trial. Generally, an accused should be brought to trial within 120 days of preferral of charges, or imposition of pretrial restraint. If a soldier is in pretrial confinement, charges must be processed with due diligence, which may require bringing the soldier to trial even more quickly.

Ensure Evidence Supports Charges. No matter how convinced a commander may be of an individual's guilt, there will be no conviction if there is

insufficient competent evidence. The convening authority must ensure that the evidence warrants trial. In this regard, a witness who is not credible can be worse than no witness at all. Trial counsel should assist commanders in evaluating evidence.

Consider the Individual. The option a commander chooses must fit the soldier as well as the crime. The commander should examine the background of the accused as well as the effect on the unit. The court will consider all of these things—so should the commander.

Summary Court-Martial. The summary court-martial is the lowest level trial court in the military justice system, and is designed to dispose of minor offenses under simple procedures. It is composed of one commissioned officer. Ordinarily, this officer should be a field grade officer.

A summary court-martial may be convened by a commander with summary court-martial convening authority, which is generally vested in battalion level and higher commanders. A summary court-martial may try only enlisted soldiers. The summary court-martial should be limited to relatively minor offenses, and is sometimes used after an accused has been offered and refused nonjudicial punishment for the offense. An accused may decline to be tried by summary court-martial. The punishment powers of the summary court-martial are listed in Figure 20-1.

Special Court-Martial. The special court-martial is the intermediate court in our system and is convened by a commander with special court-martial convening authority, usually a brigade-level commander. The punishment powers of the special court-martial are listed in Figure 20-1.

Normally the membership of a special court-martial may take one of two different forms. It may consist of (1) at least three members and a military judge; or (2) solely of a military judge if the accused so requests. If an enlisted accused requests that the court have enlisted membership, at least one-third of the court members must be enlisted soldiers.

Trial and defense counsel are detailed for each special court-martial. The trial counsel need not be a lawyer; however, the accused has a right to be represented at the trial by appointed defense counsel who is a lawyer certified by The Judge Advocate General. As a matter of practice, both counsel are usually qualified lawyers. At all courts-martial the accused is entitled to be represented by civilian counsel at no expense to the government. The accused may retain detailed counsel in addition to his or her civilian attorney.

COURT-MARTIAL PUNISHMENTS

TYPE	CONF	FORFEITURES	RED[1]	PUNITIVE DISCHARGE
SUMMARY	1 MO[2]	2/3 PAY PER MO (1 MONTH)	SEE[3]	NONE
SPECIAL	6 MO[4]	2/3 PAY PER MO (6 MONTH)	E-1	NONE
BCD SPECIAL	6 MO[4]	2/3 PAY PER MO (6 MONTH)	E-1	BCD (ENLISTED)
GENERAL	SEE PART IV, MCM	TOTAL FORFEITURE OF ALL PAY AND ALLOWANCES	E-1	BCD (ENLISTED) DD (ENLISTED WO) DISMISSAL (COMMISSIONED OFFICER)

[1] ONLY ENLISTED SOLDIERS MAY BE REDUCED BY COURTS-MARTIAL.
[2] A SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL MAY IMPOSE CONFINEMENT AND HARD LABOR WITHOUT CONFINEMENT ONLY ON SOLDIERS IN THE GRADE E-4 AND BELOW.
[3] E-5 AND ABOVE - ONE GRADE; E-4 AND BELOW - E-1.
[4] A SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL MAY IMPOSE CONFINEMENT ONLY ON ENLISTED SOLDIERS.

Figure 20-1

"BCD" Special Court-Martial. The "BCD" special court-martial is the same type of court as the special court-martial, except that this court-martial has the additional power to impose a bad-conduct discharge as part of the sentence. Certain requirements must be met before such punishment may be imposed: a qualified defense counsel and a military judge must be detailed; and a verbatim record must be made. In the Army only a General Court-Martial Convening Authority may convene a "BCD" special court-martial.

General Court-Martial. The general court-martial is the highest level trial court in the military justice system, and must be convened by a General Court-Martial Convening Authority, usually a division-level commander, upon the written pretrial advice of the SJA. This court-martial tries military personnel for the most serious types of crimes.

Punishment at a general court-martial is limited only by the maximum punishments for each offense found in Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial. Only a general court-martial may sentence an officer to confinement or dismissal.

General courts-martial take one of two possible forms. The first consists of a military judge and not less than five members; the second is trial by military judge alone, if the accused so requests. The accused may elect trial by judge alone in all cases except those which are referred to trial as capital (i.e., one in which the death penalty may be adjudged). A military judge is detailed to the court in all cases. An enlisted soldier is also entitled, on request, to a trial by a court consisting of at least one-third enlisted membership.

Trial and defense counsel are detailed for each general court-martial. Both the detailed trial counsel and defense counsel at a general court-martial must be lawyers certified by The Judge Advocate General.

No charge may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation has been made in accordance with Article 32, UCMJ unless waived by the accused. The officer appointed to conduct this investigation should be a field grade officer or an officer with legal training and experience. The purposes of the investigation are to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charge sheet, to determine the correctness of the form of the charges, and to secure information upon which to determine the proper disposition of the case. The Article 32 investigating officer performs a judicial function and must obtain legal advice from a source not involved in prosecution or defense functions. The SJA will provide a legal advisor.

The investigation will be conducted with the accused present and represented by a defense counsel. The recommendations of the Article 32 investigating officer are advisory only, and not binding upon the convening authority.

Administrative Elimination in Lieu Of Court-Martial. Chapter 10, AR 635-200: Enlisted Personnel Management System, provides that enlisted soldiers who are charged with an offense punishable by a bad-conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge may submit a request for discharge for the good of the Service in lieu of trial by court-martial. The General Court-Martial Convening Authority is normally the approval authority for these requests.

The request is initiated by the accused and must be forwarded through channels, with intermediate commanders recommending approval or disapproval. If approval is recommended, the type of discharge to be issued also will be recommended. A discharge under other than honorable conditions normally is issued, but either an honorable or general discharge may be approved.

Pretrial Agreements. The accused and the convening authority may agree that in return for the accused pleading guilty, the convening authority will either drop certain charges or limit the sentence the accused will serve. The agreement must be in writing so that the court and reviewing authorities know exactly what was agreed upon.

Unlawful Command Influence.

Article 37, UCMJ, makes it unlawful for a convening authority to attempt to influence the members of a court-martial as to the outcome of the trial. However, the dangers of unlawful command influence extend beyond the members of a court-martial. This is an area where the commander must exercise extreme care.

The UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial prohibit any actual or reasonably perceived unlawful command influence in the operation of the military justice system. The appearance or perception that an accused is not receiving a fair trial has an adverse effect on the morale and discipline of the command as well as public confidence in the military justice system.

Commanders are intimately involved with the military justice system during all stages of a case—pretrial, trial, and post-trial. At each stage, commanders have many legitimate tools and powers to impose discipline. Public statements pertaining to military justice are subject to misinterpretation and should be approached with caution. Any command statements about military justice matters should be cleared with the SJA. A commander who exercises unlawful

command influence may be relieved of military justice duties.

Pretrial Stage. One of any commander's most important powers regarding military justice is the power to have preliminary facts investigated by law enforcement officials. Commanders also have the power to affect the disposition of cases involving their subordinates. This power includes the right to take any nonpunitive or punitive action authorized at their level of command *or authorized at any inferior level of command*. Field grade commanders, for example, have the authority to administer field grade Article 15s, but they may impose only a company-grade level of punishment. Similarly, a General Court-Martial Convening Authority may refer a case to a lower-level court-martial or not refer the case at all.

When taking punitive action, the commander acts in a judicial capacity and must make an independent determination that punishment is appropriate. If a field grade commander feels that a case deserves company grade Article 15 punishment, that commander can either impose the appropriate punishment personally or send the case down to a company-level commander for "appropriate disposition" at that level. However, the higher commander may not send the case to the company-level commander with instructions that "a company grade Article 15 should be administered" or that a specific type of punishment "should be imposed."

Finally, a commander who feels that a case demands a more serious disposition than can be administered at his or her level can forward the case to a higher authority with a recommendation as to disposition. An accused is entitled to a fair and independent recommendation as to disposition at each level of command. A commander cannot have a fixed, inflexible policy regarding level of

disposition, and cannot establish guidelines suggesting an "appropriate punishment" for any category of case. Subordinate commanders must be free to make an honest, independent assessment of how each case should be handled. This assessment necessarily requires individualized treatment of each soldier's case. Allowing subordinates to make honest recommendations in no way jeopardizes the system, because convening authorities are not bound by their subordinate's recommended disposition.

Although higher-level commanders may not direct subordinate commanders to impose designated punishments or to refer cases to courts-martial, they may exercise authority to dispose of certain cases in any lawful manner. An installation commander, for example, can direct that all cases of alleged officer misconduct be sent to him for appropriate disposition, or a brigade commander can direct that all cases involving illegal drugs be sent to him for disposition.

Trial Stage. Once trial begins, commanders usually are not actively involved beyond authorizing administrative support. *General* Court-Martial Convening Authorities can grant immunity to witnesses to facilitate their testifying, but subordinate commanders should scrupulously avoid statements of favorable treatment or negotiating "deals" with witnesses or accused under circumstances that could be construed as involving a promise, express or implied, of immunity.

The most egregious incidents of unlawful command influence are those that impact directly on the trial process by pressuring court members to convict (or punish) contrary to their actual conscience.

Attempts to subvert justice by putting command pressure on court members are illegal and can be charged as criminal offenses. The same applies to witnesses.

The more common problem is actual or perceived discrimination against soldiers who participate as witnesses at a court-martial. Some subordinates, eager to obey their commanders, may read more into their superior's remarks than the superior intended. When they do so in the area of military justice, the consequences could be enormous. Appellate courts are not bound by the actual intentions of the commander, however noble. Unlawful command influence often results from the reasonable, if unintended, perceptions of subordinates. If subordinates reasonably misunderstand or misinterpret the superior commander's actions or statements in a manner that deprives an accused of a fair trial, unlawful command influence exists.

Post-Trial Stage. After trial, the commander has the opportunity to review the results of the trial, to take action to approve or disapprove findings, and to approve, suspend, reduce or defer the adjudged sentence. In any BCD-special or general court-martial, the SJA provides a written recommendation to the convening authority prior to action.

Article 37 places two restrictions on the commander's authorized activity. Article 37 prohibits censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing "the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings." Article 37 also prohibits commanders from giving unfavorable efficiency ratings to court members based on their participation.

INTERNATIONAL/OPERATIONAL LAW

Operational Law is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that impacts specifically upon the military deployments of U.S. Forces in both peacetime and combat environments. Operational Law encompasses the law of war and international stationing arrangements, but goes beyond these traditional international law concerns to incorporate all relevant aspects of military law in operations other than war. Operational law is the essence of the military legal practice, and judge advocates should be actively involved in planning, training, and execution of international operations.

The Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) has been established to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and to devise training and resource strategies for addressing those issues. Located at The Judge Advocate General's School (TJAGSA), CLAMO:

- is the JAGC's central repository for lessons learned and after-action materials pertaining to legal support for deployed forces;
- coordinates legal training provided by the separate military services to foreign country personnel;
- supports judge advocates in the field by gathering and disseminating information about legal issues encountered by previously deployed judge advocates; and,
- develops curricula and sponsors conferences and symposia at

TJAGSA for operational lawyers.

Some legal concerns vary and some remain the same through all types of deployments. The dissolution of the Soviet Union caused a fundamental change in U.S. strategy. Where the U.S. once had the "luxury" of a clearly identifiable threat (the Soviets), it now must focus on a broader array of contingency threats. The National Command Authority changed U.S. strategy from "containment" to *engagement and enlargement*. Engagement and enlargement refers to the U.S. use of national power to prevent wars and regional conflicts, rather than having to confront adversaries in combat (or "cold war" scenarios). The elements of national power are: military strength, public diplomacy, economic vitality, moral and political example, and alliance relationships.

U.S. Forces Stationed Overseas Under a Peacetime Stationing Arrangement.

A "stationing arrangement" is an international agreement which defines the privileges and obligations of U.S. Forces deployed or stationed overseas. Members of the command must be thoroughly familiar with this agreement and with any supplementary arrangements to this agreement negotiated at a later point in time.

The definitions within an international agreement specify those entities and individuals to which the provisions of the agreement will apply. Among the key definitions in any agreement are:

−   *Forces.* How inclusive is this term? Are civilians to be treated as members of the U.S. Forces?
−   *civilian component.* Does inclusion in this category depend upon nationality? Are certain classes of individuals, to include host country nationals, excluded from this definition?
−   *dependent.* How does the stationing arrangement define family members? Does the definition include only a soldier's spouse and children? Are the soldier's parents, grandparents, sisters, and brothers included?

Military Justice. The key consideration in the area of military justice is that of jurisdiction. The stationing agreement must specify whether the sending state (United States) or the receiving state (Host Nation) possesses the authority to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. Ideally, the U.S. will have the exclusive right to prosecute members of the U.S. Forces, but host countries are usually reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction over the more serious offenses. Typically, the host nation will retain the prerogative to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed against its property or citizens.

Furthermore, although stationing agreements generally do not address this issue, U.S. law does not permit trial by court-martial in peacetime of U.S. members of the civilian component or dependents.

Other areas of concern are double jeopardy, production of witnesses for courts-martial, searches and seizures, and host-country confinement of members of the U.S. Forces.

Administrative Law. The guiding principle governing administrative legal matters overseas is U.S. recognition of the territorial sovereignty of the host country. Commanders must be aware that members of the U.S. Forces are generally subject to

the civil jurisdiction of the host country and must comply with host-country law. Key provisions in the stationing arrangement establish entry and exit requirements; specify the facilities to be provided U.S. Forces; establish requirements for the payment of customs, duties, and taxes; and indicate whether local labor laws will apply to civilians who are employed by the U.S. Forces.

Off-Shore Procurement. Off-shore procurement is the acquisition of supplies and services (including construction) by and for the use of U.S. Forces stationed or deployed overseas. The U.S. should ensure that the stationing agreement stipulates that host-country law will not govern U.S. acquisitions. This enables the U.S. to resolve contractual disputes under U.S. law and avoids the requirement that U.S. attorneys become familiar with the contract law of each receiving state.

Contractual provisions in stationing agreements depend upon the industrial and cultural climate of the receiving state. Members of the command must be familiar with the business environment within the receiving state to provide the commander with accurate and workable contracting advice.

Payment of Claims. Stationing agreements apply specific rules and procedures for the investigation, adjudication, and payment of claims overseas. Typically, these arrangements establish various categories of claims involving military and nonmilitary property and third-party claims.

In the absence of specific claims provisions within a stationing agreement, and in evaluating *ex gratia* payments, the Foreign Claims Act will apply to determine whether the foreign claim may be paid. The terms of this Act define who is a proper claimant, the elements of foreign claims, the forms such claims may take, and the procedural requirements for processing such claims.

Legal Assistance. Stationing arrangements generally do not address domestic relations issues and consumer matters. The law of the receiving state or U.S. law will apply to these subject areas. While members of the U.S. Forces generally have access to the courts of the receiving state, practical considerations, such as unfamiliarity with the legal remedies, the language barrier, and ignorance of procedural rules can prevent effective recourse to foreign court systems. Aggressive command information programs and providing U.S. Forces maximum access to qualified attorneys in the receiving state will help to overcome these problems.

NATO - Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement. In 1995, the North Atlantic Council approved the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which was thereafter ratified by the United States. The provisions of this agreement are essentially those of the NATO SOFA, with minor modifications. The PFP SOFA has entered into force for non-NATO PFP States such as Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The PFP SOFA will be effective for exercises conducted by United States forces in the countries which are parties to the agreement.

Deployment for Conventional Combat Missions.

The SJA is responsible for providing legal advice to the commander concerning the broad range of legal issues associated with the preparation for and

deployment of U.S. Forces on combat missions. Within the SJA office there will usually be a judge advocate charged with the specific responsibility of providing detailed advice on operational law.

International Agreements. Members of the command must be familiar with international agreements, if any, in effect between the U.S. and that country to which U.S. Forces are deploying and any countries with which the U.S. has overflight, transit, staging, or other arrangements.

Case Act. The Case Act (*1 USC § 112b*) limits the ability of members of the executive branch to negotiate agreements with foreign governments. The Act also requires that the Secretary of State transmit the text of written international agreements to Congress.

DOD Directive 5530.3: International Agreements delegates authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements to the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS has delegated this authority to the unified command CINCs.

AR 550-51: Authority and Responsibility for Negotiating, Concluding, Forwarding, and Depositing of International Agreements implements the Case Act for the Department of the Army and delegates, subject to certain restrictions, authority to negotiate and conclude agreements to the heads of staff agencies and MACOMs.

Legal Bases for U.S. Intervention. The commander should be aware of the legal bases for the use of U.S. Forces abroad. These bases define, and possibly restrict, the objectives and execution of the operation. An operation to protect U.S. nationals, for example, could not be used to justify other military objectives. The legal bases for use of force or forces overseas include:

- protection of U.S. nationals;
- through collective self-defense, by treaty or request, assisting a state in resisting armed attack/aggression, to include externally-supported insurgent activity within a state;
- unilateral self-defense against armed attack undertaken against U.S. Forces/property overseas;
- participation in properly authorized enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and
- disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

War Powers Resolution (WPR). Absent a declaration of war or specific congressional approval of the use of U.S. Forces abroad, the War Powers Resolution, codified in *50 USC §§ 1541-1548*, imposes consultation and reporting requirements, as well as time constraints, upon the President when U.S. Forces are introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Generally, Congress asserts in the WPR that the Congress must approve deployments falling within the purview of the WPR which last more than 90 days.

Review of OPLANs. Operational lawyers must become part of the planning team at each headquarters. Each operations plan, concept plan contingency plan, and operations order should be reviewed during each step of the planning process.

The SJA must focus on assisting the commander in developing a plan that will enable him to accomplish his mission within the limits of the law. The following documents set forth the operational lawyer's role in the planning process.

DOD Directive 5100.77, The DOD Law of War Program, requires that all Services ensure that their military operations comply with the law of war and designates the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for implementing the Program. *Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum MJCS 59-8* provides that legal advisers should attend planning conferences for joint and combined operations and exercises when rules of engagement and related topics will be discussed. The memorandum further provides that all plans, rules of engagement, policies, and directives should be consistent with the DOD Law of War Program and should be reviewed by the joint command legal adviser at each stage of preparation.

FORSCOM message, Subject: Review of Operations Plans, dated 292030 October 1984, requires legal advisers to review and advise commanders and staff on all operational plans and orders.

Judge advocates typically use the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) OPLAN checklist, which is found in the *OPLAW Handbook* distributed through Army legal channels. This checklist focuses on both law of war considerations and other operational law concerns that must be addressed in the planning process. The checklist is a valuable tool in reviewing all OPLANs.

FM 27-100: Legal Operations, provides additional guidance concerning operational law issues and the legal support which should be provided during war and operations other than war.

Rules of Engagement (ROE). Rules of engagement are directives that a government may establish to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own military forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces. (*JCS Pub. 1: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*). Each command will establish ROE consistent with guidance from higher headquarters. In the absence of superseding ROE, this guidance may be found in JCS standing ROE. See, *CJCS Instruction 3121.01: Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces.*

Based on an examination of the OPLANs and the command SOPs, the legal reviewer should be familiar with the operation and should consider the following questions:

- Is the right and obligation of self-defense sufficiently stressed?
- How are the ROE transmitted to the soldiers, and how are the soldiers trained? Does the Field SOP or the Tactical SOP advise soldiers how to act in various situations? Are cards and pamphlets available to guide soldiers' actions?
- Have situational training exercises been developed to train soldiers in the appropriate mix of initiative and restraint?
- Are the following key areas covered by ROE or by coordinating instructions?
    - Hostile forces, acts, and intent;

- Use of chemical munitions, to include herbicides, CS, and other riot control agents;
- Use of nuclear munitions;
- Use of booby traps;
- ADA weapons status;
- Employment of mines and mine fields, to include scatterable mines (FASCAM);
- Employment of electronic warfare (EW) assets;
- Employment of indirect fires and observers;
- Cross-border/boundary operations;
- Employment of special operations forces; and
- Transition ROE (threat/peace to hostilities).

Law of War. Commanders must be sensitive to law-of-war issues and must plan for providing instruction to the members of the command concerning the essential provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, as well as other conventions and treaties. The following discussion highlights the areas of the law of war most critical to commanders.

<u>*Regulation of Hostilities.*</u> Three general principles form the foundation for this area of the law of war:
(1) Military Necessity. This principle justifies those actions not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for the securing of the complete submission of the enemy in the shortest period of time. This enables commanders to take actions in furtherance of the military mission (Para. 3, *FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.*
(2) Unnecessary Suffering. Military necessity does not allow the commander to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering (Para. 34, *FM 27-10*).
(3) Proportionality. The loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained (Para. 41, *FM 27-10*).

In addition to the three principles articulated above, commanders must be aware of the lawfulness of certain weapons, targets, stratagems, and reprisals (Para. 497, *FM 27-10*). The commander must be aware of the U.S. policies toward nuclear (Para. 35, *FM 27-10*), biological, and chemical weapons (*Executive Order No. 11850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16187* (1975); Para. 38, *FM 27-10*), to include the limitations on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in combat (Para. 38c, *FM 27-10*) (*Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993*), and additional protocols I & II.

<u>*Geneva Conventions.*</u> The 1949 Geneva Conventions prescribe how commanders must treat prisoners of war (Chapter 3, *FM 27-10*), sick and wounded on the battlefield and at sea (Chapter 4, *FM 27-10*), and civilians (Chapter 5, *FM 27-10*). Commanders implement their legal obligations to civilians through use of their civil affairs assets such as the Director of Civil Military Operations (DIRCMO) and Assistant Chief of Staff G/S-5 of Civil

Affairs units (see *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations)*.

Commanders will require significant legal advice in executing the four functional areas of Civil Affairs: governmental, economic, public facilities, and special functions. Commanders establish "civil administrations" in occupied areas. The concept of civil administration requires legal guidance, because the U.S. Army concept places greater emphasis upon the self-help abilities of the controlled population; the term "military government" as used in *FM 27-10* and the Geneva Conventions are thereby broadened.

Commanders will rely upon legal guidance in drafting appropriate rules, regulations, and ordinances in the occupied territory (Appendix C, *FM 41-10*). Appropriate utilization of legal, civil affairs, and PSYOP assets will alleviate the administrative burden placed upon commanders who must care for civilian populations in their areas of operations.

War Crimes. The commander has an affirmative obligation to investigate, report, and discipline war criminals (Para. 506, *FM 27-10*). Further, under certain circumstances, commanders may be held criminally liable for war crimes committed by their subordinates (Para. 501, *FM 27-10*). The commander must be aware of his obligations concerning war crimes, to include the available investigative assets and choices of forum (Para. 507, *FM 27-10*).

Each of the functional areas of operational law relevant to conventional combat missions (military justice, administrative law, contracting, claims, and legal assistance) is addressed in other sections of this text.

Security Assistance Missions.

Security assistance consists of those statutory programs and authorities under which the U.S. may provide or regulate forms of assistance and sales to foreign governments (and international organizations) for the purpose of enhancing U.S./mutual security.

The principal purpose of security assistance is to enhance U.S. strategic objectives through the implementation of regional and individual country programs. These programs are designed to assist allies and friendly countries in meeting their security threats, while U.S. interests are promoted by:

- securing en route access, overflight, transit, and base rights essential to rapid deployment;
- promoting force commonalities and interoperability;
- increasing U.S. geopolitical influence; and
- improving/maintaining access to raw materials.

The National Security Council establishes overall strategic planning and goals. Security assistance programs, as one means of accomplishing these goals, are managed by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. The Under Secretary is responsible for coordinating security assistance plans and programs normally conducted by the U.S. military; he also chairs the Arms Transfer Management Group (ATMG), which provides policy planning and reviews security assistance matters.

Coordination is accomplished in a given nation by the U.S. Country Team. The team consists of representatives of all in-country U.S. Government departments and includes a military officer who

normally is in charge of the security assistance organization. The Ambassador, as the President's personal representative, functions within the organization of the State Department and has full responsibility for directing and coordinating the activities and operations of all elements of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of a U.S. unified combatant command exercises authority, direction, and control over U.S. military forces within a particular country that are assigned or attached to that command.

Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal point of contact and policy spokesman for security assistance matters. Day-to-day operation of security assistance programs is effected by the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). The DSAA is responsible for the management, control, and implementation of approved and funded security assistance programs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) develop plans and systematically review ongoing security assistance programs for specific countries and geographical regions in order to ensure their compatibility with U.S. global security interests and to confirm that military assistance resources are being utilized in ways that promote U.S. strategic objectives.

The military departments develop, negotiate, and execute agreements pertaining to security assistance programs. They also provide logistical advice and furnish the resources and administrative support necessary to move assets to a recipient country.

The CINCs are responsible for ensuring that all individual country security assistance programs within their geographical areas of responsibility are coordinated, integrated, and in consonance with regional U.S. defense plans. The CINCs also identify and apply the security assistance resources required to achieve U.S. strategic goals at the regional level.

Component commands of unified commands participate in the planning and execution of security assistance programs and specifically perform the following functions:

- assist in the development and execution of long-range plans, to include foreign military sales;
- provide technical advice on weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, and information relative to logistics support, training, and technical assistance offered by Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Technical Assistance Teams (TATs);
- ensure component contingency plans and international activities undertaken in conjunction with allied and friendly forces (such as combined training exercises and standardization conferences) are correlated with security assistance programs and overall U.S. military objectives;
- advise on the capabilities and limitations of allied and friendly forces, to include their capability of operating effectively with U.S. Forces in support of U.S. contingency plans;
- advise on the organization, force objectives, and modernization programs of allied and friendly forces;
- stay informed of the item content of a particular country's security assistance program;

- provide advice and assistance directly to component sections in the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs); and
- make field trips to assist in accomplishing the security assistance mission.

Role of the Operational Lawyer. Operational lawyers are prepared to advise commanders concerning the various security assistance and arms transfer programs. They can advise on currently applicable legislative and regulatory requirements and interpretations of existing law in order to avoid both legal difficulties and actual or perceived abuses of security assistance aims.

Security Assistance Programs. Congress appropriates security assistance funds to the State Department, which affects overall coordination of the security assistance process. Specific programs are funded annually by Congress on a program-by- program and country-by-country basis, a reflection of the significant congressional interest and participation in security assistance.

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 USC § 2151 et seq.), Part I, provides economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and other forms of assistance to various countries. Part II of the FAA authorizes the U.S. to furnish security assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, upon request and after congressional approval. The major security assistance programs are listed below.

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) previously included Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMSF), Foreign Military Sales Credits (FMSCR), and the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The purpose of FMFP is to enable U.S. allies and friends to enhance their self-defense capabilities through the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training. Due to the high cost of modern weapon systems, FMFP is primarily a grant program. While MAP and FMSF are still in effect, FMFP is the primary component of military assistance to other nations under the security assistance policy.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) (22 USC § 2347). IMET authorizes the President specific dollar amounts each fiscal year to furnish military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. This education and training may be provided in both the U.S. and abroad and must be designed, in part, to foster mutually beneficial relations between the U.S. and participating countries and to improve the ability of participating countries to utilize their resources, to include defense articles and services provided under FMFP.

Expanded IMET (22 USC § 2347). Expanded IMET permits the President to train both civilian officials with defense oversight responsibility and military forces of foreign countries about human rights, the role of the military in a democracy, and effective military justice systems.

Antiterrorism Assistance (22 USC § 2349aa, et seq.). This program authorizes the President specific dollar amounts each fiscal year to furnish assistance to foreign countries in order that they may enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist activities. The program is administered by

the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, who determines the countries to be provided assistance and the type of assistance to be furnished, and U.S. advisory personnel must, to the maximum extent possible, carry out their responsibilities within the U.S.

Economic Support Fund (ESF) (22 USC § 2346, et seq.) . This program authorizes the President to provide, when particular U.S. national interests so dictate, economic support in certain amounts or to certain countries. ESF is designed to promote economic or political stability in recipient countries, although ESF may not be used for military or paramilitary purposes. Thus, such funds generally cannot be reprogrammed from ESF to MAP or IMET.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) (22 USC § 2348, et seq.). This program authorizes the provision of assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations. This authority may be used to provide financial resources, equipment and supplies, or services.

Police Training Prohibition (Section 660, FAA, 22 USC § 2420) . A provision of the FAA, Part III, with which commanders must be familiar is Section 660. FAA funds cannot be used to provide training, advice, or financial support to police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces of a foreign government or for any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of a foreign government. Longtime democracies, with no standing armed forces and which do not violate human rights, are exempted from Section 660 prohibitions. Other countries may also enjoy specific legislative exemption. There are also narrow exceptions for training foreign police

personnel who primarily engage in counterdrug activities.

Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 USC § 2751, et seq.). The AECA provides for the transfer of arms and other military equipment, as well as various defense services, through government-to-government agreements. AECA establishes the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. Under this program, DOD purchases military equipment or services from U.S. firms or takes equipment from U.S. stocks (under limited conditions) and sells the equipment or services to a foreign government or international organization. The services of DOD personnel, such as training or management advice, may also be sold. Authority is provided for the leasing of defense articles in DOD stocks to eligible recipients. The AECA also authorizes the President to finance sales of defense articles and services or to guarantee financing to friendly foreign countries or international organizations. Note that the FMS program established under the AECA is not a grant program. Defense articles and services may not be provided to countries, under the AECA, on a nonreimbursable basis.

The AECA is subject to revision on an annual basis and contains relatively complex and sensitive legislative requirements, prohibitions, and limitations. A principal example of this is Section 21 (c)(1), which requires that personnel performing defense services sold under the AECA not perform any duties of a "combatant nature," to include duties related to training and advising that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities outside the U.S. This provision effectively bars U.S. military trainers or advisers from

accompanying friendly country units engaged in combat.

The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is a document used to effect transfers under the AECA, will detail the status DOD personnel providing defense services to a particular country will enjoy in that country. This status is usually that of Administrative and Technical Privileges and Immunities (P&I).

Other Legislation. Commanders should also be advised concerning country and issue-specific security assistance legislation. Examples of the latter include provisions which:

- limit or prohibit the provision of assistance to countries which violate human rights (*22 USC § 2304, Human Rights and Security Assistance*).
- prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries which illegally expropriate U.S. property (Hickenlooper Amendment—*22 USC § 2370(e)(1)*).
- prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries that deliver nuclear enrichment or nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to any other country, or receive such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country. Security assistance is also denied to countries which transfer nuclear explosive devices to nonnuclear states. Nonnuclear weapon states which receive or detonate nuclear explosive devices likewise may not receive security assistance funds. These prohibitions are subject to limited exceptions which require the President to certify that

termination of assistance to such a country would be detrimental to the national security of the U.S. (Symington-Glenn Amendments, *22 USC §§ 2429, 2429a*).
- completely terminate foreign assistance to any country more than six months in arrears on payment of accrued debts to the U.S. *(22 USC § 2370q, Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance*).

Certain provisions of the FAA and AECA authorize the President, acting personally, to waive provisions of law, or take other extraordinary measures, in emergencies or other compelling circumstances. For example, Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA allows the President to direct the draw down of defense articles from DOD, defense services from DOD, and military education and training, of an aggregate value of not to exceed $75,000,000 in any fiscal year. Section 506(a)(2) contains authority under which the President can direct the draw down of defense articles and services for counternarcotic and disaster relief purposes. The funding limit for this authority is likewise $75,000,000 per fiscal year. Presidential use of these extraordinary provisions is the exception, not the rule.

Deployment for Overseas Exercises.

Prior to overseas exercise deployments, the SJA must consider every aspect of the operation to assure that all potential legal issues are addressed. This process will closely parallel that undertaken in connection with deployment

for conventional combat missions. Examples of this pre-exercise planning include:

- determining if international agreements exist between the U.S. and the host country; assuring that if agreements do exist, they contain essential provisions; and determining whether, in the absence of applicable agreements, such agreements should be negotiated;
- reviewing the exercise plan through the use of the OPLAN Checklist;
- preparing the legal annex to the exercise plan; and
- using the Deployment Checklist as a guide in order to assure that all exercise preparations are complete.

The expanded use of overseas training exercises requires the commander to be cognizant of legislation concerning construction activities, training activities, and exercise-related civic and humanitarian assistance undertaken in conjunction with overseas exercises.

Construction Activities in Support of Training Exercises. Congress has passed legislation (*10 USC § 2805(a)(2) and (c), Unspecified Minor Construction*), concerning the funding of exercise related construction and unspecified minor military projects coordinated or directed by the JCS outside the U.S during any fiscal year. Commanders should become familiar with current fiscal year limitations on spending for these types of projects.

Congress has also established certain guidelines for determining the cost of projects constructed in support of military training exercises:

- Transportation costs of materials, supplies, and government-furnished equipment are excluded.
- Travel and per diem costs applicable to troop labor, and costs of material, supplies, services, and fuel furnished by sources outside of the Department of Defense on a nonreimbursable basis are also excluded. These costs shall be reported to the extent that such costs exceed a specified amount per project. The costs of supplies or services furnished on a nonreimbursable basis should be estimated on a fair-market-value basis.

For the purpose of determining costs attributable to such construction projects, the following costs shall be included:

- Costs of all materials, supplies, and services applicable to the project, including those furnished on a nonreimbursable basis by other military departments and defense agencies.
- Labor costs, except for U.S. military labor.
- Overhead or support costs, which can be identified as representing additional costs which would not have been incurred were it not for the project, except for planning and design costs.
- DOD-funded costs applicable to the operation of Government-furnished equipment, including fuel and direct maintenance accounts.

Cost estimates of non-DOD funded items should be included in the estimate of the project cost, but are not to be derived from the fund. *H.R. Rep No. 99-1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 737* (1986) (Conference Report accompanying H.J. Res. 738).

Congress has also reaffirmed a Comptroller General determination that the structures of a minor and temporary nature (*e.g.*, base camp facilities such as tent platforms, field latrines, range targets, and installed relocatable structures) completely removed at the termination of an exercise may be funded through O&M exercise accounts.

Given the evolving nature of the law and regulations applicable to exercise-related construction, theater operators and planners should consult with the unified command's legal adviser before planning exercise construction activities.

Congress establishes specific monetary ceilings for construction. Military construction is an extremely volatile area, and the operational lawyer will research this area carefully before advising commanders concerning deployments that involve construction.

Training Activities. Units deployed on overseas exercises may familiarize host-nation forces with U.S. equipment for interoperability and safety purposes. When the instruction undertaken prior to a combined exercise rises to a level of formal training comparable to that normally provided through security assistance, security assistance requirements must be met. *10 USC § 2011, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces*, permits U.S. Special Forces Operations to conduct training missions with friendly foreign forces, provided the missions are designed primarily to train U.S. Special Operations Forces.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) (10 U.S.C. § 401). The SJA is prepared to provide advice to commanders concerning the scope and nature of humanitarian and civic assistance that may be provided to nationals of a host country. *DOD Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations,* and *DOD Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program*, implement the HCA program and give detailed procedures.

HCA activities are designed to promote foreign policy, the national security interests of the United States and the country where the HCA is carried out, and the specific operational readiness skills of the U.S. Armed Forces who participate in the activity. HCA consists of:

- medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;
- construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
- well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and
- rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

HCA may be provided only to those countries that are specifically approved by the Secretary of State. The CJDC will identify to the appropriate DOD authorities those projects which should be completed in a particular theater. DOD will obtain approval for the projects from the State Department.

Except for "minimal" expenditures, only funds specifically appropriated for HCA may be used for that purpose. O&M funds may be used for the minimal expenditures.

The Secretary of Defense must report HCA activities to Congress annually. The report will list the countries where HCA activities were carried out, the type and description of such activities carried out in each country, and the amount expended in carrying out each such activity in each such country. HCA activities may not duplicate any other form of social or economic aid provided by any other department or agency of the United States.

Operations Other Than War.

Operations other than war (OOTW) often occur within the context of one of three levels of conflict discussed below. The U.S. response to a given situation is based upon the level of the conflict and applicable international law. The commander must be apprised of the legal basis for U.S. responses to situations and the legal issues associated with security assistance programs and exercises conducted by the U.S. in conjunction with such responses. Various examples of OOTW situations are peace enforcement, peace keeping, NEO, show of force, strikes, raids, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, anti-terrorism, counter drug, nation assistance, disaster relief, civil support, etc. (See *Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations,* for a detailed discussion of these missions.)

Levels of Conflict. For legal definition and for Law of Armed Conflict purposes, it is useful to categorize conflict into three levels:

Level I—Disruptive Actions Against a Constituted Government. This level of conflict involves actions committed by individuals and small, loosely organized groups. They foment discontent through propaganda, protests, and demonstrations. They also engage in subversive, violent, and nonviolent acts of sabotage and/or terrorism.

The domestic law of the state applies to these individuals and groups. They are treated as common criminals; their activities have no international legal status.

Third-party states may not aid those engaged in such activities. These states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used as a base of operations by those engaged in disruptive activities.

U.S. actions generally will consist of security assistance, arms transfer programs, and combined training exercises.

Level II—Insurgency. Insurgencies are characterized by organized military operations against the constituted government. Insurgents may exercise *de facto* control over portions of a state's territory and portions of the population and may engage in all forms of disruptive activity against the constituted government.

The insurgents are treated in accordance with the law of the state. However, they are protected by the provisions of common Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

Third-party states may not aid the insurgents, but may recognize that the insurgents exercise *de facto* control over portions of the territory and population. In some cases assistance to the constituted government may be viewed as illegal intervention. The legality of third-party state assistance to the constituted government may be largely dependent upon whether insurgent activity is externally supported or controlled. Just as in Level I, third-party states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used as insurgent bases of operations.

The U.S. may employ and exercise the full range of security assistance

activities in support of the constituted government, and the use of U.S. combat/combat support forces on a unilateral or regionally collective basis may be required.

Level III—Belligerency. A conflict rises to the level of a belligerency when the insurgents have governmental and military organizations of their own, their military operations are conducted in accordance with the law of war, they have a determinate percentage of territory and population under effective control, and the conflict becomes conventional in nature.

The law of armed conflict applies to belligerencies, which have similar status under international law as wars between sovereign states. Any assistance afforded to either belligerent by a third-party state constitutes an act of war against the other. Further, participation in the conflict by third-party states gives the conflict an international character requiring application of the international law norms of neutrality.

U.S. response may consist of appropriate unilateral or regional military actions. The U.S. may also participate in peacekeeping operations following a cease-fire in the conflict. (See *FM 100-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,* and *JCS Pub 3-07.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping,* for categories of operational/mission purposes.)

Special Operations. The Department of the Army requires that all U.S. Army special operations undertaken in any mode during periods of peace or armed conflict be conducted in compliance with U.S. law, national policy, DOD directives, and Army regulations. U.S. law, regulations, and policy guidance apply to all U.S. Army personnel without concern as to whether they are performing special or conventional operations (*DA Policy on Special Operations, 10 July 1986*). Attorneys assigned to special operations units must actively participate in all phases of mission planning and execution to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. law and policy.

CONTRACT/FISCAL LAW

Contract Legal Review.

Commanders should ensure that their contracting officers work closely with legal support. The participation of legal counsel in the acquisition process is governed by regulation and command direction. The attorney participates as a member of the contracting officer's team from commencement of the acquisition process to closeout of the contract.

Department of the Army policy requires that:

− legal counsel participate fully in the entire acquisition process;

− legal counsel participate as a member of the contracting officer's team, and advise as to the legal sufficiency of actions taken by them, for acquisitions generally in amounts over $100,000 (note that dollar thresholds change frequently); and,

− legal counsel review acquisitions under $100,000 to the maximum extent consistent with the availability of legal counsel.

Department of the Army policy also requires that legal counsel:

− review acquisition plans to assure consistency with law and regulations; and,

– review justifications or determinations and findings relating to actions exceeding certain dollar amounts.

Commanders should be aware that Government regulations frequently change dollar thresholds for legal review of contracts and other contracting actions. Many Heads of Contracting Activities (HCAs) have lowered the dollar threshold requiring mandatory reviews.

Legal counsel shall inform the contracting officer whether the proposed action is legally sufficient, the details of any insufficiency, and a recommended course of action to overcome the insufficiency. Differences between the contracting officer and the legal counsel as to legal sufficiency that cannot be satisfactorily resolved at the contracting office level are to be referred to the cognizant HCA for resolution.

Other acquisition areas in which legal counsel may assist the commander include the following:
– bid protests by disappointed bidders;
– contract performance problems;
– contractor requests for equitable adjustment or contract modification;
– contract litigation pursuant to the "Disputes Clause" of a contract or pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (*41 USC §§ 601-613)*;
– issues relating to the Commercial Activities Program,
– issues relating to nonappropriated fund contracting.
– issues relating to funding of Government contracts.

Fiscal Law.

The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority to raise revenues, borrow funds, and appropriate the proceeds for federal agencies. In implementation of these express constitutional powers, Congress strictly limits the obligation and expenditure of public funds by the executive branch. Congress regulates virtually all executive branch programs and activities through the appropriations process. Congress has also enacted fiscal procedures which, if violated, potentially subject the offender to serious adverse personnel actions or even criminal penalties. There are three major fiscal limitations.

(1) An agency may only obligate and expend appropriations for a proper *purpose*;
(2) An agency must obligate within the *time* limits applicable to the appropriation (e.g., O&M funds are available for obligation for one fiscal year); and
(3) The obligation must be within the *amounts* established by Congress.

Availability as to Purpose. The "purpose statute," *31 USC § 1301(a)*, provides that appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made, except as otherwise provided by law. The Department of Defense has nearly 100 separate appropriations available to it for different purposes. The statute does not require that every item of expenditure be specified in an appropriation act, although many expenditures are. DOD has reasonable discretion in determining how to accomplish the purpose of an appropriation. The following is the standard for measuring the propriety of a

particular expenditure, not specified in the statute. One or the other criteria must be fulfilled.

- It is reasonably necessary in carrying out an authorized function.
- It will contribute materially to the effective accomplishment of the function.

By regulation, the Department of Defense has assigned most types of expenditures to a specific appropriation.

One common problem is the failure to properly use procurement appropriations. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations are generally available to pay for day-to-day operating costs. However, procurement appropriations are required when acquiring end items which are centrally managed or cost more than a specified amount.

Another common problem relates to the proper uses of "contingency funds." Contingency funds are appropriations made available to the executive branch that may be expended without the normal controls. Congress has provided contingency funds throughout our history for use by the President and other senior agency officials. Contingency funds are tightly regulated because of their limited availability and potential for abuse. Official Representational Funds are available to extend official courtesies to dignitaries, officials, and foreign governments. However, there are restrictions on using these funds for retirements and changes-of-command ceremonies, classified and intelligence projects, entertainment of DOD personnel, personal expenses, and other related categories of expenses.

An additional area of concern is the use of O&M appropriations for military construction. Congressional oversight of the Military Construction Program is extensive and pervasive. Virtually all construction projects costing $1.5 million or more require specific prior approval by Congress and are funded from the Military Construction appropriations (MILCON). Only projects under $300,000 are presently funded with O&M funds. Maintenance and repair projects are funded differently from construction. Maintenance and repair projects are funded from either O&M or, if appropriate, Real Property Maintenance, Defense appropriations.

There is also a potential for misuse of O&M funds for improvements to family housing. Congress provides funds for the operation, maintenance, repair, and construction of military family housing in the annual Military Construction Appropriation Act. Each Family Housing Appropriation consists of two subappropriations, one for Operations and Maintenance, and one for Construction. Family Housing, Construction appropriations are provided by Congress to fund family-housing construction projects exceeding a set dollar amount per dwelling unit. This includes both construction of new dwelling units and improvements to existing dwelling units. Improvements that are less than the set dollar amount per dwelling unit are funded from Family Housing, Operations and Maintenance, but require Department of the Army approval. MACOMs must approve incidental improvements costing in excess of a certain amount per fiscal year for any one dwelling unit, or in excess of another amount for a single incidental improvement project. Commanders should consult with legal counsel to determine the current cost limitations.

Money spent on general officer quarters is closely scrutinized. Many general officer quarters are older and larger

than the vast majority of family housing units. Many are also historic and architecturally significant. These factors tend to make these units the most expensive to operate and maintain. *AR 210-13: General/Flag Officer's Quarters (GFOQ) and Installation Commander's Quarters (ICQ) Management,* establishes detailed procedures for spending money on general officer quarters and must be consulted regularly. Occupants of general officer quarters are responsible for knowing how much money is spent to maintain the quarters, and they must be familiar with cost limitations and approval authority levels.

When funding construction during contingency operations, the normal construction rules apply. Operations funds are the appropriate funding source to acquire materials and to cover the cost of erecting structures which are clearly of a *temporary* operational nature, and which will not be used to sustain permanent operations at the conclusion of the contingency. MILCON criteria apply in all other situations, including construction for which the United States would have a follow-on use.

Availability as to Time. Appropriations are available for limited periods. An agency must incur a legal obligation to pay money within the period of availability. If funds are not obligated before they expire, they are no longer available.

Appropriations are available to support bona fide needs of their period of availability. The "bona fide needs" statute, *31 USC § 1502(a)*, provides that the balance of an appropriation or fund limited for obligation to a definite period is available only for payment of expenses properly incurred during the period of availability or to complete contracts properly made within that period of availability.

Supplies. Supplies are bona fide needs of the period in which they are needed. Orders for supplies are proper only when the supplies are actually required now. Thus, supplies needed for operations during a given fiscal year are bona fide needs of that year.

Supplies ordered in one fiscal period that will not be required until a subsequent fiscal period are bona fide needs of the first period under two circumstances:

- *The Inventory Exception.* A bona fide need for supplies exists when there is a present requirement for supply items to meet an authorized stockage level (replenishment of operating stock levels, safety levels, mobilization requirements, authorized backup stocks, etc.); and

- *The Lead Time Exception.* If goods or materials will not be obtainable on the open market at the time needed for use because the time required to order, produce, fabricate, and deliver them requires that they be purchased in a prior fiscal year, such supplies are a bona fide need of the first year.

Services. As a general rule, services are presumed to be bona fide needs of the fiscal year in which they are performed. The proper appropriation is that available during the period in which the services will be rendered or delivered. There are four statutory exceptions to the general rule (see, *10 USC § 2410*a). Defense agencies may, at any time during the fiscal year, award contracts for a period not to exceed 12 months completely funded with current appropriations, for the following purposes:

- depot maintenance;

- leases for real and personal property, including the maintenance of such property when contracted for as part of the lease agreement;
- maintenance of tools, equipment, and facilities; and
- operation of equipment.

In addition, pursuant to *PL 103-335*, the agency may obligate funds available for the entire undertaking at contract award, even though the contractor will perform services in the next fiscal year, if the contract period does not exceed one year.

Availability as to Amount.

Allocation of Funds. Appropriations are apportioned to agencies for obligation by Office of Management and Budget over their period of availability. Agencies subdivide these funds among their activities. In the Army, the Operating Agency/Major Command (MACOM) is the lowest command level at which the formal administrative subdivisions of funds required by *31 USC § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures,* are maintained. Below the MACOM level, subdivisions are informal targets or allowances.

The Antideficiency Act, 31 USC §§ 1341, 1342, 1349, et seq., and 1517 et seq., prohibit any government officer or employee from:

- making or authorizing an expenditure or obligation *in excess* of the amount available in an appropriation;
- incurring an obligation *in advance* of an appropriation, unless authorized by law; or
- making or authorizing expenditures or incurring obligations *in excess* of

formal subdivisions of funds; or in excess of amounts permitted by regulations prescribed under *31 USC § 1514(a).*
- accepting voluntary services (*31 USC §1342*).

Investigating Violations. The commander of the Army activity at which a suspected violation occurs must send a flash report to DASA(FO) within 15 days of discovering the violation. The MACOM Commander (or higher) must appoint a team of experts to conduct a preliminary review to determine whether an Antideficiency Act violation has occurred, and must forward a preliminary report within 90 days of discovery of the potential violation. Where the preliminary investigation determines that a violation occurred, an investigative team is appointed to conduct a formal investigation and to prepare a final report for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). DOD is required to report the violation to the President and the Congress. See *DOD 7200.1, Administrative Control of Appropriations,* and *DOD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 10, Contract Payment Policy and Procedures,* and *Volume 14, Administrative Control of Funds and Antideficiency Act Violations*. A responsible party is the person who has authorized or created the overdistribution, obligation, commitment, or expenditure in question. The responsible party generally is the highest ranking party in the decision making process who had either actual or constructive knowledge of the improper action. Commanders and lawyers, as well as resource managers, have been senior responsible parties. The responsible party is subject to disciplinary

action commensurate with the severity of the violation.

Government Operations During Funding Gaps and Continuing Resolutions. During a continuing resolution, the Army is generally not allowed to initiate or increase the scope of existing programs, projects, and activities. Operations continue at the rate of funds available during the previous fiscal year, or at some specified lower amount. Army activities can expect to receive guidance from OMB and the Army Comptroller addressing what activities the Army can continue during the absence of appropriations. While certain employees and activities are exempt from Government suspension or shut down during a funding hiatus, other activities must be suspended and voluntary performance of non-exempt services by non-exempt employees is prohibited.

SUMMARY

Awareness of legal resources and a close relationship with the SJA are vital to the commander. The legal community stands ready to help the command accomplish its missions, and to serve the military community. Attorneys are an important resource that can do much more than just advise on whether or not a course of action is legally sufficient. They also can advise commanders on ways to accomplish legitimate command objectives, and can provide sound advice and judgment to facilitate a decision.

REFERENCES

Statutes

(1) *Antideficiency Act,* 31 USC §§ 1341, 1342, 1349, *et seq.*, and 1511 *et seq.*

(2) *Antiterrorism Assistance,* 22 USC § 2349aa, *et seq.*

(3) *Arms Export Control Act,* 22 USC § 2751, *et seq.*

(4) *Assimilative Crimes Act,* 18 USC § 13

(5) *Bona Fide Needs Statute,* 31 USC § 1502(a).

(6) *Case Act,* 1 USC § 112b.

(7) *Clean Air Act,* 42 USC §7401, *et seq.*

(8) *Clean Water Act,* 33 USC §1261, *et seq.*

(9) *Contract Disputes Act of 1978,* 41 USC §§ 601-613.

(10) *Economic Support Fund,* 22 USC § 2346, *et seq.*

(11) *Endangered Species Act,* 16 USC §1531, *et seq.*

(12) *Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992*, Pub. L. 102-386.

(13) *Federal Trespass Law,* 18 USC § 1382.

(14) *Foreign Assistance Act,* 22 USC § 2151 *et seq.*

(15) *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance,* 10 USC § 401.

(16) *Human Rights and Security Assistance,* 22 USC § 2304.

(17) *International Military Education and Training Act,* 22 USC § 2347.

(18) *Legal Assistance,* 10 USC § 1044

(19) *National Environmental Policy Act,* 42 USC §4321, *et seq.*

(20) *Peacekeeping Operations,* 22 USC § 2348, *et seq.*

(21) *Police Training Prohibition,* Section 660, FAA, 22 USC § 2420.

(22) *Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance,* 22 USC § 2370q.

(23) *Purpose Statute*, 31 USC § 1301.

(24) *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,* 42 USC §6901, *et seq.*

(25) *Safe Drinking Water Act,* 42 USC §300f.

(26) *Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces*, 10 USC § 2011.

(27) *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),* 10 USC §§ 801-946.

(28) *Unspecified Minor Construction,* 10 USC § 2805(a)(2) and (c).

(29) *War Powers Resolution,* 50 USC §§ 1541-1548.

DOD Publications

(1) *Administrative Control of Appropriations,* DOD Directive 7200.1.

(2) *DOD Law of War Program,* DOD Directive 5100.77.

(3) *Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 10, Contract Payment Policy and Procedures,* and *Volume 14, Administrative Control of Funds and Antideficiency Act Violations,* DOD Directive 7000.14-R.

(4) *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations,* DOD Directive 2205.2.

(5) *Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program,* DOD Instruction 2205.3.

(6) *International Agreements,* DOD Directive 5530.3.

(7) *Joint Ethics Regulations (JER),* DOD Directive 5500.7-R.

Joint Publications

(1) *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* JCS Pub.1.

(2) *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* Joint Pub 3-0.

(3) *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping,* JCS Pub 3-07.3.

(4) *The Law of Land Warfare,* FM 27-10.

(5) *Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces,* CJCS Instruction 3121.01.

Army Regulations

(1) *AR 27-3: The Army Legal Assistance Program.*

(2) *AR 27-10: Military Justice.*

(3) *AR 27-20: The Army Claims System.*

(4) *AR 27-26: Army Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers.*

(5) *AR 27-40: Litigation.*

(6) *AR 210-13: General/Flag Officer's Quarters (GFOQ) and Installation Commander's Quarters (ICQ) Management.*

(7) *AR 550-51: Authority and Responsibility for Negotiating, Concluding, Forwarding, and Depositing of International Agreements.*

(8) *AR 600-8-24: Officer Transfers and Discharge.s*

(9) *AR 600-20: Army Command Policy.*

(10) *AR 635-200: Enlisted Personnel Management System.*

(11) *AR 690-700: Personnel Relations and Services (Chapter 751).*

Army Field Manuals

(1) *Civil Affairs Operations,* FM 41-10 .

(2) *Legal Operations,* FM 27-100.

(3) *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,* FM 100-20.

Other

(1) *Labor-Management Partnerships,* Executive Order 12871.

(2) *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1995 Edition.*

(3) *OPLAW Handbook,* The Judge Advocate General's School, Army.

(4) *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch*, The Office of Government Ethics (OGE).

CHAPTER 21

CIVIL FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

"Over the years, the Corps of Engineers has evolved to meet the ever-changing needs of our dynamic country. Today, the Corps emphasizes three major responsibilities: navigation, flood control, and environmental protection and restoration. My experience has given me great confidence that there is the dedication and expertise in the Corps Divisions and Districts around the country to carry out these critical responsibilities.

Mr. H. Martin Lancaster
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)
before the Senate Committee on the Armed Services
December 13, 1995

INTRODUCTION

A number of activities traditionally carried out by the Department of the Army are commonly referred to as Civil Functions. This chapter presents those for which the Corps of Engineers is the responsible agency. These include the three major responsibilities cited by Mr. Lancaster, as well as some lesser known responsibilities such as the Civil Works Program carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; engineering and support to non-Defense Federal, State and local agencies; support of National Cemeteries; oversight of the Panama Canal Commission; and the foreign activities of the Corps of Engineers in support of U.S. foreign policy overseas. There are additional civil functions of the Department of the

Army for which the Corps of Engineers has no responsibilities.

A variety of funding sources finances these activities. For example, the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, along with contributions from State and local government sponsors, fund the Civil Works Program, while Corps of Engineers support to other non-Defense agencies is funded by those agencies. Several congressional committees — for example, the House Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension, Insurance and Memorial Affairs of the Committee on Veterans Affairs in the case of Arlington National Cemetery — provide legislative oversight. Despite these differences from other Army programs in financing and oversight, the Civil Functions

are integral to the overall vision of the Army and the service it provides to the Nation.

The Civil Functions greatly augment the Army's war fighting competencies, providing the capabilities to respond to a variety of situations across the spectrum of conflict. They provide a valuable tool with which to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) by maintaining, within the Department of the Army, a trained and ready engineer force, sustained at a world-class level of expertise, at virtually no expense to the Defense budget or personnel allocations. This force is familiar with the Army culture and responsive to the chain of command. Skills developed in managing large, complex projects transfer to any engineering-related operation. As a byproduct, the Civil Functions provide Army Engineer officers with valuable training — available nowhere else — in contracting and managing large projects.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Through specific statutory provisions, General Orders from the Secretary of the Army, and internal Department of the Army regulation, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) has been assigned responsibilities for Civil Functions. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) reports directly to the Secretary of the Army.

Congress established the position of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works in *Section 211 of the Flood Control Act of 1970, Public Law (P.L.) 91*-611, and reaffirmed it in *Section 501 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433*. The Secretary of the Army relies on the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) to direct and supervise the Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers. Reporting to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) on the Civil Works Program are the Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Director of Civil Works. P.L. 99-433 specifies the Assistant Secretary's duties to include overall supervision of the functions of the Department of the Army relating to programs for conservation and development of national water resources, including flood control, navigation, shore protection and related purposes

The bulk of the Army's Civil Functions are executed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a major command consisting of about 39,000 people which also plans and builds facilities for the Army, Air Force, and other DOD agencies. The Corps is commanded by the Chief of Engineers, who holds an unusual position as an Army Staff officer and a commander. Under the Chief's command are 11 divisions, four research laboratories, six engineer centers, and one battalion—the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power). Under the divisions there currently are 39 districts, 36 of which are within the Continental United States.

Reflecting the mission orientation of the Corps of Engineers to water resources, district boundaries for the Civil Works Program within the CONUS generally follow watersheds and drainage basins, while those for military construction districts follow state or other political boundaries. (See maps, figures 21-1 and 21-2.) The Corps also includes a number of overseas offices with missions in construction in support of U. S. Forces, assistance to the host country, and support to other U.S. agencies overseas. The Pacific Ocean Division, headquartered in Honolulu, HI, includes subordinate districts in Japan and Korea.

Civil Works
Division/District Boundaries

Figure 21-1

Figure 21-2

The Transatlantic Programs Center, in Winchester, VA, oversees most Corps of Engineers activities in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East; operating a subordinate center in Wiesbaden, Germany, as well as numerous area and project offices. In addition, several CONUS-based districts carry out overseas missions, such as Mobile District's support of SOUTHCOM.

The private sector is an essential element of the engineer team. The Corps employs private architectural, engineering, and construction firms for a high percentage of its design and all of its construction work. The partnership between the Corps and the private sector represents an immediate force multiplier of several hundred thousand architects, engineers, and builders, ready to support the Nation in times of emergency.

CIVIL WORKS PROGRAM

Overview.

The Civil Works Program provides for nationwide resources development and management, including the planning, design, construction, rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of flood control, navigation and multiple-purpose water resource projects that often include hydroelectric power, water supply, recreation, and natural resource management on approximately 12 million acres of land and water. Replacement value of these projects is estimated at over $150 billion.

In addition to this direct Federal investment program, the Civil Works Program includes an important regulatory mission in which the Corps of Engineers regulates construction in navigable waters and the deposit of dredged and fill material in waters and wetlands of the United States. The Civil Works Program also includes flood fighting, rescue operations, repair and restoration of flood control works, and other related emergency flood control work and recovery operations, all under the Corps' own authority as specified in P.L. 84-99; and under the Federal Response Plan in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and others.

The Civil Works Program receives Federal funding through the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts. The program also receives funding from non-Federal project sponsors who share in project costs according to formulas established by Congress in *P.L. 99-662*, the *Water Resources Development Act of 1986*, and subsequent water project authorization acts. Figure 21-3 shows the amount of Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 funding by source of funds for the Civil Works Program.

Economic Infrastructure.

The Corps of Engineers traditionally has been a major contributor to the development, construction, and maintenance of a sound water resources infrastructure. Commercial navigation and flood control are long-standing purposes of the Civil Works Program. The navigation function includes improvement and maintenance of harbors handling all of the Nation's seaborne commerce. With funds from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, the Corps maintains navigability in 299 deep draft harbors, and also maintains more than 600 smaller harbors. With more than 15 million American jobs dependent on U.S. import and export trade, the Nation's commercial ports are vital to the economic security of the United States and, thus, also to achieving the National Security Strategy objective to "Promote Prosperity at Home."

ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATION ACCOUNTS

	$ million
General Investigations (studies of potential projects)	153.6
Construction, General*	1,081.6
Operation and Maintenance, General**	1,697.0
Flood Control, Mississippi River and Tributaries	310.4
Regulatory Program (waterway/wetland protection)	101.0
Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies	10.0
General Expenses and Misc.	<u>161.3</u>
Total Appropriated	**3,514.9**
Contributions from Non-Federal Sponsors	136.0
Coastal Wetlands Restoration Trust Fund	<u>44.0</u>
Total Program	**3,694.9**

*Includes $86 million from Inland Waterway Trust Fund and from Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
**Includes $528 million from Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and $29 in Recreation User Fee Receipts

Figure 21-3

The Corps has built an intracoastal and inland commercial waterway network of 12,000 miles and over 200 locks and dams. Major improvements to inland waterway facilities are financed in part by the Inland Waterway Trust Fund. More than 600 million tons of commerce are moved every year on these waterways. Maintaining the system of ports and inland waterways involves removing more than 300 million cubic yards of dredged material each year.

The Nation's $34.7 billion investment in flood control (1928 through FY 1994) has prevented over $292 billion in flood damages — a return of more than eight dollars in flood damage reduction for every dollar invested. Civil Works projects seek to prevent flooding and its related damages

with structural measures, such as reservoirs, levees, improved channels, and floodwalls, and with nonstructural measures, such as advice and encouragement for local zoning regulations, floodproofing of individual homes, and setting aside land in the floodplain as open space. Flood control efforts range from small, local protection projects to large lakes and dams. Today, 383 dams and reservoirs are maintained and operated by the Corps for the purpose of flood control. Most flood control projects are constructed as joint ventures between the Federal government and non-Federal sponsors. These projects, once built, are owned and are operated and maintained by the sponsor.

The Corps operates 75 power plants, which represent almost one fourth of the Nation's hydroelectric capacity or three percent of the Nation's total generating capacity. Dams built by the Corps of Engineers provide water storage for drinking water, irrigation, and fish and wildlife habitat. Additionally, 463 projects (mostly lakes) are authorized and developed for recreational use. These projects accommodate nearly 400 million visits a year. The Corps estimates that 25 million Americans (one in ten) visit a Civil Works project at least once a year. Supporting visitors to these recreation areas generates 600,000 jobs. For many citizens, the rangers at the recreation sites will represent their only contact with the Department of the Army. Efforts are underway with HQDA to use these visits to Army Engineer facilities to inform the public about their Army.

The transportation infrastructure developed in the Civil Works Program plays a role in national defense. Ports and waterways serve as a vital logistics link in times of national and international crisis, when large volumes of materiel and personnel must be moved around the country and around the world. Practically all the heavy equipment and supplies bound for operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM moved by ship through ports maintained by the Civil Works Program. The Corps works with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the local port authorities to ensure that ports are ready when the need arises. Waterways built and operated and maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers similarly have direct military uses for strategic mobility. Units of the Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas National Guard have conducted successful movements over the Arkansas, Mississippi, and Illinois Rivers to their summer training area, and the 101st Airborne Division conducts annual movements by waterway from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, to Louisiana, saving thousands of dollars from the cost of other modes of transportation. Corps of Engineers flood control projects also play a role in force projection by protecting key highway and railway links. Thus, through activities as diverse as facilitating the movement of materiel to protecting vital infrastructure, the Civil Works Program contributes to the National Security Strategy objective to "Enhance Security."

The Environment.

The Civil Works Program makes an important contribution toward meeting the Nation's environmental goals by constructing projects for restoration of fish and wildlife habitat, by including mitigation in the design of all its projects, by protecting environmental assets such as wetlands through its regulatory program, and by its program of environmental compliance at Civil Works project sites.

Restoration. The Corps often incorporates ecosystem restoration in plans for new projects, especially those involving placement of dredged material from navigation projects. Under *Section 1135 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, P.L. 99-662,* the Corps also plans and executes projects to restore ecosystems at existing Civil Works projects where the original project contributed to environmental loss. Working toward a national goal of "no net loss of wetlands," the Civil Works Program is undertaking projects to restore existing wetlands, or to create new ones. In one of the largest restoration projects ever attempted, the Department of the Army and the National Park Service are cooperating on restoring the hydrologic regime for the Everglades in Florida, with funds provided by both agencies.

Legislation passed in 1990 established environmental protection as one of the primary missions in the planning, design, construction, operating and maintenance of water resources projects — along with navigation and flood control. This new direction has allowed the Corps to expand its traditional environmental activities and enhance or restore natural resources at Corps projects.

Regulatory Program. The regulatory program of the Corps of Engineers has a long history of protecting the Nation's waters. The *1899 Rivers and Harbors Act* authorizes the regulation, by permit, of construction and similar activities in navigable waters of the United States. The main objective is to ensure that unobstructed waterways are maintained for commercial and recreational users. Over time, "public interest review" became an important part of the decision process used by Corps district commanders in granting, modifying or denying permit applications. This review required the consideration and balancing of a number of interest besides navigation — among them aesthetics, conservation, economics, and general environmental factors.

The *1972 Clean Water Act* authorizes regulation, by permit, of dredge and fill activities in all waters of the United States, including wetlands. This Act expanded the Corps of Engineers' regulatory responsibilities. Also during this time, environmental laws were enacted that require Federal decision makers to consider and take responsibility for the environmental consequences of their actions. Today the regulatory program unites that public interest and environmental consequences reviews into a comprehensive evaluation process for decision making. The evaluation process promotes the balancing of environmental protection with responsible economic growth. This balancing is reflected in the program's goals: to protect the aquatic environment, render fair and reasonable decisions, and use efficient decision making procedures. The Corps regulatory program, through its decisions, continues to provide the public a valuable service—protection of the Nation's waters and wetlands.

Compliance. Compliance assessments are conducted by the Corps of Engineers at all its projects on a five-year cycle, using the Environmental Review Guide for Operations (ERGO) program. ERGO is a checklist of over 70 Federal environmental laws, plus State and local requirements. Project and facility managers, as well as external organizations, use ERGO to systematically locate and correct environmental deficiencies.

Environmental activities in the Civil Works Program are essential elements of the Army's Environmental Strategy into the 21st

Century. People who learn their specialties in Civil missions that concern natural and cultural resources, water quality, flood plain management or hazardous waste management help the Army go "beyond compliance" to take on a leadership role in natural resources stewardship. Civil Works expertise helped the Army develop such tools as the Environmental Compliance Assessment System (ECAS) and Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM). The Civil Works Program is responsible for about half the Army's land holdings, and is familiar with balancing preservation of the natural environment with human use — a major issue facing the Army. This program is also the Army's reservoir of cultural resources expertise, which the Army has used on several priority missions.

Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response.

The Army responds to the public's needs in the event of natural or man-made disasters and emergencies. Army programs provide public works and engineering assistance to protect human life, reduce suffering, and mitigate damage and threats to improved property. Response activities are supplemental to state and local efforts.

Under *P.L. 84-99*, as amended, the Corps of Engineers may undertake a broad range of readiness and response activities in relation to floods. These include disaster preparedness, advance measures to alleviate flood threats, flood fighting, rescue and emergency relief efforts during flood events, and rehabilitation of flood control and Federally authorized shore protection works which have been damaged by floods or coastal storms. This law also authorizes provision of emergency supplies of clean water to localities whose water source has been contaminated, and assistance in supplying water to drought-affected area. Further, the Corps is authorized to provide essential services to preserve life and protect property in flood-impacted areas, for up to 10 days, subsequent to a Governor's request for Federal assistance.

Under the *Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288*, as amended, the Corps utilizes its public works and engineering capabilities to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal agencies in responding to disasters and emergencies of all kinds. The Corps participates in FEMA disaster recovery efforts by carrying out mission assignments within its areas of expertise. Activities performed under the *Stafford Act* usually are reimbursed by FEMA. Emergency responses usually involve coordination with other Federal agencies, supplemented when necessary with support from military elements as coordinated by the Director of Military Support, in support of state and local efforts. Corps of Engineers engineering and contracting efforts, however, often mean that troop units called on for emergency support can be returned to training sooner than would otherwise be possible.

Under the *Stafford Act*, FEMA has developed the Federal Response Plan, which calls on 28 Federal departments and agencies to execute coordinated disaster relief and recovery operations. Under this plan, the Corps of Engineers has been delegated, from DOD, the lead responsibility for public works and engineering missions.

During FY 1995, the Corps of Engineers continued the rehabilitation of levees damaged from the Midwest Flood of 1993. This program involved a $200 million rehabilitation effort of 201 levees damaged by the 1993 event.

In January and March 1995, a series of storms inundated California, resulting in

11 deaths, more than $300 million in damages, and 57 counties in the state were declared disaster areas. Under *P.L. 84-99* authority, emergency contracting was employed for removal of debris from threatened bridge structures, emergency levee repairs, sandbags, and technical advice and assistance. Personnel of the Corps supported multiple Disaster Field Offices for the event. The spring rains of 1995 brought additional flooding to the already saturated Midwest, resulting in damages to levees that were under repair, totaling nearly $60 million.

In September, Hurricane Marilyn hit the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico with winds greater than 100 mph. In response to the disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency again tasked the Corps with more than $143 million in mission assignments to provide emergency water, temporary roofing and housing rehabilitation, temporary power, debris removal, technical assistance and logistical support and other activities to include storm documentation.

On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was destroyed by an explosion. Forty-three Corps employees from 10 districts, one division office, and one laboratory—including teams skilled in the Corps-developed System to Locate Survivors (STOLS)—traveled to Oklahoma City to search for survivors, evaluate the condition of the building, and keep rescue teams and investigators safe. Several structural specialists worked with search-and-rescue teams, making sure support columns and walls would not collapse on them. The engineers also shored up columns and used survey instruments to measure movement of the walls and columns while search teams operated inside the building. Corps employees also evaluated the condition of

other buildings in the blast area; in addition to the Murrah Building, 312 buildings in downtown Oklahoma City were damaged in the explosion. Helping plan for and respond to terrorism helps meet the National Security Strategy objective to "Enhance Security." Not only does the Nation benefit from the military involvement in recovery efforts; but, those activities provide real life training for mobilization efforts similar to those to which the Army would be expected to respond in a wartime mobilization.

Research and Development.

The Civil Works Program has, over the years, supported a very comprehensive and innovative research program encompassing a myriad of disciplines and aspects within the broad scope of the Civil Works Program charter. These many years of Civil Works-supported research and testing have produced excellent results which have made the Civil Works projects and associated operations and maintenance more cost-effective, innovative and safer.

The Corps operates four research laboratories, and lets contracts to universities and others for a sizable portion of its program. The Topographic Engineering Center (TEC), at Fort Belvoir, VA, does state-of-the-art research in mapping and charting, to include exploring applications for satellite ground positioning systems (used to position dredges when working on navigation channels), stand-off sensing (to check underwater channel conditions), and computer/satellite based terrain analyses. Currently, TEC is generating and producing maps and supporting operations in Bosnia with route reconnaissance, construction estimates, geographic information systems, and trafficability studies.

The Construction Engineering Research Laboratories (CERL), located near the University of Illinois at Champaign, IL,

specializes in construction technologies, energy conservation, and environmental operations. Many hasty construction techniques for buildings, hardstands, roads, and other facilities in the Middle East were CERL products.

The Cold Region Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL), in Hanover, NH, studies the effects of low temperature on materials, equipment, and engineer operations. This includes research on the effects of cold weather on tactical engineering. CRREL is providing cold weather construction and operation techniques for the Bosnia operation.

The Waterways Experiment Stations (WES) is located in Vicksburg, MS. As its name suggests, it specializes in water systems, but it also conducts research in soil and rock mechanics, earthquake engineering, coastal engineering, and weapons effects on structures.

Civil Works research and development provides the Corps, the Army, and the Nation with innovative engineering products, many of which have applications in both military and civilian infrastructure spheres. By creating products that improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the Nation's engineering and construction industry and providing more cost-effective ways to operate and maintain infrastructure, Civil Works research and development contributes to the National Security Strategy objective to "Promote Prosperity at Home." The military applications of this work contribute to the "Enhance Security" objective. In addition, Corps laboratories host hundreds of foreign visitors and engage in numerous joint international research projects. The contacts developed in this work support the National Security objective to "Promote Democracy."

SUPPORT TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The Corps of Engineers provides engineering support to 60 non-DOD Federal agencies, States, and local governments under the Support for Others program. Agencies often find that their construction programs can be more effectively managed with Corps expertise than by the agency's own personnel. Funds for this program are included in the appropriations of the agencies receiving support, and reimbursed to the Army.

Corps support of other agency infrastructure programs includes designing and building space launch facilities for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, managing embassy construction and security efforts around the world for the State Department and the United States Information Agency, and construction support for the Drug Enforcement Agency. The Corps also supports other Federal agencies in meeting important national environmental objectives, such as those of the Environmental Protection Agency Superfund and the Department of Energy cleanup at nuclear production facilities.

In FY 1996, the monetary value of the construction effort managed by the Corps was forecast at about $640 million.

Expected Federal agency requests for construction support in excess of $1,000,000 in FY 1996 are shown in Figure 21-4.

CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT FOR NON-DOD FEDERAL AGENCIES

Agency	Construction Effort
Department of Agriculture	$ 2,760,000
Department of Commerce	19,500,000
Department of Energy	47,110,000
Environmental Protection Agency	310,280,00
Federal Emergency Management Agency	19,430,000
General Accounting Office	26,000,000
General Services Administration	3,280,000
Department of Health and Human Services	8,360,000
Department of Housing and Urban Development	6,540,000
Department of the Interior	64,070,000
J.F. Kennedy Center for Performing Arts	13,500,000
Department of Justice	53,330,000
Department of Transportation	4,950,000
Department of Treasury	2,290,000
Department of Veteran Affairs	3,730,000

Figure 21-4

OVERSIGHT OF THE PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION AND TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

The Department of the Army plays a unique role among the Services in the implementation of the *Panama Canal Treaties of 1977*. These treaties require the transfer of the Panama Canal to the Government of Panama at noon, December 31, 1999, as well as the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Panama by the same date.

In 1989, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Department of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent for all joint fiscal and logistics aspects of Panama Canal Treaty Implementation, with a focus primarily on treaty provisions dealing with military forces for canal protection and defense. The same year, the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to establish an Executive Agent organization to carry out treaty implementation responsibilities. This organization, the Treaty Implementation Plan Agency (TIPA), is under the supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs).

The Secretary of Defense's charter establishing TIPA specified several key responsibilities. These include the release of U.S. property under control of the Unified Commander to the Government of Panama, review of the Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan (PCTIP) which specifies the timetable for and Service responsibilities during the force drawdown, oversight of major execution costs for DOD, compliance with national policy, treaties, and laws, and reporting progress to the Secretary of Defense.

In addition to the Executive Agent role for treaty implementation, the Secretary of the Army holds specific responsibilities regarding the operation and management of the Panama Canal itself. These include such functions as transferring property between agencies, establishing Panama Canal Commission (PCC) operating regulations, and overseeing the PCC employment, pay and retirement systems. The Secretary of Defense has also designated the Secretary of the Army to serve as the Secretary's representative to the PCC Supervisory Board, comprised of five U.S. and four Panamanian members. The Secretary of the Army has the authority to direct the vote of the other U.S. members. When delegated by the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary of the Army will fulfill the functions assigned to the Secretary of the Army by the Secretary of Defense relating to the Panama Canal Commission. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) provides support. Although the Panama Canal Commission is financially self-sustaining, the Army is involved each year with the process to obtain Congressional authorization for the Commission's general and administrative budget.

NATIONAL CEMETERIES

For over 125 years, Arlington National Cemetery has served as the Nation's best known place of public honor and recognition of the men and women who have served in the armed forces and given their lives in the Nation's defense. It also serves as the site of numerous important non-funeral national ceremonies. The Soldiers' and Airmen's Home National Cemetery, located in Washington, D.C., also provides a final resting place for those with military service. The Army takes pride in exercising its assigned responsibilities for operation, maintenance, and improvement of these cemeteries.

While the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) provides policy and program direction, the day-to-day activities of the cemeteries are the responsibility of the Commanding General, Military District of Washington, who executes these responsibilities through the Superintendent, Arlington National Cemetery.

The Army receives funds to operate these cemeteries in the Cemeterial Expenses, Army, appropriations account. These funds are included in the Department of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations

Act. The amount sought by the Administration in its FY 1997 budget proposal — $12 million — will provide for a continuation of the high standard of maintenance expected for these two important national cemeteries.

Since 1967, further development and improvement of the infrastructure at Arlington National Cemetery (ANC) has been based on a master plan prepared at that time. A new master plan is nearing completion that will provide a vision of the cemetery's priorities and needs well into the next century. The master plan will propose projects and policies to respond to the challenges confronting Arlington National Cemetery. These challenges include an aging infrastructure, declining availability of space for initial interment, and the need to preserve the dignity and serenity of ANC while accommodating over 4,000,000 visitors annually.

ENGINEER OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

In FY 1995, the Army Corps of Engineers supported U.S. foreign policy in 91 countries. Through the Africa Civil Action Program, assistance and support was provided to developing African nations to improve the construction expertise of their military engineers. In Central and South America, the Corps provided reimbursable engineering and construction support required to control the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics through the Counter-Narcotics Program.

As the DOD Construction Agent in many parts of the world, the Corps provides reimbursable design and construction services under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. FMS assistance is currently being provided to 10 countries in Latin America and the Middle East, with a total project value of approximately $1.03 billion. Working for the Defense Nuclear Agency, the Corps is supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction and Project Peace Programs with work in Russia, Belarus, Latvia (recently completed), and Ukraine. The work includes design assistance for nuclear storage facilities, a chemical weapons destruction program, environmental cleanup, construction of housing for former officers of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, and the removal of a radar facility. The current program is valued at approximately $152 million, with the potential for an additional $225 million.

The Corps is also called upon frequently to provide support for U.S. Agencies overseas. For example, new embassies for the State Department were constructed in a number of republics in the former Soviet Union.

Goodwill generated by international work sometimes pays unexpected dividends. In the 1970's and 1980's, a team drawn largely from the Civil Works Program managed the construction of billions of dollars worth of military and transportation facilities in Saudi Arabia, all financed by the Saudi government. The trust developed between the Army and the Saudi government was vital in reaching agreements needed for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The facilities themselves also played a key role. Troops and equipment moved through ports and airfields developed under the Corps program, and King Khalid Military City, near the Iraqi border, became a major staging center.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) provides program direction of the foreign activities of the Corps of Engineers, except those which are exclusively in support of U.S. military forces

overseas. Thus, he oversees Corps of Engineers' activities in all of these areas in support of the National Security Strategy objective to "Promote Democracy."

SUPPORT TO CINCS

Expertise in water resource development, flood control, waterway operations, dredging, coastal engineering, environmental stewardship, and disaster response supplement the skills maintained through the Army's military construction and installation support programs. This expertise is routinely called upon by the warfighting CINCs and by other DOD agencies, and is supplied by the Corps of Engineers on a reimbursable basis.

When the Army goes to war, personnel involved in Civil Functions provide timely information to the battlefield. Corps of Engineers knowledge of beach dynamics—including the Sea State Prediction Models developed at the Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi—help determine the sites for landings over the shore, while Corps expertise in soil mechanics determines the best routes for armored vehicles—often roads built using technologies developed in the Civil Works Program. Corps of Engineers work on winter navigation helps the Army cross frozen rivers. And, of course, commanders at all levels make use of topographic products and satellite-based navigation systems developed at the Topographic Engineering Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

People normally assigned to Civil Functions are available to deploy with the Army, and have done so in Grenada, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. They are key to evaluating and developing the infrastructure the force needs to enter and move about. For Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, more Civil Works personnel volunteered for deployment than the mission required. Especially noteworthy are the Contingency Real Estate Support Teams (CRESTS), who can deploy within 24 hours to acquire the troop housing, work space, hardstands, and covered storage areas the entering force will need. Also worthy of note are the LOGCAP contractor personnel who deploy with the force under contracts worked out in peacetime.

Other examples of how civil capabilities can be used to support CINCs include:

- digital mapping and soil trafficability studies for Central Command in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM;
- post-conflict cleanup of Kuwait, reestablishing utilities, and supervising repair of roads, buildings, and airfields;
- environmental and water resource assessments in Central and South America;
- river channel surveys in Bangladesh at the request of USARPAC;
- dam safety, disaster response, and water resource development;
- expertise for military-to-military contacts in European Command;
- archaeological support to the Army Central Identification Lab to help recover the remains of U.S. Servicemen in Southeast Asia; and
- coastal modeling to map optimum locations for logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti.

SUMMARY

The Civil Functions give the Army a valuable resource which contributes to the National Security Strategy objectives to "Promote Democracy," "Enhance Security," and "Promote Prosperity at Home." The valuable resources and training this program supports at virtually no cost to the Department of Defense is important to the Army. The projects, salaries, and manning levels associated with these functions are funded directly from Congress; consequently, they are not in competition with Army dollars or personnel allocations. Meanwhile, Civil Functions continue to provide the Army, as they have for nearly 200 years, a valuable tool with which to serve the Nation and its security.

REFERENCES

(1) U. S. Department of the Army, General Order #12: *Assignment of Functions, Responsibilities, and Duties within the Office, Secretary of the Army,* 30 August 1995.
(2) Public Law 84-99, *Amendment of Flood Control Act of August 18, 1941(Emergency Flood Control Work).*
(3) Public Law 91-611, *Flood Control Act of 1970.*
(4) Public Law 93-288, *Disaster Relief Act of 1974* (also known as *the Stafford Act*).
(5) Public Law 99-433, *DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* (also known as *Goldwater-Nichols*).
(6) Public Law 99-662, *Water Resources Development Act of 1986.*
(7) Public Law 104-46, *Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1996.*

CHAPTER 22

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

" . . . This is to simply say, personally and directly, how impressed I am with all involved in the public affairs aspects of "Operation Desert Shield" . . . I will stand on my record . . . of not blowing smoke and not giving unwarranted praise. But, you should know that everyone involved . . . strikes me as trying hard and succeeding mightily in striking a healthy balance between the public's right to know and military priorities. . . "

A letter to the Honorable Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, from Dan Rather, CBS News
26 November 1990

INTRODUCTION

Dealing with the media is sometimes difficult but nonetheless important. The achievements of our soldiers and the Army deserve recognition and, as the quote above indicates, are worth the expenditure of effort in the public affairs arena. The means whereby Army leaders account to the American public for their expenditure of the national treasure are manifold, but regardless of the venue — Congressional hearings, White Papers, speeches, post open houses, news conferences, etc. — all means involve some sort of communications. Communicating the success *or failure* of the Army's execution of its mission as well as the future needs of the Army to the American public is the primary mission of Army Public Affairs.

The terms "public affairs" and "public relations" are not interchangeable. Public Relations includes opinion research, press-agentry, product promotion, publicity, lobbying, fund-raising, special event management and public affairs. While public affairs as it applies to the Army includes the execution of some of these functions, it always carries with it an inherent obligation to the American people to provide them forthright, truthful information in a timely manner either as it becomes available (Active Public Affairs Policy) or on demand (Responsive Public Affairs Policy). The communication of this information to the American public is typically provided through the US news media. While the practice of Army Public Affairs should be planned and executed to present the Army's story—the story of America's sons and daughters in uniform—as favorably as possible, the need for *truth* remains paramount, and any attempt to withhold information from the American public simply because the information is unfavorable or could prove embarrassing to the Army is a breach of trust between the Army and the public it serves.

Public Affairs (PA) is also a command function and responsibility. The commander can communicate through a command spokesperson, but the success or failure of that spokesperson and the commander's public affairs program hinges on his support of and direct involvement in that program. No matter how good the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) is, he can never fully substitute for the commander in either the public's or his soldiers eyes.

While the commander's staff cannot substitute for him, they do, however, provide him specialized advice and counsel and assist him in the execution of the missions the commander is assigned. The Public Affairs Officer is no exception in this regard and serves as the commander's primary advisor with regard to communicating the command's messages to its internal and external publics. Together with his staff, the PAO formulates the command's communications — or public affairs — strategy as well as provides public affairs input to all operations plans and orders.

This chapter is designed to give senior commanders and civilian officials an insight into the functions and systems involved in the prosecution of the commander's responsibility to communicate the Army's story both directly and indirectly—primarily through the news media—to the American public.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Terms used in public affairs activities are both specialized and specific.

- Public Affairs — Those public information, command information and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (*Joint Pub 1-07 [Draft]*).

- Public Affairs Operations are a component part of a command's Information Operations as set forth in *FM 100-6*. Public Affairs Operations consist of three components: Public Information, Command Information, and Community Relations. These three components are not conducted separately. Every public affairs communications effort or plan should take all three into account as any communication, given today's technology, whether primarily directed at internal or external audiences, is likely to spill over to other groups of the public. Operations which consider all three components of public affairs have the benefit of mutual support during the execution phase.

- Public Information **-** Information provided to American and foreign publics through the civilian news media. The governing regulation for the Army's conduct of public information activities is *Army Regulation (AR) 360-5*.

- Command Information — Communication by a military organization with Service members, civilian employees, retirees and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization's goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of

the organization, and satisfies their desire to be kept informed about what is going on in the organization (*Joint Pub 1-07 [Draft])*. The governing regulation for the Army's conduct of command information activities is *AR 360-81*.

- Community Relations - Those public affairs programs which address issues of interest to the general public, business, academia, veterans and service organizations, military-related associations, and other non-news media entities. These programs are usually associated with the interaction between US military installations and their communities. Interaction with overseas non-news media civilians in a wartime or contingency theater will be handled by civil-military operations (CMO) with public affairs support as required (*Joint Pub 1-07 [Draft].)* The governing regulation for the Army's conduct of community relations activities is *AR 360-61*.

- Active Public Affairs Policy - Open dissemination of information to inform the news media and public about an issue or activity. An active approach is characterized by announcing the event or addressing the issue through news media advisories, news releases, personal contacts, news conferences, or other forms of public presentation. Such a policy encourages and supports news media coverage *(Joint Pub 1-07 [Draft]).*

Responsive Public Affairs Policy - A responsive posture by which no direct effort is made to initiate, or participate in, the public discussion about an issue or activity. When a responsive policy is in effect, authorities must be prepared to respond to news media inquiries about the issue or activity—to make brief statements to avoid confusion, speculation, misunderstanding or false information that may prevail if news media queries go unanswered *(Joint Pub 1-07 [Draft]).*

- Accreditation - Accreditation is the process whereby a sovereign nation authorizes a media representative to practice the journalism profession in that country. While the host nation may delegate the practice of accrediting media representatives to embassies or the military representing countries from which those media representatives come, accreditation is a host nation responsibility within a theater of operations. US military public affairs organizations typically credential or register media representatives from both the United States and other nations. The process of credentialing or registering media in a theater of operations allows public affairs organizations to account for the number of media representatives in theater as well as to distribute media ground rules for coverage of the operation and gain the agreement of the media representatives to abide by those

ground rules in return for access to and support from the military in theater.

- Propaganda **-** Propaganda is the practice of disinformation or misinformation designed to confuse or mislead an audience. By the nature of its relationship with the American public and as a matter of DOD policy, the Army is precluded from conducting any information operation that as a result misleads or deludes the American public.

ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS MISSION

Public Affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war.

Vision 2000: Public Affairs into the 21st Century, April 1994

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGIC GOALS

Vision 2000 is the capstone document for Army Public Affairs. It establishes a basis for modernization and provides an analytical framework for thinking about Public Affairs to identify Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel and Soldier (DTLOMS) issues critical to the future of Army Public Affairs. It lists eight strategic goals identifying the optimum conditions for the successful accomplishment of the PA mission. Attainment of these eight goals is the intent on which PA strategy development and operations planning is based.

(1) Accurately assess the information needs and perceptions of external and internal publics.

(2) Fully integrate PA estimates and recommendations into the planning and decision-making process at all levels and across the continuum of operations.

(3) Achieve open and independent reporting and access to units appropriate with the mission and national security.

(4) Expedite the flow of complete, accurate and timely information about the Army.

(5) Achieve a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information about the Army.

(6) Communicate the Army perspective to all audiences.

(7) Educate and train all leaders and soldiers on their PA roles and responsibilities.

(8) Achieve full integration of PA and related functional areas and institutionalize effective joint, combined and interagency PA operations.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS VISION

The PA Vision presented in *Vision 2000* also defines the critical parameters which the PA functional area must meet if it is to achieve the PA strategic goals and accomplish the PA mission in the evolving information communication environment:

A trained, readily deployable Total Army force of Public Affairs professionals, sufficiently resourced, technologically capable, and modularly organized to conduct operations in peace, conflict and war and maintain a timely flow of accurate, balanced information to the American public, the Army and other key audiences.

Vision 2000: Public Affairs into the 21st Century, April 1994

With advances in technology available to the media and our potential enemies, the need for the successful planning and execution of public affairs as part of the Army's future missions has never been more apparent. In an era of declining budgets and force structure, it has also never been more challenging.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS DOCTRINE AND PARAMETERS

The Constitution and First Amendment.

There is no mention of the press in the Constitution as originally drafted. The First Amendment reads only that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." As the First Amendment has been variously interpreted in the courts, the media today enjoy significant freedom to pursue their mission of keeping the American public informed of events they deem worthy of the public's attention. It is incumbent on the Army to participate actively in that process or be prepared to respond in a complete and timely fashion to queries when it consciously decides not to assume an active posture; otherwise, the media will tell a story about the Army without the Army's participation or viewpoint.

Freedom of Information Act .

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows anyone, including foreign nationals, to query the US government for specifically described records in its possession. The act requires the US government to respond in a timely manner to such requests, provide copies of nonexempt records, review the classification of records that have been classified to ascertain whether such classification still has a valid purpose and provide the requesting agency with frequent updates as to the government's progress in providing the records. DOD policy with regard to media requests for information known to be releasable under FOIA is to provide requesting media representatives with the information without requiring them to submit a FOIA request.

Privacy Act.

The Privacy Act is designed to balance the individual's right to privacy with the public's right to know. The more senior in rank an individual, the less "right" to privacy he or she may have. This is understandable in view of the amount of national resources entrusted to more senior officials. Items generally releasable concerning a soldier under the Privacy Act include: name, rank, age (date of birth), unit, hometown (not street address), education, awards, duty status, the results of judicial actions, board (e.g., promotion board) results and official photo. Items generally not releasable concerning a soldier under the Privacy Act include: social security number, marital status, race (which admittedly could be deduced from the official photograph), religion, investigative findings or the results of nonjudicial/administrative boards or actions.

DOD Principles of Information .

DOD Directive 5122.5 was published on 2 December 1993 and serves as the cornerstone for DOD policy with regard to providing information to the media. The policy requires a supporting role be played by Army Public Affairs. The directive's provisions are provided below:

- Timely and accurate information will be made available so that the

public may assess and understand the facts about national security, defense strategy, and ongoing joint and multinational operations.

- Requests for information from media organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out this policy, the following principles apply:
    - Information will be made fully available consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act will be complied with in both letter and spirit.
    - A free flow of general and military information will be made available without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their family members.
    - Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.
    - Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national and operations security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
    - The DODs obligation to

provide the public with information on its major programs and operations may require detailed PA planning and coordination within DOD and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propaganda or publicity designed to sway or direct public opinion will not be included in DOD PA programs.

Guidelines for Coverage of DOD Combat Operations.

In the aftermath of Desert Storm, representatives from the military and the media met at Wheaton, Illinois at the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation Cantigny Conference Series to discuss military-media relations as executed during the Gulf conflict. They hammered out nine principles which have served since then to define the media's role in covering DOD operations. The principles are published in *DODD 5122.5, Enclosure 3*, and are in italic text, below. The explanatory text following each principle comes from *Joint Publication 1-07 (Draft)*:

(1) *Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of US military operations*. Commanders should expect regular encounters with journalists who will show up in their assigned areas of responsibility and joint operations areas. Some of these reporters will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials issued by

the public affairs officer and, as appropriate, Geneva Convention cards. Others will merely appear and begin to cover the unit s story. Journalists not credentialed by DOD may not be given the same access as those who have credentials. Uncredentialed journalists should be encouraged to register with the Joint Information Bureau (JIB). In many cases, the journalists may not be accompanied by trained PA personnel. Local commanders, with the assistance of PA personnel, should identify shortages of escorts and provide training for non-PA personnel who will serve as escorts. Commanders must develop unit plans tailored to local conditions to accommodate reporters operating under this provision and issue guidance about what information and support they will receive.

(2) *Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity-within 24-36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage of journalists already in the area.* The formation of pools is an option for commanders as they prepare their PA plans. However, the use of pools should be limited to the earliest stages of an operation or to situations in which the presence of only a few journalists is practical. Commanders should realize that the formation of a pool places additional news media support requirements on the organization. In those cases in which commanders decide that news media pools are necessary, PA planning should include provisions for transportation which may or may not include reimbursement from the news media depending on location and availability of commercial transportation. Other news media representatives who are not members of, or associated with, the deployed media pool may be encountered. Plans must address measures for handling those reporters who are not members of the pool, but who appear in the joint operations area.

(3) *Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.* In such circumstances, public affairs plans should specify the number and types of media (including internal media) who will form the pool. The media representatives should determine who will fill the spaces in the pool.

(4) *Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the US military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect US forces and their operations.*

Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with US military operations. A public affairs infrastructure will include a JIB to serve as a logistical and information base for media relations operations. Journalists seeking credentials from the JIB will be asked to agree to ground rules tailored to the specific, on-going joint operation. In return, reporters will receive regular briefings and other information about military activities and access to the committed joint forces. Public affairs plans should also contain enforcement provisions to ensure the efficiency of the relationship. Central to this provision is the need for continuous dialogue between the joint forces and the news media who are covering its activities.

(5) *Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.* To ensure complete coverage of joint operations, commanders should plan to assist journalists to gain access to all unclassified forces which are participating in the joint operation, to include those based outside the area of operations. There will also be cases when access to special operations personnel will be desirable and appropriate.

(6) *Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.* The mission of individual PA personnel is to expedite the flow of information about the force and the operation through the civilian and military news media to both external and internal audiences and to help news media representatives understand and interpret the events and occurrences so that coverage is accurate and balanced. The goal is to gather resources to produce a responsive public affairs infrastructure to support journalists information needs. PA responsibilities include arranging access for the news media, preparing commanders and their units to accept news media visits, assisting in logistical support (i.e., communications, equipment, supplies, and transportation) for the media and providing timely information and explanations.

(7) *Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.* In many cases, the news media will be dependent on the joint forces for transportation support. To ensure the most complete possible coverage, commanders should provide dedicated transportation.

(8) *Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, and compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.* As with transportation support, commanders employing media pools are responsible for providing communications facilities for the priority transmission of news products prepared by the pool. Similar assistance should be provided on a space-available basis for those reporters involved in independent coverage. Commanders should understand the sophisticated communications capabilities available to the news media and recognize that early and regular discussions with the news media will help ensure electromagnetic operations security.

(9) *These principles will apply as well to the operation of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.* The support of the DOD National Media Pool is a priority mission for the joint task force commander. Besides the tasks outlined in these guidelines, commanders are responsible for transporting the pool into the area of responsibility and providing sustained equipment, communications, in-theater transportation, messing and medical support for pool members. Each plan should anticipate and include these provisions.

There were to have been 10 guidelines, but the basic disagreement over whether or not the military could institute some form of security review under certain conditions could not be bridged. When the news release concerning the nine principles was made, the Pentagon noted that "the military believes that it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of the mission." The statement also noted that security reviews would be conducted on a limited basis and as fairly as possible with the final release determination remaining with the news organizations.

For their part, the media organizations participating in the conference noted in an accompanying statement that:

"The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering US forces in combat must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives. News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary. We believe that the record in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam and other wars supports the conclusion that journalists on the

battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly. We will challenge prior security review in the event the Pentagon attempts to impose it in some future military operation."

Operational Security.

The media's desire to publish information as it becomes available and the military's desire to safeguard information that could compromise an operation are naturally at odds. While the media believe they are capable of recognizing such dangers themselves, their knowledge of military matters is not as extensive as the military would desire, and it is not getting better as a result of fewer and fewer journalists having had any firsthand military experience or being assigned a full-time military beat. It therefore becomes incumbent on the military to practice "security at the source" in dealing with the media and to establish clear, concise, intuitively understandable ground rules that the media can easily follow and abide by with regard to the protection of information that could have operational security considerations. The PAO will clear all information with possible operational security concerns with the operations staff prior to release. Should a journalist inadvertently gain access to information considered operationally sensitive, he should be so informed of the reasons why the information is considered sensitive and asked to observe an embargo on the information until such time as it would no longer be considered sensitive.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Proactive Public Affairs.

Effective Public Affairs interfaces with the operational planning process throughout the planning and execution of an operation. Public Affairs will already have developed a set of broad core communications messages for the command, which will serve as the basis for preparing the Public Affairs Estimate during the staff's deliberate planning process. A Public Affairs Estimate is prepared during the development of courses of action by the plans staff. It analyzes the various courses of action considered by the plans staff in terms of core audiences likely to be affected or interested in the operation, core media who will be able to reach and communicate the command's core messages to those core audiences, and the specific messages inherent in the various courses of action that support the command's core messages as well as individual events in the operation likely to demonstrate those specific messages both visually and through interviews with soldiers. The estimate will also detail media support requirements for the operation and begin the process of developing questions and answers, news releases, media advisories, etc., for the Public Affairs Annex to the Operations Plan.

The Public Affairs Annex to the Operations Plan is prepared in the same format as the basic operations order. It includes the estimate and other appendices such as fully staffed and coordinated questions and answers, copy points (a combination of core and specific messages), media support requirements, public affairs augmentation requirements (both Active and Reserve Component), contingency statements for use prior to the commencement of the operation, media ground rules (specific guidelines for media covering the operation), media advisories and releases as appropriate. In addition, the public affairs posture for the operation and commander's involvement in the public affairs plan should be briefly

detailed within the commander's intent and/or the command and signal paragraph of the basic operations order.

Part of the staffing and coordination process involved in preparing the Public Affairs Annex involves the preparation and submission through higher headquarters of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG) to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). The submission format for the PPAG is contained in *DOD Directive 5405.3* and consists of a recommendation for either an active or responsive public affairs posture, a contingency statement to be used prior to initial public release of information on the operation, a proposed statement for the initial public release of information on the operation and supporting questions and answers. Typically OASD(PA) will make initial release concerning the operation prior to the affected command's commencement of public affairs activities.

Responsive Public Affairs.

While proactive PA planning is essential to tell the Army's story effectively, there will be incidents that occur unexpectedly that will be of immediate interest to affected publics and require a more rapid response than the deliberate planning process will allow. In such situations, the PAO will be a full player in the command's operations center and will need the same ready access to the commander or his chief of staff as the operations staff. As information becomes available, the PAO must be prepared to respond to media queries. Although the command may decide initially on a respond-to-query-only public affairs posture, the PAO should still draft news releases and prepare for news conferences as appropriate. The coordination process for the deliberate planning process

should be followed as closely as possible during the time available to the PAO, although coordination with the next higher command and OASD(PA) will probably be done telephonically. Once a situation has stabilized, the command must decide whether to remain in a respond-to-query mode or whether to go proactive and preempt media interest by releasing information on its own. Should a news conference be appropriate, the commander, deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, chief of staff or other expert briefers should play an active role. The PAO can arrange for the news conference and run it himself if necessary, but in a crisis or its aftermath, the affected publics will look to the commander for answers and reassurance.

Information Operations.

PA is a battlefield function and has a direct impact on the conduct of operations. It must be fully integrated into the planning process at all levels and across the full spectrum of operations. Public affairs planners provide the commander and other staff agencies with essential information for understanding the current situation, anticipating future events, identifying and evaluating possible solutions, and developing plans and orders. A member of the PA staff will serve on the information operations battle staff. PA operations must be integrated into the battle plan, to include providing for the timely and accurate reporting of the operation to combat disinformation disseminated by the adversary. The activities of PA, psychological operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs all involve communication with critical audiences and will influence their understanding and perceptions of an operation. These agencies activities must be coordinated to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and synchronized so that

the messages communicated are truthful and mutually supportive. Only by such deliberate coordination will credibility with those critical audiences be maintained and overall mission success achieved.

ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS

The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs.

Title 10, U.S.C., paragraph 3014 establishes the Office of the Secretary of the Army and gives him "sole responsibility within the Office of the Secretary and the Army's staff" for public affairs. The office designated by the Secretary of the Army for the conduct of public affairs operations across the Army is the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (CPA). The CPA is responsible for the formulation, management and evaluation of public affairs policies, plans and programs for all components of the Army. He is responsible to the Secretary of the Army and responsive to the Army Chief of Staff.

The CPA has DA responsibility for preparing, coordinating and monitoring the worldwide implementation of Army public affairs strategies, plans, policies and programs for internal and external information. He has DA responsibility for:
- developing public affairs plans and programs to support other Army plans and programs,
- managing the Army's Public Information Security Review Program,
- managing the review and clearance of information for release outside the DOD by the Army Secretariat (OSA) and the Army Staff (ARSTAFF),
- managing the OSA and ARSTAFF public affairs program,
- exercising operational control over the US Army Field Band,
- exercising operational control over the Army Broadcasting Service, and
- serving as the proponent for all public affairs issues across the DTLOMS.

Additionally, the CPA supervises the Army Element of the Army and Air Force Hometown News Service.

TDA/Installation Public Affairs.

The installation public affairs officer can be either military or civilian. The grade of the PAO and size of his staff is dependent on the size of the installation, although the PAO is typically a lieutenant colonel or major equivalent. The installation PAO is responsible for assessing the information requirements of the installation and the surrounding area, including tenant activities of other commands (e.g., MEDCOM, AAFES, etc.); developing the commander's public affairs/communications strategy; and coordinating and executing public information (media relations), command information and community relations programs and activities for the installation. He serves as the installation commander's personal spokesman and is normally a member of the commander's special staff. He must also be prepared to coordinate DOD and HQDA media and community relations support as required on an area basis, to include casualty assistance support.

TOE/Unit Public Affairs.

Small Public Affairs sections are embedded in the headquarters of separate Army brigades, divisions, corps and echelons above corps. These sections provide PA support to the command and direct support

to subordinate PA units and sections. The PAO serves as the commander's principal advisor on PA issues and is responsible for developing communications strategies and campaigns in support of the command's operations. Personnel and materiel constraints require that these sections be augmented by separate PA TOE units, the vast majority of which are in the Reserve Component, for most operations.

Theater Army PAO.

An Army level PAO is a colonel serving on the special staff of the Army commander. The Army PAO is responsible to the Army commander for developing information strategies and campaigns in support of operations. An Army headquarters will typically be augmented by a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) should the Army commander be designated the Army forces (ARFOR) commander for an operation.

Corps and Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) PAOs .

A corps or TAACOM PAO is a lieutenant colonel serving on the special staff of the corps or TAACOM commander. When the commander is deployed as the senior ground commander for operations, the PA section will be augmented by a Press Camp Headquarters (PCH) and one MPAD for every three brigades in the task force.

Division and Corps Support Command (COSCOM) PAOs.

A division or COSCOM PAO is a major serving on the special staff of the division or COSCOM commander. When the commander is deployed as the senior ground

commander, the PA section is augmented by an MPAD.

Reserve Component Public Affairs.

The vast majority of public affairs assets are in the Reserve Components. This often requires the Active Component PA staffs to augment a Joint Task Force PA staff for the early stages of an operational deployment. Should no Reserve call-up be authorized, the Active Component PA staffs will likely be called upon to support the JTF for the duration of the mission. There are four types of PA units available:

Press Camp Headquarters.

The PCH is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and staffed by eight other officers and 19 enlisted personnel. The PCH has nine HMMWVs and audio-visual equipment sufficient to produce radio, television and print products for an internal audience as well as resources to credential, brief, escort and support visiting media. The PCH has a command section, an escort section, a briefing section and an audio-visual section. There are three in the Army National Guard and four in the Army Reserve.

Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD).

The MPAD is commanded by a major and is staffed with three captains and 14 enlisted personnel. An MPAD can support a division or corps headquarters or be broken down into five-man public affairs detachments (PADs). Their equipment and capabilities are similar to a PAD (see description below) but more robust. There is only one MPAD in the Active Component stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

There are 23 MPADs in the Army National Guard and 17 in the Army Reserve.

Broadcast Public Affairs Detachment (BPAD).

The BPAD is commanded by a major and staffed by two captains and 24 enlisted personnel. It is organized into two broadcast teams and a maintenance section. Its transportation assets include four HMMWVs, and its audio-visual equipment is sufficient for the BPAD to establish and operate field radio and television broadcast facilities. There are three BPADs in the Army, all in the Army Reserve.

Public Affairs Detachment (PAD).

A PAD is commanded by a captain and has one staff sergeant, two print journalists and one broadcast journalist. The PAD comes with its own transportation (two HMMWVs) and sufficient still and video equipment to produce print, radio and television products for internal audiences. The PAD typically supports a brigade-sized unit. There are 26 of these units authorized, 12 in the Active Component, six in the Army National Guard and eight in the Army Reserve. The majority of the active component PADs are located at divisions, but they are assigned and controlled by US Army Forces Command.

JOINT AND COMBINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)).

As established by *DOD Directive 5122.5*, the ASD(PA) is the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DOD public information, internal information, the *Freedom of Information Act*, mandatory declassification review and clearance of DOD information for public release, community relations, information training and audiovisual matters. The ASD(PA) is charged with developing policies, plans and programs in support of DOD objectives and operations and with ensuring a free flow of news information to the media, the general public and the internal audiences of the Armed Forces and other appropriate forums limited only by national security constraints as authorized by *Executive Order 12356* and statutory mandates. The ASD(PA) reports directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and acts as their spokesperson and the reviewing and releasing agency for DOD information and audiovisual materials to news media representatives. As a practical matter, the ASD(PA), or his designated representative, conducts regular news conferences in the Pentagon with the Pentagon Press Corps on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

Joint Information Bureau (JIB).

A JIB as the name implies is made up of Service members from two or more services. A JIB varies in size and composition in accordance with the requirements of the mission and the degree to which the different services are involved. The JIB director and deputy JIB director are typically colonels. The operations officer would be a senior lieutenant colonel, and ideally each of the sections would be run by lieutenant colonels. Typically, the JIB will consist of an Operations Section, a Media Response Section, a Media Support Section and Liaison Cells and Sub JIBs as appropriate.

The JIB Operations Officer and his staff are responsible for the preparation of PA plans, oversight of military-news media

communications and assessing published media products. A solid interface between the JIB s operations staff and the Joint Task Force s operations center is crucial to the success of the JIB s mission. The Media Response Section is the primary interface with the news media and responds to their queries, issues news releases, media advisories, etc. The Media Support Section credentials news media, assists in transportation and filing needs, arranges for unit visits and escorts, etc. The Liaison Cells are typically manned by interagency governmental organization as well as nongovernmental and private volunteer organization personnel as required. Sub Joint Information Bureaus are established as necessary based upon the area of operations *(Joint Pub 1-07 [Draft])*.

Combined Information Bureau (CIB).

A CIB is similar to the JIB in organization and functions except that staffing includes the full integration of allied or coalition personnel in the organizational structure. Oftentimes, when the contributions of two nations are relatively equal, co-CIB directors will be established. Depending on the ability of other nations to furnish staff for the CIB, some nations may be represented only by staff members in the Liaison Cell.

Pentagon Correspondents.

There have been media representatives at the Pentagon since the founding of the modern day Department of Defense in 1947. Some 20-25 journalists keep rent-free offices in the Pentagon, courtesy of the Department of Defense, paying only for their own furniture, telephones and office supplies. These 20-25 resident journalists as well as 75 others representing major wire services, newspapers, weekly news magazines, trade journals and radio and television networks are issued regular DOD Pentagon building passes that allow unescorted access to unrestricted areas inside the Pentagon. The practice is of benefit to both the media and the military in that news about DOD of interest to the public can be readily disseminated to correspondents who are already familiar with and reasonably well educated regarding DOD's mission, operations and structure. These correspondents are regular attendees at the ASD(PA) news conferences conducted on Tuesdays and Thursdays at the Pentagon.

DOD Media Pool.

DOD established a standing media pool in 1985 following the Grenada operation to balance the legitimate needs of the media in covering a military operation with the military s ability to support a reasonable number of media in the initial phases of a combat operation. Up to 16 journalists and three escort officers are on standby at all times and can be deployed on an exercise or an actual contingency mission. The journalists in the pool are rotated on a quarterly basis and typically represent several major newspapers, one or more wire services, a news magazine, one radio service, one television network and one or more still photographers. *JOPS Volume IV of the Joint Operational Planning Guidance* requires commanders to plan for the deployment of the pool as part of all contingency plans to include transportation, messing and billeting on a reimbursable basis, the issuance of appropriate equipment for an operation (e.g., helmets, flak vests, etc.), medical support as required and access to communications facilities to file stories on an expedited basis.

Combat Camera.

Combat Camera provides the combatant command or joint task force with the capability to acquire, process and deliver still and video imagery to communicate the force's mission to both internal and external publics, to enhance situational awareness for the National Command Authority and to document the mission for planning, legal, training or public affairs requirements. All services have combat camera units. A typical combat camera unit includes a headquarters, an electronic imagery section and up to three image acquisition teams. The J-3 establishes imagery collection priorities, and the images are transmitted electronically via the Combat Camera INMARSAT systems or other communications assets to the combatant command and the Joint Combat Camera Center in the Pentagon. After initial distribution by the center, the imagery becomes a long-term information resource that is electronically available across DOD in support of ongoing or future mission requirements. Although doctrinally aligned with the J-3 staff, Combat Camera products, after clearance, can be used to support the commander's communications plan.

MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS

The different media through which the news media present their work create different needs and expectations on the part of news media representatives in their dealings with the military. As in just about any military operation, timing is everything, and a basic analysis of media deadlines, requirements and abilities to reach the American public with the command's story can assist the commander's public affairs program as well as serve to better satisfy the media. Advances in communications technology today enable virtually simultaneous reporting from anywhere in a satellite footprint anywhere in the world. To cope with this new ability of the media, the military must be prepared to provide credible information in a format the media can use, the more so if the military expects the media to accept basic ground rules for access and support. Without this mutual coordination and understanding, the media will report what they see without the military's input, the end result of which will not likely be what the command intended to transmit as its message.

Television.

Television news broadcasts are typically pegged to specific times of the day. While a television station can interrupt programming for special announcements, such reporting is more akin to radio than television in that the voice is most likely the primary medium. Television thrives on video pictures, a script written to what the camera has seen and some carefully chosen 5-8 second "soundbites" from interviews conducted on camera with witnesses to the event, experts or participants whose words fit the video the cameraman has taken of the event. Long answers from commanders and staff officers rarely make it to the screen, so PAOs will recommend the use of copy points to assist commanders and interviewees in getting the command's message out in a format television will be most likely to use. Television is also a linear medium in that it broadcasts from a lineup of stories. This makes deviation during a live news broadcast difficult, although not impossible when "breaking news" warrants interruption of regularly scheduled programming. While CNN is more immediate and can and will likely be first on the scene, it too is hampered by the requirements of the television medium. CNN has more flexible deadlines in

reporting news of immediate national interest, although it too must make the decision when to interrupt its regularly scheduled programming like the other networks.

Radio.

Radio is the most immediate of all news media and the easiest to use. If the command has a story it wants to get out fast, radio is best suited for the mission. Live radio news broadcasts are easily changed even in progress. "Hot" stories can easily be inserted into normal programming. The voice is the only medium, and details from commanders or their spokespersons will get more air time than on television because the voice must paint the picture for the audience. A radio news desk is only as far away as a telephone line, and the story can be on the air within minutes.

Print.

Newspapers tend to follow strict deadlines to get their product to American breakfast or dinner tables. Reporters may be able to spend hours, even days with a unit before having to file their stories. The unit will likely garner more "space" in the articles by virtue of the attention the print journalist can give the story. The longer a reporter stays with the unit, the more attached he becomes to the unit, which results in more favorable coverage as a result of the reporter's increased understanding and appreciation for the unit's mission. Daily newspapers differ from weekly publications in terms of immediacy and pictorial requirements. Weeklies tend to want lots of colored pictures and will focus on more analytical, more timeless aspects of the mission, whereas daily newspapers focus on what has happened since their last deadline and will

settle for a good black and white photograph transmitted electronically. A reporter for a specific newspaper gives the commander access to one newspaper, whereas wire services such as Associated Press offer the commander and his PAO multiple access to the American public because many newspapers subscribe to the services.

Television News "Magazines."

In recent years there has been a steady growth in the number of television and radio news programs that entertain as much or more than they inform. The print media has always had some notorious examples of such journalism, and it is likely that commanders will see such print media on the battlefield as well as the newer radio and television media. It is likely that such media will be credentialed in theater, so the commander and his PAO need to be prepared to deal with them. The command's messages can be transmitted through a variety of media, and dealing with the entertainment media will require some imaginative work. While the commander should not deny access (thereby creating a story in and of itself), he should be prepared to prioritize his effort in supporting the media and has every right to pursue getting his command message out through media that reach the American public in a format that is credible and reflects favorably on the military and its operation.

Motion Picture Industry Support.

The Office of the Chief of Army Public Affairs maintains branch offices in Los Angeles and New York primarily to interface with the entertainment industry and networks headquartered in those areas. The offices assist radio, television and film professionals in all matters relating to the US Army. They serve as a local, authoritative source of

information about the Army and provide authentication, verification and limited research for producers, writers, property masters, wardrobe supervisors, film editors, etc. They also provide assistance and advice to script writers, including reviewing rough drafts and suggestions for changes prior to script finalization. Army's support of a project is contingent on scripts realistically portraying the Army and its personnel. These offices can also arrange for and coordinate use of Army equipment and supplies not commerically available, coordinate requests for Army's stock footage, arrange for and coordinate with Army installations or properties for location filming and arrange for soldier volunteers to participate in the project if requested.

SUMMARY

Advances in communications technology have made possible virtually simultaneous transmission of breaking news into the American living room. Technology has made news organizations such as CNN possible, which has decreased the dominance of traditional news organizations and increased competition for news and the attention of the American public. The elements of what makes news, however, have remained constant-and the American public is, as it always has been, interested in what happens to its sons and daughters in uniform, especially when they are executing an operational mission. The increasing number, variety and complexity of real-world operations in which the US Army has been involved since the end of the Cold War have attracted considerable public and media interest and will likely continue to do so in future. The Army has grown smaller, and budgets have grown even smaller. The Army's need to communicate its successes and future requirements has never been

greater, and the Army's ability to win on future battlefields will be hampered if the full spectrum of information operations-including public affairs-is not adequately addressed.

The need for operational security will always be of concern to the military; however, it should not prevent the Army from communicating in real time with the American public. With media able to transmit words, voice or pictures via satellites in future conflicts, the most viable solution to assure operational security will include the practice of security at the source, a clear set of ground rules accepted and understood by the media and honest interaction between the military and the media covering the operation. Maintaining OPSEC in this environment also implies that soldiers and their leaders are trained to deal with the media *before* the next conflict. The concept of security review has become a moot issue. It has not been practiced since Desert Storm, and the few conflicts between the military and the media during Desert Storm as a result of the security review process were resolved in favor of the media.

Gone also are the days when the commander could expect to provide information separately to his troops, the American public and the enemy. Information Operations involve civil affairs, psychological operations and public affairs messages that by definition overlap and that are picked up simultaneously by soldiers, the media and the enemy. The importance of consistency and truth in the message has never been more paramount, and the danger of miscommunication and the subsequent loss of credibility in a deception plan intended for the enemy's ears or in communications with a civilian populace equipped with pocket-sized, short-wave transistor radios that does not account for this overlap has never been greater.

Gone too are the days when the commander could expect his PAO to represent him with the media and stick to operational matters. The media and the American public who watch television, listen to radio and read the newspapers expect more, and public affairs has become an operational matter. It is conceivable that a commander could win the battle and lose the information war by excluding or attempting to exclude the media from his operations. What is worse is that excluding the media from an operation or creating ill will with the media during the operation means the Army's story goes untold or misrepresented, and the American public is allowed or even encouraged to lose sight of why they have an Army in the first place. So long as the US Army believes it has a role to play in the National Military Strategy of the United States, it owes the American public a look at how it is accomplishing the missions assigned it in the pursuit of that strategy's objectives.

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AAE	ARMY ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE	p. 11-8
AAFES	ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE	p. 12-7
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AAR	AFTER–ACTION REVIEW	p. 15-35
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