In 2017, the U.S. Army established Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) to organize, train, equip, and advise foreign security forces. Tom Spahr spoke with two former SFAB commanders, Dustin Blair and Jon Post, to discuss the development of these brigades, their role in great power competition, and their potential use in future large-scale combat operations. Blair and Post emphasized the importance of SFABs in building relationships with partner nations and enhancing interoperability. They also stressed the need for continued investment to ensure the SFABs’ long-term success.
They’re looking for leaders that demonstrate a level of comfort with dealing with ambiguity, leaders that express strategic empathy, that are humble leaders that can see the big picture, and that are proven in their functional areas or branches.
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Dustin Blair is a colonel in the U.S. Army. He was commissioned from the University of Central Oklahoma in May 2002. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery Basic and Advanced Courses, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in multiple duty positions within the Field Artillery Branch from Company Fire Support Officer to Battalion Commander as well as in staff billets at the Joint Staff, and Headquarters, Department of the Army level. His most recent assignment was Commander, 4th Battalion, 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, where he sustained a third of his battalion forward advising partner nations in the INDOPACOM AOR.
Jonathan Post is a colonel in the U.S. Army. He was commissioned from the United States Military Academy in 2002 and served as a Field Artillery officer in the 173rd Airborne Brigade before being selected for Special Forces training in 2006. He earned his Green Beret in 2008 and served in various command and staff positions with 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) from 2008 – 2017. He was then assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command’s Interagency Task Force – National Capital Region, where he served as a liaison to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York City, as the Director of Operation Gallant Phoenix, and as the Commanding General’s representative to the Department of State. His most recent assignment was Commander, 1st Infantry Battalion, 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade in Fort Cavazos, Texas.
Thomas W. Spahr is the DeSerio Chair of Theater and Strategic Intelligence at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired colonel in the U.S. Army and holds a Ph.D. in History from The Ohio State University. He teaches courses at the Army War College on Military Campaigning and Intelligence.
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense.
Photo Description: U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Steve McNeil, an explosive ordnance disposal advisor, with 5th Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB), conducts training on improvised explosive device detection with members of the Maldives National Defense Forces in Malé, Maldives, May 25, 2022. The SFAB trains and advises foreign security forces to improve partner capabilities and facilitate achievement of U.S. strategic objectives.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Keion Jackson
In the past, I have suggested that such things as deterrence, integrated deterrence, etc.; these must be viewed (for example, re: their effectiveness) from the perspective of our competitors, both here at home (ex: our social conservatives) and there abroad (exs: Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea and the Islamists),
a. ALL being threatened by the U.S./the West’s post-Cold War efforts to change the cultures of the states and societies of the world (to include our own); this, so that same might be made to be more compatible with the wants, needs and desires of markets and market societies and
b. ALL ultimately coming to use ALL their instruments of power and persuasion; this, to try to halt, scale down, and/or reverse/roll back these such (commonly threatening) U.S./Western post-Cold War “transformative” efforts.
(It is from this such perspective, I suggest, that you can see such things as [a] the U.S./the West’s great power competition and conflict with China and Russia today, you can see such things as [b] the U.S./the West’s competition and conflict with lesser entities as such as Iran and N. Korea today, you can see such things as [c] the U.S./the West’s competition and conflict with non-state actors such as the Islamists today and you can even see such things as [d] the U.S./the West’s competition and conflict with our own social conservatives today.)
Bottom Line Questions — Based on the Above:
1. Were/are our Security Forces Assistance Brigades properly organized, order, trained, staffed, equipped, supported, etc.; this, to deal with (a) these such “resisting change”/”reversing change” competitors and, more specifically, with (b) their “resisting change”/”reversing change” efforts and capabilities?
b. With the election of President Trump for the second time — significantly by America’s social conservatives — has/will (at least some of) our Security Force Assistance Brigades’ missions now end — or be dramatically changed — this due to, for example, (a) “conservative” Russia now being seen less as an opponent and (b) “liberal” Europe now being seen more as an opponent? (“Liberal” Ukraine, thus and its fate, to also be seen along these such “more as an opponent — more as a problem for conservative states like Russia and America — lines???)
From the written introduction to our podcast above:
“They’re looking for leaders that demonstrate a level of comfort with dealing with ambiguity, leaders that express strategic empathy, that are humble leaders that can see the big picture, and that are proven in their functional areas or branches.”
In addition to the “strategic empathy” and “big picture” matters that I present in my comment immediately above, might the following prove useful; this, as relates to how Security Force Assistance Brigades could have been/should have been (but no longer can be?) organized, ordered, etc.?:
“War is more of a cognitive problem than a physical problem” … “the information war is more important than any battle that we could ever fight.” (Both of these quoted items from a COL Spahr reply-to-comment in the 2021 War Room Blog article “Reframing the Mission in Afghanistan.”) … “The best approach in war is to first attack the enemy’s strategy” (Sun Tzu?).
Based on the above, should not our Security Force Assistance Brigades, early on, been organized, ordered, etc.; this, so that they might have proceeded more along the “cognitive warfare”/the “information warfare”/the “attack the enemy’s strategy” lines noted, for example, by LTG (ret.) Cleveland and GEN (ret.) Votel, et. al, below?:
“The Achilles’ heel of our authoritarian adversaries is their inherent fear of their own people; the United States must be ready to capitalize on this fear. … An American way of irregular war will reflect who we are as a people, our diversity, our moral code, and our undying belief in freedom.” (See the “Conclusion” of the Rand paper “The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir” by LTG [re.] Charles T. Cleveland and Daniel Egel.)
“Advocates of UW first recognize that, among a population of self-determination seekers, human interest in liberty trumps loyalty to a self-serving dictatorship, that those who aspire to freedom can succeed in deposing corrupt or authoritarian rulers, and that unfortunate population groups can and often do seek alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice. Second, advocates believe that there is a valid role for the U.S. Government in encouraging and empowering these freedom seekers when doing so helps to secure U.S. national security interests.” (See the National Defense University Press paper “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone” by then-GEN Joseph L. Votel, then-LTG Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin.)
Problem: Why this/these such approaches can no longer be done at SFABs, etc., today:
Today, more than half of Americans no longer seem to believe in and/or embrace such things as “our diversity, our moral code, and/or our undying belief in freedom.” These such Americans, in truth, no longer seem to see authoritarian leaders as being “bad” and, accordingly, these such American no longer wish to help those who “seek alternatives to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice.”
In the 180 degree “about face” circumstances that I describe immediately above, what, as capable, “American exceptionalism” “bullets” might our SFABs, our Special Operations people or the State Department for that matter — put in their cognitive warfare/their information warfare “guns” today?
(Or, based on the choices made by most America’s of late, do we no longer have access to these such [highly recommended by such authorities as GEN Votel and LTG Cleveland] cognitive warfare/information warfare capabilities anymore? And, accordingly, must pay the cognitive warfare/the information warfare “price” — of the American people’s such fateful decision?)
Note that, from the perspective that I provide above, such diverse entities as Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists — and even social conservatives here in the U.S./the West — note that these folks, of late, would seem to have decided that it would not take such things as “large-scale combat operations,” etc., this, for them to achieve to their common objective — of containing — and/or of rolling back and reversing — the threatening-to-them U.S./Western-sponsored political, economic, social and/or value changes that the U.S./the West pursued, in the name of capitalism, markets and trade (and in the name of greater power, influence and control via same) after the Old Cold War.
Rather, these such diverse entities would seem to have decided, of late, that these such — common — containment and/or roll back and reversal objectives, these might be achieved via other ways and other means, for example, (a) via the election of President Trump and (b) via his more conservative — and more-civilizational rather than market-based — worldview and related ambitions:
“We are also realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress.” (See Page 4 of the Trump NSS — midway down the second column.)
“We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution, and this is foundation for cooperation and success.” (See about the 15th paragraph of the White House transcript of the Trump 2017 speech to the United Nations General Assembly.)
“Strong, sovereign nations let diverse countries with different values, different cultures, and different dreams not just coexist, but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect.” (See about the 16th paragraph of the White House transcript of the Trump 2017 speech to the United Nations General Assembly.)
Question — Based on the above:
Given this result (the election of President Trump for the second time and re: his such worldview and related ambitions noted immediately above), can we say that (a) the suggestion of “great power competition,” (b) the need for large-scale combat operations capabilities in support of same and (c) the need for SFABs to help achieve this, ALL of these may need to be, at least somewhat, reconsidered?
Another way of looking at the question that I pose at the end of my comment above, this is by asking whether, today as in 1648, (a) a historic opportunity for peace exists; this, (b) also to be based on such things as “sovereignty?”
(This considering that [a] the basis for conflict in the Old Cold War, this was the political, economic, social and value changes demanded by the communists and communism and considering that [b] the basis for conflict in the post-Cold War, this has been the political, economic, social and value changes demanded by the capitalists and capitalism. The election of Gorbachev in the USSR, and the second election of Trump in the US; these, respectively, marking the end of these such conflicts?)
I had the great privilege to train with Jon Post as his Green Force partner force brigade commander for his VALEX at JRTC in January 2024 (Long Live South Torbia!!!!) and work with him two other times when he was the senior OC-T for another Force Package getting ready to go.
Regarding the use of the potential build out of the SFABs to become an IBCT or even ABCT in a large conflict scenario (just add Privates and Lieutenants plus some additional equipment). That was a selling point when the SFABs were being stood up circa 2017-2019 to gain senior leader buy-in. It’s just not going to happen, though and everyone knows it.
I would argue that the SFABs have taken on part of the Abrams Charter that was inherent in the formation of the Ranger Battalions in 1974 with the intent that those who serve here return to the General Purpose/Conventional Force as better Soldiers and pass that on to the rest of the force.