EDITOR’S NOTE: In light of a recent open letter by eight former Secretaries of Defense and five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the War Room editorial team thought it was worth a revisit of this outstanding article by Alice Hunt Friend.
But what might the process of civilianizing mean, and what are the results? What is being gained, and what is being lost? What, in short, distinguishes the civilian from the military?
Currently, U.S. law requires that a former military officer must be retired from active duty for a minimum of seven years before she or he may become Secretary of Defense. The role was designated by the National Security Act of 1947 as a key part of civilian control of the military. Hence, there must be something about “civilianizing” that takes at least seven years before it is appropriate for a person with a career background in military service to take on the role of second in the civilian chain of command over the armed forces. But what might the process of civilianizing mean, and what are the results? What is being gained, and what is being lost? What, in short, distinguishes the civilian from the military?
In our national conversation about civil-military relations the term “civilian” is, as the academics would say, “underspecified.” Samuel Huntington observed in The Soldier and the State that although the bounds of the military identity are well defined, to be a civilian simply means than one is not a member of the military. Although we have a strong sense of civilians’ rank and role vis-à-vis the military in a democracy (civilians, as a group, control the military and therefore “outrank” them in an institutional sense), civilians do not comprise a profession in the way the military does, and therefore do not carry with them certain standards of conduct and expertise. Civilians are so diverse in their backgrounds, views, and responsibilities—and so numerous in comparison to the small number of those who serve in the military—that lumping them together for analytical purposes is only useful as a contrast to service in uniform.
But what makes a “civilian” in the civil-military enterprise is as important today as it has ever been, because the value of civilian control of the military is increasingly in question. Not only does the American public rate its confidence in the military higher than for any civilian arm of government, but military officers themselves increasingly wonder aloud about what Peter Feaver calls “McMasterism”— the notion that senior military leaders have the right and the responsibility to oppose civilian policy guidance they find unwise in their own professional judgment.
The current phenomena of public trust in the military and military distrust of civilian leaders are nowhere more evident than the debates that still rage over the identity and status of James Mattis, President Trump’s first Secretary of Defense and a retired four-star Marine Corps general. From the tendency of people to refer to him as “General” instead of “Secretary” to his insistence that he is following professional military etiquette in not commenting on Trump administration policies, his case begs a series of questions: Is a formal and legalistic break from the responsibilities of military service sufficient to make one a civilian? Or is there more to being a civilian than simply not being in the military? Are there skills, values, habits, or abilities implicated by a civilian identity? Is being a civilian a legal, professional, or cultural designation? In the defense context, does one become a civilian according to certain standards of experience and expertise?
These are important questions to answer if we want to evaluate the democratic balance of power between the civilian institutions of government and the armed forces. We also need to know whether there is something about senior civilians’ backgrounds or abilities that confers on them not just the constitutional right but also the capacity to control the professional activities of their uniformed colleagues.
First, it is important to distinguish between types of civilians—and, relatedly, between levels of analysis. The “civilian” in civil-military relations at the policymaking level connotes particular individuals occupying specified roles in the administration and guidance of, and the budgeting for, the military services and the defense enterprise. These roles appear formally in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, but also in civilian institutions, most notably the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress with its relevant committees. Such civilians are not simply those who are not members of the armed services; they have roles and responsibilities that involve them in the civil-military relations of policymaking.
Indeed, political experience is as close to a standard for higher office as there is.
Moreover, the civilians who are qualified to play a role in defense policy are a subset of the overall civilian population. While being a non-military, politically appointed government leader with (at least partial) responsibility for managing military matters may not make one part of a formalized profession, it is ideally associated with experience and expertise in both defense issues and domestic politics. There are discernable patterns in achievement and experience among those historically appointed not only to the cabinet, deputy, and undersecretary ranks at the Department of Defense, but also the National Security Advisor, White House Chief of Staff, and the members of House and Senate armed services committees. These men and women tend to hail from legal, business, or political backgrounds. Indeed, political experience is as close to a standard for higher office as there is. Leon Panetta, who served as Secretary of Defense, was professionally steeped in politics and the machinations of Washington bureaucracies from the beginning of his career. A political science major and a lawyer, he worked as a junior appointee in the Nixon administration and went on to be a Congressman and then Director of the Office of Management and Budget for President Clinton. The first White House Chief of Staff was an academic before joining the U.S. Conciliation Service, and later the Labor Department. Others were career political campaign staffers, like Kenneth O’Donnell, or businessmen, like H.R. Haldeman. Many of these men had military careers prior to their political lives, but on average their service was brief and their experience in law, business, academia, and especially politics was much deeper.
It is true that the range of backgrounds considered good preparation for these jobs is broader than the experience garnered by military service; but that is part of the value that civilians bring to their roles in defense and national security policymaking. Careers that prepare one for public office tend to fall under the categories of social science, law, and management. These are people who spend their lifetimes being educated in and practicing how societies and public institutions should be organized and resourced. They know about balancing extremely diverse interests, public relations, and personal relationships. They know about power not just in a material sense, but also in a social one.
Civilians inhabit the world of professional politics. And politics, as Clausewitz told us, provides the purposes for military action. In a democracy, the distinction between politically active civilians and apolitical administrative functions is by design. For no arm of the executive branch in the United States is this division between politics and administration more important than for the military. That is the reason a fundamental professional standard for the American armed forces is to be non-partisan, neutral to the political interests of those in the National Command Authority, the Congress, and society as a whole. Civilians in positions of political power are not only free to adjudicate among factional domestic agendas, they are responsible for doing so in order to channel political will into military policy. Should they fail to do so, the consequences are their responsibility, not the professional military’s.
Politics therefore comprises a civilian’s core knowledge base and skill set and separates civilian from military expertise. To argue that management of a hierarchical bureaucracy regulated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice scales up to political roles is to elide the differences between military technocratic administration and political leadership. A good politician may also be a good technocrat, but excellence in managing a bureaucracy does not automatically lend itself to excellence as a politician, for the bureaucrat defends a narrow set of expertise and interests, while the politician knows how to create equilibrium among many such priorities.
Operating politically is also not a career that allows for shortcuts to achieve true expertise. Although the barriers to entry in political roles can be less systematic than those imposed on military officers, many the most effective senior politicians earned their seniority by living through countless hours of budget negotiations, personnel decisions, political campaigns, constituent services and meetings, debates, speeches, testimony, fundraising, balancing favors and interests, giving media interviews, and the sundry other necessities of survival in the political arena. Political appointees coming from a technocratic background, such as the current Secretary of Defense, may have climbed the rungs of bureaucracies and corporations. Much like the military officer, a senior political official has seen the full spectrum encompassed by her profession; she has succeeded and failed and learned a great a deal from the fight. In short, the civilian cannot transform into a competent military officer overnight, but the military officer similarly cannot transmogrify into a politician mere months after retirement.
A century ago, sociologist and economist Max Weber wrote that politics is a vocation. Being a civilian in the civil-military relationship connotes not only the principle of civilian control, but also expertise that complements and guides that provided by professional military advice. The “civilian” in the policy-relevant civil-military relationship is therefore neither a mere functionary nor a neophyte whose judgment needs to be affirmed by a sort of military peer review. The civilian represents the expertise of another professional group—more diffuse, perhaps, and less systematically commissioned, but real and not only relevant to the legitimate policymaking process but essential to it. Civilians across the defense, diplomatic, intelligence, and legislative enterprises may not comprise a single profession like military officership. But the experience, skills, knowledge, and vision that civilians bring to their politically enabled roles in the civil-military relationship provide the military profession the context in which it is called to serve.
Alice Hunt Friend is Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Institute for Security and Technology. She is a defense policy expert and has served in several civilian roles at the Pentagon. Most recently, she was the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, where she aligned staff operations to the deputy secretary’s priorities, including technological innovation, enterprise data management and transparency, program and budget reviews, climate change resilience, and workforce health, equity, and inclusion She is working on a book project about civilians in civil-military relations, based in part on the ideas in this article.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Defense Secretary Jim Mattis talks with members of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment, also known as The Old Guard, during a re-enlistment ceremony at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va., Sept. 20, 2017.
Photo Credit: DoD photo by Air Force Tech. Sgt. Brigitte N. Brantley
Might we look a such things as civil-military relations; this, from the perspective of (a) the Old Cold War of yesterday and (b) the New/Reverse Cold War of today? For example:
a. In the Old Cold War of yesterday, when the U.S./the West was in “containment” (of communism) mode back then, the U.S./the West, back then, (quite logically?) saw (a) the more conservative elements of the states and societies of the world (those both within our own home countries and indeed elsewhere) as our “natural allies” and (b) the more liberal elements of the states and societies of the world (those both within our own home countries and indeed elsewhere) as our “natural enemies.” Whereas:
b. In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, when the U.S./the West is in “transformative”-mode now (in the name of such things as capitalism, globalization and the global economy), now the U.S./the West (again quite logically?) sees (a) the more conservative elements of the states and societies of the world (those both within our own home countries and indeed elsewhere) as our “natural enemies” and (b) the more liberal elements of the states and societies of the world (those both within our own home countries and indeed elsewhere) as our “natural allies.”
Bottom Line Questions — Based on the Above:
a. Given the dynamics that I portray — in my Old Cold War example above — did these such dynamics — in one way or another — undermine or otherwise alter proper U.S./Western civil-military relations during the Old Cold War of yesterday? Likewise:
b. Given the dynamics that I portray — in my New/Reverse Cold War example above — have these such dynamics — in one way or another — undermined or otherwise altered proper U.S./Western civil-military relations; this, in the New/Reverse Cold War of today?
At the end of my comment immediately above, I ask the following question (see my item “b” there):
“b. Given the dynamics that I portray — in my New/Reverse Cold War example above — have these such dynamics — in one way or another — undermined or otherwise altered proper U.S./Western civil-military relations; this, in the New/Reverse Cold War of today?
As to that such question, consider the following answer:
As the U.S. government generally — and indeed the U.S./Western military specifically — have worked and indeed are still working hard at achieving such things as diversity, equity and inclusion (this being thought of, by the U.S. government and by the U.S. military, as something of a national security priority); as the U.S. government and the U.S. military have worked toward these goals, many individual Americans — especially recently — have and are working equally hard at declaring such things as diversity, equity and inclusion a national security threat.
From that such perspective, approximately half of the country may see the U.S. military as being (a) diametrically opposed to their values, goals, objectives and beliefs and, accordingly, as (b) their natural enemies.
(Does this such phenomenon not qualify as a matter which has undermined — or otherwise altered — U.S. civil-military relations; this, in the New/Reverse Cold War of today?)
In the first paragraph of the “open letter” — by eight former Secretaries of Defense and five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — a letter which is referenced and linked at our article above — in this such letter, these individuals note — as the apparent cause of the “exceptionally challenging civil-military environment” that U.S. finds itself in today — such things as (a) “the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ramping up of great power conflict,” (b) “the pandemic and the economic dislocations (which) have disrupted societal patterns and put enormous strain on individuals and families,” and (c) “an extremely adverse environment characterized by the divisiveness of affective polarization that culminated in the first election in over a century when the peaceful transfer of political power was disrupted and in doubt.”
Of these three such suggest root causes, (a) the “divisiveness of affective polarization” this (b) seems to be the most accurate and the most troubling. This begs the question: What caused this such “divisiveness of affective polarization” to become manifest? The answer here would seem to be as identified immediately below. (Herein, focus in on term “revolutionary changes”):
“Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past.”
(See “The American Interest” article “The Reality of Russian Soft Power” by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
Based on the explanation provided immediately above, the appropriate follow-on question would seem to be: What caused the populations in the U.S. to have to undergo such “a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which were not to the taste of all their citizens?”
The answer to this such follow-on question would seem to be: The belief (which becomes manifest in the 1980s) that (a) economic competition would be the defining characteristic of the 21st Century and that, accordingly, (b) “the central task of the federal government was to increase the international competitiveness of the American economy.” (As to the quoted item I provide here, see Page 252 of Robert Gilpin’s “The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
In the Old Cold War of yesterday, the “revolutionary change” demands of communism — sponsored by the Soviets/the communist back then — this caused a “divisiveness of affective polarization” to become manifest throughout the world. In this such conflict, the U.S./the West positioned themselves as the champions of such things as “traditional values” and, accordingly, saw the more conservative elements of the states and societies of the world become our (the U.S./the West’s) “natural allies.”
In the New/Reverse Cold War of today, the “revolutionary change” demands of capitalism, globalization and the global economy — sponsored by the U.S./the West of late — THIS has now caused a “divisiveness of affective polarization” to become manifest throughout the world. In this such conflict, now it is the enemies of the U.S./the West who have positioned themselves as the champions of such things as “traditional values” and who have, accordingly, seen the more conservative elements of the states and societies of the world become now their (our enemies’) “natural allies?”
(Based on the explanations that I provide here, might we now return to the “civil-military relations” questions — that I ask at the end of my first/my initial comment above?)
B.C.
I’m having trouble accepting the basic paradigm Old Cold/New Cold War. While the geopolitical circumstances of any given situation affect the civil-military relationship, the core word here is “relationship.” The context of current world politics will illustrate opinions, but does not define them. Take the issues surrounding former Secretary (then CJCS) Powell and President Clinton. His “Powell Doctrine” drew lessons from Vietnam and the Post-Vietnam restructuring, but we’re designed for the post-Col War world. In effect, both of your paradigms played out in a single civil-military relationship. Even then the relationship aspect of the this is lost when the analytical variable is geopolitics.
Using the Powell example again, the relationship between Powell and HW Bush was much different than Clinton. There are personal, professional, AND geopolitical reasons for this.
This ultimately gets to the heart of The article. We focus on the generals, and the global threats and argue what should or should not have happened. Rather, a key aspect here is THE civilian. The qualities he/she possesses, experiences to that point, and relationship to the military writ large. I wish I could be as insightful as the author. I enjoyed this article when it was first published and found more in it reading it again.
J. Corless:
As to the civil-military relationship, might we see this in some larger context — larger than, for example, that which exists between the President of the United States and his/her Secretary of Defense? For example, such a larger context as is described below:
“3. Under the U.S. Constitution, civilian control of the military is shared across all three branches of government. Ultimately, civilian control is wielded by the will of the American people as expressed through elections.”
(See the “open letter” — by eight former Secretaries of Defense and five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — a letter which is referenced and linked at our article above.)
As to this such larger context — and specifically as relates to, in my example below, the branch of government known as the United States Supreme Court — might we thus — properly consider the following, also, as relates to the civil-military relationship?:
” … The chief thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court has embarked on a program of reshaping constitutional doctrine so as to encourage and facilitate the emergence of a fully developed Market State in this polity, with a view to positioning the United States to be successful in meeting the competitive challenges of a new, post-Cold War international order. In taking this course, the Court has increasingly aligned itself with the prescriptive views of American business and political elites, for whom globalization is understood ‘not merely [as] a diagnostic tool but also [as] an action program.’ From this perspective, globalization ‘represents a great virtue: the transcendence of the traditional restrictions on worldwide economic activity .., inherent inherent’ in the era of Nation States. Proponents of this vision of a globalized economy characterize the United States as ‘a giant corporation locked in a fierce competitive struggle with other nations economic survival,’ so that ‘the central task of the federal government’ is ‘to increase the international competitiveness of the American economy.”
(See the only full paragraph on Page 643 of the 2005 Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law paper “Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court’s Vision of Police Power in the Age of Globalization” by Antonio F. Perez and Robert J. Delahuny.)
Addendum: The following, also from the Catholic University of America paper that I reference above (in this case, see beginning on Page 698); this, also, may prove useful to this discussion.
In this regard, note how — as described below — the political, economic, military, etc., professionals — of the United States during this time — note how nearly ALL of these folks (a) appear to totally agree with one another and, indeed, (b) appear to be on the exact same “achieve revolutionary change” (so as to maintain nation security in the age of economic competition) page:
“Even more telling than its use of elite opinion in ‘Lawrence’ was the Court’s unembarrassed reliance on elite views to determine the scope of a highly contested constitutional anti-discrimination norm in “Grutter.” Relying extensively on amicus briefs submitted by elite corporate, military and educational professionals, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, asserted the following:
‘Major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘[based on their] decades of experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps … is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security. …’ “
With regards to the arguments and information that I provide in my comments above, might we agree that — for both America’s civilian and military personnel — who operated anywhere within the period of the late 1980s until very recently — (a) the “battlefield” was often seen as that which was related to economic competition and that, accordingly, (b) various political, economic, social and/or value changes — considered necessary so as to “win” on this such economic “battlefield” — these were often considered to be (1) consistent with history (capitalism allows one to “win;” something else doesn’t) and, thus, were considered to be (2) changes that we must embrace, accept and, indeed, must “get behind?”
History also shows us, however, that — at times like these — those who might lose power, influence and control via capitalism’s required changes, these folks can, at least for a time, (a) win elections and, thereby, (b) undermine a nation’s ability to win on the economic battlefield (this, by failing to embrace necessary “change”):
“Jacksonians drew their support from Northern laborers and yeoman farmers in the South and in the West. These groups, which Jackson dubbed the ‘bone and sinew of America,’ worried that the market economy would force them into the dependent class. The Jacksonians told the farmers and the laborers that they would do everything in their power to prevent this from taking place. In essence, the men and their rank and file voting allies, along with Jackson, fought a rear-guard action against encroaching industrialization and market economy. Although they won the pivotal battles, they lost the war, because their notion of a pre-capitalist agrarian society succumbed to the industrial economy after the Civil War.”
(See the ‘Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History’ by Andrew Robertson, et al., and the section therein entitled ‘Jacksonian Democracy,’ Page 194.)”
“Republican leaders will have to acknowledge that market capitalism is not a religion. Market capitalism is a tool, like a staple gun or a toaster. You’d have to be a fool to worship it. Our system was created by human beings for the benefit of human beings. We do not exist to serve markets. Just the opposite. Any economic system that weakens and destroys families is not worth having. A system like that is the enemy of a healthy society. — Tucker Carlson, Fox News, January 2
(See the May 2nd, 2019 American Enterprise Institute (AEI) – National Review — article “Will the Right Defend Economy Liberty?” by Jonah Goldberg.)
Bottom Line Question — Based on the Above:
In situations such as these, how did/does civil-military relations fare? (Much as they did after Andrew Jackson’s time?)