President George W. Bush meets with his National Security Council Wednesday, Sept. 12, 2001, in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Seated with the President from left are: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; Colin Powell, Secretary of State, and Vice President Dick Cheney. (Photo by Eric Draper, Courtesy of the George W. Bush Presidential Library)
Melvyn Leffler, a prominent historian of American foreign policy, is in the studio offering a fresh perspective on the Iraq War. Leffler joins host Carrie Lee challenging some conventional wisdoms surrounding the war, arguing that the George W. Bush administration was not intent on invading Iraq from day one. He makes the case that there were genuine fears among American policymakers about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. He highlights the role of fear, power, and hubris in the decision-making process. Their conversation examines the extensive interviews and archival research Leffler conducted, and offers a nuanced understanding of one of the most consequential foreign policy decisions of the 21st century.
My book has become very controversial because it is both empathetic and at the same time critical of the Bush administration. So my friends on the left side of the political spectrum hate the empathy and several of the people in the Bush administration and conservatives don’t like the criticism.
Podcast: Download
Subscribe: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Amazon Music | Android | Pandora | iHeartRadio | Blubrry | Podchaser | Podcast Index | TuneIn | Deezer | Youtube Music | RSS | Subscribe to A Better Peace: The War Room Podcast
Melvyn Leffler, Ph.D., is an American historian and educator, Co-chair of History and Public Policy Program Advisory Board at the Wilson Center and Emeritus Professor of American History at the University of Virginia. He is the author of For the Soul of Mankind (2007), A Preponderance of Power (1993), and Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq (2023) He has served as president of the Society for the History of American Foreign Relations, Harmsworth Professor at Oxford University, and Dean of the College and Graduate School of Arts & Sciences at The University of Virginia.
Carrie A. Lee is an associate professor at the U.S. Army War College, where she serves as the chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy and director of the USAWC Center on Civil-Military Relations. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and a B.S. from MIT.
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense.
Photo Description: President George W. Bush meets with his National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Seated with the President from left are: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; Colin Powell, Secretary of State; and Vice President Dick Cheney.
Photo Credit: Eric Draper, Courtesy of the George W. Bush Presidential Library
One wonders how much the Bush Administration’s “Transforming the Middle East” idea/initiative/commitment (the title of a 6 Aug 2003 Washington Post article by then-National Security Advisor Condolleezza Rice) idea/initiative/commitment had to do with the decision to invade Iraq. In this regard, consider the following from the georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov article/press release entitled “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Foreign Policy” of 7 Aug 2003):
“Now that Saddam’s regime is gone, the people of Iraq are more free, and people everywhere need no longer fear his weapons, his aggression, and his cruelty. The war on terror will be greatly served by the removal of this source of instability in the world’s most volatile region. And Saddam’s removal provides a new opportunity for a different kind of Middle East.
But if that different future for the Middle East is to be realized, we and our allies must make a generational commitment to helping the people of the Middle East transform their region.
This has been the President’s clear and consistent message.
As he said in his first State of the Union speech, ‘America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.’
Seven months later, in laying out the case to confront Saddam at United Nations, he said: ‘Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. . . .’
And, three weeks before the onset of war, the President stated unequivocally: ‘The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East.’ ”
Question: Might we see this “cause” addressed significantly by author Leffler in Part 2?
Addendum: Based on the above, is it reasonable to suggest that:
a. Only by SecDef Rumsfeld, et.al, believing that the Iraqi people, minus Saddam, would support the Bush Administration’s “Transforming the Middle East” ideas — and, thus — embrace democratic, capitalist, etc., values, institutions, etc.;
b. Only by the Bush Administration’s people believing this could SecDef Rumsfeld, et. al, reject then-Army Chief of Staff Shinseki’s suggestion of the need for “something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” after the Iraq invasion?
(Thus, again, to emphasize the role that the “Transforming the Middle East” idea might have played/did play in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.)
Note that, if you accept the premise — that the overriding objective of the Bush Administration was, for example, to (a) use the exceptionally unique opportunity presented by 9/11 and the suggestion that Saddam had WMD; this, to (b) overthrow Saddam and, thereby, begin the process of “Transforming the Middle East” more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines —
Note that if you accept this premise, then you HAVE an explanation as why the Bush Administration (listen beginning at about the 25:00 point in this podcast) might wish to avoid a more thorough review of the intelligence relating to (a) whether Saddam actually did have WMD and/or, if he had same, (b) whether he would actually use and/or share it.
(In this regard, note that a negative answer as to either of the two questions posed immediately above — achieved by a more thorough and/or a more proper review of the intelligence on these such matters — this would effectively destroy the Bush Administrations’ ability to [a] use the unique opportunity presented by 9/11 and the suggestion that Saddam had WMD and might use and/or might share same; this, to [b] overthrow Saddam and begin the process of “Transforming the Middle East” more along modern western political, economic, social and/or value lines. [Thus, an explanation as to why no further intelligence work along these lines was authorized?])