THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR — THUCYDIDES (GREAT STRATEGISTS)

[Thucydides] is one of the very few primary resources we have. If he hadn’t done this, we probably wouldn’t know very much about this period at all We continue our Great Strategists series with an episode on the man whose works serve as a foundation of strategic thought about war. Thucydides (c. 460-400 BC) was […]

HOW MEMORIES OF MY LAI INFLUENCED MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

There is one thing for the event to occur; but the manner in which it was handled was more institutionally damning. In a follow-up to his article published in WAR ROOM in June, Richard Lacquement sits down with WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief Andrew A. Hill to go over the aftermath of My Lai as it continues […]

MY LAI: A STAIN ON THE U.S. ARMY

we must revisit such terrible episodes in the Army’s history, however painful; remembering My Lai may help us avoid repeating it elsewhere. From March 16-19, 1968, U.S. Army troops killed at least 175 noncombatants at My Lai, South Vietnam (the precise number will likely remain unknown but some estimates range above 400 dead).[i] The stain […]

ARMY WAR COLLEGE ROUNDTABLE ON THE NEW(?) NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

This [National Security Strategy] sort of fits the mold, in that it is strong on ends, aspirations, and vision, but vague on ways. In this podcast, four members of the U.S. Army War College engage in dialogue about the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2017. Beyond focusing on the content of […]

THE MANY TRAPS OF THUCYDIDES & THE VIRTUE OF COMPLEXITY

Imposing an artificial simplicity on Thucydides’s work makes it harder to understand the full range of warnings that his history gives. Great works of human pathos rarely distill to simplicity. Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War* (431 to 404 B.C.E.) defies simple summarizing in one cautionary lesson or trap. The account’s great virtue is the […]