BELARUS’S TURN TO THE WEST: STRATEGIC REALITY OR FANTASY?

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article was written before the current situation unfolded on the Ukraine border and obviously without the insights of that situation. The Editorial Team thought it useful to publish this piece without adding additional information about the pending invasion to demonstrate the part Belarus has historically played in the region and to present further insight as to its current role.

Western involvement in Belarus would cross a Russian redline, particularly as Belarus and Russia become ever more economically, militarily, and politically integrated. 

Following the contested Belarusian election of August 2020, a range of pundits, journalists, and scholars suggested the ensuing pro-opposition rallies not only signaled Belarusians’ wish to remove President Aleksandr Lukashenko, but also their push to align with the West. The demonstrations, along with Lukashenko’s 2021 hijacking of a Ryan Air passenger flight to arrest opposition leaders, sparked European Union (EU) and U.S. calls to support Belarus’ democratization. Though Western audiences may see a path for democratizing Minsk, and Belarusian opposition parties may want to capitalize on any near-term intervention by Washington or Brussels, such largesse could raise Ukraine and Georgia’s hopes of greater Western support – and raise even further the present risk of conflict with the Russian Federation.

Western involvement in Belarus would cross a Russian redline, particularly as Belarus and Russia become ever more economically, militarily, and politically integrated. Under these circumstances, the United States should view promoting Belarusian democracy with caution. Russia values its investment in this ‘near-abroad’ state as a vital national interest. To avoid confrontation with Moscow, the West must focus its intentions towards Belarus on dialogue with Russia. Talks could include crisis management discussions as well as past events such as the diverted airline flight and dissidents’ arrests. Further actions could broach rights of self-determination and rule of law, while concurrently enforcing anti-corruption sanctions aimed at Lukashenko’s regime. 

When Kyiv shifted westward, economic and military benefits quickly materialized.

Russia’s Relationships with Its Neighbors

During his April 2021 State of the Nation address, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew redlines around perceived Western incursions into Russia’s imagined sphere of influence. Putin’s fear of democracy’s eastward expansion has reinforced his desire to dominate Russia’s near-abroad. In his speech, he underscored his disdain for the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, which toppled Ukraine’s pro-Moscow regime and turned Kyiv toward the West. He also drew parallels between Ukraine and the current political unrest in Belarus, hinting at redlines to deter Western involvement there.

Over the past 15 years, Russia’s military has responded to several perceived threats to Kremlin interests along the Federation’s periphery. Beyond their political utility, such operations hone Russia’s military proficiency. Learning from each iteration, Russia’s tactics have transitioned from overt military actions to more underhanded ones. Whereas Putin’s 2008 invasion of Georgia relied on conventional military forces, his 2014 Ukraine incursion took a more subversive approach. Actions there included infiltration by insignia-free, so-called “little green men,” who captured Crimea without a shot and destabilized the Donbas.

Far from locking former Russian satellites down, Moscow’s military and gray zone activities in them may instead push them further westward. Since suffering territorial insults at Moscow’s hands, both Tblisi and Kyiv have pursued Western military and economic integration even harder, rather than curtailing either. Both have since forged Western ties which allowed for the development of their militaries and economies. Even Russian-aligned states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan had tepid reactions to Russia’s military operations and territorial annexation, with both states calling for a diplomatic resolution and the maintenance of territorial integrity. Any comparable Russian military intervention in Belarus would further threaten Putin’s attempts to form a commonwealth to compete against the West.

For now, Moscow desires long-term political and economic integration with Minsk. Based on past results, Russia seems hesitant to use aggressive methods in Belarus. Rather than rely on overt military intervention, the Federation has sought slow and continuous integration with its target. For example, the past 26 years have seen Belarusian language marginalized in favor of Russian, with 90% of Belarusian children attending Russian-language schools. This follows not only decades of Soviet influence and Lukashenko’s 1990s-era policy of mainstreaming the Russian language, but also external Russian influence. Russian media groups tied to Moscow’s security apparatus were convicted by a Belarusian court of inciting ethnic discord after they openly mocked the use of Belarusian.

While Russian and Belarusian leaders claim that a formal merger of the two countries is “far-fetched,” outside commentators point to indications of a soft annexation. Military exercises such as ZAPAD 2021 on Belarus’ soil reminded its people of Russia’s grip on their state. Other continuing pressures on Belarus, in the form of financial aid, propaganda, and security assistance also strengthen Moscow’s leverage.

Despite Russian soft power and Moscow’s close ties with Minsk, the Putin-Lukashenko relationship has been strained since Lukashenko’s 2014 signaling of his openness to Western integration. Additionally, in 2017, disagreements over natural gas arrangements and Russian basing rights in Belarus further soured relations. Projecting an air of independence, Belarus thwarted Putin’s efforts to permanently base Russian troops in his state. Future turmoil could create conditions that test Moscow’s willingness to rely on a soft power approach.

The stamina and resilience of Belarusian opposition protests in the midst of brutal internal crackdowns convinced some observers of the potential for a national awakening in that country and the possibility of its independence from Russia. The reinvigorated Belarusian national identity of the past several years challenges Russia’s soft power approaches toward integration. Perceiving such strains, the West might see an opportunity for intervention. 

Opportunities and Risks for the West

Ukraine and Georgia offer precedents of states with pro-democracy movements that toppled pro-Russian regimes then deepened their economic and military integration with the West. Given popular disenchantment with autocratic rule, Belarus might seek similar opportunities with the West. When Kyiv shifted westward, economic and military benefits quickly materialized. Since 2014, for example, Kyiv has offered the West raw materials, with trade in these increasing by 48%. This relationship expanded in other ways, including defense cooperation initiatives such as the Joint Working Group on Defense Technical Cooperation. 

Similarly, Georgia reinforced its alignment with the West. Significant inroads towards democratic reform enhanced its consideration for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Georgia has strengthened security dependence and interoperability with NATO through participation in multiple military operations, to include the Georgian Defense Readiness Program, the Memorandum on Deepening Security and Military Cooperation, and agreements with NATO for international training. Beyond security initiatives, the relationship between Georgia and the West has grown with the establishment of non-profit organizations such as American Friends of Georgia (AFG) which seeks to strengthen Georgia’s education, healthcare, and social services sectors.

Might the same Western-leaning result occur with Minsk? Some commentators speculate that a reorientation of Belarus would offer gains similar to Georgia and Ukraine’s. Incorporating Belarus into the West, however, would necessitate substantial economic assistance for a new regime. Minsk has a stagnated economy which has relied on Russian support since the 1990s. The Belarusian economy is highly dependent on Moscow for energy and since 2015 has tied itself to the East’s Eurasian Economic Union. Owing to its unfavorable investment climate, Belarus lacks non-Russian foreign investment. Substitutions for Moscow’s subsidies and economic institutions would require heavy direct investments from the West — a tough sell in a world recovering from COVID-19’s economic setbacks.

Another impediment to pulling Minsk into the Western fold is Russia’s security perception. It hinges on a stable and friendly near-abroad, and on the West’s not luring Belarus toward EU or NATO membership. As Brendan Chrzanowski points out, Moscow’s ontological perception of security will entrench Russia even more against the West if Belarus follows Tbilisi or Kyiv’s path. As seen in Crimea in 2014, Russia especially values its near-abroad states which host its military installations.

As it does in Ukraine, Russia bases several military assets on Belarusian territory, including an integrated air defense system. This echoes the arrangement in Sevastopol, Crimea, where Russia moors its Southern Fleet. Should Moscow fear a loss of access in Belarus, it would react as it did in Ukraine to secure Russia’s critical military infrastructure. Moscow might even react beyond its periphery, with subversive action against Western interests, using cyberattacks or hybrid operations. Any offense against a Russian vital interest may elicit an affront against a similarly valued Western interest.

For now, Belarusian enthusiasm for Western involvement has cooled, even among pro-democracy figures. Though thankful for outside support, opposition leaders in the August 2020 presidential election, such as Maria Kalesnikava, prefer Western help to establish dialogue with the current regime, rather than trying other forms of intervention. Of note, she affirmed the importance of good relations with Russia, should any change in its government occur.

Strategic leaders and analysts in the United States vary in their recommendations for action. Daniel Fried, the former U.S. ambassador to Poland, strongly suggests Washington use its leadership to support the Belarusian opposition. Such help would directly support President Biden’s interim guidance for a U.S. National Security Strategy, with the aim of revitalizing democracy worldwide. A clear westward reorientation of Belarus, however, would incur heavy risks.

Belarus remains among the states most economically and culturally aligned with Russia. Attempts to draw Belarus westward would pose an unacceptable political blow to Putin’s regime and would incite a Russian defense of its vital interests in its near-abroad. To temper Moscow’s reaction, the United States, as the West’s leading power, should lobby its Western partners to focus their efforts in Belarus on anti-corruption measures, such as targeted sanctions, to avoid punishing its people. Such measures should first be communicated to Putin, to avoid crossing Moscow’s redlines. Yet, should Russia threaten Western interests with attacks on its infrastructure or on the rule of law, Russia should be on notice that the West can always offer former Russian satellites such as Belarus an escape.

Joseph Pruce is a Commander in the U.S. Navy and a graduate of the AY21 Resident Class at the U.S. Army War College.

Thomas “Ted” Putnam is a Colonel in the U.S. Army and a graduate of the AY21 Resident Class at the U.S. Army War College.

Andrew Vidourek is a traditional guardsman and Lieutenant Colonel in the Oregon Army National Guard with multiple deployments to Iraq. He is a licensed geologist in the state of Washington. He is a graduate of the AY21 Resident Class at the U.S. Army War College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: President of Russia Vladimir Putin meets with the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) Summit 2015.

Photo Credit: Press Service of the President of Russia