The law also elevated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary and giving directive authority over the joint staff, and established the role of Vice Chairman.
Forty years ago, on October 4, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, making the most extensive changes to U.S. defense structure since the founding of the Department of Defense 40 years earlier. This sweeping law emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations within the department. It streamlined the chain of command from the president, through the secretary of defense directly to the combatant commanders, bypassing service chiefs who had previously been in this chain. The law also elevated the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military advisor to the president and secretary and giving directive authority over the joint staff, and established the role of Vice Chairman. Service chiefs assumed two roles. The first primarily focused on preparing the force by supporting their secretary in the organization, training, and equipping of service forces that could be provided to combatant commanders. The second focused on giving operational advice to the president and secretary as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the law instituted requirements for joint experience and joint education to be eligible for promotion to general or admiral, changing incentives within the services and modifying desired career paths.
These changes were made in response to failed, challenged, or indecisive military actions since DoD was established including the Korean war, the Pueblo incident, the Mayaguez incident, the Vietnam War, and the failed mission to rescue U.S. citizens held hostage by Iran. These military operations all suffered from a lack of integration between the services in planning and execution. Important stakeholders had a shared understanding that something should be done. If a system is perfectly designed for the results it gets, then in the early 1980s, DoD needed some change.
James Locher effectively told the story of this change effort, and how defense reform made it into law in his 2002 book, Victory on the Potomac. Locher had previously served as a whiz kid in Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, he was serving as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and played a key role in shepherding this bill into law. Unusually, Locher was given lead on this issue by both the SASC chair Senator Barry Goldwater, and the minority lead Senator Sam Nunn. He led the analysis, sat in the hearings, and participated in many closed-door meetings with stakeholders. His book is a compelling inside story of the fight to change the law. In his book, Locher makes what could be a dry story of development, drafting, and passing of a law interesting and exciting. He introduces heroes, villains, champions, and chumps. His insider access gave him a unique perspective and allowed him to tell the full story of getting this law passed. The book is rich with detail and nuance and tells of how a guiding coalition overcame obstacles to make the change become real. Those looking to understand or make substantive changes to any executive department, but especially the Department of War/Defense, would be wise to pick up this book and read it.
One of the first heroes in this story is Air Force general David Jones, the 9th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Locher describes how Jones came to believe that the existing system of command and control was the cause of the string of indecisive and bad outcomes suffered by the U.S. military. In 1982, Jones’s last year as chairman, he testified to a closed House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing highlighting the diffuse decision authority that led to confusion and disjointed action in recent operations, thus bringing the topic of defense reform onto the Congressional agenda. Other heroes include key Congressional leaders, including the senior statesman Goldwater and his analytic partner Nunn, as well as Congressman Bill Nichols of the HASC, and professional staff members, including Arch Barrett and Locher himself.
Unexpectedly to this reader, a book about legislative process is actually a page-turner. It is clear, compelling, and engaging.
Any system has defenders of the status quo who resist change. Most of the chiefs of the navy, army, air force, and marine corps zealously defended their authority as independent advisors and their role in the chain of command. The proposed changes would reduce their authority and power within the system, and service chiefs tried to block the change effort at many stages. Playing to form, the most resistant service to this reduction of authority was the Navy, whose tradition of independence and strong belief that an independent navy is central to the survival of the nation is evident in many of the incidents described in this book.
The story arc is not simple, and Locher describes many obstacles and pitfalls along the way to reform. Supporters of the effort had to make compelling arguments, overcome staunch resistance from the Pentagon and other political leaders, and build consensus among key Congressional power bases. Unexpectedly to this reader, a book about legislative process is actually a page-turner. It is clear, compelling, and engaging.
The U.S. Army War College teaches lessons on organizational change. These lessons historically emphasize the change process. Students study John Kotter’s eight-step model and often use it in their papers and comprehensive exam answers. These steps are clearly visible in Locher’s story: Leaders create a sense of urgency, build a guiding coalition, gain quick wins, overcome obstacles, and make the change stick. But mastering process is not enough to achieve an effective change effort. Change is harder when the content of the change runs counter to the culture of the organization, and when the internal and external context is not ripe for change.
In this case, the change effort took time. Locher notes that it took over four years from General Jones’s testimony to passage of the law. That success owed a great deal to the support of powerful legislators like Congressman Nichols and Senators Nunn and Goldwater. Moreover, the course of events helped make the case. The military actions in Grenada and Lebanon highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing joint command relationships and the lack of interoperability among the services. As time passed, leaders who opposed change moved from their positions, and the internal and external context surrounding the reform effort changed, making the department riper for a change. Context and content aligned with process, and the change became law.
Victory on the Potomac’s epilogue evaluated the Goldwater-Nichols reforms after 15 years. Locher gave the law positive grades for simplifying the chain of command and improving joint integration in operations and planning. Important pluses included clearly stating that the secretary has authority, direction, and control over everything in the department, simplifying the chain of command for warfighting, and clarifying roles for services that build the force and combatant commands that employ the force. These changes resulted in positive outcomes that persist today. Yet Locher still noted persistent characteristics of the department that reduce effectiveness. Resistance to change is embedded deep into military culture and bureaucratic processes make any change slow to enforce. As the Department is working to increase its focus on warfighting and speed, reducing bureaucratic barriers and accelerating outcomes, Victory on the Potomac provides an example of a change effort worth studying.
Bob Bradford is the Associate Professor of Defense and Joint Processes at the U.S. Army War College and is in his eleventh year on the Carlisle faculty. Bob served 30 years as an officer in the U.S. Army, the last 20 as an operations research analyst supporting enterprise decisions.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of War.
Photo Description: Clockwise from top left: Senator Barry Goldwater, Congressman William F. Nichols, Mr. James R. Locher III, and Senator Sam Nunn.
Photo Credit: Clockwise from top left: Yoichi Okamoto, Unknown Author, via Wikimedia, Russell F. Roederer via National Archives and Combined Military Service Digital Photographic Files via Wikimedia
