The UN’s lack of centralized authority, the veto power of the Security Council permanent members, and the inability of the General Assembly to pass binding resolutions have allowed Russia to shield itself from collective security actions under the UN framework.
After the devastation of World War II, the United Nations (UN) was established to prevent future generations from enduring the scourge of war. Founded in 1945 with 51 member states, the organization has since expanded to 193 nations, all pledging to “maintain international peace and security.” In support of this pledge, UN member countries commit to uphold Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine raises concerns about the UN’s ability to enforce this principle and has reignited debates over the relevance of Article 2(4). These debates have surfaced repeatedly in response to past conflicts, including North Korea’s attack on South Korea in 1950, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In the case of Russia’s invasion, structural shortcomings of the UN and a fragmented global response have undermined the enforcement of Article 2(4) and enabled Moscow to evade accountability. The UN’s lack of centralized authority, the veto power of the Security Council (UNSC) permanent members, and the inability of the General Assembly (UNGA) to pass binding resolutions have allowed Russia to shield itself from collective security actions under the UN framework. Additionally, the Global South’s economic and strategic alignments with Russia have reduced the effectiveness of Western-led efforts to hold Moscow accountable, diminishing the consequences of violating Article 2(4). Despite these enforcement issues, the article remains valuable in guiding diplomatic responses and shaping international norms. As seen in Russia’s legal justifications and the UNGA’s resolutions, the prohibition on the use of force continues to provide a universal legal framework and norm to evaluate state behavior.
Article 2(4)
Article 2(4) has been described as the cornerstone of the UN Charter and one of the foundations of the modern international legal order. It states the following:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
While the article codifies the prohibition on the use of force, the UN Charter also provides two key exceptions for when force is justified. The first is the inherent right to self-defence under Article 51, and the second involves authorization by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII. Beyond these codified exceptions, controversial practices such as humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine have emerged, though they lack formal recognition under Article 2(4). Despite Russia’s efforts to justify its actions under the UN Charter, leading scholars have characterized Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine as a “flagrant,” “unambiguous” and “egregious” violation of Article 2(4).
UN Structural Limitations
Unlike domestic legal systems, which operate through hierarchical structures with enforcement mechanisms, the United Nations relies on voluntary cooperation among sovereign states, making enforcement inherently challenging. Without a centralized authority, compliance with Article 2(4) depends on mutual benefits, reciprocity, and the pursuit of legitimacy as responsible global actors. However, as demonstrated by Russia, a country’s pursuit of its national interests can override these incentives, undermining adherence to Article 2(4). When this occurs, the rulings of international law can become largely symbolic, in contrast to domestic legal systems that often possess mechanisms to ensure enforcement. For example, although the ICJ ordered Russia to “immediately suspend” its military operations, the court’s lack of enforcement mechanisms left the ruling without practical effect.
While the UN established the UNSC to augment enforcement of Article 2(4), the council’s inability to hold permanent members accountable exacerbates issues of enforcement. The UNSC has the authority to adopt legally binding resolutions on all UN member states when addressing threats to international peace and security. However, for a resolution to pass, it must secure an affirmative vote from at least nine of the fifteen members and not be blocked by a veto from any of the five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Hence, in the 2022 resolution proposed by the UNSC to condemn the invasion, Russia’s veto prevented its adoption, despite eleven of the fifteen council members voting in favor and no vetoes being cast. Although challenges to enforcement would remain, adopting the resolution could have fostered a more unified response as seen in collective military action in Kuwait in 1990 and Libya’s no-fly zone in 2011. Russia’s actions in the UN structure are a classic example of how permanent members of the UNSC can utilize their veto power to shield themselves from binding resolutions, making collective security of Article 2(4) nearly impossible when a permanent member is the violator.
The strength of the permanent members’ veto power is further illustrated by the UNGA’s inability to enforce collective action. The UNGA, which represents all UN member states, can pass resolutions to express the collective will of the international community and address breaches of international law. However, unlike the UNSC, UNGA resolutions lack binding authority, limiting their effectiveness in holding violators accountable. For example, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UNGA adopted Resolution ES-11/1, which deplored “in the strongest of terms” Russia’s actions and called for an immediate withdrawal of its forces. Despite the resolution being supported by 141 member states, with only 5 opposing and 35 abstaining, its non-binding nature left it without feasible means to compel Russia to comply. Thus, without a central authority to govern states, permanent members of the UNSC are safeguarded from binding accountability measures because the UNGA cannot overrule a failed resolution in the UNSC.
By strengthening trade partnerships with countries in the Global South, Russia has managed to circumvent the effects of Western economic sanctions.
Fragmented Collective Action
Along with the systematic failures of the UN, another concerning issue lies in the inability of countries to project a unified response to address Russia’s violation outside of the UN framework. Without a binding resolution, countries can still take measures to hold Russia accountable for its violation. For instance, although the United States has recently adjusted its pressure on Russia to create space for negotiations, for the majority of the war it has joined the EU, Japan, Australia, and others in imposing coordinated economic, military, and political costs to deter Russian aggression. However, states aligned with Moscow and nations pursuing nonalignment have diluted the impact of these Western-led efforts.
By strengthening trade partnerships with countries in the Global South, Russia has managed to circumvent the effects of Western economic sanctions. While Western countries aligned to impose punitive measures, many Global South countries have refused to sanction Russia, with BRICS foreign ministers even declaring unilateral sanctions “incompatible” with the UN Charter. As a result, Russia has maintained strong economic ties with smaller nations that rely on it for food, energy, and other critical trade commodities. Additionally, larger economies, such as China, Brazil, and India, have sustained or expanded trade with Russia, further reducing the effectiveness of sanctions. The lack of collective action to hold Russia accountable for its invasion has helped its economy grow by approximately 2.2% in 2023, with some reports suggesting it grew over 3% in 2024.
Furthermore, while Western military aid has been crucial in supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russia, countries such as North Korea, Iran, and China have either covertly or openly provided military support to Russia’s war effort. North Korea sent approximately 3,000 troops to support Russia’s invasion, with expectations of further deployments. Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of drones as well as short-range ballistic missiles, and artillery shells to bolster Russia’s offensive capabilities. Additionally, reports indicate that China continues to send dual-use technologies, such as semiconductor chips, navigation equipment, jet parts, and other military-applicable components. Although this support is smaller in scale and technological sophistication than what Ukraine is receiving from the West, it has nonetheless highlighted the symbolic and strategic challenge of forging a truly unified global response.
The struggle to promote collective action is also evident in diplomatic efforts to isolate Moscow. Although the United States has recently opened diplomatic talks with Russia, for most of the conflict Western countries have endeavoured to impose political costs on Moscow. Nevertheless, despite Russia being removed from international forums such as the Council of Europe and the UN Human Rights Council, it has strengthened its engagement in alternative platforms, including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Many Global South countries have also resisted publicly condemning Russia, likely out of concern for maintaining diplomatic and economic ties. For instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has failed to issue a unified public condemnation of Russia’s actions, reflecting its members’ cautious approach to balancing relations with both the West and Moscow. Ultimately, countries’ geopolitical interests combined with economic incentives have inhibited the global community from projecting a unified front against Russia.
Enduring Relevance
In the landmark case Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the ICJ emphasized that the breach of a recognized rule does not signify the end of its authority. This principle remains true in Russia’s violation of Article 2(4). Despite enforcement challenges, the UNGA’s overwhelming support for Resolution ES-11/1, which deplored Russia’s actions, reveals the enduring strength of the prohibition on the use of force as a norm of international law. The resolution passed with 141 states in favor and only 5 opposing, reflecting broad international condemnation. Similarly, although Russia’s veto blocked a UNSC resolution, 11 of the 15 Council members voted in favor. Moreover, Russia justified its actions within the UN Charter’s framework, suggesting that even violators recognize the credibility of the article. As Graham Melling notes, Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine “is a clear, if somewhat paradoxical, indication of the affirmation of the UN Charter norms related to the prohibition of the use of force.”
Russia’s reference to the UN Charter also highlights how Article 2(4) functions as a shared legal language that allows states to engage in dialogue across diverse political, cultural, and historical contexts. Christian Tams reinforces this idea, noting that countries “invoke and apply” the charter’s provisions “every week, and have done so since 1945.” This legal framework not only facilitates diplomatic discourse but also reinforces global norms by compelling states to frame their actions in legally recognizable terms. Hannah Birkenkötter exemplifies this phenomenon by stating international law is “hermeneutic,” serving as “a common language that cuts across spheres of authority” and “a conflict management tool for interface conflicts.” The continued invocation of Article 2(4) demonstrates its resilience as an embedded norm in the global system.
Conclusion
In 1945, the founding countries of the UN committed to “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.” Yet, as war continues to devastate Ukraine, critical structural flaws in the UN and geopolitical divides hinder member countries’ ability to collectively uphold Article 2(4). The absence of a centralized enforcement mechanism, combined with the UNSC’s veto power and the UNGA’s inability to pass binding resolutions, has enabled Russia to evade collective security measures in the UN. The Global South’s alignment and dependence on Russia has also reduced the impact of Western-led efforts against Russia, undermining the consequences of violating the prohibition on the use of force. Nevertheless, Article 2(4) continues to serve a purpose in the international system as it helps guide diplomatic responses and shape international norms. Moving forward in the 21st century, enhancing the collective action of countries in international institutions will be essential to ensuring that commitment to peace and sovereignty remains more than just a legal ideal but a practical reality.
Noah Jager is a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army and a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He is currently pursuing a Master of Arts in War Studies at King’s College London.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Working trip of the President of Ukraine to the Kyiv region, April, 2022.
Photo Credit: Courtesy of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy official website
