November 4, 2024
The American intelligence community (IC) is a complex network of 18 different agencies constantly vying for authority and resources. This competition, along with the ongoing effort to balance civilian and military organizations within the IC, is the focus of today's discussion. Dr. Jeff Rogg, a senior research fellow at the Global and National Security Institute, joins podcast editor Ron Granieri to explore the history of the U.S. intelligence system, highlighting its civilian-military dynamics and the critical balance between national security and civil liberties. They delve into the roles of key figures like William Donovan and examine the challenges faced by various Directors of Central Intelligence as they navigate the intricate relationship between military and civilian agencies. This insightful conversation also raises questions about potential reforms needed within the intelligence community, especially considering the growing capabilities of surveillance technology and the need to preserve individual freedoms while ensuring national security.

The American intelligence community (IC) is a complex network of 18 different agencies constantly vying for authority and resources. This competition, along with the ongoing effort to balance civilian and military organizations within the IC, is the focus of today’s discussion. Dr. Jeff Rogg, a senior research fellow at the Global and National Security Institute, joins podcast editor Ron Granieri to explore the history of the U.S. intelligence system, highlighting its civilian-military dynamics and the critical balance between national security and civil liberties. They delve into the roles of key figures like William Donovan and examine the challenges faced by various Directors of Central Intelligence as they navigate the intricate relationship between military and civilian agencies. This insightful conversation also raises questions about potential reforms needed within the intelligence community, especially considering the growing capabilities of surveillance technology and the need to preserve individual freedoms while ensuring national security.

Intelligence is entirely un-American…it goes against the grain of everything we deeply believe.

Jeff Rogg, PhD, JD, is Senior Research Fellow at the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI) at the University of South Florida (USF) where he conducts policy relevant research in the areas of intelligence, grand strategy, and national security. He holds a BA from Swarthmore College, a JD from Villanova, an MA in security studies from Georgetown, and a PhD in history from The Ohio State University. His book The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence, will be published by Oxford University Press in spring 2025.

Ron Granieri is Professor of History at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor of A BETTER PEACE.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo Credit: Courtesy of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

4 thoughts on “THE SPY AND THE STATE: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE

  1. From the Oxford University Press webpage introducing Dr. Rogg’s upcoming book “The Spy and the State: The History of American Intelligence,” at the “Description” section of same:

    “Still, the IC’s greatest struggle is always with the American people, who expect it to keep them safe but not at the cost of their liberty and principles. This foundational problem is at the center of The Spy and the State. … With the American public in mind, he (Dr. Rogg) introduces the concept of US civil-intelligence relations to explain the interaction between intelligence and the society it serves.” (Item in parenthesis above is mine.)

    Note:

    In the past, I have suggested that the changes in U.S./Western (and certain other countries’) civil-military relations, civil-government relations and civil-elite relations, that these such changes might be traced to the fact that:

    a. While during the Old Cold War, our and certain other countries’ militaries, governments and elites worked hard to PREVENT and/or to ROLL BACK often unwanted and threatening (communist-based in this case) political, economic, social and/or value change both here at home and there abroad,

    b. After the Old Cold War, our and certain other countries’ militaries, governments and elites worked hard to ACHIEVE (capitalist-based in this case) often unwanted and threatening political, economic, social and/or value change both here at home and there abroad.

    (This such 180 degree “about face” helping to explain the [negative?] changes in our and certain other countries’ civil-military relations, civil-government relations and civil-elite relations.)

    Question – Based on the Above:

    If (as per Dr. Rogg above?), we should now add civil-intelligence relations to the civil-military, civil-government and civil-elite list that I provide above, then should we not — also and accordingly — now consider any [negative and/or other?] changes in our and certain other countries’ post-Cold War civil-intelligence relations; these, from this exact same “cause and effect” thesis/point of view?

    1. My thought above possibly stated in a somewhat different way:

      If, post-the Old Cold War, our and other countries’ militaries, governments, elites and intelligence communities all understood their jobs to be to help ACHIEVE such political, economic, social and/or value changes as were considered necessary; this, for example, so as to survive, and to prevail, in a new, much more competitive and much more capitalist-based world.

      Then, in circumstances such as these, would not those individuals and groups — in our and other countries — who would bear the brunt of these such political, economic, social and/or value changes — would not these folks (truthfully?) believe that their militaries, their governments, their elites and their intelligence communities were (a) asking too much of them and that these such entities, in fact, (b) were aligned against them? (Or, from the Oxford University Press quote that I provided in my initial comment above, aligned against critical aspects [for them] of their “liberties and principles?”)

      (The “paradox of American intelligence,” thus, needing to be considered from this perspective also?)

  2. Consistent with the information that I provided in my initial two comments above, consider the difficulty that our intelligence community might have/is having with the national security problem that is described below; a national security problem which, I suggest, can be traced directly back to the ACHIEVE political, economic, social and/or value change (in the name of capitalism, markets and trade) initiatives that our and other countries undertook post-the Old Cold War:

    “Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past.” [See “The American Interest” article “The Reality of Russian Soft Power” by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.])

    Questions – Based on the Above:

    In circumstances such as these, do we think that America’s social conservatives might have good and/or reasonable cause; this, to question whether their intelligence services (etc.) are likely to be friend or foe? This such difficulty, accordingly, having significant impact on such things as America’s civil-intelligence (etc.) relations?

    1. As to my comment immediately above, this item, also, might prove useful:

      “During the Cold War, the USSR was perceived by American conservatives as an ‘evil empire,’ as a source of destructive cultural influences, while the United States was perceived as a force that was preventing the world from the triumph of godless communism and anarchy. The USSR, by contrast, positioned itself as a vanguard of emancipation, as a fighter for the progressive transformation of humanity (away from religion and toward atheism), and against the reactionary forces of the West. Today positions have changed dramatically; it is the United States or the ruling liberal establishment that in the conservative narrative has become the new or neo-USSR, spreading subversive ideas about family or the nature of authority around the world, while Russia has become almost a beacon of hope, ‘the last bastion of Christian values’ that helps keep the world from sliding into a liberal dystopia. Russia’s self-identity has changed accordingly; now it is Russia who actively resists destructive, revolutionary experiments with fundamental human institutions, experiments inspired by new revolutionary neo-communists from the United States. Hence the cautious hopes that the U.S. Christian right have for contemporary Russia: They are projecting on Russia their fantasies of another West that has not been infected by the virus of cultural liberalism.” (See the December 18, 2019, Georgetown University, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs article “Global Culture Wars from the Perspective of Russian and American Actors: Some Preliminary Conclusions,” by Dmitry Uzlaner. Therein, look to the paragraph that begins “Russia and the United States as screens for each other’s projections.”)

      Question:

      In cases in which a nation has taken on the task of ACHIEVING such political, economic, social and/or value changes as are considered necessary (for example, so as to survive and to prevail in a much more capitalist, and thus a much more competitive, world); in cases such as these, are not these such nations’ security services (etc.) going to be looked down upon, feared, or at least be questioned; this, by those individuals and groups, in said nation, who will bear the brunt of/who will be most adversely effected/who will likely actively resist these such (highly unwanted by these such individuals and groups) changes?

      Thus, such things as adverse changes in civil-intelligence relations, in civil-military relations, in civil-government relations more generally and even in civil-elite relations, etc., these such adverse changes to be EXPECTED (and reasonably planned and prepared for) in such times?

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