While most Americans would be hard pressed to locate Moldova or Georgia on a map, these elections serve as a lesson in how Russia employs hybrid warfare to undermine U.S. security and advance Russia’s interests globally.
In the fall of 2024, both the Republic of Moldova and the country of Georgia held major and contentious national elections, the results of which sent shockwaves through their respective societies, as well as the international community more broadly. While Moldova managed to remain on its pro-European path, Georgia’s “Georgian Dream” Party, a pro-Russian party in power since 2012, won again despite mass outrage and accusations of election interference. While most Americans would be hard pressed to locate Moldova or Georgia on a map, these elections serve as a lesson in how Russia employs hybrid warfare (an effort to shape the global environment primarily through information manipulation) to undermine U.S. security and advance Russia’s interests globally.
Moldovan Election
On October 20, 2024, the people of Moldova took a stand against Russian interference in their country, voting to permanently embed European integration in the constitution. Additionally, President Maya Sandu, Moldova’s pro-EU leader, was re-elected to a second term in a run-off election held on November 3. The votes for both European integration and for a Sandu second term were hardly won by a wide margin. Despite early polling indicating a roughly four to five percent advantage for the pro-EU vote, the final tally was a mere 50.46 percent in favor. In the first round, Sandu fell short of the 50 percent needed to win outright, receiving only 42.45 percent of the vote, as her rival, Alexandr Stoianoglo, backed by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists, received approximately 25 percent of the vote. In the second round, Sandu received approximately 55 percent of the vote, ultimately beating out Stoianoglo. A large part of the pro-EU victory in both the referendum and the presidential election was thanks to the Moldovan diaspora, living largely in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. In each election, before the Moldovan diaspora vote was fully counted, it briefly seemed that the country would swing away from the West.
Moldovan officials have highlighted the alarming and heavy-handed role that Russia played in this election through vote buying and an aggressive disinformation campaign, pointing to this involvement as the cause of the near failure of the European integration project. These reports are backed by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) election observations and Freedom House preelection assessments. This is not the first time the country has faced such pressures from Moscow.
On November 12, 2024, the U.S. Helsinki Commission hosted a briefing on “Moldova’s European Future” in which the panelists discussed how Russia leverages vulnerabilities in Moldovan society to undermine its democracy and development. The vulnerabilities identified included internal divisions along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines; energy dependence; financial weaknesses; and the frozen conflict in the Russian-separatist region of Transnistria. Weaknesses in Moldovan media were also highlighted, including ownership of major media sources by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan oligarch living in exile in Russia, and Russian covert influence over media narratives through disinformation campaigns. Moldova also struggles with wide-reaching corruption. These vulnerabilities make Moldova a critical front for Russia’s war against the United States, NATO, and the West. If Russia can undermine the development of Moldovan democracy and interrupt its European integration, it can maintain a presence on the border with Romania, a NATO ally and EU member.
Georgian Election
In the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections, Georgians had the option between the incumbent, pro-Russia Georgian Dream party or the pro-EU and -Western opposition. When the results rolled in, Georgian Dream claimed victory, taking 54 percent of the vote and retaining control over the parliament. Still, opposition parties and international election observers, including the OSCE, have accused the ruling party of rigging the ballot, buying votes, and intimidating voters and the media of promoting political propaganda and disinformation.
Additionally, Salome Zourabichvili, Georgia’s president (a role that is largely ceremonial and holds little power), rejected the results, calling on Georgians to protest against Georgian Dream. She stated, “This election cannot be recognized, because it is the recognition of Russia’s intrusion here, Georgia’s subordination to Russia.” This election comes on the tail of the June “foreign influence law,” which critics see as a copycat of a similar Russian law and which seeks to curtail media freedom in Georgia.
Like Moldova, Georgia’s internal weaknesses are being exploited by the Kremlin. Though 79 percent of the Georgian population holds pro-European sentiments, the increasingly autocratic government driven by the parliament has made it difficult for the population to enact its EU aspirations. Further, Zourabichvili and nearly all opposition parties have refused to accept the results reported by the election authorities alleging Russian disinformation was widespread in the leadup to the election. In Georgia, though, it takes a different shape than in Moldova, where the disinformation is traced directly back to Russia. With Georgia, the Kremlin relies mainly on the Georgian Dream party to promote its message and execute its goals, to great effect.
Beyond potential interference in this election, Russia has long exerted influence over Georgia directly and indirectly.
The election results sparked outrage and widespread protests, such as on November 11, when thousands rallied in Tbilisi waving Georgian and EU flags and demanding a new election with increased international monitoring. Later in November, protestors clashed violently with police, who responded with tear gas and water cannons. Recently, journalists and opposition leaders have been under attack, and a new president, Mikheil Kavelashvili, has been sworn in despite President Zourabichvili’s denial of her successor’s legitimacy, claiming he was appointed by an illegitimate parliament elected in a fraudulent election.
Beyond potential interference in this election, Russia has long exerted influence over Georgia directly and indirectly. Directly—like in Moldova’s Transnistria region—Russia has deployed troops into Georgia, supporting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2008, and in 2024 satellite imagery revealed the construction of a new Russian naval base in Ochamchire. Indirectly, the Kremlin backs pro-Russia actors, engages in disinformation campaigns, and exerts substantial economic influence over Georgia. As a result, Georgia, once viewed as a beacon of democratic hope in the Caucuses, appears to be caught in a cycle of democratic backsliding that has given Western leaders pause and interrupted integration with the EU, thus allowing the Kremlin to gradually strengthen its influence over Georgia and therefore maintain a presence in the Caucasus.
So What?
Vladimir Putin is explicitly concerned with the futures of Moldova and Georgia. As former Soviet republics, the Kremlin considers these countries as within its “sphere of influence” and seeks to maintain control over them. Because of the overt and easily documented nature of Russia’s interference in Moldova and Georgia, these elections provide important insight into how the Kremlin operates as it seeks to exert influence globally and compete with the United States by disrupting fragile democracies and destabilizing key regions. Ultimately, these case studies demonstrate the very real security threat posed by Russian hybrid warfare and the integration of multiple elements of power to shape the environment below the level of actual conflict.
By studying the patterns of interference observed in Moldova and Georgia, U.S. decision makers can better understand how Russia seeks to disrupt the United States from within—something particularly important in an age of strategic competition. During the 2024 U.S. presidential election, reports of Russian interference were extensive. On September 4, the U.S. Justice Department announced the seizure of thirty-two internet domains linked with Russian foreign malign influence campaigns aimed at affecting the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. In the days leading up to the election, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials warned of an increase in alarmist fake articles and videos undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process. On election day, polling locations in Georgia, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania received hoax bomb threats linked to Russian e-mail domains. These efforts are illustrative of how Russia seeks to utilize disinformation and hybrid warfare to erode trust in institutions and promote partisan divides, thereby weakening the United States and undermining its role as a global leader.
Recommendations
The United States needs to make a concerted effort to strengthen its anti-disinformation campaign, both within the United States and globally, focusing on providing counter-narratives to Kremlin talking points and educating populations on identifying disinformation. Historically U.S. funding for publications such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America have provided multi-lingual, reliable information to groups vulnerable to Russian propaganda, the importance of which cannot be overstated for U.S. security. The United States must also support partner countries, like Moldova, in their efforts to strengthen media freedom, diversify journalism, block Russian ownership over media outlets, and translate state and independent news into minority languages.
Domestically, the U.S. government must protect its citizenry from Russian disinformation and hybrid warfare. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, disinformation campaigns require first the construction of a false narrative, then the broad amplification of the narrative, and finally, concealment or obfuscation of the origins of the narrative. The best way to protect a community from falling victim to a narrative is to “pre-bunk” it, that is, to identify it before its amplification and construct an early and aggressive counter-narrative. The counter-narrative should highlight and repeat the false narrative and educate people on their own vulnerability to disinformation. There will undoubtedly be challenges to implementing these steps in the United States, primarily related to an increasingly fragmented media environment, accusations of partisanship, and disagreement over what is considered disinformation. However, Russian election interference in Moldova and Georgia is only the latest example of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare to promote its interests, and given Russia’s history and worldview, this behavior will continue in an age of strategic competition. As such, U.S. decision makers and Western leaders must understand Russia’s efforts and take action to inoculate their populations against these tactics in the future. Failure to do so puts American unity and leadership at risk.
Anna Harvey is a Research Intern at the American Foreign Policy Council, working for their Russia-Ukraine Program and Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. She holds a master’s degree from Stanford University’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies. In 2022 to 2023, she was awarded a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant position to Cahul State University “B. P. Hasdeu” in Moldova, where she directed a project educating local teachers on countering Russian disinformation in the classroom. Previously, she has interned at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies in Tartu, Estonia, and at War Room.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Maia Sandu, President of the Republic of Moldova speaking in the War in Europe: Year 2 session at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2023 in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, 17 January.
Photo Credit: Courtesy of World Economic Forum/Sikarin Fon Thanachaiary
The author of this article would seem to behind the times/would seem to be on the wrong sheet of music here; this, given that — from an ideological point of view — the United States (a) would no longer seem to see itself as being engaged in strategic competition with such diverse entities as Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea and the Islamists now but, instead, (b) would now seem to itself (much like Russia, China, N. Korea and the Islamists) being engaged now more in strategic competition with (a) the defenders of the liberal international order and (b) their efforts to maintain and expand same (for example, in places such as Moldovia and Georgia).
How to explain this such — seemingly strange — thinking? Perhaps via the perspective offered below:
“Civilizational imaginaries are being embraced by major political actors too, whether state or non-state based, around the world. These imaginaries are often closely interlaced with anxieties of civilizational crisis and decline, perceived to be caused by powerful cultural, economic, and political forces within and beyond one’s own civilization. Right-wing populists in the United States and across Europe—from Donald Trump to Geert Wilders and Viktor Orbán—have all called for a vigorous defense of what they refer to as the Judeo-Christian West. Very different Islamist actors—from Mohammad Khatami of Iran, to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, and jihadist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—have consistently articulated a civilizational understanding of the Muslim world. Civilizational themes have come to the forefront of Xi Jinping’s rhetoric about China as a state civilization. Vladimir Putin, and much of the Valdai Club intelligentsia around him, subscribes to a view of world politics defined by inter-civilizational relations with Russia as the epicenter of a broad Pan-Slavic, Christian Orthodox, or Eurasian civilization.” (See the second paragraph of the Introduction portion of the article “Civilizationism and the Ideological Contestation of the Liberal International Order” by Gregorio Bettiza, et. al, in International Studies Review, Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2023.)
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
At the “Recommendations” portion of her article above, author Anna Harvey notes that “Historically U.S. funding for publications such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America have provided multi-lingual, reliable information to groups vulnerable to Russian propaganda, the importance of which cannot be overstated for U.S. security.”
In this regard, should we not point out how far behind the times author Harvey now is/how she would seem to be on the wrong sheet of music now; this, given that President Trump, of late, and thus as one of his first courses of action after being elected President for the second time, has moved out smartly to DEFUND Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and/or the Voice of America? (Have I got that right?)
As to those such actions — and others — should they not be seen from the perspective of the U.S. believing, ideologically at least, that (a) it is less threatened now by the likes of Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists, etc., and (b) more threatened now by the defenders of the liberal international order (such as the EU?) and their efforts to maintain and expand same, for example, in places such as Moldovia and Georgia?
Question — Based on my thoughts above:
If the U.S. believes that — ideologically at least — it is less threatened today by the likes of Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists, etc. — and more threatened today by such things as liberalism, the defenders of the liberal international order (such as the EU?) and these such defenders efforts to maintain and expand same,
Then, in these such (bizarre?) circumstances, might the U.S. find itself hesitating, for example, to criticize — and/or to stand hard against/counter — Russia’s use of such things as “hybrid warfare” and “disinformation;” these; employed by Russia to achieve Russia’s (and now the U.S.’s also?) (common?) — anti-liberalism/anti-liberal international order goals?
(From this such perspective, thus, to suggest that author Anna Harvey’s recommendations that we “pre-bunk” Russian disinformation efforts — and counter Russian hybrid warfare efforts — these such recommendations might, now, not be considered to be in our own country’s best interests/would seem to be contrary to the goals that both we — and our “partner” Russia[?] — were now hoping achieve?)
Another way of looking at the matters that I present above, this would be from the perspective of the following — fictional — analogy; wherein:
a. The Soviets/the communists win the Old Cold War and, post-the Old Cold War, expand communism throughout the world according. And then:
b. 30 or so years after the Old Cold War, these Soviets/the communists, then at the height of their power, become threatened by entities — coming from both within the Soviet Union and outside of it — who come to power by running on a platform of anti-communism. (I.E., on a platform of “buyers remorse?”)
c. The United States, Europe, etc., during this interim 30 or so year period, not coming forward and/or championing things based on a competing ideology relating to democracy, capitalism, markets, trade, etc., but, rather, coming forward and championing things based on a competing ideology relating to such things as everyone’s — everywhere — traditional social values, beliefs and institutions. (I.E., the very matters that had been effectively threatened/had been effectively suppressed/had been effectively quashed by the communists and communism!)
d. Thus, with the popularity of communism being on the serious wain (this, due to “buyer’s remorse”) — and with the popularity of everyone’s, everywhere, traditional social values, beliefs and institutions being on the serious rise — many in the communist political party (a) abandon communism and (b) embrace the traditional social values, beliefs and institutions movement as their way forward/as their way to regain — and to retain — power.
(From this such perspective, thus, to ask: Do we think that those that had come to power by abandoning communism, and by embracing such things as traditional social values, beliefs and institutions instead, these folks would [a] let stand a “Voice of the Soviet Union” entity that advocated, throughout the world, for such things as political, economic, social and/or value communism and/or [b] champion “pre-bunking” projects, which were designed to interfere with/compromise the efforts of the pro-traditional social values, beliefs and institutions folks, who were using such things as “hybrid warfare” — and/or “disinformation” — to achieve their anti-communism goals — both in their own backyards — and even in the hometowns of their most serious opponents?)
One day, people will remember John Halford Mackinder and the impact he has had on the world since the turn of the 20th century. You are witnessing their final attempt at the Heartland. They have secured Israel as the necessary castle.
“Domestically, the U.S. government must protect its citizenry from Russian disinformation and hybrid warfare.”
No, we need to rid our Pentagon of people that think like you. I bet you’ve never heard of von Clausewitz, have you? It’s apparent in your thesis and propaganda.
Thank you for that. Some propeller-head is really full of himself, and his sterile definition of “liberalism”.
George and Schwarzpeter:
There is significant discussion of liberalism, the liberal international order, the perceived threats thereto, and who and what would seem to be threatened thereby and why; this, in the paper — “Civilizationism and the Ideological Contestation of the Liberal International Order” by Gregorio Bettiza, et. al, in International Studies Review, Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2023 — which I point to in my initial comment above. Is this helpful?
Wherefore and whatwith? (I’ll get to your snootish erudition just as soon as I wrap up War and Peace.)
Unlike how the Rothschilds and other such tribe undermine elections in the US, eh?
You are the perfect product of disinformation. My congratulations. Get rid of people that don’t think like you is exatly the way Putin and other dictators act. The hearthland is out of time as geopolitical theory. Maritime nations will always stay years ahead of continental nations. Just think about economy and commerce. It’s not for playng that China and India are building strong navies. And itìs not for playng that Trump wants to build a stronger Navy.
It was a reply to George.