The Carlisle Scholars Program at the U.S. Army War College is a unique experience for a select seminar of students each academic year. After completing the majority of the academic requirements in an accelerated 10 weeks of course work, the remainder of the year focuses on research, writing, and advising senior leaders. Bernardo Gonzalez-Lazaro Sueiras, Rick Luce and Luigi Valentini are in the studio to explain the results of their study that investigated the issue of interoperability in NATO. They join guest host Tom Galvin to reveal the issues and successes they found after many hours of interviews and examination of NATO member nations and their military leaders.
We observed clearly that we are moving to a federated interoperability concept. So we are moving not only to the interoperability that is achieved with true integration of training when we are deployed, but day zero interoperability.
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Bernardo Gonzalez-Lazaro Sueiras is a lieutenant colonel in the Army of the Kingdom of Spain. He received his commission as AN Artillery Officer from the Spanish military Academy in 1998. Prior to his arrival at Carlisle Barracks, he was assigned to Operation INHERENT RESOLVE as Military Advisor in Public Affairs of the of the Iraqi Joint Operational Command in Baghdad, Iraq. He is a graduate of the AY24 Resident Course at the U.S. Army War College and a member of the Carlisle Scholars Program.
Rick Luce is a lieutenant colonel and Maneuver, Fires and Effects and Infantry Officer in the U.S. Army. He has served both as an enlisted soldier and officer as well as in the Army National Guard and on active duty. His assignments include multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as a unique battalion command leading a Republic of Korea/U.S. Light Infantry Battalion in the Joint Security Area, or the DMZ between North and South Korea. He is a graduate of the AY24 Resident Class of the U.S. Army War College and a member of the Carlisle Scholars Program.
Luigi Valentini is a colonel in the Italian Army. In 1996, he joined the Italian Army Military Academy in Modena when, in 1998, he received his commission as Cavalry Officer. Prior to his arrival at Carlisle Barracks he was appointed Commander of the 32nd Tank Regiment in Spilimbergo (North-East of Italy) from 2022 to 2023.He is a graduate of the AY24 Resident Course at the U.S. Army War College and a member of the Carlisle Scholars Program.
Tom Galvin is Associate Professor of Resource Management in the Department of Command Leadership and Management (DCLM) as well as the leadership and management instructor for the Carlisle Scholars Program. at the United States Army War College. He is the author of the monograph Leading Change in Military Organizations and companion Experiential Activity Book.
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Sniper teams from the Netherlands, Italy and Spain practice engaging targets under high winds on July 11, 2018 during the International Special Training Centre Desert Sniper Course at Chinchilla Training Area, Spain. The two-week course is designed to teach trained sniper teams the necessary skills to operate in a desert environment.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek
If the United States comes to see Russia as more of a friend rather than as more of an enemy — this, because the U.S. has come to believe that Russia’s “traditional values,” etc., ideas are more correct (or at least more politically useful right now ), while Europe’s “progressive values,” etc., ideas are more error (or at least more politically limiting right now), then how might this effect:
a. The relationship that the U.S. has with Europe and
b. NATO — and objectives such as “Day Zero” interoperability, etc. — accordingly?
If the above is how Russia “wins” — and is how the U.S./the West and NATO “loses” — then what good are such things as the NATO nations’ — military but not politically-joined efforts — and such things as federated (“day zero” or other) — military but not politically-based — interoperability?
“Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past.” [See “The American Interest” article “The Reality of Russian Soft Power” by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.])
“Compounding it all, Russia’s dictator has achieved all of this while creating sympathy in elements of the Right that mirrors the sympathy the Soviet Union achieved in elements of the Left. In other words, Putin is expanding Russian power and influence while mounting a cultural critique that resonates with some American audiences, casting himself as a defender of Christian civilization against Islam and the godless, decadent West.” (See the “National Review” item entitled: “How Russia Wins” by David French.)
In this regard, is “military interoperability” simply a project that we do to try to keep busy during this interim period; this, while the real battle takes place/is being fought along the lines that I outline above?
A more recent War Room podcast, dated July 23, 2024 and entitled “Strategic Autonomy: Ours, Theirs and the Balance in Between” (for which, by mistake or by design, a comments section is missing?); this more recent podcast suggests that the NATO nations — while supporting the concept of military interoperability today (as noted in the podcast “NATO Interoperability: A Carlisle Scholars Study” above) — understand that they (the NATO nations) — today and likely in the future — will need to be less-dependent upon each other and, thus, less-bound by this such alliance?
(As to that such suggestion, if the NATO nations considered that — today and in the future — they are/would be politically and strategically aligned — then, in that much different circumstance, why would such things as “strategic autonomy” be needed????)
Thus while:
a. “Military interoperability” provides that NATO nations can act better together today if they wish or need to,
b. The move to “strategic autonomy” provides that NATO nations, at some point in the near future, can and probably will (a) move away from the confines of this such alliance and (b) act more independently?
(From the Russian and/or Chinese point of view, thus, to see this such change/this such transition to be considered a massive and historic strategic success on their part? Herein, having NATO nations adopt “strategic autonomy,” this thus being best understood from the perspective of “divide and rule”?)
My argument above possibly stated another way:
From the perspective that I provide above, if “divide and rule” is the Russian and Chinese strategy, then:
a. Does NATO’s “military interoperability” really worry Russia and/or China at all/even a little bit; this,
b. Given the success of their (Russia and China’s?) — worldwide — “strategic autonomy” initiatives?
(As exemplified, for example, by China’s most recent success with France — as discussed in the “Strategic Autonomy: Ours, Theirs and the Balance in Between” podcast of yesterday?)
As to my argument above, consider the lens through which Chinese President Xi seems to see such things as “strategic autonomy” today:
“For Xi, the visit has domestic importance, as he wants to demonstrate to the Chinese public that he is still fêted in Europe. Xi also sought to encourage Macron’s ambition for European strategic autonomy, an element that was already present in Macron’s visit to China last year. Xi’s interpretation of strategic autonomy is one where Europe turns away from the United States and moves toward other partners, particularly China. But this is not France’s or Europe’s interpretation. Europeans’ vision of strategic autonomy intends for Europe to build greater capacity and the ability to act, from a political, economic, and security and defense standpoint, to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link with Washington. By contrast, Xi’s goal is to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe and to show that there are limits to trans-Atlantic unity on China.”
(See the “Deliverables and What Comes Next” section of the May 8, 2024 Brookings Institute paper “Xi’s Visit Exposes Fault Lines in European Unity” by Tara Varma.)
Thus, if there are European unity and/our U.S./European unity “fault lines” — at the political and/or the strategic levels — then does this not somewhat compromise the capabilities realized from achieving “federated interoperability” at the military level?