Russian innovations with short/medium-range hypersonic weapons present the main challenge to the United States.
As the conflict in Ukraine continues into its fourth full year of full-scale war and with the entrance of a new U.S. presidential administration, the security environment for the United States vis-à-vis Russia has changed rapidly. Russian lessons learned, strategic innovations, and battlefield successes and failures have generated new challenges that will threaten U.S. national security in the near term. Within this article, a strategic threat is defined as a factor that denies or mitigates the United States’ ability to employ its current warfighting doctrine, conduct combat operations, or effectively protect its allies. Despite the recent focus on Russian ground operations, in the next 3-5 years, the most prominent Russian strategic threats to the United States will be advancements in hypersonic technology, Russia’s use of its regional and global partnerships to bolster munitions production, and Russia’s leveraging of partnerships to expand its geographic advantage. Also, Russia’s massed offensive maneuver capability will remain a challenge but likely will decrease over the next 2-3 years as the Russians seek to reconstitute their losses.
Emerging Threat #1-Advanced Weapons Development: Hypersonic Missiles
Russian innovations with short/medium-range hypersonic weapons present the main challenge to the United States. These weapons can destabilize the current offense-defense balance that informs the military strategy for both the United States and Russia. The new Russian Khinzal and Zircon hypersonic missiles can defeat U.S. and European air defenses not only through the massing of effects, supported by Russia’s increased production rates, but also due to the weapons ability to maintain its radar defeating plasma layer through the terminal phase when striking static targets. This capability would tilt the offensive advantage in favor of Russia, which could conduct strikes on strategic infrastructure across Europe that hinders the U.S. ability to respond to adversary aggression or come to the aid of NATO allies with resources both inside and outside the theater of operations.
The urgency to address this threat grows more pressing for several reasons. First, due to the relative success of the Patriot air defense system in Ukraine against Iskander, Kalibr, and Geran-2 drones, NATO and the United States have doubled down on investments in these systems. Several countries, including Germany and Romania, are actively pursuing the procurement of additional batteries, while the United States is investing in expanding interceptor and platform production. Expanded focus on the Patriot system as a European shield consumes large amounts of precious capital with little tangible alternative if a superior weapon renders that investment obsolete. Second, Russia’s hypersonic weapons are increasing their effectiveness against the Patriots. In early 2024, Russian and Ukrainian sources reported the employment of Zircon hypersonic missiles in Ukraine. Officials claimed Patriots intercepted only one Zircon, which departs from this system’s typically high intercept rate. Finally, with its mass serial production announced in February 2024 and the development of a ground-based launcher, the Zircons’ initial effectiveness over the Patriot system threatens to negate the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO air defense in the region. Furthermore, considering the similar $3 million cost of Patriot interceptors and Zircon missiles, Russia will seek to harness its increased industrial production base over the next several years to outproduce the West. These factors will support Russia’s drive to gain an asymmetric advantage over Western air defenses. If achieved, this advantage will enable Russia to target infrastructure critical to U.S. warfighting and ally support at its chosen time.
Emerging Threat #2-Russia’s Alliances: Munitions and Manpower
In the immediate future, Russia’s strengthening of alliances with regional and global partners will increasingly challenge the United States. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) echoes this sentiment, indicating that due to deteriorating Western relations, Russia will continue to expand ties with countries in its Near- and Far-East.
Russia’s partnerships open avenues for increased munition sourcing and combat power replacement. Russia has already demonstrated the impact of this threat in Ukraine by procuring thousands of conventional munitions from North Korea and acquiring drones from Iran. The initial augmentation of ammunition supply now appears to be transitioning into a permanent arrangement as North Korean facilities operate at max capacity to sustain Russian demand. Similarly, Russia and Iran have deepened their material cooperation, including the transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles and the establishment of domestic Shahed/Geran drone production. These relationships dubbed the “Arsenal of Autocracy” by the Atlantic Council, allow Russia to receive critical conventional ammunition, thereby allowing their domestic production lines to focus on missile and rocket production that directly facilitates the first threat outlined above.
This Arsenal of Autocracy has also become a conduit through which Russia seeks to replenish manpower in recent months. In October 2024, news outlets first reported that North Korea had dispatched 1,500 special forces soldiers to Russia for potential use in combat operations in Ukraine. This estimate swelled to nearly 12,000 at the end of 2024, and despite reported heavy losses, North Korea continues preparing to deploy further troops to the region. The provision of not only weapons but also manpower further underscores how the deepening of ties between Russia and its Arsenal of Autocracy partners will complicate the security environment in the coming years, not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific.
Emerging Threat #3-Russia’s Alliances: Geographic Advantages
The third emerging threat, Russia’s gaining of geographic advantage and positioning, also derives from its increased relations with regional partners. This threat primarily stems from Russia’s increasing control of Belarus but can also benefit Russia in areas where it seeks to project power to counter U.S. moves. With the Russian army suffering devastating losses in Ukraine, some argue that Russia would be incapable of affecting NATO countries after only taking 18% of Ukrainian territory. However, the United States must not discount the advantage that geographical placement would provide to Russian ground forces. As seen in 2008, 2014, and even in the limited gains of 2022, geographical proximity played a pivotal role in the rapid seizure of land by Russian troops. This threat will grow as Russia seeks to increase its ties and influence with regional partners that may be willing to host Russian forces.
The Russian-Belarus exercises in early 2022, which became the northern invasion axis, clearly demonstrated that Russia can utilize its allies’ territory to devastating effect.
Russia has already used cooperation with Belarus to improve its military posture. The Russia-Belarus exercises in early 2022, which became the northern invasion axis, clearly demonstrated that Russia can utilize its allies’ territory to devastating effect. In two to three years, strengthening of regional partnerships can likely allow Russia to place reconstituted forces permanently or via “joint exercises” in nearby territories, threatening the Baltics or Ukraine once again. This type of posturing will directly threaten the U.S. strategic interests as a Russian presence outside its borders will decrease transparency of pending operations, as was the case with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. Additionally, it would increase the reaction time of a NATO/U.S. response if Russia conducted a swift, limited action, likely resulting in their ability to achieve fait accompli objectives. Each of these outcomes would be unacceptable to the United States, reinforcing that Russia’s renewed efforts to seek a geographic advantage through its allies will only increase as a threat in the coming years.
Diminished Threat- Massed Maneuver Potential
Though Russia poses several growing strategic threats to the United States, its ability to conduct large-scale operations will likely decrease over the next 2-3 years. In the initial phases of the Ukrainian invasion, Russia committed many of its most cohesive, well-trained and -equipped ground units, which suffered severe losses and withdrew for reconstitution. Most recent Russian offensive operations have occurred only at the company level or below. Until the war concludes, this scale of operations will likely continue for the next two years as units continue to reconstitute. There are conflicting reports on the time it will take for Russia to reconstitute its forces, with Lithuanian officials estimating 2-3 years. At the same time, former Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell asserts that Russia has already reconstituted its forces. Even if Russia fills its manning charts and delivers new equipment, its capability to operate at echelon and scale in a manner that poses an offensive threat to the United States is likely several years in the future. The ATA underscores this assessment, stating that Russia will face a multi-year recovery and must rely on other strategic capabilities and avenues such as those discussed above.
Way Forward
The war in Ukraine ravaged Russia and its military; however, after three years of warfare, some threats that the United States faces grow while others have weakened. While the Russian threat of massed maneuver operations and offensive potential has receded, the development of hypersonic weapons and the strengthening of strategic partnerships to sustain operations and gain geographic advantage represent growing challenges to the United States’ ability to operate in the region. With increasingly effective Russian missiles posing to overwhelm Western air defense and Russian-aligned partners willing to ease the munition burden for Russia and provide geographic advantage for future operations, the United States must reorient its strategy to meet these challenges. By identifying emerging threats early on, the United States can focus on and reprioritize its defense spending, innovation, and diplomatic power in areas to counter them. For example, U.S. investments in weapons innovation on technology such as next-generation full-band Patriot radar and its own hypersonic capability can aid in restoring the regional offense-defense balance. Economically, the Institute for the Study of War proposes that the West could sanction Belarus in kind with Russia. This action could not only stifle munition provision and sanction evasion but also discourage Belarus from fully integrating with Russia, thereby decreasing the likelihood of unrestricted troop access inside the country. Finally, U.S. and allied national decisionmakers can pursue more unconventional means to disrupt the flow of munitions into Russia from its allies. The United States, NATO allies, or partners like Ukraine could employ, or support, covert action to target production facilities or logistical sites that transfer munitions to Russia. Doing so may provide a way for the United States to disrupt the threat presented by Russia’s Arsenal of Autocracy. A renewed strategic emphasis by the U.S. interagency and our NATO allies on the threats outlined above remains critical to meeting, countering, and overcoming the challenges the Russian military poses in the coming years.
Eric J. Uribe is a major in the U.S. Army and a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), with an area concentration in Europe. He holds a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service with a concentration in International Security. Prior to service as a FAO he served in a variety of armor assignments, including command at the company level and has previously deployed to Afghanistan and Eastern Europe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: The 3M22 Zircon is a Russian scramjet-powered, nuclear-capable hypersonic cruise missile. Produced by NPO Mashinostroyeniya for the Russian Navy, the missile utilizes the 3S-14 launch platforms on frigates and submarines. The missile has a reported top speed of Mach 9. The weapon was first used during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Photo Credit: Courtesy of Минобороны РФ via Wikimedia Commons
While Russia’s advanced weapons development, its alliances development and its geographic advantages are important, what would seem to be of even greater importance, this would seem to be Russia’s (superior?) understanding of the “spirit of the age,” to wit: the counter-revolutionary “spirit of our current age” which — as described below — (a) we are witnessing both at home and abroad today and that (b) Russia’s would seem to be employing its weapons development, its alliances and its geographic advantage in concert with:
“Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past.” (See “The American Interest” article “The Reality of Russian Soft Power” by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
“Politically, in many cases today, the counter-insurgent (until Trump, the U.S./the West and its partner governments) represent revolutionary change, while the insurgents (people both here at home and there abroad?) fight to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier – a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counter-insurgency. Pakistan’s campaign in Waziristan since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernisation, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counter-insurgency. But it also echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the effects of globalisation.” (Item in parenthesis above is mine. See David Kilcullen’s “Counterinsurgency Redux.”)
“Dhofar, El Savador and the Philippines are all campaigns driven by fundamentally conservative concerns. When we are looking to Syria right now, (however,) it is not just about maintaining order or even the regime, but about larger political change. In Afghanistan and Iraq too, we (the U.S./the West) represented revolutionary change. So, perhaps we should read Mao and Che Guevara instead of Thompson in order to find the appropriate lessons of how to achieve large-scale societal change through limited means? That is what we are after, in the end. And in this coming era, where we are pivoting away from large-scale interventions and state-building projects, but not from our fairly grand political ambitions, it may be worth exploring how insurgents do more with little; how they approach irregular warfare, and reach their objectives indirectly.” (Item in parenthesis above is mine. See the Small Wars Journal article “Learning From Today’s Crisis of Counterinsurgency” — an interview by Octavian Manea of Dr. David H. Ucko and Dr. Robert Egnell.)
“In this new world disorder, the power of identity politics can no longer be denied. Western elites believed that in the twenty-first century, cosmopolitanism and globalism (i.e., the revolutionary change related to same) would triumph over atavism and tribal loyalties (i.e., the status quo). They failed to understand the deep roots of identity politics in the human psyche and the necessity for those roots to find political expression in both foreign and domestic policy arenas. And they failed to understand that the very forces of economic and social development that cosmopolitanism and globalization fostered would generate turbulence and eventually resistance, as ‘Gemeinschaft’ (community) fought back against the onrushing ‘Gesellschaft’ (market society), in the classic terms sociologists favored a century ago.” (First two items in parenthesis above are mine. see the Mar-Apr 2017 edition of “Foreign Affairs” and, therein, the article by Walter Russell Mead entitled “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order.”)
Question — Based on the Above:
Given that the U.S./the West has over three hundred years of experience (to wit: since the 18th Century?) of successfully dealing with various here at home and there abroad opponents; who, like Russia today, (a) understood and acted within the counter-revolutionary “spirit of their age” and (b) employed advanced weapons, alliances and geographic advantages within same:
Given these such matters, what can the U.S./the West learn from this such, massive, history of our prior successes? (And our instances of — only temporary it would seem — failure?)
If Clausewitz’s “spirit of the age” is to be understood as the social and political conditions, that affect the circumstances and means (for example today, Russia’s advanced weapons development, its alliances development, and its utilization of its geographic advantages?), within which, conflicts occur and wars are fought, then let us consider that — today — (a) the social and political conditions, that (b) affect the circumstances and means within which conflicts occur and wars are fought currently, these are (c) the counter-hegemonic ideological reactions, to the attempts at the globalization of the liberal international order, that entities both within and outside of the U.S./the West have taken post-the Cold War. In this regard, consider the following:
“Abstract:
Discourses and practices reproducing a world where a plurality of distinct civilizations clash or dialogue, rise or fall, color multiple facets of global politics today. How should we interpret this unexpected surge in civilizational politics, especially notable in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, China, and Russia? This paper argues that the growing turn to civilizations or, better, civilizationism, should be understood as a counter-hegemonic ideological reaction to the globalization of the liberal international order. It theorizes the deepening and widening of the liberal international order in the aftermath of the Cold War as enabled by powerful constitutive ideological forces, which congeal into a distinctively modern, informal, universal standard of civilization. This liberal civilizational standard can be experienced by a particular category of non (fully) liberal actors within and beyond the West as ideologically entrapping them—through processes of socialization or stigmatization—in a state of symbolic disempowerment. The paper shows how civilizationism provides an ideological path for resisting and contesting the liberal standard of civilization by articulating a distinct and valued (essentialized) sense of collective belonging, and an alternative (generally illiberal) normative system and (broadly multipolar) vision of international order. … ”
“Yet, as noted by scholars across different theoretical traditions, the liberal international order is not simply a normatively thin order that regulates in mutually beneficial ways relations among states through value-free rules, institutions, and markets. It is rather an ideologically thick order (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018; Jahn 2019; Cooley and Nexon 2020), infused with a complex set of ideas, norms and principles, whose main institutions, actors, and practices seek to transform states and their societies both beyond and within the West.”
(See the article “Civilizationism and the Ideological Contestation of the Liberal International Order,” by Gregorio Bettiza, Derek Bolton and David Lewis, in the journal “International Studies Review,” Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2023.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
When looking at such things as Russia’s movement to advanced weapons development, to its alliances development, and to its utilization of its geographic advantages; when doing this, does it not behoove us to get a sense of the “spirit of the day,” that is, (a) the social and political conditions that (b) might explain both “our” — and “their” — movement to such things as illiberalism, multipolarism, balance of power, spheres of influence and/or civilizationism? (To wit: the “context” — within which — these types of moves are both contemplated and made?)