Even as China’s military capabilities are rapidly advancing and its determination to achieve reunification appears to be hardening, the military ability and desire of the United States to defend the island are increasingly in doubt.
Credibility—having both the power and will to use it—is essential to coercion and deterrence. Yet in relation to Taiwan, the trajectories of China and the United States are diverging. Even as China’s military capabilities are rapidly advancing and its determination to achieve reunification appears to be hardening, the military ability and desire of the United States to defend the island are increasingly in doubt. Even a wargame that found the United States could prevail cast doubt about whether the cost would be worth it, particularly when reunification is such an important issue for the Chinese Communist Party. Geographic distance and policy asymmetry seem to fatally undermine U.S. deterrence.
The challenge echoes a paradox that strategic thinkers confronted during the Cold War—that in an age of devastating weapons, stability might emerge not from absolute control, but from carefully managed uncertainty. This apparent contradiction lies at the heart of one of the most influential frameworks in deterrence theory. In a 1959 internal paper at RAND, subsequently published in his 1966 book Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling advanced a counterintuitive proposition: that introducing an element of chance into strategic threats could make them more credible and therefore more effective at preventing conflict. Now, nearly sixty years later, as the United States seeks to deter Chinese aggression without triggering a catastrophic war, Schelling’s concept of a “threat that leaves something to chance” offers a compelling solution to perceptions of eroding U.S. credibility. This essay illuminates how a threat that leaves something to chance could positively affect key escalation pathways by altering the perceptions and beliefs of Chinese leaders, even while acknowledging the limitations and potential instability of such an approach to deterrence.
The Paradox of Uncertainty
Schelling asserted that a threat which intentionally leaves the final decision up to chance can sometimes serve as a more effective deterrent than a carefully controlled, direct threat. The inherent unpredictability and risk of uncontrolled escalation in a potential U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan could paradoxically exert a strong restraining effect on both sides, even if the underlying conditions for such a war exist.
A threat that leaves something to chance introduces an element of risk and unpredictability, raising the potential costs of action by creating the possibility that events could spiral out of control in catastrophic and unintended ways. The core assumption in this scenario is that China might feel emboldened to attempt a forceful takeover or coercive campaign against Taiwan if its leaders believe that they possess the military capability to achieve a swift victory and that the United States would be unlikely to mount an effective intervention. Other variables could increase the risk of conflict: a continued lack of clarity around the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, opposing “nationalist” sentiments on both sides of the strait, Chinese overconfidence, and a United States distracted by other crises or priorities. While a comprehensive examination of each of these variables is beyond the scope of this discussion, and there is fierce debate among critics regarding the relative weight of each, it’s sufficient to note that these and other factors are relevant both to a potential decision by China to attack Taiwan and to the effectiveness of any deterrence strategy relying on uncertainty.
One of the primary ways a threat that leaves something to chance could deter China is by elevating the risk of uncontrolled military escalation. Even if China’s leadership believed they held a commanding local military advantage and could swiftly overcome Taiwan’s defenses, they would still need to weigh the danger that a war could inadvertently expand to include the United States and its allies. In the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the United States might feel compelled to intervene to affirm the credibility of its security commitments to allies and partners. In this case, intervention could lead to a direct clash between the American and Chinese militaries. Such a confrontation could then escalate horizontally across the region, as an attack against Taiwan would threaten the security of key US allies like Japan and South Korea, possibly inducing them to enter the conflict.
While horizontal military escalation is possible, the risk of vertical escalation to the nuclear level is the nightmare scenario that China (and everyone else) deeply fears and has long sought to avoid. Such an escalation would be highly unpredictable and non-linear. It would depend on a complex interplay of chance, miscalculation, and the uncontrollable pressure of events once hostilities begin. It is precisely this uncontrollable danger, the fact that so much would be left to chance in an incredibly high-stakes situation, which could deter China from attacking Taiwan in the first place, even if it maintained favorable odds in a purely localized conflict. The prospective costs of a war over Taiwan spinning out of control and igniting a nuclear exchange would be so severe that even a low probability of this occurring could be sufficient to stay Beijing’s hand.
Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggests a continuing American emphasis on deterrence and an aversion to nuclear warfighting. This is no different than the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which may be a more relevant guide under the new Trump administration. Both documents leave the door open for nuclear threats and even limited nuclear use as a means of controlling escalation and defending key interests in a crisis, a posture largely consistent with Schelling’s concept of a threat that leaves something to chance. The 2022 NPR and 2018 NPR both emphasize the need for a “flexible” U.S. nuclear force posture, but the 2022 NPR is more direct in linking a flexible nuclear posture to effectively deterring China, highlighting the growing challenge posed by China’s ambitious nuclear modernization and diversification efforts. According to the 2022 NPR, these efforts could allow China to “include nuclear coercion and limited nuclear first use” in its strategy, underscoring the real and growing risk of deterrence failing and a conventional conflict escalating to the nuclear level. At the same time, both reviews state that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter, not fight, a nuclear war. The DoD has therefore recognized the complementary role of non-nuclear capabilities in shaping adversary perceptions and decision-making.
The outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait would almost certainly trigger severe disruptions to the regional and global economy, as the war could sever critical trade routes and supply chains.
In addition to horizontal and vertical military escalation, the internal political and economic consequences of a Taiwan conflict could further deter China. The outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait would almost certainly trigger severe disruptions to the regional and global economy, as the war could sever critical trade routes and supply chains. Such a shock would damage China’s export-dependent growth model, likely plunging the country into a painful economic crisis with sweeping domestic social and political ramifications. There is also a risk that mobilizing the Chinese people for a war against Taiwan could backfire on the Chinese Communist Party if the conflict were to go badly, or if it were to impose excessive hardships on the population. These economic and domestic political variables could be difficult for Chinese leadership to anticipate or control. While perhaps not as decisive on their own as the fear of military escalation, these additional sources of unpredictability and non-linearity in a Taiwan conflict would further compound the overall deterrent power of a threat that leaves something to chance.
At the same time, Schelling’s concept is not a foolproof deterrent, and its applicability to a Taiwan scenario would depend heavily on the perceptions and beliefs of China’s top decision-makers. For a threat that leaves something to chance to reliably deter, those leaders would need to see the potential for uncontrolled escalation as real and see it as intolerably dangerous to China’s core national interests. The less Chinese leaders fear the consequences of a widening war, or the more confident they are in their ability to manage escalation and achieve a quick, relatively painless victory, the less effective Schelling’s logic of deterrence will be. Some analysts have even flipped the script, arguing that a risk-acceptant China could attempt to leverage the threat of deliberate escalation, such as threatening to strike the US homeland, to coerce Washington into backing down during a crisis.
Logical, Unsatisfying, and Terrifying
There are many ways the United States and China could find themselves in a military confrontation over Taiwan. Schelling’s concept of a threat that leaves something to chance suggests that the sheer unpredictability and potential for uncontrolled escalation in such a conflict could still restrain both countries. The mere prospect that an initially limited clash could erupt into a devastating regional war or even a nuclear exchange might be enough to induce caution and restraint in both Beijing and Washington, even if one side or the other believed it enjoyed a military advantage. In a world of destructive uncertainty and existential danger, it may be the very threat that leaves something to chance that offers the best hope for stability.
Let’s be clear, though: deterring China with the threat of uncontrolled escalation is a deeply unsatisfying and ultimately unsustainable strategy. It’s a terrifying proposition, asking us to rely on the subjective calculus of cost and risk on both sides, and especially on the attitudes and assumptions of China’s top leaders. While Schelling’s framework provides invaluable insights into the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of deterrence, it does not offer a guaranteed solution for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The urgent question remains: what viable alternatives are there?
Kristofer Seibt is an Army Strategist assigned to Headquarters, Department of the Army. He previously served as an international history instructor at the United States Military Academy. He holds a B.A. in History from Providence College and an M.A. in European History from Columbia University.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: View of Taipei, Taiwan skyline from Elephant Mountain in January 2019.
Photo Credit: 台湾でSamuel in Taiwan via Wikimedia Commons
