As was the case following the end of the Cold War, the Army is pursuing transformation to reorient its capabilities in preparation for the future multi-domain battlefield.
Like culture change, transformational change is hard. Both involve an important human dimension. Typically, culture change involves correcting attitudes and behaviors to reinforce existing norms, values, warfighting ethos, and attitudes. But transformation involves something else, a deliberate breakage from the past to instill a new normal–one that promises greater capability and success in the battlefield.
In 2025, transformation is a must. As was the case following the end of the Cold War, the Army is pursuing transformation to reorient its capabilities in preparation for the future multi-domain battlefield. Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George describes this as “transformation in contact,” because the Army must simultaneously transform while still engaged in current operations. Army Futures Command Commanding General Jim Rainey describes today’s transformation in contact as but one phase as the Army must also simultaneously exercise “deliberate transformation” to ensure longer-term development of leap-ahead weapons systems remain feasible and affordable.
However, what to break in order to make such transformations happen? And what does this breakage do to the psyche of the soldiers in the units whose capabilities are to be cast aside? It is these questions I recently confronted in contributing to transformational efforts in two different army commands. Each resulted in a general challenge, or peril, that transformational efforts face that might not always be salient to the leaders pushing for change. I will include a third peril at the end.
My experiences came in the form of two recent multi-day workshops, each related to large organizations undergoing transformational change at their level simultaneously with the on-going army transformation. In both cases, the efforts to deliberately break from the past produced some deep concerns and anxiety over what the transformation would accomplish. There was no disagreement that the transformations were necessary, and most welcomed it. But the process of crossing the line of departure was very uncomfortable. Below I will share themes relating to this experience that I believe are sufficiently common so as to warrant broader attention. For obvious reasons, I must obscure the details of these experiences.
Overcoming Emotion
One peril of transformational change, well-known to organizational scholars, are the many forms of resistance to change; some are quite understandable or even justified. In military organizations, letting go of some capability that has worked well in the past can be challenging. When there is strong emotional attachment to that capability, letting go is really tough.
I was asked to facilitate a week-long workshop based on my Capabilities-Based Planning Workbook. The command encountered the workbook when doing a search for how to do a hasty capabilities-based assessment without going through the long official data-driven approach that requires two years. The command had to get their arms around what future capabilities they needed to invest in today, and had major decisions to make within weeks. Time was of the essence.
As part of my orientation, I learned that this command had several capabilities that were better suited for Iraq and Afghanistan than large-scale contingency operations. Nearly all the participants agreed that rebuilding conventional capabilities was vitally important. But most found themselves unable to accept that it required divesting the old capabilities. Their stories justifying keeping the old stuff followed a recognizable script:
We were on patrol or doing some mission, when out of nowhere the enemy hit us! We were desperate but then we grabbed this capability. Because of it, we won the day.
This capability saved my life, my buddy’s lives, and my unit’s lives.
I know we need to transform and that the Army needs to invest in newer capabilities, but we need to get rid of something else instead. This capability was a lifesaver – we must keep it!
These quotations do not do justice to the actual expression of thoughts, which included choking up, struggling to find the words, eyes tearing, or fists pounding the desk.
As an outside consultant, my task was to help the command separate these deep emotions from the decisions facing them at that time. I did this through the analytical tools in the workbook that provided the hard evidence needed to make a sound, defensible recommendation. The capabilities-based assessment process involved table-top exercises and what-if scenarios that put the command’s current and future capabilities to the test against a determined enemy. The capabilities that these honest and forthright soldiers held so dearly did not measure up in this future fight, and other capabilities that all agreed were neglected because of Iraq and Afghanistan were of the highest priority to restore. Reason ultimately won the day, but it was not easy.
This is doubly true for changes where capabilities targeted for divestment are ones that are battle-tested and of which soldiers owe their lives or those of their buddies. The challenge for leaders is that the uncertainties of the transformed future may be too great to be convincing for those holding onto with white knuckles those now-obsolete capabilities.
Getting Beyond the Slogans
However, making the decisions to transform is but one challenge. Communicating those decisions to the force is quite another. After all, given that transformational change in general has a relatively poor track record, and many know it, how can leaders convince the force that the new capabilities will deliver the goods as promised when promised?
The answer is probably obvious, communication. John Kotter and other scholars have reinforced the idea that communication is key to successful transformational change. But are leaders always heeding that lesson?
My second experience of change management came in a workshop facilitated based on my Leading Change: Experiential Activity Workbook. The transformation in this instance was that a major community of practice was undergoing substantial changes in its duties, responsibilities, and processes. This includes retraining and reskilling a sizable workforce into new military specialties and instilling new types of expertise that the Army has not yet fully adopted. The organization wanted a workshop on how to lead and manage change for the mid-level leaders who would be the principal drivers of the transformation. Adding to the complexity of the task, this community of practice is large and globally distributed.
The command wanted the discussion to focus on actual problems. The fifty-odd participants broke into six groups, each looking at one of these specific problems holding back transformation. Some were structural, some procedural, some personality-driven, none were particularly unusual (at least in my experience). But as we went through the workshop, it was apparent that we were really dealing with six symptoms of the same problem. The transformation was not well communicated. The basic 5Ws were not being answered–exactly what the transformation was actually going to accomplish?
This fear of getting things wrong reflects a common pattern among other change efforts that I have witnessed in my military service and in advising or consulting since.
I learned that there was no shortage of communication about the ongoing effort. In fact, communication was regularly coming from the upper levels of the command, both down the chain of command and through mass communications such as social media. But there were problems. First, the message was not tailored for internal members. Instead, it was the same talking points being given to those outside the Army without any sense of how leaders would accomplish their goals. Junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers could not understand how the transformation would unfold and how it would benefit them. Worse, some mid-level leaders failed to pass on the message at all, leaving communication voids to be filled by misperceptions and myths. Workshop participants were more familiar with these emerging myths than the transformation plan itself.
Part of the problem was the higher command was still crafting significant parts of the plan while implementation had already begun. Mid-level leaders were therefore uncomfortable releasing too much detail out of legitimate fear that the situation could change and necessitate major changes to the plan. The results could include unnecessary confusion and frustration.
This fear of getting things wrong reflects a common pattern among other change efforts that I have witnessed in my military service and in advising or consulting since. Communicating the vision (such as Kotter advocates) is not enough to generate the kind of buy-in needed for a transformational change to succeed. The vision has to be presented in an actionable form so that the individual members (soldiers, civilians, etc.) can see themselves following the path to that desired future.
In other words, transformations need a concept for the change, expressing the ends and ways but not necessarily the means. The Army uses concepts to express basic ideas about future operations and how ground forces must conduct them, helping identify capability requirements, and enable modernization plans. Similarly, concepts are important for transformational change to communicate the purposes for transforming, explain the major actions (absent the details) that must be undertaken, and describe the measures of progress. Most importantly, good concepts explain how the force will make the transition from the old to the new ways. Typically in transformations, the old ways break before the new ways have formed into the new normal. It is in this middle space where members can become confused and disenchanted, then start retreating for the good old days. A well-communicated transition plan prepares members for those times of uncertainty and keeps them facing forward toward the goal while providing points of contact to report difficulties or showstoppers. Overall, the concept builds the buy-in necessary for success. If the plan must change—and transformational plans often do—it will become easier to explain what must be altered and why because the buy-in is already there. Also, mid-level leaders will understand better what authorities and responsibilities they will have so they are less likely to sit on their hands waiting for guidance. They take greater initiative at their levels either in the form of action or of raising questions when something appears to be going wrong.
You CAN Overcommunicate Change if the Message is Wrong
While Kotter correctly identifies undercommunicating change as a common problem, my own experiences raise questions about the prescription that one must therefore communicate more. This is the third peril, that commanders and change agents feel the need to keep pushing the same message ad nauseum in hopes that it will sink in after repeated hearings. In fact, popular leadership literature and bloggers emphasize repetition to overcome reticence or confusion and encourage others to internalize the message.
They assume the message is the right one in the first place and that members trust the leaders. That might not be the case, especially if the looming transformation seems threatening. Communications about change must be purposeful and should help members connect their actions to the pursuit of a better organization. If the leaders are themselves uncertain about some aspects of the change, that is okay so long as they can explain the path to the solution while being transparent about those uncertainties to enlist members to help. This will empower commanders to help keep their charges better informed and diffuse any misinformation or rumors that may arise due to a lack of information.
Tom Galvin is Associate Professor of Resource Management in the Department of Command Leadership and Management (DCLM) as well as the leadership and management instructor for the Carlisle Scholars Program. at the United States Army War College. He is the author of the monograph Leading Change in Military Organizations and companion Experiential Activity Book.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
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